NOTE

This Microfiche meets the quality requirements of the American National Standard for Microfiche of Documents (ANSI PH5.9-1975). However, because of imperfections in the document from which it was made, it contains images that are illegible or difficult to read. The source document for this microfiche is the best copy that could be obtained prior to filming.

CIS

Congressional Information Service
Washington, D.C.

84th Congress, 2nd Session - - - - - House Document No. 477, Vol. V

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957

Volume V

Austrian State Treaty; Summit and Foreign Ministers Meetings, 1955

Editor in Chief William Z. Slany
Editor Charles S. Sampson

United States Government Printing Office
Washington
1988

H920-6

DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 9454

OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN

BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402

Preface

The publication *Foreign Relations of the United States* constitutes the official record of the foreign policy of the United States. The volumes in the series include, subject to necessary security considerations, all documents needed to give a comprehensive record of the major foreign policy decisions of the United States together with appropriate materials concerning the facts that contributed to the formulation of policies. Documents in the files of the Department of State are supplemented by papers from other government agencies involved in the formulation of foreign policy.

The basic documentary diplomatic record printed in the volumes of the series *Foreign Relations of the United States* is edited by the Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State. The editing is guided by the principles of historical objectivity and in accordance with the following official guidance first promulgated by Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg on March 26, 1925.

There may be no alteration of the text, no deletions without indicating where in the text the deletion is made, and no omission of facts that were of major importance in reaching a decision. Nothing may be omitted for the purpose of concealing or glossing over what might be regarded by some as a defect of policy. However, certain omissions of documents are permissible for the following reasons:

> a. To avoid publication of matters that would tend to impede current diplomatic negotiations or other business.
>
> b. To condense the record and avoid repetition of needless details.
>
> c. To preserve the confidence reposed in the Department by individuals and by foreign governments.
>
> d. To avoid giving needless offense to other nationalities or individuals.
>
> e. To eliminate personal opinions presented in despatches and not acted upon by the Department. To this consideration there is one qualification—in connection with major decisions it is desirable, where possible, to show the alternative presented to the Department before the decision was made.

Documents selected for publication in the *Foreign Relations* volumes are referred to the Department of State Classification/Declassification Center for declassification clearance. The Center reviews the documents, makes declassification decisions, and obtains the clearance of geographic and functional bureaus of the Department of State, as well as of other appropriate agencies of the government.

The Center, in coordination with the geographic bureaus of the Department of State, communicates with foreign governments regarding documents or information of those governments proposed for inclusion in *Foreign Relations* volumes.

The then Deputy Historian and General Editor, William Z. Slany, supervised the planning of this volume, which was compiled entirely by Charles S. Sampson. John P. Glennon oversaw final preparation of the volume through the declassification process. Vicki E. Futscher performed the technical editing under the supervision of Rita M. Baker. The Twin Oaks Indexing Collective prepared the index.

William Z. Slany
The Historian
Bureau of Public Affairs

Contents

Preface III

List of Sources VII

List of Abbreviations and Symbols XI

List of Persons XV

List of Short Titles XXI

Participation of the United States in the final drafting of the Austrian State Treaty:

Multilateral discussions concerning Austria and the status of the draft treaty, February 8–May 1, 1955 1

The Vienna Ambassadorial Conference and the signing of the State Treaty, May 2–15, 1955 66

Meeting of the Heads of Government (Summit Conference) of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union at Geneva, July 18–23, 1955:

Preparations for the Conference:

- Establishment of the London Working Group, January 6–May 5, 1955 119
- Diplomatic exchanges and multilateral discussions concerning the possibility of a meeting of the Heads of Government, May 6–June 4, 1955 164
- Discussions at Washington, New York, and San Francisco on procedures for a meeting of the Heads of Government, June 6–24, 1955 215
- Development of the final U.S. position for the meeting of the Heads of Government, July 1–12, 1955 247
- Final discussions among the delegations of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France at Paris and Geneva, July 8–17, 1955 309

Proceedings of the Summit Conference, July 18–23, 1955 361

Documents of the Conference 516

Reports on the Conference 528

Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union, October 27–November 16, 1955:

Preparations for the Meeting, July 26–October 26, 1955 537

Meetings of the Foreign Ministers, October 27–November 16, 1955 632

Reports on the Foreign Ministers Conference 802

Index 809

List of Sources

The principal source of documentation for this volume was the indexed central (decimal) files of the Department of State. Documents from the central files have been supplemented by materials from decentralized office files, the lot files of the Department of State. The editors also examined the record collections maintained at the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library in Abilene, Kansas, and the daily appointment books in the John Foster Dulles Papers at the Princeton University Library in Princeton, New Jersey. Documents from all sources are identified in this volume by a file description in the first footnote to each document. Here follows a list of the unpublished sources, not including Department of State central files, used in the preparation of this volume.

Department of State

CFM Files, Lot M–88

Consolidated master collection of the records of conferences of Heads of State, Council of Foreign Ministers and ancillary bodies, North Atlantic Council, other meetings of the Secretary of State with the Foreign Ministers of European powers, and materials on the Austrian and German peace settlements for the years 1943–1955 prepared by the Department of State Records Service Center.

Conference Files, Lot 60 D 627

Collection of documentation on official visits by Heads of Government and Foreign Ministers to the United States and on major international conferences attended by the Secretary of State for the period 1953–1955, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State.

Conference Files, Lot 62 D 181

Collection of documentation on official visits by Heads of Government and Foreign Ministers to the United States and on major international conferences attended by the Secretary of State for the period 1956–1958, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State.

Conference Files, Lot 63 D 123

Collection of documentation on official visits by Heads of Government and Foreign Ministers to the United States and on major international conferences attended by the Secretary of State for the period 1955–1958, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State.

EUR Files, Lot 59 D 233

Files of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs for the years 1945–1957.

INR Files, Lot 58 D 766

Miscellaneous files of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research for the years 1946–1957.

INR–NIE Files

Master file of National Intelligence Estimates maintained by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

OCB Files, Lot 61 D 385

Master set of the administrative and country files of the Operations Coordinating Board for the years 1953–1960, as maintained by the Operations Staff of the Department of State.

OCB Files, Lot 62 D 430

Master files of the Operations Coordinating Board for the years 1953–1960, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State.

Presidential Correspondence, Lot 66 D 204

Exchanges of correspondence between President Eisenhower and heads of foreign governments for the years 1953–1964, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State.

S/P–NSC Files, Lot 61 D 167

Serial file of memoranda relating to National Security Council questions for the years 1950–1961, as maintained by the Policy Planning Staff.

S/P–NSC Files, Lot 62 D 1

Serial and subject master file of National Security Council documents and correspondence for the years 1948–1961, as maintained by the Policy Planning Staff.

S/S–NSC, Lot 63 D 351

Serial file of National Security Council documents and correspondence and related Department of State memoranda for the years 1947–1961, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State.

S/S–NSC Files, Lot 66 D 148

Miscellaneous files concerning subjects considered by the National Security Council during the period 1949–1962, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State.

Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation, Lot 64 D 199

Chronological collections of the Secretary of State's memoranda of conversation and the Under Secretary of State's memoranda of conversation for the years 1953–1960, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State.

State–JCS Meetings, Lot 61 D 417

Records of meetings between representatives of the Department of State and the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the years 1951–1959 and selected problem files on the Middle East for the years 1954–1956, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State.

Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas

Dulles Papers

Papers of John Foster Dulles, 1952–1959.

C.D. Jackson Papers

Papers of C.D. Jackson, 1931–1967.

Project Clean Up

Project "Clean Up" collection. Records of Gordon Gray, Robert Cutler, Henry R. McPhee, and Andrew J. Goodpaster, 1953–1961.

White House Office

Records of the Office of the White House Staff Secretary, 1952–1961.

Whitman File

Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower as President of the United States, 1953–1961, as maintained by his Personal Secretary, Ann C. Whitman. The Whitman File includes the following elements: the Name Series, the Dulles-Herter Series, Eisenhower Diaries, Ann Whitman (ACW) Diaries, National Security Council Records, Miscellaneous Records, Cabinet Papers, Legislative Meetings, International Meetings, the Administration Series, and the International File.

List of Abbreviations and Symbols

Editor's note. This list does not include standard abbreviations in common usage and those abbreviations and contractions which, although uncommon, are understandable from the context.

ACA, Allied Control Authority
AEC, Atomic Energy Commission
AGO, American Government officer (official)
AHC, Allied High Commission
Amb, Ambassador
ARQ, Annual Review Questionnaire (NATO)
BASC, Berlin Air Safety Center
BBC, British Broadcasting Corporation
BdD, Bund der Deutschen (Federation of Germans)
BHE, Bund der Heimatvertriebenen und Entrechteten (League of Expellees and Disenfranchised)
BNA, Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, Department of State
B/P, balance of payments
Br, British
C, Counselor of the Department of State
CA, circular airgram
CDU, Christlich-Demokratische Union (Christian-Democratic Union)
CF/Doc, conference document
CG USAREUR, Commanding General, United States Army, Europe
CG USFA, Commanding General, United States Forces, Austria
Chanc, Chancellor
ChiComs, Chinese Communists
CIA, Central Intelligence Agency
cif, cost, insurance, freight
COCOM, Coordinating Committee of the Paris Consultative Group of nations working to control strategic exports to Communist countries
CPR, Chinese People's Republic
CSC, Coal and Steel Community
CSU, Christlich-Soziale Union (Christian Social Union)
DA, Department of the Army
DDSG, Donaudampfschiffahrtsgesellschaft (Danube Shipping Company)
del, delegation
Dento, series indicator for telegrams from the Denver White House
Dept, Department
Deptel, Department of State telegram
DMW, Deutschemark West (West German Mark)
DP, displaced person
DRP, Deutsche Reichs Partei (German Reich Party)
Dulte, series indicator for telegrams from Secretary of State Dulles while away from Washington
DWG, Disarmament Working Group
E, Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, Department of State
EAD, Eastern Affairs Division
ECE, Economic Commission for Europe
ECOSOC, United Nations Economic and Social Council
EDC, European Defense Community
EE, Office of Eastern European Affairs, Department of State
Embtel, Embassy telegram
EPU, European Payments Union

EUCOM, European Command
EUR, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
Euratom, European Atomic Energy Community
EW, East-West
ExIm, Export-Import Bank
FBIS, Foreign Broadcast Information Service
FCDA, Federal Civil Defense Authority
FDP, Freie Demokratische Partei (Free Democratic Party)
FE, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State
FedRep, Federal Republic of Germany
FM, Foreign Minister
FOA, Foreign Operations Administration
fob, free on board
FonOff, Foreign Office
for, foreign
ForMin, Foreign Minister
FPM, Four-Power Meeting
Fr, French
FSS, Foreign Service Staff
FVP, Freie Volks Partei (Free People's Party)
FY, fiscal year
FYI, for your information
GA, United Nations General Assembly
GARIOA, Government and Relief in Occupied Areas
GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDR, German Democratic Republic
GER, Office of German Affairs, Department of State
Ger, German
GerDel, German Delegation
GFR, German Federal Republic
GNP, gross national product
GOI, Government of Italy
GPA, Office of German Political Affairs, Department of State
HEW, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
HICOG, High Commission(er) for Germany
HICOM, High Commission(er)
HMG, Her Majesty's Government
IBRD, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ICA, International Cooperation Administration
ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization
ICBM, intercontinental ballistic missile
ID, identification document
IFEMA, International Fund for Equipment and Mutual Aid
ILO, International Labor Organization
INR, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
IRBM, intermediate-range ballistic missile
ISA, International Security Affairs, Department of Defense
IZT, interzonal trade
JCS, Joint Chiefs of Staff
KPD, Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands (Communist Party of Germany)
KVP, Kasernierte Volks Polizei (Garrisoned People's Police)
L/GER, Assistant Legal Adviser for German Affairs, Department of State
loc, line of communication
MAP, Military (Mutual) Assistance Program
MC, memorandum of conversation
MDAP, Mutual Defense Assistance Program
MDay, mobilization day
MFM/Doc, Meeting of Foreign Ministers, Document
MFM/Doc/RD, Meeting of Foreign Ministers, Document, Record of Decision
MFN, most favored nation
MIG, Mikoyan i Gurevich (acronym for Soviet aircraft designed by A.I. Mikoyan and M.I. Gurevich)
mil, military
MinInt, Minister of Interior
Min, Minister
mytel, my telegram
NAC, North Atlantic Council
NAT(O), North Atlantic Treaty (Organization)
niact, night action, telegram indicator requiring attention by the recipient at any hour of the day or night
NIE, National Intelligence Estimate
NRW, Nordrhein-Westfalen (North Rhine-Westphalia)
NSC, National Security Council
OAS, Organization of American States
OCB, Operations Coordinating Board
OEEC, Organization for European Economic Cooperation

OSA, Ob'edinennye Shtaty Ameriki (United States of America)
OSD, Office of the Secretary of Defense
OSP, offshore procurement
OTC, Organization of Trade Cooperation
P, series indicator for telegrams from the Commander in Chief of the United States Forces in Austria
PL, Public Law
PMCG(SF)MC, preparations for the meeting of the Chiefs of Government (San Francisco), memorandum of conversation
Pol Dir, Political Director
PermRep, Permanent Representative
Polto, series indicator for telegrams from the United States Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council
POM B, Preparations for the October Meeting of Foreign Ministers, Background Paper
POM D, Preparations for the October Meeting of Foreign Ministers, Document
POM(NY)(Wash) MC, Preparations for the October Meeting of Foreign Ministers (New York) (Washington), Memorandum of Conversation
POW (PW), prisoner of war
RA, Office of European Regional Affairs, Department of State
R Day, the date of final ratification of the Austrian State Treaty
reftel, reference telegram
rep, representative
RIAS, Rundfunk im Amerikanischen Sektor (Radio in the American Sector of Berlin)
RRA, Refugee Relief Act of 1953
S/MSA, Special Assistant for Mutual Security Affairs, Department of State
S/P, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State
S/S, Executive Secretariat, Department of State
S/S-RO, Executive Secretariat, Reports and Operations Staff, Department of State
SAC, Strategic Air Command
SACEUR, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
SCA, Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, Department of State
SecGen, Secretary General
Secto, series indicator for telegrams from the United States Delegation at Foreign Ministers, Heads of Government, and North Atlantic Council meetings
SED, Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (Socialist Unity Party of Germany)
SHAPE, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe
SOF, status of forces
Sov, Soviet
SPD, Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Social Democratic Party of Germany)
SX, series indicator for telegrams from the Commander in Chief, United States Army, Europe
Tedul, series indicator for telegrams to Secretary of State Dulles while away from Washington
TO&E, table of organization and equipment
Toden, series indicator for telegrams to the Denver White House
Toget, telegrams series indicator for telegrams to President Eisenhower while at Gettysburg
UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
USAF(E), United States Air Force (Europe)
USAREUR, United States Army, Europe
USARIT, United States Army, Italy
US Ber, United States Mission at Berlin
USCINCEUR, United States Commander in Chief, Europe
USCMB, United States Command, Berlin
USCOB, United States Command, Berlin
USCom, United States Command
USDel, United States Delegation
USEP, United States Escapee Program
USFA, United States Forces Austria
USIA, United States Information Agency
USIA, Upravlenye Sovetskogo Imushchestva v Avstrii (Administration of Soviet Property in Austria)
US OD, United States Order of the Day
USRO, United States Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations
VOA, Voice of America
Vopo, Volkspolizei (People's police)

WE, Office of Western European Affairs, Department of State
WEU, Western European Union
WFTU, World Federation of Trade Unions
WG, working group
WHO, World Health Organization
WPC, World Peace Council
ZI, zone of the interior

List of Persons

Achilles, Theodore, C., Minister in France until August 1955

Adams, Sherman, Special Assistant to President Eidenhower

Adenauer, Konrad, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany and, until May 1955, Minister of Foreign Affairs

Anderson, Dillon, Special Assistant to President Eisenhower

Anderson, Robert B., Deputy Secretary of Defense

Appling, Hugh G., Foreign Affairs Officer on the Reports and Operations Staff, Executive Secretariat, Department of State

Baillou, Jean, Deputy Director of the Cultural Affairs Section, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Barbour, Walworth, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, Department of State

Beam, Jacob D., Director of the Office of Eastern European Affairs, Department of State, from March 1955

Berard, Armand, Diplomatic Counselor to the President of the French Council from March 1955

Bischoff, Norbert, Austrian Ambassador to the Soviet Union

Blakenhorn, Herbert, Director of the Political Affairs Section in the Foreign Ministry of the Federal Republic of Germany until May 1955; thereafter Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council

Bohlen, Charles E., (Chip), Ambassador to the Soviet Union

Bowie, Robert R., Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning and Department of State Representative on the NSC Planning Board from August 1955

Brentano, Heinrich von, Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany from April 1955

Brownell, Herbert Jr., Attorney General of the United States

Bulganin, Nikolai Alexandrovich, Chairman of Soviet Council of Ministers and Member of the Presidium of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union

Caccia, Sir Harold A., British Deputy Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

Chauvel, Jean, French Ambassador to Austria until February 1955; thereafter Ambassador to the United Kingdom

Cheklin, N.I., Member of the Collegium, Soviet Ministry of Foreign Trade, 1955

Couve de Murville, Maurice, French Ambassador to the United States

Crouy-Chanel, Etienne de, Director General for Political Affairs, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs

de Margerie, see Jacquin de Margerie

Dillon, C. Douglas, Ambassador to France
Dulles, Allen W., Director for Central Intelligence
Dulles, John Foster, Secretary of State

Eden, Sir Anthony, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs until April 1955; thereafter Prime Minister
Eisenhower, Dwight D., President of the United States
Eisenhower, Major John D., Personal Assistant to and son of the President
Elbrick, C. Burke, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs

Faure, Edgar, Prime Minister of France from February 1955
Figl, Leopold, Austrian Foreign Minister
Freund, Richard B., Officer in Charge of Austrian Affairs, Office of Western European Affairs, Department of State

Galloway, William J., Special Assistant to the Counselor of the Department of State
Genevey, General Pierre, Controller General of the Army, French Ministry of National Defense
George, Walter F., Chariman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Gleason, S. Everett, Deputy Executive Secretary of the National Security Council
Goodkind, Louis W., Chief of the Economic Defense Division, Department of State
Goodpaster, Colonel Andrew, Jr., Staff Secretary to President Eisenhower
Gray, Gordon, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
Gromyko, Andrei Andreevich, Soviet First Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs
Gruber, Karl, Austrian Ambassador to the United States
Gruenther, General Alfred M., Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Hammarskjöld, Dag, Secretary-General of the United Nations
Hancock, Patrick F., Head of the Central Department, British Foreign Office, until September 1955; thereafter Private Secretary to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
Harrison, Sir Geoffrey W., Assistant British Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
Hayter, Sir William G., British Ambassador to the Soviet Union
Hood, Viscount Samuel, Head of the Western Organizations Department, British Foreign Office
Hooper, Peter, Jr., Foreign Affairs Officer, Office of German Affairs, Department of State, from February 1955
Hoover, Herbert, Jr., Under Secretary of State
Humphrey, George M., Secretary of the Treasury

Ilichev, Ivan Ivanovich, Soviet Ambassador to Austria

Jackson, C.D., Special Assistant to President Eisenhower, February 1953 to March 1954
Jackson, William H., Special Assistant to the Secretary of State from September to November 1955
Jacquin de Margerie, Roland, Assistant Director General for Political and Economic Affairs, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, until June 1955; thereafter Director General
Johnson, U. Alexis, U.S. Representative at the Geneva Ambassadorial talks with the Representative of the People's Republic of China from August 1955
Jones, J. Wesley, Director of the Office of Western European Affairs, Department of State
Joxe, Louis, French Ambassador to the Soviet Union

Jurgenson, Jean, Acting Chief of the Central European Section, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, from May 1955

Kemenev, V.S., Soviet Deputy Minister of Culture

Khrushchev, Nitita Sergeyevich, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Chairman of the Council of Ministers, and Member of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet

Kidd, Coburn B. Officer in Charge of German Political Affairs, Office of German Affairs, Department of State, until September 1955; thereafter Special Assistant to the Director of the Office of German Affairs

Kirkpatrick, Sir Ivone A., British Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

Knowland, William F., Member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee

Kreisky, Bruno, Austrian Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

Krekeler, Heinz L., Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany in the United States

Lalouette, Roger, French High Commissioner to Austria

Lay, James S., Jr., Executive Secretary of the National Security Council

Leishman, Frederick J., First Secretary of the British Embassy in the United States

Lyon, Cecil B., Director of the Office of German Affairs, Department of State, until May 1955

MacArthur, Douglas, 2nd, Counselor of the Department of State

McCardle, Carl W., Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs

Mackenzie, Archibald R.K., First Secretary in the British Foreign Office

Macmillan, Harold, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs from April to December 1955

Makins, Sir Roger M., British Ambassador to the United States

Malenkov, Georgii Maksimilianovich, Deputy Chairman of the Soviet Council of Ministers and Minister of Electric Power Plants

Manach, Etienne, Assistant Director for Eastern European Affairs, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Massigli, René, Franch Ambassador in the United Kingdom until February 1955

Mendès-France, Pierre, French Prime Minister until February 1955

Menthon, Pierre Bernard de, Central European Affairs Section, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Merchant, Livingston T., Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs

Mikoyan, Anastas Ivanovich, Soviet Minister of Trade and Member of the Presidium of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union

Molotov, Vyacheslav Mikhailovich, Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs

Murphy, Robert D., Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

Nixon, Richard M., Vice President of the United States

O'Connor, Roderic L., Special Assistant to the Secretary of State until December 1955

Ollenhauer, Erich, Chairman of the Social Democratic Party in the Federal Republic of Germany

O'Shaughnessy, Elim, Director of the Office of Political Affairs, Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, until May 1955; thereafter Political Counselor at Bonn

Palmer, Joseph 2nd, Acting Director of the Office of European Regional Affairs, Department of State

Penfield, James K., Deputy Chief of Mission in Austria until August 1955; thereafter Counselor

Perkins, George W., U.S. Permanent Representative at the North Atlantic Council

Phleger, Herman, Legal Adviser in the Department of State

Pinay, Antione, French Minister of Foreign Affairs

Pink, I.T.M., British Assistant Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

Rabb, Julius, Austrian Chancellor

Radford, Admiral Arthur W., Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Reinstein, Jacques J., Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs until August 1955; thereafter Director of the Office of German Affairs

Rockefeller, Nelson A., Special Assistant to President Eisenhower

Russell, Francis H., Special Assistant to the Secretary of State from September 1955

Sauvagnargues, Jean-Victor, Technical Adviser in the Personal Cabinet of French Foreign Minister Pinay

Schaerf, Adolf, Austrian Vice Chancellor

Schoener, Josef, Director of the Political Department, Austrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Sobolev, Arkady Aleksandrovich, Soviet Representative on the United Nations Disarmament Subcommittee

Soutou, Jean, Chief of the Division of Central European Economic Affairs, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Stassen, Harold E., Special Assistant to President Eisenhower for Disarmament

Stoessel, Walter J., Jr., Office of Eastern European Affairs, Department of State, until November 1955

Strauss, Admiral Lewis L., Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission

Streibert, Theodore C., Head of the U.S. Information Agency

Sullivan, Charles A., Chief of the Policy Division, Office of Foreign Military Affairs, Department of Defense

Suydam, Henry, Chief of the News Division, Department of State

Thompson, Llewellyn E., High Commissioner to Austria until May 1955; thereafter Ambassador to Austria

Thring, Rear Admiral George A., British Ministry of Defense Representative at the Geneva Foreign Ministers Meeting

Thurston, Ray L., Director of the Office of Western European Affairs, Department of State

Tippets, R.B., Assistant Secretary of the British Board of Trade

Troianovskii, Oleg Aleksandrovich, Soviet Interpreter

Tyler, William R., Deputy Director of the Office of Western European Affairs, Department of State, from July 1955

Verosta, Stephen, Chief of the Legal Division, Austrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Vinogradov, Sergei Aleksandrovich, Soviet Ambassador to France

Wainhouse, David W., First Secretary of the United States Embassy at Paris

Wallinger, Sir Geoffrey, British High Commissioner to Austria

Walmsley, Walter N., Jr., Counselor at Moscow

Watson, John H.A., British Information Liaison Officer at Washington

Wilson, Charles E., Secretary of Defense

Wolf, Joseph J., Acting Director of the Office of European Regional Affairs, Department of State, from March 1955

Young, Sir George, Head of the British Foreign Office News Department

Zarubin, Georgii N., Soviet Ambassador in the United States

Zhukov, Georgii Konstantinovich, Marshal of the Soviet Union and Minister of Defense

List of Short Titles

Cmd. 9543. *Documents relating to the Meeting of Heads of Government of France, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and the United States of America, Geneva, July 18–23, 1955.* Miscellaneous No. 14 (1955). London: July 1955.

Cmd. 9633. *Documents relating to the Meeting of Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and the United States of America, Geneva, October 27–November 16, 1955,* Miscellaneous No. 21 (1955). London: November 1955.

Documents Diplomatiques Français. Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, *Documents Diplomatiques Français,* 1955. Paris: 1987.

Documents on Germany. United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Documents on Germany, 1944–1970.* Washington: 1971.

Documents (R.I.I.A.) for 1954. *Documents on International Affairs, 1954–.* Denise Folliot, ed., Royal Institute of International Affairs, London: Oxford University Press, 1958.

Documents (R.I.I.A.) for 1955. *Documents on International Affairs, 1955.* Noble Frankland, ed., Royal Institute of International Affairs, London: Oxford University Press, 1957.

Erinnerungen. Konrad Adenauer, *Erinnerungen, 1953–1955.*Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlangs-Anstalt, 1968.

Foreign Ministers Meeting. United States Department of State, *The Geneva Meeting of Foreign Ministers, October 27–November 16, 1955.* Washington: December 1955.

Foreign Relations Committee. United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,* Eighty-fourth Congress, First Session, vol. VII. Washington: 1978.

Full Circle. Sir Anthony Eden, *The Memoirs of Anthony Eden, Full Circle.* Boston: Houghten Mifflin Company, 1960.

Geneva Conference. United States Department of State, *The Geneva Conference of Heads of Government, July 18–23, 1955.* Washington: October 1955.

German Unity. Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, *Documents on German Unity,* 3 vols. Frankfurt and Bonn: 1951–1953.

H.C. Debs., 5th series. House of Commons, *Parliamentary Debates,* 5th Series.

Khrushchev Remembers. Strobe Talbott, ed., *Khrushchev Remembers—The Last Testament.* Boston: 1974.

Macmillan, *Tides of Fortune.* Harold Macmillan, *Tides of Fortune, 1945–1955.* New York: 1969.

Mandate for Change. Dwight D. Eisenhower, *The White House Years. Mandate for Change: 1953–1956.* New York: 1963.

Recollections. Livingston Merchant, *Recollections of the Summit Conference, Geneva, 1955.* Washington: November 1957.

Tenth Anniversary. Tenth Anniversary of the Signing of the United Nations Charter, Proceedings and Commemorative Meetings. New York: 1955.

USCOA. United States Command for Austria, *Texts of Principal Diplomatic Notes, Memoranda and Resolutions regarding the Austrian State Treaty,* vol. 3, 1954–1955.

Witness. Charles E. Bohlen, *Witness to History.* New York: 1973.

PARTICIPATION OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE FINAL DRAFTING OF THE AUSTRIAN STATE TREATY

MULTILATERAL DISCUSSIONS CONCERNING AUSTRIA AND THE STATUS OF THE DRAFT TREATY, FEBRUARY 8–MAY 1, 1955

1. Telegram From the Department of State to the Office of the High Commissioner for Austria[1]

Washington, February 15, 1955—3:54 p.m.

2288. Department has considered Austrian position Molotov speech February 8.[2] Based on translation FBIS text our observations are:

1. Molotov appears hint Soviets willing accept unilateral Austrian declaration military neutrality with some form Four-Power guarantee outside state treaty itself.
2. Soviets might also be willing sign treaty and withdraw all troops without awaiting German peace treaty.
3. Slight ameliorations 1 and 2 above and mollifying tone appear more than offset by other conditions included Molotov statement. Soviets appear now demanding (a) German neutrality prior peace treaty or in any event some form satisfaction re Germany as pre-condition Austrian treaty; (b) non-ratification Paris agreements;[3] (c) early Four-Power conference without awaiting ratification.

Thus Soviets offering small shifts but at price as high or higher than at Berlin.[4] If addressees agree foregoing analysis we could use it as basis response queries to indicate our view Molotov speech gives no basis improved hopes for Austrian treaty. Among other reasons this might help discourage wishful thinking on part Austrians.[5]

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 663.001/2–1555. Confidential. Drafted by Freund, Jones, and Allen of WE on February 14; cleared by Crawford, Kidd, and Beam; and signed for the Secretary of State by Merchant. Also sent to Moscow and repeated to Paris and London.

[2] For text of Molotov's speech, see *Soviet News,* February 17, 1955.

[3] For documentation on the ratification of the Paris Nine- and Four-Power Agreements, see *Foreign Relations,* 1952–1954, vol. v, Part 2, pp. 1404 ff.

[4] For documentation on the Berlin Conference, January 25–February 18, 1954, see *ibid.,* vol. VII, Part 1, pp. 601 ff.

[5] On February 17 the Embassies in London and Vienna reported British and Austrian agreement with the substance of this analysis. (Telegrams 3644 from London and

Continued

Ambassador Thompson concurs.[6]

Dulles

1811 from Vienna; Department of State, Central Files, 663.001/2–1755) The Embassy in Paris reported French agreement on February 21. (Telegram 3518 from Paris; *ibid.*, 663.001/2–2155) In addition Gruber, in a conversation with Freund and Allen on February 9, stated that he had found little if anything encouraging in Molotov's report, but believed that it should be studied carefully. (Memorandum of conversation, February 9; *ibid.*, 611.63/2–955)

[6] Ambassador Thompson was in Washington for consultations.

---

2. Telegram From the Office of the High Commissioner for Austria to the Department of State[1]

Vienna, February 23, 1955—11 a.m.

1853. Figl and Kreisky called in three Western representatives yesterday afternoon. We reviewed indications so far received re Soviet interpretation Molotov speech:

1. Ilyichev's attitude as set forth Embassy telegram 1834.[2]
2. Soviet Minister Kudryatsev has said recent Soviet Government changes do not represent hardening of Soviet policy and that Molotov speech says "something new", implying that Austrian treaty could be concluded and Austria evacuated if Western powers would give "guarantee" against Anschluss.
3. In conversation with Yugoslav Counselor, local Soviet Counselor Timoshenko said Austria is vital area for USSR, that 1938 guarantees against Anschluss were insufficient and that therefore Soviets must have something more. He strongly hinted that this something more was demilitarization of Germany.

Figl said Austrians were asking Soviets for clarification of Molotov speech but that in addition situation here demanded some action by Western powers. He suggested that some public reiteration of Western willingness sign Austrian treaty without regard to progress on Paris treaties (as set forth in note of November 29[3]) would fill this need. After some discussion Wallinger offered to recommend that a parliamentary question be planted which would refer to Molotov's statement that evacuation of Austria possible and inquire re attitude of HMG. Reply could reiterate November 29 position and emphasize that this position not dependent on fate of Paris agreements. Presumably press would then ask same question of Department and Secretary or Department spokesman could make similar reply. In view current French political situation it would of course be more difficult to get authoritative French statement on the record.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 663.001/2–2355. Secret. Repeated to Moscow, Paris, London, and Bonn.

[2] Telegram 1834 reported that Raab and Schaerf had their first conversation with Ilichev since his return from Moscow on February 18. They pressed for clarification of Molotov's report and Ilichev finally promised to seek further information on the nature of the guarantee. (*Ibid.*, 663.001/2–1955)

[3] For text of the tripartite note of November 29, 1954, concerning Soviet proposals on a European security system, see Department of State *Bulletin*, December 13, 1954, pp. 901–902.

We all three expressed sympathy for Austrian position but made clear that we could not promise immediate action along desired lines. Although no officials are optimistic over possible change in Soviet policy, there is, as usual, a problem of public opinion here which has been stimulated not only by Molotov speech but also by recent press articles in *Salzburger Nachrichten* and Catholic *Die Furche* advocating scrapping of present treaty draft and substitution therefor of simple "declaration of liberation". In addition, Ilyichev apparently again attacked Raab during most recent meeting on his statements in US[4] in which he reportedly expressed hope that Austrian treaty could be signed after passage of Paris agreements. We believe Figl's proposal that West reiterate that willingness sign Austrian treaty not dependent on Paris agreements, may in part reflect Raab's desire undo effect his press statements in US.

Action on Figl proposal along lines suggested by Wallinger would be helpful locally. Even though handled in very routine and unspectacular way in Western capitals, it could be effectively exploited here.[5]

Penfield

---

[4] Chancellor Raab visited the United States, beginning November 21, 1954.

[5] On February 25 the Embassy in Vienna was informed that the Department of State was reluctant to make any statement that might impede ratification of the Paris agreements. If, however, the British and French believed the suggested course was feasible and desirable, the Department of State would participate. (Telegram 2391 to Vienna; Department of State, Central Files, 663.001/2–2355)

3. Telegram From the Office of the High Commissioner for Austria to the Department of State[1]

Vienna, February 26, 1955—noon.

1882. Eyes only Acting Secretary and Merchant. Figl has informed Western High Commissioners in strictest confidence as follows:

Molotov yesterday asked Bischoff to come to see him and elaborated his views on Austrian question asking that Austrian Government inform no one of this approach. He explained that Soviet Union did not demand total agreement on German question but wanted security that Anschluss would not take place now or in future. How this was to be accomplished was not explained but he did say that if this was achieved Austrian treaty could be concluded and evacuation carried out immediately. Bischoff's brief message did not explain what next step was to be. Presumably Soviets are softening up Austrians to support some Soviet initiative with Western Powers. Figl hopes receive further information and to discuss matter with Raab, who is out of town, on Monday.

Thompson

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 663.001/2–2655. Top Secret; Priority. Repeated to London, Paris, and Moscow eyes only for the Ambassadors.

---

4. Telegram From the Department of State to the Office of the High Commissioner for Austria[1]

Washington, March 3, 1955—6:43 p.m.

2445. Gruber came in today to inform us of information just received from Foreign Office concerning substance Vienna's 1882, 1895 and 1906[2] plus latest talk Bischoff had with Molotov.[3] According

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 663.001/3–355. Top Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Allen, cleared by Jones, and signed for the Acting Secretary of State by Freund. Repeated to London, Paris, and Moscow.

[2] Telegram 1882, *supra*. Telegram 1895 reported that the Austrian Foreign Office was drafting a reply to Molotov which would ask for Soviet suggestions on preventing Anschluss. (Department of State, Central Files, 663.001/2–855) Telegram 1906 reported that the reply had been sent to Bischoff as guidance in any further talks with Molotov. (*Ibid.*, 663.001/3–155)

[3] No record of Gruber's conversation on this subject has been found in Department of State files; however, a three-page memorandum of conversation on other topics, dated March 3, is *ibid.*, 611.13/3–355.

Gruber, Bischoff told Molotov matter guarantee against Anschluss must receive Four-Power consideration and could not be concluded solely between Soviet Union and Austria. Molotov agreed. Bischoff requested clarification concerning type guarantee Molotov had in mind and Molotov answered that Soviet clarification could not be given until Austrian Government has answered Molotov speech February 8. Gruber reported Soviets pressing Austrian Government to call for Four-Power meeting and his view Soviets do not have in mind meeting deal exclusively with Austrian question. He believes Soviets capable exerting sufficient pressure force Austrians at least call for conference solely on Austria and that Soviets would object.

Gruber said he has no instructions request US views now and is not asking for them although he did. Austrian Government will however wish adopt course completely in line with US policy and he hopes therefore when issue clarified US guidance can be furnished early next week. We told Gruber further report regard matter expected soon from Vienna and that upon receipt thereof matter would be considered further.

Request your recommendations on position US should adopt. Still contemplate tripartite coordination Vienna and dealing with Austrians through you but Gruber will expect be informed.[4]

Hoover

---

[4] On March 3 the French Minister at Washington, Gontran Begougne de Juniac, called on Merchant to discuss the Austrian Treaty, asking specifically whether the United States considered closer consultation on the Austrian problem to be necessary. Merchant informed him that he believed consultation among the High Commissioners at Vienna was sufficient. (Memorandum of conversation, March 3; *ibid.*, 663.001/3–355) The substance of this conversation was cabled to Vienna in telegram 2444, March 3, 6:27 p.m. (*Ibid.*)

---

5. Telegram From the Office of the High Commissioner for Austria to the Department of State[1]

Vienna, March 4, 1955—6 p.m.

1937. Figl informed me at reception last night that Austrian Govt would wish to discuss Soviet démarche with Western HICOMs on Monday and that they had received additional information from Bischoff, nature of which he did not reveal. Presume additional information referred to that furnished by Gruber (Deptel 2455[2]). I have as yet received no other information on second Bischoff conversation with Molotov. I hope meet with British and French before seeing Figl.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 663.001/3–455. Top Secret; Priority. Repeated to London, Paris, and Moscow.

Austrians are concerned that Soviets might at any time make public substance of recent discussions and that Austrian Govt might be put in position of having failed respond to overture which promised hope for treaty. Believe however we should urge Austrians refuse to call for conference until Soviets clarify what they have in mind by expression "security against Anschluss". If by calling for Austrian Govt answer to Molotov's speech Soviets mean that Austrian Govt should call for a conference, hope we can persuade Austrians to stand firm. If however they mean merely public statement by Austrian Govt taking official position on Molotov's speech, would be difficult for Austrians to refuse although as Dept aware Figl has already commented in public speeches.

Before discussing question further with my Western colleagues, would like Dept's reaction to following: Soviets appear determined take soon step re Austria prior to completion ratification Paris protocols. Believe effect could be mitigated and pressure taken off Austrians if Western powers should seize initiative and address inquiry to Soviet Govt asking for clarification references to Austria in Molotov's speech. Would suggest this could be done by Quadripartite note which would not be published but which would state copy being furnished to Austrian Govt. Note could refer to Soviets' failure to answer Western note of November 29,[3] welcome indication in Molotov's speech that Soviets now appear prepared agree to firm date evacuation troops and not make Austrian treaty dependent upon completion German treaty but deplore fact that Molotov has again raised new obstacle in vague and uncertain terms. Note might conclude that in view importance achieve long overdue solution Austrian question hope Soviet Govt will make their position clear and that Molotov's speech is not merely another attempt prevent or delay ratification of Paris Agreements by proposing a conference which would make settlement of Austrian question contingent upon actions re Germany which would clearly be unacceptable to Western powers. To serve purpose note would have to be despatched promptly. If Dept reaction favorable suggest it prepare draft and request British and French authorize their representatives here to join me in sound-ing out Austrians on general idea without waiting for agreement on final text.

---

[2] Presumably a reference to telegram 2445, *supra*, since telegram 2455 deals with another subject.

[3] For text of the tripartite note of November 29, 1954, see Department of State *Bulletin*, December 13, 1954, pp. 901–902.

Thompson

---

6. Telegram From the Department of State to the Office of the High Commissioner for Austria[1]

Washington, March 5, 1955—1:52 p.m.

2472. Agree Vienna's 1937[2] key point is clarification Soviet requirement of "security against Anschluss". If as suspected this merely way disguising previous Soviet requirement for satisfaction re Germany in attempt promote Four-Power conference important Austrians not allow themselves be used as tool by Soviets in their effort precipitate conference. Even were conference ostensibly limited solely to Austria would be difficult prevent Soviets using Anschluss issue introduce entire German question.

Recommend you stress foregoing if possible with your colleagues in meeting with Figl Monday in attempt persuade Austrians stand firm. If they unwilling go back to Soviets with another request for clarification and feel must make public statement suggest they use publicly line employed first reply to Molotov (Vienna 1895[3]) plus earlier Figl public comment that Molotov speech clearly tied Austrian treaty to German question and ratification Paris accords.

We feel tripartite notes to Soviets at this time would play into Soviet hands by appearing constitute formal Western initiative bring about conference. Believe they wish conference even if only concerning Austria. If Austrians insist on making public statement believe we could handle by publicizing substance your proposed notes by means such as reply to planted question in British Parliament with subsequent French and U.S. press statements in response planted inquiries.

Hoover

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 663.001/3–455. Top Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Freund and cleared in substance with EE. Also sent to London, Paris, and Moscow.

[2] *Supra.*

[3] See footnote 2, Document 4.

7. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State[1]

Moscow, March 5, 1955—9 p.m.

1460. Although British and French Ambassadors had been likewise informed by respective Foreign Offices of Molotov's démarche to Bischoff here, none of us had thought it wise to approach Bischoff on subject in view of the extremely confidential manner in which Austrian Government was handling subject. However, yesterday Bischoff in an unusually talkative mood at reception told British Ambassador and myself results of his second interview with Molotov (Vienna's 102[2]). Bischoff, in accordance with instructions from his government, endeavored to obtain from Molotov some indication of exactly what Soviets had in mind as security or guarantees against Anschluss. Molotov evaded question and repeated what he apparently had said previously, that Austrian Government "should state its position" in regard to his statements on Austria in his Supreme Soviet speech. He said that after this had been done by Austrian Government they could discuss further exactly what Soviet Government had in mind as guarantee against Anschluss. Apparently Molotov made no particular reference to Austrian initiative for calling conference or at least Bischoff made no mention of this point.

Bischoff's impression which of course has to be taken with some reservation is that Soviet Government is anxious to keep Austrian issue alive on general grounds. He feels that having committed themselves so definitely against negotiations on German question following ratification Paris agreements, Soviets do not wish to slam all doors for contact with West and he notes in this connection that at no point in his two interviews with Molotov did latter directly bring in question of Paris agreements. Bischoff, although usually unduly optimistic in regard to this country, is inclined to view present Soviet démarche not so much as indication willingness to conclude treaty with adequate safeguards against Anschluss but as preparing ground for possibility continuing Austrian negotiations after entry into force Paris accords.

I believe there is much in this view although it is conceivable that Soviet Government for its own reasons might desire resolution Austrian question, possibly in connection with proposed East European military organ which will unquestionably be brought into being following ratification Paris accords. In any event it does not appear that Soviet démarche is primarily a method of additional pressure to defeat ratification Paris agreements which following vote in German Bundestag[3] Soviet Government must recognize as imminent. Soviet request for secrecy in these exchanges with Bischoff would also indicate that they are not at this juncture primarily interested in propaganda exploitation.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 663.001/3–555. Top Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated to London, Paris, and Vienna.

[2] Same as telegram 1937, Document 5.

With reference to Vienna's suggestion of quadripartite (*sic*) note, while this might have advantage of relieving Austrian concern over Soviet publication recent discussions, it would be almost impossible to keep fact of such note secret and this might tend to defeat its purpose. If contents of note as outlined should leak and require full publication by West powers, it is certain that Soviet response would not be in any way clarification of Molotov's Supreme Soviet speech but reiteration of general propaganda charges seeking to place blame on West for failure to conclude Austrian treaty. Soviets might therefore be afforded opportunity to make for propaganda purposes connection between ratification Paris agreements and conclusion Austrian treaty.

Foregoing is of course on basis that Austrians would stand firm in event that Soviet pressure for Austrian initiative in calling Four Power Conference develops. In any event, we will have to await further clarification of exactly what, if anything, Molotov proposed along conference line to Bischoff. I believe in view of Molotov's direct request to him (Vienna's 97[4]) that it would not be wise to attempt to obtain further details from Bischoff here.

With reference to Vienna's 101,[5] I will of course scrupulously respect confidence of Swedish Minister Vienna. Swedish Ambassador here has proved very cooperative and communicative on such matters in past. I have had no recent opportunity or occasion to discuss with him implications of Molotov's Supreme Soviet speech but it is quite possible that he would tell me if such occasion presents itself on his own initiative of his conversation with Semenov. Statements attributed to Semenov are of interest in that they would represent departure from standard Soviet practice and Communist propaganda line which in opposing ratification Paris agreements carefully avoided implication that anything good could happen subsequent to their entry into force. While this of course is propaganda position with no real relation to Soviet intentions in future, Semenov's apparent departure from the normal is of particular interest in relation to Soviet démarche on Austria.

---

[3] On February 27 the Federal Bundestag ratified the Paris Agreements.

[4] Same as telegram 1882, Document 3.

[5] In telegram 101, Thompson reported that Semenov recently confided to the Swedish Minister in Moscow that the Soviet Union would be prepared to conclude an Austrian Treaty even if the Paris Agreements were ratified and had stated further that the Soviet Union recognized that the Austrian question was separate from the German. (Department of State, Central Files, 663.001/3–455)

Bohlen

---

8. Telegram From the Office of the High Commissioner for Austria to the Department of State[1]

Vienna, March 7, 1955—6 p.m.

1947. Figl and Kreisky today gave Western HICOMs text of Austrian memorandum which they expect telegraph to Bischoff Wednesday noon for earliest delivery. Text follows in my next telegram.[2]

I objected to extent to which text implied willingness Western powers to negotiate on question Austrian neutrality. As a result of discussion words "with the powers concerned" were dropped from last sentence of point two.

Austrians appeared take realistic views of Soviet tactics, but considered they could not fail to explore situation on slight possibility that Soviet move was not mere propaganda. Kreisky said he had impression Soviets were unhappy that world spotlight was on Far East where Chinese are pursuing somewhat independent policy and that they may wish restore European theatre to first place in world affairs. Both Ministers made clear Austria did not wish play Soviet propaganda game and Figl pointed out that this would be the third time Austrians had gone back to Soviets with request for clarification.

Thompson

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 663.001/3–755. Priority; Limited Distribution. Repeated to London, Paris, and Moscow.

[2] Telegram 1948, March 7, not printed. (*Ibid.*) For text of the Austrian memorandum, delivered to Molotov on March 14, see *Documents* (R.I.I.A.) for 1955, p. 220.

9. Telegram From the Office of the High Commissioner for Austria to the Department of State[1]

Vienna, March 21, 1955—7 p.m.

2072. Figl and Kreisky informed Western HICOMs today of Bischoff's report on his conversation with Molotov on the Austrian memo[2] which took place March 14.[3] Semenov was present at the interview. With regard to point 1 of the Austrian memo, Molotov said additional guarantees would be required only in case of ratification of Paris agreements and the rearmament of Germany. If there should be agreement on the German question in the future these guarantees would no longer be necessary.

With regard to point 2 of the memo, Molotov observed that there appeared to be no difference of opinion between Austria and the Soviet Union.

With regard to point 3 Molotov also observed that there appeared to be no basis of opposition.

In discussion of point 1, Molotov asked what guarantees would be possible and acceptable to Austria. Bischoff replied that guarantees were not up to Austria and urged Molotov to express what the Soviet ideas were. Molotov stated that the prevention of the Anschluss was not only in Austria's interest but was also a European question. Bischoff inquired whether he had in mind some kind of guarantee by European powers. Molotov replied that they must both think over this question and whether it would be better to have a guarantee by the big powers or by the neighbors of Austria.

Bischoff reported as his own opinion that the Soviets would have more interest in a conference after ratification of the Paris agreements than before.

In the discussion that followed, Kreisky expressed the opinion that it was now clear that the Soviet move was not primarily directed against ratification of the Paris agreements. He attached great importance to the fact that Molotov himself was conducting the conversations, and he thought it was also clear that this was not merely a propaganda maneuver. Both he and Figl emphasized that the Austrians considered themselves obliged to keep the discussions going and could not afford to let themselves get in the position where they might be charged with having missed the boat. While the matter was left that both sides would think about the problem, they thought it unlikely that Molotov would now make any further move until the Austrians had expressed an opinion. The only move the Austrians have definitely decided upon is to recall for consultation the Ambassadors at Washington, Paris, London and Moscow, to arrive here on March 28.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 663.001/3–2155. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to London, Bonn, Moscow, and Paris.

[2] Transmitted in telegram 1948; see footnote 2, *supra*.

[3] Bohlen reported briefly on Bischoff's conversation with Molotov in telegram 1548 from Moscow, March 15. (Department of State, Central Files, 663.001/3–1555) Bischoff told Bohlen that there had been no mention of a four-power conference in the first two discussions and that Molotov had no particular comments to make on the Austrian position, but would refer it to his government.

The Austrians inquired whether we thought the Western powers would agree to attend a Four Power conference to deal only with the Austrian question, if such conference took place after ratification. We replied we were not in a position to answer this question, but pointed out that at the moment the public position was that if such a conference were called today, it would presumably be called on the basis of the Molotov speech,[4] and I said I did not think my government would be prepared to attend a conference on such a basis. I said my government was anxious not to miss any opportunity conclude the Austrian treaty, and if it became clear that the Russians really mean business, I was sure we would do everything possible to see if an acceptable basis could be found. I observed that Molotov's reference to a guarantee by neighbors contained some pitfalls, at which point Kreisky emphatically stated that Austria would never accept a guarantee by her neighbors, as this would mean putting Czechoslovakians and Hungarians in the role of victors in the war. I attempted without success to draw out both Figl and Kreisky as to whether the Austrians had any even rough ideas as to what kind of reply they consider it would be appropriate for them to give to Molotov and I am convinced that they have not yet formulated any even tentative proposals. Kreisky did emphasize that while there was no danger of Anschluss from the Austrian side, they were very much concerned at what the position might be in Germany in several years time in view of the extent to which German economic and other pressure on Austria was already evident. Figl urged that our governments inform their Ambassadors of our thinking as fully as possible before their return to Vienna. I am meeting with Wallinger and Lalouette tomorrow in order see if we can reach any joint recommendations.

Thompson

---

[4] Presumably a reference to Molotov's report to the Supreme Soviet on February 8.

10. Telegram From the Office of the High Commissioner for Austria to the Department of State[1]

Vienna, March 23, 1955—6 p.m.

2093. Re mytel 2972 [*2072*] March 21[2] following has been agreed with my French and British colleagues who are sending similar telegrams their governments:

A. Analysis of present situation:

1. Soviet handling of Austrian affairs in recent weeks suggests that immediate objective of Soviet Government is to engage Western powers in conference on Austrian question in such manner as to enable them to reopen negotiations on German problem or at least keep door open to do so later.

2. Soviet Government appears to have accepted the inevitability of ratification Paris treaties although not yet of actual German rearmament.

3. Basic Soviet objective appears to be creation belt of neutral states consisting of Sweden, Germany, Austria and Yugoslavia. In view apparent recent trends in Yugoslavia toward neutralism, creation of situation in which Germany would be only missing link in this chain must have great attraction for Soviets. We therefore consider possible Soviets prepared conclude Austria treaty if neutralization or something closely approaching neutralization of Austria can be achieved. Prevention of rearmament is probably still their primary aim and they may indeed consider that neutralization of Austria would contribute thereto.

4. Austrian Government opinion appears to be moving toward necessity of accepting some form of neutralization as price for treaty.

5. Austrian Government is nervous and worried by present bilateral discussions and would prefer to shift responsibility to Western powers but is forced by political situation and public opinion to continue them until this can be done as long as there is any prospect that they might lead to progress toward treaty.

B. Recommendations:

1. When working groups are set up to consider Western tactics in negotiations with the Russians after the ratification of the Paris agreements, that on Austria should be kept distinct from that on Germany and should if possible meet in a different place.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 663.001/3–2355. Secret. Repeated to London, Paris, Moscow, and Bonn.

[2] *Supra.*

2. We consider that it suits Western policy (as it apparently also suits Soviet policy) to discuss Austria first. We should endeavor to restrict discussion to issues having direct impact on Austria.

3. It is to be hoped that Molotov will make the next move.

We discussed possibility that if he does not Western powers should intervene by a tripartite note but reached no conclusion. In absence one of these alternatives we believe Austrian Government will be compelled to take initiative themselves and that they might be advised as first step to speak to Russians as follows:

> "We ourselves are content to see the state treaty which contains provisions against 'Anschluss' signed here and now in its present form and we have already assured you that we do not intend to conclude military alliances or to allow military bases on our territory. Molotov's latest talks with Bischoff suggest that you want something more; we should be glad to consider anything that you may suggest provided that (a) it does not infringe Austria's independence and sovereignty; (b) it can be agreed by the four powers without delay, and is not contingent upon the settlement of questions which are no direct concern of Austria."

4. We realize that this is substantially a restatement of Bischoff's communication of March 14;[3] but we are doubtful carrying matters further on a bilateral basis which might lead to yielding of further points without any return. In this connection we consider that Raab's speech on March 20[4] has already weakened our position.

Thompson

---

[3] Transmitted in telegram 1948; see footnote 2, Document 8.

[4] In telegram 2087 from Vienna, March 22, Thompson reported on Raab's radio address of March 20. With regard to Anschluss it quoted Raab as stating that the best thing would be a four-power guarantee automatically safeguarding the inviolability of Austria. (Department of State, Central Files, 663.001/3–2255)

---

11. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State[1]

Moscow, March 25, 1955—8 p.m.

1645. The latest Bischoff–Molotov exchange published in Soviet press today was given correspondents last evening. Assume therefore,

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 663.001/3–1555. Secret. Repeated to London, Paris, Bonn, and Vienna.

Department has full text of Soviet reply March 24[2] to Austrian communication March 14.

Soviet reply still leaves obscure exact immediate purpose Soviet Government is seeking in Austrian question but appears, however, to confirm desire to segregate Austrian question from German at least for purposes negotiation. Reply does not clarify exactly what Soviet Government means by guarantees against Anschluss in light rearmament Western Germany and Soviet comment on point 1 of Austrian statement merely refers to visible necessity of adoption "real measures" taking into account existing plans for remilitarization Western Germany which increase danger of Anschluss followed by vague reference to examination time of troop withdrawal as well as "measures" which should be undertaken in future in event of emergence of direct threat of Anschluss. This latter phrase would appear to indicate some intention to reserve the right of re-entry of troops in event Soviet Government chose to consider Anschluss threat immediately. Similar obscurity is noted in point 1, as to nature guarantees Soviets have in mind against Austrian participation in military alliances or establishment bases. On conference question, it is noted that Soviet Government does not go beyond stating that Austrian question would be considered "separately" but does not exclude by any means possibility of other matters also being discussed at any such conference.

Reference to favorable Soviet reaction to alleged desire Chancellor Raab to visit Moscow in near future is new element since we have not seen here any public statements which would give that impression. It may be nothing more than Soviet invention designed to place Raab and Austrian Government in embarrassing position. It would be interesting to know if in fact Raab had ever given any such public indication as that attributed to him.

While immediate intentions Soviet Government are still matter of speculation, its basic concern as in past still appears to be prevention of integration Austria into Western defense system which in their eyes is rendered particularly acute by imminence entry into force Paris agreements. Under conditions continued German disarmament Soviets clearly feel this purpose best served by continuing occupation Austria and sabotage peace treaty. However, prospects German rearmament may have increased danger in their view of some form of concealed military association through lines of communication or other military arrangements which would result in de facto involvement 3 Western zones Austria in NATO military network, to which Soviet Government would respond by integrating more closely Soviet zone into projected Eastern military setup with consequent result division Austria somewhat along German lines. Thus the present Soviet maneuver could serve dual purpose of working towards neutralization of Austria as a whole or conversely as propaganda preparation for countermeasures in event of necessity to safeguard Soviet military position in Soviet zone Austria.

---

[2] On March 24 Molotov had handed Bischoff the Soviet reply to the Austrian memorandum of March 14 (see footnote 2, Document 8). With regard to point 1, the Soviets replied that it would be necessary to consider the time limits for withdrawal of troops from Austria and measures to prevent Anschluss. On point 2 the Soviets stated that they were prepared to discuss the form of a neutrality declaration. On point 3 they replied that the question of an Austrian State Treaty should be discussed separately at a four-power meeting. Molotov also mentioned to Bischoff that the Soviet Government would welcome a visit of the Austrian Chancellor and other officials in the near future. For full text of the Soviet reply, see *USCOA*, March 24, 1955. A copy was also transmitted as an enclosure to despatch 1104 from Vienna, March 28. (Department of State, Central Files, 663.001/3–2855)

Bohlen

---

12. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, March 25, 1955[1]

SUBJECT

Austrian Treaty Problem

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary
EUR—Mr. Livingston T. Merchant
Ambassador Karl Gruber
Dr. Ernst Lemberger
WE—Mr. William R. Tyler
WE—Mr. Richard B. Freund

Ambassador Gruber, who had requested the interview with the Secretary, asked for the Secretary's views on two subjects prior to the Ambassador's departure for Vienna tonight, where the Austrian Ambassadors from London, Paris and Moscow as well, will be on consultation. The two problems are a) the recent Soviet proposals regarding a Treaty, including guarantees against Anschluss and of Austrian neutrality and the question of time limits for troop withdrawals after a Treaty is signed and b) the Soviet invitation to Chancellor Raab to visit Moscow for Treaty discussions.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 663.001/3–2555. Secret. Drafted by Freund. The source text was initialed by Merchant. A summary of this memorandum was transmitted to Vienna in telegram 2658, March 25. (*Ibid.*) A briefing memorandum for the conversation with Gruber, prepared by Merchant on March 25, was the basis for Secretary Dulles' remarks. (*Ibid.*)

On the question of Chancellor Raab going to Moscow, the Secretary observed that it is a dangerous place to go alone but supposed that there might be some reason to hope for some constructive purpose and that it might be difficult for the Chancellor to refuse the invitation. The Secretary said that he assumed that if the Chancellor went to Moscow, he would make no commitments or say anything on behalf of the U.S. that would be prejudicial to its position. The Secretary reminded the Ambassador that the West withdrew its offer, made at the Berlin conference, to sign the draft Treaty and that while the offer had been renewed on November 29, 1954,[2] it had not been accepted and should not be considered to be on the table indefinitely. The U.S., he said, is in fact ready to renew the offer at an appropriate time, but the decision to do so could not be made for us. The offer at Berlin had included concessions the U.S. did not like to make and as more time goes on without a Treaty those concessions become more undesirable. The Soviets continue, for example, to drain the Austrian economy while the present draft Treaty would require the Austrians to pay the same price upon signature of the Treaty.

The Secretary said his main point was that he assumes Chancellor Raab would not go to Moscow under the impression that he could speak for the U.S. It would not be possible for him to voice the views of the British or French as well as those of the U.S.

So far as a guarantee against Anschluss is concerned, the Secretary stressed that any proposal must be examined very closely. The Soviets he said, tended to use such guarantees as excuses for intervening in the internal affairs of other nations. He cited Molotov's claim at Berlin that articles in Austrian trade journals indicated preparation for Anschluss and Molotov had failed to reply to the Secretary's question as to whether the Soviets would insist on continuous supervision of the Austrian and German press. Therefore, the Secretary said, one must watch to see that decisions to assure against Anschluss do not lead to communist domination of the entire life of Austria.

Turning to the idea of a four-power conference on the Austrian Treaty, the Secretary informed Ambassador Gruber that we could consider a conference of the High Commissioners or Ambassadors at Vienna, since it would be possible to hold the discussion to Austrian matters, the Ambassadors not being competent to discuss problems elsewhere. At the Foreign Ministers' level, however, a conference would present problems, as it would be practically impossible for Foreign Ministers to exclude discussion of other problems, such as

---

[2] For text of the tripartite note of November 29, 1954, see Department of State *Bulletin*, December 13, 1954, pp. 901–902.

Germany and China. The higher level conference might of course come after the deposit of all ratification instruments of the Paris Accords and when other considerations are met, providing a reasonable prospect for success of the conference. The Secretary stated that we are not prepared to have a Foreign Ministers' conference solely on Austria.

Ambassador Gruber having asked about the timing of a visit to Moscow, the Secretary remarked that he could see advantages in moving a bit slowly. Events relating to WEU are, he said, moving rapidly and will be crystallizing over the next few weeks. After that, chances of a useful visit to Moscow might be better. He added that we are unwilling to have a high level conference on Germany as long as the Soviets would be in a position to use the conference as a means of breaking up the position of the West. The same factor applies to a conference on Austria.

While the U.S. might be willing to enter a conference of Ambassadors in Vienna on Austria, the Secretary said he doubted that the Soviets would agree to it, as their motive seems to be to use the present approach on Austria as a back door to the German problem. Perhaps, it would be better if the Austrian question were delayed until the situation is ripe for a Foreign Ministers' conference. The Secretary further advised that it would be desirable not to press for a conference on Austria so as to avoid likely frustration of Austrian hopes and the victimization of Austria by the addition of new conditions to a Treaty.

Ambassador Gruber thanked the Secretary for his views and said that while he had no instructions, he wondered whether the West or Austria should propose a Vienna Ambassadors' conference. The Secretary replied by reiterating his statement that the Austrians should not consider themselves in a position to speak for us in Moscow. He went on to caution the Ambassador against the Austrians referring in Moscow to the idea that the U.S. might consider an Ambassadors' conference. That was for the information of the Austrians alone, so that they will, if the results of the Moscow trip justify it, make a recommendation on the subject to the three Western powers. The Secretary emphasized that he was speaking entirely without prior consultation with the British and French and that such consultation will be necessary before any basis for action will exist.

Ambassador Gruber agreed that it is too early to judge the question of a conference and inquired whether the Secretary would be in Washington when he, the Ambassador returns in about ten days, so that he may report the results of his Vienna consultation. The Secretary believed that he would be in Washington at that time.

Ambassador Gruber also asked whether if a conference of Ambassadors would be convened it would exclude a higher level conference later. The Secretary said that it would not be excluded, and that if agreement should be reached to hold a high level conference at some later date and the Austrian problem had not already been settled, we would, of course, wish it included in the agenda.

Ambassador Gruber asked whether the Secretary intended to reopen points in the present draft Treaty. The Secretary replied that if the Soviets resume bargaining on the Treaty, the West would wish to be in a position to do some bargaining of its own. There is, he said, an unfortunate history of concessions granted to the Soviets without ever attaining a Treaty. The Secretary stressed the need for the West to retain freedom of action so as to obtain the best terms possible for Austria.

Finally, Ambassador Gruber inquired as to what to say to the press. It was agreed that he should merely say that there had been a general review of the Austrian problem between the Secretary and the Ambassador as a prelude to the latter's forthcoming consultation in Vienna.[3]

---

[3] On March 27, Barbara Salt, a First Secretary of the British Embassy, told Freund and Allen that Foreign Secretary Eden had also warned the Austrian Ambassador in the United Kingdom, prior to his departure for Vienna, about the dangers involved in making any concessions at Moscow. (Memorandum of conversation, March 27; Department of State, Central Files, 663.001/3–2755)

---

13. Telegram From the Office of the High Commissioner for Austria to the Department of State[1]

Vienna, March 25, 1955—7 p.m.

2122. West HICOMs agreed today on following:

1. We do not believe that Raab can refuse Soviet invitation and in fact may have committed himself already to accept if formal invitation received. (Kreisky informed French few days ago that it had been agreed that if Raab made visit he would take Schaerf.) We therefore believe it would be useless and unwise for us to attempt to prevent Raab's acceptance. (Our own sources indicate that the Soviets [*Socialists*] are inclined to send Kreisky rather than Schaerf in order retain greater freedom of action.)

2. We believe it important to put Austrian Treaty question back on a 4-Power basis, with Austria participating, as soon as possible.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 663.001/3–2555. Secret; Priority. Repeated to London, Paris, and Bonn.

3. We believe best procedure would be for 3 West Powers to make declaration text of which could be transmitted officially to Austrian and Soviet Governments through diplomatic channels before Raab's visit. Such declaration would have purpose of bringing treaty discussions back on 4-Power basis and of aiding Raab to avoid making commitments. We will submit suggestions of points to be covered by such declaration which we believe should be brief and positive.[2]

4. We consider Working Group should meet urgently in London or Paris to work out text such declaration as well as to coordinate our policies toward eventual treaty negotiations. It is unlikely that Raab's visit would take place in less than 2 weeks although Austrian Government will probably have to reply to invitation within a few days after meeting of 4 Ambassadors here Monday. (Because of Chauvel's knowledge of Austrian problem I believe French would be disposed to agree to Working Group meeting in London.)

5. We believe Raab should be cautioned not to make any commitments which would prejudice negotiations. My colleagues were not disposed to mention any specific points upon which Raab should be cautioned, but we will endeavor forward suggestions as to points upon which Working Group might endeavor reach tripartite agreement with respect to negotiations. It may be that Working Group may wish recommend that our position on some of these points be made clear to Raab before his departure.

Thompson

---

[2] The suggestions, transmitted in telegram 2128 from Vienna, March 25, contained a review of the U.S. attitude on the Austrian question and a statement that the present moment might be opportune to undertake again negotiations on Austria with Austrian participation, and concluded that the means of resuming negotiations should be studied through diplomatic channels. (*Ibid.*)

---

14. Telegram From the Department of State to the Office of the High Commissioner for Austria[1]

Washington, March 25, 1955—6:45 p.m.

2666. Agree importance maximum strengthening Raab's posture prior his departure Moscow (Vienna's 2122[2]) but disturbed by suggestion Vienna's 2123[3] we might imply we find latest Soviet maneuvers give reliable basis for assuming they have in fact modified their basic policy regarding Austria. In line Deptel 2658 [4] to Vienna would prefer limit present action to tripartite approach to Raab prior his departure Vienna and perhaps statement to press in reply questions that Raab visit Moscow matter for him decide but that any treaty matter subject four-power determination.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 663.001/3–2555. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Freund, cleared by Beam, and signed by Merchant for the Secretary of State. Also sent to London and Paris and repeated to Bonn and Moscow.

[2] *Supra.*

Hope London and Paris will be able obtain British and French support for Secretary's line contained Deptel 2658 as basis tripartite approach Raab. Substance given both British and French Embassies here. In addition agree include reproach to Raab over points made March 22 speech (Vienna's 2099 para 2[5]) and also indicate our attitude on neutralization (Paris 4113[6]) under same reserve as on guarantee against Anschluss. Basically West position unchanged and willing consider additional Soviet demands only upon clarification by Soviets. As Secretary informed Gruber we are agreeable consider Raab's views upon his return, after which West's position will be determined.

Also prefer leave establishment working group in abeyance at this time, but agree force your arguments in favor Paris or London.

Department has been giving thought to possible explanation Soviet initiative as stated (para 2–c Moscow's 1637[7]).

Dulles

---

[3] Presumably a reference to telegram 2128 (see footnote 2, *supra*) which was initially numbered 2123 on the copy in Department of State files.

[4] See footnote 1, Document 12.

[5] Telegram 2099 reported on Raab's speech to the Austrian Cabinet on March 22, stating that Raab had agreed to a neutral Austria guaranteed by the four powers. Thompson proposed a tripartite reproach to Raab for making concessions to the Soviet Union. (Department of State, Central Files, 663.001/3–2355)

[6] Not printed. (*Ibid.*, 663.001/3–2555)

[7] Telegram 1637 presented several possible reasons for the Soviet initiative on Austria. Paragraph 2–c suggested that the initiative was designed to prepare a propaganda base for Soviet countermeasures in Austria following the ratification of the Paris Agreements. (*Ibid.*, 663.001/3–2455)

15. Telegram From the Office of the High Commissioner for Austria to the Department of State[1]

Vienna, March 29, 1955—noon.

2149. Schoener invited representatives three Western powers to call morning March 29 and officially communicated Cabinet decision to accept invitation to Moscow. Aust Delegation will be composed of Chancellor, Vice Chancellor, Figl and Kreisky and will be accompanied by Schoener and Verosta, Chief Legal Dept Fon Off. Aust group intend fly Moscow Monday April 11 and hope return Vienna Friday April 15.

Schoener remarked Austs do not desire remain longer since (1) they believe everything could be said in course of one day and (2) they are expecting official visit Prime Minister Bech of Luxembourg on Monday April 18.

In response question Schoener stated announcement acceptance of invitation would be made in official communiqué this afternoon and Austs did not contemplate further written communication to Sov Govt. He volunteered he had already informed Ivanov of Sov element concerning Aust acceptance and Ivanov had asked whether the decision had been unanimous. Schoener replied all Cabinet decisions taken unanimously, whereupon Ivanov inquired whether there had not been some opposition, particularly whether Amb Gruber had not on "instructions from Washington" sought to delay acceptance Moscow's invitation. According Schoener Ivanov appeared genuinely surprised when he was assured there had been no opposition or intervention from any quarter.

Thompson

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 663.001/3–2955. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Moscow, Paris, London, and Bonn.

---

16. Telegram From the Office of the High Commissioner for Austria to the Department of State[1]

Vienna, March 30, 1955—6 p.m.

2174. I had long talk today with Kreisky in effort reorient his thinking as he has evidently had considerable influence on both

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 663.001/3–3055. Secret; Priority. Repeated to London, Paris, and Moscow.

Schaerf and Raab. He began by stating Austrians had been most disappointed at Berlin rejection Molotov's proposed continuation discussion Austrian question by Ambassadors in Vienna. Austrians had understood from British and French and to some extent from us that in return for their taking strong line which we desired, some machinery would be set up to continue consideration of Austrian problem. He was therefore disturbed by fact that we now apparently at this late date were thinking in terms of exploratory talks, by Ambassadors' conference, which we had rejected in Berlin. (I understand Raab is somewhat favorably inclined to handling matter in this way.) I said I could give him only my personal thoughts and assumptions but it seemed clear that Soviet rejection of Secretary's offer at Berlin to sign treaty in form Russians had proposed, had clearly demonstrated they were not prepared for any real progress on treaty. Secretary Dulles had made clear that he believed progress on this and other matters could only be made against background of Western unity and strength. Unfortunately French had rejected EDC[2] which had delayed matters but in view their ratification Paris Agreements[3] time was now approaching when we might see whether further conference could be fruitful. With respect handling question Conference of Ambassadors in Vienna with Austrian participation, Secretary had made clear that his mind still open but that meeting of Foreign Ministers which would almost certainly involve discussion of Germany and China was now premature and that best way to achieve separate discussion of Austrian question which Austrians desired would be to have conference which would not be competent to go beyond consideration Austrian questions. Kreisky thought Soviets would press Austrians hard to agree to calling of conference and that any public statement we could make referring to possibility of conference would be helpful to them in resisting such pressures.

Kreisky indicated that at Moscow Austrians, in addition to probing Soviet proposals would probably discuss following questions without undertaking commitments.

1. They would state they could not accept merely a guarantee against Anschluss but would welcome a simple guarantee of their independence by four powers.

2. A Socialist idea was that they should indicate willingness guarantee not to return industrial properties classified as German assets to Germany and should at same time press Soviets give up their oil concessions or at least limit themselves to, for example, 60 percent of Austrian production with the oil fields themselves being turned back to Austrians.

---

[2] For documentation on the French rejection of the European Defense Community (EDC) in August 1954, see *Foreign Relations*, 1952–1954, vol. v, Part 1, pp. 1052 ff.

[3] On March 27 the French Council of the Republic passed the Paris Agreements.

3. Austrians might undertake to pass a basic law for defense of Republic, such as those already existing in Germany and Italy, which would prohibit organizations aimed at destroying integrity of state, wearing of uniforms, etc. This law would apply to Nazis and Communists alike.

Kreisky also told me he had proposed and Raab had agreed that Bischoff should openly keep Western Ambassadors in Moscow currently informed of Austrian discussions there.

With regard to first point, after giving Kreisky our official position on guarantees as stated by Secretary to Gruber,[4] I went on to give him some personal views emphasizing them as such. I said I had been most disturbed by what appeared to be drift in Austrian thinking toward idea of neutralization. I said that if Austrians went to Moscow and conducted themselves on basis of thinking that it was quite clear they could obtain guarantee of Austrian territory from Western powers they might get themselves into situation where it was Western powers who would be blocking treaty. I pointed out that Russians appeared to be seeking commitment against military alliances in an extreme and binding form as well as guarantees against Anschluss, maintaining their foothold in Austria through possession of oil properties and DDSG as well as imposing on Austria a heavy debt for purchase of German assets. They apparently also had idea of excluding Austria from economic and political European organizations. All of these various questions were inter-related and it could be that they would be asking us to guarantee integrity of a country whose integrity was already gravely impaired by terms of treaty. This did not mean that we were not interested in maintenance of Austrian integrity against threat of Soviet Communism but pointed out that what Austrians seemed to have in mind was a formal guarantee which would run forever. It was difficult for anyone to foresee how political structure of Europe would develop particularly so long as future of Germany was undecided. To ask us to commit ourselves on question of guarantee at this time would be asking us to take step in what was almost complete darkness. I also said that I wished to make two remarks on question German assets. There seemed to me to be a great danger in opening up this question in connection with a discussion of guarantees since it implied that such guarantees might be coupled with detailed measures of implementation. If way were open for Soviet Union to pass upon Austrian economic actions, they would have little independence left. My second observation was that while US had carefully refrained from getting involved in Austrian internal questions, if by raising this matter Socialists should precipitate a coalition fight at very time they were endeavoring to present a united front in Moscow, this would be most unfortunate and dangerous. (One of principal reasons we have been unable make progress on German asset question has been inability of two Austrian parties to agree. Socialists would like to perpetuate nationalization and some People's Party politicians would almost rather see them return to Germany than have this happen.)

---

[4] See Document 12.

Kreisky seemed impressed by these arguments but observed that German economic penetration was already a fact and one that worried Socialists greatly.

I also said to Kreisky that in my opinion basic Soviet motives in reopening Austrian question was not with Austrian objectives in mind but rather German problems. It might be that we could turn this to Austria's advantage but we would have to proceed extremely carefully.

Kreisky said he had asked Gruber whether US policy was dominated by desire of our military to remain in Austria. (We understand a number of Austrians have had the idea.) He said his question had been motivated by information Austrians had received from Paris through non-American sources that US military were intensely preoccupied with question of maintaining their communications line through Austria.

He professed to be fully satisfied with explanations which Gruber and I gave him. In this connection I emphasized that we were far more interested, so far as Austria was concerned, in cold war than in a hot war particularly in these days of atomic bombs and modern communications.

Kreisky is probably most intelligent member of Austrian Govt concerned in foreign affairs and is completely pro-Western. He has been influenced however by his long service in Sweden (he has a Swedish wife) and he naturally has a strong interest in securing Austria's independence and is naturally intrigued by possibility of protecting Austria from being squeezed to death in a great power struggle. He will of course inform Schaerf of gist of this conversation and I was perhaps indiscreet in going so far but it seemed most dangerous to me in view of his increasing influence to let him go to Moscow with serious misconceptions regarding our point of view. Incidentally Kreisky states Schaerf completely skeptical possibility anything constructive being accomplished in Moscow.[5]

Thompson

---

[5] On April 1 the Department of State cabled Thompson and expressed its complete agreement with what he had told Kreisky. (Telegram 2737 to Vienna; Department of State, Central Files, 663.001/3–2955)

17. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State[1]

Moscow, March 31, 1955—noon.

1690. I have read with great interest various messages concerning forthcoming visit to Moscow of Chancellor Raab and in particular Ambassador Thompson's conversation with Kreisky (Vienna's 152[2]). I believe it might be helpful at this juncture to elaborate views already indicated in previous messages concerning Soviet motivation in recent developments affecting Austria. While it is true that German question dominates Soviet political thinking and therefore any European question and particularly Austria is regarded in its relation thereto, I do not believe that "basic" Soviet motivation in reopening Austrian question is related to their present position on Germany but is more a consequence of their recognition that rearmament of Western Germany cannot be stopped. (Their long-term policy on Germany is another question.) This development to which Soviet Government attaches great importance cannot but affect their attitude towards Austria.

I believe as already indicated Embtel 1645[3] that chief immediate motivation of Soviets in reopening Austrian question is to endeavor to insure neutralization of Austria in order to prevent military integration three Western zones of Austria into NATO set-up or, in event Soviet demands in this respect are rejected by three Western powers and Austrian Government to prepare way for safeguarding Soviet military position in eastern Austria. Question may be rendered acute by imminence projected Soviet counter-measures for military organization Eastern Europe. It is probable that given guarantees and safeguards adequate in their eyes to prevent any Austrian military involvement with West, Soviet Government on balance would prefer complete neutralization of Austria as a whole to alternative mere retention Soviet military position in eastern Austria with three Western zones moving towards military incorporation in Western defense organization.

If this view is correct, conversations with Raab will center on neutralization issue. (It is doubtful if Soviets would go to all this effort merely to restate Berlin position.) Soviets will undoubtedly endeavor to obtain Austrian consent to some form of guarantee which would provide Soviet Government under its terms with legal grounds in future for intervention or pressure on Austrian Government to prevent any association with West in general and Bonn in particular which Soviets would regard inimicable to their interests and their purposes.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 663.001/3–3155. Secret. Repeated to London, Paris, and Vienna.

[2] Same as telegram 2174, *supra.*

[3] Document 11.

Dangers and unacceptability of any measures which would give Soviet Government opportunity legally to interfere in Austrian internal affairs or to dictate Austrian relationships with other countries are obvious but this may become central point in Raab negotiations here. If Soviet demands, as they may well be, are sufficiently obvious—for example, involving continued stationing of troops or right of entry under conditions to be determined by Soviet Government—I would imagine no serious problem would arise in regard to Austrian reaction to proposals of this nature. Given understandable Austrian desire for treaty, danger of acquiescence would be much greater if Soviet conditions are phrased merely in terms of proposal for four-power guarantees, Austrian commitment, et cetera.

I assume from our Berlin position and fact that we offered no specific objection to Austrian note of March 14[4] that unilateral declaration by Austrian Government of its intention to refrain from military alliances or accept bases on its territory is not unacceptable to three Western powers. If this is correct, there would seem to be no particular objection to a declaration or agreement by the four-powers undertaking to respect Austrian position on this point. Anything beyond this point involving, for example, a guarantee by four powers of Austrian independence and against Anschluss, as indicated by Kreisky in Vienna's telegram under reference, would be dangerous in that it would inevitably give Soviet Union certain responsibilities and rights in the field of determining what did or did not constitute a threat to Austrian independence or danger of Anschluss. It would seem to me therefore that key point and one which might especially commend itself to Austrians is that determination as to what constitutes a threat to Austrian independence, neutrality or danger of Anschluss must be left to Austrian Government and should not in any circumstances be embodied in treaty or accompanying agreements in any such manner as to afford Soviets a basis for making their determination on these points.

In view of variety of factors affecting our position on Austria, foregoing thoughts are set forth not in any sense as recommendation but merely as indications of probable lines Soviet Government may pursue in negotiation with Raab and particular points of danger as seen against background of Soviet intentions.

I am glad to note that Raab has agreed that Western Ambassadors in Moscow should be kept openly and currently informed of Austrian discussions here. I have already discussed this point with

---

[4] Transmitted in telegram 1948; see footnote 2, Document 8.

British Ambassador and we will work out most convenient mechanism here. (French Ambassador is leaving tomorrow for consultation in Paris and may or may not return for Raab visit.)

While I realize importance of avoiding any impression that Raab is empowered to reach any agreement or make any commitments here, I believe it would be valuable for me to have Department's latest thinking, particularly on points raised above in this message for guidance and background. It might be advantageous to nip in bud any Soviet proposition which would be clearly unacceptable to us before Austrians become too deeply involved in its discussion.

For Vienna: In view of shortness of visit I imagine that Austrian Legation meet him and that no attempt at entertainment or other social activities should be undertaken by Western Embassies here but would appreciate your views.

Bohlen

---

18. Telegram From the Office of the High Commissioner for Austria to the Department of State[1]

Vienna, April 2, 1955—6 p.m.

2201. Gruber informs me that he believes Austrian Delegation is aware of the dangers of the Moscow visit and will take firm position.[2] He tells me that following my talk with Kreisky[3] latter changed his position radically and strongly supported Gruber's position. I am nevertheless worried by what I believe to be line of Raab's thinking. I understand that he believes if Austria does not achieve treaty on this round she will probably end up by being partitioned. Soviets can hold out prospect of concessions, particularly in economic field which will be attractive to him. Raab also has ambitions to be the man who got the Russians out of Austria and believes that even if he has to pay too high a price, he can later renege on his agreements. Moreover there are good indications that he still distrusts Gruber and may not be convinced that he accurately reflects the US position. Unless the Department perceives objection I should like to see him alone subsequent to the tripartite approach[4] and in addition endeavor probe his thinking, to make following points:

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 663.001/4–255. Secret. Repeated to London, Paris, Moscow, and Bonn.

[2] In telegram 2191 from Vienna, April 1, Thompson reported that Figl and Kreisky had made similar statements to the Western High Commissioners. (*Ibid.*, 663.001/4–155)

[3] See Document 16.

1. US position not crystallized and in any event must be concerted with British and French. Moreover we can not take firm position until extent Soviet demands are known. May be useful to him however for indication of our current line of thinking and preoccupations.

2. Would endeavor convince him that US genuinely interested in achieving Austrian Treaty now.

3. We are fully prepared to respect Austrian decision not participate in alliances or allow bases. Form in which such undertaking given and extent of Western underwriting is however tricky business and must be considered in relationship to rest of settlement Austrian question. Would explain we see important distinction between military neutrality and political and economic neutrality.

4. While we would probably be prepared to make clear we will continue to support Austrian efforts to defend herself against Soviet attempts at domination, he must not assume we could agree to anything approaching neutralization nor, in view of the terms the Soviet Union seeks to impose upon Austria, to a formal guarantee of her frontiers.

In discussing part 3 I could refer to our concern at his speech[5] which he would take in better part if not made in front of other HICOMs. I have already expressed concern to Figl on this point on personal basis and Gruber tells me Raab realizes that he made a slip which was unintentional.

I could of course balance my talk with Kreisky by seeing Figl but believe he has little influence on Raab and is not certain to get the matter straight.[6]

Thompson

---

[4] See Document 20.

[5] Regarding Raab's radio address of March 20, see footnote 4, Document 10.

[6] On April 5 Thompson reported that in view of Raab's "flat statement" on that day that Austria would make no commitments at Moscow, he would not make the approach outlined in this telegram. (Telegram 2226 from Vienna; Department of State, Central Files, 663.001/4–555)

19. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, April 4, 1955[1]

SUBJECT

Austrian Treaty

PARTICIPANTS

Dr. Karl Gruber, Austrian Ambassador
Dr. Ernst Lemberger, Counselor, Austrian Embassy
WE—Mr. John Wesley Jones
WE—Mr. Richard Freund
WE—Mr. Edgar P. Allen

Dr. Gruber, having just returned from Vienna, came in to review recent developments. In discussing the problem of troop evacuation, concerning which the Soviets made a recent reference, Dr. Gruber speculated that the Mendes-France proposal of last fall may possibly have been preceded by some Soviet-French understanding.[2] He did not elaborate.

He expressed his belief that it is tactically wise for Raab, Schaerf, Figl and Kreisky all to go to Moscow, as they would all have to withdraw for discussion among themselves before replying to any significant Soviet proposal or question.

Dr. Gruber said that Raab and the entire Austrian Cabinet are now agreed that no Austrian commitment will be given in Moscow. The agreed procedure will be for the Austrians to endeavor to obtain Soviet views and to return to Vienna for a discussion of the situation within the Austrian Government and with the Western powers. If requested to submit an Austrian proposal, Raab will take the position that any Austrian proposal must be submitted to all four Powers at the same time and cannot be negotiated or agreed bilaterally. Raab, personally, does not wish to remain in Moscow longer than three days and hopes that he will be able to leave at the end of that time. If the Soviets insist on a longer stay, Raab hopes to depart perhaps leaving some subordinates in Moscow to carry on.

Dr. Gruber sees two dangers in the present situation:

1. That everybody may expect too much, and
2. If the negotiations are broken off abruptly, the Austrian people might be frightened, having in mind recent Soviet threats concerning NATO, partition, uselessness of Allied Council, etc.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 663.001/4–455. Secret. Drafted by Allen. Four copies of this memorandum were sent to the Embassy in Vienna.

[2] In a speech before the U.N. General Assembly on November 22, 1954, French Prime Minister Mendès-France had proposed, inter alia, that Austria accept a time limit of 18 months to 2 years for the evacuation of troops after the signing of a treaty.

He, therefore, hopes that the Raab visit may lead to a situation which will permit negotiations to continue.

Dr. Gruber said that the Soviets appeared to be very disappointed when informed by the Austrians that the U.S. had not objected to the Raab visit. He thinks it highly desirable that the proposed tripartite statement[3] include a statement to the effect that the West welcomes the Raab trip.

Dr. Gruber referred to the fact that the Austrians have been saying for years that they will not participate in any military alliances. He believes that this Austrian stand took a propaganda weapon out of Soviet hands and now the Communist press is objecting to any economic alliances, OEEC, etc., knowing that the Austrians could not accept any such restriction. He said that during one of Bischoff's talks with Molotov the latter indicated that verbal guarantees would not be enough, the impression being that the Soviets want something that would permit them to keep their foot in the door. The Austrian Government, he added, would refuse any provision for a Soviet right of re-entry.

Dr. Gruber believes it important that the Austrian public remain convinced that the West really desires an Austrian treaty. He mentioned in this connection the very undesirable effect of a lower ranking military officer in Salzburg who is reported to have remarked at a recent cocktail party that the U.S. really does not want an Austrian treaty.

On the question of a tripartite statement, concerning which Ambassador Gruber said that he hopes we will show him the proposed text as soon as available, he volunteered the opinion that the following points should be included therein:

1. The West should avoid giving any impression that they have not been kept fully informed by the Austrians concerning recent developments;
2. The West should stress the fact that they have consistently worked for a treaty and that they wish one now;
3. It should be made clear that there has been no break between Austria and the West on the Raab visit;
4. The statement should not be too optimistic concerning future developments.

While discussing the composition of the Austrian party which will go to Moscow, Dr. Gruber remarked that the Chief of the Legal Division of the Foreign Office was included in the party because of the fact that he had prepared proposed texts on the question of guarantees. Dr. Gruber said that he had advised his Government to leave these texts at home and to show no texts to the Soviets. He indicated that the Austrian Government had agreed to his suggestion. Dr. Gruber said that he had also advised his Government that if developments should warrant Austria's requesting a conference, the Austrian request should be merely for a "conference" (which could be on an Ambassadorial level) and that Austria should avoid specifically requesting a Foreign Ministers' conference. He agreed that any such Austrian proposal would, of course, not be made until after consultation with the West.

---

[3] See the editorial note, *infra.*

---

20. Editorial Note

In response to requests from the British and French, the United States on March 31 agreed to the issuing of a public declaration giving the Western position on the Austrian Treaty. Proceeding from a British draft, dated March 30, a tripartite working group, consisting of Sir Geoffrey Young, British Assistant Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; Sir George Young of the British Cabinet Office; Etienne Crouy-Chanel, French Minister-Counselor at London; Norris Chipman, American First Secretary at London; and Peter Rutter, American Second Secretary at London, began discussions in London on April 1. By April 4 the working group had completed its task and the declaration, which reads as follows, was released to the press on April 5:

"For many years the Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States and France have sought to conclude an Austrian state treaty. They have made ceaseless efforts thus to bring about the restoration of Austrian freedom and independence at the earliest possible moment.

"At the Berlin Conference in 1954 the three governments expressed their readiness to sign the draft state treaty with the Soviet texts of the previously unagreed articles. This would have resulted in the termination of the occupation and the withdrawal of all foreign troops within 3 months of the entry into force of the treaty. But the Soviet Government declined and insisted on putting forward new and unacceptable conditions which would have infringed Austrian sovereignty.

"The three governments have followed closely the recent exchanges between the Austrian Government and the Soviet Government on matters relating to the state treaty. From these exchanges it appears that the Soviet Government may now have certain clarifications to offer regarding their policy toward Austria, in particular on the question of the independence and sovereignty of that country already provided for in the first five articles of the draft treaty. The three governments trust that the decision of the Austrian Government to accept the Soviet invitation to Moscow will result in useful clarifications.

"Questions relating to the conclusion of the state treaty are of concern to the governments of all four responsible powers, as well as to the Austrian Government. The Governments of the United Kingdom, United States and France accordingly consider that if the Soviet Government should offer proposals which hold clear promise of the restoration of freedom and independence to Austria, these could appropriately be discussed by the four Ambassadors in Vienna with the participation of the Austrian Government.

"It remains the earnest desire of the Governments of the United States, United Kingdom and France to conclude the state treaty as soon as possible in conformity with principles which would insure Austria's full freedom and independence." (Department of State *Bulletin,* April 18, 1955, pages 647–648)

Documentation on the formation and discussions of the tripartite working group, including text of the British draft, is in Department of State, Central File 663.001.

---

21. Telegram From the Department of State to the Office of the High Commissioner for Austria[1]

Washington, April 9, 1955—2:05 p.m.

2820. Department appreciates greatly analysis Moscow (Embtel 1690[2]) current developments re Austrian Treaty and various analyses from Vienna. Following may be helpful as background should Raab contact Bohlen during Moscow visit but constitutes only preliminary views which we particularly do not wish other governments have for present.

We inclined place more emphasis on Soviet German objective than in analysis first two paras reftel. Would add three other points that have also been raised in previous cable: (1) discussion Austrian question may offer Soviets opportunity discuss German problem on their terms rather than in context we would wish to deal with it; (2) pretexts, being concurrently built up could be used as justification for harsh Soviet action in Austria, which could go as far as partition should Soviets find themselves unable attain objectives otherwise; with the possibility Soviets may have some plan incorporate eastern

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 663.001/3–3155. Top Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Freund on April 7, cleared by Beam and Barbour, and signed by Merchant for the Secretary of State. Also sent to Moscow and repeated to London and Paris.

[2] Document 17.

Austria in threatened formalization [*formation*?] Eastern military bloc. The Soviets probably attempting retain flexibility through various alternatives. In any event agree with Vienna choice probably no longer between treaty and status quo. Soviet effort along lines your third and fourth paras seems likely but consider probable Soviets will not expose hand sufficiently during Raab visit to permit easy Austrian refusal.

Tentative thinking re maximum US positions is:

1. Assuming Soviets would not accept unilateral Austrian declaration re military alliances and foreign troops and bases we might be willing deal with both neutrality and Anschluss questions by four-power declaration promising respect Austrian neutrality and integrity. Realize this adds little to Articles 2 and 4 draft treaty. Other European nations would be invited adhere and West Germany asked undertake formal adherence.
2. Would seek agreement immediate Austrian UN membership but in any event would insist only enforcement provisions would be those in UN Charter.
3. Points 1 and 2 acceptable only if Austria permitted treaty army and free to obtain arms where it chooses, no bars erected to Austria joining multilateral economic and political organizations, Article 35 amended to eliminate Soviet operation oil and shipping, Soviets have no reentry right.
4. If other aspects negotiations reach acceptable results, fixed troop withdrawal date up to two years from ratification provided agreement reached on functions of forces and retention zones occupation and control machinery until evacuation.

While concur desirability Raab keeping Western Ambassadors in Moscow currently informed, there is danger that he might use this as substitute for tripartite consultations should he succumb, despite our warnings, to Soviet pressure to make concessions in Moscow.[3]

Dulles

---

[3] On April 12 Thompson cabled that he was "most pleased" with the line of thinking set forth in this telegram, but cautioned the Department of State about use of the word "neutrality" in connection with Austria. (Telegram 2292 from Vienna; Department of State, Central Files, 663.001/4–1255)

22. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State[1]

Moscow, April 13, 1955—noon.

1791. Reference Embtel 1789.[2] Three Western representatives met with members Austrian delegation and were given account of yesterday's meeting and present status discussions by Figl.

Molotov, Mikoyan, Gromyko and Ilichev were principal officials on Soviet side yesterday.

1. Molotov made statement that Soviet Government was prepared to sign Austrian draft treaty as soon as possible. They were willing to fix a date in "very short time" for withdrawal of all foreign troops.
2. Soviet Union was prepared to return on signature of treaty to Austrian Government oil properties and assets of Danube Shipping Company as specified in Article 35 in return for deliveries of oil from Austria to Soviet Union to be spread over six years in quantities to be fixed.
3. Soviet Government repeated its Berlin offer (Article 35 clause 6) concerning 150 million dollars and method and length of payment.[3]
4. While no changes were proposed in actual text, there were a number of articles which no longer reflected current situation and this would be taken into consideration in their application.
5. Austrian Government should make "nationally binding" declaration of its intention not to participate in any military alliances or to permit foreign military bases on its territory. This declaration to be outside treaty.
6. Guarantee by four powers of independence and sovereignty Austria also to be outside text of treaty. Soviets gave no indication of exact form of this guarantee but cited guarantee of Switzerland as example.
7. Soviets made no specific proposal in regard to subsequent conference but indicated that they expected Austrian Government would be helpful in arranging such a conference to complete and sign treaty. Soviets emphasized that conference would deal only with Austrian treaty. They didn't specify level but clearly seemed to have in mind eventual foreign ministers meeting but did not make any objection to preliminary Ambassadors' or other preparatory meeting.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 663.001/4–1355. Secret; Niact. Repeated to London, Paris, and Vienna.

[2] In telegram 1789, April 12, midnight, Bohlen reported that the Austrian Delegation was extremely optimistic after its first meeting with the Soviet Delegation and that representatives of the three Western Embassies would meet with the Austrians at their Embassy at 10 a.m. on April 13. (*Ibid.*, 663.001/4–1255)

[3] For text of the Soviet proposal on Article 35, Clause 6, as presented at the Berlin Conference, January 25–February 18, 1954, see *Foreign Relations*, 1952–1954, vol. VII, Part 1, p. 1202.

Figl in giving this information emphasized that Austrian delegation was staying completely within framework of procedure which had been discussed with representatives three Western powers in Vienna and made entirely clear (which Soviets apparently accepted) that they did not intend to reach any form of agreement implied or otherwise here but merely to take back to Vienna clarification of Soviet position. Austrian Government naturally hopes that this clarification would form basis for future conference at which Austrian treaty might finally be concluded.

Although Austrian delegation is understandably pleased and even elated at present Soviet attitude, they are realistically aware that snags may arise in further conversations during their stay in Moscow. However, as matters now stand, and if Soviets back up in concrete form the positions adopted yesterday, they believe that prospects for conclusion treaty are bright.

On troop withdrawal Soviets did not indicate fixed period for total withdrawal and Austrians will endeavor to obtain clarification on this point today. However, from Soviet statements yesterday they believe period will be quite short.

In addition to troop withdrawal Austrians naturally attach great importance to declared willingness Soviets to give back ownership of German assets under Article 35 and their general impression was that oil deliveries over six years would not be too difficult to work out.

Chief point, of course, remaining obscure, in addition to date troop withdrawal, is exact nature of four-power guarantees which Soviets have in mind.

As of considerable interest in reflecting basis present Soviet attitude, last night at dinner Austrian Embassy Bulganin in his toast stated that in past Soviet Government had linked Austrian and German question in hope that a settlement would facilitate solution of German problem but now this was not possible and therefore Soviet Government saw no reason for any further delay in conclusion Austrian treaty.

Another meeting is set for 11 a.m. this morning. We will receive this afternoon information on results.

Bohlen

23. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State[1]

Moscow, April 13, 1955—8 p.m.

1796. Members Austrian delegation are if anything even more optimistic after today's conversations than they were this morning. Kreisky gave me following fill-in on highlights today's discussion:

1. On troop withdrawal, Soviets proposed six months after entry into force of treaty but Austrians stuck to their position that 90 days provided for in treaty was adequate. While Soviets did not withdraw from six-month period, they did not state that it was essential and Austrian impression is that they would eventually accept three-month period.

2. On oil properties, Soviet proposal was one-half of Austrian oil production over six-year period; and for Danube shipping assets, a fixed and relatively small one-lump-sum payment.

3. On declaration neutrality and guarantee, Soviets said they were willing to have Austrian declaration and four-power guarantee made after ratification of treaty so that it might come from sovereign government. They, however, wish word "neutrality" in some form inserted into Austrian declaration submitted at Berlin.[2] On four-power guarantee, Soviets have presented no draft but referred to example of Switzerland and to 1815 statement of five powers concerning Switzerland which apparently in addition to respecting Swiss neutrality contains guarantee of independence and territorial integrity Switzerland. Soviets referred in this connection to practice developed in field of neutrality by Swiss. At tomorrow's meeting Austrians will endeavor to obtain clarification as to exactly what Soviets have in mind especially in regard to right of Austria to join UN and other international or regional organizations of a non-military nature.

4. Soviets were in agreement with Austrian position of undesirability of attempting to reopen any agreed articles of draft treaty with exception of those relating to economic assets but indicated willingness to revise or even drop a number of clauses which are now outmoded, i.e., concerning war criminals. Austrians welcome this development but do not consider points of sufficient importance to warrant renegotiation if there is any doubt on part three Western powers.

At Austrian Embassy reception this afternoon Molotov again went out of way to underline Soviet recognition that ultimate decision rests on agreement among four powers and Austria. He told us that Soviet Government welcomed fact that Austrian delegation was keeping three Western representatives here currently informed on course discussions and several times expressed hope to three of us that their efforts here would meet with approval our governments. We, of course, told him that all we could do is to report developments during discussions to our governments and restated our general position concerning desire of achieving acceptable Austrian treaty.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 663.001/4–1355. Secret; Niact. Repeated to London, Paris, and Vienna.

[2] For documentation on discussion of the Austrian problem at the Berlin Conference, see *Foreign Relations*, 1952–1954, vol. VII, Part 1, pp. 1061 ff.

There will be further meetings tomorrow at an hour yet to be determined but Austrian delegation has stated they will have final informative briefing with Western representatives at close of discussion tomorrow. Present plans are for Austrian delegation to leave Friday morning for Vienna.

Bohlen

---

24. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State[1]

Moscow, April 14, 1955—9 p.m.

1808. Western representatives met with Bischoff to obtain information concerning results today's discussion. According to Bischoff, Ministers Figl and Kreisky had expected to be presented but were apparently held up in last minute drafting of communiqué expected to be issued this evening.[2] Interview was not particularly satisfactory as Bischoff as always was somewhat vague and not too clear on number of specific points and especially on neutrality issue (Embassy telegram 1796[3]) which yesterday Austrians said they intended to clarify. In general as far as we could gather final results were as follows:

1. Treaty as drafted will remain unchanged.

2. Soviet economic concessions (Embassy 1796) to be embodied in bilateral agreement between Austria and Soviet Union.

3. On troop withdrawal article in treaty stands but Soviets offered to accept either three-month period provided in treaty or December 31, 1955, whichever was earlier if treaty ratified during course this year.

4. Guarantee: It was on this point that Bischoff was extremely vague and unclear. In reply to our questions he said Soviets had not made any more precise their position as to Swiss model than they had yesterday but at one time he stated he had "impression" that Soviets expected Austrian Government would request four powers to guarantee its independence and territorial integrity. Whether this was

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 663.001/4–1455. Secret; Niact. Repeated to London, Paris, and Vienna.

[2] For text of the final communiqué, dated April 15, see Department of State *Bulletin*, May 2, 1955, pp. 734–735 or *Documents* (R.I.I.A.) for 1955, pp. 223–224.

[3] *Supra*.

to be a request for a collective instrument or individual guarantees was not at all clear and at one point Bischoff said that it would be up to each power to respond as it saw fit. This, of course, is extremely important point but we were unable to extract from Bischoff exactly how situation was left beyond fact Soviets considered that as matter for four powers to decide. Since we will not have further opportunity, except possibly at airport tomorrow morning, to see members Austrian delegation, believe it important that Western Ambassadors at earliest possible moment obtain clarification on this point.

5. Communiqué will be issued this evening which will reflect results of discussions here and will not we gathered from Bischoff be confined merely to generalities.

Bischoff at one point stated that Chancellor Raab after consultation with parties forming coalition and with approval Parliament, on April 26 on occasion tenth anniversary formation Austrian Government, would announce Austrian position on neutrality. In reply to this we all three stated we felt it was extremely important that Austrian Government before making any such public declaration and commitment should have full consultation with three Western governments particularly on neutrality issue.

It was most unfortunate that we were not able to have fill-in from members Austrian delegation as previously since with Bischoff it was impossible to tell whether what he says represents (A) Soviet position, (B) that of his government, or (C) his own personal impressions and views.

Will send my analysis of Soviet position tomorrow.

Bohlen

---

25. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State[1]

Moscow, April 15, 1955—2 p.m.

1811. Reference: Embtel 1810.[2] Three Western representatives met with Figl and Kreisky this morning and were able to clear up number points left obscure by Bischoff yesterday (1808[3]). There was apparently no difficulty in regard to communiqué but last night's dinner at Kremlin made it impossible to get final agreed text and translations done in time for release yesterday evening. Communiqué will be released 3 p.m. Moscow time.[4] Communiqué outlines in general results of talks and refers to desirability early conclusion Austrian Treaty; reaffirmation by Austrian delegation of Berlin Conference declaration concerning military alliances and bases[5] and intention pursue policy independence; Soviet willingness for troops of occupying powers to be withdrawn after entry into force treaty not later than December 31, 1955; referring to tripartite declaration April 5[6] expresses hope that favorable prospects exist for conclusion treaty by agreement four powers and Austria; 150 million dollars to be paid entirely in Austrian goods; willingness Soviet Government to turn over oil properties against future oil deliveries, and properties DDSG. Communiqué concludes that Supreme Soviet will examine favorable request for release of any Austrians serving Soviet sentences and that by time withdrawal Soviet occupation troops "no Austrian prisoners of war or interned civilians will remain on territory Soviet Union."[7]

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 663.001/4-1555. Secret; Niact. Repeated to London, Paris, and Vienna.

[2] Telegram 1810 reported that the publication of the communiqué had been delayed until April 15 and that Bohlen was meeting with the Austrian Delegation at 10:45 a.m. on that day. (*Ibid.*)

[3] *Supra.*

In addition to communiqué Austrian delegation gave us following confidential information:

(1) Danube River fleet, wharves and other installations will be returned in toto to Austria against compensation 2 million dollars.

(2) All oil properties, refineries etc., will be returned to Austria in return for 10 million tons of oil to be delivered over period 10 years.

(3) Mixed Commission will be set up to negotiate trade agreement between Austria and Soviet Union.

(4) On neutrality, Austria will make a declaration concerning its intention not to engage in military alliances or accept bases on territory along lines Berlin declaration. Austrians obtained definite statement from Semenov that policy neutrality would not preclude Austria's membership UN; on contrary Soviet Union would facilitate such entry.

(5) On guarantee, Soviets stated their willingness to participate in guarantee of independence and territorial integrity Austria which would be requested by Austrian Government of four powers. Austrian declaration and guarantee would not be part of or attached to treaty but would be made after ratification. Guarantee would be confined to four powers and no mention was made of other countries joining in. Soviets presented no text or gave any specific indication of what form this guarantee should take. This therefore remains chief unclear point in Soviet position but Austrians perhaps unduly

---

[4] For text of the communiqué, see Department of State *Bulletin,* May 2, 1955, pp. 734–735 or *Documents* (R.I.I.A.) for 1955, pp. 223–224.

[5] For text of proposals regarding Austria, made at the Berlin Conference, see *Foreign Relations,* 1952–1954, vol. VII, Part 2, pp. 1193–1203.

[6] See Document 20.

[7] On April 14 Bohlen reported that the Austrian Delegation had petitioned the Soviet Union for the release of Austrians detained in the Soviet Union for war crimes. (Telegram 1801 from Moscow; Department of State, Central Files, 663.001/4–1455)

so did not anticipate any stepped-up Soviet demands on this point. Soviets continued to make reference to Swiss model.

(6) Austrians emphasized that communiqué does not contain details on economic questions nor any reference to neutrality or guarantee and expressed hope this would be kept confidential.

(7) Results conversations were recorded in aide-mémoire[8] initialed by both parties which contained statement that Austrian delegation would endeavor to obtain Parliamentary approval for positions adopted at Moscow.

(8) As to future procedure, no time was set for four-power conference with Austrian participation but both agreed to recommend Vienna as place. We gather that Austrian Government will immediately undertake necessary consultations with three Western powers in order to accelerate final conclusion treaty.

(9) Soviets were extremely amiable at last night's dinner and no toasts or speeches were made which contained attacks on any country. Molotov repeatedly stated that conclusion Austrian Treaty was not matter for Soviets and Austrians alone but required agreement among four occupying powers. He also expressed view that conclusion Austrian Treaty would be indication possibility settling other outstanding questions between great powers by negotiation.

Bohlen

---

[8] For a summary of this aide-mémoire, see telegram 2331, *infra.*

---

26. Telegram From the Office of the High Commissioner for Austria to the Department of State[1]

Vienna, April 16, 1955—5 p.m.

2331. Figl and Kreisky this morning informed West HICOMs as follows:

The delegation had signed a memorandum[2] which had not committed the government but the 4 members of the delegation undertook make effort obtain assent of Parliament and Western powers. The memo was to be kept confidential. Figl, so far as I could tell, then read virtually the entire memo which following are the outstanding points:

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 663.001/4–1655. Secret; Priority. Repeated to London, Paris, and Moscow.

[2] A translation of the full text of the memorandum was transmitted in telegram 2360 from Vienna, April 19. (*Ibid.*, 663.001/4–1955) The German text (along with another translation) was transmitted as an enclosure to despatch 1221 from Vienna, April 20. (*Ibid.*, 663.001/4–2055) The memorandum was made public in May following the signing of the Austrian State Treaty, and is printed in full in Department of State *Bulletin*, June 20, 1955, pp. 1011–1013.

1. The Austrian Government would make a declaration, after conclusion of the treaty, to the effect that it would enter no military alliances or allow military bases on its territory and that it would behave in a neutral manner comparable to Switzerland. The 4 powers would be asked to take note or undertake to respect (Austrians are very vague on this point) the Austrian declaration.

Kreisky said that in discussion this point Secretary Dulles' statements at Berlin[3] were cited to the effect that once Austria was free she could of course make a declaration of this kind. Austrians said they were fully convinced that without mention of neutrality Soviets would refuse to conclude treaty.

2. The memo stated that Austria would welcome a 4-power guarantee of integrity and inviolability. Austria will make every effort to obtain such guarantee.

3. The agreement on oil fields and DDSG was as already reported from Moscow. Only additional point was agreement there be no discrimination against employees of USIA. Soviets orally stated workmen could, of course, be discharged for inefficiency. In discussion of payments to be made under Article 35 Mikoyan recognized Austria could not be expected to supply goods she did not regularly export. Soviets will furnish list of goods desired as basis for discussion and Mixed Commission will work out details. World market prices expressed in American dollars will prevail. Deliveries and prices will be fixed annually. Article 35 to be left as is in treaty but as indicated in bilateral agreement. When I pointed out that so far as West powers were concerned we would have no legal right object should Soviets reoccupy oil fields Austrians indicated probability that Soviets would agree amend the article if we insisted. After long discussion Soviets agreed accept one million tons raw oil per annum for 10 years, quality unspecified, delivered at Austrian frontier. Soviets would accept speeded up deliveries. Soviets claimed reserves amounted to 70 million tons. Austria will be obliged undertake no turnover any German assets in Soviet zone to foreign individuals or companies but indicated they would make no difficulty re small properties.

4. Occupation forces to leave no later than end 1955. Raab had pressed for fixed date and Soviets for 6 months. Soviets made clear they were prepared both sign and ratify without delay.

5. It was agreed that various outdated articles in treaty could be dropped including 6, 11, 15, 16 bis. and 36. Soviets also expressed willingness drop 48 bis. if Austrians would give up their claims. Soviets indicated prepared drop other articles if agreement readily reached but not willing engage in long redrafting. Also said that they had no interest in articles concerning only West powers.

6. It was agreed that Soviet Union and Austria would establish normal trade relations. No date indicated.

7. Austrians had no clear ideas of future procedure. Cabinet will be informed on Tuesday as well as principal party leaders. Austrians did not know whether Soviets would now send us note. If nothing transpires before 27th Austrians will then call for conference. Soviets

---

[3] For Secretary Dulles' statement on Austria at the Berlin Conference, see Secto 126, *Foreign Relations*, 1952–1954, vol. VII, Part 1, p. 1066.

agreeable to holding conference in Vienna. I pointed out would be difficult for West powers to determine their policy on larger questions that had been raised until they knew exactly what would be in treaty. I made personal observation this would seem to indicate at least preliminary conference of Ambassadors with Austrian participation. Kreisky said highly important that West react in concrete manner promptly and thought call for meeting of Ambassadors would be best procedure. Kreisky said Bulganin remarked that Austrian treaty question could not have been settled earlier as Soviets had considered that Austrian and German questions should be settled together. They had thought settlement Austrian question would have helped settle German problem but now the German question has been settled in another way. They could continue to remain in Austria but were prepared to settle if none of the big powers gained advantage therefrom. Mikoyan remarked that settlement of problem involving 7 million people could not form precedent for settlement problem involving 70 million. Kreisky said was sure Soviets would use Austrian settlement in their propaganda in Germany but believed they recognized German problem could not be dealt with for time being.

When asked what would be next development in the settlement of Austrian question Mikoyan remarked might be possible make progress on disarmament. He mentioned that development of A-bombs had involved frightful cost to Soviet Union.

Kreisky said at no time during discussions did Soviets make any remarks hostile to West powers.[4]

Thompson

---

[4] On April 19 Bohlen reported that this account agreed "in all particulars" with the information which he had received from the Austrian Delegation except for two minor points: he had not understood that there would be a separate four-power statement on the Austrian declaration of neutrality and he had understood the reference to troop withdrawal at the end of 1955 meant only in the event the treaty came into force in that year. (Telegram 1838 from Moscow; Department of State, Central Files, 663.001/4–1955)

27. Telegram From the Department of State to the Office of the High Commissioner for Austria[1]

Washington, April 17, 1955—11:11 a.m.

2893. Dept concurs British reaction cautious optimism (London's 4560[2]) and agrees Western attitude and actions should avoid creation any impression other than West intention conclude acceptable Austrian treaty quickly as possible. Western initiative this respect as suggested French (Paris 4486[3]) has we believe considerable merit as has suggestion Moscow's 1816[4] Western powers drafting guarantee document. Some doubt however re net advantage West being on record as taking initiative in proposing any form guarantee which in any event would require most careful study and Congressional consideration here.

We are considering suggesting to UK and France that we agree upon and announce soonest: 1) establishment April 25 tripartite working group consider results Austro-Soviet talks; 2) invitation Soviets and Austrians ambassadorial conference Vienna beginning immediately after NATO ministerial meeting[5] (perhaps May 16) to resume negotiations Austrian treaty; 3) Western view that if successful ambassadorial conference should be followed promptly by meeting Foreign Ministers to conclude treaty.

Foregoing proposals of course depend upon report received from High Commissioners Vienna following their talk with Austrians which we hope will further clarify what actually took place Moscow and include High Commissioners assessment present situation. Meanwhile desire addressees comments.

Also recommend consideration tripartite expression to Raab and Schaerf undesirability further extremely optimistic public statements particularly to forestall such statements on tenth anniversary establishment second Austrian Republic. Three West High Commissioners could explain to Raab and Schaerf that lack clarity Soviet intentions on neutrality and guarantee and absence West views those points argue for greater caution. Such public statements prejudice West position and may make negotiations more difficult and costly.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 663.001/4–1555. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Freund and Allen; cleared by Beam; and signed by Merchant for the Secretary of State. Also sent to Paris and London and repeated to Moscow and Bonn.

[2] Telegram 4560 reported that the Foreign Office's initial reaction was one of cautious optimism, tempered by a belief that concessions to Austria presaged a "new gambit on Germany". (*Ibid.*)

[3] Telegram 4486 reported that Jurgensen was extremely gloomy over the situation and suggested that the Western powers should take the initiative and propose a meeting of Ambassadors at Vienna for mid-May. (*Ibid.*)

[4] Telegram 1816 reported that a four-power guarantee seemed to be the only remaining question and suggested that it be drafted by the Western powers. (*Ibid.*)

[5] For documentation on the NAC Ministerial meeting at Paris, May 9–11, see vol. IV, pp. 6 ff.

Austrian Govt. should be requested furnish West with substance, form and time limit proposed Austrian declaration against military alliances.

London and Paris requested obtain views FonOffs soonest on foregoing minus contents second paragraph.[6]

Dulles

---

[6] On April 18 the Embassy in Paris reported that Jurgensen agreed in general with the policy outlined in this telegram, but expressed the opinion that a Foreign Ministers conference would be better than one of Ambassadors. (Telegram 4520 from Paris; Department of State, Central Files, 663.001/4–1855) On the following day the Embassy in London reported that it would not approach the Foreign Office since the British Embassy at Washington had on April 18 asked the Department of State for a speedier course of action than that outlined in this telegram. (Telegram 4613 from London; *ibid.*, 663.001/4–1955) No further record of the British approach has been found in Department of State files.

---

28. Telegram From the Office of the High Commissioner for Austria to the Department of State[1]

Vienna, April 18, 1955—4 p.m.

2338. Must confess to strong feeling of resentment at Austrian action in Moscow. Figl's protestations that delegation committed themselves as individuals is pure sophistry in view fact Raab and Schaerf leaders not only government but also coalition parties. Believe it would be impossible for us refuse to sign treaty which will be so much better than one we were prepared conclude at Berlin. Since Austrian declaration neutrality will be made after ratification we will scarcely be in position to object. We can of course refuse guarantee such neutral status but will have to respect it. Would seem that only point on which we have real freedom of choice is that of guarantee of Austrian integrity. Although Schaerf believes we can avoid this, Soviets will be on strong ground in pressing for at least guarantee against Anschluss and I would suspect Soviets would be capable of refusing conclude treaty unless we agree. Believe West German commitment would be minimum requirement to achieve treaty. I am inclined think however that in end we are likely have choice only between guarantee against Anschluss or guarantee Austrian integrity particularly as Ambassador Bohlen has pointed out there exists danger of unilateral Soviet guarantee. As between two I am now inclined favor guarantee against Anschluss in view of position Austrians have taken on neutrality. A guarantee of integrity would tend to reenforce Austria's neutral position and it would be difficult if not impossible to limit it in time whereas a guarantee against Anschluss can certainly be limited. While on one hand our refusal to guarantee Austrian integrity might make Austrians more amenable to Soviet pressure, by same token they would have to consider effect their actions upon our willingness to assist them in resisting any threat their sovereignty. While guarantee against Anschluss might strengthen legal basis for Soviet intervention, such basis already exists by virtue Article IV and as already suggested believe we could lessen dangers of guarantee by reference to United Nations.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 663.001/4–1855. Secret; Priority. Also sent to Moscow and repeated to London, Paris, and Bonn.

In event Department should consider we would in end be prepared give guarantee against Anschluss suggest we do so without first stirring up Germans by asking for commitment from them.

While believe to some extent Raab and some members of his party will be prepared yield to Soviet pressure in such matters as East-West trade controls do not believe Austrians will go far in this direction and think that Austrian sympathies and interests will continue to be closely linked to West. Soviet leaders indicated they did not care what action Austrian Government took against Austrian Communists (other than commitment against USIA employees) and this callous disregard of their supporters will doubtless further weaken their relatively insignificant Communist strength in Austria. Austrians have shown themselves to be assertive of their rights even in face of 40,000 occupation troo[illegible]d I do not believe that Austrian Government will be less independent when occupying troops leave. Without base of large and active Communist Party do not believe Soviet subversion of Austria is possibility and would doubt that importance of Austria would ever justify overt Soviet intervention. Settlement as now shaping up is to my mind desirable alternative to breakdown of negotiations although regret that Austrians did not leave us more freedom to press for better solution.

Thompson

29. Telegram From the Department of State to the Office of the High Commissioner for Austria[1]

Washington, April 18, 1955—7 p.m.

2904. We are concerned at apparently sketchy information on what transpired in Moscow between Austrian Delegation and Soviets and informal manner in which it has been presented to Western High Commissioners after return to Vienna. Figl's oral briefing which may not have revealed full contents of secret memorandum (Vienna's 2331[2]) . . . not inspired us with full confidence.

If you have similar reservations suggest you consult with your Western colleagues on desirability requesting Austrian Government make a full and formal written report to three High Commissioners on Moscow consultations and Austrian intentions.

Concur all points Vienna's 2346.[3]

Dulles

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 663.001/4–1855. Secret. Drafted and signed for the Secretary of State by Jones. Repeated to London, Paris, and Moscow.

[2] Document 26.

[3] In telegram 2346, Thompson reported that he did not consider that subsequent information should change the policy outlined in telegram 2893 (Document 27). He recommended, however, that he be authorized to make a statement to Raab along the lines of paragraph 3 of telegram 2893 and that the United States ask the Austrians for a draft of Article 35 which would cover the Moscow agreement with the Soviet Union. (Department of State, Central Files, 663.001/4–1855)

---

30. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State[1]

Moscow, April 19, 1955—3 p.m.

1843. Following is translation of oral statement made to me this morning by Molotov concerning results Austrian talks:[2]

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 663.001/4–1955. Secret; Niact. Repeated to London, Paris, and Vienna.

[2] At 1 p.m. Bohlen cabled that Molotov had seen him at noon and read him the text of this oral statement. Molotov then handed Bohlen note No. 31/OSA which, inter alia, called for a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, the Soviet Union, and Austria at Vienna for the conclusion of an Austrian State Treaty. (Telegram 1842 from Moscow, April 19; *ibid.*) Russian and English texts of the note and the Russian text of the oral statement were transmitted as enclosures to despatch 407 from Moscow, April 19. (*Ibid.*) For text of the note, see Department of State *Bulletin*, May 2, 1955, p. 734 or *Documents* (R.I.I.A.) for 1955, pp. 224–225.

"From 12 to 15 April in Moscow there took place negotiations between Soviet Government and Governmental Delegate of Austria. As a result of these negotiations agreement was reached on number of basic questions connected with conclusion state treaty with Austria.

Austrian Governmental Delegate undertook to see to adoption on part of Austria of following measures:

> (1) In spirit of statement made by Austria at conference Berlin in 1954 concerning non-participation in military alliances and prohibition of military bases on territory of Austria, Austrian Government will make a declaration in form placing upon Austria an international obligation to effect that Austria will permanently (postoyanno) maintain neutrality of a similar type to that maintained by Switzerland.
>
> The declaration of Austrian Government will be presented for adoption of decision to Austrian Parliament immediately after ratification of state treaty with Austria. Government of Austria will undertake all appropriate steps in order that the declaration confirmed by Parliament of Austria should receive international recognition.
>
> (2) Government of Austria will welcome giving by four great powers of guarantee of integrity and inviolability of Austrian state territory and will support with Governments of France, Great Britain, USA and Soviet Union such a declaration concerning guarantee by the four great powers.
>
> (3) Following transfer to Austria of German assets in eastern Austria the Federal Government of Austria will undertake measures in order to exclude transfer of these assets to ownership foreign citizens including juridical persons of private or public law.

For its part Soviet Government expressed its willingness to sign Austrian state treaty without delay and also agreed that all occupation forces of four powers would be withdrawn from Austria following entry into force of state treaty not later than December 31, 1955.

In addition Soviet Government declared its willingness to take part in the giving by four powers of guarantee of integrity and inviolability of Austrian state territory along model of Switzerland.

The parties came to agreement also on following economic questions:

> 1. Soviet Government expressed its willingness to accept the equivalent of the total sum of 150 million American dollars contained in Article 35 of state treaty entirely by means of delivery of Austrian goods which would be delivered to Soviet Government in yearly installments over six years in amount of 25 million American dollars annually.
>
> 2. Soviet delegation accepted proposal of delegation of Austria that Austrian Government in return for transfer to Austria of oil installations and oil refineries belonging to USSR to effect payment by means of deliveries to Soviet Union of crude oil in amount of one million tons annually over ten years, in all 10 million tons.

> 3. Soviet side agreed to transfer to Austria all assets of Danube Shipping Company located in eastern Austria including shipbuilding ways in Korneuburg, ships and port installations for which Government of Austria will pay Soviet Union two million American dollars simultaneously with transfer of these assets to Austria."

Information in statement coincides very closely with that already received from Austrians but it is noted that Soviet statement refers to "agreements" reached on these questions and formulation of Austrian declaration reveals importance which Soviet Government attaches to this point. It is noted that although model is Switzerland, no mention is made of understanding concerning Austrian participation in UN. Guarantee is not clarified as to content beyond reference to Swiss model but reference is made to Soviet willingness "to take part" in four-power guarantee. There is thus no indication in this statement concerning possibility unilateral guarantee. On this point I sought to obtain further clarification from Molotov and asked him if he could tell me exactly what type of guarantee Soviet Government envisaged. He stated that this subject had not been clarified at all in Austrian talks as it was matter for four powers. He added that it was one of subjects that could be discussed at Foreign Ministers' meeting which Soviet Government was proposing but did not go beyond these remarks.

Bohlen

---

31. Telegram From the Department of State to the Office of the High Commissioner for Austria[1]

Washington, April 19, 1955—7:25 p.m.

2922. Austrian Ambassador called today on Secretary. In referring to latest Soviet offers he expressed concern that these might represent Austria's last chance for independence. Secretary referred to current public reports that motive behind new Soviet policy on Austrian treaty was anticipated impact on German situation. While Secretary said he did not believe that German and Austrian cases were analogous nor that neutral Austria could serve as model for reunified Germany he wished Ambassador to understand clearly that any concern we might have about future of Germany would have no influence on our intentions to press ahead to conclusion of Austrian treaty. He recalled that this had been one of our objectives for many years; that President had referred to it in his speech of April 16, 1953[2] and that only last Sunday in Augusta the Secretary had welcomed in remarks to press what appeared to be promising developments toward this goal.[3] Consequently, he could assure the Ambassador that while there were several points, particularly with respect to neutrality and guarantees of integrity which were not yet clear, US desired to avail present apparently favorable attitude Soviets and would take every appropriate step to conclude treaty as quickly as possible. He recalled that Soviets had in past linked German and Austrian questions and reiterated US determination not to confuse two issues nor to permit former to influence our policy in respect latter.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 663.001/4–1955. Confidential; Priority. Drafted and signed for the Secretary of State by Jones. Repeated to London, Paris, Moscow, Rome, and Bonn.

In response to Ambassador's question, Secretary expressed view that meeting at Ambassadorial level in Vienna would be not only desirable but necessary to bring treaty to point of signing. He added that while he would not go to Vienna to engage in weeks of negotiations over treaty and related texts, he would be delighted to go to Vienna to sign treaty, once agreement had been reached at Ambassadorial level.

Ambassador said it would be helpful to his government if he could have some idea of timetable of events. Secretary replied that while he would be in Europe for NATO Ministerial meetings, middle of May, he felt that until our Ambassador in Vienna had had opportunity to consult more extensively with his Western colleagues and subsequently 3 of them with Soviet High Commissioner, it was not possible to anticipate date that treaty might be ready for signature.

Dulles

---

[2] For text of President Eisenhower's speech, "The Chance for Peace", see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower,* 1953, pp. 179–188, or Department of State *Bulletin,* April 27, 1953, pp. 599–603.

[3] For text of Secretary Dulles' statement to the press at Augusta on April 17, see *ibid.,* May 2, 1955, pp. 727–728.

32. Telegram From the Department of State to the Office of the High Commissioner for Austria[1]

Washington, April 21, 1955—1:26 p.m.

2953. *New York Times* today carries MacCormac article datelined Vienna April 20 quoting *Neue Zeitung* (*sic*) report of contents guarantee Austrians will ask. Quotes Government spokesman as saying while article could not be regarded as official "it could be considered correct". Article states four powers required guarantee independence, integrity and inviolability Austria and recognize her neutrality. Guarantee would make infringement guaranteed points by any one of four or other state casus belli obliging any or all guarantors intervene. Guarantee would also contain specific provision against Anschluss.

In addition talk you already planned with Raab (Embtel 2383 concurred in by Deptel 2940[2]) urge you emphasize to Raab in strongest terms if not already done, difficulties we foresee if Austrians continue conduct treaty matter without greater care and close confidential prior consultation with West. Raab seems bent on exercising independence before Austria receives it and therefore to have completely abandoned traditional cooperation with West at time when it may prove necessary. Not only will such behavior greatly increase negotiating problem for us with Soviets but possibilities obtaining congressional approval any guarantee (should we decide ask for one) will be seriously diminished. We are speaking similarly to Gruber and hope British and French will do likewise.[3]

Hoover

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 663.001/4–2155. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Freund and signed for the Acting Secretary of State by Elbrick. Repeated to Moscow, Paris, and London.

[2] In telegram 2383, Thompson asked for authorization to talk to Raab and to explain the U.S. point of view. In telegram 2940, the Department of State authorized his talk with Raab. (Both *ibid.*, 461.6341/4–2055)

[3] Deputy Under Secretary Murphy spoke with Ambassador Gruber along these lines during the afternoon of April 21. Gruber undertook to query his government about the story, but insisted that there was no text of a guarantee. (Telegram 2957 to Vienna, April 21; *ibid.*, 663.001/4–2155)

33. Memorandum of Discussion at the 245th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, April 21, 1955[1]

[Here follow a list of participants and discussion of items 1–4, a Central Intelligence Agency quarterly report, significant developments affecting United States security, the military situation in the Far East, and the military assistance program. For discussion of item 4, see volume IV, page 2.]

5. *U.S. Objectives and Policies With Respect to Austria,* (NSC 164/1;[2] Progress Report, dated April 11, 1955, by the OCB on NSC 164/1[3])

Mr. Dillon Anderson briefed the Council on the contents of the Austrian policy paper (NSC 164/1), and read paragraph 16–d thereof, as being the crucial paragraph in this policy, as follows:

> "Vigorously resist the neutralization of Austria as contrary to the U.S. interest. However, should the Austrians, British and French press strongly for accepting some degree of neutralization, the United States may be required to make some concession to avoid the onus of unilaterally blocking a treaty. Nevertheless the United States should refuse to sign a treaty which would preclude Austria's association with the economic community of Western Europe, which would prejudice Austria's capacity to preserve internal order, or which would restrict the Western Powers in giving aid to Austria in the establishment of adequate internal security forces. . . ."

Meanwhile, the Executive Secretary handed out to the members of the Council a revision[4] of the State Department memorandum of April 20[5] on the subject, together with a proposed action by the Council to meet the problem of negotiating an Austrian State Treaty. Secretary Hoover summarized this memorandum, and pointed out the acute importance of timing, since a working group was to leave for Vienna on Friday.[6]

At this point, Secretary Anderson handed to the Council a draft action on the Austrian Treaty negotiations which had been prepared in the Department of Defense.[7] He stated that the Department of

---

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Gleason on April 22.

[2] For text, see *Foreign Relations,* 1952–1954, vol. VII, Part 2, p. 1914.

[3] This Progress Report reviewed U.S. policy toward Austria for the period August 25, 1954–April 6, 1955. (Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 164 Series)

[4] Not printed. (*Ibid.,* S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, NSC 5603 Series)

[5] Not found in Department of State files.

[6] Reference is to the U.S. Working Group on the Austrian Treaty which was to assist Thompson in preparing for the talks in Vienna.

[7] Not found in Department of State files.

Defense did not disagree basically with the record of action proposed in the State Department memorandum. Nevertheless, he pointed out that the Austrian Treaty had been ten years in the making, and Defense felt that the step we were about to take was of the utmost significance. It was therefore regrettable that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had not had sufficient time to discuss thoroughly the military implications of the proposal for an Austrian Treaty made by the Soviet Union. Secretary Anderson went on to point out a number of military problems with which the Joint Chiefs were concerned: . . . .

Secretary Anderson concluded by suggesting the creation of a high-level State–Defense group to avoid any danger that the U.S. might be taken by surprise in the course of its negotiations for the Austrian Treaty. In summarizing the proposed action by the Department of Defense, Secretary Anderson said it called essentially for a reconsideration by the Council of the U.S. position on an Austrian Treaty one week from today. This interval would permit the Department of Defense to present the Council with its views on the military implications of the Treaty.

Secretary Hoover said that he must point out the speed with which the Secretary of State was obliged to move regarding this problem. This was unquestionably a crash area, and Secretary Dulles needed more authority to conduct negotiations than was permitted by the restrictions set forth in paragraph 16–d of NSC 164/1. After summarizing the State Department's position with particular respect to the problem of timing, ...

• • • • • • •

As a final thought, the President indicated his belief that the Soviet gambit on Austria was definitely made with Germany in mind as the real target.

The National Security Council:

a. Noted the reference Progress Report on the subject by the Operations Coordinating Board.

b. Noted and discussed the situation regarding the Austrian Treaty in the light of the memorandum submitted by the Department of State, dated April 21, 1955 and circulated at the meeting.[8]

c. Recognized that the United States could not afford to place itself in the position of alone blocking conclusion of an Austrian State Treaty.

---

[8] This memorandum reviewed the course of the discussions between the Soviet Union and Austria and proposed the several courses of actions approved by the Council under points c–g below. (Department of State, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, NSC 5603 Series)

d. Recommended that the Secretary of State be empowered to proceed with negotiation of an Austrian State Treaty on the general basis of the long draft Treaty and paragraph 16 of NSC 164/1; but with authority to depart therefrom as he deems necessary to avoid placing the U.S. in the position of blocking a treaty; and suggested that the Secretary of Defense make available to the Secretary of State his views regarding the defense aspects of the Treaty.

e. . . .

f. Recommended that the Secretary of State be authorized to explore with the British and the French possible methods of handling any request for a four-power guarantee of the independence and territorial integrity of Austria.

g. Agreed that the Council should further consider the U.S. position regarding an Austrian State Treaty at its next meeting on April 28, 1955, including consideration at that time of the wisdom of the U.S. participating in a guarantee of the independence and territorial integrity of Austria.[9]

Note: The actions in c, d, e, and f above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretaries of State and Defense for appropriate action.

[Here follows discussion of item 6, the status of NSC projects.]

S. Everett Gleason

---

[9] The texts of points c–g were transmitted to Thompson in telegram 2972, April 22. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 663.001/4–2255)

---

34. Telegram From the Office of the High Commissioner for Austria to the Department of State[1]

Vienna, April 22, 1955—10 a.m.

2410. I had long and satisfactory talk with Raab last night. I gave him survey of American postwar policy in Europe and toward Austria in particular stressing importance of American public and Congressional opinion and my preoccupations of effect on it of Austrian actions and declarations. I found him fully aware of possibility Austrian action might affect opinion in European countries and he informed me he had already told German representative here that Germany must continue to arm as that is only language Soviets understand. He expressed gratitude for Secretary Dulles' statement that we would not allow any concern over effect upon Germany to delay conclusion of Austrian treaty.[2]

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 663.001/4–2255. Secret; Priority. Repeated to London, Paris, Moscow, and Bonn.

In course of discussion Raab said he did not consider that Austria would be obliged to ship strategic material to Soviet Union and that she could maintain right of asylum for Iron Curtain escapees. It was clear that Raab did not consider that addition of word neutrality added anything material to undertaking not to join military alliances or allow bases. When I suggested that it might be easier to charge that Austria's joining Coal and Steel Community was a violation of neutrality than to charge that this was a military alliance, he replied that he saw no reason why Austria could not accept membership. He considers that Austria has full freedom to determine text of neutrality declaration so long as it is along lines of Swiss model. He would welcome any suggestion or collaboration from us. Pointing out that his agreement at Moscow left matter to Austrian Parliament he asked what Russia could do if declaration did not mention neutrality but referred only to alliances and bases. He thought it would be quite possible to include in declaration of neutrality a statement that recognition of such neutrality did not carry any right of intervention.

I stated I had no knowledge of my government's position on question of guarantees other than that Ambassador Gruber by Secretary Dulles.[3] I could imagine however this would be most serious problem for us. He pointed out that his intention was to seek such guarantee but later admitted that it was possible that Soviet Union would insist upon four power agreement before signing treaty although this was not covered in Moscow memorandum. [4] He said this whole question would have to be clarified at Ambassador's conference. He seemed to consider that statement in memorandum was all that Soviet Union would do on this question. When I pointed out possibility of unilateral guarantee extended by Soviet Union he at first failed or pretended to fail to understand what risk was involved. He mentioned that Austria would welcome guarantees from anyone including Czechoslovakia and Hungary and at first seemed unaware that this might carry any implication of guardianship but later recognized that this matter involved some risk.

In discussing possible revisions of draft treaty I inquired whether he thought we could eliminate or raise limitation of size of Austrian Army. He thought we could certainly raise matters particularly on basis Swiss example but thought unlikely Soviets would agree.

---

[2] See footnote 3, Document 31.

[3] Presumably a reference to Secretary Dulles' conversation with Ambassador Gruber on March 25; see Document 12.

[4] See Document 26.

Raab referred to fact that of all countries of Europe Austria had been in forefront in dealing with internal Communist menace and said that such infection as there was would be cleaned up when Austrian freedom was restored. He was happy that Austria had refused conclude treaty at Berlin since treaty now in prospect would mean actual retreat of Soviet forces in Europe which should have beneficial effect elsewhere. He said he and his colleagues considered maintenance of friendship with US their primary task and said that in his speech on April 27 he intended give full recognition American assistance. He expressed his gratitude for my frank talk with him and said that if ever lightest suspicion should develop he hoped we could immediately take steps to remove it. He stated several times that Austria was tied culturally and ideologically with West and would remain so.

Thompson

---

35. Editorial Note

On April 20 the tripartite working group at London reconvened to begin drafting a reply to the Soviet note of April 19 (see Document 30). The working group quickly produced an agreed draft which was subsequently revised to take account of minor differences of view, and delivered to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs on April 22. In their reply the Western powers agreed to a meeting of Foreign Ministers for the signing of an Austrian Treaty and proposed that their Ambassadors in Vienna begin proceedings on May 2 with Austrian participation to achieve an agreed text. For text of this note, see Department of State *Bulletin*, May 2, 1955, page 733; a copy is also in Department of State, Central Files, 663.001/4–2255. Documentation on the discussions of the working group, including the text of the first draft of the reply, is *ibid.*, 663.001/4–2055 through 2255.

The Soviet reply to this note was handed to the Western Ambassadors on April 26. Although the note stated that the Soviets did not believe that the calling of an Ambassadors conference represented the shortest path to an agreement, they nevertheless agreed to begin the sessions at Vienna on May 2. The text of the note was transmitted from Moscow in telegram 1910, April 26. (*Ibid.*, 396.1–VI/4–2655) The Russian text of the note was transmitted as an enclosure to despatch 419 from Moscow, April 26. (*Ibid.*)

36. Telegram From the Office of the High Commissioner for Austria to the Department of State[1]

Vienna, April 27, 1955—8 p.m.

2480. At meeting of West Ambassadors with Raab, Schaerf, Figl and Kreisky today following developed:

Austrians have in mind that no declaration on neutrality other than that by Raab's general statement in Parliament today will be made until after all five powers have ratified treaty, at which time a constitutional law would be passed. Their idea of such law was that it would simply state that Austria intends to follow a policy of friendship and neutrality toward all powers and would join no military alliances and would allow no bases on Austrian territory. They appeared to assume that their invitation for a guarantee would follow the passage of this constitutional law. The fuzziness of their thinking was illustrated by the fact that they stated everybody would be welcome to guarantee them. The Austrians indicated that they did not contemplate applying for UN membership until after the treaty was in force, and they had constitutionally established their neutral status. We clearly pointed out the relationship between these various problems, and the difficulty for our governments in taking a position on any one of them until all were clear. The Austrians repeated information already given us that on the governmental level they had no thought of an automatic guarantee. When it was pointed out that the Soviets might object to the form of their neutrality declaration, and might also insist upon a four-power guarantee as a condition of signature of the treaty, they agreed to draw up and communicate to us next week a draft of the constitutional law establishing Austria's neutral status. We pointed out some of the pitfalls and dangers which we foresaw in connection with both the question of neutrality as well as the request for a guarantee.

We pointed out we would have difficulty in pressing for revision in any of the treaty clauses unless such revisions were requested by the Austrians, and specifically asked their intention about Article 35. Austrians at first took the position that this should not be reopened. They did not believe the Russians would agree to any changes other than dropping obsolete Articles. Discussion brought out that Austrian Ministers had given little thought to their bilateral arrangements implementing the Moscow memorandum,[2] and apparently had not considered it necessary to undertake this until after conclusion of treaty. After we had forcefully elaborated the dangers of this procedure, Austrians agreed to support an effort on our part to amend Article 35 to include their Moscow agreement, or to annex it to the treaty. Austrians made clear they would welcome insertion in Article 35 of a paragraph relating to non-return of German assets in West Zones and agreed that this might attract Russians to agree to amendment of Article 35. It was made clear that none of us were in a position to state that our governments would be able to do this. Austrians indicated they probably would not ask for revision of military clauses, but do have intention of creating the treaty army and, although they realize limitation is too low, they expect to rotate conscripts and thus develop reservoir of trained, if unarmed, personnel. Earlier in the discussion the Austrians said they expected to be free to obtain arms from any power as did the Swiss.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–VI/4–2755. Secret; Priority. Repeated to London, Paris, Bonn, and Moscow.

[2] See Document 26.

Chancellor agreed instruct appropriate officials to work out with us assurances covering continuation in force of present restitution legislation, arrangements for return of, or compensation for, properties of United Nations beneficial owners, and for oil concessions, and to consider "de jure" denationalization of British, American and Canadian oil firms within a specified period of time after entry into force of the treaty.

We were appalled by the lack of clarity in the Austrian thinking on these problems, and extent to which they have failed to foresee possible difficulties with the Soviets. We believe, however, they will be inclined to work with us in avoiding, insofar as possible, the dangers which we foresee and some of the pitfalls to which we drew their attention.[3]

Austrian Delegation will consist of Figl, Kreisky, Schoener and Verosta.

Thompson

---

[3] In telegram 2489, April 28, Thompson reported that at one point in this meeting Figl produced a draft text of a neutrality declaration, but that Raab and Schaerf had objected to it. Thompson transmitted the text in telegram 2489 despite its withdrawal. (Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–VI/4–2855)

37. Memorandum of Discussion at the 246th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, April 28, 1955[1]

[Here follow a list of participants, a paragraph of remarks by the President regarding Council procedure, and discussion of items 1–3, the mobilization program, electromagnetic communications, and significant world developments affecting United States security.]

4. U.S. Position on an Austrian State Treaty (NSC 164/1;[2] NSC Action No. 1383[3])

. . . .

The National Security Council:[4]

a. Considered further the United States position regarding an Austrian State Treaty.

b. Recommended that the Secretary of State be empowered to proceed with negotiation of an Austrian State Treaty on the general basis of the long draft Treaty, but with authority to depart therefrom as he deems necessary in accordance with the following provisions:

. . . .

[Here follows discussion of item 5, developments in Vietnam; for text, see volume I, page 307.]

S. Everett Gleason

---

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Gleason on April 29.

[2] For text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1952–1954, vol. VII, Part 2, p. 1914.

[3] See the last part of Document 33.

[4] The text of this record of action was transmitted to Vienna in telegram 3045, April 29. (Department of State, Central Files, 663.001/4–2955)

---

38. Telegram From the Office of the High Commissioner for Austria to the Department of State[1]

Vienna, April 28, 1955—7 p.m.

2502. For the Secretary. While as indicated previous cables positions British, French and particularly Austrians on various matters far from clear, negotiating problems have emerged to point where further guidance possible.[2] I would appreciate before Monday your views on following:

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–VI/4–2855. Secret; Niact. Repeated to London, Paris, and Moscow.

As I see it, it will be extremely difficult meet objective paragraph I(f) Deptel 2983[3] which instructs me arrange for signing Austro-Soviet bilateral agreement and disposition Austrian neutrality declaration and four-power guarantee questions at time treaty itself agreed.

a. Austrian Government seems content allow bilateral regarding Soviet concessions under Article 35 to be negotiated later, but would support Western effort include in treaty pertinent economic provisions Moscow Austro-Soviet agreement.[4] Believe we must make effort do so and if Soviets refuse, attempt have those provisions or a bilateral attached to treaty. Austrians only yesterday began to see risks allowing bilateral be left for later negotiation. Soviets have stated informally they prepared for no treaty revisions other than dropping obsolete articles, but that may be negotiating tactic.

b. Austrian Government only now preparing draft neutrality declaration. My thought that regard, however, is that it will not prove a serious problem. Indications from Austrians are that it will be general and cover only specific points in Moscow Austro-Soviet agreement. Soviets will probably insist accordingly that word "perpetual" be used and I can see little we can do to prevent it. In any event West ambassadors expect to be consulted informally on draft declaration which Austrians presently plan would not be made constitutional law until after all treaty ratifications completed. So long as declaration contains only those points mentioned in Moscow agreement would be extremely difficult for Soviets seriously to object or alter commitment re troop withdrawal. Therefore seems best not take initiative to bring neutrality question into Ambassadors' Conference or otherwise make issue of it, saving our efforts for more serious questions of Austro-Soviet bilateral re Article 35 and four-power guarantee. Would, however, use authority granted me in paragraph I, 3, Deptel 2984[5] if necessary.

c. Soviets have indicated informally four-power guarantee subject only for ministerial discussion. I still do not know whether they will make it a precondition for signing of the treaty, precisely what they have in mind, or whether their actual objective is to be in a position to make unilateral guarantee. Our position, of course, dependent on NSC decision expected today.[6]

---

[2] Working Groups from the United States, the United Kingdom, and France began discussions on April 25 with Austrian officials in an attempt to achieve agreed positions on the various questions outstanding in the draft treaty. Documentation on their work is *ibid.*, 396.1–VI/4–2555 ff. A set of the position papers prepared by the U.S. Group for these discussions is *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 449.

[3] Telegram 2983 transmitted an outline of tactics for the Ambassadors meeting. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 396.1–VI/4–2355)

[4] See Document 26.

[5] Telegram 2984 transmitted a paper on the possible positions of the United States on the Austrian Treaty. (Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–VI/4–2355)

[6] See the memorandum of discussion, *supra*.

As previously reported I am reluctant force issue on question guarantee at Ambassador's Conference particularly in view lack of time to coordinate position with French, British and Austrians. Most likely Soviet position is that this could be discussed only by Foreign Ministers; we might persuade Austrians to advance proposals but would be difficult if not impossible for them to sponsor formula satisfactory to us. (They would not desire any limitation on duration of guarantee.) Also Austrians not fully alive to dangers of unilateral guarantee and we would be in difficult position if Soviets should propose guarantee by Austria's neighbors in lieu of four-power guarantee. Before this question tackled with Russians would hope we could prepare Austrians to reject unilateral guarantee or be prepared make statement with object protecting themselves against possible consequences such guarantee and that we could have firm tripartite position with British and French including their attitude on position tripartite declaration such as that prepared for Berlin Conference (authorized in NSC 164/1) to be used now in event four-power guarantee not feasible.

On the other hand I am much worried by position in which you may be placed if we proceed to draft up final text of treaty (even if subject to reservations) and develop further public expectation that you are coming to Vienna simply to sign previously agreed treaty when there may be still outstanding important unsettled points. Most important is of course question of guarantee and our proceeding along present lines will increase expectation that we are prepared at least seriously to discuss participation in such guarantee. I believe therefore that, depending upon developments in negotiations (including Article 35 question as well as guarantee) and NSC decision that we may have to make our position clear in Ambassadors' Conference and by public statement.

Believe we will have to be in position to fix firm date for Ministers' meeting by end of Ambassadors' Conference.

Thompson

39. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the Secretary of State and the Director of Central Intelligence (Dulles), Washington, April 29, 1955, 2:42 p.m.[1]

The Sec. asked if he has any interest in Article 16 of the Austrian Treaty. AWD said yes. The Austrians should not be under compulsion to return the refugees if we can get around it. There is no compulsion as the Sec. reads it. They can send someone over to interrogate them. The Sec. read part to him. The Sec. does not believe they will drop it. AWD said we should get out those who are vulnerable. The Sec. also thinks we should get those out who would be under pressure. AWD asked where do they go—few can get here and not many countries will take them. The Sec. said it provides no relief shall be given to those refusing to go if they fought on the side of the enemy. They agreed we could help them. AWD asked re its affecting people coming over in the future and mentioned the Hungarian Border being opened. The Sec. thought it was applicable only to the present. The Sec. read more. AWD said it could be argued both ways. The Sec. said he was welcome to send someone over for the 5 p.m. mtg.[2]

[Here follows a brief discussion of command problems in Indochina.]

---

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers. Drafted by Phyllis D. Bernau of the Office of the Secretary of State.

[2] Not further identified.

---

40. Telegram From the Office of the High Commissioner for Austria to the Department of State[1]

Vienna, April 30, 1955—8 p.m.

2532. Following two draft guarantee declarations were given informally to French and UK Ambassadors in restricted session today. I explained that they were only my ideas of an approach to the guarantee problem which might be useful. I explained that I believed that the first version represented a position which I could take at present within the limits of my present instructions (as set forth in paragraph c

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–VI/4–3055. Secret; Niact; Limited Distribution. Repeated to Moscow.

Deptel 3045[2]). In presenting second version I said that it probably went beyond my present instructions but that I would refer it to Washington for comment. (FYI. I hope it can be considered as an interpretation of present instructions.) You will note that I have omitted German peace treaty time limitation in first version since I fear that by adding to already highly restrictive proposal such limitation we could not expect serious if any consideration by Soviets. Time limitation in second version might have chance of success.

First Version.

The Govts of Republic of France, UK, the USA and USSR, taking note of the declaration of the Govt of Austria dated (date) regarding the decision of Austria to refrain from entering into any alliances of a military nature and not to permit the establishment on its territory of foreign military bases, and

Recognizing that the four signatory powers have affirmed in the Austrian State Treaty their desire to re-establish Austria as a free independent and democratic state, and have bound themselves to respect the independence and territorial integrity of Austria as established under the treaty, and

Recognizing further that the four signatory powers have obligated themselves under the Charter of the United Nations to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace,

The four signatory powers now, therefore, solemnly declare that if, in the opinion of any of them, there is a violation of Austrian territorial integrity, they will treat such violation as a grave threat to the peace and will bring the matter immediately to the attention of the United Nations with a view to securing appropriate decisions or recommendations by the United Nations to meet the situation.

The four signatory powers further declare that in accordance with the obligations which they have undertaken under the provisions of the Austrian State Treaty to support Austria's candidature for admission to the United Nations, they will unconditionally support the immediate admission of Austria to membership in the United Nations.

This declaration will become effective upon entry into force of the Austrian State Treaty.

Second Version.

(First four paragraphs identical with first version above).

The four signatory powers now, therefore, solemnly declare that if, in the opinion of any of them, there is a threat to or violation of Austrian territorial integrity, they will treat such threat or violation as a grave threat to the peace and will bring the matter immediately to the attention of the United Nations with a view to securing appropriate decisions or recommendations by the United Nations to meet the situation. In the event that the United Nations is unable to agree upon appropriate measures, the four powers will consult together and with the Austrian Govt in order to determine what action should be taken.

---

[2] Not printed, but see footnote 6, Document 37. Paragraph c is the same as that in the NSC action, *ibid.*

The four signatory powers further declare that in accordance with the obligations which they have undertaken under the provisions of the Austrian State Treaty to support Austria's candidature for admission to the United Nations, they will unconditionally support the immediate admission of Austria to membership in the United Nations.

This declaration will become effective upon entry into force of the Austrian State Treaty. It shall remain in effect until the entry into force of a treaty of peace between the Allied powers and Germany at which time it may be reviewed and continued in effect thereafter upon agreement by all of the powers signatory to the present declaration.

Note foregoing involves US participation in joint declaration which not provided for in NSC decision. Assume joint declaration implied.

Request authorization urgently (1) to inform UK and French colleagues that either of foregoing texts is acceptable my govt and (2) that I be authorized utilize them in Ambassadors' conference as may seem to me advisable.

Thompson

---

41. Telegram From the Department of State to the Office of the High Commissioner for Austria[1]

Washington, May 1, 1955—6:13 p.m.

3082. Both draft declarations contained your 2532[2] are considered acceptable within limits of NSC decisions although second version is probably as far as we can go. Therefore you are authorized to seek French and British agreement to both drafts but second version should not be shown to Austrians or Soviets without specific prior approval by Department. You are authorized to utilize your first version in Ambassadors conference as you deem advisable in light of following.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-VI/4-3055. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Arthur Compton of the Office of Western European Affairs, cleared in substance by Secretary Dulles and Merchant, and signed for the Secretary of State by Jones. Repeated to London, Paris, and Moscow.

[2] *Supra.*

With regard to tactical considerations concerning "guarantee" question raised in your 2533,[3] our objective is to avoid having Secretary arrive Vienna with this question remaining unopened. Of course ideal result of this exercise would be complete agreement on this question as well as all others at Ambassadors conference. Our minimum objective should be to smoke out Soviets and Austrians as far as possible on this issue without allowing it to cause Ambassadors conference to flounder. Therefore, if question of guarantee is not broached by Austrians Soviets or other Western powers, you should raise it in whatever manner you think best in accordance with the foregoing (such as asking clarification of Austro-Soviet discussion this matter or tabling your first version of draft declaration etc).

Secretary has suggested some thought be given to the possibility, in event of lack of four-power agreement, that British and French (who are apparently prepared to go farther in matter of guarantees than the U.S.) join Soviets in some form of joint outright guarantee of Austria's inviolability and integrity while U.S. limit itself to unilateral declaration along lines of your first version. This formula would have advantage of avoiding unilateral Soviet guarantee and could be justified on grounds that UK France and USSR are European powers and have apparently followed practice of giving such guarantees in past whereas U.S. has not—even in connection with NATO. Your views on this possibility would be appreciated.[4]

Dulles

---

[3] Telegram 2533 answered a number of questions about the tactics for the upcoming Ambassadors meeting. (Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–VI/4–3055)

[4] On May 2 Thompson cabled that he did not believe the British or French would undertake such a commitment without full U.S. participation. (Telegram 2554 from Vienna; *ibid.*, 396.1–VI/5–255)

THE VIENNA AMBASSADORIAL CONFERENCE AND THE SIGNING OF THE STATE TREATY, MAY 2–15, 1955

42. Telegram From the Delegation at the Vienna Ambassadorial Conference to the Department of State[1]

Vienna, May 2, 1955—8 p.m.

2559. Dept pass USIA. First Ambassadorial conference with US presiding in 4-1/2 hours meeting after agreeing rapidly procedures heard Figl suggest discussion of treaty article by article.[2] Uncontroversial articles to be settled quickly while disagreed articles laid aside for later consideration. Figl divided such articles into two groups (1) obsolete and (2) incompatible with envisaged Austrian neutrality. Figl asked results Moscow negotiations be considered in treaty text specifically economic alleviations.

UK, US and France, to lesser extent, supported Figl position but Soviets argued agreement already existed on state treaty making article by article examination superfluous. Ilyichev argued only articles on which participants had observations be reviewed. Figl sought reconcile US and Soviet proposals by declaring intention to request deletion Article 6 and reserve right return to Preamble. Figl's proposal adopted and examination of articles beginning Article 6 began.[3]

Conference quickly agreed delete Articles 6, 11, 13, 14, 15 at Austrian request. Figl suggested deletion Article 8 but readily agreed to accept retention. Article 9 including USSR 1950 addition accepted.

First disagreement arose Article 16. Austrian asked deletion on grounds obsolete and contrary refugee convention as well as envisaged Austrian neutrality. Soviets next took firm stand against deletion. Ilyichev argued article agreed at Berlin. Launched into attack West treatment DP's and hindrances raised to repatriation. Absolved Austrian Govt of blame.

West Ambassadors strongly supported Figl with US Ambassador Thompson speaking last arguing that Austria might be obliged withdraw from Geneva Convention with which this article incompatible which would certainly not be helping Austrian start on new road envisaged for her. US Ambassador continued that in view Austria's intended neutrality, particularly important that no foreign govt have basis for intervention Austrian internal affairs. This article as now stands allows indefinitely repatriation teams and thus furnishes basis intervention and quarrels with Austrian Govt. US Ambassador stated world demands we approach this treaty in new spirit. Our govts have not only to sign this treaty but ratify it. Would be great pity to present treaty to our respective Parliaments containing articles leading to misunderstanding and criticism.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–VI/5–255. Confidential; Niact. Repeated to London, Paris, Moscow, and Bonn. Telegrams from the delegation are numbered in sequence with telegrams from the Embassy in Vienna.

[2] The meeting began at 11 a.m. The heads of the five delegations were High Commissioner Thompson (United States), High Commissioner Ilichev (Soviet Union), High Commissioner Wallinger (United Kingdom), High Commissioner Lalouette (France), and Foreign Minister Figl (Austria). The unofficial U.S. Delegation verbatim minutes and the official conference minutes of this meeting were transmitted as enclosures to despatch 1273 from Vienna, May 4. (*Ibid.*, 396.1–VI/5–455) For a French account of this meeting, see *Documents Diplomatiques Français*, 1955, Tome 1, pp. 557–559.

[3] For text of the articles of the treaty, see *Foreign Relations*, 1947, vol. II, p. 516; subsequent revisions in 1948 and 1949 to articles that were still unagreed are *ibid.*, 1948, vol. II, p. 1514, and *ibid.*, 1949, vol. III, p. 1131.

When Ilyichev complained re alleged difficulties visiting DP camps, US Ambassador replied that Soviets for six years had permanent repatriation mission in US Zone and after its withdrawal Soviets had never been denied access to camps. To Soviet Ambassador's complaint that visits DP camps conducted under eyes military police and Ilyichev's reproach West more concerned with articles than human beings, Thompson retorted precisely because we do think of DP's as human beings that we have controls on visits. US Ambassador concluded that ample time had passed for satisfying ourselves no remaining DP's desire repatriation. To eliminate any doubt re this point US Amb offered allow visits to any camps US Zone. Wallinger and Lalouette supported US Chairman strongly. Discussion Article 16 to be resumed next session Tuesday May 3, 1430 hours under Soviet chairmanship. Factual joint communiqué issued conclusion conference.[4]

No further communiqué until end of conference unless jointly agreed.

Conference instructed secretariat proceed with correlation texts articles agreed thus far. Any disputes would be resolved in plenary session.

Verbatim text will be dispatched earliest.

---

[4] The text of the communiqué was transmitted with the minutes of this meeting; see footnote 2 above.

43. Telegram From the Delegation at the Vienna Ambassadorial Conference to the Department of State[1]

Vienna, May 3, 1955—midnight.

2575. Dept pass USIA. Second Ambassadors conference today in over 4-1/2 hour session under Soviet chairmanship achieved little agreement.[2] On Article 16 Figl again pointed out DP camps under Austrian supervision after treaty ratification.[3] Wallinger termed Soviet opposition to deletion "illogical and completely unconvincing." U.S. Ambassador termed retention 16 incompatible with envisaged Austrian neutrality; said world will be watching our work and what we do here will undoubtedly influence resolution other international problems; asked Austria be given maximum chance have no interference from outside in her internal affairs. U.S. Ambassador on second time around made compromise proposal retaining paragraphs 1 and 2 and deleting rest article, stating if Soviets need a legal basis for any legitimate activities, they would have it in paragraphs 1 and 2. French, Austrian and British concurred while Soviets said would consider U.S. proposal and reserved right return subject later.

Conference next deleted Article 16–bis at Austrian request.

Figl next requested in general terms revision Articles 17–30 and stated that security of a neutral Austrian policy cannot be only guaranteed by the great powers but must also depend on preparedness Austrian people themselves. Wallinger supported Figl by mentioning Austria's envisaged neutrality, stated perhaps 53,000 too few for army and cited Swiss and Swedish models. U.S. Ambassador asked conference to take into account following criteria in determining Austrian military needs (1) maintenance internal order (2) length of Austrian frontiers and size armies of her neighbors. Warned treaty must not create situation where anyone tempted to present us with fait accompli before outside assistance could come. Emphasized Austria has primary responsibility determining her military needs.

Soviet Ambassador refused discuss articles in group and invited remarks on specific articles.

Figl thereupon proposed removal numerical limitations on armed forces in Article 17. French sought to allay Soviets fear by stating not necessary delete all articles though French prepared to delete Articles 17, 19, 25 and retain others, some of which in line with present international situation. British stated they preferred ceiling figure raised, and while not rejecting French proposal, it would need careful consideration.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–VI/5–355. Confidential; Niact. Repeated to Paris, Moscow, London, Bonn, and Rome.

[2] The meeting was held from 2:30 to 7:[illegible]5 p.m., May 3, with the same heads of delegation present as at the first session. The unofficial U.S. Delegation verbatim minutes and the official conference minutes of the meeting were transmitted as enclosures to despatches 1273, May 4, and 1302, May [illegible]1, respectively, from Vienna. (*Ibid.*, 396.1–VI/5–455 and 5–1155)

[3] For the unagreed text of Article 16, see *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol. III, pp. 1131–1132.

U.S. Ambassador stated he could agree with French proposal but wished to leave no impression that Austria should maintain armed forces beyond her capacity. Soviet Ambassador thereupon took firm stand he not authorized to discuss 17. U.S. Ambassador supported by British and French, reserved right return to article later.

Figl next requested deletion final paragraph of paragraph 4 of Article 18. Although West supported Figl, Soviet Ambassador reserved right to return to this later.

On Article 25, Figl led off stating Austria intends base future Army on compulsory military training, and therefore proposed deletion. British pointed out Article 17 mentioned in Article 25, and moreover Article 19 bore close relation to Article 17. Difficult to discuss without decision on others. Soviet Ambassador stated since this article connected with 17, he maintained same position. Here British raised procedure point and asked whether Article 21, which not commented on, considered agreed. Soviet Ambassador then stated all articles upon which no comment made would stand.

On Article 33 Soviet Ambassador introduced new text which deletes references to 90 day period and substitutes "after entry into force of state treaty not later than December 31, 1955". (See separate telegram for textual changes.[4]) West Ambassadors and Figl asked time study Soviet proposal but Figl added he welcomed any proposal guaranteeing earliest withdrawal occupation forces.

Figl next raised Article 35 and requested conference take into account Moscow negotiations specifically "economic alleviations". After support by West Ambassadors, Ilyichev read prepared statement that 35 was agreed article, that transfer oil fields, DDSG and OROP[5] was bilateral arrangement between U.S.S.R. and Austria, that this did not affect contents of Article 35 and hence Conference of Ambassadors "not competent" to discuss.

Wallinger asked how Soviets could request revision 33 on basis Moscow agreements and refuse similar revisions Article 35. U.S. Ambassador pointed out future Austrian neutrality definitely concerns U.S. He emphasized under present 35 Soviets retained 30 years right intervention. Added if Soviets felt violation had occurred they might reoccupy oil fields and leave West no legal basis to object. Such situation incompatible Austrian neutrality. Added quite apart from this Moscow agreement affects interests U.S. nationals.

---

[4] Thompson summarized the changes and his attitude toward them in telegram 2572, and transmitted the wording in telegram 2573, both May 3. (Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–VI/5–355)

[5] The minutes cited in footnote 2 above indicate that this is a reference to an "Oil Trading Company". The reference has not been identified further.

Soviet Ambassador stated 33 concerned all four powers whereas 35 with regard to Moscow agreement affects only Austria and U.S.S.R. and repeated comments in prepared statement. West Ambassadors reserved right revert to issue tomorrow.

U.S. Ambassador closed by stating he might clarify U.S. viewpoint by hypothetical example. Suppose, he said, we reached bilateral agreement with Austria that German assets West Austria would not be returned to Germany and suppose we had bilaterally reached agreement with Austria that she would not adopt policy of neutrality. Would Soviets not want inclusion of that bilateral in treaty? Ilyichev bluntly hinted Moscow agreement none of U.S. business.

Next meeting Wednesday 1430.

---

44. Telegram From the Department of State to the Delegation at the Vienna Ambassadorial Conference[1]

Washington, May 3, 1955—7:38 p.m.

3106. Department approves tactics for deletion Article 16 outlined Embtel 2395[2] including your proposed compromise offer to permit entry repatriation missions Allied and Associated Powers limited period before completion troop withdrawal, if necessary to obtain deletion entire article. Regret cannot approve compromise offer regarding withdrawal USEP or similar US organizations Embtel 2531[3] since it would appear to signify weakening of US policy of protection and assistance for refugees and have detrimental effects US objectives secured through US programs utilizing or operating on behalf refugees. No objection to second compromise offer proposed in same telegram since obvious US could not maintain operations in Austria not desired by that government once independent and free.

If unsuccessful in obtaining elimination entire article you are authorized propose compromise outlined Vienna's 2395 which would a) provide definite time limit of no longer than 90 days applicable to

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–VI/4–3055. Secret; Priority. Signed by Secretary Dulles and repeated to Paris, London, Frankfurt for OFC, Geneva for U.S. Delegation at ICM, Moscow, and Bonn.

[2] Telegram 2395 stressed deletion of the whole Article, but failing that, deletion of paragraph 5 and redrafting the remainder. As a final compromise the whole Article could be accepted subject to interpretive limits. (*Ibid.*, 663.00/4–2055)

[3] Not printed. (*Ibid.*, 396.1-VI/4-3055)

Austrian obligations under entire article; b) eliminate paragraph 5; and c) define those persons covered under article as those DP nationals of any Allied or Associated Powers who were in Austria at early explicit date. If unable obtain all three of these modifications you should next offer to drop demand for (c) above. Department agrees that final compromise position regarding minimum acceptable safeguard Soviet duress would be provided by acceptance entire article subject to time limitation described in (a) above (Vienna's 2395 and 2538 paragraph 10[4]).

Adoption of any of foregoing compromises would undoubtedly involve Western and Austrian responsibility take adequate measures secure protection and maintenance persons affected as necessary.

If negotiating situation such that West must finally consent Article 16 in Soviet version as only means secure overriding objective treaty agreement, US considers this decision must involve concomitant acceptance by three Western powers of moral responsibility and their recognition politically imperative take necessary decisions and actions assure safety and well-being all persons potentially endangered thereby or who consider themselves so. This responsibility would involve necessity secure, prior coming into force of treaty, safe haven (West Germany, France or elsewhere) through coordinated diplomatic action. Success this effort would undoubtedly require prior commitment by three powers effect final resettlement all persons involved and seek means to finance all costs thereof plus costs interim care. Believe also three powers should agree in principle accept substantial numbers own countries for final resettlement. US prepared give most expeditious treatment under RRA.

While per capita costs would vary with specific arrangements worked out, FOA suggests illustrative round figure US $1000 (including transport, interim care possibly for extended periods and resettlement costs), for discussion purposes. Irrespective of any limiting definitions which may be contained in compromise text, must expect that Soviets will exploit right of free access to carry out well known objectives any and all categories. Thus many refugees outside limitations may rightly consider themselves endangered and therefore number persons requiring evacuation could, under any formula, involve most of foreign speaking refugees.

Also believe three powers must be prepared issue joint statement simultaneous with final agreement of West to accept treaty with any version of Article 16 which would 1) make clear that decision taken solely in broader interests securing Austrian treaty 2) reaffirm and pledge continuing Western support principle asylum and assistance political refugees and support thereof in UN.

---

[4] Telegram 2538 suggested a 90-day time limit. (*Ibid.*, 396.1-VI/5-155)

You are requested inform your British and French colleagues of foregoing in order strengthen Western position re Article 16 and emphasize US assessment minimum consequences acceptance Soviet version in terms responsibility incurred for protection from moral and material coercion persons involved and for maintaining faith with principle political asylum. FYI: Vigorous opposition this article by major religious and nationality groups here could prejudice US ratification treaty particularly at time US efforts resolve refugee/escapee problem receiving bad domestic press and papers beginning carry reports Communist redefection campaign. End FYI.

Agree desirability obtaining reiteration Austrian past commitment treatment refugees (Embtel 2538) and further suggest three Western Ambassadors obtain assurances from Austrian Government it would construe Soviet version of Article as permitting continuation existing US, international, and voluntary agency programs Austria in behalf political refugees (including subsequent escapees) and that this will not be inconsistent with Austria's proposed neutrality. Finally Austrian Government should agree make official public declaration at time signing of treaty to reassure thousands of refugees in Austria that government will continue its traditional practice of granting political asylum to refugees and will not tolerate involuntary repatriation of any foreigner within its territory.[5]

Dulles

---

[5] On May 4 Thompson replied that he did not believe the modifications desired in this telegram could be obtained unless they were taken up at the Foreign Ministers meeting. Thompson concluded his remarks by underscoring the difficulty of his position on Article 16:

"I am making hard fight to achieve objectives sought by Department, but Department must realize that I am working within the framework of the fact that we have once agreed to Article 17 as it stands; that I have not been authorized to reserve such questions for Foreign Ministers meeting; that I am not to break down conference over such issue, and that presumably I am to work for early conclusion of the Austrian Treaty and not expose United States to the charge of stalling." (Telegram 2578 from Vienna; *ibid.*, 396.1–VI/5–455)

45. Telegram From the Delegation at the Vienna Ambassadorial Conference to the Department of State[1]

Vienna, May 4, 1955—11 p.m.

2596. Department pass to USIA. Third session Ambassadors Conference began with British Chairman referring to press comments re conference, terming them "based largely on intelligent anticipation".[2] Appealed nonetheless to use utmost discretion in discussion deliberations.

Soviet Ambassador began by stating he would have remarks to make on articles he had reserved for further discussion but would prefer proceed with remaining articles after 35. US Ambassador stated he would have remarks on 35 and suggested after that going on to other articles.

French then took up Article 35 and tabled first paragraph including sub-paragraphs A, B, and C of Article 35 as transmitted Embtel 2462[3] and suggested Austrian delegate undertake spell out its obligations under Moscow Agreement with Soviets.[4] French also made oral suggestion consider principle of non-return former German assets to Germans in all four zones Austria. Asked delegates study proposal and urged no discussion now.

US Ambassador next replied to Soviet "none of your business" argument of yesterday[5] by pointing out that German assets East

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–VI/5–455. Confidential; Niact. Repeated to London, Paris, Moscow, and Bonn, and pouched to Rome. Transmitted in two sections.

[2] The meeting was held from 2:30 to 7:02 p.m. May 4 with the same heads of delegations present as at the first two meetings. The U.S. Delegation unofficial verbatim minutes of the session were transmitted as an enclosure to despatch 1273 from Vienna, May 4. (*Ibid.*) A summary of the records of decisions taken at the meeting was transmitted in telegram 2591 from Vienna, May 4. (*Ibid.*)

[3] Telegram 2462 reads as follows:

"1. The Soviet Union, United Kingdom and United States of America and France have the right to dispose of all German assets in Austria in accordance with the protocol of the Berlin Conference of August 2, 1945.

"(A) The above property, rights and interests shall be transferred as they exist, including such improvements and equipment as have been added to them while under control of the powers referred to above.

"(B) The above property, rights and interests shall be transferred to Austria without any charges or claims, including creditor claims, on the part of the Allied and Associated Powers arising out of the Allied control of these properties, rights and interests after May 8, 1945. Austria for its part waives all claims, including claims for taxes, against the Allied and Associated Powers in respect of such properties, rights and interests.

"(C) The handing over to Austria of all properties, rights and interests above shall be completed within two months from the date of entry into force of the present treaty." (*Ibid.*, 396.1–VI/4–2655)

[4] See Document 26.

[5] See Document 43.

Austria not being given but sold by Soviets to Austrians, that title to some of them far from clear and that Soviets agreed to sell some or all of them on condition that they not be resold to US. Therefore concluded difficult to see that this none of US business. He next pointed out Moscow understandings if carried out change Article 35 since conditions on transfer assets are imposed which not now in Article 35. Expressed belief US prepared to accept new situation for Austria created by Moscow agreements but US concerned to insure that new situation for Austria be stable one. Hence asked that vague but important Moscow arrangements be clearly stated. Added US belief it was important that no foreign power have special rights and privileges in Austria that might threaten Austria's new status. Called French written proposal interesting and depending on formulation Austria's obligations tentatively acceptable. Added if prohibition transfer German assets throughout all Austria meant to Germans he prepared consider it sympathetically. Added although US often accused in certain press of wanting return large industrial German assets to Germany, that has never been our intention and is less so now in view proposed new status for Austria. Concluded by stating French proposal as a whole needed careful consideration.

Soviet Ambassador reiterated argument that Article 35 does not envisage any limitations on Soviet right to dispose of its rights and properties Eastern Austria and cannot concern West. Reaffirmed Soviet right to enter agreements with Austria concerning transfer such rights to her. Rejecting US charge that Article 35 could be used by Soviets to interfere internal affairs Austria and US attempt link Article 35 with question Austria's neutrality, he called charge inadmissible since Austria will be neutral. Added interference in internal affairs inadmissible not only re neutral states but also any states. Charged Western wish to revise agreed Article 35 would cause new complications and delays in preparation treaty. Re French proposal Soviet Ambassador agreed only to reserve right to return to oral portion dealing with non-return former German assets applied throughout Austria, though he stated Soviet "positive" attitude on this question known.

Austria and UK agreed study whole French proposal.

US Ambassador agreed intervention internal affairs all states inadmissible but Soviets asking US to set up state in which USSR has rights to occupy oil fields for 30 years. While same rights existed in treaty prior to Moscow agreement, latter resulted in proposed Austrian neutrality and proposal that other states be asked guarantee integrity Austrian territory. These questions closely connected. US Ambassador reminded Soviets that at Berlin Molotov had proposed redraft paragraph 6 Article 35 at request Figl so Austrians could pay 150 million dollars in goods rather than dollars. As 35 now [exists?]

USSR could insist on payment in dollars. "All we ask", he continued, "is that Soviet-Austrian understanding be recorded in treaty". Concluded, there are no tricks to our proposal, we would merely want in record where we stand. Asked Sov Amb earnestly to consider Fr proposal without commitment today and added that he could only consider whole Fr proposal and not just part.

Chairman ruled all dels reserved right return to Art 35 later.

Conf next agreed unanimously delete Art 36 at Aust request.

Figl next requested deletion in par 3 Art 38 words "on its own behalf and on behalf of Aust nationals" and "and Ger citizens." Fr stated preference for retention. US Amb regretted US could not agree since proposal would place Aust nationals in privileged position with respect to number other Allied nationals. US Amb indicated US understanding of Aust Govt difficulties in that some claims already settled. Added that question would arise whether waiver retroactive. Stated while courts could settle such questions he prepared to meet difficulties by proposing that after words in par 3 "powers occupying Germany" insert "and without prejudice to validity of settlements already reached." Sov Amb reserved right to return to examine Amer proposal. Wallinger also rejected Figl proposal but accepted tentatively US proposal. Chairman then ruled subject reserved for further discussion.

Art 39 retained without discussion.

Following brief recess US Amb asked if conf would agree to West version Art 42 since present version particularly affects US interests. Sov Amb maintained Sov version adopted at Berlin.

Fr and Brit associated themselves with US view. Upon Sov request Figl was asked for his views but remained noncommittal. Discussion on Art was adjourned.

Art 44 retained without discussion.

Figl requested par 1 Art 45 be amended to indicate Aust nationals be paid appropriate compensation for confiscated properties according to principles of international law.[6] On par 2 of Art 45 he pointed out practically [*particularly*?] reparations burden and in case matter resolved among interested states, he would submit future proposal to conf.

All four Ambs requested postponement discussion with US and Sov Ambs pointing out Figl's proposal re par 2 would affect Yug interests. Since conf would obviously like to know Yug views US Amb hoped this would not delay treaty work. Chairman ruled Art 45 adjourned for later discussion.

---

[6] The full text of the Austrian draft was transmitted in telegram 2595 from Vienna, May 4. (Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-VI/5-455) On May 5 the U.S. Delegation was informed that this amendment could not be accepted since it might make the United States liable to pay compensation for property that was not returnable under U.S. law. (Telegram 3135 to Vienna; *ibid.*)

Figl next asked deletion Art 48 bis but Fr referred par 2 Art 48 and repeated interpretation as made in prior negotiations. Wallinger proposed deletion first par Art 48 as obsolete. Before expressing own views Sov Amb asked Aust views on par 1. Figl asked for deletion. US Amb stated no objection to deletion. Fr agreed delete par 1. Sov Amb reserved right to return later. Chair adjourned discussion.

Conf agreed unanimously delete Art 48 bis at Austrian request.

Figl next requested deletion Art 49 as obsolete. Fr and US supported request while Sov and UK reserved for later discussion.

Arts 50, 52, 52 bis, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57 retained without discussion. Figl later referred Art 54 and reserved right raise in connection with discussion annexes.

Figl next requested re Art 58 para 2 accession instruments should be deposited Vienna instead Moscow. Wallinger suggested Figl consider also 59 whereupon Figl asked ratification instruments be deposited Vienna and Ger text made authentic. Wallinger stated Austs had actually four proposals: One, deposit accession instruments Vienna. Two, make Ger text authentic. Three, deposit ratification instruments Vienna. Four, treaty document itself deposited Aust archives instead Moscow. Sov Amb objected to 1, 3 and 4 and reserved his position on 2. Fr agreed with Sovs but indicated preparedness accept Ger text if other dels would. US Amb ready concur any or all four proposals. Wallinger agreed with Fr proposal and ruled Art 58 stands while discussion adjourned on 59.

US Amb added US desire delete in par 3 Art 59 words "and have affixed thereto their seals" pointing out that all expect signing will have to take place in great hurry and affixing seals cumbersome lengthy operation. Added US views on how treaty should be prepared as in Deptel 3083.[7] Chairman asked US to prepare proposal on technical aspects and circulate to joint Secretariat.

Sov Amb now asked to return to arts which had been reserved. Stating USSR guided by spirit of wishing conclude treaty quickly he proposed entire Art 16 deleted. Four other dels thanked Sov Amb and heartily supported move.

Sov Amb next supported Aust proposal to delete last par of par 4 in Art 18. Others quickly agreed.

Sov Amb next stated that number of unagreed arts still before conf citing 17, 19, 25, 33 and 35. USSR desiring complete agreement and speedy treaty, he stated Sovs prepared support Fr proposals delete 17, 19 and 25. He added hope he would meet same understanding from West re Sov proposals on Art 33 and especially 35.

---

[7] Telegram 3083 transmitted detailed instructions on the technical aspects of signing the treaty. (*Ibid.*, 396.1–VI/4–3055)

Brit supported deletion Art 19 immediately.

Fr offered accept Sov proposal on Art 33 if others agreed.

US Amb indicated agreement with Sov suggestion. Added on Sov proposal re Art 33 he had not received instructions. Pointed out difficulty all conferees faced on ratification question. Said we cannot know in advance what various legislatures will do in this respect and thus to some extent effect Sov proposal depends on date of signing. Reiterated US interest in earliest signing but legislative schedules uncertain and withdrawal troops complicated and time consuming.

Brit stated Arts 33 and 35 required further study and hence he would reserve position on Arts 17 and 25.

Meeting adjourned 1900. Next meeting Thurs 1430.

---

46. Telegram From the Office of the High Commissioner for Austria to the Department of State[1]

Vienna, May 5, 1955—4 p.m.

2602. Joint Embassy-USOM [*USCOM*?] message. Subject: Economic consequences proposed State Treaty.

1. Have completed preliminary study this subject which airpouching today.[2] Conclusions indicate Austrian economy could bear treaty costs with presently available resources, although major adjustment current government policies necessary. Calculations projected only for first post-treaty year but believe foregoing conclusion warranted because economic burdens of treaty expected be heaviest in first one or two years. We recognize and stress that calculations subject considerable margin error.

2. Study analyzes projected B/P after treaty, probable required Federal Budget expenditures, and general impact of treaty upon economy. Major assumptions of study as follows: (a) Austrians lose income from occupation force expenditures. (b) Oil operations at lower rate, with small exportable surplus but costs of extraction and shipment to Soviets require supplementary budgetary expenditure. (c) Austrian reparations for USIA cost $25 million in goods per annum for six years foreign exchange loss partially offset by resources USIA, but full amount chargeable budget. (Now studying

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-VI/5-555. Secret.

[2] Transmitted in despatch 1261 from Vienna, May 2. (*Ibid.*, 663.001/5-2555)

USIA complex with Austrian Government and hope evaluate its production and related factors more realistic basis near future.) (d) Austrians will establish army whose size assumed arbitrarily to be 25,000 first year and 53,000 second year, with bulk basic equipment obtained no cost Austrian Government. Assume no air force. (These assumptions considered only tentative and illustrative and do not presume as to ultimate American policy vis-à-vis Austrian military nor as to Austrian decision concerning level its forces and sources financing same. If maximum forces established first year at Austria's cost without foreign assistance, would change our conclusions concerning economic impact as costs could reach $250 million, an amount clearly irreconcilable with resources presently available.) (e) No serious economic recession world economy, and Austrians maintain political stability.

3. Re B/P chief costs include following: (a) Loss roughly $55 million per year from occupation troops of which $35 million in dollars and remaining $20 million EPU currencies; (b) Payment $25 million in goods per annum to Soviets; (c) Added import requirements of $5 million for establishment army and (d) Costs civil aviation.

Principal offsetting factors not same magnitude, these including (a) Net increase foreign exchange earnings from USIA production of $10 million per annum; (b) Small exportable surplus oil, not over $3 million per annum; (c) Increased tourism receipts some $5 million per annum; (d) Increase in flow foreign capital $10 million per annum.

Project probable deterioration B/P at $50 million per year and in light present overall equilibrium Austrian B/P believe this probably involves unfavorable balance in roughly same amount.

4. Re budget, principal additional expenditures foreseen arise from establishment army and payments to Soviets. At moment uncertain as to possible additional expenditures inherent in required oil deliveries to Soviets, operating capital for oil and USIA firms and possible new investment needed immediately. Have assumed that any profits from USIA be used new investment. Net deterioration of budget estimated at about 1.2 billion schillings first year after treaty, assuming military equipment obtained from outside. (If Austrian Government bears total expense net deterioration as high as 7 billion schillings.) In light extremely favorable budgetary development first quarter 1955 believe originally estimated deficit of Austrian Government much too pessimistic and anticipate only small deficit total fiscal operations of federal government this year be covered by cash on hand from 1954 operations. Projecting this development would mean probable surplus total budget in 1956 against which would be new charges of almost 2 billion schillings (as army expenditure increase in second year).

Economy, already booming, likely to develop stronger inflationary pressures from increased demand resulting from treaty. These pressures may become serious if public investment program not modified to allow for at least part of expenditures that will face Austria, e.g. army, USIA rehabilitation.

Embassy believes on balance Austrian resources if properly directed could cover immediate drain of state treaty. However, economic burdens will undoubtedly present problems, and there are still many uncertain factors which could have adverse effects on Austrian ability find satisfactory solution.

Thompson

---

47. Telegram From the Delegation at the Vienna Ambassadorial Conference to the Department of State[1]

Vienna, May 5, 1955—11 p.m.

2619. Department pass to USIA. Fourth session Amb Conf with French presiding saw British withdrawing reservations Articles 17 and 25 which thereupon deleted.[2]

On Article 33 Wallinger expanded on ratification difficulties and said three possible results of Soviet proposal depending when treaty enters into force (1) if at extremely early date, 90 day period greatly exceeded; (2) if close December 31, troop withdrawal difficult; (3) if after December 31, no clear provision concerning withdrawal. Suggested Soviets would not desire troop withdrawal whether treaty enters into force or not. Alleged Soviet proposal made to please Austrian Govt and public. Next offered two proposals (1) retain present Article 33 but accompany it upon signature treaty with quadripartite declaration containing best endeavors clause, declaring firm desire four powers all processes ratification should be completed and treaty enter force with minimum delay so that Allied forces may be withdrawn from Austrian territory at early date and if possible by November 1, date suggested by Raab in Parliament speech recently. Wallinger offered second alternative proposal, accepting Soviet amendments paragraphs 2 and 5 but amending paragraph 3 to read

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–VI/5–555. Confidential; Niact. Repeated to London, Paris, Moscow, Bonn, and Rome.

[2] The meeting was held from 2:30 to 6:30 p.m. on May 5 with the same heads of delegation present as at the first three meetings. The U.S. Delegation unofficial verbatim minutes and the official conference minutes of this session were both transmitted as enclosures to despatch 1302 from Vienna, May 11. (*Ibid.*, 396.1–VI/5–1155)

"forces of Allied and Associated Powers and members Allied Commission be withdrawn by (blank) or if treaty has not entered into force by (blank) 90 days after entry into force of treaty." Wallinger suggested as possible dates for blanks November 1 and August 1.

British Ambassador finished speech by stressing ratification difficulties in UK and expressing pleasure at Soviet agreements yesterday.

Soviet Ambassador asked his proposal be discussed first and for Austrian opinion. Figl had no objection.

US Ambassador now pointed out additional difficulty in fixing arbitrary terminal withdrawal date namely possibility Austria would be left virtually defenseless since Austrian Govt might not have begun formation of its defense forces when all troops withdrawn. Added US desires earliest possible signature and ratification and readiness enter formal declaration that effect.

Soviet Ambassador defended his proposal and assured conference Soviets would not delay ratification. Suggested possibility West using delaying tactics. Since USSR, France and Austria agreed to December 31 date and US Ambassador in earlier remarks had stated one country not necessarily US might delay ratification, Soviet Ambassador stated only UK possible guilty party and I am sure Mr. Wallinger will agree if we all speak to him. Added US Ambassador wants create Austrian army first and then ratify treaty but according treaty Austria cannot arm until ratification. Asked if Austria declares neutrality and four powers guarantee that neutrality (note this is first Soviet mention these subjects) where then lies danger? Soviet Ambassador accused British proposals lacking substance and opposition to Soviet proposal based on wish prolong occupation.

US Ambassador pointed out he had been misquoted or misunderstood. He had not proposed Austria begin creation of its defense forces before ratification. He had merely pointed out that situation could arise where all had withdrawn forces and Austria not yet in position begin creation its own army. Saying Soviet Ambassador had very skillfully confused two separate things, he accused Soviet Ambassador of taking as one and same thing support Soviet proposal and certainty ratification treaty. Challenged French representative to state he could guarantee French Parliament would ratify treaty by October 1 without question. West accused of desiring prolong occupation but if treaty ratified promptly with Soviet version Article 33, period for withdrawal troops could be 180 instead 90 days. Thus if all ratified by July 1 troops out by October 1. If that date too early for Soviet Ambassador and he wishes prolong, US willing to consider.

French suggested formation sub-committee resolve "technical" problem and again asked Austrian views. Soviet Ambassador stated

Austrians had been very clear on Soviet proposal and rejected French suggestion. Speaking to US, Soviet Ambassador noted "touching situation is arising. Figl agrees with Soviet proposal and has no apprehensions but Mr. Thompson more worried than Austrians themselves."

French then submitted compromise proposal retaining 90 day period for troop withdrawal after treaty goes into force but adding "and insofar as possible not later than December 31, 1955." British accepted and prepared withdraw own proposals, Soviet Ambassador reserved right express opinion later. US asked if French proposal amendment Soviet proposal or current treaty text and if former might be acceptable to US. If latter, then further study required. Reserved right to return to problem. French stated his proposal amendment Soviet proposal. When Austria reserved right examine proposal, Soviet Ambassador proposed adjourning discussion.

French now turned Article 35 and referred his proposition circulated yesterday.[3] Suggested restricted meeting.[4] Ambassadors agreed.

Upon reconvening US motion adjourn adopted. Next meeting Friday 1430 hours.

---

[3] See footnote 3, Document 45.

[4] See *infra* and Document 49.

---

48. Telegram From the Delegation at the Vienna Ambassadorial Conference to the Department of State[1]

Vienna, May 5, 1955—10 p.m.

2620. Article 35 discussed only in restricted session[2] (five representatives with one or two advisors) May 5, where Soviet Ambassador opened with firm reiteration his rejection French proposal of previous day (paragraph 1 text Embassy telegram 2462[3]). Declared Moscow agreement should not be linked to Article 35 since it only represented right of U.S.S.R. to dispose of property belonging to it. Ilyichev asserted Moscow agreement entirely outside competence Ambassadorial Conference. Charged Western arguments aimed at delaying and complicating treaty. Concluded that Article 35 must remain without modification.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–VI/5–555. Secret; Niact. Repeated to London, Paris, Moscow, and Bonn.

[2] The restricted session was held from 4:58 to 6:30 p.m.; for a report on the discussion of other topics besides Article 35, see telegram 2617, *infra*.

[3] Not printed, but see footnote 3, Document 45, for the text of this proposal.

U.S. Ambassador stressed importance U.S. attached to Austrian decision neutrality, a status which U.S. would accept, and tabled following two proposals. First would become paragraph 1(d) to reference telegram:

"D. The above provision for transfer shall be supplemented by the agreement reached between the Governments of Austria and the U.S.S.R. as set forth in annex (blank) to the treaty."

Second U.S. proposal to become paragraph 2 would read:

"2. Austria, for its part, undertakes that, except in the case of educational, cultural, charitable and religious property, rights and interests, none of the properties, rights and interests transferred to it as German assets shall be returned to ownership of German juridical persons or, where the value of the property, right or interest exceeds (260,000) schillings, to the ownership of German natural persons".

Purpose of latter amendment, he explained, would be to protect Austria from strong German pressure for return large industrial properties which would arise under present version Article 35. At same time, Austria should have discretionary powers to restore small private holding in order to avoid political friction. U.S. Ambassador explained adoption of second U.S. amendment conditional upon acceptance of first, and that it would be understood to replace the bilateral no foreign ownership clause covering east zone, with no German ownership prohibition applicable to all of Austria. U.S. Ambassador stressed desirability nationally uniform treatment recovered assets thereby eliminating all vestiges of zones. Both British and U.S. mentioned new arrangements on Article 35 would ease otherwise likely difficult ratification problems.

British and French thought U.S. amendments acceptable after study, while Austrians undertook examination but expressed preference that four powers should reach agreement amongst themselves. Soviet Ambassador modified his attitude to extent of agreeing to take under study combined French and U.S. proposals with further discussion tomorrow.

49. Telegram From the Delegation at the Vienna Ambassadorial Conference to the Department of State[1]

Vienna, May 5, 1955—9 p.m.

2617. After leaving Article 35,[2] restricted Ambassadors' session turned to question neutrality and guarantee at suggestion French chairman. Soviet replied they were questions for Ministers to discuss. French Ambassador said our important task is prepare way for Ministers, at least in general way, and that any information on these questions would be helpful. He asked if they would arise on occasion of signing of treaty and pointed out neutrality question bound to large extent to question of treaty. Soviet Ambassador repeated it is up to Ministers to decide what they discuss. British Ambassador pointed out it is Ambassadors' task to prepare for Ministers discussion, to which Soviet Ambassador replied Ambassadors' task only to prepare treaty text but that other two questions might be subjects for Ministers.

French Ambassador asked if he could conclude that Soviets prepared raise and discuss those questions at Ministers' meeting, and Soviet Ambassador replied that they will be discussed by Ministers if they wish and is difficult for Ambassadors decide for them.

US Ambassador expressed wish for opportunity obtain some information and asked if Austrians could clarify when they intend establish neutral status. In answer series US, UK and French questions, Figl replied Austrian neutrality declaration will be made by Parliament immediately after it ratifies treaty without awaiting entry into force. Then Austrian Govt will notify all nations with which Austria has diplomatic relations and ask them respect and recognize neutral status. At same time, Austrian Govt will ask Four Powers grant guarantee that will safeguard inviolability and integrity Austrian territory. UK Ambassador mentioned possible difficulties granting recognition neutral status before Austria obtains sovereignty.

US Ambassador said he was sure Secretary will be prepared discuss either or both questions at conference and that Austrian neutrality poses no difficulties for US. Guarantee question particularly complicated for US and US Constitutional procedure that regard well known. Remarking he was being purposely blunt, US Ambassador continued by saying important thing is whether Ministers are going to sign treaty without any prior commitment or condition, or must decision on a guarantee be made beforehand. Reason US must know is that if guarantee to be a condition for signing Secretary would not be in position commit himself and whole treaty would be blocked. Austrian hopes had been built up and dashed many times before and very important Austrians not be deceived again. He was sure Secretary would discuss either or both questions fully and quite prepared accept Austrian neutrality. Would help if before conference Austrians at least made clear form of their forthcoming neutrality declaration.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-VI/5-555. Secret; Niact. Repeated to London, Paris, and Moscow.

[2] See telegram 2620, *supra*.

UK Ambassador supported US comments and added his Minister would also wish more clarification re guarantee that he will be asked give.

Soviet Ambassador asked what US Constitutional difficulties are. US Ambassador replied that only Congress has power to declare war and, therefore, form of guarantee becomes very important.

French Ambassador asked if it was possible for Soviets to answer US questions. Soviet Ambassador answered he was unable to say anything. French Ambassador repeated key US question of whether guarantee is condition for signing treaty and pointed out difficulty for US Govt and need study problem before Ministerial Conference. Practical aspect, he said, was that even if Ambassadors are not going to be able to discuss guarantee here they must fix date for Ministerial meeting.

Soviet Ambassador said as far as he knew Soviet Govt never brought up such conditions. Meeting closed with US Ambassador saying he hopes have more clear answer before Ambassadorial Conference concludes.

---

50. Telegram From the Office of the High Commissioner for Austria to the Department of State[1]

Vienna, May 5, 1955—11 p.m.

2618. We learned that Soviets berated Austrians for having proposed so many revisions in the treaty, effect of which has been to frighten Austrians badly. Even in the meetings Ilyichev has openly and unmercifully twisted Figl's arm. Result has been that on such matters as troop withdrawal Austrians continue to say Soviet proposal acceptable and leave to me entire burden of carrying the fight, although they are worried by the risks involved. They also have weakened on Article 35 to point of saying they would accept any solution agreed by the Four Powers. Austrians are convinced that Soviets wish to conclude treaty and get out quickly and think that after signature Soviets will probably return some USIA enterprises even before ratification. If I can hold them and other Western powers in line believe we will prevail in achieving our objectives.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–VI/5–555. Secret. Repeated to London, Paris, and Moscow.

Thompson

---

51. Telegram From the Office of the High Commissioner for Austria to the Department of State[1]

Vienna, May 6, 1955—6 p.m.

2638. I believe Soviets will accept my proposal on Article 35 and French compromise proposal on troop withdrawal in which case all outstanding points can be quickly cleared up.[2]

I asked Ilyichev privately if he could tell me whether or not Soviets would insist upon decision on guarantees as condition of concluding treaty. He said this had never been their idea and that he had asked for permission to tell me so officially and was awaiting reply. I anticipate that unless there is a hitch conference will have concluded its main work by Monday night with possibly only some drafting remaining although Soviets may still balk at changing Moscow memorandum to allow return to non-German foreign owners.

Kreisky informs me he thinks Austrians will be prepared table their proposed neutrality declaration including UN paragraph on Monday.

Do not believe Ilyichev will discuss it and we do not now propose to put forward proposal that Four Powers agree in advance to accept it. I believe this will be useful for Secretary to have available if necessary.

Austrians do not think Soviets will be difficult on guarantee and in my opinion there is considerable possibility that our second version[3] would be acceptable.

Thompson

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–VI/5–655. Secret; Priority. Repeated to London, Paris, and Moscow.

[2] For text of the U.S. proposal on Article 35, see Document 48. For text of the French proposal, see footnote 3, Document 45.

[3] The texts of the two versions of the guarantee were transmitted in Document 40.

52. Telegram From the Delegation at the Vienna Ambassadorial Conference to the Department of State[1]

Vienna, May 6, 1955—7 p.m.

2639. Dept pass USIA. Fifth Ambassadorial Conference with US Ambassador presiding resumed discussion Article 38.[2] Result of half-hour sparring was that Figl withdrew original Austrian proposal and supported US counter proposal,[3] while Soviet Ambassador reserved his position.

On Article 42 British reserved position. Soviet Ambassador asked for Austrian views adding his belief this article of great importance to Austria. Figl reserved right to return.

On Article 45 paragraph 1 US regretted unable support Austrian proposal since it would expose US possible claims and suits in international courts.[4] Added one category of such claims would be Nazi collaborators whose property had not been returned. British and French also accepted US position. Soviet Ambassador asked article remain unchanged. Thereupon Figl withdrew his proposal and paragraph 1 retained.

On paragraph 2 Article 45 Figl reserved position expressing hope Austria soon would reach agreement with Yugoslavs in direct negotiations making deletion paragraph 2 possible.

On Articles 48, 49, 59 and annexes one or more delegates reserved position.

Figl mentioned Preamble again but prepared to discuss after other articles agreed.

On Article 33 French clarified yesterday's proposal[5] by including references to paragraph 3 in paragraphs 2 and 5. British prepared accept French proposal with US Ambassador adding hope that December 31, 1955 would be meaningless due earlier withdrawal. Soviet Ambassador requested consideration his proposal and asked if his colleagues had any new propositions regarding Soviet view on Article 35. When all indicated none he stated he had nothing to add. Session thereupon recessed and then went into restricted meeting.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–VI/5–655. Secret; Niact. Repeated to Moscow, Paris, London, and Bonn, and pouched to Rome.

[2] The meeting was held from 2:30 to 5:37 p.m. on May 6 with the same heads of delegation present as at previous meetings. The official verbatim conference minutes of this session were transmitted as an enclosure to despatch 1302 from Vienna, May 11. (*Ibid.*, 396.1–VI/5–1155) For a report on the restricted part of the meeting, see telegram 2641, *infra*.

[3] Regarding these proposals, see Document 45.

[4] Regarding the Austrian proposal on Article 45, see *ibid.*

[5] Regarding the French proposal on Article 33, see Document 47.

Upon reconvening conference agreed US proposal issue interim communiqué[6] and adjourn until Monday.

---

[6] The text of the communiqué was transmitted in telegram 2640 from Vienna, May 6. (Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–VI/5–655)

---

53. Telegram From the Delegation at the Vienna Ambassadorial Conference to the Department of State[1]

Vienna, May 6, 1955—9 p.m.

2641. Following Soviet statement that he had nothing to add on Article 35, further discussion this article pursued again in restricted session where US Ambassador offered alternative proposal (to that in Embtel 2620[2]) in effort to meet Soviet objection.[3] Soviets were told this was as far as US could go without leaving issue unresolved in which case delegates must ask their Foreign Ministers if they prepared to meet under circumstances involving substantive treaty negotiations.

US proposal comprises:

A. Adoption of present Article 35 with addition of "no German ownership" clause such as that reported as "second US proposal" in Embtel 2620;

B. Annexation to treaty of economic clauses of Austro/Soviet Moscow agreement with 3 additional stipulations:

> (1) Transfer to Austria of oil properties and DDSG to be completed within 2 months after entry into force of treaty;
>
> (2) Oil and DDSG properties to be transferred free of indebtedness and claims as in paragraph 7(E) of Article 35;
>
> (3) Agreement that Austria may restore small properties, houses, etc. to foreign owners (necessity of its stipulation dependent upon degree to which Soviets ultimately willing to waive Moscow east zone "no foreign ownership" clause).

US Ambassador explained that stipulation (1) above might be covered by re-wording of paragraph 8, Article 35 and similarly stipulation (2) by extension of applicability of paragraph 7(E), Article 35, also stipulation (3) would become unnecessary if Soviets fully withdrew "no foreign ownership" clause in Moscow agreement in favor of "no German ownership" clause as proposed in paragraph "A" above.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–VI/5–655. Secret; Niact. Repeated to London, Moscow, Paris, and Bonn.

[2] Document 48.

[3] The restricted part of the fifth Ambassadorial meeting lasted from 4:35 to 5:30 p.m. For a report on the nonrestricted part of the meeting, see telegram 2639, *supra.*

All representatives agreed to keep offer confidential and to study for discussion Monday. Impression gained that Soviets attracted by all Austria "no German ownership" proposition and will agree.[4]

---

[4] Following the discussion of Article 35 Thompson informed his colleagues that Secretary Dulles, who was in Paris for a North Atlantic Council meeting, wanted him to be there on May 7. The Ambassadors agreed to adjourn for the weekend and to request instructions from their governments on the remaining issues. They also discussed the date of the Foreign Ministers meeting, but arrived at no decision. (Telegram 2640 from Vienna, May 6; Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–VI/5–655)

---

54. Telegram From the Delegation at the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting to the Department of State[1]

Paris, May 7, 1955—11 p.m.

Secto 1. Secretary, Pinay and Macmillan today agreed following message would be sent individually to their representatives in Moscow.

"Ambassadors in Vienna are making good progress with state treaty. Signature should be possible by end of next week. Dulles must leave Vienna not later than afternoon of May 15 and it would be very difficult for him to fly back to Europe for some time. Macmillan also has many engagements in UK.

"Please put foregoing to Molotov and say it would be much appreciated if his plans would enable him to join Dulles, Macmillan and Pinay for examination and signature of treaty latter part of next week, and in any event, not later than afternoon of May 15."

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–VI/5–755. Secret; Priority. Repeated to London, Moscow, and Vienna.

The Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France were at Paris for the North Atlantic Council Ministerial meeting, May 9–11; for documentation, see vol. IV, pp. 6 ff. After a briefing by Thompson at a luncheon at 1 p.m., Secretary Dulles met with Macmillan and Pinay late in the afternoon to discuss a variety of topics. The message transmitted in this telegram was a product of that meeting. Other than a daily agenda for his stay in Paris, no further records on the discussions on Austria on May 7 have been found in Department of State files. The agenda is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 445.

55. Notes of the Delegation to the North Atlantic Council Staff Meeting, Paris, May 8, 1955, 11 p.m.[1]

Ambassador Thompson asked for final guidance before returning to Vienna.

It was agreed that the Foreign Ministers meeting in Vienna should be on the basis of the Four Powers plus Austria. The Secretary was anxious that the question of chairmanship should not delay proceedings.

Ambassador Thompson reported there seemed to be agreement among the three Western Powers on the question of guarantees.

It was agreed that Austrian UN membership should be supported and Austria would probably be admitted ahead of the other countries which are being excluded. It was important not to imply that Austrian UN membership had been brought about as a result of a Four-Power deal which might affect the application of other countries.

Ambassador Thompson observed the Soviets might reject our fall-back position on Article 35, namely that the Austro-Soviet bilateral should be annexed to the treaty. He suggested a second fall-back position to the effect that the Soviet Government be asked to give us a note stating that it does not interpret the agreement as permitting reoccupation of the oil fields. It would also be necessary that the Austrians and Soviets agree on the unsettled points arising from the Moscow Agreement, particularly the date of the release of the properties.

The Secretary observed that he and the President were worried that the Austrians might be concluding a "broken treaty" since Article 35 would not be carried out in the terms in which it is written. The Secretary wished to avoid the possibility of a Soviet claim of breach under circumstances which would prevent Article 55, which dealt with arbitration, from being invoked. It was suggested that this difficulty could be overcome by making it clear in the treaty that the application of Article 35 would be modified in accordance with the Moscow Agreement.

[Here follow two brief paragraphs on the work of the Disarmament Subcommittee in London and a Four-Power meeting.]

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 445. Drafted by Beam; the meeting took place at the American Ambassador's Residence.

56. Telegram From the Delegation at the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting to the Department of State[1]

Paris, May 9, 1955—1 a.m.

Secto 10. Following is summary of discussion of Austria in meeting of US, UK and French Foreign Ministers afternoon May 8:[2]

Pinay opened by saying results of discussions in Vienna had been encouraging and apparently there would be no difficulty on text of treaty. Question of guarantee remained unsettled. Suggested it was desirable that Four Powers take note of Austrian declaration of neutrality and agree to support Austria for membership in UN and non-military international organizations. Also appeared desirable Four Powers guarantee Austrian integrity and neutrality. However, guarantee of integrity raised problem for French and US. On other hand, it might have advantage of giving basis for maintenance of US forces in Europe after German settlement.

Pinay suggested Western Powers were still not clear on Soviet intentions, i.e., whether they would require agreement on guarantee as condition to signing treaty. He wondered whether Ministers could go to Vienna until this point had been clarified. He also suggested it might make bad psychological impression to meet with Molotov just after he had come from Warsaw, where he was supposed to set up some kind of Eastern bloc.[3]

Secretary said US had impression, which was not yet confirmed, that guarantee might not come up at this stage. There was some indication USSR would sign treaty without making guarantee precondition.

Macmillan said there were three items to be acted on:

(1) Treaty, on which agreement would have to be reached by Wednesday if Ministers were to go to Vienna for signing.

(2) Austrian declaration of neutrality, terms of which would have to be known before signing. Only possible danger this involved was Austrians changing their position on language before issuing declaration, which he thought we could risk.

(3) Guarantee. This requires good deal of thought since it involves commitments by our governments. UK Government would not be prepared to enter into commitment at this time, partly because it would be improper to give commitments during general elections and partly because, as practical matter, it would be impossible to assemble government to consider subject. He understood US also

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 663.001/5–955. Secret; Niact; Priority. Sent also to Vienna and repeated to Moscow and London.

[2] The meeting took place at 3:30 p.m. For a French account of this meeting, see *Documents Diplomatiques Français*, 1955, Annexes, Tome 1, pp. 95–102.

[3] Reference is to the East European security conference held at Warsaw during the second week of May.

had difficulty in entering into commitment without consulting Senate. It could be indicated to Soviets we would be prepared to discuss question in principle, but could not enter into any engagements at Vienna. He thought this would prevent Soviets from proceeding with unilateral guarantee.

Pinay continued to urge that Ministers should assure themselves that Soviets would sign treaty without making guarantee precondition, before going to Vienna. He also suggested that Austrians should indicate content of their neutrality declaration and that Soviet reaction to Austrian declaration should be known.

Macmillan pointed out Austrians had undertaken in Moscow memorandum of understanding[4] to seek guarantee from Western Powers. We should ask Austrians to table declaration of neutrality in Vienna and say this raised guarantee question, which should be considered first by Ministers and concluded subsequently by Ambassadors. He thought that wording of telegram to Molotov[5] indicating that the Ministers were ready to come to Vienna to examine and sign treaty would allow Western Ministers to deal with Molotov on subject, provided it were clear that there was agreement on terms of declaration, and that we would only negotiate regarding guarantee. Both he and Pinay expressed concern regarding possibility of unilateral Soviet guarantee.

Secretary said he understood text of Austrian declaration would be tabled in Vienna Monday, and that Austrians had indicated in Moscow they would accept a Four Power guarantee but not a unilateral guarantee by USSR. He thought Western Powers were protected by terms of telegram to Molotov referred to by Macmillan. Secretary agreed with Macmillan that question of guarantee would have to be examined very carefully. He doubted very much whether US could give guarantee in strict sense. We could perhaps make statement that we would undertake to respect Austrian neutrality and to consider breach of neutrality grave event calling for consultation. We might possibly be able to consider guarantee if it could be done within context of UN Charter. He doubted that US could guarantee borders of Austria permanently. If this were precondition to conclusion treaty, he did not think US could sign.

Pinay again reverted to question of desirability of Ministers going to Vienna without knowing whether Soviets would sign the treaty in absence of agreement on guarantee. Secretary said he understood we were to get answer on this point. Question was also implicit in message sent to Molotov. If both responses were favorable, he felt Ministers could safely go to Vienna.

---

[4] See Document 26.

[5] Reference is the message transmitted in Document 54.

Pinay said question would have to be decided in light of Molotov's answer to telegram.

(In subsequent private conversation member of the French delegation said French were concerned that discussion with Ilyichev had been inconclusive since it was not clear that he was speaking for Moscow. Member US delegation told him he understood that Ilyichev was asked confirm his statement that guarantee not precondition.)

---

57. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Delegation at the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting, at Paris[1]

Moscow, May 8, 1955—10 p.m.

390. For Secretary. The British Ambassador and French Chargé received today messages from Macmillan and Pinay corresponding to that in your message Polto 7, May 7,[2] but with instructions to see Molotov. French Chargé and I met with British Ambassador at latter's request at Bolshoi Theater tonight few minutes before ceremony commemorating VE Day and Hayter stated that he had asked to see Molotov, who was expected at ceremony, during intermission or first thing tomorrow morning. I told Hayter I did not disassociate myself from his proposed démarche as matter of schedules for Austrian treaty meeting was agreed between yourself and Messrs. Macmillan and Pinay, but that I had no operating instructions.

During first intermission Hayter got word that Molotov would see him, and they met for perhaps ten minutes. Hayter then reported to French Chargé and me as follows:

Hayter put problem of schedules of respective Secretaries to Molotov. He asked Molotov whether meeting at Vienna at end of week could be arranged. Molotov said it would be difficult for him to agree to a date prior to the 15th, and suggested the 15th and 16th. Hayter reminded Molotov that your schedule and Macmillan's would make it difficult to meet beyond the 15th. Molotov then suggested that perhaps one day, the 15th, would suffice. Hayter then asked again whether a day or two earlier would be convenient to Molotov, and Molotov said he could not answer at this moment.[3]

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–VI/5–855. Secret; Niact. Repeated to Washington, London, and Vienna. The source text is the copy sent to Washington.

[2] Same as Secto 1, Document 54.

(I might say as a side light that Hayter's request to see Molotov was apparently the subject of consultation between members of Presidium on stage in view of the audience. A paper was handed at the end of the line by a messenger during principal address by Marshal Konev and passed to Molotov, and the message was read in turn by Bulganin, Khrushchev, Voroshilov, Mikoyan, and Saburov, and then they all got into as close a huddle as their positions behind the front table permitted.)

Walmsley

---

[3] On May 10, the Embassy in Moscow reported that Molotov replied affirmatively for both May 14 and 15. (Telegram 1997 from Moscow; Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–VI/5–1055)

---

58. Telegram From the Delegation at the Vienna Ambassadorial Conference to the Delegation at the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting, at Paris[1]

Vienna, May 9, 1955—8 p.m.

404. Soviet Rep stood firmly on his position on Art 35.[2] French tabled new formulation of what was in essence my proposal, text of which will be telegraphed separately.[3] Sov Rep refused despite our repeated urging to produce any new reasons why he could not agree to some solution which would meet our concern. I stated that if Aus and Sov Governments could conclude bilateral agreement covering points we had raised in time for Foreign Ministers meeting we could agree that such agreement not be annexed to the treaty provided the treaty itself contained appropriate reference to it.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–VI/5–955. Secret; Niact. Repeated to London, Bonn, and Washington. The source text is the copy sent to Washington.

[2] The sixth meeting was held from 2:30 to 6:40 p.m., May 9, with the same heads of delegation present as at previous meetings. The official verbatim conference minutes and the U.S. Delegation unofficial minutes of this session were transmitted as enclosures to despatch 1302 from Vienna, May 11. (*Ibid.*, 396.1–VI/5–1155) For a report on the restricted part of the sixth meeting, see *infra.*

[3] Telegram 2665 from Vienna, May 9. (*Ibid.*, 396.1–VI/5–955) The French proposal contained minor wording changes and suggested that the economic clauses would be annexed to the treaty with a preamble indicating that they were an implementing provision of Article 35.

As there were indications he was merely probing strength of our position I took firm line and was supported by Brit and French. I stated that while I would need instructions to say so officially, I was convinced that Secy Dulles would not come to the meeting we were endeavoring to arrange for the end of this week unless we were sure that the problem we had raised would be resolved.

During the tea interval we endeavored to ascertain whether possibility of return of oil fields to foreign control was the stumbling block. In order to prevent Sovs from breaking story that we were blocking treaty over this issue, I told Ilyichev that the Austs had made clear that they did not intend to transfer them to US or anyone else and indicated that we might be able make this clear in some form or another. He showed considerable interest in this idea and I believe that if we are willing to attach to the treaty an annex along the following lines we can obtain agreement our proposal:

> "Austria, for its part, undertakes not to pass to foreign ownership those rights and properties indicated in lists 1 and 2 of Article 35 of the State Treaty which are acquired thereby by the Soviet Union and which will be transferred to Austria by the Soviet Union in accordance with annex ——."

Since we have already reached agreement in principle with the Austrians on this point and the oil companies have accepted it, there would be some advantage in making it public and avoiding the charge that our interest in getting back the oil fields was the reason why agreement was delayed and was why we agreed to the prohibitions against transfer to Germany of German assets in the Western zones.

It is of course possible that this may not be the principal problem for the Russians and in the discussions Ilyichev has constantly indicated that important point for them was that they had received these assets and could dispose of them bilaterally without any interference from US.

I made clear in the discussion today that our proceeding with arrangements for a meeting the end of this week before agreement had been reached was due solely to the shortness of time and should not be taken as an indication that we could agree to abandon our position.

In the event that we put forward this further concession and Ilyichev still stands firm, request instructions as to position I should take. Would the Secretary be prepared come to Vienna even though no agreement has been reached on this point?

59. Telegram From the Delegation at the Vienna Ambassadorial Conference to the Department of State[1]

Vienna, May 9, 1955—10 p.m.

2644. After fruitless discussion Article 35 (reported separately[2]), restricted session continued with remaining outstanding articles. Soviet Ambassador in chair employed slanted presentation of questions and other strong-arm methods in effort obtain Austrian concessions. Result as follows:

Article 38: Soviet Ambassador stated all but Austrians have agreed retain original version paragraph 3. Despite denials by others, Figl states he would accept either US compromise version or original and finally agreed to original on basis desire speed conference.

Article 45, paragraph 2: Soviet Ambassador took stronger negative line than previously maintaining that no agreement with Yugoslavs would have any effect. Figl requested Article remain open pending conclusion negotiations with Yugoslavs and Article remains reserved.

Article 48: French weakened Western position by indicating would accept paragraph 1 if Austrians did, but Article remains reserved on basis British and US action.

Article 49: Soviet Ambassador hinted at his suspicions reasons others wish delete and insisted Article remain. Figl and Wallinger argued mildly that Article is out of date and numerous bilateral agreements already in effect. French Chargé expressed continued desire delete Article but stated would agree retain if Austrians did. Soviet Ambassador attempted claim Figl had withdrawn his suggestion which Figl initially denied, but said he would withdraw if no agreement reached. US Ambassador insisted on reserving Article for further study, pointing out its spirit is to impose on Austrians what is normally handled in bilateral agreements. Since Austria will be neutral it is important for us to remove any restrictions on its freedom of action. Moreover, some provisions are vague and might give rise to future misunderstandings. US Ambassador cited paragraph 1(D) on overflights as example. Soviet Ambassador rebutted by pointing out last sentence paragraph 8(D) and provision for reciprocity. Article reserved.

Annex VIII: While Soviets had previously reserved on this Annex without comment, they today stipulated Annex should be kept as is. Similar position taken on Annex IX. Both Annexes continue be reserved.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–VI/5–955. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to London, Paris, and Moscow.

[2] *Supra.*

Articles 42, 54, to [*sic*] and Annexes I and X remain reserved and no significant comment was made concerning them.

---

60. Telegram From the Delegation at the Vienna Ambassadorial Conference to the Delegation at the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting, at Paris[1]

Vienna, May 10, 1955—2 p.m.

411. Raab and Schaerf agreed to maintain Austrian position on Article 35 at least today.[2] Raab explained however that at Moscow he had agreed that repurchase of oil fields and properties and DDSG would be bilateral arrangement between Soviet Union and Austria. Both he and Schaerf said they had no fears that Soviet Union would not carry out agreement. They begged us inform our governments that Soviet concessions marked big advance over treaty which we were willing to sign at Berlin and that we should not allow quick conclusion of treaty to be lost over this point.

If Soviets do not agree today we will state must seek instructions. I would strongly recommend we agree to meet end of this week but reserve our position on Article 35 for discussion by Ministers. Point arises whether we should maintain our offer to add provision re non-return German assets in Western zones to Germany.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–VI/5–1055. Secret; Priority. Repeated to London and Washington. The source text is the copy sent to Washington.

[2] At noon on May 10 Thompson reported that following a violent debate within their delegation the Austrians had decided to withdraw their insistence on tying the Moscow agreement to the treaty. Thompson reported further that he and Wallinger hoped to persuade them to remain firm for at least one more day. (Telegram 2668 from Vienna; *ibid.*, 663.001/5–1055)

61. Telegram From the Delegation at the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting to the Delegation at the Vienna Ambassadorial Conference[1]

Paris, May 10, 1955—6 p.m.

Polto 57. From USDel. I am not disposed to come to Vienna to sign a treaty which contains clauses which I know Austria does not intend to fulfill, in reliance on a side agreement with Soviet Union of which side agreement, however, the treaty takes no cognizance whatever. Therefore, you are authorized to say that I had assumed that text of treaty will be agreed before my departure for Vienna and that I cannot agree to absence from text of any reference to bilateral agreement between Soviets and Austria on Article 35 matters. You have, I believe, room for maneuver to handle this and I authorize you to agree to any compromise which imports the bilateral into the treaty sufficiently so that we could have a status to be heard and demand arbitration under Article 57 as against future ability Russia arbitrarily to claim a breach and to move back into Austria to seize Article 35 assets. You can state that I do not see how I could depart for Vienna if you are unable to secure such safeguard.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 663.001/5–1055. Secret; Niact. Repeated to London and Washington. The source text is the copy sent to Washington. According to another copy of this message, it was drafted by Merchant and approved by Secretary Dulles. (*Ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 448)

---

62. Telegram From the Delegation at the Vienna Ambassadorial Conference to the Delegation at the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting, at Paris[1]

Vienna, May 10, 1955—8 p.m.

413. Soviets stood firm on their position on Articles 33 and 35.[2] During tea interval I informed Soviets that I had received clear indication that Secretary Dulles unwilling come Vienna until these points resolved. Soviets asked whether we insisted upon annex or whether

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–VI/5–1055. Secret. Repeated to London, Moscow, and Washington. The source text is the copy sent to Washington.

[2] The seventh meeting was held from 2:30 to 5:55 p.m. on May 10 with the same heads of delegation present as at previous meetings. The official verbatim conference minutes and the U.S. Delegation minutes of this session were transmitted as enclosures to despatch 1302 from Vienna, May 11. (*Ibid.*, 396.1–VI/5–1155) For a report on the restricted part of the seventh meeting, see *infra* and Document 64.

some reference in Article 35 to the Moscow understandings would be sufficient. I said I did not see how this could be worded since if we referred to the economic provisions of the Moscow memorandum, it would cover such matters as trade agreements. I also pointed out this would involve publishing the Moscow memorandum. I suggested better method would be for Soviets and Austrians immediately to sign an agreement in Vienna covering the necessary points, and that in Article 35 we would insert a paragraph reading along the following lines:

"This Article is subject to the provisions of the agreement between the USSR and Austria signed in Vienna on May 2."

We are preparing and will transmit to Soviets and Austrians a draft text of such agreement. There would not be time for ratification before Ministers meeting, but believe we need not insist upon this as we could delay our ratification until such agreement had been approved.

If we included in Article 35 prohibition against transfer German assets to Germany, I will ask that Soviet Union send Austrians note stating that this paragraph in the state treaty supersedes the provision in the Moscow memorandum prohibiting transfer German assets in eastern zone to foreigners. We could add to the paragraph on this subject in Article 35 a statement that Austria undertakes not to transfer the rights and properties in lists 1 and 2 Article 35 to foreign ownership. Corwin states he has no objection to this.

I continue to believe Soviets will meet our position in some form or other, but time is getting short and Austrian nerves will not stand much more strain.

---

63. Telegram From the Delegation at the Vienna Ambassadorial Conference to the Department of State[1]

Vienna, May 10, 1955—midnight.

2686. In further consideration Article 35 in restricted session Ambassadorial conference today May 10, Soviets remained in firm opposition to any changes in Article 35.[2] British Chairman pointed out in introductory summation of previous day's discussion that British and US considered new paragraph 13 to Article 35 contained in latest French proposal (Embtel No 2665[3]) must be understood to supersede the "no foreign ownership" clause in the Moscow agreement. He also restated US and UK readiness to accept Austrian desire that recovered oil fields not be restored to foreign ownership.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–VI/5–1055. Confidential; Niact. Repeated to Paris, London, Moscow, Bonn, and Rome.

[2] Regarding the discussion of Article 35 during the unrestricted part of the seventh meeting, see *supra*.

US Ambassador noted that in course of many compromises offered Soviets, three important Western concessions had been advanced:

(a) Willingness to preserve bilateral identity of Austro-Soviet agreement in treaty annex (recalled that US Delegation had gone even further with offer to omit annex provided satisfactory new Austro-Soviet bilateral containing essential points raised by Western representatives completed prior to Foreign Ministers' meeting and that Article 35 make reference to it),

(b) Insertion of no ownership clause covering German assets in all zones,

(c) British and US agreement to prohibition against Austrians restoring oil fields to Western ownership.

US Ambassador stated that it was unimportant which of the compromise offers would be adopted so long as essential requirements of Western delegations met. In reply to US query as to attitude towards proposal for all-Austria "no German ownership" clause, Soviet Ambassador stated that this was another question upon which he reserved his right to state his opinion later.

When Soviet Ambassador remained unmoved, three Western Ambassadors stated that they would be forced to seek further instructions.

---

[3] Not printed, but see footnote 3, Document 58.

---

64. Telegram From the Delegation at the Vienna Ambassadorial Conference to the Department of State[1]

Vienna, May 10, 1955—9 p.m.

2684. Paris for USDel. Continuing in restricted session after discussion Art 35 (reported separately[2]) conference discussed Art 33.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–VI/5–1055. Secret; Priority. Repeated to London, Paris, Moscow, Bonn, and Rome.

[2] Telegram 2686, *supra*.

Agreement do so was after US Amb's suggestion meeting adjourn without discussing other Arts. Sov Amb refused discuss French compromise proposal[3] maintaining his own proposal[4] provided more definite time limit for troop withdrawal, which in line Aust wishes as in Moscow communiqué[5] and professed desire all concerned ratify and withdraw troops soonest. UK Amb in chair pointed out inconsistency Sov insistence incorporate this item of Moscow agreement in treaty while refusing incorporate another. US Amb supported French proposal on grounds (1) allows earlier troop withdrawal if all ratify promptly, (2) avoids difficult situation that would arise if any one government should fail ratify by October 1, not to mention (3) almost absurd situation if one failed ratify by December 31. While anticipate earliest ratification by US, cannot be certain what Parliaments will do. French Chargé added argument that problem is constitutional one, i.e. no French Government could instruct him accept Sov proposal without risk conflict between Government and Parliament. Thus, ratification procedure would not be simple as all wish.

Sov Amb refuted UK charge of Sov inconsistency by stating his Art 33 proposal introduced because concerned all four powers whereas economic aspects Moscow agreement concern only two. US Amb pointed out Sovs had admitted Moscow agreement does concern all four powers and Sovs now holding to their position although the other three had found that aspect Moscow agreement unacceptable. His earlier suggestion for adjournment was made so as not make situation more difficult. Three Western Foreign Ministers must now decide very delicate matter of whether or not to come to Vienna end this week in face firm Sov refusal compromise on Art 35. He asked whether Sov Amb wanted the three Ministers to make that decision in light Sov intransigence also on Art 33. Remaining discussion this Art resulted in its being reserved, with Sovs stressing question remains under normal discussion.

There followed considerable discussion as to whether to proceed with discussion remaining unagreed Arts. US and UK Ambs (having in mind yesterday's session) attempted adjourn meeting, but attitude other three made it difficult and unwise do so.

Art 42 was adopted in Sov version after Figl, answering direct question by Ilyichev, saying Austs preferred Sov version and French Chargé, following that with similar statement in hope he could make positive contribution. US conceded in view Aust and French positions, but after pointing out Sov version operates against certain US interests. UK Amb expressed hope that in making his concession it would be reciprocated, e.g. Art 33.

---

[3] See Document 47.

[4] See Document 43.

[5] For text of the Moscow communiqué, see *Documents* (R.I.I.A.) for 1955, pp. 223–224.

Austs requested one more day before Art 45, para 2, is decided and subject reserved. On para 1, Art 48 Sovs demanded retention on basis not all parties of treaty took part in Rome conference. US supported UK in pointing out that with 48–bis deleted, bracketed portion Paragraph 1 no longer necessary as indicated by footnote. But Sovs denied any relationship between the two Arts. Thereupon French, touting their action as "taking large view," agreed retention para 1 as did Austs. UK retained its reserve on entire para and matter adjourned.

Re Art 49, Sovs again claimed Austs had withdrawn their proposal for deletion but they, while admitting were prepared withdraw, would be grateful for deletion. US Amb expanded on arguments made yesterday which Sovs rebutted. French and British supported, and Art remains reserved.

Sovs said thought Austs proposal on Art 59 would not meet with difficulties, but Sov position will be stated later.

Annexes I, VIII, and X remain reserved although British Amb said UK now willing drop Part B, Annex VIII and retain Annex X.

After Sovs, British and French proposed retention Annex IX (to which US not a party) Austs gave in and conference decided retain that Annex unchanged.

Due funeral Figl's mother tomorrow, next session will begin 4 p.m. but may go on beyond usual closing hour.

---

65. Telegram From the Delegation at the Vienna Ambassadorial Conference to the Delegation at the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting, at Paris[1]

Vienna, May 12, 1955—1 a.m.

428. Paris for USDel. After Soviets had conceded Article 33 in plenary session this afternoon (reported separately[2]) remainder meeting was in restricted session. Inconclusive debate Article 35 reported separately,[3] and conference turned to remaining outstanding points:

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–VI/5–1255. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to London, Moscow, Washington and pouched to Rome and Bonn. The source text is the copy sent to Washington.

[2] Telegram 2704 from Vienna, May 11, reported that the Soviet Delegation had accepted the French proposal for Article 33 during the unrestricted part of the eighth meeting. (*Ibid.*, 396.1–VI/5–1155)

[3] Telegram 425, *infra*.

Article 45, Paragraph 2. Figl stated that since other delegations had said Yugoslavs opinion must be heard and Austria does not wish delay treaty, he would withdraw his proposal. He made statement for record, however, that Austria expects four great powers will approve any bilateral later agreed with Yugoslavs that modifies Article 45. Thus both paragraphs Article 45 remain unchanged.

Article 48, Paragraph 1. After Ilyichev had obtained Austrian statement that Austria does not object to deletion, all agreed delete Paragraph 1.

Article 49. Soviets maintained firm refusal delete, and US Ambassador then agreed retention in order speed up treaty work although repeated his preference deletion for reasons previously explained. Others followed suit, and Article 49 remains in treaty.

Article 59. After Soviet accession it was agreed retain Article with modification, to make German language authentic text. Also decided against earlier US suggestion omit seals (trust Secretary carrying seal as Department had indicated he would).

Annexes I, VIII and X. After Soviet statements willingness delete entire texts all three, other delegations agreed and annexes deleted.

Article 54. French suggested that since there remains one military and one economic Annex, it would be preferable place Article 54 under Part X, "Final Clauses," instead of present position under "Miscellaneous Economic Provisions." French further suggested article be revised to read along lines, "the provisions of the Annexes shall be considered to be part of the treaty and have force and effect as integral parts of the present treaty." After Figl and US Ambassador agreed, Soviets suggested passing both matters to Secretariat for disposition, which conference agreed.

Article 38. Although previously agreed Article 38 should remain unchanged, Soviets today expressed desire meet Austrian wishes and proposed adoption US compromise revision previously reported.[4] New Soviet proposal was agreed, and Article 38 will be revised by adding words, "and without prejudice to the validity of settlements already reached," in paragraph 3.

Annex IX. At last minute, Soviets reraised Annex saying that since Austrians wish it dropped, Soviets would agree now. UK, however, reserved.

Dual signing. US Ambassador raised question whether Ambassadors as well as Foreign Ministers would sign treaty. He said he understood it was UK practice and that US prepared for dual signature, although Washington would have to telegraph full powers. French and Austrians agreeable, but after saying each government should decide independently, Soviet Ambassador said he would inform his government.

---

[4] See Document 45.

Preamble. Figl made long impassioned plea for deletion third paragraph. Among points made were that it is not only politically and ideologically, but juridicially, difficult for Austria, that during war Austria was under foreign domination and thus not capable assuming national responsibility, that paragraph inconsistent with intentions and spirit of treaty, particularly if Austria is to carry out political and moral tasks of a peaceful neutral, guilt label inappropriate. If paragraph retained, Parliament could only solemnly reserve its right. US, UK and French Ambassadors took note Figl's statement and agreed deletion. Soviet Ambassador, however, stated he not authorized discuss subject "at this conference." When French Chargé asked whether Soviet Ambassador wished discuss matter tomorrow or reserve subject for others, latter replied he had nothing to add.

---

66. Telegram From the Delegation at the Vienna Ambassadorial Conference to the Delegation at the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting, at Paris[1]

Vienna, May 11, 1955—10 p.m.

425. USDel for Merchant. Soviets agreed to French proposal on Article 33 and only important outstanding question remains Article 35.[2] I put forward simplified Annex which was telephoned to Paris today.[3] Soviets had apparently not realized before our willingness agree to inclusion firm prohibition transfer East zone oil fields to foreign ownership. Soviet position was however firmly maintained and Austrians are convinced they will not yield on modification Article 35. They thought Soviets might be willing to attach Annex provided no reference to it in Article 35. Ilyichev agreed to study our proposal and when I suggested meeting tomorrow morning he asked that we not meet before 3 pm indicating that he will at least seek new instructions. If this fails we can still put forward proposal referred to in Polto 60[4] which I did not table today because of French reluctance.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-VI/5-1155. Secret; Niact. Repeated to London, Moscow, and Washington. The source text is the copy sent to Washington.

[2] For a report on the rest of the restricted part of the eighth meeting, see telegram 428, *supra*.

[3] Transmitted in telegram 431, *infra*.

[4] Not printed; this proposal reads:

Continued

This would doubtless mean however he could not obtain instructions to accept it before Friday.

Secretary may wish consider personal message to Molotov either now or after tomorrow's meeting if Soviets reject our proposal. If President correctly quoted Soviets may be misled on firmness our position although I made it absolutely clear to Ilyichev privately today. While fully convinced of soundness of our position it is clear that if we maintain it and agreement not reached Friday at the latest conference can not take place as planned and there will be a considerable delay in conclusion of treaty. In these circumstances and in view of Soviet concessions on Article 16 and military clauses, I believe Secretary would be in difficult position before world opinion if he did not come to Vienna to make attempt persuade Molotov personally, particularly if Macmillan, for reasons of election, should indicate his willingness to come. I believe it will be difficult to present issue public clearly enough to justify refusal of Ministers to meet. It would seem to me Secretary could cover his position by stating that he was coming to Vienna, but that unless this point was resolved in manner to deprive Soviets of right of economic reoccupation he could not sign treaty. If Molotov arrives in time, meeting might be held Saturday afternoon allowing time for any changes in treaty text to be made for Sunday signature. I still have strong hope however that Soviets will yield.

"This Article is subject to the pertinent economic provisions of the memorandum of understanding between the USSR and Austria signed at Moscow April 15, 1955 and to an appropriate bilateral agreement in implementation thereof to be concluded between the two Governments." (Department of State, Central Files, 663.001/5–1155)

---

67. Telegram From the Delegation at the Vienna Ambassadorial Conference to the Delegation at the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting, at Paris[1]

Vienna, May 12, 1955—1 a.m.

431. Paris for USDel. US proposal tabled in conference May 11 (referred to in Embassy telegram 425 to Paris, 2705 to Department[2])

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–VI/5–1255. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to London, Bonn, and Washington. The source text is the copy sent to Washington.

[2] *Supra.*

consists of two following paragraphs to be added to existing Article 35:

"13. Austria undertakes that, except in the case of educational, cultural, charitable and religious property none of the properties, rights and interests transferred to it as German assets shall be returned to ownership of German juridicial persons or where the value of the property, rights and interests exceeds (260,000) schillings, to the ownership of German natural persons. Austria further undertakes not to pass to foreign ownership those rights and properties indicated in Lists 1 and 2 of this Article which will be transferred to Austria by the Soviet Union in accordance with the Austro-Soviet memorandum of April 15, 1955. The provisions of this paragraph shall be deemed to supersede those provisions having to do with exclusion from foreign ownership of German assets, contained in the memorandum signed in Moscow on April 15, 1955.

"14. The provisions of this Article shall be subject to the terms of Annex — of this treaty."

It was further proposed that the following Annex be added to the treaty:

"Annex (—)

"Having regard to the arrangements made between the USSR and Austria, and recorded in the memorandum signed at Moscow on April 15, 1955, Article 35 of the present treaty shall have effect subject to the following provisions:

> 1. On the basis of the pertinent economic provisions of the April 15, 1955 arrangements between the USSR and Austria, the Soviet Union will transfer to Austria within two months from the date of entry into force of the present treaty, all property, rights and interests to be retained or received by the Soviet Union in accordance with Article 35, except the DDSG assets in Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria.
>
> 2. It is agreed that in respect of any property, right or interest transferred to Austria in accordance with this Annex, Austrian rights shall be limited only in the manner set out in Paragraph 13 of Article 35."

---

68. Telegram From the Department of State to the Secretary of State, at Paris[1]

Washington, May 12, 1955—11:03 a.m.

Tedul 24. Eyes only Secretary from the President. Thank you very much for keeping me so completely informed. Your cables are intensely interesting.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 663.001/5–1255. Secret; Niact.

I fully approve your courses of action in regard to the Austrian Treaty, though I am of course hopeful that the situation will so develop that it will be possible for us to participate in the final signing of the document in Vienna with the other powers over the coming weekend.[2] Warm regard, DE.

Hoover

---

[2] At 9 p.m. on May 12 Secretary Dulles replied:

"I greatly appreciate your personal message. I think the situation has now developed so that we can sign the Austrian Treaty on Sunday. The Soviets have given way, and I am proceeding to Vienna tomorrow morning." (Dulte 36 from Paris; *ibid.*)

---

69. Telegram From the Delegation at the Vienna Ambassadorial Conference to the Delegation at the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting, at Paris[1]

Vienna, May 12, 1955—3 p.m.

434. For USDel. Attempted reach agreed tripartite recommendations to Ministers on tactics at Ministers Conference and put forward following points:

1. Begin with examination and discussion of treaty. Assuming Article 35 is out of way, only point likely to be raised is Austrian desire drop paragraph three of preamble which Ilyichev said yesterday he was not authorized discuss.

2. I suggested we ask Austrians to table their intentions regarding form of neutrality declaration. I suggested and all agreed that would be extremely unwise raise questions as to effect of Austrian declaration on Austrian membership in international economic and political organizations except the United Nations which is mentioned in the Austrian draft resolution of the National Council on Neutrality. We believe that raising questions on membership other than United Nations will give Soviets opportunity to place interpretation on Austrian declaration contrary to our interests. I am satisfied they have sufficient freedom in this respect as matters stand. We could appropriately ask questions of Austrians regarding intention as to timing of their declaration and request for our recognition and respect. We could also at this time declare our own intention unconditionally to support Austria's application for membership and smoke

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-VI/5–1255. Secret; Niact. Repeated to Moscow and Washington. The source text is the copy sent to Washington.

out Soviet intentions. If they refuse agree unconditional support, they will not be in such strong position to press us on guarantees.

Lalouette stated he understood French Cabinet strongly opposed to our raising either question of neutrality or of guarantees on the basis that any sympathetic consideration of these two questions on our part would have bad effect on Germany.

3. On question of guarantees, assume [we should?] leave Soviets or Austrians to raise this matter. Our questions might relate to timing of Austrian request and form of guarantee, particularly effort to find out whether Soviets have in mind a collective guarantee.

In view of French attitude reported paragraph two above, you may wish discuss this matter with Pinay and Macmillan before leaving Paris.

---

70. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Department of State[1]

Paris, May 12, 1955—6 p.m.

Dulte 32.

"Dear Mr. President: [Here follows a summary of conversations with the French on Vietnam and various European matters.]

"Throughout these days our activity has been punctuated by frantic cables and telephone calls from Vienna. The Soviets are very sticky and following their usual tactics of holding out to the last in hopes of getting some slight dividend. I had planned to go to Austria this p.m., but cancelled that out in order to preserve the uncertainty as to whether I would go in the face of Soviet tactics. Now, the Soviets have given in on the article relating to the withdrawal of troops so that it is firm and I think that we can work out a solution of the economic article 35 employing, if necessary, the device of a reservation which the three Western powers would make at the time of signing. This would shift to the Soviets the choice of whether or not to sign.

I have invited the three other Ministers, including Molotov, to dine with me Saturday night, and they have accepted.[2]

Everywhere, particularly at NATO, I meet your friends who send their greetings to you.

Faithfully yours,

Foster"

Dulles

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 447. Top Secret; No Distribution.

[2] See Document 75.

71. Telegram From the Delegation at the Vienna Ambassadorial Conference to the Department of State[1]

Vienna, May 12, 1955—9 p.m.

2731. In restricted session today,[2] US Ambassador recalled that yesterday in last effort resolve difficulty regarding Article 35 he had tabled new proposal (Embtel 2711, Paris USDel 431, London 350, Bonn 238, Moscow pouch[3]) which Soviet Ambassador undertook to study, and requested Soviet views. Ilyichev replied that Soviet Delegation had carefully examined views submitted by US Delegation and that, in the interest agreement and speedy completion preparation state treaty, Soviet Delegation prepared accept US proposal. He accepted proposal on basis deletion last sentence paragraph 13, as suggested US Ambassador yesterday. This deletion was quickly agreed.

Ilyichev followed his acceptance US proposal with statement, "this is our contribution to the present meeting". Various delegation heads expressed appreciation contribution Soviet Ambassador had taken in assisting conference over very difficult problem.

UK Ambassador said in view Soviet proposal he would disobey his instructions to extent withdrawing his opposition deletion Annex IX order clear that problem from slate. Accordingly this Annex now deleted.

US Ambassador suggested would be of assistance committee collating text of treaty if agreement could be reached on one major point which appeared outstanding in Article 42. He pointed out that Soviet Delegation had outstanding proposal for final sentence paragraph 8(A) which had not been agreed. Effect of paragraph would deprive certain former Austrians who had assumed other nationalities of benefits under Austrian compensation laws.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–VI/5–1255. Confidential; Priority. Sent also to Paris.

[2] The ninth meeting was held from 2:57 to 4:50 p.m. with the same heads of delegation present as at previous meetings. The unofficial U.S. Delegation minutes and the official conference verbatim minutes for this session were transmitted as enclosures to despatch 1314 from Vienna, May 16. (*Ibid.*, 396.1–VI/5–1655) In the unrestricted part of the meeting the Conference discussed Annex IX.

[3] Document 67.

While recognizing that deletion of paragraph would cause some difficulty for Austrian Government, deletion would facilitate final agreement on treaty and would reduce criticism of Austrian Government in future. Accordingly, he requested whether Austrian Government could agree deletion. After slight hesitation, Figl agreed accept proposed deletion. Member Austrian Delegation immediately indicated in aside to US Delegation that this agreement would cost Austria great deal financially.

In general atmosphere good will existing conference this point, Austrians raised several points they had apparently been holding for such occasion. Re paragraph 3, Preamble, Soviet Ambassador repeated that he had no authority to discuss. Austrians raised paragraph 1, Article 10, and requested deletion on ground it is obsolete due enactment parallel Austrian legislation. Soviet Ambassador, however, indicated he could not agree deletion, and Figl accordingly dropped request.

Thereafter session concerned itself with details reception Foreign Ministers and schedule for next few days, details of which will be sent separate cable. Agreed tentative text communiqué[4] which will be released this afternoon and adjourned until Friday morning for review work of committee collating text in order resolve any outstanding points.[5]

---

[4] The text of the communiqué was transmitted in telegram 2730 from Vienna, May 12 (Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–VI/5–1255), and as an enclosure to despatch 1314 from Vienna, May 16. (*Ibid.*, 396.1–VI/5–1655)

[5] On May 13 the Ambassadors met for the last time and approved the final text of the treaty in four languages without further modifications. (Telegram 2734 from Vienna, May 13; *ibid.*, 396.1–VI/5–1355)

---

72. Memorandum of a Conversation, Vienna, May 13, 1955[1]

PARTICIPANTS

Secretary of State Dulles[2]
Chancellor Raab
Vice Chancellor Schaerf
Ambassador Thompson

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.63/5–1755. Confidential. Drafted by Thompson. Transmitted as an enclosure to despatch 1317 from Vienna, May 17.

[2] Secretary Dulles arrived at Vienna from Paris early on the afternoon of May 13. This meeting with the Austrians was apparently his first discussion after arrival at the Embassy.

During an exchange of opening remarks Chancellor Raab expressed the hope that the Austrian settlement might be beneficial with respect to the solution of other international problems as well. "Maybe the Russians will be more humane in the future," he said.

Secretary Dulles then remarked that he thought one point of the Austrian settlement required particularly close watching, i.e. Austrian neutrality. He recalled that the U.S. had been the primary sponsor of the collective security principle while the Soviet Union tried to block the U.S. efforts and to isolate the non-Communist nations from one another. He reported that at the NATO Council meeting he just attended in Paris several of the smaller nations had expressed their concern to him that the Austrian example might have a disintegrating effect on the Western defense efforts. Chancellor Raab injected that none of these small countries were neighbors of the Soviets. Mr. Dulles replied by mentioning Norway. Chancellor Raab in turn pointed to the positive aspect of the Austrian settlement, i.e. the Russians withdrawing eastward both in a military and an economic sense.

Mr. Dulles then remarked that if the Austrian conception of neutrality were to be one where no further need for their own defensive efforts were seen, this would have a very negative effect. Chancellor Raab replied there was no danger of that, if for no other reason than that the Austrians had long borders facing two Communist states, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, and that protection was needed against any invasion by illegal gangs from there. He appealed to the U.S. to leave as much of its military equipment in Austria behind as possible since this would greatly facilitate and speed up the creation of Austrian forces.

Mr. Dulles then mentioned that it seemed to him that in the latest Austrian draft of a neutrality declaration[3] the language expressing the Austrians' determination to defend their neutrality had been weakened as against an earlier draft. A former draft had spoken of Austria's being resolved to defend her neutrality while the latest one spoke only of Austria's being willing. The interpreter having translated these words as "entschlossen" and "gewillt" respectively, Chancellor Raab insisted that in German they both meant the same thing. Mr. Dulles then jokingly expressed the hope that the English text he would receive would use the translation *resolved* since this would make matters much easier for him in the U.S. Senate.

Reverting to the matter of U.S. military equipment, Mr. Dulles expressed the willingness of the U.S. in principle to turn such equipment over to the Austrians, provided, of course, that the latter were determined really to use it for their own defense. Chancellor Raab injected that the Austrian parties did not differ in this determination. Mr. Dulles continued that there were some technical and legal complications in the way of turning over much equipment at one time and asked whether the Austrians would want a special law passed by Congress to facilitate such a quick and massive turn-over. Chancellor Raab was rather non-committal; when Mr. Dulles pointed out that in a Congressional debate of such a law the whole matter of Austrian neutrality might be aired, Chancellor Raab remarked that that didn't seem very desirable to him.

---

[3] The two drafts mentioned in this paragraph have not been identified further.

Asked by Vice Chancellor Schaerf what intervals would be involved without such a special law, Mr. Dulles pointed out that under the law presently in operation about $20 million worth of equipment could be turned over provided the Austrian treaty came into force before the authorization under this law lapses with the end of the current fiscal year on June 30. Ambassador Thompson then mentioned that some more equipment of the Gendarmérie kind of small arms might be turned over on a loan basis before the State treaty takes effect, as had been done previously since such equipment, involving for instance rifles but not tanks, was within the limitations of existing Allied Council regulations. Asked by Mr. Dulles whether such a further turn-over before the treaty is in effect might cause the Austrians trouble with the Russians, Chancellor Raab answered, no, quite the contrary. Ambassador Thompson further explained that General Arnold would store some of his forces' military equipment centrally in barracks so it could be conveniently left behind and turned over at the time of the withdrawal of American forces. Mr. Dulles concluded this point by saying the U.S. would do its best and that he thought a way could be found.

Mr. Dulles then expressed his gratification that both Austrian coalition parties support the principle of an armed, defensive neutrality and hoped that in view of the many dangers and problems still ahead and the suspiciousness of Soviet motives the existing policy of national unity would continue. Chancellor Raab and Vice Chancellor Schaerf nodded, the Chancellor again referring to Austria's first hand observations of the neighboring Communist states.

Mr. Dulles expressed the hope that the ratification process could be pushed rapidly and concluded before Congress adjourns in July. He saw only two potential difficulties: a. Austrian neutrality. He was confident Congress would accept it if it was coupled with the determination of the Austrians to defend themselves. b. Settlement of Jewish claims. Chancellor Raab replied that negotiations with the Jewish representatives were proceeding very satisfactorily and that after the meeting of the Council of Ministers next Tuesday he hoped to be able to communicate to the U.S. the reaching of a final settlement. There had already been rough agreement on the total sum involved, about $20 million, and that only the distribution remained to be ironed out. They had reached virtual agreement with the representatives of American Jewish groups and only had some difficulties with baptised Austrian ex-Jews.

As for the Austrian defense effort, Vice Chancellor Schaerf reported that it was Austria's intention to send parliamentary groups to both Switzerland and Sweden to study their set-up and see how the Austrians can benefit by their experience. Mr. Dulles reiterated that it would be most useful to him if he could go back with the assurance of both the Chancellor and the Vice Chancellor as spokesmen of their parties that Austria was aiming at an armed neutrality and would not just trust the promises of others. Chancellor Raab again mentioned that the Soviets could well withdraw and still send in gangs from Hungary and that Austria must and will protect herself against any such dangers. Vice Chancellor Schaerf added jokingly that he and the Chancellor both having been army officers at one time he thought they had a particular appreciation of the problem.

Mr. Dulles concluded the conversation by saying that many people wonder how it came about that the Austrians suddenly are getting their independence and the withdrawal of foreign troops; that in his opinion the explanation was to be found right here in Austria. Austria's freedom and independence are not received as a gift but are what the Austrian people and their government have earned through their love of freedom and their steadfastness. He was sure that the free world could continue in the future to count on these same qualities. Chancellor Raab answered smilingly that Austria would remain faithful to Western culture.

---

73. Telegram From the Office of the High Commissioner for Austria to the Department of State[1]

Vienna, May 14, 1955—9 p.m.

2764. At one hour and ten minute meeting of 5 FonMins treaty was accepted as prepared by preceding Ambassadors' Conf with exception para 3 of Preamble (war guilt clause) which was deleted without discussion at Aust request.[2]

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–VI/5–1455. Official Use Only; Niact. Repeated to London, Paris, Moscow, Bonn, and Rome.

[2] The unofficial U.S. Delegation minutes of the Foreign Ministers meeting were transmitted as an enclosure to despatch 1314 from Vienna, May 16. (*Ibid.*, 396.1–VI/5–1655) For a French stenographic report of this meeting, see *Documents Diplomatiques Français*, 1955, Tome 1, pp. 647–653.

Molotov read out first 5 paras of Moscow memorandum of April 15[3] concluding with remark that Sov Govt assumed that 3 Western powers shared in approval of these proposals. The Secretary acknowledged his awareness of Moscow memorandum and stated that US found no objection to Austria's following course laid down therein. Both French and UK FonMins likewise raised no objection in principle, but added they should like to become acquainted with terms of declaration which Austria envisaged. Macmillan mentioned that he would further like to know of the ways and means by which it would be proposed that UK should participate in any 4 power guarantee. Figl simply responded that AustGov stood by Moscow agreement and was prepared today, if FonMins agreed, to submit draft of intended Aust neutrality declaration. Molotov then offered draft text of proposed 4 power declaration wherein 4 powers wld respect and observe status of permanent Aust neutrality of type observed by Switzerland in relations with other states.[4] The Secretary acknowledged usefulness of having Sov views but reserved his final position until he could become acquainted with text of neutrality declaration as adopted by AustGov, adding that in principle he found no objection to declaration along lines of Sov draft. Brit and French voiced similar views. Remainder of discussion concerned arrangements for treaty signing which is to take place Sunday May 15 at 11:30 at Belvedere Palace.

After end meeting Austs circulated their draft neutrality declaration, and Sovs their suggested 4 power declaration, texts of which are being sent separately.[5]

Thompson

---

[3] See Document 26.

[4] Transmitted in telegram 2765 from Vienna, May 14, this declaration reads as follows:

"The Governments of the USSR, US, UK and France hereby declare that the Soviet Union, the United States of America, Great Britain and France shall respect and observe the status of permanent neutrality of Austria of the kind adhered to by Switzerland in her relations with other states." (Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-VI/5-1455)

[5] For the draft neutrality declaration, see telegram 2766, *infra*.

74. Telegram From the Office of the High Commissioner for Austria to the Department of State[1]

Vienna, May 14, 1955—10 p.m.

2766. Following is clean text of proposed Austrian neutrality declaration as tabled by Austrians in Foreign Ministers' meeting May 14 and referred to in Embtel 2764.[2]

Begin text: "Whereas Austria, in the proclamation of April 27, 1945, solemnly declared the restoration of her independence;

"Whereas Austria is convinced that, as an independent, sovereign and free state, she can make her special contribution toward the maintenance of world peace and order in Europe;

"Whereas Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States of America, in the Moscow Declaration of Oct 30, 1943, and France, through the Declaration of Nov 16, 1943, wanted to see restored a free independent Austria;

"Whereas France, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States of America, through the signing of the Austrian State Treaty on May 15, 1955, once again have manifested their conviction that the inviolability of the territory of the Austrian state is in the interest of the policy of all Europe; and

"Whereas in the preamble to the Austrian State Treaty, France, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States of America declare their readiness to support Austria's application for admission to the organization of the United Nations, and since in the past Austria herself has repeatedly manifested her serious desire to contribute, as a member of the United Nations, toward the accomplishment of the principles embodied in the United Nations Charter;

"The Nationalrat (Parliament) on the occasion of the signing of the State Treaty Concerning the Restoration of an Independent and Democratic Austria on May 15, 1955, adopts the following resolution:

> "Austria declares, with the object of the lasting and perpetual maintenance of her independence from without and the inviolability of her territory, as well as in the interest of maintenance of internal law and order, of her own free will her perpetual neutrality, and is resolved to maintain and defend it with all means at her disposal.
>
> "Austria, in order to secure these objectives henceforth will in the future join no military alliances and will not permit the establishment of military bases of foreign states in her territory.
>
> "Austria, in this connection, declares her desire to observe at all times in her relations with other states the principles laid down in the United Nations Charter, and once again voices her willingness and ability to accede to and observe the obligations contained in the Charter.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–VI/5–1455. Official Use Only; Niact. Repeated to London, Paris, Moscow, and Bonn.

[2] *Supra.*

"The Federal Government is requested to submit to the Nationalrat (Parliament) the draft of a Federal constitutional law regulating the neutrality;

"To take all steps in order to achieve the final admission to the organization of the United Nations, for which Austria has already applied on — 1947;

"To inform all states of this law with the request for recognition of Austria's neutrality as soon as the Austrian State Treaty has entered into effect and Austria has been evacuated of the occupation forces." *End text.*

Thompson

---

75. Editorial Note

Following the meeting at 5 p.m. on the Austrian State Treaty (see Document 73), the Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and France attended a dinner given by Secretary of State Dulles at Ambassador Thompson's residence. In the course of their conversation during and after the dinner the Foreign Ministers discussed Formosa and a Four-Power Conference at some length and Indochina, disarmament, and the Berlin Autobahn tax briefly. For a report on the discussion of Formosa and a Four-Power Conference, see Document 116; memoranda of the other conversations are in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 445.

---

76. Editorial Note

At 11:30 a.m. on May 15 at the Belvedere Palace in Vienna, the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union; their High Commissioners; and the Foreign Minister of Austria signed the State Treaty. In the course of the ceremonies, each of the Foreign Ministers made a brief statement and Secretary of State Dulles presented Austrian President Koerner with a letter from President Eisenhower expressing the best wishes of the American people.

For text of President Eisenhower's letter, see Department of State *Bulletin*, May 30, 1955, page 873; for text of the Austrian State Treaty, see *ibid.*, June 6, 1955, pages 916 ff.; the texts of the Foreign Ministers statements were transmitted as enclosures to despatch 1177 from Vienna, May 19. (Department of State, Central Files, 663.001/5–1955)

On May 17, Secretary Dulles reported to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on his participation in the North Atlantic Council meeting and the signing of the Austrian State Treaty. With regard to the latter he reviewed the process by which the final treaty had been reached and expressed his belief that its signature was the first fruit of a united Western Europe and the bringing into NATO of West Germany. For the full text of his testimony, see *Foreign Relations Committee*, pages 493–512.

On May 19, Secretary of State Dulles reported on his trip to Europe to the National Security Council. With regard to the Austrian State Treaty the memorandum of discussion reports the following:

> "His next subject, said Secretary Dulles, would be Vienna and the Austrian State Treaty. The high point in this phase of his trip was our success in getting rid of Article 16 in the Treaty draft, and our success in getting the new economic articles incorporated by reference into the Treaty. This latter issue had required 'some doing', and had proved to be the toughest sticking point. Until the last minute, the Soviets had refused to incorporate the economic arrangements they had agreed to bilaterally with the Austrians at Moscow into the Treaty, and had insisted that Article 35 should stand as written. It was at this point that Secretary Dulles had informed Ambassador Thompson that he would not even come to Vienna if the Soviets insisted on this position. They had thereafter given in.
>
> "The Soviets had from time to time during the Vienna negotiations exhibited their characteristic trickery. This was manifest in the attempt to remove from the preamble of the Treaty references to Austrian war guilt, though the Soviets gave in on this one too. The trickiness was even more manifest on the occasion of the actual signature of the Treaty. Molotov was supposed to make a brief two-minute ceremonial statement. This he had turned into a 15-minute political and propaganda speech, to which the Americans were obliged to sit and listen. In the course of this speech Molotov had imputed to the United States complete acceptance of the proclamation of Austrian neutrality. In fact, of course, we have not accepted any statement of Austrian neutrality as yet, except in principle." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

On June 1 President Eisenhower submitted the text of the treaty together with Secretary Dulles' report thereon to the Senate which ratified it on June 17 by a vote of 63 to 3. Austria, France, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom completed their ratifications by early July and the Austrian State Treaty entered into force on July 27, 1955.

On October 26 the Austrian Nationalrat passed a law defining the terms of Austria's permanent neutrality and sent the text to the other four signatory powers. The United States recognized the permanent neutrality set forth in the law in a note dated December 6 and the three other powers made similar recognition by the end of the year. For the texts of the Austrian law, the note transmitting it, and the United States reply, see Department of State *Bulletin,* December 19, 1955, pages 1011–1012.

MEETING OF THE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT (SUMMIT CONFERENCE) OF THE UNITED STATES, THE UNITED KINGDOM, FRANCE, AND THE SOVIET UNION AT GENEVA, JULY 18–23, 1955

PREPARATIONS FOR THE CONFERENCE

Establishment of the London Working Group, January 6–May 5, 1955

77. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France[1]

Washington, January 8, 1955—2:47 p.m.

2459. Re Paris Embtel 2840 and Mendes-France's letters to President and Secretary transmitted Embassy's telegrams 2845, 2846 and 2847.[2] You should inform highest available French official that these communications are receiving serious consideration US Government and replies will be forthcoming at early date concerning questions raised.

At same time you should take occasion, after consultations with Jebb who has similar instructions, to outline in strong terms following US position re Mendes-France's proposal that Western initiative be taken now to call for a Four-Power conference on European questions with the Soviet Union in May:

1. Such a Western approach made before final act of ratification in France would, as pointed out Moscow's 1049,[3] present Soviets with excellent opportunity to reinforce whatever effect their present

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1/1–655. Secret. Drafted by Tyler and Thurston on January 7 and cleared with Elbrick. Repeated to London, Moscow, and Bonn.

[2] All dated January 6. Telegram 2840 reported a discussion with Mendès-France regarding the ratification of the Paris Accords. (*Ibid.*, 751.00/1–655) The notes to President Eisenhower in telegrams 2845 and 2847 discussed Germany and a Four-Power meeting. (*Ibid.* and *ibid.*, 396.1/1–655) The note to Dulles in telegram 2846 discussed Germany and European unification. (*Ibid.*, 751.00/1–655) Regarding these notes and similar exchanges with Eden and Churchill, see *Documents Diplomatiques Français*, 1955, Tome 1, p. 23, footnote 1, and Annexes, Tome 1, pp. 213–224.

[3] Telegram 1049, January 6, concluded that it was difficult to see any advantage to the approach suggested by Mendès-France. (Department of State, Central Files, 396.1/1–655)

attitude is having on French opinion and would also create impression of Western uncertainty and weakness, which would be interpreted by Soviet rulers as clear indication of correctness of their present line of intimidation. Soviet rejection of proposal for conference would, of course, be made contingent upon ratification question and thus tend to throw ball back to West, whereas in unlikely event Soviets would agree to proposed conference, this would certainly give every wavering parliamentarian pretext for further delay in ratification. Issue of ratification now versus negotiations now was squarely resolved in Western note of November 29 to Soviets,[4] and backtracking by West would be interpreted by all peoples and governments concerned as reflecting indecision and weakness. Fundamental assumption on which Western Powers have proceeded in these past years has been that in last analysis Soviets will realistically accommodate themselves to such concrete manifestations of Western defensive determination and cohesion as embodied in Paris Accords. Out of such accommodations could emerge genuine settlements with the Soviets. To fail to demonstrate to Soviets such determination now will tend to defeat goal towards which we have been moving.

2. In referring to possibility Soviets could in this period gain initiative by means of declarations without any real import, Mendes-France appears to overlook fact that should Soviets so choose they can do so regardless of any Western stimulus.

3. If it is the thought of Mendes-France that such a Soviet offer would relate to Germany, we think it most improbable that the Soviets are in a position to make any real concessions on this subject since the latter would involve the yielding by Soviets of their position in East Germany. Neither at Berlin Conference[5] nor later has Molotov given slightest indication Soviet Union is prepared to make such a move.

4. No matter what Western Powers would say regarding the impermissibility of a discussion of their security arrangements in any conference with the Soviets, we may be sure that the Soviets would utilize both negotiations preceding and a conference itself to attack Western arrangements, necessitating counter-argumentation on our part. A good deal of the Berlin Conference was taken up with this subject.

5. You should make very clear to French harm which would be done to Western alliance were France to make a unilateral démarche to Soviet Union. In our opinion, French démarche on Austria following Mendes-France's UN speech created an unfortunate impression that at least Western tactics were no longer unified as they had been formerly. For France now to take another step by herself in approaching Soviet Union would greatly accentuate this impression and would encourage the Soviet Union to pursue its tactics of intimidation and to concentrate its efforts on France. You should not let the French feel that we would agree to such a separate démarche being made with language implying approval of the United States. We feel that Mendes-France must be left under no illusions as to our view

---

[4] For text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, December 13, 1954, pp. 901–902.

[5] For documentation on the Berlin Conference, January 25–February 18, 1954, see *Foreign Relations*, 1952–1954, vol. VII, Part 1, pp. 601 ff.

that we could not prevent such a move on his part from having a very adverse influence on the future of the Western alliance and the role of France within it.

6. It is noted that Mendes-France refers in his letter to German interest in negotiations with the Soviets. Such interest is obvious. Presumably the subject matter of a conference would primarily be Germany, and also according to the timetable, the Federal Republic would then be a sovereign state and US, UK and France no longer occupying powers. Under these circumstances our status to deal with German affairs is drastically altered, and we assume that Mendes-France would want to give the most serious consideration as to whether he thought it opportune at this time to open up that vista and to conduct the negotiations with the Germans which would be indispensable if the three powers were not to be put in the position of interlopers.

FYI. In replies of President and Secretary to Mendes-France above referred to, we hope to strike a somewhat more positive note in the sense of suggesting that there now be set up with public knowledge a working party to prepare an invitation to Soviets to be transmitted immediately following WEU coming into force. However, we are not yet prepared to formulate this idea specifically for transmission.[6]

Dulles

---

[6] On January 9, Dillon reported that he had called on Parodi that afternoon and left an aide-mémoire closely paraphrasing paragraphs 1–6 and that Jebb had made a similar approach. Copies of these aides-mémoire were transmitted as enclosures to despatch 1387 from Paris, January 10. (Department of State, Central Files, 396.1/1–1055) On January 10, Bohlen reported that he had discussed the proposal with the British and French Ambassadors who agreed that it would be preferable not to make it at that moment. (Telegram 1069 from Moscow; *ibid.*)

---

78. Editorial Note

On January 12, Prime Minister Churchill transmitted to President Eisenhower a four-page secret letter in which he wrote, inter alia:

"Anthony [Eden] and I are in full agreement with you that there can be no Four Power Conference of any kind until ratification [of the Paris Agreements] is complete, and we feel of course that everything reasonable in our power should be done to press for a definite decision. I suppose they could, if they chose, spread the whole process out for four or five months." (Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower Papers, Whitman File)

79. Letter From Secretary of State Dulles to Chancellor Adenauer[1]

Washington, January 13, 1955.

Dear Mr. Chancellor:

[Here follow four paragraphs concerning the prospects for ratification of the Paris Accords in the Federal Republic and in France.]

I believe that Sir Anthony Eden, you, and I are in complete agreement as to the dangers of any four-power conference before ratifications are completed and effect has been given to the Paris accords. It appears obvious that the Soviets would like to use the prospect of such a conference for the purpose of impeding ratification. On the other hand, any invitation at this time which made a conference expressly conditional upon completion of ratifications, would almost surely be rejected with more threats and warnings to confuse public opinion. I am thus convinced that we should bide our time on this. In my opinion, the Soviets adjust their tactics to facts, and when the fact of increased Atlantic solidarity and strength is confirmed by the adoption of the Paris accords, I foresee for the first time the possibility of fruitful discussions. In face of the long record of Soviet threats from the Marshall Plan to the present day, which they have customarily made to prevent the conclusion of any agreement that promised to strengthen Europe's independence, I do not for a moment believe that the possibility of a further conference is foreclosed, but merely that it will take place on a more propitious basis. The Soviet leaders obviously regard it as in their interest to protest in advance, but they cannot fail to accommodate themselves in the end to the facts of Europe's renewed vitality, security and confidence when our measures have been accomplished.

I am thus confident and determined that new efforts can and shall be made on behalf of German reunification and a lasting peaceful settlement of both the German and Austrian questions. These remain, as stated in the tripartite Declaration at London, fundamental goals of our policy.

In subordinating so much to the question of ratification at the present time, you will understand my thought that this is necessary to enable us to resume the progress toward greater European unity of which the EDC held so much promise. The form in which this goal might be realized is perhaps of less importance than the objective and the will to go forward. These have been embodied in the policies of the Federal Republic under your leadership with inspiring vision and courage. I know that there are many statesmen in Europe and broad elements of the population in all walks of life who will not let the efforts of recent years be lost. I have not ceased to believe that the full stature of the European nations, in the face of common threats and common problems, will be realized in the measure in which they infuse their political life with greater unity, and that this alone will enable them to safeguard their rich national heritages of freedom and culture and to continue to exert their proper influence in the world today.[2]

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Konrad Adenauer. Drafted by Kidd.

With warm personal regards,

Yours sincerely,

Foster Dulles

P.S. You may be interested in the marked portion (page 3) of a speech which I made day before yesterday.[3]

J.F.D.

---

[2] On January 30, Chancellor Adenauer replied to this letter, writing in particular about the proposed four-power conference:

"A decisive problem, however, remains the relations with the Soviet Union, and here I am particularly thankful to know that we agree, as you write in your letter, that new efforts on behalf of German reunification and a lasting, peaceful settlement of the German and Austrian question can and must be undertaken. I am of the opinion that a Four Power conference should under no circumstances be sought before the treaties enter into force. Like you, I expect that negotiations with the Soviets can only have a certain chance of success if the Western alliance system has become an established fact. On the other hand, however, it seems necessary to me that we promptly, that is, immediately after the treaties enter into force, call a study group to London in which representatives of the governments of the United States, Great Britain, France, and the Federal Republic undertake a basic exchange of views on the solution of the major problems, particularly reunification and a system of collective security. Only a careful preparation will give us the opportunity, after the treaties enter into force, to undertake initial diplomatic exchange of views with the Soviet government which can finally lead to a Four Power conference." (*Ibid.*)

[3] No copy of this speech was found attached to the source text. Presumably reference is to Dulles' speech to the Young Women's Christian Association in New York on January 11; for text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, January 24, 1955, pp. 123–125.

80. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France[1]

Washington, January 15, 1955—3:52 p.m.

2541. For Achilles. On receipt this cable convey following personal letter from President to Mendes-France:

"Dear Mr. President:

"Your letter of January 5 and its accompanying memorandum,[2] informally setting forth your views concerning your problem of assuring prompt ratification of the Paris accords by the Council of the Republic, have received my careful attention. Mr. Dulles has discussed with me the letter which you sent to him on the same date forwarding the same memorandum, and is replying at greater length. I fully share his view that it would be a very serious matter indeed if we were to make at this juncture a three-power approach to the Soviets, or if France were to do so alone. I assure you that we appreciate your difficulties and I am confident that our two countries, together with our British allies, can through our firm alliance improve the prospects for peace.

"In my desire to be helpful to you in your efforts to achieve ratification, I am giving careful consideration to the possibility of issuing, prior to the debate in the Council of the Republic, assurances closely similar to those which I issued last April in connection with the European Defense Community.[3]

"I send you my cordial personal wishes."

Murphy

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/1–1555. Secret. Repeated to London, Moscow, and Bonn. Cleared by Merchant, Murphy, and Goodpaster in the White House by telephone.

[2] Neither printed.

[3] For text of the April assurances, see Department of State *Bulletin*, April 26, 1954, pp. 619–620; for text of the further assurances referred to here, see *ibid.*, March 21, 1955, pp. 464–465.

---

81. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France[1]

Washington, January 15, 1955—3:52 p.m.

2542. For Achilles. On receipt this cable convey following personal letter from Secretary to Mendes-France informing him without undue emphasis at same time that Adenauer is being kept generally informed our views on matters he has raised:

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1/1–1555. Secret. Drafted by Merchant. Repeated to London, Moscow, and Bonn.

"My dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I was very glad to receive your letter of January 5 and the accompanying comments on the ratification of the Paris Agreements.[2]

On the matter of United States relations with the Arms Control Agency of WEU, I am afraid that I cannot, at this time, go beyond the assurances I gave you in my message of Dec 7.[3] This of course does not exclude the future possibility of our expanding this relationship as the Agency develops.

I am well aware of the difficulties which you have so ably overcome, and of those which you still face before ratification is completed. I would like to be as helpful as possible. In all frankness, however, I must tell you that it would in my opinion be a great mistake for us now to make another démarche to the Soviet Government. To do so would undoubtedly create an impression of hesitation or weakness. Moreover, it would enable the Soviets to reinforce officially their present propaganda position: that they will not meet at all unless the West agrees to do so before, and not after, completion of ratification.

If we press forward without hesitation, it is my firm conviction that the Soviets will in the end accommodate themselves realistically to this further demonstration of Western defensive strength and unity. They have consistently done so in the past despite their bluster and threats. I believe it is of vital importance to avoid giving them such an opportunity to try to delay the process of ratification, the completion of which means the coming into force of all the Paris Agreements. I assume that our understanding on this is the same and that we are agreed that the action taken by the West must be, as you put it to me when you were here,[4] 'irreversible', before we enter any negotiations for a conference with the Soviets.

Moreover, I deeply believe that for your Government alone to make a move such as you propose would do real harm to the Western alliance, particularly in the absence of any indication that it were done with our approval. The effectiveness in recent years of our common policies has rested largely on the fact that we have always moved together in step. It is in our mutual interest to preserve this tactical unity.

I do hope that notwithstanding the extraordinary volume of your many activities you are in good health and spirits. My warm greetings to Mme. Mendes-France and yourself.

John Foster Dulles"

Dulles

---

[2] Neither printed.

[3] Dulles' message pledged the closest possible coordination with the Arms Control Agency of the WEU in the matter of military assistance. The message was transmitted to Paris in telegram 2081, December 7. (Department of State, Central Files, 740.5–MSP/12–754)

[4] For documentation on Mendès-France's visit to Washington, November 17–19, 1954, see *Foreign Relations*, 1952–1954, vol. VI, Part 2, pp. 1455 ff.

82. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State[1]

Paris, January 16, 1955—6 p.m.

2994. Messages in Deptel's 2541 and 2542[2] delivered to Mendes this afternoon and 1-hour discussion ensued:

On aspects other than East-West talks his only comment was with respect to President's statement that he was considering issuing assurances "closely similar" to those of last April in connection with EDC. Mendes hoped that new assurances would be as nearly as possible identical with those of last April except for replacing term EDC by Paris agreements since critical eyes would attempt to exaggerate any other changes.

On East-West talks he said he was greatly disappointed. He several times expressed conviction that his UN speech and subsequent démarche in Moscow on Austria had swung small but decisive number of votes in Assembly and that favorable decision could not otherwise have been obtained. It was necessary to do something similar before Senate debate. Disavowing presumption of questioning his estimate of French political scene, I nevertheless told him bluntly that in last 10 days we had been struck by complete absence of any signs of French public or Parliamentary interest in new approach to Moscow at this time and by apparent unanimity of many Senators and others with whom we had talked that Senate was simply not interested.

He said he would be consulting his colleagues in Cabinet about it, but we could be sure topic would be live one in Senate debate. I stressed importance, particularly at this time, of avoiding any suggestion of disunity and of developing maximum strength and unity for any eventual negotiations. He thought Anglo-Saxons tended to underestimate concern not only in France but elsewhere on continent, which he had found in Rome and Germany, that West was continuing to permit Moscow to appear more interested in relaxing tension and developing real peace than was West. I expressed opinion Russian propaganda in this sense was making little impression and that rapid succession of their notes was decreasing their effectiveness. He agreed on latter point but not on former.

He reiterated that his continued references to "parallel" negotiations with East had been essential and believed he would be tasked in Senate with not having made greater progress since November and particularly since Assembly vote. I asked whether it might not be tactically wise to let Senate take initiative by passing harmless resolution (Embtel 2974, January 13[3]), expressing desire French Government, in concert with its allies, seek to resolve problems with USSR. He replied that question of negotiations was his business, not Senate's, that he would be in box if such resolution directed him to make some approach US and UK would not accept and that moreover such a resolution might take form of "suspensive" clause. To my suggestion that he seemed to have enough votes in Senate to write his own ticket, he replied that while he did not wish to appear overly pessimistic, he did not want to be overly optimistic either. While party distribution was more favorable than in Assembly, all non-Communist parties would split. He must leave nothing undone. If agreements must be repassed by Assembly, he was confident he could get them repassed but he very much wished to avoid having to do so.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/1–1566. Secret. Repeated to London, Moscow, and Bonn.

[2] Document 80 and *supra*.

He reiterated that he had always insisted negotiations should be held only after ratification. Why was it not possible to say the same thing in positive form, i.e., invite the Russians specifically to attend a meeting after ratification?

I asked effect on this problem of Moscow's latest statement and read him Moscow's 1110 to Department.[4] He was much interested in reference to press reports that French Government pressing for new approach, inquired whether they had been in French press and indicated seemingly genuine surprise when I replied they had been primarily in Russian press. He observed that Russians seemed to differentiate between negotiations on Germany and on other questions, apparently seeking to come as close as they could, without actually doing so, to closing door to post-ratification negotiations on German unification while leaving it more ajar on other questions.

During conversation he referred two or three times to British suggestion of possible tripartite working group (Deptel 2536, January 15[5]) and I did not question his comment that Washington apparently disliked idea.

In summing up, he reiterated that he must do something before Senate debate. He would have preferred tripartite démarche in Moscow or as second choice, unilateral one with US and UK approval. Now he would have to devise third choice and perhaps such working group might do. I reiterated Washington felt best course was to do nothing but expressed opinion that if he considered it essential to propose something, Washington would dislike a proposal from him for a tripartite working group far less than for any further initiatives to the Russians.[6]

---

[3] Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/1–1355)

[4] Telegram 1110 reported the latest Soviet declaration on the Paris Agreements and indicated that press reports showed the French Government to be pressing for a four-power conference. (*Ibid.*, 762.0221/1–1555)

[5] Telegram 2536 reported that Eden had expressed to the French Counselor in London British opposition to the approach to the Soviet Union, but had speculated on the possibility of a tripartite working group in Paris whose work would be secret but whose existence would be known. (*Ibid.*, 396.1/1–1555)

Achilles

---

[6] On January 17, Achilles reported that Jebb and British Chancellor of the Exchequer Butler had seen Mendès-France later in the day and that they had presented arguments substantially along the same lines as his. (Telegram 3004 from Paris; *ibid.*, 396.1/1–1755)

---

83. Telegram From the Department of State to the Office of the High Commissioner for Germany, at Bonn[1]

Washington, January 19, 1955—5:55 p.m.

1973. Bonn's 2032 and 2044.[2] Department carefully studying various suggestions that have been made for "study group". For your guidance our preliminary view is that establishment study group prior ratification Paris Agreements might give rise to serious misunderstanding (Moscow's 1088[3]) and provide opportunity for opponents of ratification to propose further delays. Our immediate aim is to secure ratification Paris Agreements since it has always been U.S. view that increased strength and unity of Europe resulting therefrom would put West in better position negotiate with Soviets on German reunification, etc.

FYI Idea of study group had already occurred to us as possible means of deterring Mendes-France from making his Moscow démarche but it appears that general unfavorable reaction to démarche may have made him less insistent on carrying out plan. We feel Adenauer's present proposal should be discouraged for the present and only employed as a "last resort" in event Mendes and/or Adenauer continue insist such step essential to ratification by their respective Parliaments. Note also possible conflict Adenauer's desire four-power group (on which composition we agree if group were established) and Mendes-France reference to tripartite group. We also have serious doubts inclusion parliamentarians as Adenauer suggests in any such working group. End FYI.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1/1–1755. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Elbrick; cleared by Tyler, Lyon, and Thurston; and signed for the Secretary by Merchant. Repeated to Paris, London, and Moscow.

[2] Telegram 2032 reported that at a meeting with Mendès-France on January 17 Adenauer advanced the idea of a quadripartite study group to consider plans for a four-power conference after the coming into effect of the Paris Agreements. Telegram 2044 reported that the study group would include members of the SPD. (Both *ibid.*)

[3] In telegram 1088, Bohlen reported that there appeared to be solid agreement that any approach to the Soviet Government along the lines of Mendès-France's idea would be dangerous and would provide the Soviet Union with the opportunity to state that the conference was dependent on the postponement or abandonment of ratification. (*Ibid.*, 740.5/1–1255)

Dulles

---

84. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State[1]

Paris, January 20, 1955—8 p.m.

3069. Reference Department telegram 2576.[2] Massigli sent for me this afternoon and referred to Mendes' belief that something ought to be done concerning East-West talks before Senate vote. He said that while Mendes felt his task in Senate might be easier than in Assembly, he had only gotten Assembly approval by repeated forcing of votes of confidence, weapon not available to him in Senate. Since US and UK were adamantly opposed to any approach to Moscow prior to ratification, Mendes was prepared to fall back on Eden's suggestion (Department telegram 2536 January 15[3]) of tripartite working group. Under Mendes' instructions, Massigli had this noon asked Jebb to sound out British Foreign Office as to their views of setting up such a tripartite working group one or two weeks hence. He asked me to do same with Department.

Massigli said Mendes realized importance of including Germans in such working group but did not want them included at start for two reasons: One was that existing divergence of views among three powers with respect East-West talks could better be ironed out before Germans participated, and secondly, it would be politically impossible for Mendes to have German participation prior to Senate vote.

I said I would, of course, seek Department's views immediately but that I already knew Washington felt strongly it would be mistake to make any new move with respect East-West talks prior to Senate debate which appeared likely to begin within three weeks, and that on purely practical grounds it would seem difficult for respective governments to accomplish necessary preparatory work to enable working group usefully to convene before that. I also referred to Bundestag debate at approximately same time and expressed belief that prior establishment of study group which did not include Germans would increase Adenauer's difficulties.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1/1-2055. Secret. Repeated to London, Bonn, and Moscow.

[2] Same as telegram 1973, *supra*.

[3] See footnote 5, Document 82.

Saying that he had not discussed details with Mendes and was accordingly speaking personally, he thought it possible that Mendes would agree, if arrangements could be worked out tripartitely on satisfactory basis, that announcement be made before Senate vote that tripartite study group would meet at early date (presumably after Senate vote) to prepare for eventual East-West meeting, announcement to state that Germans would be invited to participate in talks at relatively early stage.

Achilles

---

85. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom[1]

Washington, February 1, 1955—6:56 p.m.

3948. Bonn's 2171.[2] As indicated Deptels 2050, 2008, 1974 and 1973 to Bonn,[3] we have serious reservations about establishing any Working Group on East-West questions or announcement of intentions before completion ratifications. Since Adenauer seems generally optimistic about ratification prospects now and this confirmed by other reports, we strongly hope he will not make any Working Group proposal at this time. Point might be made to both Adenauer and Mendes-France that even announcement of intention convene Working Group after ratifications involves much the same risk as actual meeting in providing Soviets with opportunity reassert more firmly that conference after ratification purposeless. Such an exchange might serve more to stimulate than calm opposition to Paris Agreements in Paris and Bonn and provide new excuses for seeking delay.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1/1–3155. Secret. Drafted by Hooper; cleared with Jones, Palmer, Thurston, and Merchant, and signed for the Acting Secretary by Lyon. Also sent to Bonn and repeated to Paris and Moscow.

[2] Telegram 2171 reported that Hoyer Millar told Adenauer the reasons for U.S. and British opposition to the idea of a study group. The Chancellor then suggested that the four governments might announce their intention of convoking a study group before ratification, but indicate that its work would not begin until after the Paris Agreements came into effect. (*Ibid.*, 396.1/1–2955)

[3] Telegram 1973 is printed as Document 83. Telegrams 2050, 2008, and 1974 reiterated in one manner or another U.S. reservations about the establishment of any working group. (Department of State, Central Files, 396.1/1–2655, 1–2055, and 1–1855, respectively)

FYI. If some announcement must in last resort be made for political necessities either Mendes or Adenauer, we should prefer them to say that they were "considering with the three other Governments preparations for meeting with Soviets, on matters of direct concern to Federal Republic, US, UK and France, after Paris Agreements enter into force". Such general statement less easy for Soviets to exploit than reference to Working Group.

We agree UK Foreign Office thinking (London's 3354[4]) that it would be difficult even announce plans for eventual study group without some notion of agenda. This another reason for avoiding premature study group or announcement. French Embassy has informed Department that Adenauer mentioned German reunification and European security pact as topics for quadripartite study group. While we agree Adenauer may reasonably feel Federal Republic should be in on anything affecting German reunification, other questions such as Austrian Treaty or European security arrangements involve other states which would feel entitled to be consulted as much as Federal Republic and would certainly not wish Federal Republic to act as spokesman for them. Similar difficulty would arise in connection French proposal for initial tripartite study group if either German or European security questions to be discussed. For these reasons we wish to reserve approval of announcement proposal until more compelling evidence of need. In any event would not wish either Adenauer or Mendes to jump gun on announcement without informing other three. Decision on announcement should also not be made until certain Mendes-France will survive North African debate. End FYI.

Paris if queried by French whether US considering alternative suggestions should limit responses to statement that various proposals under study but basic US position remains unchanged.

London discuss foregoing including FYI with Foreign Office.[5]

Hoover

---

[4] Not printed. (*Ibid.*, 396.1/1–3155)

[5] On February 2 and 4, the Embassies in Paris and London replied to this telegram. Achilles stated that the guidance provided would be used if needed, but that Mendès-France was absorbed in other matters and was unlikely to press the issue. (Telegram 3242 from Paris; *ibid.*, 396.1/2–255) Aldrich reported that the Foreign Office was in complete agreement with Department of State thinking and was in no haste for the study group to reach any decision. (Telegram 3455 from London; *ibid.*, 396.1/2–455)

86. Memorandum by the Director of Political Affairs, HICOG (O'Shaughnessy)[1]

Bonn, March 9, 1955

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH HERBERT BLANKENHORN

I called on Blankenhorn yesterday, after being called for consultation, and asked him if he or the Chancellor had any views which might be helpful in my conversations in the Department. Also, I gave him a list of questions which I told him I thought might be asked me, although I was not acting under instructions in so doing and this was a purely personal approach which I was making to him—Blankenhorn.

Tonight I saw Blankenhorn again who told me he had had a long talk with the Chancellor, and also had put the questions (see attachment[2]) to him. He said that before addressing himself to the questions, the Chancellor had the following general observations to make:

1. Any negotiations with the Soviets would be very difficult. No guarantee which could be offered to them would satisfy them, short perhaps of an Austrian-type solution, which the Chancellor found completely unacceptable.
2. Any offer made in connection with a European security system would have to contain the following elements:
    a. The military potential of the Federal Republic could not be diminished.
    b. The furthest Adenauer would go would be to accept no increase over the twelve-division potential in the event of reunification.
    c. Reunification should not involve giving up the Oder-Neisse territories. He maintained that the German frontiers be fixed at the peace treaty. (Article 7 should not be altered.) No restriction of German sovereignty should be made by any new unilateral controls.

Adenauer added that the Soviets' sole interest was the withdrawal of U.S. forces and bases from the European continent, and that there can be no price for this. He feels it essential that U.S. forces and bases remain.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762A.00/3–955. Secret. Attached to a memorandum from Lyon to Merchant, dated March 14, which briefly summarized its contents.

[2] Not found attached to the source text. Another copy of this memorandum indicates that the questions in the second number and letter series below was the attachment.

Referring to the questions asked him yesterday:

1. Should any modifications be made to the Eden Plan?[3]

The Eden Plan should be "sharpened and strengthened". Stronger guarantees were needed, for instance, with regard to the holding of free elections.

2. Is it considered tactically advisable to discuss other points in addition to the free election point? If so, what?

The status of Germany should be discussed. (See the five points of the Bundestag Resolution of June 10, 1953.[4])

> a. Should the military status of a united Germany be discussed? What would be the minimum acceptable size for a German national army? What types of controls, inspection, and limitations over German rearmament would be acceptable? Would it be possible to reduce the size of German armed forces as now planned as the price for reunification if Germany remains in NATO?
>
> There should be no reduction from present contemplated levels. Western Union controls should be maintained. He thinks German membership in NATO should carry with it a full troop contribution.
>
> b. Would there be tactical advantages in appearing to be willing to discuss a proposal to limit the freedom of a future all-German government to conclude treaties or a proposal for a quadripartite agreement to refrain from entering into one-sided military alliances with Germany?
>
> Emphatically not.
>
> c. Should any consideration be given to the establishment of a neutralized zone along the eastern border of a united Germany?
>
> A demilitarized German East Zone could be considered only if Poland and Czechoslovakia were likewise demilitarized. Since this would mean a Soviet request for Allied withdrawal from Western Germany, this is obviously not an acceptable solution.
>
> d. How should the question of the withdrawal of occupation troops be handled?
>
> No answer.

---

[3] For text of the Eden Plan, FPM(54)17, dated January 29, 1954, see *Foreign Relations*, 1952–1954, vol. VII, Part 1, p. 1177.

[4] The five points included: (1) free elections throughout Germany, (2) formation of a free government for all Germany, (3) conclusion of a freely negotiated peace treaty with that government, (4) settlement of all territorial questions by that treaty, and (5) guarantee of freedom of action to the all-German Government consistent with the United Nations principles. For full text of the resolution, see *Deutschlandfrage*, pp. 171-172, or *Documents on German Unity*, vol. IV, p. 15.

e. To what extent for negotiating purposes would the Federal Republic agree to the continuation of four-power controls over a united Germany?

This represents the Austrian solution which he has already declared unacceptable.

3. Would the Federal Republic agree to the participation of the GDR in a conference on German unity with a status equal to that of the Federal Republic?

Only if absolutely necessary, and then under protest, and if it did not mean recognition of the Pankow Government.

4. What is the Federal Republic's thinking re mutual East-West security arrangements to which Adenauer has made allusions in the past?

Chancellor now believes that a general agreement on nuclear weapons should now be the point of departure of any security arrangements, but beyond this Blankenhorn reports that Adenauer is rather vague on the subject of security systems in general.

The Chancellor considers that the Soviet attitude has now sharpened and hardened; that they wish to maintain the status quo in Germany and to stay in the East Zone. Therefore, he concludes, it will be very difficult to set up any plan to negotiate with the Soviets.

The Chancellor also asked that sympathetic consideration be given to his request for a study group or study commission as outlined in his letter of January 30 to Secretary Dulles.

---

87. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State[1]

Paris, March 22, 1955—1 p.m.

4033. Faure sent for me this noon. Pinay was present. Faure handed me aide-mémoire, of which quick translation given in immediately following telegram,[2] concerning rapid convocation of working group to prepare for talks with Soviet Government, reiterating that he would obtain unconditional and undelayed approval by Senate but that in process he and Pinay had taken moral commitment to do everything possible to bring about early talks with Russians.

After reading it, I asked how soon he envisaged working group meeting. He replied as soon as possible. I asked how he envisaged

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1/3–2255. Secret; Priority. Repeated to London and Bonn.

[2] Telegram 4034, not printed. (*Ibid.*)

German participation since Germans would undoubtedly insist upon it. He recognized that this problem would have to be dealt with and thought it could through consultation or otherwise, though he did not wish them to participate as equals, at least not initially. He thought group should initially be tripartite. I asked when he envisaged any approach being made to Russians and whether he thought this should depend upon progress of the working group. He said he thought it should be made as soon as possible since some French parliamentary and public opinion was still thinking of Mendes-France's proposal for meeting in May but that timing, manner and substance of any approach to Russians would be matter for agreement among three governments in working group.

Faure emphasized that aide-mémoire would not be made public but that he wished British and ourselves to be informed in advance [and][3] that he would speak along these lines in Senate debate. He said Foreign Office was advising press only that he wished before opening of Senate debate to advise British and United States governments of spirit in which his government was asking Senate ratification and that this was why, in Pinay's presence, he had received British Ambassador and myself.

Jebb saw him just before I did.

Achilles

---

[3] In telegram 4043 from Paris, March 22, the Embassy requested that "and" be added to telegram 4033 at this point. (*Ibid.*)

---

88. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom[1]

Washington, March 28, 1955—7:09 p.m.

4949. Dept and British Emb exchanged views Saturday on talks with Soviets. Texts being pouched.[2]

Brit paper proposes talks designed to "bring results even of limited character" rather than propaganda exercise. Should be held immediately after ratification Paris Agreements because "we as close to being able to talk on terms of equality with Soviet leaders as likely in foreseeable future".

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1/3-2855. Secret. Repeated to Bonn, Paris, and Vienna.

[2] Copies of the first British paper and the U.S. paper referred to are *ibid.*, 396.1/3-2655; a copy of the revised British paper is *ibid.*, 396.1/3-2955.

Talks would cover (a) Austria, Germany and European security (b) study of ways and means of dealing with all other issues outstanding between East-West.

British suggested following arrangements:

(a) US, French, UK officials to meet in London about April 14 to reach preliminary agreement.

(b) Paris meeting week later would include West German representatives for discussions on Germany. Consultation with permanent NAC representatives on European security. NATO representatives to be kept generally informed about Germany.

(c) Consultation in Vienna between our Ambassadors and Austrian Government.

(d) Meeting of US, UK, French and German Foreign Secretaries first week of May to decide on approach to Soviet Government.

(e) Thereafter or concurrently NATO Foreign Ministers meeting coinciding with Paris Agreements entry into force.

US reply expressed general agreement but made two points on arrangements: (1) Suggested no date should be set for official level talks prior deposit of Paris Agreements ratification. (2) Newly sovereign Germany cannot be entirely excluded from initial phases and therefore meetings suggested in points (a) and (b) of British paper should be consolidated. Simultaneously US, UK and French talks could be held on subjects not directly concerning Germany.

Our paper urged British not present theirs to French unless amended in accordance US suggestions.

Brit Emb has just informed us FonOff agrees to our suggested changes. Brit Emb Paris instructed deliver to Quai d'Orsay today. Department not yet in possession new text but understands it now calls for "diplomatic consultation" to be followed by meeting of officials in London or Paris in which German representatives would take part. Understand timing now proposed as "as soon as possible in April".

Dulles

---

89. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, April 1, 1955[1]

SUBJECT

British Proposals for Preparations for Talks with the Soviet Union

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1/4–155. Secret. Drafted by Tyler.

PARTICIPANTS

Mr. J.H.A. Watson, Counselor, British Embassy
Mr. C. Burke Elbrick, EUR
Mr. Jacob D. Beam, EE
Mr. William R. Tyler, WE

Mr. Watson was told that the Department had considered the British proposals and timetable for preparations for talks with the Soviets,[2] and that we had decided that it would not be advisable to establish a working group until at least France and Germany had deposited instruments of ratification along with the UK and the US. Mr. Elbrick said that we had made a great effort all together to achieve a position of strength from which negotiations with the Soviet Union might be profitably attempted. There must be no suggestion that such a position of strength could be compromised, and this required that final irreversible action be taken with respect to the instruments of ratification and exchange of letters between France and Germany on the Saar. We had noted a Foreign Office statement the previous day on plans for preparatory talks which implied, if it did not explicitly state, that a tripartite working group would be set up in early April. This was not in accordance with our understanding of our respective positions and we felt that the deposit of instruments must be proceeded with as far as the four Western powers are concerned, before discussions could be officially held. Pending this time, consultation would, of course, go on through diplomatic channels. We, on our side, had to cover a considerable amount of ground and make careful preparations. Mr. Elbrick added that the above should not be construed as meaning that there was any reluctance on our part to meet, and we are prepared to do so just as soon as the deposit of instruments has taken place.

Mr. Watson, speaking informally and personally, observed that the pressure from London was undoubtedly due to the prospect of elections perhaps in June, and to Eden's awareness that "he would be fighting for his political life" in order to become Prime Minister. He observed also that Eden would wish to get the elections out of the way before there was any chance of a meeting with the Soviets, as otherwise he would be under very great pressure at such a meeting.

Mr. Watson said he would convey the Department's position at once to London. He asked whether we had anything to say with regard to location of the working group meeting in London. Mr. Elbrick said that we had not taken any firm position on this but that we felt Paris had certain advantages with respect to consultation with our other NATO allies, since we would be close to the Permanent Representatives there.

---

[2] Regarding these proposals, see telegram 4949, *supra*.

Mr. Watson then asked whether we had any views about informing Chancellor Adenauer of the plans and timing for setting up those discussions. He suggested that it would be good to inform Adenauer very soon and that this might be followed by a US and UK démarche to him and to Pinay urging Germany and France to proceed with deposit of instruments and exchange of letters. Mr. Elbrick agreed that Adenauer should be informed shortly and said that we would consider the advisability of a formal démarche as suggested by Mr. Watson. Mr. Watson said he would cable London at once to get their views and would be in touch with the Department again when he had received an answer.[3]

---

[3] Barbour and Tyler also discussed this topic with de Juniac on April 1 indicating the U.S. position along these lines. De Juniac stated that his government shared the U.S. view and raised the subject of German participation in the talks. (Memorandum of conversation by Tyler, April 1; Department of State, Central Files, 396.1/4–155)

---

90. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France[1]

Washington, April 7, 1955—7 p.m.

3576. Re Bonn's 2877 and Paris Embtels 4307 and 4331.[2] FYI Our principal objective at this time is to bring Paris Agreements into force soon as possible. This means we must try get over hurdles of French and German deposit as early as possible in April so that there will be no further reason for delay by other countries involved. US instruments signed by President today and will be forwarded Bonn forthwith; we will be ready deposit by end of week. British and Germans now also ready, remaining problem is French Government willingness deposit in its turn.

We are seriously concerned by indication Paris reftels that French do not plan deposit until some time in May. French may have some genuine concern at danger German Constitutional Court might render adverse verdict on Saar agreement and thus throw into question what French have unilaterally insisted is an integral part of Paris Agreements. On this subject we understand German position is that

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.022/4–555. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Stanley M. Cleveland (RA) and cleared with Tyler, Palmer, and Kidd. Also sent to Bonn and repeated to London.

[2] These telegrams reported various aspects of the problem of depositing ratifications and establishing a working group. (*Ibid.*, 740.5/4–555, 396.1/4–555, and 762.022/4–555, respectively)

Heuss' signature on letter approving Saar Agreement binds Germany under international law and Constitutional Court issue is internal matter; this position appears reasonable to us and was apparently acceptable French FonOff last week (Paris Embtel 4217[3]). In any case, danger adverse Court decision appears greater and its repercussions on hard-won structure of unity in Paris Agreements far worse if Agreements not in force before Court acts.

On other hand, we fear Faure may wish hold up French deposit in order use timing as bargaining weapon in bilateral negotiations with Germans on Saar and Roechling matters[4] which we would consider unjustified and which would create serious danger of prolonged delays.

For these reasons we are not prepared agree to date Working Group meeting until we know that ratifications of at least four major powers concerned will be deposited before working group meets. We are happy to note from London's 4421 (rptd Bonn 393 Paris 622)[5] that British FonOff supports this stand.

It is however clear from Paris reftel we face difficult bargaining situation with Faure. We feel best tactic under circumstances is not emphasize tie between deposit and Working Group but rather to press for rapid French action on deposit and hold off on agreement for Working Group date until we know when French will deposit. End FYI.

For Paris: On this basis Dillon should see Pinay and if necessary Faure and make following points:

1. US anxious bring Paris Agreements into force soon as possible and thus lay basis of strength and unity for negotiations with Soviet Union. All necessary parliamentary action will have been taken in all countries by first week May and we would hope bring Agreements into force by that time. This would permit holding NATO Ministerial meeting in second week May to mark fact that Atlantic Community has entered a new phase.

2. President has ratified Paris Agreements for US and instruments will be ready for deposit in a few days. We understand UK also ready to deposit at any time. We are however anxious speed up German deposit so that German action becomes irreversible before new road-blocks arise there. Rapid deposit by four major countries concerned would also encourage other NATO countries to expedite action. We understand Chancellor now ready deposit if US, UK, and France do. For this reason we would hope that deposit by all of us could be made within two weeks; Pinay's visit to Bonn seems provide good occasion. (If Pinay or Faure raises Constitutional Court

---

[3] Not printed.

[4] The control of the Roechling Works in the Saar was a continuing matter of contention between France and the Federal Republic.

[5] Telegram 4421 reported that the Foreign Office was more concerned with the deposit of ratifications than with the establishment of the working group.

problem you may in your discretion use line of argument in second paragraph this tel.)

3. As concerns Working Group, meeting with Soviet Union should be solidly prepared, which means delegations must come to Working Group meeting well-briefed. Internal US preparations will require several weeks. Agree usefulness meeting of Ministers in May to discuss tactics and timing; however Secretary cannot take two trips to Europe so close together, so this meeting would best take place in connection NATO Ministerial meeting. Working Group could help lay groundwork for Ministers meeting and then complete preparations on basis instructions from Ministers.

4. We believe it important Germans should participate fully in German phase Working Group's activities. Also feel continuing consultation NATO Council important because of NATO interest in European security arrangements and in order strengthen NATO political consultative machinery as we and French both desire. These arrangements will be greatly facilitated if any uncertainty removed about German deposit so that Chancellor will be free of internal pressure on this subject and if deposits other NATO countries well on way to completion by time Working Group meets.

Subsequent to drafting of foregoing, French Ambassador called and expressed concern re US position that Working Group should not begin work before deposit ratification agreements by principal powers.[6] He said French Government felt this would mean in effect that Working Group could not start much, if any, before Ministerial meeting since French could not deposit until following problems had been resolved:

(1) Exchange of letters on Saar, which French understand Germans not willing effect until court pronouncement early May;
(2) Franco-Saar Convention concluded; and
(3) Roechling problem settled.

Secretary indicated our understanding Germans willing exchange Saar letters prior court determination, thereby making them binding internationally. Secretary also expressed concern at imposing extraneous matters such as (2) and (3) as conditions to deposit instruments of ratification. He emphasized we were proceeding on assumption we should get one thing done before starting another. So long as uncertainty prevailed by virtue failure deposit instruments of ratification there was always possibility other extraneous matters might be raised which would affect coming into force of treaties which we all have recognized must be effective before negotiations undertaken with Soviets. He thought all foregoing questions could be resolved by first of May provided Germans willing exchange Saar letters. He thought we should all concentrate on getting Working Group started before

---

[6] A memorandum of Dulles' conversation with Couve de Murville is in Department of State, Central File 396.1/4–755. For the French account, see *Documents Diplomatiques Français*, 1955, Tome 1, pp. 415–416.

NATO Ministerial meeting. At same time he thought we should also try get instruments of ratification deposited before Working Group established.[7]

For Bonn: You should in your discretion support British suggestions reported Deptel 2698.[8] We would also like your estimate prospects Constitutional Court action (including timing and danger of injunction) and what assurances Chancellor might be prepared give French on binding nature Saar Agreement.

Dulles

---

[7] On April 8, Dillon reported that he delivered an aide-mémoire to the French along the lines instructed. (Telegrams 4385 and 4386 from Paris; *ibid.*, 740.5/4–855) On the following day he cabled further stating that if the United States continued to hold up the working group until after deposit of the ratifications, it might seriously jeopardize the timely deposit of the instruments. (Telegram 4388 from Paris; *ibid.*, 740.5/4–955)

[8] Telegram 2698 reported that the British would accept the condition that no working group be established until after the deposit of the instruments of ratification provided no action was taken by the High Commissioners to terminate the occupation until ratification had been completed by all the other countries. (*Ibid.*, 740.5/4–455)

---

91. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State[1]

Paris, April 14, 1955—2 p.m.

4449. Faure asked me to come and see him at noon today and when I arrived I found Massigli in his office representing Pinay, who is absent from Paris. Faure handed me a note answering the aide-mémoire which I left with Massigli on April 8,[2] and setting up a timetable for deposit of ratifications and meetings regarding four power conference with Soviets. Original text follows in separate telegram.[3]

In note French Government renews pledge to carry out Paris Accords and after citing problems regarding deposit of ratification proposes following time schedule.

1. Meeting as soon as possible, in any event during month of April, of expert working group.
2. Deposit of instruments of ratification on May 7.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/4–1455. Secret; Niact. Repeated to Bonn and London.

[2] See footnote 7, *supra.*

[3] Telegram 4454 from Paris, April 15. (Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/4–1455) For text, see *Documents Diplomatiques Français*, 1955, Tome 1, pp. 444–446.

3. Meeting of Foreign Ministers in Paris on May 11 in the afternoon after the conclusion of the NATO meeting that day.

Faure then told me he was handling this matter personally in order to emphasize its importance, and the importance which France attached to making progress on the preparations for a four power conference. He said that it would be impossible to deposit the instruments of ratification prior to the date proposed, because it would take that long to assure completion and settlement of the Roechling problem in the Saar. He said he hoped that in view of France's willingness to set a date for deposit of instruments of ratification, we would now be agreeable to proceeding with the working group. He said if this was not agreeable it would cause real embarrassment to him at the congress of the Radical-Socialist Party which has now been officially set for May 4. If France deposited the instruments of ratification on May 7, without any prior meeting of a working group, Faure said it would also probably mean he would have to answer interpellations on the subject in Parliament. He said he did not fear such interpellations but that he much preferred not to have this subject reopened on the floor of the National Assembly.

I told Faure that I would transmit his message immediately to Washington and would hope for an early reply.

Massigli then mentioned the British aide-mémoire which had been received yesterday,[4] and said that the date which had been suggested in that aide-mémoire for deposit of ratifications, namely April 25, was absolutely out of the question. Faure was receiving the British Minister immediately after me to give him the same, or a similar, note.[5]

Comment: I am certain that insistence by the U.S. on deposit of ratification instruments prior to a meeting of the working group will have no effect in speeding up the date for deposit of ratifications. It will merely cause ill will here and will cause some embarrassment to Faure personally, although I do not believe that this will be serious. I believe it might be possible to move up the date of deposit of ratifications by a few days, but I imagine that Faure would much prefer the 7th in order not to have the deposit take place immediately before or during the congress of the Radical-Socialist Party. For these reasons and reasons I have previously outlined, I hope the Dept can find some basis for allowing the working group to meet toward the end of April, prior to actual deposit of the instruments of ratification.

---

[4] On April 13, Dillon reported that the British Minister had delivered an aide-mémoire to the Foreign Ministry concerning the timetable for the working group and deposit of ratifications. (Telegram 4432 from Paris; Department of State, Central Files, 396.1/4–1355)

[5] In telegram 4450, May 14, Dillon reported that Faure took a much firmer line with the British Minister, stressing that he would not deposit the French instruments of ratification until the working group met. (*Ibid.*, 740.5/4–1455)

Dillon

---

92. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France[1]

Washington, April 15, 1955—7:56 p.m.

3676. Re Embtel 4454.[2] In reply to Note transmitted Embtel, please inform Pinay orally as follows:

1. Proposed date May 7 for deposit French ratification instruments unacceptable. As I told Couve de Murville,[3] I cannot put myself in position of leaving or even making public plan to leave for Paris to attend meeting which is contingent upon entry Germans into NATO, while uncertainty remains as to whether meeting will be held. Uncertainty about French and German deposits sure to lead to hanging back by other signatories which could produce last-minute hitches in other deposits and possible need to postpone NATO meeting and consequent public relations fiasco. To avert this danger, latest possible date for completion deposit ratification major powers seems to be May 4 and we urge French agree to this date. We intend to deposit next few days and are urging all other signatories to do same.

2. As concerns meeting of experts, we are anxious it take place as soon as possible after proper preparations have been made. As we see it, function of Working Group would be to lay groundwork for discussion by Ministers especially on timing of proposed Four-Power Talks and on possible agenda. Preliminary preparations should not require more than a week, so that meeting opening around April 27 should give adequate time. Experts would then presumably continue to meet after Ministerial meeting to work out detailed positions on points in question.

3. In order reach agreement on timetable which will meet French and our problems, we are prepared to accept following compromise: If French prepared give firm assurance deposit no later than May 4

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/4–1455. Secret. Drafted by Palmer and Cleveland, cleared with Merchant and WE, and approved by Dulles. Repeated to London and Bonn.

[2] Not printed. (*Ibid.*) For a summary of the note, see telegram 4449, *supra*.

[3] Presumably reference is to the conversation between Dulles and Couve de Murville, summarized in Document 90.

we would be prepared agree to meeting of experts in London or Paris beginning April 27. In presenting this proposal, you should make it clear that it is a package agreement. FYI While we are sure Faure would rather face his Radical Congress with the question of French deposit still in the air, we believe the requirements of the international situation should be paramount in this case. End FYI.

4. Invitation to Soviets for Four-Power Talks, as well as timing and agenda such talks seem to us matters for discussion by Foreign Ministers. We therefore feel that any communiqué such as that suggested numbered para 3 French note can not be issued until there has been opportunity for full tripartite Ministerial and NAC discussion issues involved.[4] This means in practice communiqué should not be issued until conclusion meeting of three Ministers.

5. FYI As concerns timing of Ministerial meetings, we would favor initial tripartite Ministers meeting afternoon May 8. Such meeting would permit preliminary exchange of views before discussion Agenda Item II at NATO Ministerial Meeting. Further tripartite and quadripartite meetings could then be held if necessary at end of NATO meeting. End FYI.

6. You should also make sure that it is understood that Germans will participate fully in Working Group discussions on German problem from time Group first meets in London. You should also remind FonOff that we are still awaiting French views on issues requested by Secretary from French Ambassador (Deptel 3618[5]).

Dulles

---

[4] The draft communiqué would have announced the intentions of the three Western powers to convene a four-power conference by the summer of 1955. (Telegram 4454 from Paris, April 14; Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/4–1455)

[5] Telegram 3618 reported that Dulles asked Couve de Murville during a conversation on April 11 for the French view on items that should be included or avoided on the agenda for a four-power conference. (*Ibid.*, 740.5/4–955)

---

93. Editorial Note

In subsequent discussions among the United States, the United Kingdom, and France it was agreed that the French would give a definite commitment to deposit the instruments of ratification on May 5, that the working group would begin its deliberations at London on April 27, and that a communiqué would be issued stating that the Foreign Ministers of the three Western Powers would meet at Paris beginning May 8 to discuss concrete plans for the holding of a Four-Power Conference with the Soviet Union.

Documentation on these discussions is in Department of State, Central Files 740.5 and 396.1. For text of the communiqué, issued on April 25, see Department of State *Bulletin,* May 9, 1955, page 759. Documentation on the deliberations of the working group is presented on the following pages.

---

94. Memorandum of a Meeting, Department of State, Washington, April 23, 1955, 10 a.m.[1]

SUBJECT

London Working Group Terms of Reference

PARTICIPANTS

Mr. Merchant, EUR
Mr. Tyler, WE
Mr. Cleveland, RA
Mr. Fuller, S/P
Mr. Palmer, RA
Mr. Wolf, RA
Mr. Hooper, GER
Mr. Kidd, GER
Mr. Beam, EE
Mr. Barringer, Defense
Mr. Billingsly, Defense
Col. Lawlor, Defense
Col. Hensty, Defense
Mr. Reinstein, GER
Mr. Blake, E
Mr. Lyon, GER
Mr. Cottman, S/S

The following is a record of actions taken at the 10:00 a.m. meeting in the EUR conference room on the terms of reference for the US Delegation to the London Working Group:

1. That the US Delegation to the London Working Group would engage in a general exchange of views regarding Germany and European security, leading possibly to the formulation of an agreed analysis of the situation and possibly setting forth alternative proposals regarding the timing of the proposed Big Four meeting and the agenda thereto.

2. That the US Delegation should discuss the "Eden Plan" for free elections in Germany and the proposed German Peace Treaty (as outlined in FP (WG) D–4a and D–4/2a[2]) *but* would not initiate dis-

---

[1] Source: Department of State, CFM Files: Lot M–88, Box 254, FP(WG)Memos. Confidential. A cover sheet indicated the memorandum was drafted by Cleveland and Cottman, approved by Merchant, and circulated as FP(WG)Memo 7.

[2] The former, dated April 19, recommended that the basic features of the Eden Plan (FPM(54)17, January 29, 1954, *Foreign Relations,* 1952–1954, vol. VII, Part 1, p. 1177) should again be advanced in the next conference with the Soviet Union. The latter, also dated April 19, proposed a draft German peace treaty as a step going beyond the

Continued

cussion in the Working Group on various proposals for European Security arrangements which have been discussed in the joint State–Defense Working Group meeting here.

In particular, the US Delegation should not put forward in London any elaboration of suggestions concerning a possible extension of the WEU Arms Control provisions; rather it should attempt to draw out the other delegations on the subject of European Security arrangements in general.

3. That the basic position of the United States is to maintain and strengthen NATO and Germany's association with the West through NATO. No proposal should be accepted which would conflict with this position.

4. That the Working Group should endeavor to encourage the exposition of the views of the UK, French and German Delegations, always keeping in mind in any exchange of views their relation to the basic US position as set forth above. (Item 3.)

5. That action should be taken in Washington to initiate an OCB working group, similar to that set up for the Geneva meeting, to consider means for developing policies designed to implement US objectives in the overseas information and propaganda field. (Mr. Reinstein action.)

6. That FE be requested to prepare a paper for the guidance of the London Delegation in meeting possible insistence that we agree to inclusion of Far Eastern matters on a Big Power conference agenda. This paper might suggest that if our position in opposition to inclusion of this item is not acceptable to the others, the Working Group

a) agree to refer this matter to the Foreign Minister level;
b) agree that US will consider these proposals.

7. That Mr. Reinstein would coordinate back-stopping operations for the London Working Group.

Eden Plan and enclosed such a draft treaty. (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 452) A set of the FP(WG)D documents, numbering 1–6 and covering Austria, Germany, European Security, the Far East, and a Four-Power Meeting, is *ibid.*

95. Letter From the High Commissioner for Germany (Conant) to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant)[1]

Bad Godesberg, April 25, 1955.

DEAR LIVIE: This is in reply to your letter of April 13, 1955.[2] Today was the first opportunity I had of raising the questions mentioned in this letter with the Chancellor. My ostensible reason for visiting him was to discuss once again the Berlin situation, but I took the opportunity of congratulating him on his article in the *Saturday Evening Post,*[3] which I read last night. Then, as you suggested, I took off on a general discussion of his proposals for armament control and a European security system.

I found the Chancellor anything but enthusiastic about the Western Powers putting forward new proposals to the Russians about German reunification which would seem to be anything like a concession. He was unwilling to elaborate his own ideas about a European security system and I got the impression that this part of his *Saturday Evening Post* article was not to be taken too seriously *insofar as the present is concerned.* I gathered the Chancellor feels that the time is not yet ripe to push forward with the real steps which will bring about German reunification and the creation of a more peaceful posture in Middle Europe. He kept restating his premises in regard to the present situation. Since these were the starting points for the subsequent discussion, I may as well state them at the outset in this letter. The Chancellor believes that Russia is probably at the high point of its power, and the decrease in this power from now on may be very rapid. As evidence, he cites the failure of their agrarian policy both in Russia and the satellite countries and in China. He is convinced that the problem of finding the necessary food for the populations in these countries causes enormous difficulties. He feels that the failure of Russia to align the Asian-African peoples to their point of view, as evidenced at Bandung, is of the greatest importance. The success of the Paris Treaties represents another failure of the Russians. As to the situation in Berlin, he feels they will never risk another blockade and we can therefore by the show of strength and determination ensure unharassed access to that city.

As to public opinion in Germany, the elections Sunday in Lower Saxony have brought evidence, so he believes, that the population in the Federal Republic is completely on his side. He believes that all the talk of the SPD and the talk of some part of the FDP about reunification can be ignored. (In this connection, our public opinion polls show that a remarkably small percentage of those questioned did have their hearts in reunification. This fact, needless to say, I did not mention to the Chancellor and it should be held most closely in Washington.) The Chancellor pointed out that there were two phases of the reunification problem which could *not* be discussed publicly. The first was the Oder-Neisse line, which he could neither agree to as the boundary of Germany nor could he refuse reunification if that were made the condition. The second was the alleged fact that the Soviet source of uranium is in the Soviet Zone. He did not believe that there was any possibility of the Russians agreeing to reunification unless and until some agreement as to the control of atomic weapons could be reached. This is a consequence of his last assumption about the Soviet source of uranium. He kept stressing the importance of agreement on the control of atomic weapons and classical weapons and kept saying that any conference must be concerned with world problems and not just with German reunification. He said it was the total situation in the world which needed attention. The Russians did not fear the twelve German divisions,—what they feared was the American power and above all American nuclear weapons. Therefore, he said, any discussion merely of the German problem would be quite out of focus and would be a mistake. If the Russians wanted to start discussing this problem, we should insist on enlarging the discussion and putting it on a global scale with reference to the Far East and disarmament. (Since I was not officially representing the United States point of view, I did not raise some obvious objections at this point.)

---

[1] Source: Department of State, EUR Files: Lot 59 D 233, Germany 1955. Official–Informal; Personal–Secret. Attached to a memorandum from Merchant to Dulles, dated May 4, which outlined the subjects which Chancellor Adenauer might raise at his meeting with Dulles on May 7. For a record of their meeting, see Document 106.

[2] Not found in Department of State files.

[3] Reference is to "Germany Faces the Facts", *Saturday Evening Post,* vol. 227, p. 31.

In the course of the discussion, the Chancellor said that there could be no hope of getting the Soviet Zone back until there were free elections in Poland and Czechoslovakia, as well as in the Soviet Zone. Between a free Poland and a free Germany, an agreement could be reached as to boundaries of their respective nations, but there could be no agreement between a satellite Poland and a freely elected all-German government. Furthermore, he believed that historically Poland and Czechoslovakia had been, and in the future must be, the outposts of western civilization.

He seemed to be very little interested in proposals that might be put to the Russians on the basis of the limitation of European armaments, or control of European armies, since he felt these proposals could not be realistic and would only weaken our position if they were made concrete and would do no good if they were left vague. I tried on him, for example, as a personal idea a proposal that if the Russian troops were to be withdrawn from the Soviet Zone, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, a freely elected all-German government might be willing to have certain limitations placed on it in advance. These might be (1) no troops to be stationed beyond the Elbe line and (2) no recruitment of soldiers in the country east of the Elbe. The first of these conditions he seemed to think might be worth discussing, but the second would be out of the question. And when I went on to amplify my ideas as to United Nations control of armament and inspection in East Germany and in the satellite countries, he came back to the problem of the uranium deposits and the Oder-Neisse line. (This last point certainly worries him, and he is obviously afraid of a counter-propaganda move by the Russians which would place him in the awkward position of accepting this boundary, or refusing it even as a price of reunification.)

There is one part of your letter which I didn't feel I could suggest to the Chancellor, namely, what is implied by the sentence which runs over onto the top of page 3 and which includes the following statement: " . . . [4] a fundamentally new situation of peace would have been created in which the United States would willingly undertake adjustments of its military positions proportionate to any the Soviets were prepared to make." In the first place, it was clear that the only thing that would create a fundamentally new situation of peace from the Chancellor's present viewpoint would be an agreement on the limitation and control of weapons. Secondly, unless I was specifically directed, I should be unwilling to suggest to the Chancellor even as a personal view that the United States would weaken its position here in Europe; for I am sure that this is one of the matters which he does not wish to hear considered and coming from my lips officially or unofficially any idea that we would adjust our military position in Europe might be the source of very grave misunderstandings, to say the least, or possibly cause for actual alarm.

In the course of nearly an hour's conversation, I kept returning to the question of whether the Western Powers should stand on the Eden Plan and our position at the Berlin conference. The Chancellor certainly never once indicated we should go beyond this position, though he did not definitely state we should stick to it. Rather, he kept trying to put the discussion in a broader context, bringing in Africa, the Far East and, above all, disarmament. One thing seems plain to me. He is not at all desirous of trying to get a yes or no answer from the Russians on the question of German reunification. Quite the contrary, he feels that if the subject must be discussed, the discussion must be kept going on in the broadest possible framework. In the meantime, I assume he would be prepared to go ahead with the rearmament of Germany.

---

[4] Ellipsis in the source text.

If I may venture my own opinion on this highly complex subject, I would suggest that what is needed is a conference which will last for a very long time indeed. I recognize that it is impossible for Foreign Ministers to keep on meeting, but insofar as the German problem is concerned, it seems to me that negotiations prolonged over many years while rearmament was taking place would be as good an answer to the question which now confronts us as can be found. (But this conference should not be in Berlin.)

The Chancellor believes the inhabitants of both Berlin and the East Zone can hold out for some years under the present system, but I venture to think he is over-optimistic on this point unless there is continuous indication that the Federal Republic and the Western Powers are trying to do something to bring about reunification. I venture to be more anxious than is the Chancellor about a conference on German reunification which would be a failure, as was the Berlin conference. Therefore, I come out with a very strong opinion that what is needed here is a meeting of Foreign Ministers, then of experts at various levels, and then another Foreign Ministers' conference, et cetera, for many years. In the meantime, if the Russian situation continues to deteriorate, according to the Chancellor's prediction, and the West continues to show its unity in Europe, we will be from year to year in a better position to work for our ultimate objective here in Europe, which would be freely-elected governments in the satellite states with some limitation on their armament and a freely-elected all-German government to govern a united Germany.

I am very glad I was able to have this discussion with the Chancellor on such a cautious and unofficial basis. If my understanding of his reactions are correct, I am afraid he will have been very alarmed, indeed, if I had put forward the thinking in your April 13 letter as coming from Washington officially. Of course, he may have seen through my camouflage about the *Saturday Evening Post* article, but I think my own views were sufficiently cautious and tentatively presented to make him uncertain as to whether I had any news from Washington. It is even conceivable that he thought I was reflecting what he believes to be my undue consideration for the SPD. It would not hurt my feelings if he came to the unwarranted conclusion that what I was endeavoring to do was to present in a favorable light a modification of the SPD position, though I particularly pointed out the foolishness of their idea of a united Germany without alliance. At all events, I did the best I could in trying to smoke out the Chancellor's position, but I refrained from pointing out the inconsistency of his private views (for we were supposedly speaking in private and in confidence) and those he presented to the Press Club in Washington[5] and the *Saturday Evening Post.*

With all good wishes,

Sincerely yours,

Jim

---

[5] For text of Adenauer's address to the National Press Club in Washington, October 29, 1954, see the *New York Times,* October 30, 1955.

---

96. Telegram From the Delegation at the London Working Group to the Department of State[1]

London, April 27, 1955—9 p.m.

4785. From Beam. First meeting working group this morning, Harrison representing United Kingdom, Seydoux France.[2] No communiqués to be issued.

U.K. emphasized three govts committed early meeting with Soviets but working group should stress procedure not substantive questions. French proposed review substantive questions but indicated it would be difficult formulate recommendations.

Despite United States proposal keep NATO Council currently informed progress, U.K. and French doubted value presenting a more than general outline proceedings; subcomite to draft progress report for NATO early next week.

Agreed invite Germans participate Thursday morning prior Blankenhorn's departure Bonn for Adenauer–Pinay Saar talks. In accordance U.S. suggestion, Germans will attend as many plenary meetings as possible.

U.K. opened afternoon meeting by expressing hope all would enter conference optimistically and seeking genuine solution with Soviets; must accept possibility Soviets will be more fluid and may accept Eden Plan. French said French public opinion expects concrete results; must approach meeting in spirit détente; expressed worry regarding dangers German neutralization (French could not accept this), but must go beyond Berlin positions since less would not appear represent genuine effort at negotiation. U.S. stressed necessity take advantage strengthened Western unity, emphasize confidence and optimism; only such posture has chance inducing Soviets to modify policies towards Europe.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1/4–2755. Secret. Repeated to Paris, Moscow, Bonn, Berlin, and Vienna.

[2] Members of the U.S. Delegation met twice with their British counterparts on April 26 to discuss, inter alia, disarmament, European security, the agenda for a four-power meeting, and German participation in the working group. (Telegrams 4759 and 4760 from London, April 26; *ibid.,* 396.1/4–2655)

U.S. in answer U.K. question on timing conference said we had no exact instructions, although Secretary had tentatively suggested late summer. U.K. said conference not possible until mid-July at earliest due lack U.K. Govt prior mid-June. French indicated July 1, earliest possible. U.K. suggested Ministers might discuss conference with Molotov at Vienna or possibly June meeting in San Francisco;[3] however committed to sending some type communication to Soviets between May 9–10. U.S. said Foreign Ministers themselves must consider timing at NATO meeting, particularly in light progress on Austrian treaty.

Following sites for conference mentioned for consideration Ministers: Berlin, by U.K. (opposed by all since Adenauer objects); Vienna, by U.K. (generally opposed as intimating Austrian solution for Germany); Lugano, by French (opposed by U.S. and U.K. due lack telecommunications); Stockholm, by U.K. (French do not like); Geneva, by U.K. (all felt psychologically not wise); Paris and London, by U.S. (objected to by U.K., who felt all NATO countries out due possibility Soviet rejection and counter-proposal of Moscow).

U.K. said committed to tell public during or immediately after NATO meeting that approach being made to Soviets. U.S., U.K. favored note possibly presented by Ambassadors and released thereafter to press. French opposed sending written notes to Soviets and want approach to be more serious and supple. French said will reconsider.

U.K. then read following instructions: "U.K. proposes approach to Soviet Govt for meeting four heads of government should be held to discuss all outstanding points at difference between Russia and three Western allies. This, of course, would not exclude continuance of practice of meeting four Foreign Ministers to discuss an agreed agenda." U.K. said this proposal did not preclude continuance preparation for Foreign Ministers meeting by working group, although U.K. said Foreign Ministers meeting prior to meeting at top might be neither necessary nor proper. U.S. expressed grave reservations in light constitutional difficulties and risks of approach of this kind; question could only be settled by Ministers unless prior instructions received. U.K. said any U.K. Govt which did not provide for meeting at top would be in danger in the elections. Group agreed keep question secret, although French doubted this could be done (Amb Aldrich informed of foregoing).

---

[3] See Documents 73–75 and 143.

Re German participation in Foreign Ministers conference, all agreed in principle this depends on FedRep decision; latter must take responsibility.

---

97. Telegram From the Delegation at the London Working Group to the Department of State[1]

London, April 28, 1955—3 p.m.

4796. From Beam. Reference: Embtel 4786.[2] Blankenhorn told Kidd that on Monday he had discussed with Chancellor subject working party and preparations conference with Soviets. Chancellor's main point was that German representatives not authorized deal with any point of substance before he had opportunity personal discussion with Secretary at Paris. Blankenhorn welcomed possibility frank exchange views with British and ourselves, but preferred not go very far with French until after Ministers' meeting. Indicated German impression that developments occurring in French Foreign Office and government of which difficult predict outcome. Germans felt easier about Pinay than about Faure. We said that German position seemed quite close to British and if Chancellor desired avoid questions substance until after meeting with Secretary we could not object.

Blankenhorn stressed Chancellor's personal view that acceptance into West's treaty system was Germany's greatest asset. Traditional German defect had been to waver between East and West, and now that "for first time in 50 years" Germany had support of western allies, Chancellor determined to avoid at all costs giving any impression that Federal Republic would waver in its allegiance to WEU and NATO. Felt that if he could hold to this course until elections 1957 and win those elections, his policy would have time take root and could not be disturbed thereafter. In this respect, if we could understand, certain questions of internal politics more important than reunification immediately. Chancellor strongly against any Austrian treaty solution for Germany and could think of abundant dissimilarities in German case. (Raab had sent message saying that condition of

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1/4–2855. Secret. According to another copy, this telegram was drafted by Kidd who was in London as part of the delegation. (*Ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 452) Repeated to Bonn and Paris.

[2] Telegram 4786 reported Kidd's conversation with Blankenhorn on the Saar. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 396.1/4–2755)

Austria's present policy was that Germany continue its present policy rearmament in western alliance.) Chancellor inclined to think German settlement might follow only in wake global US-Soviet détente. In any event, Germany would be in stronger position tackle reunification question two years hence. Necessity proceeding very cautiously now.

When conditions permit general détente, Chancellor saw certain elements or ideas in WEU which might possibly be extended or supply pattern for all-European arrangement. Principle was that Germany could accept any such restrictions as arms limitations, non-aggression assurances, withdrawal support of allies in case of violation, which other nations also accepted. Otherwise sovereignty including freedom of alliance was essential. Under no circumstances "neutralization". Also under no circumstances could Germany give up claim to Oder-Neisse and eastern territories, although willing renounce use of force for solution such questions. This was type of idea Chancellor wished reserve for conversation with Secretary. Blankenhorn did not go into details, but indicated arrangement also intended apply for forces USSR, UK and US on European continent.

Blankenhorn's personal opinion that something more than Berlin conference positions on free elections, if short of security plans reported above, would be needed to hold public opinion in light conclusion Austrian treaty and possible Soviet moves. He thought principles of an all-German peace treaty (mentioned to him merely as one possibility among others) based squarely on Berlin position of sovereignty including freedom of alliance but reserving question of frontiers for formal peace conference negotiations, might have possibilities as propaganda device to put Soviets on defensive. However, wished to consider matter further and would endeavor keep us informed.

---

98. Telegram From the Delegation at the London Working Group to the Department of State[1]

London, April 28, 1955—9 p.m.

4812. From Beam. At meeting working group this morning Blankenhorn gave outline German position re necessity for four-power talks, importance of German reunification issue and desirability

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1/4–2855. Secret. Drafted by Beam and McBride. Repeated to Paris, Bonn, and Moscow.

West's recapturing initiative from Soviets (Embtel 4796[2]). He said Austrian developments had deepened German feelings these subjects but added Germans realized Austrian solution unthinkable for them, and Chancellor not willing consider any formula for neutralizing Germany. He said Big Four should not touch newly created Western treaty system since Germany completely devoted to its present obligations. He mentioned there was strong German opposition but this not increasing and Chancellor can continue to rely on big majority for support of treaty system.

On agenda he believed West should go further than at Berlin and might propose European security system. In reply French question Blankenhorn, stressed Germans not now tabling proposal this complex and vital subject but looking forward discussions Foreign Minister level Paris. He thought such plan could be development (though not extension) Paris Agreement and should include all European states (including Soviet Union) as well as US and Canada. Without going into further detail he thought plan should include following principles: (1) mutual non-aggression guarantees; (2) mutual assistance by all members if one member attacked; (3) loss of treaty rights if violations discovered; (4) armament restrictions and controls; and (5) exclusion of resort to force for settlement territorial disputes. He said it important maintain secrecy developments here.

British and French agreed with general outlines German presentations as did we, but none commented on Blankenhorn's statements re European security arrangements except to ask clarifications.

Discussing same hypotheses brought out by Seydoux yesterday, Blankenhorn indicated strong feeling Soviets would not accept Eden Plan for free elections and were not prepared to surrender East German Government unless some high price such as US troop withdrawal from Europe occurred or implementation military clauses Paris Agreements suspended. Seydoux recognized differences with Austrian situation but said French were astounded Soviets willing withdraw their troops from Austria as this was first time single Soviet soldier had evacuated occupied territory, and he thought this indicated increasingly flexible policy which might be shown in Germany.

French and Germans agreed most likely possibility was Soviet decision leave Germany divided. In that event French remain seriously concerned how four-power conference can appear make progress. Blankenhorn suggested perhaps conference can be adjourned without breaking up and could appoint committees study European security program. Seydoux agreed with desirability thus keeping conference in being but stressed need that in public presentation in forthcoming weeks we not indicate we expect no immediate results.

---

[2] *Supra.*

On discussion time, place and participation, Blankenhorn indicated he thought invitations might go out before Austrian peace treaty but appeared agree tripartite position that international situation prevented meeting before July at earliest. As to place, Blankenhorn was agreeable to Switzerland but strongly opposed Berlin and found objections to all other suggestions for various reasons. On participation he said, as last resort, Adenauer might prefer permit East and West German Governments present separate statements to four participants rather than have Federal Republic entirely unheard.

All delegations agree paper covering procedural problems as well as certain other topics such as Soviet intentions, for four Foreign Ministers to study should be completed by May 6.

---

99. Telegram From the Delegation at the London Working Group to the Department of State[1]

London, April 29, 1955—1 p.m.

4818. From Beam. Department pass Defense. Following is further description of Chancellor's views re security system mentioned in Embtel 4812.[2]

Chancellor's thought was at suitable time West should propose European security system comprising all European nations, US, Canada, USSR, and Soviet satellites. NATO, however, would continue in effect. New proposal not intended interfere with German military build-up under Paris Agreements. System would be based on principles of non-aggression, mutual assistance, loss of treaty rights by violators, arms restrictions and controls and no use of force for territorial changes. This European security proposal would accompany, but not be subordinated to, a renewed offer of German reunification under the Eden Plan.

In Blankenhorn's view, Soviets at this conference not likely to consider any arrangement involving their withdrawal from Eastern Germany unless accompanied by simultaneous withdrawal of US forces from Europe or non-implementation of Paris pacts. Regardless of almost certain rejection, however, West should be prepared put forward European security proposals for tactical and propaganda reasons.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1/4–2955. Secret; Priority. Drafted by B.P. Barringer, Department of Defense representative on the delegation; cleared with Wolf and Kidd; and initialed by Beam. Repeated to Bonn and Paris.

[2] *Supra.*

Blankenhorn emphasized complete unacceptability any form of German neutralization. As Adenauer's direct spokesman in this working group, he is in frequent touch with Chancellor, and has made it clear to US reps that Adenauer considers it of paramount importance that Germany should fulfill her obligations to NATO under Paris Agreements. (Embtel 4796[3]) Blankenhorn's statements must therefore be viewed in this light.

During working group discussions Blankenhorn made it clear that "European Security System" would be on different plane from present regional groupings, specifically NATO, but would conform to principles of UN Charter. Presumably current Soviet defense arrangements with Eastern European satellites would also be unaffected by this new organization.

Begin Def Rep comments:

New security system would therefore appear to be limited to superstructure of high level security treaty, without further internal organization except machinery for enforcement of arms limitations throughout the agreed area. Arms limitations machinery would be continuing test of Soviet performance, however, since it could be operative only if USSR permitted effective inspection in satellites and Soviet Union itself. Conversely, level of arms limitations could be set sufficiently high so as to permit NATO to be able to bring collective strength to bear against aggression. While agreement for inspection in satellites would constitute some breach in Curtain, inspection in USSR itself would be much greater advance and would, unlike inspection limited to satellites, be of some security value. Proposal to include USSR raises question of whether arms limitation and inspection in US proper and Canada to be included, or only US and Canadian forces in Europe. Latter appears obviously preferable from US point of view. If West's proposal limited to latter, Soviet would probably seek to add US and Canada proper. To this, US might wish consider whether comment might be made that this raises question of Soviet allies in Far East, and that such global arms restrictions should be handled within UN framework.

End Def Rep comments.

For first time USSR is included in proposed European security arrangement. Since NATO would continue, inclusion of USSR appears to meet in part the points raised in para 4a, JCS memo of April

---

[3] Document 97.

22,[4] but offers little new to meet JCS objections to a regional disarmament plan in absence of agreement on general principles involved (para 4b, same memo) which would have to be part of package.

Blankenhorn has indicated to US Reps that Adenauer wishes to consult Secretary Dulles before making this view known to UK or France in Ministerial forum presumably at May 8 Ministerial meeting. Therefore recommend, at Def Rep's suggestion, that Defense consideration this project be so scheduled that Secretary would be prepared in some degree to comment at that time upon this type of security proposal, which can be taken to reflect Adenauer's views.

---

[4] This memorandum was a response to position papers drafted for the U.S. Delegation and in particular a response to the military implications of Allied and Soviet withdrawal from Germany under the terms of a German peace treaty. In paragraph 4a the JCS commented that European security would be illusory if it disregarded the motivating reasons for the establishment of NATO. In paragraph 4b the JCS commented that the security arrangement might better be called a regional disarmament plan. A copy of the memorandum is attached to a letter of transmission to Dulles, dated April 25. (Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/4–2555)

---

100. Telegram From the Department of State to the Delegation at the London Working Group[1]

Washington, April 29, 1955—8:12 p.m.

5580. To Beam. Reference your 4785 repeated Paris Topol 209, Moscow 200 Bonn 416 Vienna 142.[2]

1. US views on meeting "at summit" have been made clear on numerous occasions, most recently by President at press conference April 27. He said: "Assuming that meeting [of Ambassadors in Vienna][3] will be successful, we will know then the Big Four will meet then in terms of their Foreign Ministers. And if that leads to something that might demand higher concurrence it is possible. But I say at this moment I see no reason for that summit meeting. But, as I say, anything might grow out of it." See also President's press conferences March 23 and March 30. While subject will clearly have to be discussed by Foreign Ministers, you should discourage British from thinking we are likely to agree to meeting of heads of govern-

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1/4–2755. Secret. Drafted by Reinstein; cleared by Elbrick, Merchant, BNA, EE, RA, and WE; and signed by Dulles. Repeated to Paris, Bonn, Moscow, and Vienna.

[2] Document 96.

[3] Brackets in the source text.

ment unless there has previously been Foreign Ministers' meeting and unless it is clear from Foreign Ministers' meeting that meeting at heads of government level would be useful and desirable.

2. Re time of meeting, you should emphasize need for adequate preparation and coordination of views of Western governments before meeting. This will require not only further working group meeting but also opportunity for consideration its work by governments.

3. We share doubts that Soviets will agree to meeting in NATO country and believe best solution is to propose site in neutral country. Subject suitable facilities, either Lugano or Stockholm would probably be acceptable. Inclined prefer former. Department studying technical problems and will comment further.

4. We are somewhat concerned by reiteration of British statement (reference Embassy's 4756 repeated Paris Topol 205[4] and previous messages) that "invitation" for Four Power meeting will be issued to Soviets on May 12 or earlier. We have agreed that communiqué should be issued by Ministers in Paris after NATO meeting indicating their desire to meet with Soviets and that invitation would follow shortly. However wording of communiqué remains to be agreed by Ministers. Agree with position you took that this will be affected by status of Austrian problem at that time. If, for example, Ministers were to meet in Vienna on Austria shortly after NATO meeting, communiqué might indicate it was intention of Western Ministers to propose further conference to Molotov on that occasion. If matter is not dealt with by Foreign Ministers personally with Molotov, feel strongly there should be tripartitely agreed note to Soviets. (Reference London's 4810[5])

5. As you are aware, we wish conference with Soviets confined to European questions, particularly Germany. This point will be determined by the wording of communiqué and of note to Soviets if there is one. Assume working group will propose one or more drafts for describing purpose of conference for Ministers' consideration.

6. Your reports indicate working group is likely to engage in little discussion on substance of positions to be taken in meeting with Soviets and you need not press for such discussion. It would nevertheless be useful if paper could be prepared commenting on probable Soviet position and tactics and of basic Western purposes in

---

[4] Telegram 4756 reported on a U.N. disarmament subcommittee meeting on April 26. (Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/4-2655)

[5] Telegram 4810 reported that the French favored an oral invitation to the Soviet Union, while the United States opposed it. (*Ibid.*, 396.1/4-2855)

conference. Believe such a paper would assist Ministers in Paris in discussions re substance and further preparatory work to be done.

Dulles

---

101. Telegram From the Delegation at the London Working Group to the Department of State[1]

London, April 30, 1955—4 p.m.

4835. From Beam. Following report on trends in London working group may be useful in preparing Secretary for participation Ministerial meeting.

Recommendations will probably deal mainly with procedures and nature of approach to Soviets for conference. French and British stress three governments committed by last weekend agreement with French to alleged effect invitation will be addressed to Soviets immediately after Paris Ministerial meeting and probably before signature Austrian Treaty. We have agreed this might be desirable forestall Soviet initiative, but Ministers must be left free decision in light Austrian and other developments at time.

British wish give priority in invitation to four power talks at highest level, while not excluding preliminary FM meeting. French desire mention highest level in invitation but envisage prior FM Conference. We will insist on inclusion of alternative reversing order of priority, i.e., not excluding meeting at summit after FM Conference.

Chief difference arises over agenda to be proposed in invitation. All agreed first item should be "problems relating to Germany and European security". Also agreed Far Eastern questions should not be included. British with French support suggest second item "study of ways and means of dealing with all other issues outstanding between East and West, including advancement current disarmament talks under United Nations auspices". British argue Soviets likely propose basket item on relaxation world tensions and will undoubtedly raise atomic question. Also say public opinion expects discussion thermonuclear threat. British claim their proposal aimed at restricting discussion to procedures for breaking log jams on matters still at issue rather than at basic consideration such issues. We said we will have to present in report our arguments for alternative limiting agenda to European questions.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1/4–3055. Secret. Repeated to Paris, Moscow, Bonn, Berlin, and Vienna.

Regarding timing, report will simply state July earliest practical date for four power meeting.

While attention until now primarily devoted to procedures, the two subcommittees, which with German participation will respectively examine possible Soviet moves and Western counteraction, may produce interesting exchange of ideas.

We trust above positions generally accord with Department's instructions just received in Department telegrams 5575[2] and 5580[3] which we will implement further.

Attitudes revealed to date by various delegations here may be pertinent to positions they will take in Paris.

British disarmingly frank in acknowledging their proposals, particularly for meeting at summit, aimed at local electorate, also in assuming we and French prefer Conservative Government remain in office.

Electoral uncertainty may, however, be only partial excuse British reluctance reveal substantive positions. Kirkpatrick in talk yesterday said too early discuss such questions with French and Germans and that ideas should be closely held among ourselves until fully developed in order avoid risk revealing basic positions to Soviets. He envisaged general exchange by Western Ministers, who would then order intensive study by working groups. His own idea was that West in good position vis-à-vis Soviets, who are beset by fear of United States nuclear superiority, by internal difficulties and also perhaps differences with Red China. While he did not consider it immediately likely, he thought Soviets might be eventually prevailed upon abandon German East Zone and that we should seriously consider price we would be willing to pay for tremendous return of removing Berlin danger and extending Western influence to Polish border. He personally thought Soviets might be attracted by "neutralized" zone extending from Eastern Germany through a part of Czechoslovakia, through Austria, and making use of Yugoslav middle position. He had in mind including a united Germany in NATO, although Eastern portion would be demilitarized. He believed WEU voluntary acceptance force levels offered scope for security arrangements, although he had not thought out details.

French in working group extremely inquisitive and volubly uncertain. They wish as approach to Soviets stress improvement has already occurred and that further détente should be pursued. They have raised question whether security guarantees with Soviet Russia could not be based upon acceptance split-Germany and indirectly broached this suggestion to Germans in plenary meeting who gave flat rejection. Quite probable they will adopt strong co-existence line.

---

[2] Telegram 5575 informed the delegation that the United States believed the four-power talks should be limited to European items and for this reason opposed the inclusion of disarmament on the agenda. (*Ibid.*, 330.13/4–255)

[3] *Supra.*

Germans have given good indication of confidence and loyalty to Western system. French question this as exaggeration Adenauer's ability to control German situation, but Kirkpatrick inclined accept German professions at face value in belief Adenauer good for two more years and during that time will be able consolidate Germany firmly with the West, despite time lost through French recalcitrance.

In view our colleagues' differences of approach, with British and German desire restrict discussion of substantive points before meeting of Ministers, we have tried actively participate in committee work without pushing for any particular new position, such as principles peace treaty or security arrangements.[4] Believe these may be better reserved for subsequent working party when British and Germans will feel more free to talk.[5]

---

[4] On May 3, the delegation was informed that the views outlined in this telegram were generally in accord with those of the Department of State. (Telegram 5629 to London; Department of State, Central Files, 396.1/4–3055)

[5] Following a recess for Sunday, May 1, the London Working Group met May 2–5 before completing its deliberations. The sessions were largely devoted to drafting a four-part final report for the Foreign Ministers. None of this activity is documented here. An extract from the final report is printed *infra;* a complete set of the telegrams to and from the U.S. Delegation dealing with the last 4 days is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 452; some of these telegrams are also *ibid.*, Central File 396.1.

---

102. Report of the London Working Group[1]

London, May 5, 1955.

I. INTRODUCTION

Officials of the Governments of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America met in London from April 27 to May 5 in order to draw up for their respective Foreign Ministers a report on preparations for convening a conference of the Three Western Powers and the Soviet Union. Officials of the German Federal Republic attended the meetings for discussions affecting the

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1/5–555. Secret. A cover sheet noted that there were four parts to the report. Only part I is printed here; regarding parts II–IV, see footnote 3 below.

German problem. Member countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation were given an interim report on our work.[2]

2. We agreed that the next conference with the Soviet Union would open under quite different conditions from those prevailing when the Berlin Conference met a little more than a year ago. With the ratification of the Paris Agreements a new situation exists. The Western Powers now find themselves in a position of greater strength and therefore more favourably placed for reopening talks with the East.

3. We noted that the Soviet Government has sought recently to create an impression of greater flexibility in its foreign policy. Whatever the truth may be, the apparent Soviet readiness, for example, to conclude the Austrian State Treaty, involving the withdrawal of Soviet troops from eastern Austria, is an important step forward from a Soviet position which had seemed immutable.

4. In making our proposals, we have also taken account of the expectation prevailing in the free world that negotiations with the Soviet Union should be reopened by the Three Powers as soon as possible. Having made ratification of the Paris Agreements the preconditions for the reopening of such talks in the most favourable circumstances, we are expected to take a very early initiative.

5. We agreed that the newly achieved solidarity of the Western Powers permits them more easily to envisage an extended series of meetings. Should a first attempt prove abortive, we now have more latitude than before to pursue negotiations with a view to a progressive and step by step solution of the problems at issue between East and West.

6. We accordingly agreed to recommend that:

(a) the Three Western Powers should take the initiative in proposing an early conference with the Soviet Union;

(b) the main aims of the Western Powers at such a conference should be:

> (i) by taking the initiative from the outset, to maintain diplomatic pressure upon the Soviet Government, as well as exploiting any flexibility which may exist in their positions,
>
> (ii) by drawing the Soviet Government into discussion on Germany and related problems, to test their real intentions.

7. In the following sections of our report, we deal with the questions of

(a) Approach to the Soviet Government proposing a Four Power Conference.

(b) Possible Soviet Initiatives and Moves in Europe, and

---

[2] Transmitted in telegram 4833 from London, April 30. (*Ibid.*, 396.1/4–3055)

(c) Western Objectives and Tactics.[3]

Sections (b) and (c) above do not attempt to reach firm conclusions or recommendations, as we felt it would be premature to do so.

---

[3] For texts of these sections (II, III, and IV), see *Documents Diplomatiques Français*, 1955, Annexes, Tome 1, pp. 114–124.

Diplomatic Exchanges and Multilateral Discussions Concerning the Possibility of a Meeting of the Heads of Government, May 6–June 4, 1955

103. Letter From Prime Minister Eden to President Eisenhower[1]

London, May 6, 1955.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: You will have heard, no doubt, of our proposal to the joint meeting of officials in London that the time has come when "top level" talks, between heads of Governments could play a useful part in the reduction of world tension.[2]

This may be rather a surprise to you, but I do pray that you may give it earnest consideration.

Of course we don't believe that everything can be settled in a few hours or days conversation. But I do really think that to arrange such a meeting would have great advantages. After a full and frank review of the problems, a further programme of work could be drawn up, with a far better chance of success than by any other means, if only because the imagination of all the peoples of the world will have been stirred.

Meetings of Foreign Ministers could follow, and any lines of progress explored. But to start off with such discussions may be the best hope of getting progress later.

I do hope you will be willing to try this.

The hopes of so many people, on both sides of the Iron Curtain, have been raised and a kind of mystique surrounds the idea.

---

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File. Top Secret. Attached to a note of transmission from Ambassador Makins to President Eisenhower, dated May 6. The same day Makins delivered a copy to Secretary Dulles noting that the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary were anxious that their proposals be considered before Dulles met with Macmillan at Paris. (*Ibid.*)

[2] See Documents 96 ff.

This may be foolish, but it is human.

If our meeting was publicly represented more as a starting point than as a final solution these hopes would be kept alive. I must also tell you that much in our country depends upon it; this is not a party question here, but responds to a deep desire of our whole people.

Of course our Secretaries of State could have an earlier meeting to arrange the form of our talks if you thought this necessary. In any event they would come with us. Our meeting, so far as the principals are concerned, need not last more than a very few days. A great advantage would be that it would give us time—and we need time for things to quieten, especially in the East. I do not think that anyone would precipitate trouble and try rash adventures while such a meeting was in the air.

This would help us all. Moreover, I believe if we issue the invitation promptly it may get in ahead of any tiresome Soviet approach to the Germans. Of course, if the Russians turn it down, our people and the other peoples of our alliance would feel that at least we have tried. And a fresh and much needed impulse would be given to N.A.T.O. and the efforts of each member state.

Could you consider this, and Foster could discuss it further with Harold in Paris.

With kindest regards,

Anthony[3]

---

[3] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

---

104. Letter From the Secretary of State to the British Ambassador (Makins)[1]

Washington, May 6, 1955.

Dear Mr. Ambassador: I am instructed by the President to request you to transmit the following to Sir Anthony Eden:

"Dear Anthony:

While we are a bit surprised that you have gone so far in your thinking as to present your idea as a definite proposal, nevertheless

---

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles–Herter Series. Top Secret. Attached to this letter was a note from Secretary Dulles to President Eisenhower, dated May 6, which states that Dulles redrafted the President's draft reply into its present form. The major change was made in the third paragraph where Dulles cast the text into a more questioning tone. A copy of the President's draft, also dated May 6, is *ibid.*

Foster and I have together spent some hours on it, and I give you my immediate reactions as follows:[2]

We appreciate the importance to you of this project under existing circumstances, and are naturally disposed to do everything we can to further it. On the other hand, you will understand that we also have our local problems, including public opinion, to consider. We believe that it would be wholly impractical to have such a meeting with a previously announced specific agenda covering global variety of subjects. At the other extreme, we think it would be most unwise to meet without giving the world some clear intimation of the generality of the subjects to be discussed. The reason for this is that almost every nation in the world will believe its interests are in some way to be affected by such a conference and would therefore be resentful at its lack of representation.

If there were to be a meeting, general subjects to be talked about might, we suppose, include some or all of the following: Exploration of ways and means of eliminating or minimizing atomic activity and armaments; the general subject of disarmament by the large nations; the limitation of forces in Continental Europe that belong to nations outside that area; and, possibly, a general limitation of armaments in the European area. Another subject that might be added would be the reunification of Germany, but for this one the announcement should specify that Germany would be represented. To this of course could be added the perennial question of lessening of world tensions.

Even if such a procedure could prudently be followed, it would seem to us most unwise to attempt to hold a meeting without some form of preparation through our Secretaries of State. If those officials could meet informally—possibly when they are in Vienna—and discuss this matter and each suggest to his own Government that these or similar subjects might be well talked about 'at the summit' in order to discover whether or not there was a general willingness to proceed on an honest search for some answers, such a meeting would probably make sense even to the die-hard opponents of any contact with the Communists. I wonder whether such a scheme could be implemented without delaying too long the ability to issue the invitation, which delay might defeat the purposes you may be seeking.

In any event, Foster and I have discussed this at such length that he will be far more capable of clarifying our views to Macmillan and possibly to you than I can do in this hastily written cable.[3]

---

[2] Reference is to Eden's letter *supra*.

[3] On May 8 Ambassador Makins delivered the following reply:

"Thank you so much for all the trouble you have taken. I am sure that we can now leave it to Harold and Foster to work something out. Your understanding help is so valuable to me." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File)

With warm personal regard
As ever,
D.E."

Sincerely yours,

John Foster Dulles[4]

---

[4] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

---

105. Editorial Note

Secretary of State Dulles left Washington on Friday, May 6, for meetings with the Foreign Ministers of France and the United Kingdom and for the North Atlantic Council meetings beginning May 9. The documentation that follows deals only with his discussions of the London Working Group report (see Document 102) and other issues arising from the exchange of letters between President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Eden on May 6 (Document 103 and *supra*).

Following the conclusion of the North Atlantic Council meetings on May 11, Dulles remained in Paris 2 more days for further discussions with his British and French counterparts before flying to Vienna for the signing of the Austrian State Treaty on May 15. For documentation on his conversations in Vienna, see Documents 72 ff.

---

106. Memorandum of a Conversation, Embassy Residence, Paris, May 7, 1955, 3–4 p.m.[1]

PARTICIPANTS

Chancellor Adenauer	Secretary Dulles
Dr. Hallstein	Amb. Conant
Mr. Blankenhorn	Mr. Merchant
Interpreter	Mr. Bowie

[Here follows discussion of the Paris Agreements, the political situation in Germany, and Communist tactics in Europe.]

---

[1] Source: Department of State, CFM Files, Lot M–88, Box 170. Secret. A summary of the conversation was transmitted in Secto 4 from Paris, May 7. (*Ibid.,* Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 448)

The Secretary then turned to the question of German unification, and asked the Chancellor's thinking on how this problem should now be approached. The Chancellor considers that it is time to do something about the problem, and that the Three Western Powers should take the initiative. In his view the USSR is now in a weaker position both by reason of economic strains arising from overextending their resources and from their failure to pull the Far Eastern countries into their orbit. At the same time it is necessary to have patience and to endure long negotiations, for we must recognize that the East Zone of Germany raises for the USSR questions of its security and its position in the satellites. In Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary, there is much opposition to Soviet control which the Soviets would feel would be enhanced by their release of East Germany. The Secretary then asked whether the Chancellor meant that German unity could be obtained only within the framework of some security system offering assurances to the Soviet Union. The Chancellor considers that the Soviets do not fear Europe or Germany but only the United States, and that their whole policy is directed to getting the United States out of Europe, as is shown by their emphasis on foreign bases. Looking at things from their point of view and their goal of world domination, the United States is the only real barrier. Hence, it will take time to convince them that they cannot achieve that goal and to induce them to adjust themselves to that fact. That is why the Chancellor feels that European integration is so vital in order to bind the United States closer to Europe and to block the Soviet aim to strengthen themselves, vis-à-vis the United States. He is convinced that the Soviet people are farther away from democratic attitudes today than under the Czars, and that it will take a long time for them to evolve into a democratic pattern. The Soviets will be a threat as long as they are a dictatorship. The Chancellor feels that the Soviets have failed in their efforts to strengthen themselves in Asia. To him the Bandung Conference[2] showed that Asian countries, including Red China, were not willing to subject themselves to Soviet leadership. In their internal position the Soviets had had serious failures, especially in agriculture both in the Soviet Union and in the satellites, which he viewed as creating critical conditions. They had undertaken an enormous task in trying so rapidly to change the pattern of agriculture radically and to create industrial workers from peasants. From the prisoners-of-war the Germans had learned that the industrial situation in many sectors of the Soviet Union was bad. Another factor is the continuing doubt about the top control. In summary, without being over optimistic, he felt there were signs that the relative Soviet position was weakening: Europe was growing in strength; Asia wanted to keep clear of Soviet control; the United States has stood firm in its European policy. All this gives basis for hope for a good outcome in the long run, but it will take patience, tenacity and consistency.

---

[2] Reference is to the Bandung Conference which took place in April 1955.

Turning to the possibility of Four Power talks, the Secretary then asked the Chancellor's views on (1) whether such talks should include German unity as a topic; (2) whether the Federal Republic would want to participate; and (3) whether its position would be affected by participation also of East Germany. The Chancellor said that he hoped that after due preparation, say by late summer, it would be possible to have a conference on German unity which would of course also raise the question of security safeguards. On the second and third questions, he said that since East Germany could not be excluded if West Germany took part, he felt it would be better for neither to participate. If the East German Government did take part, the psychological effect on the people of the East Zone would be extremely bad. For this reason, he would prefer that the Federal Republic be a full partner in preparing for the talks and be constantly consulted during any conference, but not be a direct participant.

The Secretary then asked the Chancellor's view on the handling of the Autobahn issue. The Chancellor said that since the East German ordinance applies to all vehicles except those licensed by it, it clearly violates the Agreement of 1949.[3] Hence, the Three Powers should carry the ball. Ambassador Conant then referred to the meetings with the Russians (Pushkin) scheduled in Berlin for the 20th. In any settlement, the Chancellor was most anxious to avoid the impression that the West was always ready to give in. He was ready to agree to higher payments if calculated on a fair basis and if the money was actually applied to the roads. The Secretary agreed that the Three Powers should insist that the tolls violated the 1949 Agreement with the Soviets, which Ambassador Conant pointed out had been done from the beginning. Both agreed, as did the Chancellor, that stronger action might have been taken earlier in pursuance of the protest. The Chancellor remarked that in dealing with the Soviets it was wise to insist on strict adherence to agreements, even on small points.

Coming back to any Four Power negotiations, the Chancellor said he had one point of deep concern which he wished to entrust to the Secretary. In any negotiation, it should be made quite clear that the implementation of the Paris Agreements would not be stopped.

---

[3] For text of the Communiqué of the sixth session of the Council of Foreign Ministers, June 20, 1949, see *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol. III, p. 1062.

In his opinion the present French Government shares this view, but a future one—and changes are frequent—might not take the same attitude. Hence, the United States should find an occasion to make the point clearly in order to remove any such risk. The Chancellor trusts Pinay and has had good talks with him, but in some countries power is divided between the Minister and the Ministry.

The Secretary then asked how promptly the Federal Republic could get started with carrying out the Paris Agreements so that they would become an accomplished fact. The Chancellor said that contrary to the original plans—which might have been better—he now thinks that they will probably start with volunteers, of which they already have had 100,000 without any appeal. In this way, he believes they can perhaps get started in the fall. In response to a question, he said that even this would require legislation regarding their status, but that this was relatively simple and could probably be passed by the end of July.

The meeting had to be broken off as the result of the arrival of Macmillan for a 4 o'clock appointment with the Secretary.[4]

---

[4] The only U.S. record of this meeting was a brief summary report which reads: "Then Macmillan came in and we discussed primarily possible Big Four meeting of Heads of Government. He does not think that this meeting should attempt to take up any substantive matters, but merely to identify points of tensions and to consider what acceptable procedures could be set up to deal with them. In essence, his concept is something like what took place at Potsdam when the Heads of Government agreed to establish the Council of Foreign Ministers to deal with various problems arising out of the war and the making of the peace treaties." (Dulte 2 from Paris, May 7; Department of State, Central Files, 396.1/5–755)

For Macmillan's account of this meeting, see *Tides of Fortune*, pp. 587–588.

---

107. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Department of State[1]

Paris, May 8, 1955—11 a.m.

Dulte 3. Eyes only Acting Secretary from Secretary. I shall shortly be sending suggested message regarding Big Four meeting which should have urgent consideration by the President.[2] I am satisfied that there is a tremendous demand in U.K. and France for something of this order. I, of course, see serious disadvantages in any meeting of the President with the heads of the Soviet Union, but in the form proposed which is merely to consider whether or not ways and means can be found to settle differences and not to reach any substantive decisions, probably the harm is held to a minimum. The U.K. feels that some move of this sort is quite indispensable from their standpoint, and Faure has said the same thing to me.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1/5–855. Top Secret; Niact; Absolutely No Distribution.

[2] Transmitted in Dulte 4, *infra*.

When you receive the draft, you will note that it is couched so as to avoid the implication of a world Directoire of the Four Powers, since the organs for solution which might be selected might include such organs as the U.N., the O.A.S., N.A.T.O. or special organs to be established which might not include all of the Big Four and which might include others than the Big Four.

Dulles

---

108. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Department of State[1]

Paris, May 8, 1955—11 a.m.

Dulte 4. Eyes only Acting Secretary from Secretary. Following is U.S.–U.K. draft referred Dulte 2 [*3*].

"We believe that the time has now come for a new effort to resolve the great problems which beset Europe and the world. We, therefore, invite the Soviet Government to join with us in an effort to remove sources of conflict between us.

"We recognize that the solution of these problems will take time and patience. They will not be solved at a single meeting nor in a hasty manner. Indeed, any effort to do so could set back real progress toward their settlement. Accordingly, we think it would be helpful to try a new procedure for dealing with these problems.

"In view of their complexity and importance, our suggestion is that these problems be approached in two stages. We think it would be fruitful to begin with a meeting of the Heads of Government, accompanied by their Foreign Ministers. In the limited time for which the Heads of Government could meet, they should not undertake to agree upon substantive answers to the major difficulties facing the world. Such a meeting could, however, provide a new impetus by establishing the basis for the detailed work which will be required. For this purpose the Heads of Government could devote themselves to identifying the issues to be worked on and to agreeing on methods to be followed in their solution.[2]

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1/5–855. Top Secret; Niact; Absolutely No Distribution.

"This would lay the foundation for the second stage in which the problems would be examined in detail by Foreign Ministers or their deputies. This would facilitate the essential preparation and orderly negotiation most likely to bring about agreements by progressive stages. The important thing is to begin the process promptly and to pursue it with patience and determination. This work should be started as soon as practicable after the meeting of the Heads of Government and carried on thereafter by such methods, organs, and participants as it appears will be most fruitful according to the nature of the issues.

"We hope that this proposal will commend itself to the Soviet Union as a useful basis for progress toward better relations between us. If the Soviet Union agrees that an early meeting of Heads of Government to explore such a program would be useful, we suggest that our Foreign Ministers settle through diplomatic channels or otherwise upon a time and place for such a meeting."

Dulles

---

[2] Later in the day Secretary Dulles suggested that the following be added to the end of this paragraph:

"The Foreign Ministers, to assist the Heads of Governments in their task, might come together shortly in advance of the meeting of the Heads of Government and at the same place." (Dulte 10 from Paris, May 8; *ibid.*)

---

109. Telegram From the Department of State to the Secretary of State, at Paris[1]

Washington, May 8, 1955—9:07 p.m.

Tedul 3. Eyes only Secretary from Hoover. This afternoon I showed the President your message (Dulte 2[2]) and US–UK draft (Dulte 4[3]). He also read account of your conversations with Adenauer, Macmillan and Faure with great interest.[4] At the end of our conversation he especially asked me to send you his warmest regards and appreciation.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1/5–855. Top Secret; Priority; No Distribution. Drafted by Hoover and cleared by Murphy.

[2] See footnote 6, Document 106.

[3] *Supra.*

[4] Regarding the conversation with Adenauer and Macmillan, see Document 107 and footnote 6 thereto. A summary of the discussion of Indochina with Faure and Macmillan was transmitted in Secto 8; see vol. I, p. 372.

With respect to US–UK draft he commented essentially as follows (your Dulte 10[5] with suggested additions re Foreign Ministers prior meeting had not yet arrived):

a) We have always insisted heads of state should not meet until after Foreign Ministers had canvassed the field.

b) He therefore thought it possible Foreign Ministers meeting in Vienna on Austrian Treaty might resolve itself into separate but subsequent meeting to explore methods, timing, and location for heads of state to get together (this is slight variation on your Dulte 10).

c) Foreign Ministers meeting would not enter substantive discussions.

d) Re timing of Summit meeting, he did not express firm views, saying only there were many reasons why we should not rush into it, yet mere statement that a meeting would take place in future would lead to increasing buildup of speculation in public mind as time went on.

e) He also speculated on idea that Summit meeting might be held at Edinburgh, Geneva or some other location other than capital of one of interested powers although he did not come to any conclusion.

f) He made no comments on proposed text US–UK draft except suggesting perhaps use of words "exploring for a" instead of "their" near end of last sentence in third paragraph.

In discussion that followed he viewed recent Soviet moves re Austrian Treaty etc. as not being fundamental changes in Communist motives or objectives, but rather represented shift in tactics. Our method of handling was all important particularly in view of large elements in U.S. who would regard entire exercise with considerable suspicion.

(Of course I think you will agree with me that on both sides of the curtain there will also be great cynicism over our entering into a meeting of this kind. Perhaps there is now no choice but it seems to me that the statement could well contain at least a few words indicating reserve on our part that the fundamental objectives of the Soviet bloc have changed.)

(The President's comments on other subjects included in your cables are being transmitted separately.)

Hoover

---

[5] See footnote 1, *supra*.

110. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Department of State[1]

Paris, May 9, 1955—1 a.m.

Dulte 12. Eyes only Acting Secretary from Secretary for President.

"Dear Mr. President:

"My first meeting today (Sunday) was with Harold Macmillan. We then prepared the draft of a possible message to the Soviet Union on a Big Four meeting, the text of which I cabled you via Hoover.[2] I took him aside and asked him privately whether his government really attached high importance to this, and he assured me that they did. I am somewhat concerned over the passionate eagerness here in Europe for a meeting of the Big Four, particularly at the Head-of-Government level on the theory that this will produce some kind of a miracle. No one seems interested in trying to think up how there can be any discussion which will in fact be fruitful. The mere fact of meeting seems of itself to be enough. The Macmillan proposal[3] is at least an effort to grapple with the realities of the fact that it is hopeless to believe, and wrong to bring the public to believe, that in three or four days you and Bulganin could settle such problems as the unification of Germany, the elimination of atomic weapons and general disarmament. Nevertheless, these are the items which Faure later on proposed to be the agenda. If the four agree on a procedure for tackling these problems, and possibly the problem raised by China's threat against Formosa, that in itself will be a great and difficult achievement. Later in the day Macmillan agreed to introduce in the draft invitation the further reference to the Foreign Ministers coming together somewhat in advance of the Heads of Government to pave the way for agreement on the procedural matters which, according to his proposal, would be on the agenda.

"Following my meeting with Macmillan, Martino, the Italian Foreign Minister, came in to beg for a NATO resolution which would declare obsolete and of no effect all aspects of the Italian Peace Treaty which were 'discriminatory'. I said that I had no power to abolish treaty provisions that had been approved by the Senate and that nobody could tell what clauses were 'discriminatory'. Was it 'discriminatory' that Italy gave up its colonies, whereas the other signatories did not? The plight of the Scelba party seems desperate since it broke open over the election of President, and he is looking for some miracle to help save him. I am afraid I cannot produce the particular miracle he specifies.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1/5–955. Top Secret; No Other Distribution. A copy of this telegram was delivered to the White House at noon on May 9.

[2] See Document 114. For a brief account of this meeting by Macmillan, see *Tides of Fortune*, p. 589.

[3] See Dulte 13, *infra*.

"After lunch, the three Western powers first met and then were joined by Adenauer.[4] Pinay presided. At the meeting of three, Macmillan outlined his project for a Big Four meeting, and Pinay seemed to agree. However he seemed confused and later on after Adenauer joined us, made a quite inconsistent and unacceptable proposal of his own for a meeting to deal with the substantive matters referred to above. He did not specify that it should be heads of government. There is considerable jealousy between Faure and Pinay. Faure wants a meeting at the Heads-of-Government level, and Pinay wants it at the Foreign Ministers level. Incidentally, Adenauer privately whispered to me that he felt that it would be wise to avoid bringing Faure into the discussions with the Soviets. He does not seem to feel that he is very 'solid'.

"The meeting of Four was desultory and got nowhere. The conclusion was to await our decision as to Big Four meeting.

"Pinay reopened the Austrian matter and seemed to be wavering on whether or not we should sign the Austrian Treaty. I cannot think why and he did not give any clear indications. In any event the upshot was to await Molotov's reply to our invitation to sign next week.

"Pinay also told me privately that he did not think that Faure meant what he said when he proposed to withdraw the French troops.[5] Pinay implied that Faure was bluffing because, Pinay said, it would be 'unthinkable' to abandon southern Viet Nam to the Communists. This is another matter where Faure and Pinay differ sharply, but Indo-China is not under the jurisdiction of the Foreign Minister, but under the Minister for Colonies, and Faure is in fact running that and alone dealing with Indo-China to the exclusion of Pinay.

"Tonight I give a dinner for Pinay.

"Faithfully yours,

"Foster"

Dulles

---

[4] Minutes of these two meetings are in Department of State, CFM Files, Box 170, Quadripartite Meetings; also see Dulte 13, *infra.* For a French account of these meetings, see *Documents Diplomatiques Français,* 1955, Tome 1, Annexes, pp. 95–110.

[5] In a meeting with Dulles on May 7 Faure proposed the withdrawal of French forces from Vietnam. (Dulte 2 from Paris, May 7; Department of State, Central Files, 396.1/5–755)

111. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Department of State[1]

Paris, May 9, 1955—noon.

Dulte 13. At tripartite meeting May 8 Macmillan proposed that conference with Soviets should be initially at Heads of Government level.[2] He suggested that Heads of Government should lay down program of work, in which they would identify subjects for negotiations and decide whether they should be taken up by Foreign Ministers or through other channels. Purpose was to indicate that West was prepared to enter into long and patient series of negotiations with Soviet Union. He said it would have to be made clear both to the Soviets and to public opinion generally that substantive agreements were not to be expected from such a meeting. He thought this would avoid risk of unwarranted hopes and yet meet public expectation. He stressed need for maintaining hope of ultimate settlement through negotiations in order to maintain Western defense efforts.

Pinay agreed with Macmillan's proposal. I pointed out in detail objections which US had previously had to meeting of Heads of Government for which ground had not been adequately prepared, but said that Macmillan's present proposal might avoid these difficulties. I made it clear that it was my understanding that Heads of Government would not be expected to reach any substantive agreements, pointing out, however, that even procedural decisions involved grave questions.

I agreed we would consider proposal and subject will be taken up again when I am able to report President's views, possibly Monday night.

In subsequent quadripartite meeting with Chancellor Adenauer,[2] question of level of meeting was not raised with Chancellor, but he was informed that proposal had been made which was under consideration. It was agreed that agenda for meeting with Soviets could not usefully be considered until question of level had been settled. However, Chancellor was informed that German question would be included in agenda. It was agreed that it would be preferable to have meeting somewhere in Switzerland, although I indicated we would not wish to have it in Geneva. Time of meeting was also left for discussion after question of level had been settled. There was general agreement that, after Soviet reply had been received, and if it were affirmative, working group would again have to be convened to undertake further preparatory work for the conference.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1/5–955. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution.

[2] Minutes of this meeting are *ibid.*, CFM Files, Box 170, Quadripartite Meetings; see also Dulles' letter to President Eisenhower, *supra*.

It was agreed that brief general report would be made by Pinay at meeting of NATO Ministers on Monday, main purpose of which will be to provide opportunity for expression of views other NATO governments.

No press communiqué was issued after tripartite or quadripartite meetings. It was agreed press would be informed Ministers had had general exchange of views but no decision will be reached until after other NATO Ministers have been consulted.

Dulles

---

112. Telegram From the Department of State to the Secretary of State, at Paris[1]

Washington, May 9, 1955—4:17 p.m.

Tedul 7. Eyes only Secretary from Acting Secretary. I discussed your Dulte 12[2] with the President this morning. He shares your apprehensions regarding the extreme eagerness of UK and France for the four power talks at heads of state level without, apparently, any substantive objectives, and especially their theory that a miracle can be brought about without any concrete ideas of how it can be done.

During the discussion I asked him if he thought it would not be desirable to obtain as firm commitments as possible from the British and French regarding procedure and substance of such a meeting, if it were held, before the US committed itself to attendance. This would be especially true if no agenda had been agreed upon in advance. One example, for instance, might be a commitment that nothing would be done which could be regarded as an indication of our approval of, or our readiness to approve, the status quo of Eastern Europe or our abandonment of the peoples behind the Iron Curtain. I said that such commitments might prove even more necessary if UK election should result in a new Cabinet. The President agreed fully.

In this connection the President wondered what your reaction might be to his earlier suggestion that the Vice President could head the US delegation. He felt the latter might be more nearly on the same level with some of the Prime Ministers who would be attending. I offered no comment, as I was unaware that such a proposal had been considered, though on second thought I can see many reasons why it would be most difficult to sell the idea to the other participants.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1/5–955. Top Secret; Niact.

[2] Document 110.

While I found the President fully shared your concern about (a) the lack of constructive results that might ensue from such a meeting, (b) the liability to us of raising false hopes in many areas, and (c) the risk of having the other three powers combining, either deliberately or inadvertently, to place us in a series of difficult positions, he nevertheless gave me the impression that some sort of meeting would still probably be necessary. I feel sure that he would be greatly guided by your advice as a result of your meetings in Paris. In this regard, I think that his reference to the Vice President is significant.

(Due to delay your Dulte 13[3] has just been delivered (4 pm Washington time), subsequent to drafting above cable, and President has not yet seen.)

Hoover

---

[3] *Supra.*

---

113. Telegram From the Department of State to the Secretary of State, at Paris[1]

Washington, May 9, 1955—7:56 p.m.

Tedul 12. Eyes only Secretary from Acting Secretary. This afternoon I showed the President your delayed Dulte 13.[2] In response to your specific question regarding Macmillan's proposal for a conference to take place first at the level of heads of state, the President commented along the following lines:

(a) We want to give every possible consideration to helping our friends. He is cognizant of the UK position and realizes that they would like to use his name under the present circumstances even though they apparently do not expect much of a substantive nature to come out of such a conference.

(b) There should be some sort of a meeting at the Foreign Ministers level to work out details in advance of the top-level conference.

(c) The Foreign Ministers meeting must say that the subsequent top-level conference will be (1) of an exploratory nature to determine the issues and subjects which the permanent staffs can continue to work on, and (2) for a general exchange of views at the top level but with no substantive decisions to be reached.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1/5–955. Top Secret; Niact.

[2] Document 111.

(d) He would like to leave any further decisions for you to work out entirely at your discretion.

The President is following your cables with the greatest of interest and again sends his warmest regards and appreciation.

(It occurs to me we may wish to consider the possibility that the Soviets might well turn down such a proposal, demanding either a substantive discussion or none at all. In such event we might have to face alternative of acquiescence or adverse repercussions.)

Hoover

---

114. Editorial Note

On May 9, following the adjournment of the North Atlantic Council session, the three Foreign Ministers reached agreement on the text of an invitation to the Soviet Union to a Four-Power Conference. (Dulte 14 from Paris, May 9; Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/5–955) The text was approved by President Eisenhower and Chancellor Adenauer on May 10 (Tedul 14 to Paris and Dulte 20 from Paris, May 10; *ibid.*, 396.1/5–955 and 5–1055), transmitted to the three respective Embassies in the Soviet Union, and delivered to the Foreign Ministry on the same day.

For text of the note, which is the same in substance as the draft transmitted in Document 108, see Department of State *Bulletin*, May 23, 1955, pages 832–833.

---

115. Telegram From the Department of State to the Secretary of State, at Vienna[1]

Washington, May 15, 1955—1:43 p.m.

Tedul 28. Eyes only Secretary from Acting Secretary. After Cabinet this morning the President asked me to review your latest telegrams with him (Dultes 30 and 36[2]).

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1/5–1355. Top Secret; Niact. Drafted by Hoover. Secretary Dulles was in Vienna to sign the Austrian State Treaty.

[2] In Dulte 30 Secretary Dulles reported that he had discussed with Macmillan arrangements for another working group which would coordinate Western positions for the Four-Power Conference. The Foreign Ministers agreed that in the first instance the United States and the United Kingdom should discuss the issues and that this could be done by Ambassador Makins in Washington. (*Ibid.*, 396.1/5–1255) In Dulte 36 Dulles reported that he was leaving for Vienna on May 13. (*Ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 447)

He was in full agreement that the meeting should be held in an atmosphere of continuing negotiation, and it was desirable to build up this conception wherever possible.

The President expressed strong concern about the tentative timing of the meeting for late summer. He felt it desirable to hold the session as early as possible, perhaps the first part of July, for the following reasons:

1. The purpose of the meeting was to be exploratory only, and no substantive problems or decisions should be considered. It would locate areas of tension and disagreement, and assign them to working groups or to organization such as the UN. He felt the sooner the meeting could take place the better chance there would be of holding the conference within these terms of reference. He was fearful that delay would provide time for hardening of issues with danger of having to be faced with decisions.
2. He also foresaw danger that the Communists would make a drive to bring in the ChiComs as a party to the conference, or at least attempt to force substantive decisions on related subjects.
3. In addition, he was apprehensive that delay would allow false hopes and speculation to rise unnecessarily in many areas, as well as unnecessary opportunities for unwarranted propaganda.

(Senator George's attitude on same subject is outlined in next following Tedul[3]).

Hoover

---

[3] In Tedul 29, May 13, Secretary Dulles was informed that Senator George believed the timing for a summit meeting late in the summer was excellent as it would allow ample time for preparation and Congress would have adjourned. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 110.11–DU/5–1355)

---

116. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Department of State[1]

Vienna, May 15, 1955—2 p.m.

Dulte 46. Eyes only Acting Secretary from Secretary for President.

"Dear Mr. President:

"Have just finished Four-Power dinner during which we discussed many serious matters.[2]

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 110.11–DU/5–1555. Top Secret.

[2] The conversations took place during and after a dinner given by Secretary Dulles for the other three Foreign Ministers on May 14 at Ambassador Thompson's residence.

Continued

"I talked alone with Molotov about the China situation. He said it was very complicated. I referred to the menacing build-up of air-power and said he must know about it because it was being done with Soviet equipment. Molotov said this was purely a Chinese internal affair. I said we were exerting influence on the Chinese Nationalists and they should exert a comparable influence on the Chinese Communists. I said that we needed a situation where as in Germany, Korea and Vietnam, it was agreed that unification would not be sought by force. Molotov said they wanted peace. He suggested a Five-Power conference. I said a Six-Power conference would be better. He said the Chinese Communists would not meet with the Nationalists. I said we would not meet with the Communists without the Nationalists. I urged him to think about a way of solution, and he said he would do so. I said to communicate with us either through our Ambassador at Moscow or their Ambassador at Washington.

"I do not feel that much concrete progress was made, but I think that the Soviets may as a result of our talk put increasing pressure upon the Chinese Communists to avoid war.

"We discussed at great length the invitation to a Four-Power conference. On behalf of the three Western powers I explained the philosophy underlying it. Molotov seemed generally to agree. We also agreed that none of the heads of government would be excluded from bringing up any topic which he thought called for solution.

"One of Molotov's most significant remarks was that they would propose a Five-Power conference. This clearly indicated that they would not stipulate that this first Four-Power conference should itself be a Five-Power conference.

"We discussed time and place. Molotov pressed insistently for Vienna. The three Western powers stoutly opposed this. We gave as the reason that we could not hold a conference in a country which would still be occupied. Actually we feel that it would have a very disastrous effect upon Germany if Vienna, as a reward for becoming neutral, should instantly be made a center of European activity, including discussion of the future of Germany. We strongly urged Switzerland.

"Molotov said to me privately as he left that our refusal to accept Vienna would make serious difficulties. My own feeling is they will accept Switzerland, though he indicated they would want Geneva rather than Lausanne because they have no consular facilities at Lausanne.

Memoranda of the discussion of a Four-Power Conference, summarized below, and on Indochina, disarmament, and the Berlin Autobahn tax, are *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 445. For two other brief accounts of the dinner, see *Tides of Fortune*, pp. 599–600, and Merchant, *Recollections*, pp. 3–4.

"As regards date, I said that without talking to you, I could not say whether or not it would be possible to have a date prior to the adjournment of Congress. The middle of July might perhaps be possible enabling you to return before Congress adjourned or else a date in August after Congress adjourned. He did not indicate that either period would be impossible, and I gather there is considerable flexibility as to time.

These are the highlights as I dictate them early Sunday morning. The rest I can tell you on my return.

"Faithfully yours,

"Foster"

Dulles

---

117. Memorandum of Discussion at the 249th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, May 19, 1955[1]

[Here follow a list of participants and discussion of items 1–5: Budget Objectives, National Petroleum Program, Middle East Oil, United States Policy Toward Finland, and Secretary Dulles' Trip to Europe. An extract from Dulles' report on his trip is printed in Document 76.]

6. Basic U.S. Policy on the Four-Power Heads-of-Government Meeting

Secretary Dulles indicated that preparations for the forthcoming Heads-of-Government conference would involve an immense amount of work. The President agreed with Secretary Dulles, and said that the Council might well pause at this point and talk a little about the very ready instrument for accomplishing this task which existed in the shape of the NSC Planning Board. The President said that he believed that the Planning Board would be a first-rate agency to prepare for the conference, because this staff group was so accustomed now to working together.

Mr. Dillon Anderson pointed out that the Planning Board had given considerable thought to the role it might play in preparation for the forthcoming conference, and had suggested that he present to the President and the Council certain of the subjects which the Planning Board believed it might usefully study. The object would be to solicit the Council's guidance for Planning Board consideration of these subjects. In the first instance, said Mr. Anderson, the Planning

---

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Gleason on May 20.

Board proposed to present recommendations on the general U.S. attitude toward the purposes of the meeting and the objectives which the U.S. would seek to achieve.

The President commented that on a number of the subjects which would be included in such a report, U.S. policy had already been clearly stated. Even so, the President felt it would be desirable to put in a single package what the United States would talk about at the conference. The President added that he had been giving a great deal of thought to this matter.

Secretary Dulles agreed that the Planning Board could do a very useful task in certain areas of preparation for the Heads-of-Government conference. However, in addition to the work of the Planning Board, there must be coordination at the, so to speak, working level of plans for the actual conduct of the conference. Secretary Dulles indicated that he had asked the Counselor of the Department of State, Douglas MacArthur, II, to undertake this procedural coordination.

Secretary Dulles then indicated that the subject of disarmament would be among the most important matters on which the United States must be prepared for discussions at the conference. Governor Stassen pointed out that his interim progress report on this subject would be up for Council discussion at the meeting of next Thursday. Secretary Dulles went on to state that the disarmament problem would be hard to handle. The forthcoming Four-Power conference, while not expected to settle such difficult problems, would be expected to explore ways and means by which the interested nations could proceed to deal with the problem. We might decide to continue the present discussions in London, or perhaps to bring them to the United Nations, or something else. Perhaps what we really want to do is to set up some special and dramatic forum. In any case, disarmament needed to be pushed.

Governor Stassen then said that the thinking of his group who had been studying the problem, was to refer the interim report which he would make on May 26 to the Planning Board and to the appropriate departments and agencies. There were, he added, very strong differences of view, both among the U.S. departments and agencies and between the U.S. on the one hand and the British and French on the other.

Secretary Dulles agreed, and pointed out that the Soviets imagined that their recent disarmament proposal[2] marked a big step by them toward meeting the U.S. position with respect to disarmament. Molotov had made this very point to him. In fact, however, said Secretary Dulles, the Soviets had actually gone a long way to meet the British and French position on disarmament, without realizing that there was a very wide gap between the United States and the British and French on the issue of disarmament.

---

[2] Reference is to the May 10 Soviet proposal to the U.N. Disarmament Subcommittee meeting at London.

The President inquired as to the nature of this gap between the U.S. and the British and French. After Governor Stassen explained the difference, Governor Stassen said that he had very real doubts as to the genuineness of the apparent Soviet change of heart regarding a disarmament program.

The President indicated that this discussion certainly showed that there were a lot of issues that must be coordinated by the United States Government prior to the conference. As he understood it, MacArthur would coordinate the procedures. Yet another problem where we had wide differences with our allies was that of East-West trade. This, the President was sure, would come up at the conference, and he expressed his familiar view that the traditional U.S. position with respect to strict controls on trade between the free world and the Soviet bloc was not a wise or practical position.

Governor Stassen pointed out that there were just as sincere differences within the Administration on the subject of East-West trade as on the subject of disarmament. Secretary Humphrey then pointed out the effect on East-West trade of the possible creation of a belt of neutral states in Central Europe. If in fact we were heading in the direction of such a belt, and if the line between the Soviet bloc and the free nations of Europe were to become fuzzy, as Secretary Dulles believed, this would be bound to have a great effect on trade relations between the free world and the Soviet countries.

Secretary Dulles said that he believed that we were now confronting a real opportunity in the present situation for a rollback of Soviet power. Such a rollback might leave the present satellite states in a status not unlike that of Finland. He for one, said Secretary Dulles, would not object to such a development. The big idea is to get the Russians out of the satellite states and to provide these states with a real sense of their freedom. Now for the first time this is in the realm of possibility.

Governor Stassen agreed that this was indeed the case, and repeated that if this development actually occurred the whole trade picture would be bound to change. Secretary Humphrey pointed out that such a change in the picture would be a very serious matter for the free world because the creation of the neutral states would offer the USSR a great chance to build up its internal strength through trade with these countries.

Dr. Flemming then inquired of the President whether he could raise another question. He reminded the President that he had said the other night that in the course of preparing for the conference and going through with it, the United States must remain strong and confident. Ought not the Planning Board to give consideration to this aspect of the problem?

The President replied in the affirmative, and said that with regard to the posture which the United States would assume in anticipation of the Four-Power conference, he had himself been speculating on the wisdom of the plan to carry out a test evacuation from Washington of essential Government personnel. This test was scheduled for June 15, 16 and 17 to test the continuity of the Government in the event of a devastating air attack, and he himself was supposed to take part in it. Was he, however, the President asked, to run out to a cave for a few days in what was essentially a war game, and then turn around and go to a Four-Power conference? The whole thing seemed "queer and incongruous" to him.

Dr. Flemming said that this was the kind of problem which he had in mind in raising this question. On the other hand, as an illustration of the effects of the President's strong leadership, he wished to inform the Council that the Congress had at long last manifested a real interest in a dispersal program for the Legislative Branch. Dr. Flemming then quoted from a letter he had received from several members of Congress, requesting an investigation of an emergency relocation site for the Congress. The President expressed his pleasure, and Dr. Flemming indicated that we do not want to lose the momentum and progress that was indicated by this inquiry; and yet, on the other hand, we did not wish to create the wrong atmosphere in Congress in regard to the approaching Four-Power meeting.

Mr. Allen Dulles said that he felt compelled to point out to the Council that there was absolutely nothing to indicate that the Soviets were relaxing one little bit on going ahead with the development of their military program.

The President then suggested that Mr. Dillon Anderson and Douglas MacArthur get together and explore the need for any additional coordination between the work of the Planning Board and of the State Department in the preparations for the Four-Power conference.

Mr. Anderson then continued to describe his proposal for an over-all paper to be prepared by the Planning Board on the basis of an initial draft prepared in the State Department. The President added that he wanted everything brought together into a single package paper. There were certain issues that the United States did not wish to have brought up at this conference. There were certain others which it did.

Mr. Anderson, having completed his description of the general over-all paper, went on to point out the need for an exploration on the topic of a European security system including Germany.

Secretary Dulles said that he understood that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had been requested to come up shortly after June 1 with a report on the implications of a withdrawal of U.S. forces from Europe. Admiral Radford said that this paper was in preparation.

Turning to Secretary Wilson, Secretary Dulles suggested that it would be desirable to have additional machinery and additional personnel earmarked in the Defense Department to go forward with the task of preparing for the conference. Specifically, Secretary Dulles said he wanted a top Defense Department official to work with MacArthur.

Secretary Wilson replied that Assistant Secretary Struve Hensel wished to leave the Government service on June 30. Secretary Wilson had been planning to have a successor for Hensel by that date. If, however, he could find the right man, he could appoint him at once to do the kind of job which Secretary Dulles had thought to be desirable.

The President inquired what kind of tasks Secretary Dulles had in mind that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were not already geared up to perform. Secretary Wilson replied that the Defense Department always seemed to have some borderline cases. The President repeated that he believed that the interests and responsibility of the Defense Department with respect to the coming conference would largely lie in the area of military advice, which would be provided by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Secretary Wilson replied that in the Defense Department we seem always to have a certain number of borderline cases. The President repeated his view that the Defense interest in the forthcoming conference would lie largely in the area of military advice by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Mr. Allen Dulles said that he had one point of very great importance to put before the Council. He felt that the Council was assuming much too quickly that what had happened in Austria and the concessions made by the Soviets to get a treaty, was clearly understood by the populations behind the Iron Curtain. Actually, these populations know little or nothing about the Soviet concessions at Vienna. It was going to be a very big job to get this information in the hands of the satellite countries. The President merely commented that the U.S. Information Agency should get to work at once.

Mr. Dillon Anderson said that he had yet another matter with respect to the Planning Board work on the problems of the Four-Power conference. Should the Planning Board study the problem of China and Far Eastern security? What did the Council think of this suggestion?

The President replied that he did not believe that Far Eastern problems should be studied as a matter of urgency at this time. He said he was determined not to take part in any Five-Power conference at present. It was his advice that the Planning Board get its European ducks in a row first, although, of course, we could not overlook the problems of China and the Far East.

Secretary Dulles inquired whether Mr. Anderson's suggestion for a study of Far Eastern problems implied any idea that the Administration should revise its policy with a view to considering U.S. participation in a Five-Power conference to include the Chinese Communists but not the Chinese Nationalists. Mr. Anderson answered that his query had not arisen in the context of any Five-Power conference, but was put forward because the Planning Board believed that the general subject of China and Far Eastern security matters could be looked at to advantage.

Secretary Dulles then remarked that he was still assuming that the United States would not wish to sit down at any Five-Power conference. Indeed, it would be little short of catastrophic if we undertook to do so. Mr. Anderson again indicated that he was making no suggestions whatever regarding a Five-Power conference, but only inquiring as to the advantage of a broad study of U.S. security policy in the Far East in the light of present developments.

The President agreed that we had always made it clear that the United States would not attend any Five-Power conference under present conditions. On the other hand, if at the forthcoming Four-Power conference the Soviets inquired as to what the conditions were which might induce us to attend a Five-Power conference, what could we say? At the very least we ought to know the answer and be able to list our reasons clearly.

The Vice President offered the suggestion that the Planning Board might usefully explore whether there was any other choice open to the United States than a Four-Power or a Five-Power conference.

Secretary Dulles indicated a conviction that the Soviets and the Chinese Communists would never agree to holding a Six-Power conference to include the Chinese Nationalists. Secretary Dulles added his thought that there were a great many things more urgent at this time than a review of U.S. policy toward Communist China. Such a review would be a very tough job as long as the United States continued to stand on the proposition that it would not attend a Five-Power conference including the Chinese Communists but excluding the Chinese Nationalists.

The President agreed that this was so, but pointed out that the United States had also stated publicly its willingness to meet with the Chinese Communists separately on the subject of the Formosa Straits. Accordingly, the Soviets may very well ask us why, in this case, we would refuse to meet the Chinese Communists in the presence of representatives of other powers. The President felt that we must have a satisfactory answer for such a question. It was all right to refuse to attend such a conference, but a decent respect for the opinion of mankind required us to be in a position to state the reasons for our refusal. The United States cannot be put in a position of simply saying it refused to talk. Nevertheless, the President went on to agree that there was no need at present to review the entire field of United States policy toward China. It would be sufficient if we marshalled all the reasons why we are opposed to a Five-Power conference.

Mr. Dillon Anderson countered with a suggestion for a somewhat broader treatment of the problem posed by Communist China, and asked what our response would be if the Chinese Communists should suddenly be induced to follow a line in the Far East something like the Soviets had followed in Austria. Would it not be profitable to study how we would respond to such a Chinese Communist initiative?

The Secretary of State expressed agreement with the President's point that study should be made of a possible U.S. response to a Communist proposal for convoking a Five-Power conference. It was necessary, he added, to be clear on the reasons why we opposed such a conference.

Dr. Flemming then asked if he could suggest once again a position paper on the point which he had raised earlier in the meeting—namely, the posture of strength and confidence which the United States ought to assume in the period prior to and during the Four-Power conference. The President answered that he thought this was a good suggestion, and then with a smile said that he seemed to be getting a reputation throughout the world for being a very peaceful man who was surrounded by warmongers. Amid laughter, Secretary Dulles observed that the situation the President described was not without its advantages.

Secretary Dulles brought the discussion to a close with the statement that one of the greatest dangers the United States would face at the forthcoming conference was the danger that the Soviets would present projects and ideas designed to create the impression that the United States and the free world were willing to accept the current situation in the Soviet satellites. Under the circumstances it would be highly advantageous for the U.S. to take certain initiatives to prevent any such view from gaining currency. In other words, we must raise very affirmatively the issues of freedom for the Soviet satellites and the activities of the international Communist movement. On the these two fronts the United States must proceed to launch strong counter-offensives.

The National Security Council:

a. Discussed procedures for developing a U.S. position on the Four-Power Heads-of-Government meeting, in the light of the above report by the Secretary of State and suggestions by the NSC Planning Board as reported by the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

b. Directed the NSC Planning Board to prepare as a matter of urgency for Council consideration, recommendations on the basic U.S. policy with respect to the Four-Power Heads-of-Government meeting, including:

> (1) The general U.S. attitude toward the purposes of the meeting and the objectives which the U.S. would seek to achieve, taking into account: British and French objectives; estimated Soviet objectives, immediate and long-term; existing or anticipated Soviet proposals and possible U.S. proposals which might be introduced at such a meeting.
>
> (2) Maintenance of a U.S. posture of strength and confidence before, during and after such a meeting.
>
> (3) Disarmament (incorporating any Council decisions based on the progress report on May 26, 1955 of the Special Assistant to the President on Disarmament).
>
> (4) European security, including the U.S. position toward Germany; a neutral belt of European states and its impact on trade with the Soviet bloc; the status of satellite countries; and the activities of the international Communist movement.
>
> (5) The U.S. position on Far Eastern issues which might be raised, including the basis for U.S. opposition to a Five-Power meeting.

c. Noted that the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs would coordinate the above-directed Planning Board activities with the Counselor of the Department of State, who would be responsible for coordinating the arrangements for the Four-Power meeting.

S. Everett Gleason

---

118. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, May 20, 1955, 2 p.m.[1]

SUBJECT

Meeting of the Chiefs of Government

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 471. Secret. Copies of this memorandum were circulated as PMCG MC-1, dated May 23; a set of the PMCG MC is *ibid.*

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary
Mr. Murphy
Mr. MacArthur
Mr. Merchant
Mr. Bowie
Mr. McCardle
Mr. Beam
Mr. Vedeler
Mr. Lyon
Mr. Reinstein

The Secretary approved Mr. MacArthur's proposal that the Chiefs of Government should meet for four days, July 18–21, and that the Foreign Ministers of the Four Powers should meet on July 16 to arrange procedures before their chiefs gather. After discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of several sites, it was agreed that the US would initially propose Lausanne, with a fall-back position of Geneva. The US will propose that the delegations themselves will be composed of the Heads of Government, the Foreign Ministers, the Ambassadors to Moscow, such experts as are needed, plus press and communication personnel.

The Secretary also approved proposing to the British and French a tripartite meeting of the Foreign Ministers in New York on June 16–17 prior to the UN ceremonies in San Francisco, and agreed to the proposal that a Tripartite Working Group begin its work in Washington on June 8. The Secretary asked that Mr. MacArthur clear these matters with the President during his conversation on Monday,[2] and also mention the complications attendant on the mid-June Foreign Ministers' meeting in New York and the San Francisco ceremonies: namely, French elections, the relocation test and Queen Elizabeth's State Visit to Norway.

Mr. Merchant reported that the Swiss Minister here visited him yesterday inquiring about the Secretary's activities during his recent trip to Europe and that during this conversation he had asked whether a site had been chosen for the Summit meeting.[3] Mr. Merchant told him that Geneva and Lausanne were both under consideration and sought the Minister's view as to his Government's reaction. The Swiss Minister said if all four nations agreed on a site in Switzerland, he felt certain that his Government would be pleased to play host.

In a further discussion of administrative facilities in the two Swiss cities, the Secretary noted reports that both UNESCO and the Peaceful Uses Conference would be in session in Geneva in the latter part of July. He agreed that Lausanne would be the initial US proposal, but went on to say that the purported public sentiment against Geneva did not weigh heavily with him.

---

[2] See footnote 1, *infra*.

[3] A memorandum of Merchant's conversation with the Swiss Minister is in Department of State, Central File 396.1/5–1955.

Mr. Beam was asked to draft the follow-up note to the Soviets. In this connection the Secretary emphasized there is to be no formal agenda for the Chiefs of Government meeting. The Secretary pointed out that, although the schedule would be crowded, if the meeting could not be held on the dates we proposed, it would have to be set back a full month since it would be necessary for the President to be in Washington for ten days before and ten days after the recessing of Congress to discharge his constitutional duties.

Mr. Merchant noted that it was not certain that Foreign Minister Macmillan would attend the ceremonies at San Francisco. The Secretary asked that Mr. Merchant check this matter with Ambassador Makins.

The Secretary asked Mr. Bowie what he knew of Governor Stassen's disarmament plan. Mr. Bowie replied, although the plan was still fuzzy, it provided essentially for a freeze on armaments; that is, a standstill agreement. Mr. Bowie was unable to say whether such an agreement would resemble the Korean one.

Mr. Merchant presented to the Secretary a paper prepared in EUR entitled "Reunification of Germany".[4] After reading it the Secretary said that the meetings of the Chiefs of Government would not deal with substantive issues. It would determine what issues the four nations would discuss and how, when and where they would be discussed. He said that he foresaw the German issue being assigned to the Foreign Ministers as a problem for a subsequent meeting with the three Western Allies consulting fully with the Federal Republic during the course of the meeting, while the Soviets did the same with the representatives of the German Democratic Republic.

Mr. Merchant pointed out that the Soviets might well introduce concrete proposals at the Summit meeting which are of such a nature that we must react almost at once. The Secretary said he expected that the Soviets will have staked out their position with great care and precision and may try to dominate the meeting from the propaganda standpoint. Mr. Merchant agreed and observed that such action by the Soviets might also give their proposals a degree of priority at the Foreign Ministers level. The Secretary commented that this is one of the inherent disadvantages in being one of three. The three Western Allies cannot hope to reach agreement on non-substantive issues of such moment on such short notice. Mr. MacArthur said that if there is no fundamental agreement among the three Allies, the Soviets can drive a wedge between us. Mr. Bowie expressed his concern, saying that the Soviets would very likely expound their point of view either orally or in written proposals while the three Western Chiefs of Government either sat at the table tongue-tied or accepted the lure and began to discuss these grave issues without adequate coordination.

---

[4] Not found in Department of State files.

Mr. Bowie asked whether it would be possible to discuss the German reunification problem without also going into the problems of European security and disarmament. He said he could foresee a considerable discussion of these topics by the Chiefs of Government solely to determine the nature and extent of the problem which they would delegate to their Foreign Ministers. In this connection he pointed out that Governor Stassen's disarmament survey would very probably not be cleared by the US Government on all levels before mid-July.

The Secretary said he felt there was need for talking papers on the following subjects:

1. Germany.

This would not be difficult to prepare since there was adequate material available in the Berlin Conference file.

2. Disarmament.

A paper on this subject must await Governor Stassen's report.

3. Level of armaments and forces.

4. Status of the satellites.

5. Extension of WEU controls into Eastern Europe.

In reply to Mr. Bowie's query as to how the German paper was to be prepared, the Secretary said that the Chiefs of Government were meeting not to discuss the substance of these issues but to find new paths and new approaches to these subjects. We shall need to prepare counter-statements to use if the Soviets resort to a propaganda offensive.

Mr. Bowie observed that the possibility remained that the Soviets would put forth proposals for other than propaganda purposes and that in that event we must be careful to maintain an atmosphere so that they know they can conduct further fruitful discussions with us. In Mr. Bowie's opinion the nub of the problem is what price will we and our Allies pay to get the Soviets out of the satellite states. JCS studies basic to this point were scheduled for completion June 1.

Mr. Murphy contrasted the brief period planned with the six weeks spent at Moscow in 1946–47 discussing only Germany. The

Secretary said that we shall need alternate courses of action to deal with either a serious Soviet approach or a propaganda contest. Propaganda ammunition could be found in abundance in the Berlin conference record. A three-or four-page "Atoms for Peace" talking paper would be useful. Another subject which should be covered is "Why the US will not agree to a Five-Power Meeting including Communist China". The Secretary went on to say when we talk with the Soviets on the subject of relaxing international tensions we should mention not only Germany and the conduct of Communist China but stress the status of the satellite states over which the USSR presides as a jailer and the international Communist apparatus which seeks to overthrow our governments. If the USSR would abandon such foreign adventures and look instead to raising the living standards of its own people, international tension could be reduced.

---

119. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom[1]

Washington, May 23, 1955—2:36 p.m.

5949. From Secretary for Ambassador. Please convey following highly confidential message from me to Macmillan:

Begin text. Dear Harold:

I have talked to the President about the four-power meeting of Heads of Govt and reported to him on our good talks in Paris and Vienna on this subject. He has now asked me to get your reaction to the following suggestions regarding the four-power meeting:

The President fully agrees with the conclusion we reached in our recent talks that this conference should be held just as soon as practicable. He therefore suggests that the four Heads of Government meet from July 18 to July 21 inclusive, with the four Foreign Ministers meeting on July 16 to go over the final arrangements. This would leave time for further discussions among the three Western

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1/5–2355. Secret; Limit Distribution. Also sent to Paris for Pinay and repeated to Moscow. Drafted by MacArthur on May 21 at the request of Secretary Dulles, who in turn made several minor revisions of the text. (Memorandum by MacArthur, May 21; *ibid.*, 396.1/5–2155) MacArthur, again at the request of Dulles, also cleared it with President Eisenhower at a meeting at 10:50 a.m. on May 23, where two minor revisions were made by the President.

At the same meeting with the President, MacArthur informed him of the decisions that had been taken at the meetings on May 20 (see *supra*). President Eisenhower raised no objection to the arrangements, but did stress the importance of keeping the delegations small. (Memorandum by MacArthur, May 23; Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 460)

Ministers on the 17th and a further meeting with Molotov if necessary. If the meeting cannot be held at the above time, it would probably not be feasible for the President personally to leave Washington until the latter days of August, because for Constitutional reasons he must be here during the final ten days of the Congressional session, which is expected to adjourn some time in early August, and for at least ten days following the session.

Insofar as the place of the meeting is concerned, we would suggest Lausanne, because the international meetings which are now scheduled for Geneva in July would make it very difficult to arrange adequate facilities for the meeting as well as living accommodations in Geneva. The President would however accept Geneva if physical arrangements could be made.

The President believes that the Delegations should be limited to reflect the purpose of the meeting not to engage in any substantive discussions of issues, but simply to formulate the issues to be worked on and to agree on methods to be followed for their solution. He is, for himself, having regard for the limited purposes of the meeting, thinking along the lines of the US Delegation consisting of himself; myself; our Ambassador to Moscow; and two or three senior advisers who would be expected to sit in regularly at the meetings. There would be, in addition, a press officer and the necessary clerical and communications assistance.

The President also feels there would be advantage in our following up our May 10 invitation to the Soviets[2] with another message, making a specific suggestion as to time and place, and I am enclosing a draft of such a message to indicate what we had in mind. I am also attaching a list of topics which we anticipate might come up, either at the suggestion of the Western powers or the Soviet Union.

I know we are all in full agreement on the vital importance of adequate tripartite preparation. Now that Mr. Molotov has indicated that he will come to San Francisco, I assume from our talks in Paris that both you and Mr. Pinay would also plan to come. This will afford us opportunity for some good tripartite discussions as well as further talks with Molotov. Before the three of us meet with Molotov, it seems most important that we talk together, and it has occurred to me that we might meet in New York about June 16–17, immediately preceding the San Francisco Conference. For us to accomplish the maximum results from such discussions, I also suggest that it would be useful to have our meeting preceded by a tripartite working group, where our experts could lay the groundwork for our talks. With this in mind, such a working group might meet in Washington from about June 8 to 14, and then be available to us in New York.[3]

---

[2] See Document 114.

I would greatly appreciate your views, both on the President's suggestions as to the four-power conference of Heads of Government set forth above and on the possibility of our getting together in New York. If the New York meeting at the dates suggested is impracticable, I would welcome any ideas you might have as to when and where we might get together before the meeting with Molotov at San Francisco.

I am sending a similar message to Mr. Pinay.

Faithfully yours, Foster Dulles. *End text.*

Enclosures mentioned in foregoing text sent in next two immediately following telegrams.[4]

Dulles

---

[3] In telegram 5952, May 23, the Embassy in London was told to inform Macmillan when it delivered this message that the United States was prepared to exchange views on a Four-Power Conference privately with the United Kingdom prior to the meeting of the working group. (Department of State, Central Files, 396.1/5–2355)

[4] *Infra* and Document 121.

---

120. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom[1]

Washington, May 23, 1955—2:36 p.m.

5950. For Ambassador. ReDeptel 5949. Following is first enclosure to message:

Begin text. The Govts of France, the UK, and the US, refer to their Notes of May 10, 1955, addressed to the Soviet Govt proposing an early meeting of the four Heads of Govt. They recall that during their informal conversations in Vienna on May 14 and 15, the four Foreign Ministers agreed upon the desirability of such a meeting.

Accordingly, the three Govts now propose for the consideration of the Soviet Govt that the four Heads of Government meet at ——— from July — to —. Conforming to the suggestion in their Notes of May 10, the three Govts also propose that the Foreign Ministers hold a preliminary meeting in ——— on July —. *End text.*

Dulles

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1/5–2355. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Beam and MacArthur on May 22. Cleared with Dulles and Merchant. Also sent to Paris and repeated to Moscow.

121. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom[1]

Washington, May 23, 1955—2:36 p.m.

5951. For Ambassador. ReDeptel 5949. Following is second enclosure to message:

I. Issues Which May Be Formulated by the Western Powers:

1. Unification of Germany.
2. Limitation of armaments, including atomic and thermonuclear weapons.
3. Status of Soviet satellites. (Yalta and satellite treaty agreements.)
4. Activities of international Communism. (Litvinov Agreement.[2])

II. Additional Issues Which May Be Formulated by USSR:

1. Security Pact for Europe, including withdrawal of US forces.
2. Neutralized band from Finland and Sweden in north, through Germany, Austria, to and including Yugoslavia in south.
3. Five-power conference, to include Communist China, for consideration of Far Eastern matters.
4. East-West trade.
5. "Reduction of tensions". (This is a vague Soviet catch-all.)

Dulles

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1/5–2355. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by MacArthur on May 22. Cleared with Dulles and Merchant. Also sent to Paris and repeated to Moscow. The list of topics had been the subject of a memorandum by Merchant on May 18 that included all of those mentioned below and a few others. (*Ibid.*, 396.1–VI/5–1855) A similar list was drafted by Dulles on May 19 and left with the President. (*Ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 472) From the progression of the topics presented it is likely that this enclosure was the final draft in that series of papers.

[2] In 1933 when relations between the Soviet Union and the United States were established one stipulation was that international Communist activities as controlled by the Soviet Union would cease within the United States. This stipulation became known as the Litvinov Agreement after the Soviet negotiator; for its text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1933, vol. II, p. 805.

122. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France[1]

Washington, May 25, 1955—1:24 p.m.

4202. For Ambassador. White House and Secretary are shocked at announcement by Pinay of our suggestions contained Deptel 4174[2] re time and place four-power meeting. As reftel indicated, this was highly confidential message. Pinay's announcement is embarrassing for many obvious reasons including fact that there be tripartite agreement on July date, Soviets will believe we have deliberately and for ulterior reasons publicly announced it prior to suggesting it to them privately through diplomatic channels. You should impress on French that we just cannot handle these matters in such fashion and also let them know it has created deplorable reaction here. Furthermore since suggestions as to time and place were attributed to President, it has created difficult problem for White House in its press and public relations.

We have spoken to French and UK Ambassadors along above lines[3] and told them line being used by White House which is as follows:

Begin text: The report from Paris reflects certain suggestions which are being considered as between the three inviting powers for submission to the Soviet Union. The three inviting powers have not reached any final decision as between themselves with respect to these matters. One of the possibilities being considered for proposal to the Soviet Union is a meeting at the time and place indicated by the report from Paris. *End Text.*

Dulles

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1/5–2555. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by MacArthur and cleared with Merchant. Repeated to London and Moscow.

[2] Same as Document 119.

[3] A memorandum of MacArthur's conversation with Couve de Murville on May 25 is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 458. No record of the conversation with Makins has been found in Department of State files.

123. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State[1]

Paris, May 26, 1955—noon.

5178. For Secretary from Dillon. I also was greatly shocked by Pinay's announcement of suggestions contained in Deptel 4174,[2] which announcement was made by him personally as he was leaving meeting of Conseil des Ministres at Elysees Palace. While during my talk earlier in the morning with Pinay I did not specifically charge him to secrecy on this matter, letter as delivered to him was very plainly marked "Secret" in large letters, and I did specifically point out to him that in my opinion the most important immediate item in the letter was the suggestion as to tactics that should be adopted by the three powers toward the Soviet Union: i.e., the advisability or not of sending a further communication to the Soviets.[3] In view of this I must frankly admit it never occurred to me that Pinay would leak the contents of such a possible future note prior to its delivery and even prior to three power agreement on its content.

In view of Pinay's extreme pride and "amour propre" I do not feel it would serve any purpose for me to speak to him specifically on this subject. However, I am having Achilles speak to Laloy, Pinay's Chef de Cabinet, de Margerie and Berard today[4] in accordance with Deptel 4202.[5]

Provided suitable occasion arises I will also mention the matter direct to Pinay and Faure.

I am afraid that leak is merely result of Pinay's extreme inexperience in the handling of foreign affairs and that despite anything we may say other "gaffes" may be expected from him from time to time.

Dillon

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1/5–2655. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution.

[2] Same as Document 119.

[3] In telegram 5145 from Paris, May 25, Dillon reported that he had delivered Dulles' message that morning. (Department of State, Central Files, 396.1/5–2555)

[4] At 8 p.m. on May 26 Dillon reported that representations had been made "bluntly" to Berard and de Margerie who had commented "ruefully" that they too had been shocked and surprised by Pinay's statement. (Telegram 5213 from Paris; *ibid.*, 396.1/5–2655)

[5] *Supra.*

124. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State[1]

Moscow, May 26, 1955—5 p.m.

2105. Following is translation MID Note No. 50/OSA May 26 on four-power talks (see also Embtel 2104[2]).

Begin translation.

Ministry Foreign Affairs USSR presents compliments to Embassy USA and in connection Embassy's note May 10[3] on convening conference heads Government USA, France, England and Soviet Union has honor state following.

Soviet Government as is known, regards positively convening conference heads government aforementioned powers, having in view that such conference must facilitate reduction international tension and strengthening mutual confidence in relations between states. Soviet Government considers that meeting of leading state figures can contribute establishment conditions necessary for settling unresolved international problems, given genuine desire for this of all interested parties.

In this connection it is pertinent to recall that display of readiness by interested states contribute settlement such problems permitted bringing to end bloodshed in Korea and also stopping military action in Indo-China with recognition lawful rights peoples Indo-China for independent national development. By this, two dangerous hotbeds of war in area of Far East and Southeast Asia were successfully liquidated. Recently one of most aggravated questions in Europe also successfully resolved question of Austrian state treaty with recognition permanent neutrality Austria, which was important contribution to cause strengthening peace and lessening international tension.

Following its constant policy directed to securing peace, and striving for strengthening mutual confidence in relations between states and cessation "cold war", Soviet Government May 10 specifically set forth its position on questions disarmament, banning atomic weapons, and elimination threats of new war. Achievement appropriate agreement these questions first of all among great powers would permit putting end to existing arms race, including field of atomic and hydrogen weapons, freeing peoples from ever growing burden military expenditures and creating conditions for peaceful and untroubled life of peoples.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1/5–2555. Official Use Only; Niact. This text should be compared for minor textual differences with that in *Documents* (R.I.I.A.) for 1955, pp. 3–5. The Russian text of the note is in Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/5–2655.

[2] Not printed.

[3] See Document 114.

In accordance with this, Soviet Government expresses its agreement to proposal of Government USA and also Governments France and Great Britain relative to carrying out in very near future meetings heads of governments four powers with participation Ministers Foreign Affairs. However, Soviet Government in this connection cannot but draw attention to certain statements of leaders of USA made after receipt by Soviet Government of aforementioned note Government USA. In these statements it is pointed out that Government USA while declaring for convening conference heads of governments four powers, approaches this conference "from position of strength" which indicates desire to exert inadmissible pressure on conference. This is done in spite of fact that fruitlessness similar attempts in negotiations with Soviet Union has been repeatedly demonstrated.

Aforementioned leaders US have even gone so far as to state necessity interference in internal affairs other states, making various thrusts and attacks in regard to countries of peoples democracy, who are defending freedom and independence their peoples. At same time it is completely evident that such attempts to interfere in internal affairs other states, which are incompatible with principles UN, must be rejected as expressions aggressive intentions certain circles, which have as their aim further intensification arms race, prolongation "cold war" and still further exacerbation international tension. Such statements cannot be evaluated as other than tendency to discredit very idea of convening conference four powers.

In this manner, US Government on one hand proposes organize meeting heads governments of four powers for consideration of unresolved international problems and on other hand is already proposing plans which deliberately doom conference to failure. This can be explained only by fact that Government USA, in spite of its statements, evidently does not in fact seek settlement aggravated international problems.

In such situation conference of four powers not only cannot give positive results on which peoples are naturally counting, but on contrary frustration of conference, which is already being prepared, would lead to further deepening of disagreements between powers and worsening of international situation.

Soviet Government as it has stated repeatedly in past considers task of conference heads of government of four powers to be reduction of international tension and strengthening of confidence between states. Such aim can be attained only in event all interested states strive for it. Only in this case can conference heads of governments give positive results. Regarding questions which should be subject of consideration at conference, taking foregoing into consideration, heads of governments could themselves determine range of questions and also determine ways of settling them and give appropriate instructions to Ministers Foreign Affairs.

Soviet Government considers most suitable place for convening conference heads of government to be Vienna, which corresponds also to invitation extended by Federal Chancellor Austria J. Raab.[4]

Soviet Government assumes that question of time of convening conference heads of government will be subject further agreement.

Analogous notes of Soviet Government are also being sent to Governments Great Britain and France.[5]

End translation.

Foreign Office is apparently calling press conference 1800 hours local time at which note will presumably be released.

Walmsley

---

[4] Not further identified.

[5] This note was discussed briefly at a meeting in Secretary Dulles' office at 2:25 p.m. on May 26. In the course of the discussion Merchant, McCardle, and Dulles stated that the note seemed to offer little hope for any serious move by the Soviet Union and McCardle termed it "a very clever piece of propaganda". (Memorandum of conversation (PMCG MC-2), May 27; Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-GE/5-2355)

---

125. Letter From Foreign Minister Pinay to Secretary of State Dulles[1]

Paris, May 27, 1955.

DEAR FOSTER DULLES: The French Government has examined your proposal reserving the dates of 16–21 July for a meeting between the heads of Government preceded by conversation between the four Ministers of Foreign Affairs.[2] It is forced to observe that choice of these dates would cause it serious difficulties. On the one hand, the commitments which the President of the Council and I, myself, have made to Parliament oblige us, in fact, to be in Paris during all the end of the month of July, a period when the program of parliamentary work is particularly heavy. I notice, on the other hand, that the note which we have just received from the Soviet Government indicates that it reserves to the meeting at San Francisco of the four Ministers of Foreign Affairs, the task of taking a decision on the date of the conference. If this is the case and under the best hypothesis, I do not see how we would have the time to proceed with the material preparation of the conference in the 15 or 20 days that would remain.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 489. Secret. The source text is a translation prepared in the Department of State. The French text of this note, as delivered to Murphy on May 28 in Note No. 317, is *ibid.*

[2] See Document 119.

It seems wiser to me to envisage the second period that you suggest, that is, the second half of August. This longer delay would leave, moreover, time to prepare for the meetings with all the necessary care they require.

Concerning the place of the meeting, I believe that we would insist on Lausanne, or, if necessary, Geneva where it seems possible to provide the necessary facilities in August, and which I have reasons to believe the Soviets would finally accept. But I am ready to consider on this point any other view upon which agreement could be reached.

Finally concerning the meeting at San Francisco you know the great importance that I attach to meeting with you and Mr. Macmillan on that occasion. The senatorial elections in France take place on June 19, including the Department which I represent, and you know how difficult it is for a member of the government to be absent under the circumstances. I could arrive in New York on the morning of June 20 but I wonder whether it would not be preferable that we go directly to San Francisco and that we meet there, you, Mr. Macmillan and myself on the morning of the 21st before seeing our Soviet colleague. If these various suggestions meet with your approval and that of the British Secretary of State, I would propose the following calendar for the various three and four-power meetings and the work which would precede them:

(1) Meeting at Bonn on the second of June of the working group charged with developing a revision of the Eden plan.

(2) Meeting at Washington on June 4 of the working group (with Canada) charged with studying the Russian proposals of May 10 concerning disarmament from the purely technical point of view in order to reach a common position with regard to the elimination of the unacceptable points which they contain.

(3) Meeting at Paris on June 10 of a working group to study questions concerning European security.

(4) The representatives of our three governments would meet in Washington at the Ambassadors' level about June 18 to prepare for the talks at San Francisco.

(5) Meeting at San Francisco on the morning of June 21 of the three western Ministers of Foreign Affairs before their meeting with Mr. Molotov.

(6) The month of July and the first half of August would remain available to complete our preliminary studies and make the material preparations for the four-power talks.

(7) The meeting of the four Ministers of Foreign Affairs could take place August 19 preceding that of the heads of government on August 22.

I am informing Mr. Macmillan of these views and ask you to accept [etc.]

Antoine Pinay[3]

---

[3] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

---

126. Letter From Prime Minister Eden to President Eisenhower[1]

London, May 29, 1955.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Harold is sending Foster a reply to his helpful message about the Four-Power talks.[2] We are in entire agreement with you about the need for adequate preparation by the Western Powers. It is essential that we should all have clear ideas as to our joint attitude on the questions which will be raised.

2. The proposed programme of talks at the official level and between Foreign Secretaries seems good to me and well planned. But I also feel that we should be wise to have a talk ourselves before meeting the Russians. You have on occasion said that you might be able to visit this country again. Nothing could give greater pleasure in Britain and you would certainly receive a heartfelt welcome from everyone. Is there any possibility that you could come here before the first round of top-level discussions, perhaps in July? We could ask Faure over to join us. It would be a real help to me to talk over our general attitude and the tactics which we might adopt. Nor would it do any harm to display the unity of the West.

3. I have also been thinking about the length of time that the first round of talks should take. These are to be purely exploratory and intended to find some basis on which further discussions can go on at other levels and at such length as may be necessary. I therefore agree that, apart from practical and personal considerations, we

---

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File. Secret and Personal. Attached to the source text was a letter of transmission from Ambassador Makins to the President, dated May 29, which states that Eden had not mentioned this matter to the French.

[2] *Infra.*

should not allow them to be dragged out. But I am a little apprehensive of our tying ourselves too firmly and rigidly to an exact timetable. We are after all meeting to test the temperature and see what openings there are for useful discussions and an improvement in relations. In my experience it is the informal contacts which are often the more useful with the Russians. This should be especially true if, as I believe, they are—whether for internal or other reasons—more ready for serious discussion now than they have been since the war. Even so they are deeply suspicious and slow-moving animals. I hope therefore that we shall leave ourselves a day or two in hand to extend the talks should this seem desirable at the time. In any event I trust that we shall have a minimum of four to five clear days.

Yours ever,

Anthony[3]

---

[3] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

---

127. Letter From Foreign Secretary Macmillan to Secretary of State Dulles[1]

London, May 29, 1955.

Dear Foster: I have now had a chance of discussing with Anthony the various messages about the Four Power meeting and what has been happening while we have been separated by the calls of electioneering.[2]

2. Anyway, the first development is satisfactory, Molotov's note of May 26[3] formally accepts an early meeting of the nature which we have proposed. This is the vital point, and we have followed your wise line in our public statements, by ignoring polemics and concentrating on the hopeful fact of the Russian acceptance.

3. I am of course delighted to know that the President agrees with the broad conclusions which we reached in our talks in Paris and Vienna, and that he feels that the conference should take place as soon as practicable. Anthony shares this view. For our part, we of course would welcome it taking place in July. But we realise all the

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 483. Secret. Delivered to the Department of State by Ambassador Makins on May 29, who stated that this message minus paragraphs 6 and 8 had also been communicated to Pinay.

[2] British general elections were held on May 26.

[3] See Document 124.

difficulties involved having regard to the President's programme and his inescapable duties in relation to Congress.

4. While we are ready to meet the general convenience, the earlier the better so long as the preparatory conditions are such as to make the chances of a useful meeting as great as possible.

5. About the length of the meeting, we both now feel that four days may really be rather too short. Of course the formal work to be done by the Heads of Governments may not take very long, for it consists really in reviewing the ground that has to be covered and in deciding on the proper machinery for dealing with the various problems. We have never expected more than this as the first result of the conference of Heads. But of course there is always the chance (and that is the real purpose of these meetings) of some useful by-product emerging in the course of the less formal discussions. It may happen that in such conversations among the Heads a phrase or two or a sentiment may emerge which will give us a line as to where we could most usefully probe a little further or where we might hope for possible concessions. Four days seems little time for this sort of atmosphere to develop. Five days, or even the possibility of going on for a week if things were going well, would give a better chance.

6. Anthony is sending a separate message to the President[4] about how we should prepare for all this, which I hope you and he will consider favourably.

7. As regards the other plans set out in your message to me, I certainly agree the Tripartite Working Group in Washington from June 8 to 14 and also the meeting in New York of the three Foreign Ministers, say June 16 to 17 before going on to San Francisco. All this would suit me excellently.

8. I have also sent instructions about the private Anglo-American discussion which I agree with you in thinking most important.

9. The only thing that remains is about the place. We have no strong views about this except that it should not be in Vienna. Since we have had a hint that the Russians would compromise on Geneva, would it not be a good thing to propose it ourselves to them and so clear up that issue? I understand there may be some difficulties about accommodation, but these will probably apply to any of the places which have been mentioned if the meeting is to take place during the tourist period. But such problems can no doubt be solved. After all, we are quite important visitors.

10. I am sending a similar message to M. Pinay.

Yours ever,

Harold[5]

---

[4] *Supra.*

[5] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

128. Letter From President Eisenhower to Prime Minister Eden[1]

Washington, May 31, 1955.

DEAR ANTHONY: Our recent public statement of satisfaction over the release of four United States airmen conforms, I think, to your suggestion as to what we should do along that line.[2]

I agree that the three Western powers should have a clear accord among themselves as to their joint attitude on questions which will likely be raised at the Conference. I doubt, however, that it will be possible for me personally to undertake attendance at a preliminary meeting which would have as its purpose the formulation of such joint attitudes. It is always an awkward thing for the President to leave this country for more than a day or so, and at this particular time it seems more difficult than is usually the case.

However, it is clear that we must make arrangements that will bring about the desired accord. Possibly Foster and Harold should work on this.

As to the length of the "Summit" meeting, there are several reasons why we do not want it unduly prolonged. The first of these is, again, the difficulty I have mentioned above. The second is that long and laborious meetings, discussing substantive questions, will inevitably lead the public to expect concrete solutions to the specific problems that obviously trouble the world. A meeting of a very few days could logically be accepted by the people as an effort to ease tensions and to outline means and methods of attacking the tough problems we have to face. But a prolonged meeting would lead to expectations which cannot possibly be realized either quickly, or in this kind of meeting. Thirdly, we feel that we must be particularly careful that the meeting and the note on which it ends shall neither raise false hopes among our own people nor create despair among the captive nations.

We are, of course, quite ready to take what time is necessary in such a conference to discuss general attitudes and general methods to be followed in the solution of problems. To attempt more than this and at the same time try to devise a final communiqué that would convince the world that an easing of tensions has actually begun, would, I think, most certainly create confusion. Possibly it might lead the peoples of Eastern Europe to believe that we had finally and irrevocably accepted the status quo with regard to them. This, of course, we must not do.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/5–3155. Secret and Personal. This message was transmitted to London in telegram 6091, May 31, for delivery to the Prime Minister.

[2] For text of this statement, dated May 30, see Department of State *Bulletin*, June 13, 1955, p. 953.

If necessary, I think I can manage the "clear four to five days" that you believe will be required. But we would want to know that you were prepared to stand with us in preventing the development of long drawn-out, profitless arguments which could have nothing as their purpose except propaganda.

With warm personal regard,

D.E.[3]

---

[3] Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.

---

129. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France[1]

Washington, May 31, 1955.

4280. For Ambassador. From Acting Secretary. Please convey following highly confidential message from me to Pinay, stressing importance of secrecy pending tripartite agreement and subsequent notification to Soviets of Western views regarding date, place, etc., of four-power meeting of Chiefs of Government.

Begin text. Dear Mr. Pinay: Your message of May 27[2] to Mr. Dulles regarding the four-power meeting was received just after his departure from Washington for a brief absence until June 2. However, in view of the urgency of this matter and the importance of the points you made, your message was forwarded to him. I now have his ideas, which are as follow:

1. With respect to the date of the four-power meeting of Chiefs of Government, we understand that the dates of July 18–21 raise real problems for you. On the other hand, while not excluding the possibility of a meeting in late Aug if the circumstances leave no other alternative, in the light of Mr. Macmillan's reply[3] (copy of which I understand was sent to you) indicating that the British Govt would welcome the meeting taking place in July if this meets with general convenience, the President and Mr. Dulles wondered whether you

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1/5–3155. Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Bonn, Moscow, and London. The same day Hoover sent a message to Macmillan, enclosing a copy of this message and thanking him for his note of May 29. (Telegram 6092 to London; *ibid.*)

[2] Document 125.

[3] See Document 127.

and Prime Minister Faure might be willing to re-examine the possibility of the July meeting. The President and Mr. Dulles continue to feel there is much advantage in making an early specific suggestion to the Soviets as to time and place so that we could try to reach agreement with them on these two points before the San Francisco meeting. If the three of us could agree on a date and place, we might put this to the Soviets within the next week.

2. In regard to the length of the meeting, Mr. Macmillan has suggested that four days may really be rather too short and that five days might be better. I have discussed this matter with the President, who, while willing to consider the possibility of a five-day meeting, feels that in the first instance we should propose a four-day meeting to the Soviets. Since by agreement, the Chiefs of Government will not enter into discussion of solutions of the various issues but rather try to identify them and to agree on methods to attack these problems, four days would seem to be adequate. This would mean that discussion of solutions of the issues themselves would occur at a later date at Foreign Minister level.

3. Regarding the place of the meeting, Mr. Dulles fully agrees that we should refuse to accept Vienna and should press hard for Switzerland. In view of Soviet opposition to Lausanne, he believes we might suggest Geneva, as a compromise between Vienna and Lausanne. The Swiss Govt has let us know confidentially and informally that it would be possible to hold the meeting in Geneva prior to the Atomic Energy Conference which begins in early August. Before suggesting a date and place to the Soviet Union we would of course have to request, officially and very confidentially, Swiss agreement, but this should not take more than about a day.

4. Mr. Macmillan has accepted the suggestion that the three Foreign Ministers meet in New York on June 16–17, but we fully understand the difficulties which these dates present for you. Mr. Dulles does feel that it is exceedingly important to have good and full tripartite discussions before meeting with Molotov. Your proposal that the three Foreign Ministers only meet in San Francisco on the day after the opening of the UN Conference would hardly permit this, since presumably Mr. Molotov would already have arrived and be expecting to meet with the three Western Ministers very soon after the opening of the UN Conference on June 20. In addition, the pressures on Mr. Dulles, as host Foreign Minister, particularly during the opening days of the San Francisco meeting, will be very heavy. If it is not possible for you personally to come to New York on the 16th and 17th of June, could you designate a representative who might meet in New York with Mr. Macmillan and Mr. Dulles? In these circumstances, the three Western Ministers would of course also meet briefly together in San Francisco prior to seeing Molotov.

5. In your message to Mr. Dulles, you also suggested a series of working group meetings in various places. Inasmuch as many of the questions which require tripartite discussion and preparation are overlapping and interrelated, we feel there would be great advantage in the first instance to discuss them together. Therefore, to begin with, we would suggest that a single working group be established in Washington on June 8 to prepare for the talks with Molotov and also to begin exchanges of views on the important substantive matters which we must discuss thoroughly prior to a four-power meeting. As you know, Mr. Macmillan has agreed to the June 8 working group to meet in Washington.

Mr. Dulles would appreciate very much your thoughts on the above ideas, which he asked me to transmit to you, together with his warm regards.

Sincerely, Herbert Hoover, Jr. *End text.*

Hoover

---

130. Memorandum From the Counselor of the Department of State (MacArthur) to the Secretary of State[1]

Washington, June 3, 1955.

MR. SECRETARY: Yesterday we had a two-hour meeting with Makins,[2] and today we had a second meeting[3] with him, pursuant to the agreement you and Mr. Macmillan reached in Paris.[4]

In these two meetings, Makins set forth tentative British thinking and points that were going through their minds. On our side, we simply asked questions to clarify what he stated. Makins stressed that he was not presenting UK positions, but rather was laying out for us an indication of what they were thinking about so that we could give him our reactions. We undertook to meet with him again Monday morning at 11 o'clock to give our reactions.

I attach two memos of these conversations. The first, covering yesterday's two-hour session, is quite long and detailed, whereas the second is just a page and is a brief summary of the new salient points that came out of today's meeting. It seems very important that if at all possible you read both of these memos before our meeting with you at 11 a.m. tomorrow, since we will need your guidance before we meet with Sir Roger again on Monday morning.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 515. Top Secret. A handwritten notation on the source text indicates that Secretary Dulles saw it.

[2] A nine-page memorandum of this conversation, PMCG MC–13, dated June 3, is *ibid.*, Central File 396.1–GE/6–355.

[3] A five-page memorandum of this conversation, PMCG MC–14, dated June 6, is *ibid.*, 396.1–GE/6–655.

[4] See footnote 2, Document 115.

D MacA

[Attachment 1]

Memorandum by the Counselor of the Department of State (MacArthur)[5]

Washington, June 3, 1955.

The British Ambassador has given us a report of the lines along which the Foreign Office is thinking with respect to the meeting of the four Chiefs of Government. He emphasized that these were not firm positions, but rather ideas for consideration.

The British expected that the conference would be led off by a general statement of views by each participant. The British spokesman might comment on such Soviet contributions to international tensions as (a) limitations on access to the Soviet people; (b) Soviet subversion abroad; (c) the impossibility of normal trade relations because of Soviet emphasis on heavy industry and defense, and the tendency to economic autarchy; and (d) persistent Soviet abuse of other states, particularly the United States, and breaches of the Satellite Treaties.

The British did not wish to be negative. They would also suggest the need for greater mutual confidence, which might be based on cooperative development of resources or other cooperative East-West undertakings—for instance, in atomic energy.

They thought the next step would be for the Chiefs of Government to survey specific problems in order to decide where and how they might best be further considered.

On disarmament, the British thought of taking into account that the West does not know enough about Soviet policies and intentions; the need for effective controls; and the extraneous considerations in the recent Soviet proposals (of May 10: foreign bases, Germany).

They thought that the principal European questions were:

a. Unification of Germany and Germany's place in Europe;
b. Independence of the satellites;
c. Mutual security arrangements.

---

[5] Top Secret.

On the Far East, they proposed to leave the initiative to the Soviets in the Conference.

The Ambassador said that Mr. Macmillan wondered if the time had not come to adopt a general over-all strategy rather than trying to deal with our problems separately and one at a time. The basic Soviet objectives were unchanged, but it seemed useful now to probe the new flexibility in their tactics. Following the coming into effect of the Paris Agreements, we could not expect further major steps to increase our strength in the next two or three years. At the same time, our position might be made less strong by the Soviets pressing their atomic development. It seemed useful, therefore, to consider reduction of tensions by a general limitation of arms at this time.

Within the framework of a global limitation-of-arms plan, the British suggested that there were prospects for a settlement of the German question on the basis of a unified Germany in NATO. Speaking from the diagram below, the Ambassador outlined the following possible alternatives:



a. In what is now the Soviet Zone of Germany, there would be only German troops. In West Germany there could be both German and other NATO forces. To the east of the present Soviet Zone, there could be Soviet and satellite forces.

b. There would be no foreign troops in Germany east of the Rhine. NATO forces would be only west of the Rhine. Soviet troops would be withdrawn to "a line in Poland", to be agreed.

c. Non-German forces would be withdrawn from all of Germany. Soviet troops would all be withdrawn from Poland.

d. Total demilitarization (no troops of any kind) of the present Soviet Zone with or without restrictions on foreign troops in the West Zone of Germany.

The British noted the importance of German public opinion and of close consultation with the German Government in all questions relating to Germany.

We raised with the British the risk that any proposal for such mutual withdrawal from part of Europe might lead the Soviets to suggest withdrawal of American forces to the U.S. in return for the withdrawal of their forces to the U.S.S.R. We also questioned how inviting the British proposals might be to the Soviets, since the proposals involved a weakening of the satellites, withdrawal of Soviet troops, and assurances that the new all-German Government would be in NATO.

The Ambassador said the British Government was very familiar with and shared our views with respect to the status quo in the satellite states. They doubted that the Soviets intended to lessen their control. They would probably, in fact, seek Western recognition of their right to such control. The Foreign Office thought of our objectives in the satellites as:

a. to liquidate all forms of Soviet penetration and control;
b. to hold general free elections;
c. to achieve withdrawal of Soviet forces from West Germany.

(a) and (b) seemed impossible at present, although there might be some advantage in putting forward the proposal for free elections. Withdrawal of forces was not worth much in itself unless we also had the first two points in mind.

The Ambassador warned against discussion of the Polish-German frontier (the Oder-Neisse line), which would only upset the Germans and Poles and which should be dealt with in the German Peace Treaty.

We shall be meeting further with the British to discuss European security arrangements, and to explore further the ideas which they have presented.

[Attachment 2]

Memorandum by the Counselor of the Department of State (MacArthur)[6]

Washington, June 3, 1955.

In a further meeting with the British Ambassador today, he set forth the Foreign Office thinking on European security.

The British consider European security an integral part of world security. They also feel sure that the Soviets will put forward overall European Security plans at the Summit meeting and that we should have a position of our own. Their basic premise is that

---

[6] Top Secret.

NATO is indispensable, as is the right of a free Germany to join NATO. At the same time, they think it will be necessary to take into account Soviet fears of a remilitarized Germany. They believe that unilateral declarations of peaceful intent by the Western powers would carry no weight with the Russians. A five-power pact (US, UK, USSR, France, Germany) for mutual assistance in the event of an attack in Europe by any signatory would not take account of the satellites. They had then considered a five-power pact calling for immediate consultation in the event of hostilities involving a non-signatory power. This would limit NATO's freedom of action in the event of a satellite attack on Germany. While none of the suggested arrangements seemed entirely satisfactory, the British thought something along these lines would have to be done to take care of genuine Soviet fears.

The British thought that it was important not to let the question of foreign bases, raised in the Soviet proposals of May 10, be separated from the basic questions of disarmament. The Ambassador suggested that the Soviet May 10 disarmament proposals be probed at the Summit meeting in order to determine whether they were in earnest. If they were, we could then decide about the usefulness of discussing the German problem in the context of an over-all disarmament program. If they were not, the question of German unification would have to be considered separately.

We will meet to discuss these British views further next Monday.

---

131. Letter From Prime Minister Eden to President Eisenhower[1]

London, June 3, 1955.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Thank you so much for your message.[2] Naturally I am disappointed that you do not feel able to come to this country for preliminary talks, but I quite understand how difficult it would be for you to get away. I am sure excellent preparations will be made by the Foreign Secretaries but I hope that you and I, perhaps with Faure, will have some chance of a talk when we arrive in advance of our meeting with the Russians.

I am very glad that you think you could manage the four to five clear days for the meeting at the summit. I understand your reasons for wanting to identify the problems and discuss methods of work rather than enter into a discussion of solutions. This is our own approach also. It follows that, if we are to carry public opinion with us the meeting should be presented as a first of a series at various levels to handle the problems confronting the world. For this reason I think it important that we neither in our minds nor in anything we say publicly exclude the possibility of further meetings at the top level if that seems useful.

---

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File. Secret. Attached to this letter was a note of transmission from Makins to President Eisenhower, dated June 3.

[2] Document 128.

Yours ever,

Anthony[3]

---

[3] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

---

132. Letter From Foreign Minister Pinay to Secretary of State Dulles[1]

Paris, June 4, 1955.

Dear Mr. Foster Dulles: The President of the Council and I have examined the question of possible dates for a Four-Power Conference, in light of the considerations that have been set forth to us in London as well as Washington. Our wish is, certainly, to see the conversation commenced as soon as possible under the best conditions for preparation and for success.

We recognize that numerous reasons of all kinds exist for a meeting in July on the dates proposed in your last message. Even though these dates raise serious difficulties for the carrying out of French parliamentary work, we are disposed to accept them. It might be necessary, in order to do so, to suspend the parliamentary debates. As this exceptional procedure could not be prolonged or renewed, it seems necessary to us, as Mr. Macmillan suggests, to agree immediately among ourselves that the discussions of the Chiefs of Government could extend, if necessary, throughout a full week.

With regard to the meeting of the three Ministers of Foreign Affairs at New York before San Francisco, regardless of the difficulty that causes me, I have made arrangements to be in New York on

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 489. The source text is a translation of Note No. 327 prepared in the French Embassy at Washington and delivered to MacArthur, together with the French text, on June 4.

June 16 to meet with you and Mr. Macmillan before we meet at San Francisco with Mr. Molotov.

Please accept [etc.][2]

Antoine Pinay[3]

---

[2] On June 6, Secretary Dulles replied to this message welcoming French agreement to the proposed arrangements. Dulles also stated that he would certainly not exclude extending the Four-Power Conference to 5 days, but such a decision would have to be taken in light of developments at the conference. (*Ibid.,* CF 483)

[3] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

Discussions at Washington, New York, and San Francisco on Procedures for a Meeting of the Heads of Government, June 6–24, 1955

133. Editorial Note

On June 4, the Department of State began work on a note to the Soviet Union calling for a Four-Power Conference to begin on July 18 at Geneva. Copies of the draft were given to the British and French Ambassadors on that day and transmitted to London and Paris for delivery to the respective Foreign Ministries. (Telegram 4334 to Paris, June 4; Department of State, CFM Files: Lot M–88, Box 170) Two days later the Western Ambassadors delivered identical copies to the Soviet Foreign Ministry. For text of the note, see Department of State *Bulletin* June 20, 1955, pages 989–990. A copy is also in Department of State, Central File 396.1/6–655.

On June 13, the Soviet Union replied in a brief note accepting Geneva as the location and July 18 as the opening date for the Four-Power Conference. (Note 55/OSA, transmitted in telegram 2238 from Moscow, June 13; *ibid.,* 396.1–GE/6–1355)

On June 7, the Embassy in Moscow delivered to the Soviet Foreign Ministry a personal note from Secretary of State Dulles to Foreign Minister Molotov inviting him to a dinner on June 20 at San Francisco to discuss various aspects of the Four-Power Conference. (Telegram 1033 to Moscow, June 6; *ibid.,* 310/6–655) Molotov accepted the invitation the same day. (Telegram 2181 from Moscow, June 7; *ibid.,* 396.1/6–755)

134. Letter From the Chairman of the Quantico Vulnerabilities Panel (Rostow) to the President's Special Assistant (Rockefeller)[1]

Quantico, June 10, 1955.

Dear Mr. Rockefeller: At your invitation, a group of eleven persons knowledgeable in many fields important to the American-Soviet struggle, have met as a Panel at Quantico, Virginia, from 5–10 June, to explore methods of exploiting Communist bloc vulnerabilities at this crucial state of world affairs. As your designated Chairman, and on behalf of my colleagues, I am herewith transmitting the reports and recommendations of our group.

All of us appreciate the freedom of action you gave us to develop our own guidelines of investigation. We soon discovered that several significant vulnerabilities could be identified and that fruitful courses of action could be developed only if we looked at the total political and security problems facing the U.S. at this juncture.

We have no expectation that we have produced either a magic formula for positive U.S. action or a substitute for the staff considerations currently under way in the responsible Government Departments. We offer these recommendations and the papers that underlie them as a supplement to those considerations. It is our hope that responsible officials will find our efforts constructive and that use can be made of the many concrete suggestions included in the Panel results.

The over-all report of the Panel and its four appendices represent a general group consensus.[2] We had neither the time nor the data to make, as individuals, definitive commitments of judgment on all the recommendations and on every line of text. But we forwarded these documents confident that they deserve serious consideration by the Government. We are also submitting ten papers prepared by individual Panel members. Many ideas from them have found their way into our joint recommendations; but time did not permit the Panel to evaluate the texts fully. I personally deem them an extremely interesting product of the week's work.

All of us appreciate the contributions made by governmental representatives toward this Panel and, in particular, the willing help of the responsible officials from your office, the Departments of

---

[1] Source: Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 66 D 148. Secret.

[2] Only the summary of recommendations of the report is printed below. The five chapters, four appendices, and five tabs comprising the bulk of the report are not printed. Copies were transmitted to President Eisenhower and the Department of State, and on June 16 a copy of the summary of recommendations was sent to Secretary Dulles by Murphy. (*Ibid.*)

State and Defense, of CIA, USIA, NSC, and OCB, who took of their precious time to join us periodically in our discussions.

The one impression which stands out in my mind is the unanimous belief of the Panel members that the U.S. now enjoys a significant but transitory period of over-all strength vis-à-vis the Soviet bloc. The next two or three years afford the United States the opportunity to negotiate from a strong position for genuine concessions by the enemy without sacrifice of essential positions of strength. Such negotiation, along with a vigorous and urgent development of potential Free World strength, could create the conditions for victory in the cold war.

May I express our appreciation for having had this opportunity to serve.

Dr. Frederick Dunn
Director, Center of International Studies
Mr. C.D. Jackson[3]
Time Life
Dr. Ellis A. Johnson
Director, Operations Research Office
Dr. Paul Linebarger
School of Advanced International Studies
Dr. Max Millikan
Center of International Studies, MIT
Dr. Philip Mosely
Director, Russian Institute
Dr. George Pettee
Deputy Director, Operations Research Office
Dr. Stefan Possony
Air Intelligence Specialist, Department of the Air Force
Dr. Hans Speier
Rand Corporation
Dr. Charles A.H. Thomson
Brookings Institution

W.W. Rostow
(Center of International Studies, MIT)

---

[3] A personal account of C.D. Jackson's participation in the Quantico Panel is in Eisenhower Library, C.D. Jackson Papers, *Time–Life* Log 1955.

[Attachment]

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS QUANTICO VULNERABILITIES PANEL

Purpose. This report (1) makes recommendations regarding operational positions and actions the U.S. might take vis-à-vis the USSR (as for example at the coming round of East-West conferences) that will permit the exploitation of Soviet vulnerabilities, and (2) offers suggestions for related actions advantageous to the U.S.

The Panel assessed the current strengths and weaknesses of the Soviet Bloc and the Free World. It concluded that the next several years afford the United States the opportunity to act from a strong position and to exact from the enemy genuine concessions without sacrifice of deterrent strength by us. A full exploitation of the enemy's transitory position of relative weakness and the Free World's actual and potential foundations for strength requires a wide range of U.S. initiatives and actions which transcend the area of negotiation with the Soviet Union.

Recommendations

In the light of this assessment we develop in our submissions a strategy and a broad tactical line for the forthcoming conferences and we submit the following specific recommendations:

A. Actions Prior to the Conference.

1. The United States should insist that the Soviets lift the Berlin toll blockade prior to the conference.

2. Suggestions should be made to the USSR, to the UK, and to France, that they should be prepared to exchange ratifications of the Austrian Treaty on the occasion of the conference.

B. Actions During the Conference.

1. The United States should be prepared to make a series of proposals designed to move towards the control of armaments. These include:

a. Discussions of:

(1) A proposed agreement for mutual inspection of military installations, forces, and armaments, without limitations provisions.

(2) A convention insuring the right of aircraft of any nationality to fly over the territory of any country for peaceful purposes. (Proposed with reservations noted in the text.)

b. Proposal of a disarmament plan to the USSR; after rejection of the plan, the U.S. to make every effort to win the arms race as the safest way of forcing the Soviet Union to accept a satisfactory arms convention.

2. The United States should be prepared to make a series of proposals concerning exchange of persons, information and goods, covering:

a. An agreement for the expansion of East-West trade.
b. An agreement greatly increasing the freedom of persons to travel anywhere in the world for peaceful purposes.
c. A convention providing for free and unhampered international communications for the exchange of information and ideas, conditioned on conclusion of an anti-jamming agreement.
d. Further exploration of peaceful uses of atomic energy and a world-wide fund for cooperative economic development of the underdeveloped areas.

3. The United States should pursue the following sequence in dealing with German matters:

a. Rapid implementation of rearmament provisions.
b. Proper conditions for free elections.
c. Free elections.
d. Unification of government.
e. Conclusion of a peace treaty not predetermining Germany's international status.
f. Withdrawal of troops only after a unified Germany has reemerged as a strong military power and has become an integral part of NATO. If Germany abstains from joining NATO, she should be permitted to rearm to a level sufficient to meet her security needs.

4. The United States should take the following actions to bring about greater Allied unity on Far Eastern policy, and to worsen difficulties between the Soviet Union and Red China:

a. Take steps to put strains on the Moscow–Peiping alliance.
b. Keep the Japanese fully informed of progress at the conference.
c. At least once during the conference, the Department of State should obtain for the President the advice of the Japanese Government on a specific Far Eastern point at issue in the conference.

C. Actions Outside of the Conference.

Outside of the conference, either concurrently with it or subsequent to it, the United States should take the following actions:

1. General:

a. Propose an international scientific conference of all powers producing atomic weapons on the problem of reducing the danger of radioactive fallout.

b. The United States should convene at an early date an exploratory conference to discuss implementation of the economic and other non-military provisions of the North Atlantic Treaty.

c. Accelerate the revival of Japan as a great power and treat her as a diplomatic equal in developing Far Eastern policy.

2. In relation to Europe, the United States should:

a. Invoke the peace treaties with Bulgaria, Rumania, and Hungary, and the provisions of other wartime and postwar agreements relating to the limitations of arms in Eastern Europe, demanding inspection to determine compliance with the limitations of these agreements.

b. Take early and forceful steps to assure improved air defense, passive and active, for our European allies.

c. Seek the establishment, organization and support of research and development in the NATO countries on an ambitious scale.

d. Relax to the maximum restrictions preventing the flow of necessary technical intelligence to European scientists working in behalf of a Free World.

e. Request SHAPE to make a maximum effort to find tactical solutions to NATO defense which minimize the possibilities of civilian casualties.

f. Explore seriously concrete recommendations designed to reduce present fears in NATO nations concerning atomic weapons.

g. Develop with NATO countries a joint policy for accelerated economic growth in the underdeveloped countries of the Free World.

3. In relation to Asia, the United States should:

a. Greatly increase the flow of investment resources to the underdeveloped countries, including Japan, South Asia and Southeast Asia.

b. Advise the Chinese Nationalist Government that its good relations in the South and Southeast Asia are a matter of interest to the U.S. U.S. diplomatic and other authorities in Formosa should openly sponsor informal news and cultural connections there.

c. Convince Asians that the U.S. is capable and willing to deal by means short of major war, with Communist military aggression.

d. Prevent a Communist take-over in Southern Vietnam.

e. In order to convert a major Free World problem into an asset, launch a positive U.S. political and economic program for Formosa.

135. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State[1]

Moscow, June 12, 1955—7 p.m.

2231. As of possible assistance in connection with preparatory work for forthcoming Four Power Conference, without attempting at this stage to predict with any exactitude Soviet positions on questions which may be discussed, I believe the following general considerations underlying present phase of Soviet developments both foreign and domestic, may be of value. In essence recent developments in Soviet foreign relations are a part of the process by no means complete of attempting to reorganize the direction of Soviet Union, its relations with Communist bloc and with non-Soviet world in the new circumstances created by the death of Stalin or, in other words, an attempt to administer a dictatorship without a dictator and an empire (at least in Eastern Europe) without an emperor.

I shall not attempt to go into all the complicated factors involved in this process, but merely deal with those which have a direct bearing on the subject of this message. There has obviously been no change of heart on part of the men who rule this country nor abandonment of ultimate objectives but I doubt that they are greatly concerned with latter at this juncture. Rather they are reacting in conformity with their concept of immediate Soviet interests to the changed conditions confronting them in the foreign as well as domestic field since the death of Stalin and more in response to the pressure of events both internal and external than was the case in Stalin's time. As I have frequently reported from here, I believe that the chief preoccupation of Soviet Government at present time is to retain maximum degree of control and influence possible in circumstances of Communist world and at same time avoid involvement in a war. Whereas in the initial period following Stalin's death it would appear that their desire to bring about a relaxation of tension was largely motivated by their fear that left to itself the current international situation would automatically evolve in direction of war, now I believe this fear is somewhat lessened, but has been replaced by a more immediate and practical concern which centers around the burden of modern armaments on the already overstrained Soviet economy. In part, I believe Soviet estimate last fall of the future correlation of military power in the world, particularly in the atomic field (with the prospect of West German rearmament), played an important part in the economic shift observable at end of year. These economic shifts have appeared to be made in part at least with view of expanding and strengthening industrial base of Soviet Union in anticipation of continued arms race, especially in atomic field, but effect over period of years on Soviet economy and attendant political repercussions were viewed with genuine apprehension by Soviet leaders. Faced with this prospect Soviet leaders sometime in March came to conclusion that serious effort must be made in international field to avoid the burdens and consequences of an all-out arms race. They seem to be sufficiently realistic to realize that any progress in disarmament was dependent in no small measure on relaxation in international tension and also that mere words and gestures were insufficient. These I believe are some of the underlying considerations which will help explain recent Soviet moves in international field: Austrian Treaty, the Disarmament Proposal of May 10, the agreement to a high-level conference, Yugoslavia, invitation to Adenauer, et cetera. While there would appear to be a genuine desire on part of Soviet Government to find some international means of reducing the burden which atomic armament places on Soviet economy, it of course does not follow that, given the limitations imposed by the Soviet structure and mentality of the men who run it, they would be prepared to agree to extent of control and inspection essential to make any such agreement workable. However, there may be in present circumstances more serious basis in this field for discussion than has existed in the past. With regard to other questions which Soviets may advance at Four Power meeting, recent information has been extremely sketchy and inconclusive, but it still appears that Soviet proposal of May 10, which included many other subjects besides disarmament, in general constitutes a very probable blueprint of questions Soviet Government will on its own initiative raise at Geneva. These will include (1) a revival of the all-European security treaty first proposed in Berlin in 1954; (2) the attempt at elimination of military bases, particularly United States, in foreign territory; and (3) evacuation of foreign troops from territory of other countries with particular reference to Germany. Incidental standard Soviet questions such as non-discrimination in trade—i.e. abolition of controls and renunciation of warlike propaganda—cultural exchanges and other minor questions will probably be brought up. The extreme sensitivity with which they have greeted any reference, particularly from United States, to question of satellites makes it reasonably certain that Soviets will refuse categorically to discuss any measures affecting the internal situation in those countries. On unification of Germany, present indications are that they may attempt to sidestep that question as no longer suitable for Four Power discussion alone, but as one primarily to be worked out between the two German governments. On Far East it is virtually certain that Soviets will attempt to discuss calling of Five Power or even larger conference for Asian questions.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1/6–1255. Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated to London and Paris.

In general, however, the two main subjects, judging from present indications, that Soviets will press at Geneva appear to be (1) disarmament, and (2) some form of general security treaty for Europe as a method of weakening or even undermining present Western defense system.

In general, judging from here, the Western Powers go into this conference with great advantage on their side, faced with an adversary considerably less sure of himself than in past. It does not, however, follow that we should anticipate Soviets will be prepared at Geneva to make series of concessions or will reflect in negotiation elements of weakness or indecision. Indeed, these present advantages of West can be dissipated if they are stressed publicly or acted on too overtly since Soviets, like all dictatorships, are mortally afraid of showing weakness or of appearing to yield to foreign pressure.

Department pass Bonn if desired.

Bohlen

---

136. Editorial Note

The Tripartite Working Group on preparations for the meeting of the Heads of Government met at Washington, June 8–14. Douglas MacArthur and Jacob Beam headed the United States Delegation while Sir Roger Makins and Lord Hood and Maurice Couve de Murville and Etienne de Crouy-Chanel, respectively, led the British and French Delegations. The working group held five meetings, on June 8, 9, 10, 13, and 14, and drafted a 30-page report for consideration by the Western Foreign Ministers. The report, which considered arrangements for the Four-Power Conference (Section I), issues to be discussed and methods of exploring solutions (Section II), suggestions regarding opening statements by the Western Representatives at the Heads of Government meeting (Section III), and arrangements for continuing tripartite coordination (Section IV), did not deal with the substance of any of the items that might be on the agenda of the conference. Secretary of State Dulles discussed Section III briefly with President Eisenhower on June 15 and the President expressed his general agreement with its substance. (Memorandum for the record, June 15; Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 472) For full text of the report, see *Documents Diplomatiques Français*, 1955, Annexes, Tome 1, pages 195–206.

A copy of the report is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 472; memoranda of the discussions at the five meetings of the working group are *ibid.,* Central File 396.1–GE and *ibid.,* Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 486 and 488; for a discussion of the report by the Western Foreign Ministers at New York, see PMCG(NY) MC–7, Document 140.

---

137. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, June 13, 1955, 4:30 p.m.[1]

PARTICIPANTS

Chancellor Adenauer
The Secretary of State
Ambassador Blankenhorn
Mr. Merchant
Herr Weber (the Chancellor's interpreter)

The Chancellor by prior arrangement called on the Secretary at 4:30 this afternoon and remained for almost two hours.[2]

The Chancellor first referred to the invitation to visit Moscow which he had recently received.[3] He said that in his opinion this had been designed to achieve two purposes. The first was to sow distrust among Germany's Western allies with respect to Germany's trustworthiness, and the second was to maneuver him personally into such a position that he would bear the personal blame and responsibility for any failure of the negotiations with the Soviets. The Chancellor said that domestic considerations made it necessary that he should go to Moscow. He did not, however, feel pushed as to the timing and therefore the question arose as to when would be the best time. He was inclined to think September and in any event after the Geneva meeting of the heads of government. Meanwhile it was his thought that his Ambassador and the Soviet Ambassador in Paris should conduct the preliminary discussions since he felt it was important to have the groundwork carefully laid. Parenthetically he said that Italian Foreign Minister Martino had urged him to go before the Geneva meeting but that he was clear in his own mind that it was better for him to wait until that was over. This was a subject which he would want to discuss with Macmillan and Pinay in New York. Meanwhile he would be grateful for any thoughts which the Secretary might care to express on the subject.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.62A11/6–1355. Top Secret. Drafted by Merchant.

[2] Chancellor Adenauer was in the United States to accept an honorary degree from Harvard University. A supplementary memorandum of this conversation is *infra.* For Adenauer's account of this meeting and the one with President Eisenhower on June 14, see *Erinnerungen,* pp. 455–461.

[3] On June 7, the Soviet Embassy in France delivered a note to the Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany inviting Adenauer to visit the Soviet Union in the near future. For text of the note, see *Documents* (R.I.I.A.) for 1955, pp. 245–248. Under Secretary Hoover briefed the Cabinet on the invitation on June 10, saying that it was not a surprise and fit the general pattern of Soviet approaches to Austria and Yugoslavia. Hoover stated that he was "confident that Mr. Adenauer will not make any commitment adverse to the free nations." (Eisenhower Library, Cabinet Minutes, June 10, 1955)

The Chancellor then raised the question of the President's reference at a press conference some weeks ago to neutrality from which it had been inferred that a position of neutrality for a unified Germany was open to consideration.[4] He said that something similar had happened again at the President's press conference on June 8.[5] He had been told that at the close of the latter press conference John Hightower of the Associated Press had told the reporter of the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* that, "The President has given you full liberty and his neutrality statement three weeks ago was no slip of the tongue." He said that a French reporter who overheard this looked aghast and a TASS man broke into a broad grin.

The Chancellor went on to say that last week Ollenhauer had publicly said that the United States was ready to steer a milder course regarding Germany but that the Chancellor was stiff in his opposition. Then a few days ago a representative of the United States Embassy in Bonn in discussing the military legislation with a German official had suggested that if trouble was met on the legislation providing for volunteers, the legislation should be postponed until after the summer recess.

• • • • • • •

. . . The Department at times did not participate in the formation of foreign policy. Certain figures on the White House staff were responsible for advising the President. These were alleged to be Milton Eisenhower (who was portrayed as a former associate of Harry Hopkins who was asserted to have been responsible for the naming of General Eisenhower to the Supreme Command in Europe during the War), Sherman Adams and Senator George. George Kennan was also considered influential in this group. The initiative for direct talks with the Soviets had come from this White House group which had a direct connection with Ambassador Bohlen. Senator George was portrayed as favoring the establishment of a neutral belt in Europe. Senator Knowland was depicted as thinking of resigning because of the appeasement course of policy. Far Eastern matters were said to dominate all Washington thinking.

---

[4] According to *Erinnerungen*, p. 443, Adenauer was referring to President Eisenhower's press conference on May 18; for the transcript, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1955*, pp. 505–518.

[5] For the transcript of President Eisenhower's press conference on June 8, see *ibid.*, pp. 578–592.

At the conclusion of the reading of these reports the Chancellor said that he could not say if they were true. The sources, however, he considered good and he had thought it his duty to inform the Secretary frankly. He went on to say that if the United States loses interest in Europe then the Communists will take over control, including control of the German army. He concluded by saying that in his opinion the Soviets are now weak and we should not grant them the time to recover.

The Secretary responded by saying that there was no foundation for the suspicion that the President was carrying on a foreign policy of which he was ignorant nor was there, to his knowledge any difference in view between them. The Secretary said that he had every reason to believe that he had the President's complete confidence. If this were not true he would resign. There had been in the past Secretaries of State who had been placed in the position of being ignored by the President in the conduct of foreign policy but he was not of that breed. There were of course constant rumors such as these which the Chancellor had cited but he was absolutely certain that there was nothing to them. He cited as one example a reference in the report to the alleged intention of the President to take Senator George to Geneva. He said this was not the case. He then expressed his gratitude to the Chancellor for his frankness in having spoken as he had.

The Secretary then said that the Chancellor might be interested in his thoughts as to the reasons why the Soviets had changed their policies.

First of all he felt the Russians were faced by many serious problems and that they were anxious to relieve the pressures building up against them. One of these was the problem of leadership. The structure of government was that of a dictatorship but they now lacked a dictator. Khrushchev had power but impressed him as a man who talked without thinking. Bulganin was a stuffed shirt who could neither think nor talk. Molotov he felt was in a weakened and uneasy position. He had been impressed by his lack of sure-footedness at Vienna as compared to past occasions.[6]

Secondly, the Soviets faced a most difficult economic situation. The burden of armaments was heavy. Atomic development was extremely expensive. Russian agriculture was in a serious state.

---

[6] Reference is to the signing of the Austrian State Treaty at Vienna on May 15.

Finally the demands on the Soviets from China for armaments and the means to industrialize their country must be extremely heavy. The satellites had been squeezed and exploited. They were now economic liabilities rather than assets.

For all these reasons the Secretary believed that the Soviets had decided that they needed a pause to reduce the burden of armaments and to open up world trade, thereby permitting some increased satisfaction of consumers demands. He felt that recent actions such as their reversal on the Austrian Treaty testified to the urgency of these problems. Likewise the pilgrimage to Belgrade[7] which he thought comparable to a visit by the President and himself to Mao Tse-tung in Peking with advance admission that the troubles between China and the United States rested on our doorstep. The question then arises, do we press the Soviets hard now or do we give them the relief that they seek. He feared that our allies were growing tired and might not be inclined to press strongly at this time. He believed, however, that if we stay strong and resolute it will be possible to accomplish the unification of Germany, the peaceful liberation of the satellites and thereafter accomplish something substantial in the limitation of armaments. He was opposed to any proposal which seemed to confirm the right of Soviet domination of the satellites. He was anxious that we should not sell out our strong position cheaply.

The Chancellor interjected that he agreed fully with the Secretary's estimate of the Soviet position. He assured the Secretary that Germany was not tired.

The Chancellor said that he will discuss the general situation with Eden in London on his return from New York. He agreed that the danger is that the West will abandon its positions unnecessarily and cheaply ("The Soviets don't deserve it."). He added that this was why he had been horrified to read of one speech by a high United States official to the effect that if the Geneva conference ends in failure then all is lost. The Secretary said that this was not the view of the United States Government.

The Chancellor referred again to his invitation to visit Moscow and said laughingly that he had only read the text of it on the aircraft coming over to this country. He expressed his happiness at the frankness of this talk.

The Secretary then inquired as to the prospects of the legislation for military volunteers in Germany. The Chancellor said that the Bundesrat had had no right to reject it. One of his Ministers had talked too much. The matter will be straightened out and the bill will be passed before the recess of the Parliament on July 18.

---

[7] Khrushchev and Bulganin visited Belgrade May 26–June 2.

The Secretary said that he thought it extremely important that it be passed before the Geneva conference and the Chancellor's visit to Moscow. The Chancellor assured the Secretary that he could count on its passage by mid-July, on which note the discussion closed.

---

138. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant) to the Secretary of State[1]

Washington, June 15, 1955.

I have sent to S/S to you for approval my memorandum of your private conversation on the afternoon of June 13 with Chancellor Adenauer,[2] at which Blankenhorn, Weber (the Chancellor's interpreter) and I were also present. In this memorandum (of which there are only two numbered copies herewith) I set down certain passages in that conversation which I believe are too sensitive for distribution.

I. At the outset of your meeting with the Chancellor, he stated that Shaeffer had been twice approached by a General Mueller (identified as the head of the East German People's Police) in an effort to ascertain what chance there was of direct negotiation between the GDR and the Federal Republic. The second approach suggested a meeting in East Berlin which Mueller stated was designed to transmit information for communication to the allies and thereby to assure a successful meeting of the 4 Heads of Government. (The Chancellor held in his hand a handwritten letter which he withdrew from and in conclusion returned to his billfold. It was my impression that this was a letter from Shaeffer to the Chancellor reporting Mueller's second approach.) The Chancellor said that Shaeffer felt that he ran considerable personal risk in meeting with Mueller. He was, however, now in Berlin and planned to go ahead with the meeting. (I inferred that this was being done with the Chancellor's explicit or implicit approval.) The Chancellor concluded this report by stating that he was momentarily expecting to hear the results of the meeting from Shaeffer but as yet had received nothing.

II. At the conclusion of the Chancellor's citation of excerpts from various intelligence reports made available to him, he stated that the SPD, in his opinion, has connections with lower echelons in the Department of State. He linked this statement with a reference to the fact that various remarks concerning the possible neutrality or neutralization of Germany kept reappearing, despite official denials, as in the case of the President's press conference. He did not elaborate further on this point.

---

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Strictly Confidential. Top Secret; Personal and Private.

[2] *Supra.*

III. In discussing with the Secretary the annotated *National Geographic* map, he stated that it had been prepared for him by General Heusinger.[3] In the course of the discussion of the map, it was confirmed by the Chancellor that all of Italy is intended to be in Zone 2. The Chancellor stated that he had had the lines drawn on an English map so that there would be no indication of its origin. Toward the end of the conversation the Chancellor reverted to the map and said that he thought the President would like to study it. The impression was left that the Chancellor would not himself raise this subject with the President unless he had the opportunity to do so alone.

At the very conclusion of the conversation the Secretary inquired whether he had approved himself on political grounds the zonal plan which Heusinger had sketched on the map. The Chancellor responded that certainly he had approved it on political grounds; otherwise he would not have given it to the Secretary. He then explained that it was of course only for use if the Secretary's intended effort to push the Soviets back failed. The Secretary in reply reiterated essentially his remarks concerning our intention to make a strong effort to secure the withdrawal of Soviet forces to the border of Russia and achieve a substantial measure of national independence for the European satellites.

IV. After the Chancellor had expressed his full agreement with the Secretary's exposition of his own views on the current weaknesses in the Soviet position, the Chancellor assured the Secretary that Germany was not tired. The Secretary replied that he was not concerned about Germany but he was worried about Great Britain and France. The Chancellor answered that he was not worried over Great Britain becoming tired. He was, however, concerned over France. He said that Faure had told him of his intention to shift Pinay to the Ministry of Defense and take over the Quai d'Orsay himself. Faure he considered brilliant but unreliable. The Chancellor then said that he would see Eden in London on his way home but that he would not talk to him with the intimacy which characterized this conversation with the Secretary.

---

[3] No copy of the map under reference has been found in Department of State files or at the Eisenhower Library. However, the following summary outlines its details:

"1. Establishment of a demilitarized zone with limits on both sides of the Oder-Neisse line reaching approximately from the Elbe to the Vistula, and extending from the Baltic Sea south through Europe and converging on either side of Trieste;

"2. German territory west of the Elbe to be garrisoned by EDC troops only;

"3. Europe west of Germany to be garrisoned by NATO troops; . . ." (Annex C to NSC 5524, June 28, 1955; Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5524 Series)

LTM

---

139. Memorandum of a Conversation, White House, Washington, June 14, 1955[1]

PARTICIPANTS

The President
Chancellor Adenauer
The Secretary of State
Mr. Murphy
Amb. Conant
Mr. Merchant
Amb. Blankenhorn
Amb. Krekeler
Mrs. Lejins (US interpreter)

After an exchange of greetings the draft communiqué, as approved by the Chancellor and the Secretary, was discussed. It was approved with the addition of a final sentence presented by the President to the effect that all of our policies were governed by our pursuit of peace.[2]

The Chancellor commented humorously that peace had not been mentioned in the original draft because "we civilians take it for granted."

The President assured the Chancellor that the sole duty of soldiers was to regain the peace which civilians had lost.

The Secretary then reported that the Chancellor and the Secretary had had two satisfying and frank conversations.[3] He wondered if the Chancellor had any points which he wished to raise with the President.

The President interjected that he was particularly glad that the Chancellor had found it possible to make this trip shortly before the 4-Power meeting at Geneva and with the invitation from Moscow in his pocket.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.62A11/6–1455. Secret. Drafted by Merchant.

[2] For text of the joint statement of the Chancellor and the President, see Department of State *Bulletin*, June 27, 1955, pp. 1033–1034.

[3] Regarding the conversation between Dulles and Adenauer on June 13, see Document 137 and *supra*. A memorandum of the conversation on June 14 is not printed.

The Secretary said that the Chancellor had told him that he planned to accept the invitation and was thinking of making the trip in September, assuming that the 4-Power conference did nothing to undermine his bargaining position.

The President said that it would be undermined only by gross stupidity on our part. The Chancellor said that he was happy to hear this and felt in no danger of being undermined by stupidity.

The Secretary remarked, and the President agreed, that we must keep in extremely close contact with the Chancellor before and during the Geneva meeting.

The Secretary then referred to difficulty we had run into in connection with the air transport agreement with Germany. The Department had insisted that it be made as favorable as possible to Germany and he feared that the technicians conducting the negotiations for us had somewhat overdone it. In consequence signing had been delayed in order to review the agreement particularly in light of the outcry from Congress. He thought that we would be able in the end to carry it through substantially in its present form.

There was some discussion of the routes involved, closing with the Secretary's comment that it would probably require a couple of weeks for us to work the matter out within the government.

There was then a considerable discussion of the Chancellor's trip via Iceland, his aircraft and air travel in general.

The Chancellor referred to the degree which he would receive in a day or so from Harvard at which time Ambassador Conant also was to be honored. The President remarked that this made both of them fellow alumni of his since he also held an honorary degree from Harvard. The Secretary referred to the degree which he had just received at Indiana University and the President rejoined with his experience in receiving an honorary degree (the first in 50 years) from Penn State approved by the Board of Trustees over the objection of his younger brother, the President of the College.

At 12:50 the photographers were admitted to the room for the customary pictures.

140. Memorandum of a Conversation, Waldorf-Astoria Hotel, New York, June 17, 1955, 2:10–4 p.m.[1]

PMCG (NY) MC–7

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary
Mr. MacArthur
Mr. Merchant
Mr. Bowie

Mr. Macmillan
Sir Roger Makins
Sir Harold Caccia
Lord Hood

Chancellor Adenauer
Ambassador Krekeler
Ambassador Blankenhorn (NATO)
Mr. Weber (interpreter)

M. Pinay
Ambassador de Murville
M. Sauvagnargues
M. Crouy-Chanel

Mr. Andronykov

The Secretary opened by explaining to the Chancellor that the three power talks had considered primarily procedural matters.[2] He referred to the Molotov dinner, the selection of chairmen, rotation of chairmanship, translations, etc. The three Western powers will try to conduct the meeting on a serious basis and not as propaganda. The heads of government will keep their speeches short and businesslike. These matters will be discussed with Molotov in San Francisco.

We expect that the heads of government will consider as the main problems German unification, European security, and global disarmament. They would also bring up as principal causes of tension (1) the activities of the Communist parties in various countries and (2) the deprivation of freedom in the satellites. While we recognize the Soviets are not likely to agree to discuss these topics or to create any forum for pursuing them, we could not omit bringing them up for they constitute, at least for the United States, the most serious sources of tension. The Soviets will doubtless raise issues in the Far East and propose a Five Power Conference which the West will reject. In our opinion it will be more practical to make progress through informal efforts on both sides rather than by formal conferences which would raise serious issues as to composition and subjects.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 481. Top Secret. Drafted by Bowie. This meeting is also described briefly in *Erinnerungen*, pp. 461–462.

[2] The Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France had discussed the report of the Washington Working Group (see Document 136) at 2:15 p.m. on June 16 and at 10 a.m. on June 17. The decisions they reached are summarized in the briefing that Secretary Dulles gave to Adenauer in this memorandum. Memoranda of the Foreign Ministers discussions, PMCG(NY) MC–3 and MC–4, are in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 481. For Macmillan's account of the meetings at New York, see *Tides of Fortune*, pp. 605–607. For a French account of these meetings, see *Documents Diplomatiques Français*, 1955, Annexes, Tome 1, pp. 169–194.

The three powers intend to set up a working party in Paris to begin on July 8. We hope that the Chancellor will designate someone for liaison with the Federal Republic for this Paris working group and for the Geneva meeting. In addition, we hope to have a meeting of the NATO Ministerial Council on the 16th in Paris to review with the other NATO countries the plans for the Geneva conference and to reassure them that matters affecting them will not be considered without consulting them. In addition, we may ask their advice on the best methods for consultation in any subsequent conference on such matters as European security.

We would also like the views of the Chancellor on how he wishes the Federal Republic to participate in later discussions of German unity and of European security as it may become involved. As the Secretary has previously reported to the French and British, he had asked the Chancellor in Paris about how he wished to handle this question. Since the Soviets would insist on GDR participation if the Federal Republic took part, the Chancellor had then said that he preferred to be consulted behind the scenes by the three powers rather than to take part directly in later meetings on German unity. The Secretary hoped the Chancellor would comment on this.

European security which will become entwined with the unity issue will also interest other NATO members as well as the Federal Republic. A method for consulting those interested must also be worked out for if the West proposed that the NATO members take part directly, the Soviets would probably request participation of the Warsaw group, including the GDR. That would raise the same problems for the Federal Republic.

Upon being asked whether they had anything to add on these points, M. Pinay and Mr. Macmillan said that they did not. The Secretary then said that we were all anxious to hear the views of the Chancellor.

The Chancellor said that he considered two points essential for the conduct of the meetings with the Soviets: (1) to keep down the number of participants, and (2) to avoid complications. He felt that neither of these could be fulfilled if the Federal Republic participated directly. Hence he would prefer to take part "behind the scenes" (to use the Secretary's words). The Secretary said that we would be guided by that preference. He asked whether the Federal Republic might wish to make a statement at a meeting on German unity recognizing that the GDR would then claim the same right. The Chancellor said he would also prefer to avoid this procedure which would tend to conflict with the Western position recognizing the Federal Republic as the only legitimate representative of the German people. He would rather have the Federal Republic take full part in preparing for the meeting and in being consulted intimately during its progress.

The Chancellor indicated that he would be glad to have representatives in Paris and Geneva and that Blankenhorn would probably serve in this capacity.

Recognizing that the Chancellor's view covered any Western proposal, Mr. Macmillan asked how the West should handle a Soviet proposal to hear representatives of East and West Germany. We could, of course, say that it was not appropriate to hear statements of this sort. The Chancellor responded that the answer should depend on the atmosphere of the conference. If the two sides confronted one another rigidly as heretofore, statements would serve no purpose. But if the Soviets should show signs of wanting to reach agreement, then the question should be reconsidered. The Secretary suggested that this could best be handled by consulting the Federal Republic at the time. Mr. Macmillan agreed. The governing factor said the Chancellor would be the intention behind the proposal. It could be considered sympathetically if the purpose were serious, but not if it were merely for propaganda. If the Soviets proposed at the start that the Federal Republic and the GDR take part, M. Pinay asked whether we should reject the proposal out of hand. In that case, said the Chancellor, it might be better to postpone an answer until Soviet intentions were clearer. Their making such a proposal at the start would imply that they were not serious, but it might still be better to wait before answering.

In answer to the Secretary's question, the Chancellor indicated that he did not have any further information about the autobahn situation. The Secretary said that the three powers might raise the question with Molotov in San Francisco.

The Chancellor then said he would like to make some general remarks about the Four Power Conference. He felt that it was most important to educate public opinion in our own countries and especially the press to avoid impatience which would already strengthen the Soviet hand. He attached the utmost importance to this point because at the Berlin Conference and the Geneva Conference last year great differences in public opinion had existed in the several countries and had helped the Soviets. If the Soviets find our public opinion is not united, they will be more inflexible since they have no need to take account of their own. In his view, the best way would be for the Three Powers to conduct the press relations regarding the conference jointly so as to avoid cleavages or differences in treatment which could be exploited by the Soviets.

On general disarmament, he felt that the United States as the strongest power should make another offer. While the prospects may not be hopeful, he felt that the US offer would make a great impression just as the President's speech in April 1953 had done.[3] That had left the Soviets without any adequate response.

The Chancellor referred to the repeated statements of the Soviets that they considered themselves threatened by German rearmament. While he does not believe this, he still feels that one could consider a certain balance of forces in central Europe as a means of reassuring the Soviets.

The Chancellor expects the Soviets to try to push German reunification into the background in the hope of thereby putting pressure on the Germans to buy unity later on at the price of major concessions. To counter this, he strongly favors pressing the Soviets on German unity at the Four Power meeting in order to force them to take a position. If their attitude is negative, it will provide the answer to those who are optimistic and will safeguard against the later use of the hope for unity as bait to parties and groups in the Federal Republic over the head of the government. Referring to the Soviet invitation for him to visit Moscow, the Chancellor said that he had heard that they wanted him to come before the Geneva meeting, but that he had no intention of doing so before September. Meanwhile, the German Ambassador to Paris would talk with the Soviet Ambassador there regarding (1) the German prisoners of war and D.P.'s now held by the Soviets, which total 190,000 for which the Germans have definite proof, and (2) economic relations. These talks will fill out the time until September without seeming to procrastinate which must be avoided. The Chancellor feels that Europe security cannot be achieved by contractual means until Germany is unified—only then can order and stability be secured.

In conclusion the Chancellor feels that we should judge the Soviet situation in the light of whether they will be able to overcome their economic and agricultural difficulties. He feels that it would be useful to exchange data on these matters. In his view, the agricultural difficulties may create the greatest pressure for some adjustment. The German experts who have studied this issue carefully consider that the Soviets have only limited areas which they can devote to added food output. This fact may force the Soviets to reach agreements, but the West should be prepared to negotiate for a long time and to have patience. Otherwise any gains may be only apparent.

On his trip to Moscow in September, the Chancellor hopes to get some ideas about the Soviet situation and policies. It might be useful to put off any Foreign Ministers' meeting resulting from the

---

[3] For text of President Eisenhower's speech on April 16, 1953, to the American Society of Newspaper Editors, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953,* pp. 179–188, or Department of State *Bulletin,* April 27, 1953, pp. 599–603.

Geneva conference until after his trip in order to take advantage of such information.

M. Pinay agreed with the Chancellor's statement. In particular, he agreed on (1) the need to prevent public opinion in the West from being exploited by the Soviets and to work together for this purpose and (2) on the desirability of the United States initiative on disarmament, and (3) on the general analysis of the Chancellor regarding the Soviet motivations which corresponds closely with the views exchanged among the three Foreign Ministers.

Mr. Macmillan said he had listened with great interest to the views of the Chancellor and was in general agreement with them. In particular, he approved the way the Chancellor proposed to handle the Soviet invitation to Moscow. He felt that it would enable the Chancellor to steer his course between the twin dangers of seeming either reluctant or premature in making the trip.

In Mr. Macmillan's view, the Soviets may prove to be less sure of themselves and less strong at the Geneva meeting than the public thinks. If so, the West should not be in an undue hurry to settle, but still should not hold back too long if the chance appears to achieve German unity and European security which is so closely related to it. In his view, it might not be wise to introduce a sudden new disarmament plan. It might be better to follow the line of exploring the Soviet proposals and especially trying to separate disarmament from the political aspects in their May 10 proposal. After Geneva, this might best be done in the UN Subcommittee, but we must recognize that this is a very big issue.

Mr. Macmillan suggested that not at the July meeting, but later on we may find a way of making progress by advancing the idea of a balance of forces in Europe which would provide some assurance to the Soviets without depriving us of the powerful weapons so important for Western defenses. Those weapons may be a major factor as well as agricultural difficulties in the current Soviet attitude and should not be thrown away.

The Chancellor suggested that he may have given a false impression by being too condensed in his comments on disarmament. Referring to the President's speech of 1953, he did feel that a similar proposal might be renewed at the Geneva meeting. The United States might best do this, both because the earlier initiative came from it and because the Soviets most fear the US.

While agreeing in general, Mr. Macmillan wanted to emphasize several points. The Soviet objectives were first to break up NATO and second to drive the US and Canada from Europe. Both aims should be defeated. But short of that, it might be possible to work out something in Europe on the balance of forces idea. The Chancellor fully agreed with Mr. Macmillan regarding both NATO and the presence of the US and Canada in Europe, but it was essential to convince public opinion in the West of our good will and of our good intentions. The proposal on disarmament would serve both purposes and would provide propaganda to offset that of the Soviets.

The Secretary commented briefly on the views expressed by the Chancellor. First he agreed on the necessity of preventing public opinion forcing us to do things we think unwise. This matter is a hard one to deal with under a free press which likes to create excitement and the expectation of great things. These factors make it hard to cultivate a mood of patience and create limitations which cannot be ignored. Thus, while doing everything feasible to dampen undue hopes for quick action, we must try to produce some results within about a year. The public will probably be tolerant for that period, but will expect concrete results within it. The President tried to create a sense of the time and patience which will be required. He has referred to "years" and even "generations", but in practice we will have to produce results in about a year more or less or break off on the ground that the Soviets are not serious. At present the West may have a stronger negotiating position than can be reasonably expected to exist later on. Our own political and economic situation is relatively stable in contrast to the Soviet difficulties. This should enable us to negotiate effectively now. Our position is not likely to improve materially over the coming years. Secondly, the Secretary wished to comment on the matter of disarmament. From a propaganda view it is necessary to revive and keep alive the fact that the West desires progress in this field. In his UN speech, the President may refer to his earlier proposal (the Secretary has not seen the latest draft) but as a practical matter there may be great difficulties in making progress.[4] Our experts advise us that the possibility of diverting nuclear material poses serious problems for effective control and may require new concepts. Mr. Stassen is studying the matter and trying to bring together the divergent views within our government, especially among Defense, State, and AEC. Today the US is not in a position to make concrete proposals but we can reaffirm our general support for disarmament as in the 1953 speech. This problem is extremely complex not only technically but in its political consequences. Some measures for disarmament might protect others more remote from hostile areas like the United States, but not benefit those more exposed to hostile land forces. He is not optimistic about achieving global disarmament for a considerable time, possibly years.

---

[4] Presumably reference is to the speech which President Eisenhower was scheduled to give at the Tenth Anniversary of the United Nations at San Francisco on June 20; for text, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1955*, pp. 605–611, or Department of State *Bulletin*, July 4, 1955, pp. 3–6.

It may even be that no progress will be possible until increased confidence brings about de facto reductions in military forces.

He considers, however, that European security measures can be separated from global disarmament. Some move toward balance of forces in Europe is more manageable. Indeed it is probably essential to achieve German unity. The Soviets are not going to agree to turn over East Germany to be armed against them as part of the Western alliance. Hence German unity may be closely tied to some balance of forces concept which will remove the Soviet fear of being damaged by agreeing to unity. Now is probably the best time to push ahead on these two related ideas of German unity and European security. He hoped that the heads of government might produce a new effort in either a single forum or in parallel forums. Perhaps the matter of trade could be used as a lever, as part of a package involving German unity and European security, especially freer trade in primary materials and food stuffs as distinct from manufactured strategic materials.

The Secretary joined M. Pinay and Mr. Macmillan in approving the Chancellor's proposed method for handling the Soviet invitation. He felt that it would not be difficult to schedule any Foreign Ministers meeting after Geneva so that it would follow a visit to Moscow and leave an interval to explore Soviet intentions in that way. M. Pinay and Mr. Macmillan seemed to acquiesce in this view.

The Chancellor wished to comment briefly on the view that the Soviets would not agree to German unity if it increased German war potential. In his view while unity would add 18 million Germans to the West, it should not result in an increase of German divisions above the twelve now planned. This should not be stated however, unless negotiations with the Soviets were making some progress. Moreover, unity would not add to real German strength for many years. West German resources would have to be used to improve conditions in the East Zone. This task would absorb large resources for many years. The net effect of unity would be to reduce, not increase, West German strength during that period.

The Secretary said that the four of them appeared to be in general agreement on the matters they had discussed. M. Pinay said that he shared the views of the Chancellor and had been delighted to hear them. Mr. Macmillan had nothing to add and considered that the meetings had been most useful.

The four then approved the draft communiqué which had been circulated and authorized its issuance at once.[5] The meeting ended at four o'clock.

---

[5] For text of the communiqué, see *ibid.*, June 27, 1955, pp. 1030–1031.

141. Memorandum From the Secretary of State to the President[1]

Washington, June 18, 1955.

SUBJECT

Geneva Conference

As the result of our two days of talks in New York, my own ideas are beginning to shape up with reference to the Geneva Conference. I give you this rough outline, as I now see it:

1. Global Disarmament, Atomic and Conventional

This topic will surely come up. Undoubtedly, one of the major Soviet desires is to relieve itself of the economic burden of the present arms race. We want to keep this discussion within the narrow and, theoretically, confidential confines of the United Nations Disarmament Subcommittee which is now dealing with it. Probably the Soviet Union will propose again, as it did in Berlin, a world disarmament conference. They believe that if world opinion can be aroused and focused upon us, we may accept disarmament under hastily devised and perhaps imprudent conditions.

2. Unification of Germany

This topic also will surely come up. Adenauer expects us to make it a principal topic. He himself, although being urged by the Soviets to go promptly to Moscow, does not plan to go until after the Geneva Conference, probably in September.

3. European Security

This topic also will almost surely come up. The Soviets will probably repeat their plan for a regional security system, as they did at Berlin. The Western powers generally feel that it is not possible to have the unification of Germany except within the context of some general plan for regulating European security and assuring the Soviets that East Germany will not be made an advance military position of the West. In this connection, we will be examining the "map" which Adenauer left with us.[2] Adenauer will also mention this topic to Harold Macmillan and Eden, whom he will see on his way back. General Hussinger will probably be coming here next week for discussions with Admiral Radford.

---

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, White House Memoranda. Secret; Personal and Private.

[2] See footnote 3, Document 138.

4. Satellite Liberation

Our Western partners agree this should be raised. Macmillan and Pinay are stoutly with us. However, the Soviets will probably strongly oppose.

My idea is that we should raise the question but not insist upon its being a subject for future negotiation but rather emphasize that if in fact the Soviets wish to reduce tension with the United States, they must deal with this problem which our people feel is covered by war agreements which have been violated and which feeling is constantly kept alive by the many American citizens who derive from these areas. Probably, in private conversation, you can do more along this line than can be done in formal conference.

5. International Communism

The position is about as above stated with reference to the satellites.

Pinay mentioned that he raised with Molotov the question of the Communist Party in France.[3] Molotov shrugged it off by saying "Why don't you use your police?" and then Molotov met with the leaders of the French Communist Party at Cherbourg. As with the satellites, I think the best results here are obtainable by purely private agreements, although the subject should also be raised at the conference table because of the Litvinov Agreement. Also, it was much discussed in Belgrade and the results expressed in the communiqué.[4]

6. Trade

The Soviet bloc is a deficit area and the free world is now a surplus area. No doubt the deficit countries would like to get our surplus. This may be the highest card we have to play. We should not give it away until we know that we are getting what we want in relation to Germany, the satellites and international Communism.

John Foster Dulles[5]

---

[3] Molotov had lunch at Paris with Pinay on June 9 on his way to San Francisco. The Embassy in Paris reported that nothing of substance had been discussed. (Telegrams 5404 and 5409, June 9; Department of State, Central Files, 651.61/6–955)

[4] For text of the joint Soviet-Yugoslav Declaration of June 2, see *Documents* (R.I.I.A.) for 1955, pp. 267–271.

[5] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

142. Letter From Secretary of State Dulles to Foreign Minister Molotov[1]

San Francisco, June 20, 1955.

DEAR MR. MOLOTOV: We are all looking forward with pleasure to our dinner tonight which as you have already been informed will be at eight o'clock at the Pacific Union Club.

With a view to facilitating our discussion this evening concerning certain practical arrangements for the meeting of the four Heads of Government, I enclose a list of a number of such questions. The list is, of course, tentative and by no means inclusive, but I believe these questions represent at least some of the points we should examine here.

Sincerely yours,

John Foster Dulles[2]

[Enclosure][3]

SUGGESTED ARRANGEMENTS AND PROCEDURES FOR THE FOUR-POWER CONFERENCE OF HEADS OF GOVERNMENT IN GENEVA

(Based largely on the pattern of the Berlin Meeting of 1954)

1. Chairmanship and Seating

The Heads of Government will preside in daily rotation, proceeding clockwise around the table, following the seating plan used at Berlin and earlier meetings:

[Here follows a diagram of the seating arrangement.]

2. Number at Table

Each of the four powers will have five seats at table. A second row of seats will be provided for five advisers. It is recognized that there may be occasions when the four Heads of Government might wish to meet on a more restricted basis.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 486. Confidential. Attached to this letter was a cover sheet which noted that it had been drafted by Bohlen and delivered to Molotov just prior to his meeting with the three Western Foreign Ministers (see PMCG (SF) MC–2, *infra*). The Foreign Ministers were at San Francisco for ceremonies of the tenth anniversary of the United Nations.

[2] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

[3] According to the cover sheet referred to in footnote 1 above, this list was based on Section I of the report of the Washington Tripartite Working Group as amended by the Foreign Ministers during their talks in New York.

3. Order of Speakers

With respect to formal statements, the Heads of Government will normally be called upon in clockwise order. This should not exclude interventions nor impose any restraint on free and full discussion.

4. Agenda

There will be no fixed agenda, but as proposed in the invitation of May 10[4] and accepted in the Soviet reply of May 26,[5] the Heads of Government will, themselves, decide upon the conduct of the proceedings.

5. Languages (English, French, Russian)

The words of each speaker will be interpreted into the other two languages, using the consecutive system. In addition, there will be simultaneous interpretation of the speaker into the other two languages. Consecutive interpretation may be waived in any instance by mutual agreement.

6. Agreed Conference Documents

The official documents of the Conference will consist of such decisions and communiqués as may be agreed by the four Heads of Government. There will be no agreed verbatim minutes. Each delegation will be free to take its own record.

7. Relations With the Press

The sessions will be closed to the press and the public. In respect to relations with the press, every effort should be made to handle this in a way to prevent press relations impairing the ability of the conference to achieve positive results. The four Foreign Ministers might discuss in preliminary fashion the best way of dealing with this question. Before the opening session is called to order, and perhaps again at the close of the final session, ten minutes will be allowed for photographs.

8. Secretariat

As at Berlin, the three Western powers will establish a common secretariat which will make suitable arrangements with the Soviet secretariat for records of decisions, interpretation, translation, documentation, security of the Conference premises, housekeeping, and cost-sharing.

---

[4] See Document 114.

[5] See Document 124.

9. Advance Arrangements

The four powers will designate qualified experts who will proceed to the Conference site at the earliest feasible date. These experts will be authorized by their respective governments to conclude agreements on the necessary arrangements.

10. Security

Security arrangements at the Conference site will be organized by agreement between the two secretariats. Access will be strictly controlled. Passes will be issued and arrangements made to check them at appropriate control points.

11. Finances

Each of the four powers will pay one quarter of the common Conference costs.

12. Meeting Schedule

The Conference will meet on four successive days. On the first day, there will be a meeting both in the morning and in the afternoon. On the succeeding days, the Heads of Government will, unless they agree otherwise, hold one meeting each day, in the afternoon. The Foreign Ministers may, as required, meet in the morning to discuss matters remanded to them by the Heads of Government.

---

143. Memorandum of a Conversation, Pacific Union Club, San Francisco, June 20, 1955, 10:45 p.m.[1]

PMCG (SF) MC–2

PARTICIPANTS

United States	*France*
The Secretary	Foreign Minister Pinay
Mr. MacArthur	M. Couve de Murville
Mr. Merchant	M. Andronikov
Ambassador Bohlen	

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 487. Secret. Drafted by Bohlen on June 21. This conversation took place following Secretary Dulles' dinner for the Foreign Ministers. Also discussed following dinner were Austria, the Berlin Autobahn situation, disarmament, and a declaration for the U.N. tenth anniversary meeting. Memoranda of these conversations, PMCG (SF) MC–3 through MC–6, are *ibid.* For Macmillan's account of the dinner, see *Tides of Fortune*, pp. 609–610. For a French account of this conversation, see *Documents Diplomatiques Français*, 1955, Annexes, Tome 1, pp. 223–228.

United Kingdom	*U.S.S.R.*
Foreign Secretary Macmillan	Mr. Molotov
Sir Harold Caccia	Mr. Fedorenko
Sir Pierson Dixon	Mr. Zarubin
Mr. Wilkinson	Mr. Sovolev
	Mr. Troyanovsky

The Secretary suggested that they should exchange views on certain technical matters involved in arrangements for the Four Power meeting. He had sent Mr. Molotov a memorandum on behalf of the Three Ministers listing certain of these questions.[2] Mr. Molotov said he would be glad to exchange views but he did not have a written translation of this memorandum. He inquired if it was intended to discuss only these points. The Secretary said "yes, for the present" but that any other matters could be taken up subsequently if Mr. Molotov desired. The Secretary began with the first point in the memorandum concerning the seating arrangements at the Geneva Conference. Mr. Molotov said he thought that the Heads of Government could decide the points raised in the memorandum, but that he saw no particular difficulty since it would be normal to follow the usual procedure. There was one point, however, which was not clear and that was the duration of the Conference, concerning which the views of the Soviet Government had already been expressed in its notes. He assumed that that question would be decided also by the Heads of Government. The Secretary said he would like to explain again the special position of the President as compared with the other participants. The President could not delegate his powers and that therefore the length of his absence was strictly limited by this fact, especially while Congress is in session. Some acts of Congress automatically become law with the President's signature, others are vetoed by failure to sign within the fixed period. This meant that the President could not be absent from the United States for more than one week at the most. The President indicated that he might stay on a day or so beyond the four-day period if the work of the Conference justified it, but that in any case it could not exceed a week. He remarked that, while these were details, time was important since there was less than a month before Geneva. He said he thought it was necessary to explain the particular circumstances of the President. Mr. Molotov said no doubt the Heads of all Four Governments were very busy and had many constitutional and practical matters to deal with and hence their time was valuable. He felt, however, that the Heads of Government could settle this themselves. He thought the other questions in the memorandum might be worked out through diplomatic channels in any one of the four capitals and he did not believe that there would be much difficulty. Mr. Macmillan said he thought it would be easier to settle these points in one of the capitals if they had had preliminary discussions here. Mr. Molotov jokingly said that perhaps the hardest question would be that of the seating as the memorandum had even contained a picture. He believed that if they chose Washington and that if that was acceptable to all this matter could be settled without difficulty, that is unless it was too heavy a burden for Mr. Dulles. Mr. Macmillan then said he thought they could all agree here that the President of the United States as the only Chief of State should be the first Chairman. The other question he had in mind for discussion was the press problem. Mr. Molotov agreed to an exchange of views and repeated he saw no difficulty in this question as well. Mr. Macmillan said the question was whether they expected to issue a communiqué after each day's meeting. He personally felt this was not desirable since what was to go into the communiqué might take a lot of time but it was a problem of dealing with the thousands of press representatives who would be at Geneva and who without guidance might indulge in all kinds of rumors and speculation and instead of helping the success of the Conference might cause damage. He felt the question was not easy but a preliminary exchange of views might be helpful. He said the only question was what would be the best method to adopt. The Secretary said it was more a point of what method would be the least bad. Mr. Molotov stated that he felt it was better to issue communiqués but was prepared to discuss other alternatives. Mr. Macmillan said he felt that if there was to be a daily communiqué the Heads of Government could go away leaving to the Foreign Ministers the task of working it out. Mr. Molotov replied that he agreed the Ministers would have a job of work to do. Mr. Macmillan said that even if a daily communiqué was issued the press would still seek further accounts from various sources and it was better to have them receive a generally coordinated account than dealing in conflicting versions of what had taken place.

---

[2] See the enclosure, *supra*.

The Secretary mentioned that in past meetings of the Four Governments, beginning with the first meeting in 1945, the Ministers had been making preparations not so much as to persuade each other but for publication in the press. He felt that if that developed at the Geneva meeting it would not be a success and would suffer the fate of previous meetings of the Foreign Ministers. He felt that at this meeting the statements should be short and to the point. Mr. Molotov said he could see no objection to that view.

The Secretary then said there was one related matter not included in the memorandum and that was the question of official entertainment. The President of the Swiss Republic had suggested that a dinner be given for the President and the Heads of the other Three Governments on Thursday night, July 21st. He felt they should accept but that this should be the only formal official entertainment. In order to permit informal contact and discussion a buffet might be arranged which would permit the Heads of Government and the Foreign Ministers to have informal and possibly more successful exchanges even than those at the regular meetings, but that formal official entertainment should be limited to the Swiss dinner. Mr. Molotov said that he felt those observations would not encounter any objection. The Secretary then stated that if agreeable to the Soviet Government they might indicate to the Swiss Government their acceptance of the invitation for Thursday, July 21st. Mr. Molotov said that having had a preliminary exchange of views that final decision might be made in the manner suggested, namely in Washington.

The Secretary inquired if there were any other matters of a formal nature to be taken up. Mr. Molotov said that he hoped it was understood that the last point in the memorandum concerning the duration of the Conference had not been accepted. The Secretary agreed but said, as he pointed out, he wished to leave no doubts on the point that the President's constitutional responsibilities made it impossible for him to be absent for more than a week. He said that this was a statement and he did not ask that Mr. Molotov agree. Mr. Molotov asked if there were any other questions on this general subject to be raised.

The Secretary said there was one further point and that was that in the invitation of the Three Powers reference had been made to the possible desirability of a preliminary meeting of the Foreign Ministers at Geneva. He wished to inquire if Mr. Molotov thought the meetings here and at Vienna were sufficient or if another meeting of the Foreign Ministers at Geneva before the Heads of Government meeting was necessary. Mr. Molotov replied that he thought the Ministers had already done what they had to do and that it was now up to the Heads of Government when they meet.[3]

---

[3] On June 21 and 23 Eden and Dulles each discussed the conference at Geneva further with Molotov. At both sessions Molotov stressed that the Soviet Union would want to discuss disarmament, European security, and economic cooperation during the conference. (Memoranda of conversations, PMCG (SF) Memo–2, June 23, and PMCG (SF) MC–10, June 23; Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 487)

On June 24, Molotov told Dulles that the Soviet Union accepted the procedural arrangements proposed in the Western List (enclosure, *supra*) except that it wanted a quadripartite Secretariat rather than two separate ones. (Memorandum of conversation, PMCG (SF) MC–12, undated; Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/6–2455)

Development of the Final United States Position for the Meeting of the Heads of Government, July 1–12, 1955

144. Memorandum From the Director of Central Intelligence (Dulles) to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay)[1]

Washington, July 1, 1955.

REFERENCE

NSC 5524, "Basic US Policy in Relation to Four-Power Negotiations"[2]

INTELLIGENCE COMMENTS ON NSC 5524

The following intelligence comments are submitted on NSC 5524:

1. The Soviet leaders have tried in a conspicuous way over recent months to give the impression that they are earnestly seeking an improvement in the international atmosphere. The most recent indication is their unprecedentedly conciliatory attitude over the Bering Sea plane incident.[3] However, no real evidence has yet appeared that they have altered their view that there is an ineradicable hostility between the Communist and free worlds, or that they have abandoned their ultimate aim to expand the sphere of Communist power. Their unyielding attitude to date in the Japanese treaty talks in London reveals their unwillingness to surrender positions they consider important.[4] What we have been witnessing, therefore, is probably a new phase of Soviet tactics, not a fundamental change in policy.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, INR Files: Lot 58 D 766, NSC 5524. Secret.

[2] At its May 19 meeting (see Document 117) the National Security Council directed the NSC Planning Board to prepare recommendations on the basic U.S. position for a Four-Power meeting. On June 27, a 22-page paper with four annexes was circulated as NSC 5524 in fulfillment of this directive. The substance and language of NSC 5524 sparked considerable comment including the present statement by Allen Dulles. For additional comments on the draft, see Document 150. A copy of NSC 5524 is in Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5524 Series.

[3] On June 23, Soviet planes shot down a U.S. naval aircraft over the Bering Sea. Following representations to Molotov at San Francisco, the Soviet Union agreed to pay compensation for damages. For text of the U.S. note closing the incident, see Department of State *Bulletin*, July 18, 1955, pp. 100–102.

[4] Reference is to Soviet-Japanese peace treaty negotiations, begun at London the beginning of June.

Internal

2. *The absence of a dominant figure like Stalin has raised serious problems for policy-making in the Soviet totalitarian system.* Although Khrushchev seems to have been the most influential figure since the fall of Malenkov, he does not possess decisive power, and following his unsatisfactory performance in Belgrade his position may even be somewhat shaken.[5] The new "collective" leadership has evidently been concerned to avoid decisions involving any very high degree of risk and to exercise a greater degree of tactical flexibility than Stalin.

3. *The Soviet leaders have themselves declared that the burden of military expenditures is weighing heavily on their economy, and there seems good reason for taking their expression of concern at face value.* If programs for acquiring a modern air defense and strategic air force, nuclear weapons, guided missiles, and submarines are pushed forward, along with modernization of ground forces to adapt them to atomic warfare, the burden of Soviet military expenditures will continue to increase substantially.

4. *This rising burden of military costs comes at a time when there are other pressing claims on Soviet resources. Along with continuing primary emphasis on heavy industry, the USSR is currently engaged in a major effort to increase agricultural output.* There is not now a critical food situation in the USSR. However, the Soviet leaders recognize that, unless they can overcome the near stagnation in agricultural production, the pressure of their growing population on the food supply will eventually confront them with a most serious problem. To meet this problem will require heavy investment for a number of years and could involve special strains in event of serious crop failures.

5. *Communist China, and to some extent the Satellites in Eastern Europe, are also claimants on Soviet resources.* The USSR is committed to support their military power and assist their economic growth. If the risks of war in the Far East should increase, the burden of military aid to China would probably rise sharply.

6. *The impact of all the various claims on Soviet resources may have reached a point at which it threatens to reduce substantially the rate of economic growth.* Since rapid economic growth, particularly in basic industry, has always been viewed by the Soviet leaders as a primary objective, associated with their desire to "overtake and surpass the capitalist countries", they must view with concern an international situation which forces them to devote so large a part of their resources to unproductive military purposes.

External

7. *The Soviet leaders must now recognize that their previous policies stimulated a strong Western reaction and led to a growth and consolidation of Western*

---

[5] Reference is to the Bulganin and Khrushchev visit to Belgrade in May.

strength. They probably feel that such policies have passed the point of diminishing returns. A shift to more flexible tactics probably seems necessary to give new impetus to their long standing efforts to divide and weaken the Western alliance while avoiding risks of general war.

8. *The Soviet desire to avoid general war has probably now been strengthened by a new ingredient—belated recognition of the consequences of nuclear conflict.* Progress in their own development of nuclear weapons may have convinced the Soviet leaders, as Western statesmen have already been convinced, that the dangers inherent in any major war are now vastly greater than ever before. These leaders may be particularly concerned over their relative disadvantage during the next few years until they have acquired nuclear weapons and delivery capabilities sufficient to counterbalance those of the US. However, they almost certainly recognize that even such a growth in their own nuclear capabilities will not remove the danger to the survival of their own system in event of nuclear conflict. They may therefore desire a prolonged reduction of tensions.

9. *If, indeed, the Soviets are now more keenly aware of the dangers of nuclear war, they must have regarded recent mounting tensions in the Formosa Straits with real apprehension.* Despite the many ties between Peiping and Moscow, the USSR must be worried over the possible unpredictability of their Chinese ally, and the chances of its taking action which would undesirably involve the USSR. Even local hostilities in the Formosa Strait might require at least greater material support from the USSR and might involve great danger of embroiling the USSR itself. On the other hand, failure to aid the Chinese in such circumstances would threaten the loss of an alliance which has become an essential element of the USSR's position as a world power.

10. *Even more important, the ratification of the Paris Accords must have seemed to the Soviet leaders to be a major reverse.* The rearmament of West Germany, fought so bitterly by Soviet propaganda and diplomacy since 1950, is probably regarded by the Soviet leaders not only as adding substantially to Western strength, but also as increasing the burdens and dangers of the cold war. They probably believe that, in the absence of a Soviet initiative, tensions might further increase, and therefore that their own military effort would also have to increase.

Soviet Objectives in Negotiations

11. *It appears from the foregoing that the USSR, for various reasons, almost certainly desires some reduction in tensions.* This conclusion is not inconsistent with any of the four hypotheses in NSC 5524[6] as to the course

---

[6] See paragraph 12 below.

which Soviet policy will pursue in the coming negotiations. However, hypothesis C, and to a lesser extent D, appear to be the best estimates of Soviet courses of action, but it is unlikely that Soviet policy has as yet settled exclusively on any one of these four courses. As pointed out in NSC 5524, all four may figure in a tentative way in the calculations of the Soviet leaders.

12. The following comments are advanced on the four hypotheses:

a. *"The USSR has no real willingness to alter previous positions in any substantial respect, but is engaged solely in diplomatic and propaganda maneuvers, having particularly in mind the present 2–3 year period of marked Soviet military disadvantage."* No doubt the Soviets wish to hold down risks of general war while they increase their nuclear capabilities, and they probably believe they can do so without making major concessions. If this minimizing of the risk of war is all the Soviets want, they can get it merely by insuring that Communist nations refrain from aggressive action. However, it will not ease their economic problems, or markedly improve the international situation. Moreover, the Soviets almost certainly recognize that even when their nuclear capabilities approach those of the US, the dangers inherent in full-scale nuclear warfare to the Communist system will not be appreciably reduced. Finally, the USSR cannot realistically expect to achieve its positive objectives of preventing or slowing down West German rearmament and otherwise undermining Western strength without a more forthcoming policy.

b. *"The USSR, in order better to exploit the situation in the Far East, wishes to bring about an immediate easing of tensions in other areas."* While such tactics might serve to isolate the US in the Far East and will therefore probably figure in the Soviet approach to negotiations, the USSR is almost certainly also concerned to avoid risks of war in Asia. The general motivations which appear to be behind current Soviet policy would dictate some relaxation of tensions in the Far East as well as Europe, since the Soviets probably recognize that the problem of world tensions is essentially indivisible. That the Soviets do take this view is supported by some indications that the USSR has tried to exert a moderating influence on Peiping in recent months.

c. *"The USSR considers that the present time affords an opportunity for flexible exploitation of the possibilities of settling selected outstanding issues and reserves its decision as to ensuing moves and attitudes pending the outcome of these negotiations."* This hypothesis seems the most plausible. As noted above, the Soviet leaders are worried by their internal difficulties and by trends in the world situation, and desire some reduction in tensions. It would be consistent with the Soviet technique of negotiating for them to proceed carefully, exploring such opportunities as might develop. Therefore, the development of Soviet policies as the negotiations proceed will to a considerable degree depend on the positions taken by the Western powers.

d. *"The USSR has decided to bring about a substantial and prolonged reduction in international tensions and is willing to alter previous negotiating positions appreciably to this end."* It is possible that the USSR does want a substantial reduction of tensions for a prolonged period and is willing to alter previous positions to this end. Nevertheless, it is doubtful whether Soviet concern over internal problems or over trends in the world situation has reached the point of willingness to surrender any assets of real importance to the Bloc merely to improve the international atmosphere. The USSR might make substantial concessions, but only for what it would regard as an adequate quid pro quo.

13. *The principal Soviet objectives in the negotiations will be (a) to prevent or at least to limit West German rearmament, and (b) to weaken the Western alliance and if possible to obtain the withdrawal of US forces from bases around the periphery of the Bloc.* The Soviets probably calculate that if the cold war seemed to be coming to an end, there would be great reluctance in the West to continue the effort to maintain military strength, there would also be renewed opportunities for diplomatic maneuvers which might open up a new phase of political warfare.

Soviet Tactics and Positions in Negotiations

14. *The initial Soviet position in the negotiations appears to have been laid down in the note of 10 May 1955 and confirmed by Molotov's speech to the UN on 22 June.*[7] It seems evident that the USSR wishes to gain the initiative by focusing the talks on its disarmament proposals and on its scheme for a security arrangement in Europe.

15. *The USSR will probably lay great stress on the disarmament issue and may be prepared to carry out some limited form of agreement in this field.* However, the Soviets will almost certainly not accept Western requirements for full freedom of access for international inspectors. The USSR would be unlikely to accept even the more limited form of inspection it has itself proposed unless it obtained some such concession as a substantial US withdrawal from bases in Europe and Asia. If the West were willing to accept an arms limitation arrangement without inspection, but providing for agreed levels of armament for West Germany and for mutual reduction of occupation forces in Germany, the USSR would probably welcome an agreement.

16. *The USSR probably hopes to avoid discussion of German reunification, and in particular of the Western plan to accomplish this through free elections, by making its demands for a disarmament and security agreement on its own terms a condition precedent.* The Soviets must be on the horns of a dilemma about Germany. Although they are anxious to keep the reunification dangling before West German eyes, and may even regard their forward position in East Germany as becoming less vital in an age of nuclear weapons, they are probably greatly concerned lest withdrawal from East Germany endanger their position in the Satellites. They probably also believe that the West could not provide adequate guar-

---

[7] For texts of the May 10 proposal and Molotov's speech, see *Documents* (R.I.I.A.) for 1955, pp. 110–121 and *Tenth Anniversary*, pp. 103–115, respectively.

antees against the threat of a reunified Germany. In addition, they may be reluctant to lose East Germany's substantial industrial contribution to the Bloc.

17. *Therefore, the USSR probably prefers at this time to continue the division of Germany.* It will probably offer to reduce its forces in East Germany to "limited contingents", and at the same time propose interim steps toward unification through negotiations between the two Germanies. It probably hopes that such an offer will confuse West German opinion, and thereby prevent the Adenauer government from pushing forward with rearmament. If such an effect is not achieved, however, the possibility cannot be excluded that, at some stage of a prolonged negotiation on Germany, the USSR would agree to German reunification in return for Western pledges to guarantee Eastern Europe against German aggression.

18. *As additional, but secondary issues* the Soviets will probably raise at least the following: (a) admission of Communist China to the UN; (b) a separate five-power, or larger, conference on Far Eastern affairs; (c) expansion of East-West trade; (d) banning of war propaganda; (e) broadening of cultural relations.[8]

Allen W. Dulles[9]

---

[8] On July 6, W. Park Armstrong, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Intelligence, transmitted to Allen Dulles a memorandum expressing Department of State agreement with the operative conclusions in paragraphs 11–18, but indicating disagreement with the analysis of motivation in the first ten paragraphs. (Department of State, INR Files: Lot 58 D 766, NSC 5524)

[9] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

---

145. Memorandum of a Conversation, Washington, July 1, 1955[1]

SUM MC–2

SUBJECT

Germany and European Security

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 640.0012/7–155. Top Secret. No drafting information is given on the source text.

PARTICIPANTS

United States	*Great Britain*
Mr. MacArthur	Ambassador Makins
Mr. Merchant	Mr. Adam Watson, British Embassy
Mr. Bowie	Mr. F.J. Leishman, British Embassy
Mr. Kidd	
Mr. Wolf	
Mr. Sullivan, Defense	
Mr. Galloway	
Mr. Appling	

The Ambassador said that further thought had been given in London to the German problem in relation to European security. They continued to adhere to the basic assumption that a re-unified Germany would remain in NATO. They sought proposals which would assure security in Europe and, at the same time, appeal to the Soviets. On consideration, and noting the views of the American Chiefs of Staff, the British Government thought that the political and other objections to a complete withdrawal of all foreign forces from Germany were insuperable.

The Foreign Office was now thinking of two similar plans: a "zone plan" and a "de-militarized strip plan". These were very tentative ideas not worked out in their details:

Zone Plan—Zone A

The "zone plan" contemplated a line from Stettin through Prague to Vienna on either side of which a de-militarized zone would be created. This zone (which would be referred to as Zone A) would include all of East Germany and appropriate parts of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Austria. In it there would be no military forces permanent or temporary, no military installations or training areas, no military airfields, no emplacements for launching of rockets or guided missiles, no arms industry and no military overflights.

Zone B

Although there would be no military forces in Zone A, there would, of course, have to be internal security forces over which there would have to be international inspection and control. Both to the east and west of this Zone A would be a Zone B each of approximately equal depth. The western Zone B would included Western Germany and eastern Zone B would include the rest of Poland and Czechoslovakia. A possible and desirable variation would be to have the western boundary of west Zone B follow the Rhine. This would give us greater area for re-deployment. The Ambassador said that, for reasons which were not clear to him, the Foreign Office thought this variation would not increase the disadvantages for the Soviets.

In these B Zones conventional forces would be permitted, having approximately the same character and equal strength on both sides. Tactical air forces would be permitted but no rocket or guided missile launching sites or atomic weapons.

Zone C

To the east and west of Zone B would be Zones C each of approximately equal extent. On the west this would include France, the Low Countries, and Italy, but not the United Kingdom or Spain. The C Zone would include part of the USSR itself (as far as the Dnieper). In this Zone there would be no military restrictions, except that forces would be of approximately equal strength. Mr. Merchant asked whether the zonal boundaries would follow political boundaries or terrain, or would simply be straight lines. The Ambassador said this had not been fully worked out, but in the west the lines generally followed political boundaries.

The Ambassador saw in such a plan the advantages that (a) it separated Communist and Western forces widely but at the same time permitted us to maintain forward strategy, (b) it would envisage no major change in NATO infrastructure and would thus avoid the great expenditures involved in a major withdrawal of Allied forces from Germany, (c) it would create a de-militarized zone with the West gaining the right of inspection in the satellite areas, (d) it would put the heaviest burden of re-deployment on the Soviets and satellites. (The Ambassador noted that the Skoda works and certain industrial areas of Poland would be included in the de-militarized zone.) The plan would not lead to reduction of NATO forces in Zone B.

Responding to Mr. Merchant's question, the Ambassador said he assumed that uranium mining in Eastern Germany would probably not be blocked under this plan although the specific question had not been considered. The Ambassador also noted that there would have to be civilian airfields in the zone but that this was a risk to be taken.

The Ambassador said that the British Chiefs of Staff had been asked to examine the question of the size of forces in Zone B. The question arose whether this should be the present 18 NATO divisions plus the 12 prospective German divisions, making a total of 30, or whether a NATO division might be withdrawn for each German division created to give a total 18 divisions in the zone. British thinking was guided by a desire to avoid anything which, in the short or long run, might lead to withdrawal of US forces from the Continent. The Ambassador noted that redeployment from Germany would be expensive, could lead to withdrawal of US, UK, and maybe Canadian forces and would leave German forces preponderant in Germany. It was taken for granted that military aspects would have to be studied by SACEUR and that there would have to be, in Zone B, room for British, US, and Canadian land and air forces now assigned to SACEUR. Responding to Mr. MacArthur's question, the Ambassador said he did not have specific information but believed this meant total US, UK, and Canadian forces presently assigned to SACEUR and now in the area which would become Zone B.

Mr. Sullivan asked whether the 18 divisions mentioned took account of additional supporting forces, lines of communication, and the like. Mr. Watson said that the British thoughts had not yet been worked out in terms of numbers. He added that his Government had been alert to the possibility raised by the US in earlier discussions that the Communists might try to force a US withdrawal from the Continent by proposing reduction of forces in the satellite area. The British estimated that there were now 22 Soviet divisions in eastern Germany, none in Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria, and six in other satellite areas.

Mr. Bowie suggested that the British proposal would appear to the Soviets to provide for a continued build-up of German forces and for Western forces to remain indefinitely in Germany. The Ambassador said that the Soviets would be given some security by the "thinning out" operation and that the total number of forces to be in Zone B was accordingly something which, on the assumption that Western security would not be impaired, could be negotiated between 18 and 30 divisions. To Mr. Sullivan's question the Ambassador replied that they envisaged re-positioning of 12 divisions to Zone C if the total forces in Zone B were 18 divisions. This would not escape all the difficulties and expenses of withdrawal from Germany but would be much less than the total withdrawal which had earlier been considered and was now rejected. Furthermore, if the western boundary of Zone B were the Rhine some of the forces could be repositioned in Germany south of the Rhine.

Mr. Merchant asked what provisions might be made for dual purpose conventional weapons in Zone B, for instance, 280 mm artillery and tactical aircraft which could be used for either conventional or atomic weapons. The Ambassador said he had no instructions on this point, except that NATO would presumably have to withdraw all atomic weapons and rocket launching sites from Zone B (Germany).

The Ambassador said no ideas had yet been put forward about naval strength.

Responding to questions about areas north and south of the zones described the Ambassador said that no agreement was now contemplated for those areas. The UK thought it essential, however, that Norway and Denmark be treated like parts of Zone B. Demilitarization of those countries was unacceptable. Mr. MacArthur asked what balancing limitations might be made in the east for this treatment of Norway and Denmark. The Ambassador noted that Norway and Denmark now had only conventional weapons. He agreed that some corresponding limitation could be sought from the Soviet side.

Mr. Merchant asked about the southern flank of NATO. The Ambassador said they had not gone into this very much but noted that, if the Balkans were not in the plan, the Soviets could have forces there which would threaten the flank of Greece, Turkey, Yugoslavia. They therefore contemplated the future extension of the general idea to the Balkans.

The Ambassador said that there would have to be internal security forces in the demilitarized zone over which there would be inspection and control. The plan also envisaged control and inspection in the militarized zones (Zones B and C) and this raised the question of control machinery. They had in mind reciprocal inspection by control teams in Zones A, B, and C.

Finally, the Ambassador wished to emphasize that the acceptability of this plan depended entirely on maintaining the line from Stettin through Prague to Vienna. Any change of this line to the west would spoil the plan. He added that the above plan had been considered from the military view by the British and that from a political standpoint it appeared very complicated and ambitious. There were, of course, questions as to how attractive it would be to the Soviets who would be asked to give up territory, forces, and important industries. With this in mind he added that the British chiefs had considered but were not yet prepared to put forward a plan which would put all of Austria into Zone A. Mr. Merchant noted that this would impose neutralization on Austria.

Demilitarized Strip Plan

The Ambassador said the demilitarized strip plan amounted simply to a demilitarization of Eastern Germany and reunification of Germany. This was without the complexities of the zonal plan and might be more inviting to the Soviets. It was simpler to present for public opinion, however, it did not have the flexibility of the zonal plan. His Government planned to proceed with the study of both and would be grateful for an early indication of American reactions.

Mr. Merchant and others noted that the demilitarized strip plan was simply an invitation to the Soviets to leave Eastern Germany with an assurance that the Germans would not arm that area. Mr. Bowie commented that Mr. Molotov had implied that German forces subject to limitation only by the West were not acceptable. Mr. Watson suggested that a parallel Soviet-German agreement might help. The Ambassador said that they had not gone beyond thinking that the demilitarized strip plan might be less unpalatable than the other proposal. It was noted that any plan would have to be acceptable to the Germans. Mr. Merchant suggested that the demilitarized strip plan would hardly be acceptable to the Soviets unless they believed that East Germany were lost to them anyway or unless they were pushed to desperation by internal stresses. Mr. Watson agreed that the Soviets could hardly be expected to be coming to a conference to surrender. He added that it was an old trick of the Soviets to relieve the strain in one area when they were preoccupied with another. They might wish to create in Europe an unwillingness to quarrel with the USSR at a time when they wanted a freer hand in the Far East. Mr. Bowie and Mr. Watson noted Soviet long-term concern about Germany and that this was perhaps counterbalanced by Soviet desire to get the US out of Europe.

The Ambassador said finally we should decide how far either of these ideas was acceptable to us and if so, how much we should say at Geneva. His Government was anxious not to stand pat on the Eden Plan[2] in its present form but to make some further proposal which would appear to make progress. They were thinking of saying something to reassure the Soviets that they would not suffer from a military or security point of view by accepting some variant of the Eden Plan. Mr. MacArthur said that the complexity of these questions prevented their being explored adequately for discussion at Geneva. We could suggest to the Russians at Geneva that we were willing to discuss European security but should not lift the veil on any substantive discussion at the Geneva meetings. Mr. Watson suggested that we might vaguely call attention to many proposals such as the Van Zeeland plan[3] and ask the Soviets their ideas. Mr. MacArthur said this too might invite the Soviets to lead us into discussion of substance. The Ambassador said that whatever we said would have to be guided by knowing ourselves what we had in mind ultimately with respect to European security. Mr. Merchant suggested that we might say that, in any subsequent forum agreed for discussion of Germany and the related question of European security, we would be willing to consider these subjects in terms not endangering the security of either the USSR or ourselves. Mr. Bowie added that we need not have specific details of the plans in mind but would have to have a general notion of our objectives with respect to European security. Mr. Merchant said that we could buy an "unrequited" Soviet withdrawal from Germany. It seemed equally certain that we would agree not to move into areas from which they withdrew. Mr.

---

[2] For text of the Eden Plan, see *Foreign Relations*, 1952–1954, vol. VII, Part 1, p. 1177.

[3] Regarding the Van Zeeland plan, see the memorandum of conversation, September 29, 1953, *ibid.*, vol. V, Part 1, p. 813.

MacArthur suggested that this would require study and that there was not sufficient time to work out more complicated plans before Geneva.

Mr. Merchant noted press reports from London about British consideration of a non-aggression pact. The Ambassador said he just did not understand these reports. Mr. Merchant said that the Secretary in his press conference on Tuesday had indicated that the UN Charter was the best agreement of this sort and this seemed a sound position.[4]

Mr. Watson said that his Government was concerned that Germany was over-optimistic about the pressure of internal strains on the Soviet Government. They intended to speak to the Germans about this. He asked if we had similar intentions. Mr. Merchant noted that the recent conversations in New York[5] had suggested a harmony of views although there had been no effort in New York to narrow down the general agreement to a specific shading of meaning. Therefore, while there was a harmony of views, there might be some difference of emphasis.[6]

---

[4] For excerpts from Secretary Dulles' news conference on June 28, see Department of State *Bulletin*, July 11, 1955, pp. 50–54.

[5] See Document 140.

[6] On July 7, Ambassador Makins discussed the British plan again with MacArthur and officials of the Department of State. At this meeting he stated that the British Government had "cooled off a bit" about it since it was very complicated and would have had little appeal to the Soviet Union. In response to his question MacArthur stated that the United States believed it should not be put forward at Geneva. (Memorandum of conversation, SUM MC–4; Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 527)

---

146. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State[1]

Moscow, July 4, 1955—11 a.m.

23. There could be no doubt of decision of Presidium to attend July 4 reception as spectacular gesture prior to Geneva. First five members of Presidium to arrive, Kaganovich, Malenkov, Saburov, Mikoyan, and Pervuhkin came at 6:15, and Bulganin and Khrushchev came together some ten minutes later, all remaining until 7:40. Molotov is reported due back at midnight tonight.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/7–455. Limited Official Use; Priority. Repeated to London and Paris.

There can be little doubt also that Khrushchev came with purpose which had been discussed and agreed in Presidium. Despite crush and other difficulties inherent in reception of this kind, Khrushchev informed me early that he had something to say and notwithstanding crowding and interruptions, he made pre-Geneva speech. As it turned out, Joxe and Teiydra, Dutch Ambassador, were only Ambassadors who were immediate and full witnesses.

Khrushchev, with Bulganin at his elbow at start, said that he had read with great interest President's latest speech (which by my intervening question was identified as President's press conference of last week[2]) and that while he agreed with many of President's statements he felt he had to disagree with some of them. He went on to say that Western press, and particularly American press, was in large way irresponsible but some portions of it were not. In fact, it was saying many foolish and incomprehensible things and speculating on matters which should be readily known or recognized as truths. This "irresponsible" section of Press had questioned motives of recent Soviet moves designed to ease international tensions. It had conjectured that Soviet Union was going to Geneva because of internal weaknesses. It had related Soviet desire to meet at summit as reflection of failures in industry and in agriculture and internal dissension.

Khrushchev then said that we would be quite wrong to think that we would be negotiating with a Soviet Union with "its legs broken". If criticisms that we read in Soviet press of shortcomings there are interpreted as failure of its economic programs, West would be sorely mistaken. These criticisms, including his own speeches to various gatherings, and he referred particularly to speech at Builders Conference (last December) are evidence of resolve of Soviet Government to pile success on top of already great success in fulfillment of their economic planning. With what seemed to be characteristic Khrushchev gestures for emphasis, he held my lapels and then my arms while he said that never has Soviet economy been stronger, never has fulfillment of plans been more successful, and never has the party been more united. He ended on note it was entirely unnecessary to go to Geneva if we thought we were going to deal with delegation representing country on its knees.

During this speech Bulganin had been drawn away by Italian Ambassador, and when he had rejoined us Khrushchev turned to him and said that he had been talking to me according to what they had agreed. Bulganin nodded with approval.

I thanked Bulganin and Khrushchev for their frankness and said that I would like to comment first on perhaps least important point

---

[2] For a transcript of President Eisenhower's press conference on June 29, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1955*, pp. 643–662.

Khrushchev had made. I said it was heartening to know that Western press was followed so closely here and that Khrushchev had identified what he considered the responsible and irresponsible press. From this I would be led to understand that Soviet press is fully responsible and entirely represents Soviet Government's view. There was protest from Khrushchev and Bulganin, and from Kaganovich (who had been standing at my shoulder whole time but who had not said a word) to effect that Soviet press occasionally irresponsible.

Continued along following lines.

1. As to moves he had referred to by Soviet Union to reduce tensions, I thought he had misunderstood conjectures about Soviet motives appearing in Western press. It was not question so much of moves as of timing, for if we all agreed that steps were necessary it was difficult to understand why Soviet Union delayed them so long.
2. As to "disagreements", it would be fatuousness to hold a conference if there were no disagreements among Four Powers. I thought that moving force behind accord to meet at Geneva was to discuss matters of disagreement which were at bottom of world tensions.
3. Fact that Heads of Government, including President Eisenhower, who is also Chief of State, have agreed to meet should in itself indicate intense interest and enormous importance of conference.
4. I had not realized, I said, that press speculation in West could have justified observation which Khrushchev had repeatedly emphasized about Soviet Union going to Geneva on its knees. I had imagined that all powers would be meeting on basis of equality. I compared notes afterwards with French, Dutch, British, and Italian Ambassadors who were witnesses to conversation in varying degrees, and we were all impressed by what we might call strong leads from positions of weakness. Also Khrushchev was spokesman and Bulganin made little effort to assert himself.

Joxe told me afterwards of conversation he endeavored to pursue with Pervuhkin when latter had brought up Geneva. Joxe asked what concrete measures Soviet Government had in mind for Geneva. Pervuhkin replied "a détente".

Then Joxe asked what do you mean specifically. Pervuhkin said "This meeting should lead to others."

Embassy will be reporting further on matters which came up at reception but I am desirous of getting foregoing before Department while press stories are presumably getting feature play. I might add in conclusion that Bulganin, in answer to my query when he would announce composition Soviet delegation, replied it would be made known in "couple of days".[3]

Walmsley

---

[3] On July 10 and 14, Walmsley reported that similar performances had been given by Khrushchev at receptions at the Argentine and French Embassies. (Telegrams 89 and 118 from Moscow; Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/7–1055 and 762.00/7–1455)

147. Paper Prepared in the British Foreign Office[1]

London, undated.

The unification of Germany under the conditions laid down at the Berlin Conference in the Eden Plan must continue to be the aim of the Western Powers. The main Russian objection is that to give a unified Germany freedom to associate with the West constitutes a threat to Russian security. Consequently, if the Geneva Conference is to make any significant progress and avoid serious damage to the Western cause in Germany, it is essential that the Western Powers should make a demonstrable effort to meet the Russian need for security.

It is not desirable that any cut and dried proposal should be tabled at Geneva. That should be left to the Conference of Foreign Ministers. But the Western Heads of States should inform the Russians that they understand the Russian desire for security, and that they are ready to take steps[2] to ensure that the unification of Germany and her freedom to associate with partners of her choice shall not involve any threat to Russian security. In order to achieve this they would be prepared in principle to agree to a completely demilitarised strip of territory between East and West, accompanied by a security pact and, if the Russians desire it, an agreement as to the total and stationing of Russian and satellite forces and armaments on the one hand and of forces of NATO countries on the other, in Germany and the countries of Europe neighbouring Germany. Any proposals in this field would not exclude or delay the work of the United Nations Disarmament Commission on global disarmament.

They accordingly propose that the Foreign Ministers should be instructed when considering the problem of German unity to examine the proposals which the Western Powers will be ready to make in order to guarantee that sovereignty accorded to a unified Germany shall not constitute a military risk to Russia.[3]

It should be noted that the above formula excludes discussion of American bases, or the presence in Europe of Anglo-American forces. These exist already and, insofar as they constitute a threat, the position will remain the same whether or not Germany is united. What we must be concerned to demonstrate to Germany and the world is that we are ready to ensure that no military threat to Russia will arise from the circumstance that Germany is united and free; and this can effectively be done by the measures we intend to propose.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 640.0012/7–455. Top Secret. Attached to the source text was a memorandum by Galloway that indicated this paper was given to him by Adam Watson the morning of July 4 and that it was an official British Governmental position with Cabinet approval.

[2] On the source text the words "take steps" were in brackets and the words "consider measures" were written in above them.

[3] On the source text the last 16 words of this sentence were in brackets and the phrase "take into account legitimate Soviet interests and security" was written above them.

---

148. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, July 5, 1955, 2:30 p.m.[1]

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary, Mr. Alan [*Allen*] Dulles—CIA, Mr. Sullivan—OSD, Messrs. Murphy, MacArthur, Merchant, Beam, Phleger, Kidd, Wolf, Galloway, Appling, McAuliffe

Mr. MacArthur reported that in this morning's meeting the Soviet representative had agreed to the Western proposal for a single Secretary General with three deputies for the Geneva meeting.[2] The Soviets had no response to our inquiry with respect to the President being Chairman on the first day of the conference.[3]

Having in mind his subsequent meeting with the British and French Ambassadors,[4] the Secretary pointed out that if we assume a minimum of ten subjects for consideration and allow ten minutes for the Soviets and five minutes for each of the Western powers on each subject, the four days of the conference would be fully used. There would simply not be time to get into substance. It was believed that Sir Anthony Eden would insist on putting forward some new version of the Eden Plan, and that the Soviets would be anxious to deal with matters of substance. The Secretary proposed to emphasize to the British and the French Representatives the original terms of our agreement on this meeting.

The Secretary believed that the Soviets wanted acceptance of their social and moral equality and would press the theme of treatment as equals. He suggested that our position should be one of principle and not based on the concept of power blocs. We could, for instance, emphasize individual and national liberty. Recognition of the Soviet Union as an equal would increase their power over the satellites and their influence towards neutrals. Mr. Allen Dulles commented that the very acceptance of the conference was a step toward recognition of the Soviet Union's equality.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 527. Secret. No drafting information is given on the source text. A note on the source text indicates that it is a draft.

[2] A report on this meeting was transmitted to Geneva in telegram 13, July 5. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 396.1–GE/7–555)

[3] On July 6, Soviet Chargé Striganov informed MacArthur that the President's chairmanship for the first day was acceptable. (Memorandum of conversation, July 6; *ibid.*, 396.1–GE/7–655)

[4] Secretary Dulles talked with Makins and Couve de Murville along these lines some time following this meeting, however, the only record of the conversation is a summary transmitted to London (and Paris) in telegram 46, July 6, which gives only a brief outline. (*Ibid.*)

In a review of the Secretary's list of Soviet priorities,[5] Mr. Merchant suggested reversing the first and second items, and moving the sixth to fourth place. The Secretary said it was perhaps a mistake to try to impart a strict order of importance on these items. Mr. Allen Dulles commented that they could be simply taken as a package. He suggested adding to the Soviet objectives the strengthening of the international position of the satellites.

Mr. Bowie suggested that our objectives in the conference were not immediately attainable. He thought we should try to convey to the Soviets some of the simple facts of life with which they would have to live, such as our determination not to abandon the principle of collective security. We should also try to explore the hierarchy of their values to gain for ourselves a knowledge of how they are thinking. We will also want to create machinery for dealing with problems which we have. Finally should give a fillip to those forces in the Kremlin which may be trying to work constructively within the framework of the facts of life suggested above. Mr. Bowie suggested that we exploit the conference as far as possible in these directions. The Secretary agreed generally, and said that we were faced with an immediate problem of making the conference appear to be a success.

The Secretary recommended that his papers on Western and Soviet objectives at Geneva,[6] appropriately revised, be presented to the British and French without personal attribution, in order to obtain their reactions. He agreed that Mr. Beam should do this in the working group.[7]

Mr. Allen Dulles suggested that any declaration of principles at the meeting would be dangerous and undesirable. If any statement were necessary, it might better be a statement of practices. The world was full of declarations of principles which were meaningless since there was no agreed definition of the words on which they were based. Mr. MacArthur noted that the French draft on declaration of principles rejected the possibility of simply refusing a declaration.[8] He believed this was a regression from the position the French had taken in the Working Group here.[9] There was general agreement that the West should hold to the position that the UN Charter is an adequate statement of principles. Any other statement would raise the questions of what should be added to or omitted from the UN Charter. The Secretary noted the difficulties of a communiqué limited merely to saying the problems would be taken up on other fora. Mr. MacArthur said the British and French were nervous about this. The Secretary again expressed concern about maintaining support and public opinion about the Western position at the conference.

---

[5] Entitled "Paper II, Soviet Goals at Geneva", this document listed nine items which the Soviet Union might seek to discuss at Geneva. (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, International File)

[6] Regarding the paper on Soviet objectives, see footnote 5 above; the paper on Western objectives is presumably "Paper I, U.S. Goals at Geneva", dated July 6, which listed seven items including Germany, European security, armaments, the Soviet satellites, and international communism, as issues to be discussed at Geneva. (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, International File)

[7] See Documents 158 ff.

Mr. Allen Dulles said that it might be a breath of fresh air simply to say that the powers participating at Geneva recognize the principles of the UN Charter and in accordance with them they have considered the means of tackling the following problems. Mr. Bowie suggested adding to that the need for time and patience in reaching any resolution of the great issues between us. The Secretary agreed generally and approved Mr. Merchant's suggestion that this question should be thrown into the working group early.

Mr. Allen Dulles suggested that the US could insist that the Soviets remove the Iron Curtain. It was noted that it is probably more difficult for Communists to get into the United States than it is for Americans to get into Russia. The Secretary suggested that it would not seem desirable certainly, that there should be a mutual stepping-up of restrictive measures just as it would be undesirable to propose that the activities of international communism and our counter measures should be mutually accepted and promoted.

Mr. Merchant and Mr. Sullivan agreed that we would have to keep hammering in public statements on the idea that the Geneva meetings were to be procedural and not substantive in nature. The Secretary commented that this was somewhat difficult since this is the first time that the President has ever left the United States except for the purpose of winding up a war.

Mr. Merchant said that the British remarks that Adenauer might be over-optimistic about Soviet weakness were possibly aimed at us. He thought this might reflect concern about the tone of the Secretary's presentation during the New York meetings.[10] The Secretary recalled that he had spoken generally along the lines of Mr. Macmillan's memorandum to him in this regard.[11] Mr. Allen Dulles believed that while there were certain economic, political and military strains in Russia, they were not at the breaking point. They were being pressed to complete in a few years what they had planned to achieve in ten or more. Mr. Sullivan suggested, and the Secretary agreed, that the Soviets might also be concerned that their relative progress in industry and military strength was less because Germany and Japan were being brought in on the Western side. The USSR would certainly hope to slow down the overall Western progress by an attitude of sweetness and light. The Secretary thought that we might have to accept a sweetness and light mood for the Geneva meeting.[12]

---

[8] The French draft was transmitted from Paris in telegram 28, July 2. (Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/7–255)

[9] See Document 136.

[10] See Document 140.

[11] Not further identified.

The Secretary emphasized that we should try to keep the British and French in line with the terms of the invitation to the Geneva meeting. They should be steered away from substantive discussion. There were many important problems of mechanics such as the means of consulting Germany, our relations with NATO and problems of universal security. The Secretary, in general, approved Mr. MacArthur's paper on coordination with our NATO allies[13] which also passed on the idea that we would consult with them regularly although they would not be participants in further four power meetings on European security. This was particularly important because the Soviets might now try to bring the Warsaw Pact into such a meeting which would be most undesirable.

Mr. MacArthur reported that the Italian Government wanted us to take up the question of their prisoners of war in Russia. It was agreed that such issues could not be discussed by the heads of government at Geneva, but that they might be raised on the side. Mr. Beam was asked to mention this in the working group.

Mr. Barnett[14] outlined the British and US papers on trade, and noted that our conclusions were the same although reached from different premises.[15] The Secretary said that it was his view that the Soviets were most anxious to increase trade with the West, and that this was an important bargaining counter. He asked that this be kept in mind in drafting papers on economic questions. It was agreed that we should not raise the question of trade at Geneva. If the Soviets raised it we would not advocate their taking it up in the UN, but would rather say that Soviet policies precluded any relaxation of our controls at present on strategic goods. There was, however, a wide range of non-strategic materials in which we would be glad for the Soviets to increase trade. The British argumentation seemed adequate to support this. Mr. Barnett said that without a complete upset, the Soviets would not qualify for membership in GATT.

---

[12] The following phrase was deleted by Galloway at this point in the memorandum: "and only in subsequent meetings 'take the gloves off' ".

[13] Not further identified.

[14] Robert W. Barnett, Office of European Regional Affairs, Department of State.

[15] The British paper, "Tripartite Working Group, East/West Trade", dated July 4, consists of seven pages and was circulated within the Department of State as SUM D–6; the U.S. paper, "Trade With the Soviet Union: Expanded Trade as a Bargaining Measure", dated June 30, consists of three pages and was circulated as SUM D–6a. Copies of both papers are in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 498.

With respect to the settlement of pre-war debts which the British mentioned in their paper, the Secretary said that he did not think we could keep them from raising this, but we should not allow our economic position to be thrown into bargaining on this question.

---

149. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State[1]

Bonn, July 5, 1955—8 p.m.

37. Eden Plan group message.[2]

1. There follow several general comments on work of group as whole:

2. Nature of German performance showed they had devoted most of their preliminary work to special studies rather than over-all considerations and premises of plan. They are prepared, for example, under certain circumstances, with detailed proposal that there be two or three rather than five Laender reconstituted in Sov Zone. If their initial position that there should be only a single constituency not accepted, they had worked out as a fall-back position details of a multi-constituencies system with details of how they can be gerrymandered to include areas both of West and Sov Zone in one district. However, they do not seem to have thought out carefully any clear-cut sequence of events under the plan. At this time, they seem primarily interested in maintaining flexibility which will give National Assembly freedom to meet problems as they arise. After some indecision, Gerdel advocated strongly Four-Power representation on local as well as intermediate and central organs of supervisory commission. Despite cumbersome nature of machinery involving 790 local teams with representatives of Four Powers, their ultimate position on this,

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/7–555. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Paris and London.

[2] The Bonn Quadripartite Working Group on the Eden Plan met at the American Embassy, June 24–July 5, to revise the plan in light of developments since its introduction at the Berlin Conference in January 1954. Summary reports of the nine working sessions are *ibid.*, 762.00/6–1655 through 7–555. A copy of the final 15-page report, approved on July 4 and transmitted to the Foreign Ministers of the three Western Powers, is *ibid.*, 762.00/7–455.

based on psychological considerations necessity Western representative appearing in Sov Zone, was so strong we did not feel it appropriate to press the idea umbrella supervision with local teams made up of Germans alone (FP(WG)D–4(A)).[3] Similarly, the group, following German views, left the detailed study of how part of the supervisory machinery would continue to operate after elections to Four-Power working groups set up in (2) of the plan rather than to spell it out in the plan itself or leave it to the commission as envisaged in Dept working paper.

3. The French, under chairmanship Jurgensen, and after his departure, Leduc,[4] showed great flexibility and cooperativeness throughout entire exercise. They frequently emphasized their desire that peace treaty negotiations begin as soon as possible. This view is reflected in strengthening of language on the provisional all-German authority in Stage III. They advocated para on relationship between plan and security systems but yielded to Brit position their instructions did not permit this. French proposal stated: "It is appropriate that Western powers state very clearly that carrying out of Eden Plan for solution of German problem may not become tied up with, or conditioned upon, security arrangements with respect to Germany. There can be question of envisaging for Germany special or discriminatory status. It appears that problems of European security and security in general cannot find their solution solely within framework of German question, but rather within much more comprehensive framework."

4. British held firmly to their instructions. They should consider only revision of plan with as few changes as possible. In view of this, it was impossible to include in report discussion of any special solutions of problems arising presence Soviet troops such as that all-German government should come into existence only after arrangements made for withdrawal Soviet forces and in connection signature peace treaty (Deptel 3656[5]). However, if Department has decided to push idea at Paris, we have laid basis. Report in various places points to problems involved in continued presence Soviet forces and at other points such as paras 25 and 26B (see ourtel 27[6]), possible relationship troop withdrawal to a security system is indicated. In reference paras 25 and 26B we proposed originally to use language

---

[3] See footnote 2, Document 94.

[4] François Leduc, French Minister-Counselor at Bonn.

[5] Telegram 3656 asked the U.S. Delegation to explore the idea that Soviet troops might impede the implementation of all-German elections and the authority of an all-German government if they were not removed from East Germany. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/6–2455)

[6] Telegram 27 transmitted a summary of paragraphs 15–26 of the working group report. (*Ibid.*, 762.00/7–455)

"unless some security plan, or agreed provision of a peace treaty providing for troop withdrawal at a definite time provides otherwise," but the Brits claimed their instructions would not permit them to discuss references to peace treaty provisions. We felt we could not press this point until final US position clear. Possibility consideration peace treaty at earlier stage of plan (Stage III) is found in strengthened language re provisional all-German authority and is likely to meet French support. In general, however, group, including Germans, felt plan as now worked out provided safeguards sufficient to protect against most foreseeable risks. German emphasis on flexibility in plan seemed to reflect their belief momentum engendered by plan once put in effect would assist National Assembly to improvise solutions that would make it difficult for Soviets effectively to sabotage later stages of plan.

Conant

---

150. Memorandum of Discussion at the 254th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, July 7, 1955[1]

[Here follows a list of participants.]

Basic U.S. Policy in Relation to Four-Power Negotiations (NSC 5524; Annexes to NSC 5524; Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated July 1 and 5, 1955; NSC Action No. 1419[2])

The Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs commenced his briefing of NSC 5524 with a description of the first paragraph ("Basic U.S. Approach"), with particular reference to the additions to this paragraph proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the form of two new paragraphs. (For the text of these new proposed paragraphs, taken from NSC 5501,[3] see the subsequent Record of Action.) Mr. Anderson then explained the significance which the Joint Chiefs of Staff attached to their proposed additional paragraphs. In the first place, they raised a question as to the seriousness of the Soviet desire to reach any settlement of basic issues between itself and the West. Secondly, the paragraphs were intended to suggest that the U.S. approach to the Geneva Conference should be based on the view that the position of the Soviet Union was weakening and that we should accordingly hold its feet to the fire. (Copies of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and of Mr. Anderson's briefing note on NSC 5524 are filed in the minutes of the meeting.[4])

---

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Gleason on July 8.

[2] Regarding NSC 5524 and its annexes, see Document 144. The memoranda of July 1 and 5 by Lay circulated copies of Allen Dulles' memorandum and the comments of the JCS, dated July 2, which are indicated in the discussion below. (Department of State, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 61 D 167, NSC 5524 Series) NSC Action No. 1419, taken at the 253d meeting of the Council on June 30, records actions to be taken by Stassen on disarmament.

[3] NSC 5501, "Basic National Security Policy", dated January 6, 1955, is scheduled for publication in a forthcoming volume of *Foreign Relations*.

At the conclusion of Mr. Anderson's comments on these new paragraphs and the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the President commented that the views of the Joint Chiefs on these paragraphs seemed to him to consist simply of warnings to the U.S. delegation. They could be briefly summed up by the adage "Trust in the Lord and keep your powder dry." The President said that he had no particular objection to the warnings which the Joint Chiefs desired to insert in NSC 5524, provided that in addition to these warnings something else was added which counseled us to observe these warnings "unless concrete Soviet deeds at Geneva indicated a contrary state of mind".

Mr. Anderson explained to the President that paragraph 1, with or without the addition proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was in the nature of a "general consideration" and did not affect the operating portions of NSC 5524. The President, however, went on to state that he and the Secretary of State were not so naive as to think that the Soviets have suddenly changed from devils to angels. The suggestion of the new paragraphs, continued the President, appeared to be inserted so that the U.S. position at Geneva would look sensible in the light of history.

The Secretary of State said that he was not sure that it was particularly profitable to speculate on Soviet intentions or on the causes which produced their current attitude. He informed the Council that he had written some years ago an article on the subject of Soviet foreign policy. He had recently reread this article, the opening paragraph of which had stated that we could not expect in the foreseeable future that the Soviet leadership would change its creed. On the other hand, the Soviets might well, the paragraph continued, try measures of expediency instead of continuing to buck hard against the ramparts of the free world. Secretary Dulles then said that it was at least possible that the Soviets had now actually reached the point which he had predicted they might, and were about to try a different line of approach in foreign policy. In other words, they may now deem it more convenient to conform slightly to a world situation that they have found they cannot otherwise change. Indeed, perhaps their last try at the old hard line may have been their tremendous effort to prevent the coming into existence of the Western European Union. But all this was of course highly speculative, and such speculations were not necessary in this paper.

---

[4] The JCS views are indicated below; copies of the revised text which they suggested are stapled to a copy of NSC 5524 in Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5524 Series. No copy of Anderson's notes has been found in Department of State files.

The President repeated his view that the additional paragraphs submitted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff were merely warnings. In effect they were telling us not to be "damn' babies" at Geneva. He said he was willing to accept these cautions, but that we should also state clearly in the paper that we will not shut our eyes to evidence of changes in Soviet policy.

Mr. Anderson stated that he believed that this latter point that the President had made was adequately covered in the section of the paper dealing with Soviet objectives.

Mr. Anderson then continued his briefing of NSC 5524 by a description of the contents of the paragraph entitled "Current Soviet Actions". He explained that the list of five recent Soviet actions was thought to mark a possible demonstration of increased flexibility in the conduct of Soviet foreign policy. In this connection, Mr. Anderson also referred to the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the effect that there had been no real "change in tactics" by the Soviet Union, but merely a change of "pace" in unflagging pursuit of their ultimate objectives. He suggested that Admiral Radford might wish to explain this point more fully.

Secretary Dulles observed that the list of current Soviet actions contained five main points, and suggested that the Council might wish to add a sixth and additional point, that Molotov himself had specified in his San Francisco speech as constituting a Soviet concession to the West.[5] This was the approach of the USSR to Japan for the conclusion of a peace treaty. The President directed that this point be added to the other five.

Admiral Radford then spoke to the point which Mr. Anderson had queried him on. He stated initially that the Joint Chiefs had had a very limited time to consider this very important paper. Some of the comments of the Joint Chiefs probably seemed "gratuitous", but the Chiefs felt very strongly that we had no real evidence of any genuine change in the Soviet attitude. The general thrust of all the Joint Chiefs' comments on this paper was directed to bringing out the fact that the Soviet Union would not negotiate from weakness at Geneva and that the Soviet Union had not changed its aggressive policies.

---

[5] For text of Molotov's speech on June 22, see *Tenth Anniversary*, pp. 103–115.

When Admiral Radford had finished his remarks, Mr. Anderson proceeded with his briefing and covered the section entitled "Four Hypotheses", most of which he read verbatim to the Council. These hypotheses related to the explanation of the current Soviet policy to be anticipated at the Geneva Conference and thereafter. He pointed out that the Director of Central Intelligence seemed to favor the third hypothesis,[6] namely, that the USSR believed that the Geneva Conference afforded an opportunity for flexible exploration of the possibilities of settling selected outstanding issues, etc.; along with the possibility set forth in the fourth hypothesis, namely, that the USSR has decided to bring about a measure of substantial and prolonged reduction in international tensions and might accordingly alter to some degree its previous negotiating positions. Mr. Anderson also pointed out the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the hypotheses. They desired to introduce this subject with two paragraphs from the agreed intelligence estimate on "Soviet Capabilities and Probable Courses of Action Through 1960" (NIE 11–3–55, paragraphs 155 and 162).[7] Their purpose in citing these paragraphs from the National Intelligence Estimate was by way of warning against any likelihood that the Soviet Union would seek a general understanding or settlement with the West at or after the Summit Conference.

The President expressed the view, regarding the four hypotheses, that an additional hypothesis, to explain current Soviet tactics, had been overlooked. He pointed out that since the death of Stalin there had been conspicuous confusion in the Russian dictatorship. The struggle for power in the ruling group in the Kremlin had tended to make for compromises rather than for a clear direction to Soviet policy. Mr. Anderson pointed out that this section had been carefully worked out with the Central Intelligence Agency and that accordingly Mr. Allen Dulles might wish to speak to it. However, the President went on to elaborate the point he had just made, stating that if Stalin were still alive the change he had described would not have happened. We should therefore take account, as a hypothesis, of this evident confusion in the Kremlin.

Governor Stassen said that he believed that the chief explanation of the Soviet change of tactics was their fear of nuclear war and its possible effect on the security of the regime. Mr. Allen Dulles stated his wholehearted agreement with the President's additional hypothesis, and said that he had included much the same thought in the written views which had been circulated prior to the meeting. (Copy of the views of the Director of Central Intelligence filed in the minutes of the meeting.)

---

[6] For Allen Dulles' views, see Document 144.

[7] Not printed. (Department of State, INR–NIE Files)

The President then observed that we were going to the Geneva Conference hoping to see if we could not penetrate the veil of Soviet intentions. Did not the members of the Council think that the Soviets might be going to Geneva for the purpose of probing our own intentions? Mr. Anderson commented that this point was the essence of the third hypothesis in NSC 5524.

Secretary Dulles stated that as he had said earlier, these hypotheses were rather interesting and provided a useful exchange of views as to what motivated the Soviet Union. On the other hand, he was not inclined to follow any one of them precisely, and he doubted whether, in and of themselves, these hypotheses were of any great significance.

Mr. Anderson then asked the members of the Council whether the suggested additions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be added to this section on hypotheses. The President, in response, indicated a degree of impatience with the suggestion of the Joint Chiefs, but stated that he had no real objection to inserting these additional warning paragraphs. On the other hand he felt, as did the Secretary of State, that these hypotheses were in no sense a critically important part of the paper. Secretary Dulles also indicated no objection to including these paragraphs from the National Intelligence Estimate, but said that if they were included he disliked and mistrusted the many sentences which began with such phrases as "it is probable" or "it is almost certain". The Secretary of State thought that we were not so omniscient with respect to the motives behind Soviet policy. He therefore suggested changing "most probable" to "may" or "might". The President accepted this suggestion from the Secretary of State.

Mr. Anderson then continued his briefing with a discussion of the paragraph entitled "Soviet Objectives", in the course of which he explained the split view in this paragraph. The State Department had desired to say "Until the USSR demonstrates otherwise, the U.S. should assume that the USSR is attempting to achieve the following objectives, etc.". The Joint Chiefs and the other Planning Board agencies desired to delete this conditional clause.

Secretary Dulles said he did not think that this split was very important, and the President suggested the insertion of the word "continued" between "should" and "assume". Secretary Humphrey inquired whether it wasn't precisely to find out what the Soviet Union was going to demonstrate that we were going to Geneva. Why else would we go? Why go if there were to be absolutely no change in Soviet policy? Agreeing with Secretary Humphrey, Secretary Dulles said that in any case we must not be so stubborn as to refuse to recognize possible changes in the Soviet attitude. Secretary Humphrey went on to observe that it was perfectly all right to insert all kinds of warning in the present paper, but that the United States could not go to Geneva determined to refuse to see any change that might have occurred in Soviet policy. If our delegation so refused, they might as well stay home.

The Council continued to discuss the paragraph on Soviet objectives and to agree to certain changes which are noted in the Record of Action. Secretary Dulles, in the course of this discussion, inquired whether there was any special reason for not including among the Soviet objectives with regard to the Far East the manifest Soviet desire to bring Communist China into the United Nations. The Director of Central Intelligence agreed that this was a major objective, and the Council accordingly agreed to its incorporation in this paragraph.

Mr. Anderson then went on to brief the Council on the paragraph headed "Attitudes and Policies of U.S. European Allies". When Mr. Anderson reached the point that the governments of our allied countries would be strongly influenced by popular pressures for a reduction of tensions and some form of East-West settlement, the President said he thought this was perhaps the most important paragraph in the whole paper. He based his judgment, he said, on the most recent results of the popular opinion polls taken in the Western European countries under the auspices of the United States Information Agency. The results of some of these polls, said the President, indicated popular attitudes in France and even in Great Britain which were actually alarming. These could not be ignored.

Mr. Anderson proceeded with a briefing of the next paragraph, dealing with U.S. objectives at the forthcoming conference. Apropos of this paragraph, Secretary Dulles said that he had read earlier this morning a very interesting statement which had been sent by the British Ambassador at Moscow to the British Ambassador in Washington, and subsequently to himself. The Ambassador's statement pointed out that in the Russian language the phrase "negotiating from strength" carried with it an offensive rather than a defensive connotation. Indeed, the Russians use the same words to mean "rape". It was accordingly not hard to understand the Russian anxiety about our use of the phrase "negotiating from strength", and this fact should be borne in mind (laughter).

The President continued with his earlier thought, and said that the same public opinion polls indicated to him how very touchy was this matter of "an increase in allied strength, unity and determination". He then cited the verdict of the polls taken in Western Europe on the subject of possible withdrawal of U.S. forces. These polls indicated a considerable popular opinion in favor of such a withdrawal of U.S. forces under certain circumstances and safeguards. This view, said the President, contrasted sharply with the U.S. position that we were wholly opposed to the withdrawal of U.S. forces at this time.

Mr. Anderson continued his briefing by reading verbatim the statement of specific U.S. objectives with respect to Europe. When he had reached sub-paragraph c, which indicated that the U.S. and the UK should maintain forces in Germany "to the degree and for the time required by the security interests of the U.S. and its allies, including Germany", Secretary Dulles said he wished to make a comment. It was of vital importance, he believed, that we should succeed in getting the French to work along together with the Germans. At the moment the French are weak and they are accordingly fearful of the revival of German military strength. Reconciliation between the French and the Germans could accordingly only be achieved if we and the United Kingdom continue to station sufficient forces in Germany which would permit the French to send necessary armed forces to North Africa without fear of the Germans. The French would never agree to accept any significant increase in German military strength if the U.S. withdrew its forces from Europe. Indeed, in such a contingency the French might even agree to make a deal with the Russians in order to keep the Germans down. Perhaps, continued Secretary Dulles, the point he was trying to make was already implicit in this sub-paragraph, but he believed that it would be a good idea to make the thought explicit. In short, our forces were not stationed in Europe solely in relation to a Soviet threat, but as a means of reassuring the French against the Germans. It was agreed to include Secretary Dulles' point after the President had cited additional USIA public opinion polls in France on this subject.

The President then pointed to sub-paragraph g, which read: "The continued presence of the U.S. in Europe, maintaining such forces there as are necessary, and U.S. participation in the defense of free Europe at least so long as a measurable threat to the peace and security of Europe exists". The President thought that the phrase "such forces as are necessary" was ambiguous. Moreover, the whole thought in sub-paragraph g should not be set forth as a U.S. objective in Europe, but rather as a U.S. concession to Europe. Secretary Dulles, agreeing with the President, said that of course our true objective was to get out of Europe, but we cannot do so for the time being because our presence is necessary to tide Europe over its insecurity. The President said that he was probably more sensitive on this point than most of those present, since it had fallen to his lot to negotiate and to deal with the committees of the Congress with regard to the dispatching of U.S. forces to Europe in the first instance. Despite everything, we should look on the presence of U.S. armed forces in friendly countries abroad as invariably an emergency measure rather than as a normal aspect of United States policy. The Vice President suggested, and the Council agreed, to delete the first part of sub-paragraph g down to "U.S. participation".

Mr. Anderson resumed his briefing with comments on the section of the paper dealing with the general subject of "Germany and European Security". He noted that the several paragraphs composing this section included statements which were supplements to or elaborations of existing U.S. policy. When he reached the paragraph under this heading dealing with "Security Arrangements", he pointed out that the United States should be prepared to consider possible regional security arrangements encompassing both the free world and the Soviet bloc countries, including such things as non-aggression declarations or pacts, mutual consultation pacts, guarantees of frontiers, etc., etc., as set forth in this paragraph. The Director of Central Intelligence said he felt that the United States would encounter very grave difficulties if it permitted itself to become involved in the guaranteeing of frontiers and in entering into non-aggression pacts with the countries of the Soviet bloc. Such U.S. action would have serious repercussions in the satellites, and he doubted the wisdom of U.S. entry into a European regional security arrangement which involved either non-aggression pacts or guarantees of frontiers.

Secretary Dulles quickly added that he was about to make the identical objection to the wording of this paragraph. He said that he felt the strongest objection to U.S. involvement in any non-aggression pacts with the USSR. The history of the Soviet use of non-aggression pacts as an entering wedge for aggression was only too well known. There was already sufficient cover for non-aggression undertakings in the Charter of the United Nations. Any additional search for safety from aggression by virtue of non-aggression pacts with the Soviet Union would only provide the free world with a quite false sense of security. As to the matter of guarantee of frontiers, the United States had never been willing to do so, and had most recently indicated its unwillingness to do so in the case of Austria.

The President asked Secretary Dulles to cite instances of violation by the Soviet Union of non-aggression pacts into which it had entered with other nations. Secretary Dulles cited a number of instances, beginning with the Baltic states.

Further discussion resulted in an appropriate revision of the paragraph on security arrangements.

Mr. Anderson then turned to the next paragraph, which dealt with the subject of "Armaments Limitations", and explained the split views in sub-paragraph c, with the State Department on record as favoring the establishment of arms limitation and controls in Eastern Europe "comparable to the WEU system, possibly with provision for exchange of information and verification of such information"; while the other agencies were recorded as being opposed to U.S. agreement to any proposals for a system of regional arms limitation involving West Europe together with the Soviet satellites. Mr. Anderson explained the anxiety of the Joint Chiefs of Staff lest the State proposal lead to a situation in which the Soviet Union might obtain a voice in decisions as to the level of armament in the countries composing WEU, a matter which these countries now controlled themselves.

The President said he was less worried over the point which bothered the Joint Chiefs of Staff than he was over the possibility that such a regional arms limitation arrangement might give recognition to the existing situation in the Soviet satellites.

With respect to the position taken by the Defense Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretary Dulles stated with emphasis his belief that it was wrong for the National Security Council to declare flatly against any security arrangements which involved Eastern Europe. This was certainly an area in which we would be obliged to consider the views of our allies. Furthermore, if limits could be set on the armaments of the Eastern European countries, this would be a very good thing, provided an inspection system functioned properly to see that the agreements were observed.

Governor Stassen said that the great danger here was that if we agreed to any extension of WEU to cover the East European countries, we might well give the Soviet Union a voice in the management of Western European Union itself. The Soviets might well see in this an opportunity to prevent the rearmament of Germany. If they succeeded in this we would be handing them something that they desperately want in return for the very slight gain which we might achieve in limiting the military power of Poland and Czechoslovakia.

Secretary Dulles replied with feeling that we would never succeed in our objective of a united Germany if we insisted upon limitation of the level of German armament, which level was wholly controlled by the Western powers—that is, the unification of Germany would be impossible unless it was achieved under some sort of international control in which the Soviet Union would have a voice. The Soviets would never simply throw East Germany into the pot to be added to West Germany and the united Germany to be further rearmed against the Soviet Union itself.

Governor Stassen replied that if we went so far as to yield to the Russians any considerable degree of control over the rearmament of Germany without getting in return some degree of control over the level of the armaments of the Soviet Union itself, the United States would suffer a net loss to its security.

With some heat, Secretary Dulles answered that he was perfectly agreeable to having the present paragraph concerning armaments limitation state that this was a problem into which the U.S. must go with great care and caution; but he again warned that if we say flatly "no" to any European regional security arrangements we might just as well give up all hope of unifying Germany. Moreover, by such a course of action we would be bound to suffer a severe loss of support from the UK, from France, and from Germany itself. This was a hopeless position for the United States to take. Furthermore, if, as we were discussing at last week's Council meeting on disarmament,[8] there might be conditions under which we would let the Soviet Union send inspectors of armament to the United States, why must we be so afraid to permit Soviet inspectors to verify the level of armaments in Germany?

Governor Stassen reiterated his fear of any Soviet control over Germany. The President added that in this sphere our hand would in all probability be forced if all the rest of our allies desired to enter into such a regional arms limitation agreement. The President said he thought that for the United States to say precisely what it would do in this matter and to make up its mind to refuse to budge from this position, was an impossibility.

Secretary Dulles added that it was certainly highly unrealistic to think that the United States was going to secure a degree of control over the level of armaments in the Soviet Union merely by virtue of some deal respecting the rearming of West Germany.

Governor Stassen repeated his great fear of a Communist voice with respect to the ceiling on the armaments of the Western European powers. There was very little gain if all we got in return for this was a voice in the ceilings which were to be placed on the armaments of the satellite countries. What we really needed to secure was a voice in the control of armaments in the Soviet Union itself.

In reply to Governor Stassen, Secretary Dulles said "Suppose the Soviets state that they will agree to the unification of Germany provided the present limits of German armaments are made permanent. Could we turn down such a Soviet proposition?" Secretary Humphrey answered Secretary Dulles by arguing that at the present time we were in a position among the Western powers to make any agreed changes in the level of German armament. We would no longer be in a position to make such changes if the Soviets were in a position to veto these changes. How could we offset this great Soviet advantage? Could it be offset if the Western powers secured a similar veto on any upping of the level of armaments in the satellite nations?

Secretary Dulles indicated again his strong opposition to a flat NSC veto against European regional security arrangements, and said that this kind of statement by the NSC would tie the U.S. delegation hand and foot in this very delicate area of negotiation at the forthcoming conference. Secretary Wilson commented that despite his dislike of the idea of such a regional arms limitation agreement, he agreed completely with the reasoning of the Secretary of State. Secretary Dulles said that he didn't like the idea of such a regional armaments limitation agreement either, but it was a subject about which he might very well have to talk at Geneva.

---

[8] A memorandum of the discussion at the 253d meeting of the National Security Council on June 30 is in Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower Papers, Whitman File.

The President said that it seemed to him that all the points that Governor Stassen had made in his exchange of views with Secretary Dulles had actually been included in the version of sub-paragraph c which was favored by the State Department. Secretary Dulles said that in any event he had never for a moment entertained the idea of agreeing to any such European arms limitation agreement involving West Europe and the Soviet satellites unless Germany were first rearmed and unified. He believed that Governor Stassen did not seem to realize that all his argument had been based on the assumption of the prior unification of Germany. The President said that this thought should be made explicit in the paragraph.

Admiral Radford said that the phrase to which the Joint Chiefs of Staff took most objection in the State Department version of sub-paragraph c was the phrase "comparable to the WEU system". The Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that we could not afford to become involved in any arrangement with the satellites like WEU, which was a voluntary association, because to do so would provide the Soviets with a degree of control over Western rearmament which was unacceptable. Moreover, he added, the Chiefs believed that the State draft of sub-paragraph c was by no means clear on the important subject of inspection and control of any European regional arms limitation system.

The President at this point indicated a desire to get on with the remainder of the paper. Secretary Wilson again repeated his support for the views of the Secretary of State, as did Secretary Humphrey, who insisted that those who were going to have to negotiate at Geneva must be given reasonable leeway. This was inherent in any paper prepared in support of the U.S. negotiating position. The argument was settled when the President indicated that it would be best to take the first phrase of the State Department draft and leave out the remainder, which had the United States "favor establishment of limitations and controls in Eastern Europe".

Mr. Anderson then went on to summarize the next paragraph, dealing with the problem of "Demilitarized Zones". He pointed out that the Joint Chiefs had reconsidered their earlier view that a demilitarized zone confined to East Germany between the Elbe and

Oder-Neisse might be acceptable.[9] He called on Admiral Radford to explain more fully the reasons which had induced the Chiefs to reject this possibility.

Admiral Radford replied that the Joint Chiefs had come to feel that this was no longer a fair exchange. As to the problem of demilitarized zones, he added, the Chiefs had before them at least five different plans, none of which was very clear and straightforward in character. The President pointed out that the European powers and the Germans themselves would undoubtedly present plans for a demilitarized zone, of which the United States would have to take account at Geneva and subsequently. Admiral Radford admitted this was true, but expressed the thought that a shorter and more general paragraph on demilitarized zones would be best. The President suggested taking the first and last sentences of the existing paragraph, with which view Admiral Radford expressed agreement. Secretary Humphrey commented that this was another problem on which the United States position must be to some degree elastic, or else the United States had better not go to the Geneva Conference.

Mr. Anderson proceeded to the next paragraph of NSC 5524, dealing with "Withdrawal of Soviet and Western Forces". Secretary Dulles immediately commented that the paragraph was needlessly long and set forth too many necessary conditions on the willingness of the United States to consider any proposal advanced by other countries at the Conference for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from a united Germany. The only fixed condition and requirement for U.S. consideration of such a proposal was that the proposal have the support of our major European allies, including the Federal Republic of Germany.

The President expressed his agreement with Secretary Dulles' position, and suggested that the paragraph be limited to the opening lines and the one condition which Secretary Dulles had said was necessary. The remainder of the conditions set forth in the paragraph should be set forth not as conditions but merely as matters which should be borne in mind during discussions of the subject at Geneva. Otherwise we would be setting impossible conditions for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from a united Germany, and we would be inviting great difficulties with our allies.

Secretary Dulles said there was one thing that we could be sure of: When our allies and the Germans say they wish us to withdraw our forces from Europe, we will certainly get out promptly.

---

[9] The JCS views on a demilitarized zone in Europe were transmitted to the Department of State on June 3 as an enclosure to a letter from Secretary Wilson to Secretary Dulles. (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 483)

At this point the Vice President said he wished to make a comment. As a general rule, he said, it is important that everything in NSC policy papers be stated with as much precision as possible, but in this particular instance, when the paper in question is being specifically prepared as advice to the President, there was no need or advantage to be so concerned for precision of language.

Mr. Anderson then proceeded to brief the Council on the series of paragraphs relating to the position of the United States in the event of a continuance of two Germanies. His briefing evoked no discussion of the points made under this heading. He accordingly went on to the paragraphs dealing with the "Status of the Soviet Satellites". The President suggested passing hastily over this matter, since time was running out, and Mr. Anderson went on to discuss the paragraphs relating to the "International Communist Movement". On this subject Secretary Wilson inquired whether we could not at least induce the Soviet Union to reaffirm the Litvinov Agreement. Mr. Allen Dulles said that the difficulty with such a proposal was that the Soviets might well agree to reaffirm the Litvinov Agreement. At the same time, however, they would call on us to carry out similar commitments which would curtail our activities in the satellites, such as Radio Free Europe and the like. We, of course, would observe our commitments and cease the activities to which the Soviets objected. The Soviets, on the other hand, would not observe their commitments, and would continue to foster the International Communist Movement.

Mr. Anderson then went on to brief the Council on the paragraphs dealing with the U.S. position on East-West trade at the conference, noting the split of views in paragraph 27–a, where the majority proposal indicated that if the United States considered that its interests would be advanced thereby, the United States might agree to adopt a more liberal policy with respect to the export of non-strategic goods in conjunction with a demonstrated Soviet willingness "to expand East-West trade in non-strategic goods". The Defense proposal, as opposed to the majority proposal, stated that the United States should not agree to such a more liberal policy in the export of non-strategic items except in conjunction with Soviet willingness "to ameliorate the fundamental sources of tension between East and West".

After Mr. Anderson had explained the difference in these two viewpoints, the President expressed the opinion that this was one which must be played by ear. Secretary Dulles added that there was certainly a considerable difference of opinion as to the importance the Soviets attached to the relaxation of East-West trade restrictions. He said that it was his own feeling that our willingness to relax our trade controls was a strong negotiating card for us vis-à-vis the Soviets.

Secretary Humphrey said that in place of either of the proposed versions, he would substitute the phrase that we would adopt a more liberal trade policy in non-strategic goods "whenever the United States believed that its interests would be advanced thereby". The President added that that was precisely his view, of course, though he was willing to accept the version proposed by the majority.

Admiral Radford said that wasn't it a matter of what was strategic and what wasn't? All that the Soviets really wanted out of East-West trade were strategic items and stuff that contributed to their war potential. In reply, Mr. Anderson read sub-paragraph d, which pointed out that in no event should the United States reduce or eliminate its embargo on arms, ammunition, implements of war, atomic energy materials, or advance prototypes of strategic items.

The President observed that the topic of East-West trade seemed to him to arise at nearly every meeting of the National Security Council; hence the U.S. delegation to Geneva would be very familiar indeed with the views of the Council and there was not the slightest danger of making a mistake in this area, although in the area of East-West trade we might find ourselves on one side of the argument while our allies and the Soviets were on the other.

Mr. Anderson then turned to sub-paragraph e, dealing with the problem of being prepared to discuss trade with Communist China and pointing out that we should not at the Geneva Conference undertake to discuss this matter, for reasons set forth in the sub-paragraph. Mr. Anderson indicated that Mr. Joseph M. Dodge, Chairman of the Council on Foreign Economic Policy, had expressed his agreement with the views set forth in this sub-paragraph.

Governor Stassen said he believed that the allied attitude toward trade controls vis-à-vis Communist China was more favorable to the U.S. view than it had been two years ago. The President said that the fact of the matter was that we were not going to talk about these issues at Geneva.

Secretary Dulles said that he had that very morning suggested to Under Secretary Hoover that he take up with Mr. Dodge's Council those questions of economic policy and East-West trade that might come up for negotiation after the conclusion of the Summit Conference. Governor Stassen pointed out that unfortunately the Council on Foreign Economic Policy did not have any representation from the Central Intelligence Agency or from the Department of Defense, both of which had a legitimate interest and responsibility on the subject of East-West trade. He therefore suggested that instead of the

Dodge Council, Mr. Hollister's[10] people in the State Department provided the best forum for discussions on the U.S. position with respect to East-West trade and similar economic problems. The Hollister people could work out the U.S. position, in which process they would have representation from all the interested agencies. After the position was formulated, Governor Stassen thought that some kind of subcommittee of the Big Four powers would provide the best vehicle for the subsequent international negotiations. The important thing, in any event, said Governor Stassen, is that no single department of the Government can really advise the President on these matters.

The President took issue with Governor Stassen's argument, and said he believed that Mr. Dodge's Council, with the additional elements of representation from Defense and CIA, was the best instrumentality for formulating U.S. policy in this field. Mr. Hollister and his people had too many heavy operating responsibilities. In fact, said the President, it was for precisely such matters that we had set up the Dodge Council.

Changing the subject, the President turned to the final section of the paper, dealing with "Far Eastern Issues", and said he was happy to see that these issues were treated in summary fashion in the paper. Indeed, it might have been better if nothing at all had been said on this subject.

At the conclusion of the meeting, the President turned to Mr. Anderson and said that despite all the comments and criticism, he could not easily conceive of a better service which could have been rendered to himself and to the Secretary of State than this paper which Mr. Anderson and the Planning Board had prepared and which had brought so many differing views forward for discussion. The President then counseled Mr. Anderson to write up a record of the Council's action and to check this record with the several responsible departments and agencies.

Secretary Humphrey, just before the Council meeting broke up, inquired whether Mr. Anderson should not now be asked to review NSC 5524 in its entirety, in order to remove much of the restrictive language and to emphasize the warning aspects. This process might well be gone through in the light of the view which history would one day take of this paper. In reply, the President announced that he was going to make a TV appearance just prior to departing for Geneva, and he believed that this was the best means, as it were, of setting the tone for this great proceeding. Secretary Wilson added the thought that the forthcoming Geneva Conference would present a great opportunity to the United States.

---

[10] John B. Hollister, Director of the International Cooperation Administration.

The National Security Council:

[Here follow subparagraphs a and b which noted the discussion of NSC 5524 and recorded the various revisions of its text.]

c. Recommended that the President:

> (1) Approve NSC 5524 as amended, as supplementing but not superseding existing policy, and direct its use as guidance during the forthcoming negotiations, under the coordination of the Secretary of State.
>
> (2) Direct the Departments of State and Defense, in consultation with other executive departments and agencies as appropriate, to make a continuing examination of the acceptability to the U.S. of proposals which might be considered or advanced during the forthcoming negotiations on (1) European security arrangements, in accordance with paragraph 16, (2) demilitarized zones, in accordance with paragraph 18, and (3) withdrawal of forces, in accordance with paragraphs 19–a and –b; reporting to the National Security Council any major policy recommendations which may result from such examinations.

Note: The recommmendation in c above subsequently approved by the President. NSC 5524, as amended and approved, subsequently circulated as NSC 5524/1[11] and referred to the Secretary of State in accordance with c–(1) above. The action in c–(2) above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretaries of State and Defense for implementation.

S. Everett Gleason[12]

---

[11] Document 153.

[12] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

---

151. Memorandum From the Ambassador to the Soviet Union (Bohlen) to the Secretary of State[1]

Washington, July 8, 1955.

MR. SECRETARY: I have not wished to add to the complications of preparing for the Geneva meeting by sending individual memoranda to you, but there are two general aspects of the meeting and what I believe we will encounter there that are worth bringing to your personal attention.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/7–855. Top Secret. A handwritten notation on the source text indicates that it was seen by Secretary Dulles.

1. In examining the various analyses of the factors and possible motivations which lie behind the current Soviet attitude, I believe, as I mentioned yesterday,[2] that there is the inevitable tendency to oversimplify and in some respects dangerously so. The best analysis I have seen, possibly because it does at least mention a large variety of factors, is the CIA Estimate signed by Allen.[3] As I mentioned yesterday, I do not agree that the Soviets are under such overriding compulsions due to internal economic difficulties that they have lost their freedom of choice and must as a matter of necessity reach an accommodation with the West. Internal factors, especially economic, the problems of running a dictatorship without a dictator, as well as the changed nature of their relationship to the Communist world, undoubtedly play a part, but they are not of such nature in my opinion as to force the Soviets to make concessions to the West which would either affect their existing security position or to give up at this time any areas they control as a result of World War II. The only exception I would make to this is in Germany, where they might conceivably be willing indirectly to permit the downfall of the GDR in return for Western Germany leaving the Western defense system.

Without going into the complexities and even subtleties of the process which we are witnessing inside the Soviet world, I believe this Conference is considered by the Russian leaders as a truly exploratory one, with a view to ascertaining on a more realistic basis than previously whether there exist accommodations with the non-Soviet world which would permit diminution of the chances of (a) war, and (b) a reduction in the present burden of armament without, however, giving up at this stage any of the positions acquired as a result of the war. It seems to me, therefore, that the Soviets should not obtain the impression at Geneva that all the future roads are blocked and that all doors are locked. If they return to Moscow with the impression that the only course of action for them is a stepped-up armaments race and the attendant renewal of international tensions, I believe they have the capability, without serious threat to the regime, to take the necessary steps in that direction. This, of course, does not in the slightest degree imply that there is any reason or justification for our making any concessions which would adversely affect the position of the free world. Since unquestionably no agreements as such will be reached at Geneva, I do not believe there is any danger in that direction despite the obvious greater eagerness of the UK and France.

---

[2] Presumably Bohlen is referring to a meeting held in Dulles' office at 4 p.m. on July 7 at which disarmament, relaxation of tensions, and trade were discussed in relation to Geneva. A three-page memorandum of this conversation is *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 527.

[3] Document 144.

2. On the actual conduct of the Conference, I doubt very much if we will, without serious detriment to our international position, be able to confine the discussion to purely procedural matters and avoid substantive examination of the various questions. It would seem here that a distinction should be made between *negotiation* and discussion. If it is clearly understood that we cannot and will not negotiate in the true sense of the word at Geneva with a view to reaching agreements, I believe we are amply protected. In my experience, no nation is committed even by implication, with the Soviet Union through discussion, and it is only when conclusions or agreements are reduced to writing that the element of commitment comes into play. Impressions, however, are of course conveyed by discussion and the general attitude adopted therein, and as indicated above I believe the most important result of Geneva will be the reciprocal impression left on both sides after the meeting. I believe, therefore, with the clear realization that we do not intend to negotiate at Geneva, that we should be prepared to discuss certain substantive aspects of any of the major questions which may be raised by either side. The important point of the Conference will come, of course, in the selection of those subjects discussed which are regarded as realistically suitable for serious future negotiation.

Charles E. Bohlen[4]

---

[4] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

---

152. Letter From the President's Special Assistant (Stassen) to the Secretary of State[1]

Washington, July 11, 1955.

Dear Foster: The following points to cover in our consultations with the French are suggested:

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 515. Confidential; Personal. On July 11 Stassen also sent Secretary Dulles a short note stating that it was quite possible the Soviet Union would make a "final pitch" for a five-power conference and suggesting that the United States or the Western powers counter with a proposal for another four-power meeting at the summit which would allow time for bilateral talks between the United States and the People's Republic of China. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 396.1/7–1155)

1. Our intensive re-study of the questions involved in disarmament, control and regulation of armament and related questions, indicates certain salient premises and principles regarding which we wish to have this informal early consultation with France.

2. In any agreement, the crucial and controlling factor is the system of inspection and communications.

3. In the absence of agreement, great emphasis needs to be placed upon the scientific advance in measures which would counter and cancel out advances made by the USSR in armaments. We are experiencing considerable success in this respect.

4. Nevertheless, a sound agreement with an effective inspection and communications system, if it could be reached, would have mutual advantages, and would improve the prospects of a durable peace.

5. In designing an inspection system, it appears that there is no known method by which all the production of nuclear material which has occurred prior to the installation of an inspection system can be accounted for in full. Thus, other factors, such as the delivery systems and the over-all indication of good faith adherence to an agreement, need be considered in an inspection system.

6. An inspection system must also be limited by the reciprocal acceptability within the various forms of governments and economies.

7. Any system must be so designed that if the agreement is violated, the security of the signators is not less than it would have been if no agreement had been made.

8. Our study is proceeding of the feasibility, in specific terms, of an inspection and communications system which would meet the foregoing requirements, and we will welcome an exchange of views with France as we proceed.[2]

Sincerely yours,

Harold E. Stassen[3]

---

[2] On July 13 Secretary Dulles replied to this letter, approving the points which Stassen had outlined and suggesting that they could be brought up with the French in Paris. (*Ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 515)

[3] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

153. Statement of Policy by the National Security Council[1]

Washington, July 11, 1955.

NSC 5524/1

BASIC U.S. POLICY IN RELATION TO FOUR-POWER NEGOTIATIONS

General

Basic U.S. Approach

1. Inherent in the basic U.S. approach to Four-Power negotiations must be the realization that "despite the talk of coexistence, the Communist powers will continue strenuous efforts to weaken and disrupt free world strength and unity and to expand the area of their control, principally by subversion (including the support of insurrection), while avoiding involvement of the main sources of Communist power. This strategy will probably present the free world with its most serious challenge and greatest danger in the next few years." (NSC 5501, paragraph 19.[2])

2. The existing U.S. national strategy requires that U.S. policies "be designed to affect the conduct of the Communist regimes, especially that of the USSR, in ways that further U.S. security interests and to encourage tendencies that lead these regimes to abandon expansionist policies. In pursuing this general strategy, our effort should be directed to:

"a. Deterring further Communist aggression, and preventing the occurrence of total war so far as compatible with U.S. security.

"b. Maintaining and developing in the free world the mutuality of interest and common purpose, and the necessary will, strength and stability, to face the Soviet-Communist threat and to provide constructive and attractive alternatives to Communism, which sustain the hope and confidence of free peoples.

"c. Supplementing a and b above by other actions designed to foster changes in the character and policies of the Soviet-Communist bloc regimes:

> "(1) By influencing them and their peoples toward the choice of those alternative lines of action which, while in

---

[1] Source: Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5524 Series. Secret. NSC 5524 consists of a cover page; a note by Executive Secretary Lay, dated July 11, stating that it had been adopted by the NSC at its 254th meeting on July 7 (see Document 150) and approved by the President on July 11; and a table of contents, none printed.

[2] Scheduled for publication in a forthcoming *Foreign Relations* volume.

> their national interests, do not conflict with the security interests of the U.S.; and
>
> "(2) By exploiting differences between such regimes, and their other vulnerabilities, in ways consistent with this general strategy." (NSC 5501, paragraph 26.)

3. In pursuing this strategy during the forthcoming negotiations, the U.S. must "give to the Communist regimes a clear conception of the true U.S. and free world purposes and uncompromising determination to resist Communist aggressive moves," even if cloaked in the guise of a peace offensive. (NSC 5501, paragraph 48.)

4. The U.S. should be ready to negotiate with the USSR whenever it clearly appears that U.S. security interests will be served thereby. (NSC 5501, paragraph 49.)

Current Soviet Actions

5. Since the foregoing statement of U.S. basic strategy was approved, the USSR has made a number of moves which reveal a change in Soviet tactics and may demonstrate increased flexibility in the conduct of its foreign policy:

a. Conclusion of the Austrian State Treaty on terms more favorable to Austria.
b. Submission of an omnibus proposal covering disarmament, troop withdrawals and bases.
c. The visit of the highest Soviet officials to Yugoslavia.
d. Soviet acceptance of a "Summit" meeting without the inclusion of Communist China.
e. The invitation to Chancellor Adenauer to come to Moscow to negotiate the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Bonn Government.
f. The initiation by the USSR of negotiations with Japan looking toward the normalization of relations between the two countries.

Estimate of Soviet Intent

6. On balance, the Soviet leaders may estimate that there is at present no critical threat to their security, and that there may be renewed opportunities for Communist expansion by means short of general war. They might estimate that Western power and unity are vulnerable to Soviet political action, and may become increasingly so. Therefore, the Soviet leaders may believe that they can rely primarily upon political means, and in some cases military action by local forces, to carry on their struggle against the non-Communist world.

7. It is possible that Soviet diplomacy during the period of this estimate will not be directed toward a general settlement between the USSR and the West. It may continue to combine moves intended to ease international tensions with other moves which increase such

tensions, and with political warfare pressures calculated to play upon the non-Communist world's fear of war.

Five Hypotheses

8. There are at least five hypotheses which can be advanced to explain current Soviet policy toward the pending series of diplomatic interchanges with the West. They are:

a. The USSR has no real willingness to alter previous positions in any substantial respect, but is engaged solely in diplomatic and propaganda maneuvers, having particularly in mind the present 2–3 year period of marked Soviet military disadvantage.

b. The USSR, in order better to exploit the situation in the Far East, wishes to bring about an immediate easing of tensions in other areas.

c. The USSR considers that the present time affords an opportunity for flexible exploration of the possibilities of settling selected outstanding issues and reserves its decision as to ensuing moves and attitudes pending the outcome of these negotiations.

d. The USSR has decided to bring about a substantial and prolonged reduction in international tensions and is willing to alter previous negotiating positions appreciably to this end.

e. Since the death of Stalin, competition for power within the ruling circles of the Soviet regime has resulted in a confused situation tending to produce compromises rather than clear direction of Soviet foreign policy.

The five hypotheses are not mutually exclusive in their entirety. In all likelihood, the complex pattern of Soviet motivations and objectives contains some elements of all five.

Soviet Objectives

9. The USSR continues to hold (a) the ultimate triumph of Communism as a firm conviction and a long-term goal and (b) the maintenance of the security of the regime as its overriding objective. Until the USSR clearly demonstrates otherwise, the U.S. should continue to assume that the USSR is attempting to achieve the following objectives which are not necessarily inconsistent with any of the above hypotheses:

a. Prevention of the effective rearming of Germany as a member of NATO.

b. Withdrawal of U.S. advanced bases from the Eastern Hemisphere.

c. Relaxation of East-West trade barriers.

Additional Soviet objectives which will likely be pursued simultaneously include:

a. To effect a degree of disarmament including the outlawing of nuclear weapons under conditions favorable to the Communists.

b. To isolate the U.S. from its allies and from the uncommitted free world states in order to render them incapable of decisive action by fostering and exploiting dissensions within and among them.

c. To detach Japan from the sphere of Western influence and encourage its closer association with the Sino-Soviet Bloc, to bring Communist China into the UN, and otherwise weaken the free world position in Asia.

Attitudes and Policies of U.S. European Allies

10. The UK, French, and West German governments have given clear evidence that they intend to stand firm against any Soviet initiative which would weaken the West's position of strength and promote dissension within the alliance. However, these governments are influenced by popular pressures for a reduction of tension and some form of East-West settlement and by their own concern over the risks of nuclear war to explore all reasonable avenues toward a settlement of East-West issues. Conceivably this pressure could create a dilemma and give rise to frictions between the U.S. and its allies in negotiating with the USSR.

U.S. Objectives

11. In the light of the above, no change is required in the basic U.S. objectives and national strategy set forth in NSC 5501. Accordingly, the U.S. should without relaxation continue the steady development of strength, confidence and military readiness, including mobilization programs, in the U.S. and the free world coalition. At the same time the U.S. should seek advantageous settlements of outstanding issues. The U.S. should recognize that not all elements of strength in its position vis-à-vis the Soviet Bloc are static. While U.S. power and leadership are essential to free world strength, our overall position depends in considerable measure upon the continued support of allied governments and people. Also desirable is a reasonable posture in the eyes of the uncommitted nations. Inasmuch as the West is negotiating from strength, the U.S. position with respect to solutions it may propose or consider, and indeed the U.S. posture in all negotiations, should be such as to result in an improvement in the over-all U.S. security position in Europe, whether through an absolute weakening of the Soviet position, through an increase in allied strength, unity and determination, or through a lessening in the future risk of large-scale war.

12. With respect to Europe, the U.S. should seek, in cooperation with its European allies, to hold to the following objectives which are particularly pertinent to any negotiations with the USSR:

a. The retraction of Soviet power from Central and Eastern Europe, and ultimate freedom of the satellites from Soviet domination; as initial steps, (1) the withdrawal of Soviet forces from East

Germany, Poland, Hungary, and Rumania, and (2) the increased accessibility of the satellites to information and influence from the free world.

b. A united Germany based on free elections, free to align itself as it chooses, and in fact choosing to join NATO.

c. A suitable German contribution to Western defense and maintenance of U.S. and allied forces in Germany to the degree and for the time required to foster Franco-German reconciliation and to protect the security interests of the U.S. and its allies, including Germany.

d. The continued strengthening of NATO, politically, economically and militarily.

e. Changes in Soviet policies in directions more compatible with U.S. and NATO security interests (to the degree that the U.S. can contribute to this end by pressure, influence or negotiation).

f. The establishment, ultimately, in Europe of arrangements which will insure, consistent with U.S. security interests, the lasting security and close mutual association of its peoples within the largest area feasible.

g. U.S. participation in the defense of free Europe at least so long as a measurable threat to the peace and security of Europe exists.

h. Consistent with the above, a decrease in the danger of the outbreak of general war through incident or miscalculation.

Germany and European Security

U.S. Position on German Unification

General

13. The U.S. should take as its basic policy on a German settlement the following, which is consistent with existing policy (NSC 160/1[3]): (a) that an all-German government should be formed on the basis of free elections; (b) that this government should freely negotiate a peace treaty with the allied powers of World War II; (c) that the new united Germany should be free to choose its own alignment and to rearm, and thus to join and make an appropriate contribution to NATO. The U.S. should continue to support the Berlin conference proposals (Eden Plan[4]) in their essential substance though not necessarily in all details. The U.S. should also seek to assure that present arrangements based on the Federal Republic's adherence to NATO and its contribution thereto are not prejudiced by Soviet or other blocking tactics during the process outlined above.

14. The above policy carries the risk that a united Germany might choose not to join NATO. This risk, which appears to be small, and which the U.S. should seek to reduce, is one which the U.S. must take. The U.S. should continue to support the Federal Re-

---

[3] Dated August 17, 1953, *Foreign Relations,* 1952-1954, vol. VII, Part 1, p. 510.

[4] For text of the Eden Plan, see *ibid.*, p. 1177.

public in its opposition to the neutralization of Germany and in its intention to fulfill its NATO obligations. If, at some future time, the risk that a united Germany might choose non-commitment should become greater, the U.S. would have to devise policies to meet that situation.

15. In addition to the above positions based on existing policy, the U.S. should be prepared to consider and possibly to advance additional proposals concerning European security, certain aspects of which are discussed in the following paragraphs. Failure of the U.S. to consider at an appropriate time such additional proposals would increase the risks of adverse reaction in many important segments of European public opinion, especially in Germany, and thus the risks of a slowdown in actual West German rearmament and of Soviet success in tempting the Germans with unity offers of their own or in dividing the U.S. from its NATO allies. Such additional proposals may provide the means for progress toward the important U.S. objective of retracting Soviet power in Eastern Europe. The U.S. should make clear, however, that it is willing to consider them not as separate proposals, but only as part of a settlement which includes the essence of the Eden Plan. Furthermore, the U.S. must judge their validity in relation to possible agreement on general disarmament, the status of the satellites and free world security. In any event, no local European arrangement would be acceptable which would result in a net diminution of Western strength vis-à-vis the Soviet Bloc.

Security Arrangements

16. The U.S. should be prepared to consider, as part of a settlement including the establishment of a free, united Germany, various possible elements of European regional security arrangements. The selection of any of these elements or combination thereof and their inclusion in any Western proposal require continuing examination by the U.S., as well as agreement on the part of the Western governments. The U.S. should under no circumstances agree to any European security arrangement which involves express or implied acceptance of Soviet domination of the satellites as legitimate or permanent, or compromises the effectiveness of NATO, or which prevents the establishment of a free, united Germany.

Armaments Limitations

17. The U.S. should: (a) be ready to approve appropriate application to a united Germany of any general scheme for limitation and control of armaments that might be agreed upon; (b) favor the extension of the WEU system of arms limitation and control to a united Germany, excluding the USSR from this system; and (c) favor estab-

lishment of limitations and controls in Eastern Europe in connection with a united Germany.

Demilitarized Zone

18. The U.S. could accept the concept that a demilitarized zone be established as part of the settlement establishing German unity, providing the Western military position in Europe is not thereby jeopardized and Germany is not precluded from effectively rearming. The terms of demilitarization should be such as to permit measures necessary for internal security and participation of the inhabitants of the zone in military service elsewhere.

Withdrawal of Soviet and Western Forces

19. a. The U.S. should not at this stage make any proposal which includes the withdrawal of all foreign forces from a united Germany. If such a proposal is advanced by others, the U.S. should be prepared to consider it, but should accept it only on condition that the proposal had the support of our major European allies, including the Federal Republic. In considering such a proposal, the U.S. should also bear in mind the desirability of obtaining the following, as desirable conditions:

(1) The relocation of Western allied forces in satisfactory positions in NATO countries contiguous to Germany would be politically and financially feasible both for the U.S. and for the NATO countries concerned, with satisfactory long-term commitments on the part of the latter.

(2) The alignment of united Germany with NATO was virtually certain.

(3) The USSR would withdraw its forces from Germany to the USSR and would not increase its forces in Poland or station forces in Czechoslovakia.

(4) Execution of the proposal could be so timed, phased and safeguarded that there would be no weakening of NATO's relative military position, allied forces would not be withdrawn until comparable German units to replace them were available.

b. In conjunction with the unification of Germany and the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Eastern Germany, the U.S. might consider a withdrawal of Western allied forces to specified areas in the Western part of Germany in return for compensatory withdrawals of Soviet forces from the satellites. The U.S. should promptly study possible proposals of this nature, including what Soviet withdrawals would be acceptable as compensatory.

c. The U.S. should stand firmly with its allies against any proposal for the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Europe so long as required by the security interests of the U.S. and its allies, and for fostering Franco-German reconciliation. If the Soviets should agree on general disarmament and on other matters that would change the whole outlook in Europe, this would call for reassessment of the assumptions underlying our present European policy.

U.S. Position in the Event of a Continuance of Two Germanies

(The following paragraphs are consistent with existing policy)

General

20. If no agreement on unification is possible in the forthcoming negotiations, two Germanies will continue to exist. The U.S. should, in that event, manifest clearly its intent to continue to work for German unity and for a basic settlement in Europe. Accordingly, it should favor continuation of the process of negotiations toward this end. It should also favor practical steps toward unity which may be desired by the Federal Republic and are consonant with U.S. objectives, and should seek to avoid taking or endorsing positions which treat as permanent the division of Germany or accord the East German regime equal status with the Federal Republic. In judging possible proposals the U.S. will have to take account of the degree of support they enlist in Germany and Western Europe as reasonable steps toward a German settlement and a more stable modus vivendi with the USSR.

Security Arrangements

21. The U.S. should be prepared to reaffirm its adherence to the declaration issued at London in September, 1954, regarding the Federal Republic's pledge not to use force to change the status quo.[5] It could also consider a pledge by the major powers to refuse military assistance to any government which had recourse to force in violation of the principles of the UN Charter.

Berlin

22. The U.S. should maintain and attempt to improve the free world position in Berlin in a manner consistent with NSC 5404/1.[6]

Neutralization

23. The U.S. should oppose any Soviet proposal for the neutralization of the two Germanies.

Armaments Limitations

24. It seems unlikely that any scheme of armaments limitations restricted to the two German states would be in keeping with U.S. objectives. However, in the event of a general disarmament agree-

---

[5] For documentation on the London Nine-Power Conference and the declaration under reference here, see *ibid.*, vol. v, Part 2, pp. 1294 ff.

[6] NSC 5404/1, January 25, 1954, is not printed. The Financial Appendix to NSC 5404/1 is printed *ibid.*, vol. vii, Part 2, p. 1390.

ment, the U.S. should support the application of the terms of such an agreement to the two German states under conditions that adequately safeguarded Western security interests.

Withdrawal of Soviet and Western Forces

25. The West will probably be confronted with Soviet proposals for the early withdrawal of foreign forces from Germany or for their reduction to token contingents, within the context of a continuance of a divided Germany. In present circumstances the U.S. should not agree to such withdrawal. It is believed that our Western allies will support the U.S. position. To offset the possibility that the Soviets might make political capital out of a negative response, the U.S. should insist on the consideration of such withdrawals only in the context of a program for a united Germany.

Status of the Soviet Satellites

26. Existing policy (NSC 174[7]) sets as an ultimate objective the elimination of Soviet control over the satellites. This objective is to be pursued by "appropriate means short of military force", including "if possible, negotiation with the USSR".

27. The U.S. must maintain the position that Soviet control of the satellites is one of the principal causes of world tension and is incompatible both with lasting conditions of peace and with the basic principles of freedom and self-determination. The U.S. should publicly assert this position, possibly with specific demands for withdrawal of Soviet forces, for free elections in the satellites, and for increased accessibility of the satellites to information and influence from the free world, invoking the provisions of relevant international agreements as applicable. Any demands for withdrawal of Soviet forces from the satellites could best be approached through (a) German unification, which should be accompanied by withdrawal of Soviet forces from East Germany and Poland; and (b) the coming into force of the Austrian state treaty, which should be accompanied by withdrawal of Soviet forces from Hungary and Rumania as well as from Eastern Austria.

28. In any negotiations the U.S. should seek every opportunity to weaken or break the Soviet grip on part or all of the satellite area. While making clear its view that a stable peace in Europe requires the restoration of national independence to the satellites, the U.S. should preserve flexibility of means in the pursuit of this objective. The U.S. must avoid in all circumstances any action that even appears to indicate any abandonment of this objective.

---

[7] For text, see *ibid.*, vol. VIII, p. 110.

The International Communist Movement

29. The U.S. should make use of the issue of Soviet manipulation of Communist parties and other activities in the free world, whenever it proves advantageous to do so. No agreement with the USSR is likely on the subject, nor would an agreement be worth much, as the history of such accords in the past will show Moscow has always taken refuge in the position that the Soviet government has no responsibility for or connections with the Communist parties of other nations.

30. For propaganda purposes, it may be desirable publicly to tax the Soviet leaders with their responsibility for this obstacle to international relaxation and normal relations, and to keep them on the defensive. In any case, it will be desirable to let the Soviet leaders know, privately or publicly, that the U.S. will regard their actual conduct on this issue as a test of their intentions.

East-West Trade

Existing Policy

31. Though the basic and traditional U.S. policy is to foster expanding trade and intercourse between all nations, the imposition of restrictions on East-West trade, both unilaterally and multilaterally, has been required as a defense against the aggressive policies of the Soviet Bloc. Moreover, the economic policies of the Soviet Union, including its goal of Bloc autarchy, its trading practices and the paucity of acceptable quantities and qualities of export commodities, are the principal barriers to increased trade with the European Soviet Bloc in all commodities except the small number of strategic items still subject to multilateral control by the Western Powers.

Proposed Policy

32. a. Whenever the U.S. considers that its interests would be advanced, it should consider enlarging trade with the European Soviet Bloc on a commercial basis in items not considered by it to be strategic. To this end, the U.S. might agree to adopt a more liberal policy in licensing U.S. commercial exports in conjunction with demonstrated Soviet willingness to expand East-West trade in non-strategic goods.

b. Any reduction in any of the multilateral controls which the U.S. might consider, would only be in return for Soviet concessions resulting in net improvement in U.S. security, taking into account (1) the negative attitude of our allies toward the continued maintenance of existing control levels, (2) the desirability of maintaining allied unity, and (3) the danger that any such action would lead to allied pressure for further relaxation of controls even on embargoed items.

c. Any reduction of the multilateral control of embargoed items now in effect should be made only in the context of major Soviet concessions, resulting in marked improvement in the relative security position of the U.S. which would more than offset any contribution such reduction in controls would make to the war potential of the Soviet Bloc.

d. In no event should the U.S. reduce or eliminate the embargo on arms, ammunition, implements of war, atomic energy materials, or advance prototypes of strategic items.

e. The U.S. should not, at this time, be prepared to discuss trade with Communist China, but should recognize that reductions under paragraphs b and c, above (1) will tend to increase pressures for reductions in CHINCOM controls, (2) will enable Chinese acquisitions indirectly through the USSR, and (3) will to that degree reduce the value of trade controls as a trading point in any later negotiations with Communist China.

(*Note:* Significant reductions in trade controls may require revision of the Battle Act in order to allow continued assistance to our allies.)

Disarmament

33. The current position of the U.S. with respect to U.S. policy on control of armaments is contained in NSC Action No. 1419.[8]

Far Eastern Issues

34. The U.S. should continue to oppose expanding any four power talks to include Communist China on the grounds (a) that such talks spring from the obligations of the four powers with respect to Germany and Europe; (b) that no such comparable obligations exist with respect to the Far East; and (c) that in any case the current major Far Eastern problems directly concern other nations, including the Republic of China, besides the five. The U.S. would continue to hold to the view that solution of Far Eastern problems is more likely to result from de facto programs and informal approaches than through formalized procedures.

35. In addition, the U.S. should consider what its position should be on the broader question of methods of settling Far Eastern issues, and their relation to the settlement of European or general questions. The U.S. must ensure that in any settlement of European problems

---

[8] Not printed. (Department of State, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1)

the strength, will and determination of the free world which can be brought to bear in Asia are not impaired.

---

154. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rockefeller) to the President[1]

Washington, July 11, 1955.

SUBJECT

Psychological Strategy at Geneva

A basic U.S. aim at Geneva must be to capture the political and psychological imagination of the world. Achievement of this aim requires consideration of the hypothesis that at the Summit meeting "the USSR has no real willingness to alter previous decisions in a substantial respect, but is engaged solely in diplomatic and propaganda maneuvers". Whether this hypothesis is correct or not, only the future will tell, but to be prudent the U.S. must be prepared to act as if it were.

The USSR uses conferences more often to achieve psychological and propaganda advantage than to conduct serious diplomatic negotiations. In view of the prolonged build-up and the widespread interest shown in the Four Power Conference, the propaganda stakes at Geneva may prove more significant than the actual conference results.

Although the existence of internal pressures may make it desirable for the Soviets to buy time, present Soviet tactics stem from a calculated decision to make use of what the Communists call allied "contradictions" so as to achieve fundamental Soviet objectives. A true settlement with the Western Powers is inconceivable although concrete agreements—for specific Soviet advantages—are acceptable.

At Geneva the U.S. will have to choose one of these two basic approaches:

1. React on a piecemeal basis to identified Communist positions.
2. Anticipate, neutralize, and counter Communist anticipated moves by a series of planned proposals.

Psychologically, the latter course appears more profitable.

Any selected U.S. approach should recognize that the present climate of world opinion makes difficult, but necessary, free world acceptance of our program of peace through strength. It is clear that this climate is decidedly in favor of steps to normalize relations by negotiations. The U.S. should exploit, but need not be controlled by, this climate.

---

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File.

The Soviets no doubt recognize that the necessity for allied agreement on the meaning of and ways to handle their "peace" offensive can place further strain on the Western alliance.

To expose to the world the falseness of the Soviet campaign and the validity of our own position, we should:

1. Recognize that the Soviet Union cannot achieve a genuine peace without altering its basic concepts and objectives.
2. Use this basic Soviet "contradiction" to counter the reluctance of the Western allies to stand up resolutely against Soviet blandishments.

This requires that we both:

1. Advocate solutions to issues which will permit a real lessening of tensions.
2. Advocate solutions to certain fundamental issues, which, if the Soviets do not accept, will demonstrate their basic lack of sincerity.

There are four general dangers to the U.S. world position in the Geneva talks:

1. The conference may result in some diminution of our strength in Europe without equivalent compensation.
2. If the talks are superficial and seem to go well, the trend toward neutralization will grow, which will weaken our military strength and also open the path to Communist subversion.
3. A failure of these talks may result in a general disillusionment as to the United States motives and thus strain the relations with our allies.
4. A failure of the talks will so discourage the West Germans about the prospects for reunification that they will subsequently enter into direct negotiations with the Soviets.

Parts 3 and 4 are dramatically supported by recent public opinion surveys.

To check these dangers, the U.S. should do everything possible in the Four Power negotiations without compromising American security interests to demonstrate to the rest of the world—particularly Western Europe—that:

1. The U.S. is continuing in its dedicated efforts towards peace, justice and progress.
2. The U.S. is ready to explore all approaches which could lead to these goals. It insists, however, that only genuine solutions be adopted which are in accord with the moral values of the U.N. Charter.

3. We are offering to our partners sincere and open-minded cooperation.
4. In view of the complexity of the international problems, we propose to identify the most difficult problems and to develop procedures to solve them by stages.

In this situation the security interests of ourselves and our allies will be most effectively protected if the prestige of the President and the enormous confidence in his good will and integrity are used at the Conference for these two purposes:

First, to define sharply the first concrete steps of substance required if the world is, in fact, to move towards peace.

Second, to initiate specific American proposals designed to set the process of peace-making in motion.

These acts will supply to the Free World in general and to the American public the touchstone for judging the results of the Conference and they will give the Administration the foundation for further diplomatic and domestic initiatives to strengthen the Free World if such are required in the post-Geneva period.

Since it is the Soviet practice to take the offensive at conferences, we can only assume that they will have bold propositions in hand. There would be grave dangers in attempting to ride through on the basis of Soviet proposals and excessive French and British conciliatoriness. The "summit" conversations should, just as the Yalta talks, eventually become public and could be extremely significant. We need our own positive approach at Geneva if we are to capture the world's imagination.

Conference issues which suggest themselves as most useful for this purpose include:

1. Disarmament
2. Free Interchange of Information and Persons
3. Expansion of Trade
4. Handling the Satellite Question
5. International Communism
6. Free Access to Berlin
7. Prisoner of War and Internee Repatriation
8. Underdeveloped Areas
9. Propaganda for War
10. Far Eastern Questions

Suggested guidelines for handling these issues are appended. These have been presented to the Secretary of State for consideration.[2]

On the first day, the Russians may, in addition to identifying the issues, make substantive proposals. In subsequent discussions by the heads of state, guidelines for solutions which you might propose would be advantageous. The major task of psychological strategy is the choice of timing, in relation to specific dangers and opportunities. When to seize these opportunities, you can best judge.

---

[2] None of the ten guidelines is printed.

NAR

---

155. C.D. Jackson Log Entry, Monday, July 11, 1955[1]

Dinner with Foster and Janet Dulles—36 hours before he left for Geneva. After dinner Mrs. Dulles left, and Foster unburdened, as expected, because invitation to dinner had been on basis of "alone so we can talk about things".

His opening gambit was, "I am terribly worried about this Geneva Conference". I asked for causes of worry. He said: "I have two major causes. First is that I am deathly afraid our allies might not come up to scratch. The French are so uncertain, so unhappy, and in such a mess all over everywhere that they may fall for some Soviet trick which would give France the illusion of being protected against a rearmed Germany.

"Eden is still in love with the idea of an Eden Plan for Germany. You remember in Berlin in '54 it was an accident of the seating arrangement that made our agreed-upon proposal for the unification of Germany be spoken by Eden, at which time it became labeled 'Eden Plan'. In his case I am very much afraid that he may accept some near disastrous compromise in order to have whatever it is labeled 'Eden Plan'.

"But what I am most worried about is the President. He and I have a relationship, both personal and operating, that has rarely existed between a Secretary of State and his President. As you know, I have nothing but admiration and respect for him, both as a person and as a man aware of foreign policy and conference pitfalls. Yet he is so inclined to be humanly generous, to accept a superficial tactical smile as evidence of inner warmth, that he might in a personal moment with the Russians accept a promise or a proposition at face value and upset the apple cart. Don't forget that informal buffet dinners will be the regular procedure every day, at which time I estimate the real work will be done, and it is at that time that I am particularly afraid that the Russians may get in their 'real work' with the President.

---

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, C.D. Jackson Papers, Time File—Log 1955.

"We have come such a long way by being firm, occasionally disagreeably firm, that I would hate to see the whole edifice undermined in response to a smile.

"As I was saying to the Senate Committee[2] which leaked my phrase about the possibility of Soviet collapse, we are in the situation of being prepared to run a mile in competition with another runner whose distance suddenly appears to be a quarter mile. At the quarter mile mark, the Russian quarter miler says to the American miler, 'This is really a quarter mile race, you know, and why don't we call it off now?'

"The President likes things to be right, and pleasant, between people. He tires when an unpleasantness is dragged out indefinitely. For instance, on the Bricker Amendment—that brother of his in the Middle West, the reactionary one, I can't remember his name—got hold of the President the other day and gave him a long story about giving in on the Bricker Amendment. The President got hold of me and said that he was tired of the endless bickering and wrangling and unpleasantness, and since it didn't really amount to much anyway, why shouldn't we give in and accept some kind of compromise language and let Bricker have his amendment.

"I happened to think of some language in George Washington's Farewell Address, where he made some mention of the fact that only the pragmatic tests of time would tell whether or not the Constitution should be amended, and how, and he urged that no advance theoretical amending be done—and it so happens that since the beginning of our Constitution all Amendments have been as the result of actual experience and need.

"I told this to the President—told him that he would be the first President of the United States who had ever amended the Constitution on the basis of a theory as to the future—that for Bricker to be right it would require the conjunction of a President who gave something away internationally which was unconstitutional, and a Senate which would ratify that agreement, and a Supreme Court which would confirm. *If,* and I underscore if, all these three things happened, then the danger that Bricker is trying to forestall might exist, and that does not take into account the fact that the Congress could upset it if it wished to.

"The President was impressed, and told me the next day that he had read his brother the particular passage from George Washington.

"But you see what I mean. He was tiring of running the full mile on the Bricker Amendment."

At that point I interrupted to ask about the "imminent collapse" leak from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee closed hearing.

---

[2] Not further identified.

Dulles replied that (a) it was an executive session and off the record, (b) he could not talk convincingly to these Hill committees unless he could talk freely, (c) "I was frankly laying it on thick. After all, I was trying to persuade these men that this was not the time to call off that mile race, just because the quarter miler was getting tired. I pointed out to them with all the vehemence that I could that we had reached this point consciously, expensively, and sometimes painfully, but that it had paid off. Furthermore, I emphasized and reemphasized that what Russia had predicted for our system—namely, collapse—was precisely what appeared to be about to happen to them. I don't recall using the adjective 'imminent', but I certainly elaborated on the deepening cracks in the Soviet political and economic structure."

After rambling around on various details, Dulles said: "You know, I may have to be the devil at Geneva, and I dread the prospect."

This gave me my cue to jump in and throw the mile-quarter mile simile right back at him. It was not a question of being a devil, but running that full mile, which he had so successfully started.

I added that for the first time in many, many years the United States had a real Secretary of State, and furthermore had a real Secretary of State as a close partner rather than a competitor of the President. I reminded him of the words and the warmth of tone that Eisenhower had used many times, most recently in San Francisco, referring to his "good friend and trusted adviser, the Secretary of State". That relationship had come about largely as a result of Foster's courage and wisdom. I reminded him of the flap over "agonizing reappraisal", and the worse than flap over his refusal to stop off in Paris en route to see Adenauer in Bonn after the defeat of EDC . . . [3] reminded him of his intelligent generosity in throwing bouquet after bouquet to Eden during the development of the Paris Accords plan after the defeat of EDC. All these things he had been blamed for, and yet the passage of time had proved him absolutely right. If that meant being a devil, well, then, let him be a devil again at Geneva, but a devil with his chin up.

Dulles then went into a rather pathetic little rumination about columnists, who repeatedly had descended upon him like wolves and then 3–4–5 months later when he had been proved right, had never uttered a word of correction. I told him that he should not worry about this at all, or certainly not beyond the initial irritation of whatever it was they printed. After all, columnists are in the business of going out on a limb 1–2–3–4–5 times a week, and it is again the nature of the human animal 3–4–5 months later to type out "Folks, I was wrong about that fellow Dulles".

---

[3] Ellipsis in the source text.

Interspersed in all the above was reference to Trieste, for which Dulles took full credit as something he had wanted to do ever since he got his job. Also a very interesting reference to the heat that Eden turned on during the British campaign to get the U.S. to agree to the parley at the Summit. Dulles said that at one moment when he could hardly believe that it was as important as Eden was apparently making it, he got hold of Harold Macmillan and put the question bluntly to him in terms of "I am amazed at these repeated requests from Eden—will you please tell me straight whether this is simply one of a half dozen things the Conservatives have thought of which might be of help to them in the campaign, or whether this is really of utmost importance". Macmillan replied, "It is of the utmost importance; in fact, if we don't get it, we may very well lose the election". So Dulles agreed then and there.

Picking up from the "devil at Geneva" dialogue, Dulles then said, "To my mind this is much more serious than the way we have been discussing it. In fact, this is something that I have never breathed to a soul, or even intimated, and I suppose there is not anybody else I could actually say it to. My big problem is a personal problem. I am afraid that either something will go wrong in Geneva, some slip of the allies, some slip of the President's, which will put me in the position of having to go along with a kind of foreign policy for the U.S. which could be described as appeasement—no, appeasement is too strong a word, but you know what I mean—or, on the other hand, I may have to behave in such a way at Geneva that my usefulness as Secretary of State, both domestically and abroad, will come to an end."

This was said with a depth of emotion on his part such as I had never heard before, and I was quite shocked.

I thought it was time to really give him a fight talk, so I picked up all over again on the mile race, on the success of the Dulles foreign policy, on his relationship with the President, on the status of his stock vis-à-vis Eden, on the fact that the President was no bubble head, that sure, he might get a little over-cozy with Zhukov if Zhukov turned up at the conference (Dulles interrupted to say that although the Soviet Delegation had not yet been announced, he had heard that Zhukov would probably be a member of the delegation for the express purpose of softening up the President), that Dulles' stock in the U.S. was very high (Dulles interrupted glowingly, "Yes, the latest Gallup Poll puts approval of my policies at 65%), that his stock with the man in the street abroad was probably considerably higher than he thought, and anyhow, what the hell had he done all these things for—for the greater glory of John Foster Dulles or for the United States of America?

It was quite corny and somewhat like a football coach between the halves, but it seemed to work, because as I then had to leave, he took me to the door, grabbed me by both arms, and said, "I am so grateful to you for having come down".

I told him that I was grateful to him for having been taken so tremendously into his innermost confidence, and added that I thought I would send him an edelweiss, which as he knew, was the reward of courage in Switzerland.

Footnote to this is that I commissioned Laguerre to purchase some kind of edelweiss good luck charm in Geneva and send it to Foster with a note from me saying, "As you know, only the most steadfast and courageous climber gets his edelweiss. I am sending you this one *before* the climb because I know you will earn a whole bouquet."

---

156. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Secretary of State and the President's Special Assistant (Rockefeller), Department of State, Washington, July 12, 1955[1]

Nelson Rockefeller left with me a copy of a booklet for the President, dated July 11, 1955, entitled "Psychological Strategy at Geneva".[2] I glanced through this hastily and saw that it involved making proposals with reference to the handling of the various matters that might come up at Geneva. In many cases, these proposals were not in accord with State Department policy.

I said to Mr. Rockefeller that I had grave question as to the propriety of the President getting this kind of advice from sources outside of the State Department. I said that the Secretary of State was supposed to be the principal adviser of the President with relation to foreign affairs, but that if he was getting advice on the whole gamut of international issues from Mr. Rockefeller, that would put us into a competitive position which I did not think was good organization. I said that there had been Presidents who did get much of their advice from private advisers, ignoring the State Department, but that that was not my idea, nor was I disposed to be Secretary of State under those conditions.

---

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Box 50, Nelson Rockefeller. Confidential; Personal and Private; Eyes Only. A note on the source text indicates that it was seen by Hoover and MacArthur.

[2] Document 154.

Mr. Rockefeller said that he had not thought of the matter that way but he saw the force of my remarks. He was, however, bewildered as to what to do. He presumably had a job and did not know how to do it other than the way he was doing it. He would be glad to funnel into the State Department, but had not found any way to do so and the OCB Committee was not practically functioning. He said that if there was no real role for him to play in his present job, he would be glad to give it up.

I said that I would give further thought as to how he might coordinate better with the State Department.

He asked whether he could get into the NATO meeting in Paris. I said that I had already had to cut down very sharply the list of prospective participants, and that unless the meeting was to be a very large one, which I did not yet know, I doubted whether I could work him in. However, I would see.

He asked whether there would be means of keeping the Paris contingent informed of what went on in Geneva. I said I thought it would be possible to send to Paris the same bulletin that would come here to the Vice President.

Mr. Rockefeller then gave me a redraft which he had made of the opening statement for the President which I had given the President yesterday.

JFD

---

157. Notes on a Bipartisan Conference, Washington, July 12, 1955[1]

GENEVA MEETING

The President indicated that the U.S. group goes with hope, and not with false expectations. He feels the U.S. is strong in its allies as well as militarily, economically, spiritually and morally. There is no sentiment for appeasement, and the U.S. representatives have exactly the same attitudes. If the Soviets are making a tactical change, we should take advantage of it. The conference may well be only a beginning, but we will be seeking approaches to our difficult problems.

He indicated the Secretary of State will send back a daily cable, which will serve to keep the Vice President completely informed, and he can in turn inform the Congress.

---

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File. Secret. Drafted on July 13 by Goodpaster.

Secretary Dulles then spoke, recalling how the meeting came about. He referred to Churchill's proposals a year ago,[2] and the U.S. feeling that we should delay until West Germany was in NATO. Once this had occurred, we agreed to hold the meeting but on the terms that we should not seek answers but would seek new approaches toward the solution to our problems, perhaps thus infusing a new spirit. The conference would be difficult because the Soviets often put forward spectacular plans, and we are not ready for that.

The Secretary then reviewed Soviet objectives, our own, and certain allied attitudes.

The Secretary indicated the Soviets may be wanting a "change of pace" and that this may be the reason for some of their recent actions which are not superficial but involve very important risks to themselves (the Austrian Treaty, trip to Belgrade, wooing of Adenauer, etc.). The present pace and the vitality of the West has put too much strain on them. Their leaders are not of the same personal strength as Lenin and Stalin. They cannot bear the burden of modern armaments on a "long haul" basis. There are weaknesses in their industry. The strain of their aid to China and other areas is telling. And they may be accommodating themselves to the free world rather than bucking it, i.e., for expediency they may be trying to get along. Their conduct may be a trap to give them a breathing spell, and we must conduct ourselves so as to be in good position to meet any outcome.

The President indicated that in such a meeting one objective is world opinion. Our free world system depends on the voluntary alignment of our allies—hence world opinion is quite vital. He cited recent neutralist inroads in public opinion; a few years ago he felt the people in Western Europe were strong and the governments weak—now the reverse is tending to occur. He said the Soviets are stressing that the United States is now the iron curtain country (for example in the matter of finger-printing of visitors to this country), and warned that the Soviets may make many preposterous charges.

Senator Knowland asked as to the probable position of the United Kingdom and France, referring to reports of an Eden plan for a fifty-year agreement which would put the satellites permanently into a grouping behind the iron curtain. The Secretary said the British seemed disposed to go further on specific propositions than we were. However, we will want to study them carefully. The Europeans have less concern over the satellites than do we. A working group is now meeting in Paris and he does not doubt that we will be able to get close together. British and French opinion presses them to put out concrete proposals.

---

[2] For documentation on the discussion of this idea during Churchill's visit to Washington, June 25–29, 1954, see *Foreign Relations,* 1952–1954, vol. VI, Part 1, pp. 1075 ff.

Mr. Vorys referred to the Berlin–Geneva sequence and asked if it might be repeated here. The Secretary said the Summit Meeting would be followed up with a Foreign Ministers meeting. The President indicated he would not commit himself to another meeting. If, however, success should be attained in the Foreign Ministers meetings, he would be ready to meet again any time, anywhere, to ratify.

Mr. McCormack asked who would represent the Soviet Union. The Secretary said Bulganin probably would—"that their delegation is supposed to be announced today."

Senator Wiley commented as to the effect on the American people. Many expect the millennium, others see only the same trickery. If the President reaches the conclusion that the Soviets are not seeking to make progress, the President must inform the American people very clearly. The President referred to his plan for a broadcast before going to Europe, bringing out that his approach is conciliatory but that we will sacrifice nothing in the way of interests and basic beliefs. He also plans to make a brief statement on his return, probably with the Secretary.

Mr. Vorys asked as to plans for secrecy. The President said we would try to adhere to any agreement reached on this, but would not remain quiet if others violated it. The Secretary will send reports back to the Congress. Secretary Dulles said he had reached agreement with Molotov not to turn the conference into a propaganda effort. There will be background briefings and the plan for the press contemplates several types of situations.

Senator Clements asked if the greatest area of disagreement would not be over Asia. Secretary Dulles said this meeting is not being called to discuss the Asian question because interested countries will be absent. No doubt the Soviets will raise the matter, but we would not agree to a general discussion. The President said we will not talk while countries concerned are not there. The Secretary said we might agree to discuss specific concrete issues with Red China but we will not be agreeable to a general conference with them sitting in as a great power having interests of general scope. The Secretary mentioned with respect to Indo-China that the Geneva accords are not working well, because of inherent defects. Molotov and Eden may raise this matter since they were co-chairmen at Geneva, and it may be a side issue in the conference. (Senator Smith also asked a question on this—if we exclude the question of Asia, won't that put the United States in an untenable position?)

In response to a question, Secretary Dulles said that efforts are continuing to get our flyers out of China. There is some possibility that Menon[3] may have suggested letting out a few at a time.

Mr. Gordon asked whether we would urge free elections for countries behind the iron curtain, i.e., elections under international supervision and the Secretary said that we would.

G

Colonel, CE, US Army

---

[3] V.K. Krishna Menon, Member of the Indian Parliament and personal envoy of Prime Minister Nehru, visited Peking in May 1955.

Final Discussions Among the Delegations of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, at Paris and Geneva, July 8–17, 1955

158. Telegram From the Delegation at the Paris Working Group to the Department of State[1]

Paris, July 9, 1955—midnight.

125. Department pass Defense. From Beam. At restricted working group meeting July 9 on European security Blankenhorn made following points, emphasizing he had no instructions.[2]

West must be prepared to advance concrete ideas on German reunification and security system because of public opinion factor. German press last two days stressed West had no constructive security proposals to make. His points were that we must appeal to public opinion and must permit Chancellor at time his Moscow visit to deal with any Soviet proposal in light of positions and decisions for handling question of European security taken at Geneva. Therefore, he urged that if Soviets proposed any European security formula at

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/7–955. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Wolf and cleared by Beam. Repeated to London and Bonn. In accordance with the instructions of their Foreign Ministers, delegations from the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, headed respectively by Beam, Harrison, and Crouy-Chanel, met at Paris July 8–14 to consider the substance of questions which might be raised at the Geneva Conference. They were assisted by Blankenhorn and Grewe on questions affecting Germany.

[2] At the first plenary meeting on July 8 Grewe gave a detailed explanation of the Bonn Working Group Report (see footnote 2, Document 149); the rest of the meeting was devoted to procedural questions. (Telegram 120 from Paris, July 8; Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/7–855) Regarding other topics discussed on July 9, see *infra*.

Geneva, the West should be prepared to make immediate counterproposal. Also urged West must make clear that reunification is not solely bilateral German-Soviet matter as Soviets would probably urge, since Chancellor must be in position in Moscow to refer to matter as recognized Four-Power problem. Therefore, West should at Geneva insist on linking reunification to security system, announce guiding principles, and obtain agreement on working group of Foreign Ministers' representatives to analyze and report to Foreign Ministers. He then referred to *London Times* July 8 article as evidencing general European public opinion with which majority Germans agree. Article proposed demilitarization East Zone, controls on forces and armaments similar to W.E.U. He said if these formulae completed within plan of limitation for armaments for all Europe, public opinion requirements would be met.

He therefore felt West should propose principles for European security plan on vague and general basis. However, he said demilitarization should include not only East Zone but broader zone extending from Baltic to Italian Alps, for military reasons. Also said should not bring W.E.U. and Warsaw Group under single treaty replacing NATO and W.E.U., but could have pact of all Western and Eastern countries supplemental to those treaties.

He stressed we should be ready to present formula along indicated lines very early in summit conference, as he anticipated Russians would in conference propose some European security formula to which West should respond.

General agreement between all delegations on following points of principle:

1. German reunification is four-power problem.
2. Reunification will not increase threat to Russian security.
3. Western security system offers guarantees to all.

Possible fourth point on demilitarization and balance of forces brought out difference of views. Germans said should not suggest demilitarizing zone yet but could suggest balance of forces in Europe as first step to general disarmament. British reaction to eliminating demilitarized zone markedly cool, though point not urged by them.

British also suggested possible approach in political area of guarantees on non-aggression and withdrawal of support to aggressor nation.

United States emphasized difficulties presented in proposed fourth point. Said London paper[3] had listed possibilities we were ready to consider at proper time, but United States does not believe West should refer to such possibilities specifically at Geneva. Pointed out strategy implications and necessity obtaining support NATO allies on any proposal by three Western powers at Geneva, as well as need obtain SACEUR views. Sullivan emphasized Russian desire obtain withdrawal United States and United Kingdom forces and disrupt NATO strategy. Stressed technical military difficulties connected with inspection and control procedure in any arms limitation plan, using Korea example.

---

[3] Presumably a reference to Document 102.

Germans in general agreement but said that while we probably would not come to agreement with Soviets on balance of forces, this subject is most important from public opinion point of view. United States stressed need more time for study before agreement on principles. Wolf emphasized NATO nations must be consulted and would probably request views SACEUR and Standing Group; pointed out agreement on principles could be dangerous, particularly on subjects such as balance of forces which are open to interpretation; noted problem of European security arrangement affecting global power struggle situation.

French then proposed that West should agree to definition of its concept of security as distinguished from agreeing principles. After lengthy discussion, following French draft accepted for further consideration Monday morning:

Begin (rough translation):

"The Western powers could present the following in opposition to the Soviet thesis of making the reunification and the organization of a security system dependent upon the dismantling of the Western defence organization:

"(1) Reunification is one of the essential elements of security: the responsibility of the four powers for reunification cannot be evaded.

"(2) Reunification must be achieved under conditions compatible with the security of all.

"(3) Security requires that Germany not be isolated.

"(4) Security of course requires the continuation of existing organizations.

"(5) The security of the West will allow the Western powers to take into consideration the legitimate needs of Soviet security on a basis compatible with the interests of all countries concerned.

"(6) The security of the West hence would permit giving the USSR complementary guarantees, if Germany is reunified:

> "(A) The security of the Soviets is already guaranteed by the dispositions taken under the Paris Accords with respect to matters concerning the non-recourse to force, troop levels, and armaments.
>
> "(B) Juridical guarantees could be given with respect to non-recourse to force and withdrawal of assistance to an aggressor.

> "(C) If the Eastern military organization could be placed in harmony with the Western organization, certain more precise reciprocal guarantees could be considered". *End text.*

Urgently request Department's comments on French draft before Monday meeting if possible.

USDel comment is that French proposal, with some editorial changes, appears to be best acceptable insurance policy against possible United Kingdom, German, or even French pressure for going even further in presenting security proposal to Soviets at Geneva.

Working group proposes following changes French text:

1) Introductory clause should be redrafted to indicate West could volunteer these definitions even if Soviets did not take line indicated therein.

2) Point (4) should be clarified by reference to "continuation" of present alliances and collective security arrangements, particularly NATO and W.E.U.

3) Add to 6(A): "and other collective security arrangements".

4) Reverse order of 6(B) and 6(C).

5) In 6(B) change "given" to "exchanged", and add after "guarantees" "confirming those of United Nations Charter".

6) Change 6(C) to read: "If the Eastern military organization would adopt practices and arrangements providing security to members and non-members alike, as does the Western organization, it could create an atmosphere conducive to further exploration of additional complementary arrangements".

---

159. Telegram From the Delegation at the Paris Working Group to the Department of State[1]

Paris, July 9, 1955—midnight.

128. From Beam. In plenary and subcommittee,[2] French while recognizing necessity pointing to Soviet domination East Europe as basic cause tension said discussion satellite problem at Geneva presented difficult political problem for them and hoped issue would not stand in way agreement on other problems; said key lay in coordinating policy toward satellites after Geneva; advocated adoption

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/7–955. Secret.

[2] At the plenary meeting drafts on various subjects were discussed and referred to appropriate subcommittees. (Telegram 127 from Paris, July 9; *ibid.*) The subcommittee on a declaration of principles heard the British and French support such an idea while the United States opposed any separate or new declaration, saying that the U.N. Charter contained all the necessary guides to international behavior. (Telegram 126 from Paris, July 9; *ibid.*)

different policy towards each satellite but did not spell out idea; noted United States desired play major role in raising satellite issue but agreed all would back United States; hoped expansion East-West trade would play important part in breaking satellites from Soviet grip; asked for tripartite liberation policy.

British agreed Soviet control satellites basic cause tension but doubted whether Soviets would agree consider problem realistically at this time; put special emphasis (later strongly backed by French) on proposals for broader exchange of persons and ideas to set in motion forces of change; at same time, emphasized such offers should be in broadest terms since exchanges with bloc should never be allowed to overshadow normal exchanges with free world; said cultural, athletic exchanges more valuable to Soviets than to free world (French felt cultural exchanges particularly valuable to France); agreed post-Geneva satellite policy required closest coordination.

United States re-emphasized importance maintaining continuing pressure regarding Soviet control satellites since only Soviets can alleviate this source tension; noted important role each could play by emphasizing Soviet need to solve satellite problem before real reduction tension could be achieved in Europe; urged all three should document right discuss satellite problem based on Soviet treaty obligation to West as well as on importance deprivation freedom in East Europe as cause tension.

Subcommittee drafting separate papers on satellites, exchange of ideas and persons and East-West trade.

---

160. Telegram From the Department of State to the Delegation at the Paris Working Group[1]

Washington, July 9, 1955—3:08 p.m.

95. For Beam. Makins was told yesterday[2] that British July 4 memorandum[3] goes too far in regard to position to be taken by three powers at Geneva on European security. He also told we believed it would be mistake for three powers to talk in terms of any specific arrangements relating to European security before they had thoroughly explored among themselves entire question and arrived at de-

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/7–955. Top Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Galloway and signed for the Secretary of State by MacArthur.

[2] No further record of this conversation was found in Department of State files.

[3] Document 147.

cision on what definitive arrangements they would be prepared to accept. This would not be possible before Geneva. To suggest at Geneva any specific possibilities on this general question before we had thought problem through clearly could result in a disastrous situation where we found ourselves embarked on a course which would adversely affect our own security.[4]

Makins was handed redraft of paras two and three of British July 4 memorandum as indication of US views on position which three powers should take at Geneva. US redraft follows:

> *Verbatim text.* It is not desirable that any cut and dried proposal should be tabled at Geneva. That should be left to the Conference of Foreign Ministers. But the Western Heads of State should inform the Russians that they understand the Russian desire for security, and that they are ready to consider measures to ensure that the unification of Germany and her freedom to associate with partners of her choice shall not involve any threat to Russian security. Any proposals in this field would not exclude or delay the work of the United Nations Disarmament Commission on global disarmament.
>
> They accordingly propose that the Foreign Ministers should be instructed when considering the problem of German unity to examine the proposals which the Western powers will be ready to make in order to take into account legitimate Soviet interests and security. *End verbatim text.*

FYI, Secretary saw Makins this subject today[5] and indicated willingness to go somewhat beyond position described above. However exact formulation would have to be carefully considered so that whatever was said would not appear to Soviets or general opinion as concrete proposal.

British Embassy agreed recommend that British July 4 memo would not be introduced into Working Group and that Secretary and Macmillan could discuss this at dinner July 14 prior to tripartite ministerial meetings July 15. For purposes Working Group, believe you should hold line on basis redraft paras 2 and 3 of July 4 memo as set forth above. You may of course discuss this with Harrison. End FYI.

Dulles

---

[4] Beam and Harrison also discussed the British memorandum along these lines on July 8. (Telegram 119 from Paris, July 8; Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/7–855)

[5] No further record of this conversation was found in Department of State files.

161. Telegram From the Department of State to the Delegation at the Paris Working Group[1]

Washington, July 10, 1955—3:54 p.m.

105. Embtel 125[2] considered by Secretary at meeting today with Anderson and Radford participating.[3] Following represents consensus meeting:

U.S. element Working Group able handling German presentation and subsequent discussion noted. Although we hope restrict Summit meeting to identification of issues and methods for dealing with them, we nevertheless face strong likelihood some more substantive discussion in deference views our allies, particularly Germans. Naturally we wish minimize such discussion. We particularly note in this connection Blankenhorn without instructions and would like to know whether his views accurately reflect those of Adenauer. Any further information this point will be appreciated.[4]

Following are Department's specific comments and desired changes in French draft text taking into account Working Group's comments:

Preamble deals essentially with tactics which can be left to FonMins in Paris.

Para 1. Insert "of Germany" after first mention of "reunification".

Para 2. No change.

Para 3. Substitute following for present text: "A reunified Germany must have the inherent right to associate itself with others for collective self-defense". *Comment:* Purpose change is to make clear necessity from Western point of view of German freedom to elect to retain present alliances.

Para 4. Substitute following for present text: "The existing collective security arrangements of the Western Powers will be continued. They are so framed as to render impossible their abuse by any member and thus provide security not only for the member powers but non-members as well." *Comment:* U.S. does not desire recognize any requirement for Warsaw Pact nor any other Eastern security organization which does not constitute voluntary association of free states on basis of equality.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/7–955. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Palmer, cleared with MacArthur, and signed for the Secretary of State by Merchant.

[2] Document 158.

[3] No further record of this conversation was found in Department of State files.

[4] Blankenhorn reported that at a restricted session on July 11 he discussed the German presentation with Adenauer and Hallstein who were both in accord with the ideas expressed in telegram 125. (Telegram 154 from Paris, July 12; Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/7–1255)

Para 5. Substitute following for present text: "These security arrangements are no obstacle to consideration of the legitimate needs of Soviet security, on a basis compatible with the security interests of all countries concerned." *Comment:* We desire avoid implication in French text that present Western security strong while Soviet security deficient and hence West could afford permit increase in Soviet security to meet Western level.

Para 6. Substitute following for present text: "The security of the Soviets is already assured by the dispositions taken under the Paris Accords with respect to matters concerning the non-recourse to force, troop levels, and armaments." *Comment:* Since substance para 6(a) present French text refers to present security arrangements not related to German reunification, we believe it should stand by itself and provide bridge for thoughts contained paras 5 and 7.

Para 7. New paragraph which would read as follows: "In achieving German reunification under conditions compatible with the security of all, the Western Powers would consider with the USSR the exchanging of supplementary assurances which might reinforce those of the Paris Accords and provide for the more effective implementation of the United Nations Charter with respect to non-recourse to force and withdrawal of assistance to an aggressor." *Comments:* (a) For constitutional reasons, we wish avoid words "guarantees" and "juridical guarantees" in present French draft. (b) Since nature and extent of any assurances we could extend would obviously depend at least in part on how Germans opt with respect to continuation their present alliances, we attach importance to relating any additional assurances to the Soviets to the situation which obtains upon reunification. This does not mean that we could not discuss such assurances with the Soviets prior to the achievement of German reunification and exercise of its option. It does mean, however, that the formalization of any such assurances should not take place until their context is clear. (c) Any new assurances should clearly be within the framework of existing commitments, i.e., Paris Accords and UN Charter. (d) In particular, Department opposed to 6(c) of French draft for reasons stated in Comment on para 4 above.

Dulles

162. Telegram From the Delegation at the Paris Working Group to the Department of State[1]

Paris, July 11, 1955—11 p.m.

151. From Beam. Re Deptel 102, Embtel 126.[2] After considerable argument particularly from French, Working Group dropped French and British demand for inclusion draft declaration of principles in its report. French still believe text in Embtel 126 should be useful in drafting final Geneva communiqué. On condition delegations retain text in their files for such purpose French agreed following section in WG report with reference to declaration of principles:

"It is probable that at Geneva the Soviet Delegation will try to persuade the four heads of government to adopt a declaration of principles similar to those to which they have recently subscribed (Nehru-Chou communiqué,[3] and Soviet attempt to get a declaration of principles in San Francisco[4]). It is also possible that they will unilaterally publish their own declaration of principles if they do not succeed in getting their text accepted by the West.

Three governments should resist any Soviet proposal to associate themselves with a declaration of principles, using the following arguments:

(A) We do not need a new declaration of principles: the UN Charter contains all the necessary principles;

(B) Furthermore, to exclude from a declaration certain principles in the Charter would raise questions as to whether these principles have been abandoned or whether they have lost their importance;

(C) The 4 governments have already subscribed to the Van Kleffans statement at the San Francisco commemorative meeting of the United Nations to which all UN members unanimously subscribed;[5]

(D) Any joint declaration of new principles agreed to with the Soviet Union might contain ambiguities which could be embarrassing in the future;

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/7–1155. Secret; Priority.

[2] Telegram 126 reported on a subcommittee meeting at which the French and British pressed for a declaration of principles on international behavior and transmitted the draft of a statement reaffirming the principles of the U.N. Charter. (*Ibid.*, 396.1–GE/7–955) Telegram 102 reported that Secretary Dulles did not like the proposal for a declaration and instructed the U.S. Delegation to "hold line that new declaration unnecessary". (*Ibid.*)

[3] A copy of the Nehru–Chou En-lai communiqué, June 30, 1955, is *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 497, REF–5/55.

[4] At the tenth anniversary ceremonies of the United Nations Molotov attempted to get a declaration of principles approved by the four powers. The three Western powers resisted this effort in favor of subscribing to Van Kleffens' statement referred to in footnote 5 below.

[5] It is not clear whether the reference here is to Van Kleffens' statement on June 25 or June 26; however, both are printed in *Tenth Anniversary*, pp. 283–287.

(E) In any case what the world wants is action not words."

---

163. Telegram From the Delegation at the Paris Working Group to the Department of State[1]

Washington, July 12, 1955—4 p.m.

167. For MacArthur and Merchant from Beam. Following are some notes on our work that might be useful for you to have before you leave. We will be unable to supply you with copy of working group report before you arrive. Cover report will be fairly brief, about 7 or 8 pages. Annexes will include some revised versions of position papers exchanged after San Francisco.

On the whole work has proceeded smoothly and other delegations have been willing to accept many US positions various subjects. It seems to us critical question will be how far other delegations will wish to go at Geneva in offering Russians supplementary assurances to tempt them, as the British apparently wish, to agree to German reunification or, as the French may possibly desire, to stabilize present European situation. We have been unable to draw out other delegations very far on this subject and we have the feeling they are holding their cards fairly close. Department is better informed than we on British intentions but up until now British in Paris have played straight game with us. It is difficult to know to what extent Blankenhorn reflects Adenauer's views since we suspect he is pushing Chancellor to press for flexible forward position. Hallstein incidentally will probably attend Saturday NAC meeting.

We have heard of a Faure–Pinay plan on security but have been unable to obtain further details. Our discussions indicated French may have in mind projecting program at Geneva envisaging Agreement on Force levels East and West in Europe.

Delegation has just seen press report in *Aurore* that Faure scheduled hold press conference tomorrow 4:00 p.m. Report refers to rumors of a Faure plan which envisages 20 percent armaments reduction East and West and establishment of a special world economic development fund based on resulting savings. Report says Pinay has put final touches on plan which he alluded to at San Francisco which contrary to British ideas would be put into effect before German reunification and would extend immediately to two German republics. *Aurore* attaches special interest to fact Faure and Pinay met with Cabinet Saturday.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/7–1255. Top Secret; Niact. Drafted by Beam and Wolf.

Although no hint thereof given in working group, we consider possible Faure may use press conference to outline program. Suggest Department request Ambassador Dillon see Faure before conference, allude to press stories, and, after expressing our confidence in him, state utmost importance we attach to having exchange views three Foreign Ministers before any one of them assume public postures. See immediately following telegram for Dillon's comments.[2]

---

[2] In telegram 168, July 12, Dillon reported that he did not believe the rumors warranted an interview with Faure, but stated that he would have Counselor Joyce talk with Berard along the lines suggested by Beam. (*Ibid.*) In his conversation with Joyce, Berard said he understood the concern of the United States, elaborated on the points which Faure and Pinay would make at the press conference, and added that Faure would say that if military expenditures could be reduced by 10–20 percent, the savings could be funneled into some kind of international organization for reconstruction and development in backward areas of the world. (Telegram 182 from Paris, July 12; *ibid.*) A copy of Faure's statement is *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 496, SUM REF–4/55.

---

164. Telegram From the Delegation at the Tripartite Foreign Ministers Meeting to the Department of State[1]

Paris, July 15, 1955—11 a.m.

Secto 6. In general discussion with Macmillan after dinner last night it was agreed at Secretary's suggestion that it would be advisable arrange for exchange at Geneva on Sunday morning of texts or outlines of opening statements to be made at Conference by three Western heads of Govt.[2]

Inconclusive discussion then ensued on plans for European security which might be presented by West at Geneva.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 530. Top Secret; Niact. Drafted by Beam. Repeated to London.

[2] Secretary Dulles left Washington at 4:30 p.m. on July 13 and arrived at Paris at 12:30 p.m. on the following day. For text of his statement on departure, see Department of State *Bulletin*, July 25, 1955, p. 132; a copy of his arrival statement is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 494. He then made a courtesy call on Pinay at 3 p.m. (Secto 2 from Paris, July 14; *ibid.*, Central Files, 110.11–DU/7–1455) before proceeding to the American Embassy for a briefing at 3:45. No record of the briefing has been found in Department of State files. At 8:30 Macmillan, accompanied by five advisers, arrived for dinner.

Macmillan outlined problem presenting our ideas to the Russians in form that would not be old and stale but would not go beyond safe limits. Soviets probably did not mean business; they would not reject further discussions on security but would not go very far in meeting us. They would probably try bribe Adenauer to break away from West. We should not join them in meaningless principles but should try to do practical business. We should (1) support Adenauer, and (2) persuade NATO we are constructive and are willing to make a practical start on a settlement. Our approach to Russians should be we are willing to assure them security in order to promote mutual confidence; we should be vague within necessary limits but sufficiently precise to give satisfaction to Adenauer and Europeans. We should neither present a plan nor a timetable, but something in between.

Secretary said we should consider what West Germans needed by way of encouragement. Last TASS statement pointed way to neutralism and continuing existence of two Germanys.[3] It was reasonable expect that German reunification and remilitarization should be achieved under safeguards which will protect everybody, including Germany. This would be Foreign Ministers' task; it could be approached through a number of ways and by the time of next meeting we could have a program. On the other hand, it was dangerous at this stage to commit ourselves to specific solutions at Geneva. Some of plans we have considered have looked less good on second thought. Many combinations exist, such as Van Zeeland Plan, proposals for guarantees, etc. We may find something reasonable, given all the possibilities. It would not be safe to go beyond presenting some kind of framework which might be explored. Although other plans are not satisfactory, we have as yet no plan of our own. Implications of a demilitarized strip are obscure. Working Group report[4] suggestion of harmonization of Eastern military organization with that of the West not satisfactory since might obligate us to recognize the Warsaw group, thus giving impression we confirm Soviet tutelage. Also might invite Soviet demands demilitarization of Western areas. We could illustrate scope of what we have in mind, but should not tie our hands.

Secretary said question has not been thought through whether arrangements for inspection and control which might be acceptable to the USSR would be acceptable to us. It has been claimed by Soviets that WEU controls are inadequate and if this is so, would we wish to come to agreement with the Soviets on this basis?

---

[3] Presumably a reference to the statement on July 13 that a solution to the German problem was inextricably linked with European security. (Telegram 104 from Moscow, July 13; *ibid.*, 762.00/7–1355)

[4] Document 167.

Secretary said we have examined many possibilities but are not yet ready to take risk of premature commitments. Future meetings should study problem. We should be free to accept or reject what comes forth. Possibly we can present something by way of illustration, but we should not commit ourselves at this stage.

Macmillan said we should be ready to demonstrate to Russians that we are willing to consider their preoccupations for security in event of a reunified Germany. Disarmament would continue under UN but we would try to work out a settlement on security. If Russians reject our ideas, it must be clear that it is their fault.

Secretary said security should be remitted to Foreign Ministers for study on basis that Germany's reunification would not increase danger to either side. We can't go further in specifying what we have in mind, although we could indicate this is a subject which could be explored.

Macmillan mentioned Prime Minister Eden had wanted to go further and had proposed a demilitarized strip, a security pact, and arrangements regarding disposition of forces.

Secretary said whatever presented should be general and he asked Macmillan to try his hand at such a formula.

Macmillan said he would do his best. We should not commit ourselves to the Russians but define general nature of a proposal. The Soviets had two good cards—Adenauer's age and the various appeals they can make to Germany. We must be able to present an equally effective appeal. UN Disarmament Commission should meet about the end of August and Foreign Ministers should go about solving European problems as a first step, rather than global problems. He suggested we endeavor to find out what the French have in mind.

Secretary pointed out that UN Disarmament Subcommittee must report at some time to full Committee. As regards security, mention should be limited to "reciprocal safeguards", without going further into vague plans about harmonization of East and West systems which was unreal since Eastern bloc was not made up of independent nations.[5]

---

[5] Macmillan and Dulles also discussed the Far East, Indochina, the Middle East, and NATO. Reports on the conversation on the Far East, Indochina, and NATO were transmitted in Sectos 9, 8, and 7 from Paris, July 15. (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 530) Memoranda of the discussions on these four topics, and of that reported in this telegram, USDEL MC-2 (Paris) and SUM MC-5, both dated July 15, are *ibid.*, CF 494.

165. Telegram From the Delegation at the Tripartite Foreign Ministers Meeting to the Department of State[1]

Paris, July 15, 1955—5 p.m.

Secto 11. Secretary asked Blankenhorn to call this morning.[2] Merchant and MacArthur also present. Secretary said he had been studying Paris Working Group report[3] and he did not like Section B. 1. f.11, which indicated three Western Ministers at Geneva would be ready to examine with Soviet Union supplementary measures which would apply in event of German reunification and would be compatible with security interests of all including "further concrete reciprocal safeguards which might become possible if the Eastern military organization were brought into line with the Western". Secretary said he felt this formulation could result in West being placed in position of putting Warsaw Pact on same basis as NATO, which would be great error and would have adverse impact on satellite peoples. Also it might lead Soviets to suggest that in return for certain steps they would take in Eastern Germany and satellites with respect to demilitarization, West should take similar steps in territory they control. He said he favored more general formula.

Blankenhorn said he fully understood objections Secretary had to working group form of this paragraph, and agreed that it could be better formulated. He must emphasize however that Adenauer had real problem with German public opinion and felt three Ministers at Geneva should give some indications of what they had in mind to show particularly German opinion that West had constructive ideas to put forward with respect to collective security to obtain German reunification. Adenauer, he said, would be in difficult position vis-à-vis German public opinion when he visited Moscow unless he could refer to constructive ideas put forward by West. If he cannot, he may have difficulty in resisting unacceptable Soviet proposals. Adenauer believed some reference might be made to possibility of demilitarized zone and balance of forces on assumption WEU and NATO would remain intact. Blankenhorn also indicated there might be some sort of guarantees or assurances which could be exchanged which would in no way impair WEU and NATO which must be maintained.

Secretary indicated he had in mind for paragraph f.11 language which would be general enough to include possibility of different concepts but would not specifically mention them. Subsequently at tripartite ministerial meeting later in morning it was agreed to revise Paragraph f.11, as follows and to give Blankenhorn copy of revision:

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/7–1555. Secret. Drafted by MacArthur. Repeated to Bonn.

[2] The meeting took place at the American Embassy residence at 9:50 a.m.

[3] Document 167.

> "Further concrete safeguards relating to the armed forces appropriate to ensure the legitimate security interests of those concerned".

Secretary wanted to know if Adenauer would get through his bill relating to military personnel, and Blankenhorn replied in affirmative.

---

166. Telegram From the Delegation at the Tripartite Foreign Ministers Meeting to the Department of State[1]

Paris, July 15, 1955—6 p.m.

Secto 13. Re Embtel Secto 6, July 15.[2] In tripartite discussion this morning[3] of Working Group Report[4] some difference emerged as to how far Western countries should go in presenting elements security ideas at Geneva and nature of examples they would employ. Main discussion over whether demilitarized zone should be mentioned as an illustration with UK favoring and US and France opposing.

Discussion started on report sections dealing with Germany and European security. Secretary requested confirmation that revised Eden plan would not be tabled at Geneva. He said discussion there should indicate kind of things Foreign Minister should later deal with but undesirable to table papers which would commit us to precise formulations, particularly since Western countries not yet agreed on details. Also if we tabled papers it would be invitation for Soviets to do same.

Macmillan said British would not table Eden plan but would simply refer to it at Geneva as starting point after 1954 Berlin Conference. Purpose Geneva exchange of views would be to clarify and define perspectives and objectives. We will succeed with public opinion if we can get Four Power agreement that German reunification and European security be referred to Foreign Ministers in acceptable terms. In doing so, we can perhaps outline certain interesting ideas. Only formal paper we should aim at would be instructions to Foreign Ministers re future methods to deal with problems.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 530. Top Secret. Drafted by Beam and cleared with Merchant and MacArthur.

[2] Document 164.

[3] The meeting took place at the Quai d'Orsay at 10:30; for another brief report, see Merchant, *Recollections*, pp. 17–18.

[4] *Infra.*

Secretary said it would be impossible compete with Soviets in making proposals. We should state our goals in general terms and concentrate on terms of reference for future activities of Foreign Ministers.

Secretary objected to formulation in Working Group Report (para B, I, f.ii) (reserved by U.S.) favoring harmonization East and West military arrangements (Embtel 154[5]). This would elevate Warsaw Pact to equal status with NATO and might commit us to establish demilitarized zone from Western area of depth equal to that in East.

Discussion ensued on amended language in course of which Pinay asked whether demilitarized zone excluded from possible formula. Secretary replied U.S. does not favor such zone. Pinay strongly criticized disadvantages of referring to demilitarized zone on grounds it would promote neutralization by leading Soviets to suggest demilitarization of West Germany, would undermine NATO stance and would present internal security problems. Macmillan said hardly reasonable expect Russians give up Eastern Germany, withdraw 22 divisions, abolish Communist govt if they knew Western influence and institutions were to move in and take over area. He said Pinay asking us to hold on to something we hadn't got. Would be advantageous voluntarily renounce right to fill area with NATO forces.

Secretary again stressed risks of referring to demilitarized strip comprising for example East Germany, parts Poland, Czechoslovakia. Soviets could demand withdrawals from West Germany as compensation. Also raised questions re internal security, recruitment, extension of controls and might open door to demilitarization all of Germany. Formula must not require balancing NATO against Warsaw Pact which would legitimize Warsaw Pact.

As formula sufficiently broad to include security arrangements which might be later found desirable, following text adopted to envisage examination "further concrete reciprocal safeguards relating to the armed forces appropriate to assuring the legitimate security interests of those concerned."

Next important point was extent of illustrative examples heads of govt would use in discussing security arrangements. Macmillan said sure Eden intends develop examples with a view to give broad outline of ideas altho they would not be precise proposals. In reply Secretary's question whether Eden would still desire offer suggestion of demilitarized zone, Macmillan replied in affirmative, saying Eden wished to use this as example. It was agreed this would have to be discussed by heads of govt Sunday morning. While Pinay non-commital regarding French intention to mention arms control as element security plan, he said Faure would desire to speak as positively and concretely as possible regarding Germany, security and disarmament. According to Pinay, French rejected overall security organization such as in Molotov plan[6] but wished outline ideas on collective security so details could be discussed by Foreign Ministers.

---

[5] See footnote 4, Document 161.

Arrangement made for Tripartite discussion with Faure at 4:30 this afternoon.[7] Secretary emphasized need keeping divergent views from press.[8]

---

[6] Presumably a reference to FPM(54)47, February 10, 1954, a proposed general European treaty for collective security in Europe which was tabled by Molotov during the Berlin Conference. For text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1952–1954, vol. VII, Part 1, p. 1190.

[7] See Document 169.

[8] Two other telegrams reported further on the morning meeting. In Dulte 2, Secretary Dulles reported that just before the session Pinay drew him aside to say that President Eisenhower should take the lead for the West since it was the United States and the Soviet Union which counted most. (Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/7–1555) In Secto 14 the U.S. Delegation reported that the Foreign Ministers had approved the report of the Paris Working Group (*infra*) and agreed on a procedure for briefing the North Atlantic Council. (Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/7–1555)

---

167. Report of the Paris Working Group[1]

Paris, July 15, 1955.

The Geneva conference will have three phases:

I.—Opening statements;
II.—Exchange of views on the problems requiring solution;
III.—Establishment of procedures for finding the solution of concrete problems.

I.—Opening Statements

The Working Group consider that the opening statements of the Western Heads of Government can only be coordinated at the last moment, at Geneva itself.

II.—Exchange of Views

In accordance with the instructions given by the Foreign Ministers in New York, the Working Group have pursued the examination of the subjects mentioned in Part II of the Report of the Washington

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 494. Secret.

Working Group.[2] The results of this examination are set out briefly in this covering report and in greater detail in the papers annexed to it.

A. Soviet Approach

The Soviet Delegation may be expected to develop its ideas for the relaxation of international tension on a world basis. A list of items put forward in recent Soviet statements is at Annex I.[3]

They may also be expected to make great play with recent initiatives (Austria, the Malik disarmament proposals, visit to Belgrade, invitation to Dr. Adenauer) and contend that it is now up to the West to respond.

B. Western Approach

We shall wish at Geneva to isolate and to formulate the issues on which we think progress could most fruitfully be attempted.

1. Germany and European Security

The Soviet Delegation is likely to argue that the reunification of Germany is only possible provided that such a Germany is free of one-sided alliances and foreign bases. They are further likely to put forward, as the first stage in the reunification process, a withdrawal of all foreign troops from Germany and the provisional co-existence of the two parts of a Germany in the European security system proposed by Molotov.

Our principal tasks will be:

a) to insist that the reunification of Germany through free elections must be treated as the first and immediate problem; (the revised Eden Plan is at Annex II)

b) to seek to persuade the Soviet Delegation that we understand their desire for security and that we are ready to take steps to ensure that the reunification of Germany and her freedom to associate with partners of her choice shall not involve any increased threat to Soviet security.

We should thus formally recognise the link between the reunification of Germany in freedom and European security, and we should accept the need to develop our solutions for the two, concurrently, in subsequent negotiations.

Our position could be developed along the lines of the following propositions:

a) The reunification of Germany for which the Four Powers cannot evade responsibility, is an essential element of security.

---

[2] See Document 136.

[3] None of the Annexes referred to in the source text is printed.

b) Reunification must take place under conditions which provide security for all states, including a reunified Germany.

c) A reunified Germany must be free to assure her defence in association with partners of her choice. Collective security requires that a reunified Germany shall not be isolated.

d) The Western defence organizations are designed to make impossible any individual recourse to force or aggression. They provide for the security of member countries as well as non-member countries. They, thus, contribute to collective security and the Western Powers cannot agree to dismantle them.

e) The Western Powers recognise the need to take account of legitimate Soviet security interests. They consider the provisions of the Paris Agreements concerning non-recourse to force, withdrawal of assistance from an aggressor, force ceilings and armaments already respond to the legitimate needs of Soviet security.

f) However, they are ready to examine with the Soviet Union supplementary measures which would apply in the event of German reunification and be compatible with the security interests of all:

> (i) provisions for the reinforcement of the undertakings contained in the Paris Agreements concerning non-recourse to force and withdrawal of assistance from an aggressor;
>
> (ii) certain more concrete reciprocal guarantees concerning the Armed Forces of such a nature as to answer the security requirements of the interested parties.

The Working Group consider that the advantages for the Western Powers of reunification of Germany on terms acceptable to themselves warrant thorough study of measures which might induce the Soviet Government to accept it.

A paper on European Security is attached at Annex III.

Future procedure is considered under Part III.

2. Disarmament

The Soviet Delegation will probably wish to discuss this question and will seek to exploit their proposals of May 10.

The Western Powers should themselves take the initiative and should enter into a general, but not a detailed, discussion of disarmament.

The Western Powers should demonstrate their real desire for agreement on disarmament and probe the Soviet position. Such an approach should aim at persuading the Soviet Government not to make agreements in the disarmament field conditional on settlement of extraneous political issues.

The Western Powers should concentrate on demonstrating the desirability of the Soviet Government accepting an effective system of inspection and control while at the same time indicating that the West realizes the difficulties which such a system could involve, particularly in the nuclear field.

The Western Powers should insist that the subject of disarmament is too technical for detailed discussion at Geneva and should propose that further negotiations be undertaken by the UN Disarmament Sub-Committee.

A paper on disarmament is attached at Annex IV. Future procedure is considered under Part III.

3. Other Issues

The Western Powers will wish to raise other causes of world tension:

a) Activities of International Communism;
b) The Position of the Satellites;
c) The Iron Curtain;
d) Prisoners of War.

The Soviet Delegation on its side may put forward proposals for:

a) The Far East;
b) A World Economic Conference;
c) A General Declaration of Principles.

Issues to be Raised by the West

(a) *Activities of International Communism*

The Western Powers may wish to draw attention to the activities of international communism as a source of tension which is within the power of Soviet authorities to remove in the interest of restoring mutual trust.

(b) *Position of the Satellites*

The Western Powers may also wish to draw attention to the situation in the Satellites, where, contrary to international agreements, the Soviet Union has imposed governments which do not derive from the free expression of the will of peoples.

A paper is attached at Annex V.

(c) *Iron Curtain*

The Western Powers might at an early stage:

—state their continuing belief in the value of exchanges between their countries and the countries of the Soviet bloc;

—indicate their hope that exchanges between their respective countries and Soviet Union might develop further.

Recent Soviet declarations have indicated that the Soviet Government intends to take the initiative at Geneva.

It is therefore important that the three Western Governments take the first step in order not to allow the Soviet Government to take credit for a development which they have frustrated for years.

A paper is attached at Annex VI.

(d) *Prisoners of War*

The failure of the Soviet Government to repatriate prisoners of war is a subject which might be taken up with the Soviet Delegation outside the conference.

Issues to be Raised by the Soviet Delegation

(a) *Far East*

The Soviet Delegation is likely to raise the question of the status of China either specifically or indirectly by proposing a Five-Power meeting with Communist China or a larger conference, including Communist China, India and other Asiatic States. They may also bring up the question of Indo-China alleging that the Geneva Agreement last year has not been fulfilled.[4]

The Western Powers should seek to avoid any discussion of Far Eastern issues at Geneva. They should resist Soviet proposals for a Far Eastern Conference and should take the line that the solution of Far Eastern problems is more likely to result from de facto progress and informal approaches than through formalised procedures.

A paper is attached at Annex VII.

The Western Powers should oppose any proposal for a Five-Power Conference on Indo-China or any reconvening of the Geneva Conference of 1954.

If the Soviet Delegation press strongly for Four-Power discussion of the Indo-China issue, the Western Powers should take the position that the best chance of securing fulfillment of the Geneva Agreements lies with leaving discussions with the Vietnam Government to the Western Powers while the Soviet Government use their influence to urge conciliation on the Viet Minh.

The above considerations are developed in Annex VIII.

(b) *World Economic Conference*

In his speech at San Francisco, Mr. Molotov suggested a world economic conference sponsored by the U.N. in order to develop international trade.[5] The primary Soviet objective would probably be to mobilise support for the abolition of strategic controls; they would no doubt also try to work up a propaganda line in favour of underdeveloped countries, putting forward some proposals which would be embarrassing to the Western countries.

The Western attitude should not be one of immediately setting aside Mr. Molotov's suggestion. We can state that we are very favorable to an expansion of world trade in non-strategic commodities. If the Soviet Delegation then asks what our attitude would be towards the Conference meeting under the auspices of the United Nations we should reply that we do not feel that such a conference is necessary at the present time, inasmuch as there exists numerous possibilities for an international discussion and for collaboration in economic matters, amongst others the Economic Committee for Europe. If the Soviet Delegation claims that existing institutions are not adequate in certain aspects to solve the problems which concern them we could ask them to define these problems.

---

[4] For documentation on the Geneva Conference, see *Foreign Relations*, 1952–1954, volume XVI.

[5] For text of Molotov's address on June 22, see *Tenth Anniversary*, pp. 103–115.

As regards strategic controls, it would be against our interests and mistaken tactics to be led into detailed discussion. If the Soviet Delegation shows any disposition to negotiate about the individual controls themselves, we should maintain firmly that the controls are exercised entirely for our own security and that they are not negotiable as such with the Soviet Government. If a détente between the East and the West, based on substantial Soviet concessions, occurs, this is one of the issues on which we could make concessions to Soviet demands even to the extent of accepting some risk. The maintenance of our controls is a valuable asset in any negotiations with the Soviet Government and their abandonment could not be compensated by any concessions the Soviet Government might make in the trade field alone.

A paper is attached at Annex IX.

(c) *General Declaration of Principles*

It is probable that at Geneva the Soviet Delegation will try to persuade the Four Heads of Government to adopt a declaration of principles similar to those to which the Soviet Government have recently subscribed. (Nehru–Chou En-lai, Bandoung, Belgrade, Nehru–Bulganin,[6] Soviet attempt to get a Declaration at San Francisco.) It is also possible that they will unilaterally publish their own declaration of principles if they do not succeed in getting their text accepted by the West.

The Three Governments should resist any Soviet proposal to associate themselves with a declaration of principles, using the following arguments:

(i) We do not need a new declaration of principles; the United Nations Charter contains all the necessary principles;

(ii) Furthermore, to exclude from a declaration certain principles of the Charter would raise questions as to whether these principles have been abandoned or whether they have lost their importance;

(iii) The Four Governments have recently adhered to the Van Kleffens declaration which reflects the unanimous feeling of the members of the United Nations;

(iv) Any joint declaration of new principles agreed to with the Soviet Union might contain ambiguities which could be embarrassing in the future;

---

[6] For text of the Nehru–Bulganin statement, issued at Moscow, June 23, 1955, see *Documents* (R.I.I.A.) for 1955, pp. 472–475.

(v) In any case, what the world wants is action and not words.

III. Future Procedure

A. Europe

In connection with, or separately from, a Foreign Ministers meeting, the Soviet Delegation may propose a general European Conference. The suggestion should be rejected for two reasons: first, because such a conference would not provide a suitable forum for the discussion of questions such as German reunification; second, because a wider conference cannot usefully be held until further progress has been made by the Four Powers amongst themselves.

The Western Powers should press for immediate reference of specified European questions to the Four Foreign Ministers. This should be done in carefully and precisely defined terms.

In order to allow sufficient time for preparation and in view of Chancellor Adenauer's visit to Moscow sometime in September, as well as the opening of the UN Federal [*General*] Assembly in the second half of September, sometime in October would seem to be the earliest practicable date for the Foreign Ministers to convene.

In order to avoid procedural discussions, there would be advantage in making Geneva the accepted place for the meeting of the Foreign Ministers.

A paper is attached at Annex X.

B. Disarmament

The Soviet Delegation will probably resist any formal separation of the political and technical subjects contained in Soviet proposals of May 10. It may thus be necessary for the Four Foreign Ministers to pursue as part of their European study the political aspects of the Soviet Plan whilst the technical aspects should be pursued in the UN. It is to be hoped that the Four Heads of Government should be able to agree to instruct their representatives on the UN Disarmament Sub-Committee to resume consideration of all those disarmement questions which come within the competence of the UN at an early date to be settled in consultation with the Canadian Government.

168. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Department of State[1]

Paris, July 15, 1955—2 p.m.

Dulte 1. Eyes only Acting Secretary for President from Secretary.

Dear Mr. President: Discussions last night with Macmillan and this morning with Macmillan and Pinay[2] make it quite apparent that Eden has a "Plan" for Germany which he wishes to unveil at Geneva. This will probably include the concept of a demilitarized zone in Central Europe. Pinay is strongly opposed to our introducing this concept, because he says once the concept of demilitarization is introduced, it will be very difficult to prevent its contagious spread to Germany as a whole and result in a situation such that eventually Germany will emerge not tied into the West but a balance of power between East and West which the French dread.

I indicated some support to Pinay because I understand that our own Defense people are rather inclined to the French view, and because I think we can keep the concept of demilitarization under better control if it is first put forward by the Soviet rather than by our side.

No agreement was reached as to handling this matter, but it was understood that it would be discussed at the combined meeting of Heads of Government and Foreign Ministers to be held at your Villa Sunday morning after church.[3]

We all agree that it will be necessary to indicate that we are open minded and imaginative with reference to possibilities for assuring that a unified Germany will not increase Soviet danger and that the mandate to be given the Foreign Ministers for the second stage would leave them wide latitude in this respect. The issue is narrowed down to whether or not a rather specific suggestion including demilitarization should be put forward from our side at Geneva.

Faithfully yours,

Foster

Dulles

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 529. Top Secret; Niact.

[2] See Documents 164 and 166.

[3] See Documents 178 and 179.

169. Telegram From the Delegation at the Tripartite Foreign Ministers Meeting to the Department of State[1]

Paris, July 16, 1955—2 p.m.

Secto 18. Secretary met for an hour Friday afternoon at Hotel Matignon with Faure, Pinay and Macmillan. Also present were Massigli, Jebb and Dillon.[2]

Faure outlined contents of opening statement he proposed to make at Geneva and said he had personally just completed drafting first half of his statement and expected to finish the drafting by noon Saturday. First part of statement would deal with question of German unification and European security which he considered to be one and the same question. Second part of his speech would deal with his views on disarmament. He said the whole speech would take about 45 minutes to deliver. It was evident that he had not discussed contents of his speech in any detail with Pinay, and also that he had never read report by Working Group.[3] Secretary on two occasions pointed out that purpose of Geneva Conference was to outline problems and agree on terms of reference for further consideration of these problems by Foreign Ministers and other appropriate bodies, such as U.N. Disarmament Commission. Secretary also pointed out dangers of making concrete proposals at Geneva.

Faure said that he was in general agreement with the Secretary's views but that from a public opinion and propaganda point of view he felt it would be essential for the West to appeal to public opinion at Geneva and this would require them to make their over all positions on the major issues of German unification, European security and disarmament clear.

Faure's views on Germany were:

1. German unification is essential.
2. Neutralization of Germany is unacceptable and unified Germany must be free to join the Western security system if she so desires.
3. While the West should stand absolutely firm on the first two basic points they should agree to explore any and all means of giving the Soviets satisfaction regarding their security.

Faure went on to say that the Soviets would be making a great sacrifice in giving up Eastern Germany and would naturally require some quid pro quo which could take many forms. He mentioned the following as examples, all of which he intended to include in his opening statement:

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/7–1655. Secret. Drafted by Dillon.

[2] The meeting took place from 4:30 to 5:30 p.m.; a memorandum of the conversation, the same in substance as the record presented here, is *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 494.

[3] Document 167.

1. A unified Germany should accept arms and armament limitations presently contained in the Western European Union Treaty.
2. The West should give the Soviets specific guarantees against German aggression.
3. The West should be willing to consider the creation of an all inclusive European security organization. (This organization to be in addition to the presently existing organizations such as the Western European Union and the Warsaw Group, both of which could continue.)

Faure said that it would even be in the interest of the West to have some such over all organization as it would provide the mechanism for controlling German arms and armament in case, which he considered to be theoretical, Germany should choose to remain neutral and not join the West or the East.

Macmillan suggested that this theoretical question might be better handled by a five power agreement limiting German armament. Faure immediately said that this was an excellent idea and should be discussed as an alternative to an over all European organization. Faure also said that the creation of a demilitarized zone in East Germany should be seriously considered as a possible guarantee to the Soviets. (This was directly contrary to position taken by Pinay at Quai d'Orsay during morning meeting.[4]) Faure said that in no event should the Western powers agree to the demilitarization of any portion of the West German Federal Republic.

Faure then developed his ideas on disarmament, saying that he had discovered that President Eisenhower had had a similar idea somewhat earlier and, therefore, his idea was not as original as he had at first thought. Faure said that the Soviets now had the propaganda initiative on disarmament with their May 10 proposals[5] and he felt it important to correct this situation by making some new suggestions. He also said there was no effective way to carry out adequate inspection and control of armament and it seemed to him that budgetary controls, such as he had suggested,[6] might perhaps be the best solution. He said that there were technical difficulties with his plan and that he would have to expand on it in some detail in order that it be fully understood. He also suggested that there might be certain concrete advances in disarmament if the Western European organization and Warsaw organization both agreed on reduced troop ceilings. In answer to a question he said that while he at first had been intrigued by the possibility of harmonizing the Eastern and Western security organizations he now considered that this was impractical and undesirable.

---

[4] See Document 166.

[5] For text of the Soviet disarmament proposal, see *Documents,* (R.I.I.A.) for 1955, pp. 110–121, or Department of State *Bulletin,* May 30, 1955, pp. 900–905.

[6] Regarding Faure's statement on disarmament, see Document 163.

Macmillan said that the U.K. would never agree to put the savings from armament reductions into a fund for underdeveloped areas. He said that a substantial portion of any such savings would have to be used to reduce taxes and he pointed out that such a tax reduction naturally would increase the private funds available for investment and so would help in the development of backward areas.

Secretary then pointed out that if Faure's speech should last 45 minutes it would actually require 2–1/4 hours because of the consecutive translations. This would make it impossible to complete the four opening speeches on Monday. Secretary suggested that it would be better to have the opening speeches more general and shorter so as to leave more time for discussion of detailed problems with one or more days being set aside for the discussion of each of the major problems which would come before the conference. Faure had not realized that consecutive translations would be required and suggested that it might be possible to follow the procedure used at Bandung where speeches had been merely handed around in written form and never actually delivered. Macmillan said that this would be impossible as Eden would speak extemporaneously from very rough notes. Faure then asked how long President Eisenhower's opening speech would be and the Secretary replied approximately 15 minutes. Faure then said he would do his best to shorten his speech but that it would be difficult. He said it had been his idea to develop his full thinking in his opening speech and that thereafter he had not intended to have a great deal to say. He recognized that this was a somewhat different approach from that of the U.S. Delegation.

As the meeting broke up the Secretary told Pinay that he hoped Pinay would have an opportunity to read Faure's text before it was finalized so as to assure that it would conform to Working Group decisions. Pinay said he felt sure he would have such an opportunity.

In conversations after the meeting it appeared that the British had been greatly impressed and pleased with Faure's presentation of his views on Germany and in particular on his support for creation of a neutral zone as this fitted in closely with Eden's views. On the other hand they were not in accord with Faure's views on disarmament which they considered to be most unsound.

170. Letter From President Eisenhower to Sir Winston Churchill[1]

Washington, July 15, 1955.

Dear Winston: Soon Anthony and I will be meeting with the French and the Russians at Geneva. As you know, I feel sure that the Western nations could not, with self-respect, have earlier consented to a Four Power Summit meeting. Yet I cannot escape a feeling of sadness that the delay brought about by the persistently hostile Soviet attitude toward NATO has operated to prevent your personal attendance at the meeting.

Foster and I know—as does the world—that your courage and vision will be missed at the meeting. But your long quest for peace daily inspires much that we do. I hope that in your wisdom you will consider that we there do well; certainly we shall do the best of which we are capable in the opportunities we may encounter at Geneva.

Personally I do not expect, and I hope the people of this country and of the world do not expect, a miracle. But if we can inch a little closer to the dream that has been yours for these many years, if together at the meeting table we can create a new spirit of tolerance and perhaps, in concert, come to the realization that force and the threat of force are no longer acceptable in dealings among nations, we shall gain much that will help us in the long and complicated processes that must come after the Summit meeting.

As I leave Washington,[2] my thoughts are with you, as indeed they are on many, many days. I hope you are enjoying to some degree the greater leisure that is yours.

Please give my affectionate regard to Clemmie, and, as always, the best to yourself.

Your old friend,

Ike[3]

---

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries.

[2] President Eisenhower left Washington at 8:30 p.m. on July 15; stopped briefly for lunch at Keflavik, Iceland, at 1 p.m. on July 16; and arrived at Geneva at 8 p.m. on that day. For the texts of his address to the American people just before departure, his statement on arrival at Keflavik, and his speech on arrival at Geneva, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1955,* pp. 701–707. Detailed descriptions of the trip are presented in Ann Whitman's and Major John S.D. Eisenhower's diaries in the Eisenhower Library, Whitman File.

[3] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

171. Memorandum by the Special Assistant to the President (Stassen)[1]

Paris, July 15, 1955.

Suggested U.S. position with reference to Prime Minister Faure's proposal for reduction of armaments.

On July 12, Prime Minister Faure stated ". . . Why not, along with a program of general disarmament, begin immediately by taking a certain percentage of the military expenses of each of the four great powers—thus setting an example—and put the equivalent amount into a four-power fund—open to all—which could be used, no longer for destructive, sterile, negative purposes, but for general social and positive ends?"[2]

The proposal is very undesirable and perhaps can be most easily handled by stating that it should be referred to the United Nations Sub-Committee on Disarmament, to be taken up along with other proposals now before that Sub-Committee or which are subsequently made to it.

If necessary, by raising questions, the following undesirable features of the Faure proposal may be indicated:

1. Such a step is not enforceable as the satellite budgets, the Red China budget, and the military and civilian portions of the USSR budget are all partially interchangeable.
2. In which underdeveloped territories would the funds be used? Inside the Soviet Union? Inside Red China? Inside French North Africa? In Northern Viet Nam?
3. The budget reduction in the form proposed would not contribute to security or to the prospect of peace. It would not affect production of modern atomic weapons and the capacity to deliver them.
4. It would not add any safeguard against the danger of surprise attack.
5. It would lead to a false sense of security and a let-down in the alertness of the people of the free nations. It is they who would assume the agreement meant something.
6. It would open additional Soviet opportunities for subversion. For example, would Soviet technicians be admitted under this special big-four fund to underdeveloped territories—where they are not now admitted? Would they be admitted to French North Africa, South Viet Nam, South America, Ceylon, Egypt?
7. At best, it would grant the Soviets some easing of arms burden, while the free nations, who have already adjusted their armament budgets downward, would reduce their actual security force.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 515. Secret. A handwritten notation on the source text indicates that Secretary Dulles saw it.

[2] Ellipsis in the source text. Regarding this statement, see Document 163.

8. The adoption of the proposal would result in a loss of momentum in the public opinion pressure seeking real inspection results.

9. Would the savings proposed for underdeveloped territories be available in foreign exchange, gold or in rubles?

10. How would percentage reductions be measured if there is inflation or deflation in an economy?

An alternative might be suggested, if there is a strong desire to take some immediate token step. This alternative would be for the USSR to put up a quantity of nuclear material for peaceful purposes, in accordance with the President's suggestion of December, 1953.[3] The U.K. and France could put up a similar value, to be available for the purchase within their countries of machinery and equipment used in peaceful atomic research by the lesser developed countries. In other words, all nations make a token move on the President's peaceful atomic initiative.

Harold E. Stassen

---

[3] For text of President Eisenhower's address to the U.N. General Assembly on December 8, 1953, entitled "Atoms for Peace," see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953,* pp. 813–822, or *American Foreign Policy, 1950–1955,* vol. II, pp. 2798–2805.

---

172. Memorandum of a Conversation, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, July 16, 1955, 9:15 a.m.[1]

PARTICIPANTS

Foreign Minister Pinay and three members of his staff
Messrs. Stassen, Robert Bowie, and William Tyler

In response to Mr. Pinay's request, Mr. Stassen discussed certain preliminary results of the U.S. disarmament studies, in accordance with the points outlined in the July 11, 1955 letter[2] to the Secretary of State and the Secretary's concurrence of July 14th [*13th*].[3]

Mr. Pinay expressed agreement that reliance must be placed upon the inspection system and not upon any treaty, as such, and that the free world must maintain a posture and legal right such that if an agreement is violated, the free world would not have any less security than they would have had in the absence of an agreement.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 494. Confidential.

[2] Document 152.

[3] See footnote 2, *ibid.*

He asked whether the Soviet was aware of the progress the U.S. has made in nuclear weapons and of U.S. progress in early warning and defense against attack. He was advised they undoubtedly had considerable awareness, but probably were not completely cognizant.

Mr. Pinay expressed great interest in the objectives of disarmament; asked that Mr. Stassen confer with Mr. Jules Moch;[4] indicated a preference for no separate talks with Mr. Palewski;[5] and expressed the hope that he might have a further conference with Mr. Stassen some time after Geneva.

He emphasized the importance of the free nations standing together and of including Germany in the free world association.

HES

---

[4] Jules Moch, French Permanent Representative at the U.N. Disarmament Commission.

[5] Gaston Palewski, Deputy Minister to the President of the French Council.

---

173. Editorial Note

On July 16 Secretary of State Dulles participated in a North Atlantic Council meeting, held at the Palais de Chaillot at 10 a.m., during which the three Western Foreign Ministers briefed their NATO Allies on the preparations for the Geneva Conference. (Secto 25 from Paris, July 16; Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/7–1655; summary record, C–R(55)32; *ibid.,* Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 494) During that morning he also conferred with S. Stephanopoulos, Chairman of the Council, on Cyprus. (Secto 20 from Paris, July 16; *ibid.,* CF 524) The Secretary of State then lunched with Lord Ismay, Secretary General of the Council, before departing for Orly Field at 5 p.m. No record of the luncheon has been found in Department of State files. The flight to Geneva was uneventful and Secretary Dulles arrived at 6:30 p.m. in time to greet President Eisenhower who arrived at 8. For text of the President's arrival speech, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1955*, page 707; descriptions of the ceremonies at Cointrin Airport, Geneva, are in the diaries of Ann Whitman and Major John Eisenhower. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File)

The President and the Secretary of State then drove to the President's villa, the Chateau du Creux de Genthod, on Lake Geneva, where Secretary Dulles briefed the President on the meeting with Faure and Eden scheduled for the next day and on the NATO meeting at Paris. A memorandum of their conversation is *infra.* At the same time Hagerty and McCardle met to discuss press arrangements for the United States Delegation. A memorandum of their discussion, USDEL/MC/24, July 17, is in Department of State, Central File 396.1–GE/7–1755.

174. Memorandum of a Meeting With the President, President's Villa, Geneva, July 16, 1955, 8:30 p.m.[1]

OTHERS PRESENT

Secretary Dulles
Mr. MacArthur
Mr. Merchant
Mr. Anderson
Colonel Goodpaster

In the discussion, the Secretary told the President it would be well to remind the Prime Minister and the Premier (Eden and Faure) of the conditions under which this conference had been accepted—that it would not attempt to settle matters of substance, but would be concerned with finding "approaches" by which progress toward resolution of difficult problems might be made. He thought the President might be prepared to exchange outlines of the opening speeches, but did not believe the texts of the speeches should themselves be exchanged. He indicated that it would be desirable to have a view well in mind as to setting the date for the next meeting. On this point, the President indicated that his idea would be that the purpose of a "next meeting" would be to review, and perhaps to ratify, work that had been done by the groups to which problems had been referred. It would be impractical to try to set a date for the next meeting before such progress had been evaluated.

The President said that just before he left the States, Senator George called to tell him that he liked the TV talk very much. The President had had a very cordial talk with Senator Lyndon Johnson the day of his departure, in which both saw grounds for encouragement. The President went on to say that he felt we should not write off what Bulganin has been saying, but should give him every opportunity to go forward into more concrete discussions, on the same cordial and reasonable tone.

---

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, White House Office, Geneva—Notes and Observations. Drafted by Goodpaster on July 22. This conversation is also described briefly in *Mandate for Change*, p. 512; Merchant, *Recollections*, p. 20; and in John Eisenhower's diary. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File)

The Secretary reported on his meeting with the NATO countries.[2] It had been a very good meeting, and the countries had said they would be quite satisfied to have the United States, the United Kingdom and France act as spokesmen, on the understanding that they would, of course, have full opportunity to participate in developing positions before any firm agreements were reached. The Secretary indicated there seemed to be a good deal of acceptance of the idea of inspection, and mentioned that the idea of "photographic inspection" seemed to have a great deal of promise.

A.J. Goodpaster[3]
Colonel, CE, US Army

---

[2] See the editorial note, *supra.*

[3] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

---

175. Telegram From the Delegation at the Geneva Conference to the Department of State[1]

Geneva, July 18, 1955—1:05 a.m.

Secto 29. President opened tripartite discussion with Eden and Faure this morning[2] with indication that his opening statement would be brief and not truculent, touching on the sources of existing tensions. He stressed that no plans or proposals were to be presented at these Geneva meetings which were solely for purpose identifying problems and agreeing on form and methods for their further study.[3] The Secretary noted that there were in fact no specific agreed tripartite substantive proposals to be put forward.

Eden said that Germany and German unity were the key problems before us. He felt they should be given priority and emphasis, bearing in mind that neither neutralization of Germany nor abandonment of Western security arrangements could be considered. Eden believed the Soviets were reluctant to discuss Germany and that it might therefore by useful to force the pace. He commented that pressure on the Soviets at the Berlin Conference had borne dividends in respect to Austria and that he believed the Soviets had ultimately been forced by that Conference to do what they earlier refused.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 524. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution. Cleared in draft with Merchant and MacArthur. Repeated to London and Paris.

[2] The meeting took place at President Eisenhower's villa at 11 a.m. For three other brief accounts, see *Tides of Fortune,* pp. 615–616; *Full Circle,* pp. 327–328; and Merchant, *Recollections,* pp. 20–21.

[3] Early in the morning of July 17, Merchant drafted a memorandum for Dulles attaching a checklist of points which the President should take up with the British and French. (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 515) Apparently Dulles discussed this with the President since its substance is the same as the remarks recorded here.

Faure said his opening statement had been prepared on assumption these statements would be made public in toto. Eden said his had not been so prepared but all agreed that full texts should be released.

Faure agreed with Eden that Germany was the central problem and that neutralization or dismantling of Western security could not be considered. He suggested that we were in a position of strength which would permit us to state our firm position and to ask for Soviet views. We could give assurances that Soviet security was not threatened. If they expressed concern about security, we would agree to explore how to meet their specific problems. Faure discussed four illustrative measures for possible consideration:

a) A demilitarized area.
b) An addition to existing guarantees.
c) An undertaking by Federal Republic that addition of East Germany would not increase German forces above WEU limits.
d) A security organization superimposed on WEU and the Warsaw Pact.

Faure believed guarantees were the only area of possible concession but he appeared to include the all-European organization in this possibility.

The President, the Secretary and Eden objected particularly to going into this detail and to giving apparent legitimacy to the Warsaw organization by treating it as the equal of NATO. Eden said that anything which might be said about a demilitarized zone must be tentative and vague. He suggested a formulation which would refer only to creating area where troops would not be in contact.

Faure then discussed an idea which he said he had borrowed from the President for putting disarmament savings into a world fund for technical development. Pinay strongly supported Faure. He said his expert study indicated that the only effective enforcement of disarmament would be through budgetary controls. An agreed contribution of what would amount to annual dues to a world fund could compel governments to disarm. This development in detail of the idea was strongly attacked by US and UK on grounds of possibilities for USSR to conceal its military expenditures, interference with normal trade, impossibility of committing democracies to predetermined use of budgetary savings from any reduction in armaments.

Faure appeared somewhat shaken and indicated he would redraft his opening statement with a view to making it deal in generalities.

The President closed the discussion saying that it was illustrative of risks of getting into detailed discussions at Conference.

Tripartite group meeting this afternoon to go over and coordinate three draft opening statements.[4]

---

[4] The tripartite group, consisting of MacArthur, Bowie, Beam, Jacquin de Margerie, Berard, Hancock, Caccia, Hayter, and Harrison, met at 2:30 p.m. at the British villa to discuss the opening statements and procedural matters. (USDEL/MC/2, July 17; *ibid.*, CF 516) In reporting to Secretary Dulles on this meeting MacArthur stated that British and U.S. officials had tried to whittle down Faure's opening statement, but he suspected that the end result would have to wait for Faure's meeting with President Eisenhower later that afternoon. (Memorandum for the Secretary, July 17; *ibid.*, Central Files, 396.1–NE/5–1755) For a report on the President's meeting with Faure at 5:30 p.m., see Document 179.

---

176. Memorandum of the Conversation at the Tripartite Luncheon, President's Villa, Geneva, July 17, 1955, 1 p.m.[1]

PARTICIPANTS

United States
The President
The Secretary of State
Mr. Douglas MacArthur II
Mr. Livingston Merchant
Lt. Col. Vernon Walters

United Kingdom
Prime Minister Eden
Mr. Harold Macmillan
Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick
Sir Norman Brook

France
Prime Minister Faure
Mr. Antoine Pinay
Mr. Armand Berard
Mr. Roland de Margerie

The President said that he would like to ask Secretary Dulles if he had any remarks to make.

Secretary Dulles opened by saying that the opening meeting would probably be held tomorrow. As he understood it, an agreement had been reached among themselves as well as with the Russians at San Francisco that the President would preside. The President plans an opening statement that would last about ten or fifteen minutes. He would touch briefly on the topics that might normally be expected to come up, without going into anything which might be controversial nor making any effort to suggest solutions. The thought was that if the opening remarks were general in nature, it might be possible to get all the opening statements over on the first day despite the need for consecutive translation. Then on Tuesday morning the Foreign Ministers might get together and pick out the topics on which there seemed to be common thought and the conference could then get underway at that time. He felt that it would be useful if they had thoughts as to what should be in the opening statements; they might exchange them among the heads of governments. The President had an outline but it was only an outline and he might not adhere literally to it.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/7–1755. Secret. A notation on the source text reads: "Informal record dictated by Colonel Walters—not reviewed or cleared."

The President then said that he thought that the Foreign Ministers could get together and pick out those matters which were common and study the procedure to see how these might be discussed subsequently. If any delegation had a plan they might present it at the time when the plan was to be discussed rather than now and see by whom it should be discussed and how.

Secretary Dulles then said that regarding the mention of a plan it had been informally agreed in Paris to make a difference between a formal plan and illustrative suggestions, and it was felt that no plan should be suggested prior to being studied and agreed upon among themselves and they had not yet had an opportunity for such prior study on any plan.

Prime Minister Eden then said that he felt that a great deal depended on how we assessed Russian intentions. Regarding procedures, he too would make a short statement at the opening of about ten minutes' duration and said that ideas for it might be discussed later. Behind our assessment of Russian intentions, by far the most important issue at this conference was the question of German unity and how we could help a friendly German government and make sure that the NATO front was firmly sustained. He felt sure that he could say that the Russians would not want to talk about German unity now, any more then they had wanted to talk about it at Berlin. We should do all we could to make them talk about the German problem. This was important for Germany. He did not know what the Secretary of State thought but on the matter of Austria, he had held the view that the pressure at Berlin on the Russians for a treaty for Austria had finally had a delayed effect. He had felt that the Russians would not sign an Austrian treaty before a German treaty or at least not until after a German treaty had been signed. The Soviets had been embarrassed over Austria. He did not feel that it was inconceivable that something similar might happen in the case of Germany. He felt strongly that we should keep up the pressure. There was one other thing that he wanted to mention and that was that we should not discount the fact that from the Russian point of view they might wish to delay the discussion on German unity. They might feel that Adenauer was seventy-eight, and that time was on their side, and that if they did not allow East and West Germany to come together, they might be able to keep them apart, Adenauer might die and a weaker government follow. Sir Anthony felt that if progress were to be made on the question of German unity, this conference would be a success for the West. If it was a draw, it would be a success for Soviet diplomacy even though it might not immediately appear to be so.

The President then said that when we discussed this question we should be certain of Chancellor Adenauer's views on any riposte that the Russians might throw at us so that we would not agree to anything that would embarrass him. In discussing the question of Germany, we should not make any blunders where Adenauer was concerned as he was, so to speak, our "ace in the hole".

The Secretary then indicated that there was a representative of the Chancellor right here in Geneva.

Prime Minister Faure then said he would like to know whether the opening speeches would be kept secret or published. Secretary Dulles said that it had been our idea that the opening statements might be made public and Mr. Faure agreed to this. The President then said that you had to put out something and if it was not the opening statement, what could it be. He felt that the opening statement should be weighed carefully. Prime Minister Faure said that it made quite a difference if they were to be published as they would have to rephrase them if this were the case. Prime Minister Eden then said that he thought the Russians probably expected these to be published. Secretary Dulles said this had not been discussed with them and that later that same afternoon, the four press officers would meet in a conference and this question might be raised with them at that time.[2] The Secretary then added that Molotov had asked to see him at eleven o'clock. He had been unable to agree to this time because of his prior commitment for the meeting then underway, but he was to see him right after lunch.[3] If they all agreed, he might indicate to Molotov the general character of our opening speech, which would be brief, would outline the topics and the approach to them but would not go into their substance or discuss them. The fact that he might agree on this character of our opening statement did not mean that the Russians would follow suit. It was almost conventional with them to make a long, elaborate opening statement frequently filled with accusations. Bulganin was not as bad in this respect as Molotov. The Secretary then said he was not certain that there was agreement among ourselves as Prime Minister Faure seemed to have a slightly different opinion.

---

[2] Hagerty reported on the meeting of the press officers at a U.S. Delegation briefing at 3:15 p.m., indicating that general agreement had been reached on the publication of the opening statements and other press arrangements. (Briefing No. 1, July 17; *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 502)

[3] For a report on Dulles' meeting with Molotov at 2:30 p.m., see USDEL/MC/1, *infra*.

Prime Minister Faure then said that he had in fact prepared a longer statement than ours but he would work on it this afternoon in an attempt to shorten it. He had sent his draft over to the President and Sir Anthony and would like to know how they felt about it.[4]

At this point, it appeared that the President and Prime Minister Eden had not as yet received this document. He felt that it was very important that they should all act in agreement. It would be good if they could exchange their drafts so that they would all be in harmony. As for substance, he agreed with Prime Minister Eden that the most important subject would be the question of German unity. He felt that they should discuss this subject frankly in the following manner—primarily give emphasis to the re-establishment of German unity because the division of Germany creates tension and engenders unrest in Europe. There was no valid reason for maintaining a divided Germany. All powers had agreed on the desirability of the restoration of German unity even though they might differ as to the methods to achieve this. A second point which should be developed is that the neutralization of Germany would be an impossible condition for us as a price for the restoration of German unity. This had been expressed previously by the Soviets. There are many arguments of law and fact against the maintenance of German disunity. If Germany were reunited as we advocate and not neutralized, she would probably stay in the Western European and NATO organizations. Only if she refused to stay should a real security problem arise, and this is not probable. What real objection could the Soviets present if they were acting in good faith. If all of Germany were included in the Western organization rather than two-thirds as is the case presently, this would, of course, increase the capabilities of the Western organization, but would this be a new danger for Soviet security? Mr. Faure said he did not believe that it would constitute a danger as the Western European organization is a defensive one only. The increase in our capabilities might well be compensated by the fact that a cause of tension would disappear. If the Soviets were to ask for security guarantees we could take these under study provided we were not asked to give up the Western defense organization. He felt it was extremely important that our position be firm at the outset and that no neutralization could be accepted. This being said, he felt that we could not conclude a bargain without being prepared to make some concessions and in examining this we should move to the only ground where we could make such concessions and that would be the field of assurances even if the Russians made exaggerated demands for them. The Soviets might well ask for security guarantees if Germany is reunited and stays in the Western European and NATO organizations. He said that this advantage for us might compensate by [*for*] these guarantees. In all the different studies that have been made on the question of security guarantees for the Soviets, they have been presented as follows: (We can speak on this later and agree among ourselves on tactics to be followed.)

---

[4] Not found in Department of State files.

We might renew or express in another form the guarantees that already exist on the part of the Western powers and Germany. For the West we might agree not to support any recourse to force and Germany might agree not to resort to force. These are juridical ideas that might be confirmed or expressed in a different form. The second idea was that he felt that if all of Germany were to be included in NATO instead of only West Germany, we might agree that this should not change the military potential of Germany and that a reunited Germany would maintain the same force levels in NATO as had been foreseen for the Federal Republic only. A third idea which had been expressed in England was that East Germany might be demilitarized if the country were reunited. Fourth, an over-all security organization in which Germany would be included might be superimposed on existing organizations without abolishing them. In his opinion, it was of interest to examine and discuss these matters to show that we had thought them through seriously and hiding nothing. If there were general agreement he felt this thought might be expressed without going into detail. If not, he would go along with whatever was agreed among themselves.

The President then said that he was not quite clear as to how much detail Mr. Faure felt should be included in the opening statement. He feared that if each statement expressed an identical idea and went over the ground in detail that this might give rise to a Russian rebuttal which would last all day Tuesday and would cover the whole world, including the Far East.

Prime Minister Faure said this was the reason why he had sent over his draft in order to obtain the ideas of the other delegations. The President then said that neither he nor apparently Mr. Eden had seen it. Mr. Faure said that his speech was quite long and boring but that he intended to shorten it. (The President then handed Mr. Faure an outline of his proposed remarks and Mr Faure's draft was then handed to the President.) The President said he expected to speak for about 10 or 15 minutes. Mr. Faure then said that his first draft was quite long—as the French writer, Rivaol, had said—he had not had time to shorten it. He then suggested that their assistants could get together, read the speeches and indicate where they felt helpful changes might be made.[5] Prime Minister Eden then said that he felt this had been very well handled under paragraph 2 of the proposed draft. We should seek action on unity in such a way as not to endanger the security of anyone. One or two illustrations might be put into the opening statements without going beyond. It might be indicated that some security arrangements might be reached and some armaments arrangement might be possible without going into detail.

The President said that this was correct and he felt that while we should have unity on principle this should be done in such a way as to insure that we were not repeating the same words. If he spoke in general terms and very briefly he might plead for the proper spirit and mention this problem and whoever was next to speak might add some illustration. He felt that there should be basic unity between them but that they should not parrot one another's words.

Prime Minister Faure said he fully agreed. The question was not one which should be discussed in the President's speech as he was speaking at a higher level. Then his own, which would be next (for politeness sake he had mentioned Mr. Eden first but chronologically he would be the second to speak) might add an illustration without going into detail. He felt it was important that they should agree in advance as to avoid contradictions and fastidious repetition. The President expressed his agreement with this.

Prime Minister Eden then said that he might suggest that in making an illustration we should be careful not to be specific in speaking of any demilitarized zone. Otherwise, we would be held to what we said. No indication should be given as to the area or zone in question if the topic were mentioned. We might, for instance, say that there "could be some area between the troops" but no definition should be given as to size or area.

The President said that he felt that we should be careful in expressing these ideas to make them simple and put them simply. He realized the difficulty of translating some of these thoughts into Russian and from previous contacts with the Russians he had found that they had often innocently assumed a meaning which he had not intended. He had one additional word to say concerning the neutralization of Germany. He had not talked this over with the Secretary but he was confident of his own judgement in this matter and he felt there was no possibility of having 80 million hard-working people in the center of Europe as neutrals. It simply could not be done. He did not feel we could accept this for intelligent discussion.

---

[5] See footnote 4, *supra*.

Secretary Dulles said he would like to add one remark to what Sir Anthony had said regarding the need for caution in approaching the matter of demilitarization. He felt similar caution should likewise be used in approaching the matter of the Warsaw organization and treaty. We should be careful not to treat it as a real counterpart to NATO. If the Warsaw organization were composed of truly independent states with a will of their own, some comparison might be possible. In point of fact, the Warsaw organization was a device whereby the Soviet Union projected its frontiers into the center of Europe. The West should not say or do anything that would sanctify or consolidate a situation which he felt was abnormal and must change before peace could be consolidated.

Prime Minister Faure said that personally he shared Secretary Dulles' opinion and he thought that Mr. Pinay also agreed even though the French Government might previously have taken a different position. Evidently it was an attractive idea to establish a similarity between the Western bloc and the Warsaw organization and consider them as organizations of the same type and seek contracts between them. For the reasons which Secretary Dulles had expressed he would be reluctant to accept this conception. He felt we should mention the eastern organization as little as possible, the more we spoke of it the more this would tend to give it the appearance of a real security system. The President expressed his agreement with this.

Mr. Faure then said that in his projected statement he had also considered the German question as the principal problem but he had also discussed a second matter, which was the problem of disarmament. He had been extremely impressed by an exposé of President Eisenhower in 1953 on the connection between the reduction of armaments and economic and social questions.[6] He would like to take up this idea again, while apologizing to the President for borrowing it from him. He would like to give the idea more precise form by suggesting that disarmament might be entrusted to an international organization. He felt that the only practical means to control disarmament would be of a financial nature rather than by attempting to exercise technical controls only. Taking up once again the President's idea of a reduction of military expenditures he felt that reality could be given to disarmament efforts by a contribution of the countries committed to a common fund for the development of underdeveloped areas. He felt that only along this path could a solution be found as otherwise disarmament could never be implemented. Furthermore, the idea had excellent propaganda value for the Western powers and would avoid giving the Soviets a monopoly of generous and charitable ideas.

---

[6] See footnote 3, Document 140.

The President said that the biggest trouble in this report was the impossibility of finding out from the Russians' budget exactly what amount they were really spending in the military field. They scattered their expenditures through different appropriations, chapters, and ministries and it was extremely difficult to ascertain the real amount being expended by the Soviet Union for military purposes. In our case, our newspapers, magazines and free discussion and travel made it almost impossible to maintain secrecy of this type, and if we attempted to disarm merely on the basis of military budgets, the free world would be taking what he felt was an unjustifiable risk. Because of that, he did not believe that disarmament could be disassociated from inspection. Here there was an important point he wished to make, inspections alone would not be satisfactory as today it was possible to conceal enough explosive material to defeat a nation in a relatively small space. But other things could be observed, among these was the means of delivery of these weapons. We might start off by devising a method of inspection that would be mutually acceptable, picking out items to be inspected. If this could be done, a great area of confidence could be created which did not exist at the present. A large item, such as 4-engine bombers could be checked on as it required large fields and factories to produce it. The same was true for atomic cannon, warships, and there might be other things that could be added to this. If this were done, what would be left to a potential aggressor. His capability for surprise would be severely limited. The President by no means rejected the idea of reducing military budgets and building up a world fund to assist undeveloped areas.

Mr. Faure said he did not believe there was any opposition between their two positions but rather that one complemented the other. He had had a study made of the Russian budget to see if his thesis would be applicable, and this study had brought out an extremely high figure so that even if the Russians were hiding sums, the figure would remain about ten thousand billion francs. On the other hand, he felt like the President, that they might combine both the control and budgetary methods. The budgetary method had the advantage of imposing a financial burden. If a reduction of ten percent were agreed to, this would be a thousand billion francs and if the Russians agreed to this, but did not in reality reduce their military expenditures, they would have to expend an additional thousand billion francs. The President remarked at this point that the Russians might be perfectly capable of doing this.

Prime Minister Eden then said that ~~most of~~ us—the United States on a large scale, and the others according to what they could afford—were giving considerable assistance to other nations under the Colombo Plan and under other forms. If a disarmament agreement could be achieved, we would of course be in a better position to do more for these nations, but he would not want to exclude some relief for the British tax-payers from the heavy burden they were carrying.

Mr. Faure said that he had foreseen this as a former finance minister and so had Mr. Pinay who had also been finance minister for a long period of time. If he had entered into detail, it was in an attempt to find a formula for redistribution within the countries, and he felt that control was an essential part of this plan. Prime Minister Eden then said he felt this should be handled pretty carefully. We were all free countries in principle, and it was quite true that the greater the reduction in expenditures, the more there would be available for private investment to use as well as for the governments. He did not feel that we could lay down here that they would automatically contribute to this fund the amount that would be saved by any reduction in expenditures. The President said that he could not get away with that either, but that we should not give up the idea that we do want to help others, otherwise we would go back to where we were 20 years ago. All of us would like to do more but he did not feel that we could lay down firmly exactly what we could do.

Mr. Faure said that each State had the right to reduce its arms expenditures and taxes but they did not do so because of the menace of Soviet military power. If an agreement could be reached for a reduction of armaments, each country could of course do more. The President felt we should express our desire to do more.

Secretary Dulles said he felt we should bear in mind what Prime Minister Eden had suggested, that government action should not be the only measure of what we could do as in our own society private enterprise and capital played an important part. We had mutual aid plans which had concentrated on Europe and Asia. We had not had any for South America, but this did not mean that we were not interested in this area. But the political climate was such that private capital could be invested there. In fact, over two billion dollars had been invested in Venezuela in the last five years. The measure should not be entirely government action as in a free society private enterprise also played its part. With a reduction of disarmament expenditures, this would mean a diminishing of the burden of private income and the lower the taxes are on private income, the more capital would be available to flow out for investment to these underdeveloped areas.

Mr. Macmillan then said that the French Prime Minister had referred to methods of control. The physical control and the budgetary control. He had discussed the limitations on physical control and had outlined the possibilities of budgetary control. He felt that what was done with the proceeds was quite another subject. The matter of disarmament, by financial control, could be used for what it was worth to ensure that reductions actually took place. What would be done with the savings was another question. He would be hesitant to bind ourselves to placing the resulting savings under international control. This was not relevant to our major purpose, which was to secure a reduction of armaments. They were two different subjects.

The President then said there was a very important thing called "world opinion". For a long time it had been felt throughout the world that the atomic bomb was of interest to only two places—Washington and Moscow, as an instrument of destruction and the whole field of atomic science had been similarly regarded. The United States had spent a great deal of money to show that this new science, instead of being devoted to the destruction of man, might prove to be his saving. They had tried to make this clear from Timbuctoo and South Africa to Spitzbergen. This science could be devoted to the good of man. This brought pressure on the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., and the idea of sharing the savings with others than the spenders was important, bringing home to Brazil and Burma an understanding that disarmament was important to them. We did want to do more.

Prime Minister Faure then said he had a word to say about Mr. Macmillan's remarks. He felt that the originality of his own thesis lay in the fact that it gathered together two separate ideas. Budgetary control and the contribution for a common fund. This was important because budgetary control by itself might not be effective and if the Russians today were to agree to a reduction of military expenditures and not carry it out by trickery, there would be no penalty, so to speak for them, but under the idea of the contribution to a common fund, they would have to spend this additional amount in order to make their contribution. He felt that his whole idea rested on the matter of the common fund. He would go further than the President and say that his idea transformed a negative idea (disarmament) into a positive idea (common fund), and would make an unrealizable idea capable of realization. He realized that there were many difficulties in this plan and that it was not something that could be achieved tomorrow, but he felt that if the idea of an economic organization could be tied to the idea of disarmament, something new and valuable would have been done. The President then asked if there was not some such organization within the framework of the United Nations. Prime Minister Faure replied that there was an organization of this type but he felt that this common fund could better be handled outside of the United Nations. Prime Minister Eden then asked if we did not have enough administrations already. Mr. Pinay then said that the idea of the common fund might be combined with the control of items as suggested by the President, and this might enable the countries to contribute more.

Secretary Dulles then said we should bear in mind that money saved domestically through budgetary reductions was not exactly the same as making available foreign exchange. There was a difference between money spent internally which was kept in the country and a fund which would be sent abroad and would impose a contribution of goods and services, and that we should recognize the difference between these two.

Mr. Faure said this was very important and he had not mentioned it in order not to go into too great a length on this subject. If a government reduced its military expenditures, there should be a corresponding increase in national production so that disarmament would not become a cause of recession. It was a very complicated problem and if that country were to reduce its military expenditure by ten percent, as an example, consumer goods should be given rather than foreign exchange. Trucks instead of tanks and transport aircraft instead of military aircraft.

Mr. Pinay then said the organization might not be as complex as the President envisaged. It might be even fairly simple. It could list the requirements of each undeveloped country, and place orders for shoes, textiles, trucks or other items in contributing countries and then see that they were delivered to the undeveloped countries. He felt that the question of control item as extremely important. Mr. Faure had not perhaps brought out sufficiently its relations to budgetary economies. If ten percent were saved, there might be a five percent tax reduction and a five percent contribution to the common fund.

The President then said that this detailed discussion illustrates how if the four heads of government go into such detail, the discussion of this one subject might take two days. He felt that the heads of governments should establish a spirit and leave the details in the hands of technicians and professional specialists.

Secretary Dulles then said he was about to commit the sin that the President had just condemned. He had one other thought, if you put shoes, textiles and other goods into an area as free exports, giving them away, this would have disastrous effects on international trade. We have unhappily been engaged in a business of trying to dispose of surplus agricultural goods, and this had a disastrous effect on normal trade.

Prime Minister Faure then said that he would also commit sin but would then go to confession. He felt that Secretary Dulles' objections might be overcome by having the international organization sell these products to the undeveloped nations and then use the money for their own improvement by digging canals, building dams, and other similar projects. He would now leave sin and return to the light. He understood the objections to his thesis but he thought it was a good one. The Soviets had promised disarmament and happiness to the peoples of the world. They had given neither and had never proposed anything practical. Under his idea they would be offered the choice of contributing to the welfare of under-developed nations without being able to sandwich in Communist ideology. If they accepted this, they would be bound up in a system other than their own. If they refused, this would have an extremely adverse effect on world opinion towards them.

The President said he felt it was a good idea and we did have to help the rest of the world. He was not sure that shoes might necessarily be the way. He could cite a case in the Philippines where if you gave a man a pair of shoes, he would tie them on a stick and carry them over his shoulder. When he saw you and realized you were his benefactor, he would put them on, but as soon as you went away, he would put them back on a stick over his shoulder.

Mr. Faure said that the wife of one of the French governors in Africa had gone around giving baby carriages to the natives and the native women had merely strapped the babies on their backs and had pushed the empty baby carriages around.

At this point the discussion began to break up and Mr. Pinay said that we should not agree with anything that would in any way weaken NATO. The President said he had worked so hard to build up NATO, that he could certainly agree with that, and Mr. Pinay said that it was not only a question of not giving up NATO, it was a question of doing nothing that would in any way weaken the NATO defensive organization. At this point the President invited his guests to join him at lunch.[7]

---

[7] At 2:30 p.m. Merchant briefed the U.S. Delegation on the tripartite meeting. Dillon Anderson's record of the briefing, which is substantially along these lines, is in the Eisenhower Library, White House Office, Geneva—Notes and Observations.

177. Memorandum of a Conversation, Secretary's Villa, Geneva, July 17, 1955, 2:30 p.m.[1]

USDEL/MC/1

PARTICIPANTS

United States	*USSR*
The Secretary	Mr. Molotov
Ambassador Bohlen	Mr. Zaroubin
	Mr. Troyanovsky (interpreter)

Mr. Molotov said he had no major questions to take up but merely wished to see Mr. Dulles before the conference began. He understood that all organizational and procedural questions had been agreed upon.[2]

The Secretary said that that was agreed insofar as he was aware. There was, however, one question he wished to take up and that was the desirability of making public the initial statements tomorrow of the four Heads of Delegations. The President planned to make a ten or fifteen minute statement outlining the problems as he saw them without, however, going into substance. The Secretary said he hoped the list of the problems would not be controversial. It was his impression that if the press were given something of this nature for the first day it would then be easier in subsequent meetings to have more informal and intimate discussions which would not be given out to the press.

Mr. Molotov inquired whether this statement would be the President's major statement or merely a preliminary one.

The Secretary replied that the President had no prepared material except for this brief statement which was in the form of a preface. It was anticipated that subsequent discussions would be informal and the President would speak extemporaneously and without prepared material.

Mr. Molotov said he understood.

The Secretary stated that, while he could not speak for the British or the French, they had lunch today[3] and their ideas were, he thought, in general along the same lines except that M. Faure has in mind a more extended speech than that of the President. He added that Sir Anthony Eden also wished to keep the discussions informal.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/7–1755. Secret. Drafted by Bohlen. A nearly verbatim summary of this memorandum was transmitted to Washington in Secto 27 from Geneva, July 17. (*Ibid.*)

[2] While most of the organizational and procedural questions had been agreed on, the delegation secretaries also met at 2:30 to discuss with Peter Wilkinson, Secretary General for the Conference, last-minute arrangements and procedures. A memorandum of their discussions, CF/ADM/SEC.DEL/1, July 17, is *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 502.

[3] See *supra.*

Mr. Molotov asked whether the President, M. Faure and Sir Anthony Eden would also make statements for publication.

The Secretary replied that he understood they would do so if this was acceptable to the Soviet Delegation.

Mr. Molotov said he thought it was acceptable and would inform the Prime Minister but he anticipated no difficulties.

The Secretary said the President had received an invitation from Mr. Bulganin for dinner tomorrow night and for a subsequent dinner to include the other Heads of Delegations. The President, however, in conformity with protocol established in Washington that the President, who was Head of State, does not accept official invitations to meals would follow the same practice here. The President, however, would like to invite six members of the Soviet Delegation to dine with him tomorrow night which would afford an opportunity to talk.

Mr. Molotov said he would transmit the invitation and added that it might be possible to find some other form of meeting on an unofficial basis at the Soviet residence which the President could attend.

The Secretary said he would communicate this suggestion to the President. He hoped that opportunity for informal discussions at the Palais des Nations would be possible during the intermissions and at the buffet.

Mr. Molotov replied, "of course".

The Secretary continued that possibly the most useful results of the meeting would emerge from these informal contacts and while the directives, which might be officially adopted, would not be momentous they might nonetheless reflect a new spirit behind them which might be developed during these informal contacts.

Mr. Molotov agreed and said judging from preliminary indications of the statements made by the Heads of Delegations, it seemed to him that some such result might well emerge from the conference. He inquired whether tomorrow morning's session would be devoted to statements by the Heads of Delegations.

The Secretary said that was his understanding and that it might be necessary to use up some of the afternoon session for the same purpose since he imagined that part of the morning would be taken up by photographers. He said that he thought on Tuesday morning the Foreign Ministers might meet in order to agree on the topics to be discussed by the Heads of Governments that afternoon.

Mr. Molotov said that seemed possible.

178. Memorandum of Conversations, President's Villa, Geneva, July 17, 1955, 4:30 p.m.[1]

USDEL/MC/30

PARTICIPANTS

The President
The Secretary of State
Sir Anthony Eden
Mr. Harold Macmillan

SUBJECTS

Eden's Proposed Statement
Alpha
Quemoy-Matsu Situation
Prime Minister Nehru
Convertibility

The President talked with Sir Anthony Eden at the residence while I talked with Harold Macmillan at the boat house. Harold Macmillan showed me the draft of Eden's proposed statement for tomorrow. I said I thought it was good subject to two points:

1. It seemed to me to deal too explicitly with the "demilitarized zone". I suggested that it might be better to try to put it more in terms of having a gap between the forces on the two sides so that they would not be in direct contact.
2. It seemed to me to treat the forces of the Satellite States as permanently a part of the Soviet group to be balanced against NATO forces. I said I thought it dangerous to envisage a situation, the permanency of which depended upon the permanent hold of the Soviet Union on Satellite countries and that if, for example, Czechoslovakia should be genuinely independent the plan should still be workable.

Macmillan said he saw the force of both points and would try to get Eden to accept them. However, he said there had been so much newspaper talk about Eden's plan for a "demilitarized zone" that it would be difficult to get away from the phrase. Also since apparently Faure was going to adopt the term there was less reason for Eden attempting to get away from it.[2]

The President told me that his talk with Eden had dealt primarily with the following points:

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/7–1755. Top Secret. Drafted by Dulles. The U.S. Delegation reported briefly on these meetings in Secto 32 from Geneva, July 18. (*Ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 524)

[2] In another memorandum of conversation, USDEL/MC/6, July 17, Dulles reported that he and Macmillan had also discussed the procedure for the meeting of the Heads of Government on July 19. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 396.1–GE/7–1755)

1. The Alpha project as regards which Eden had given him an Aide-Mémoire, a copy of which the President gave me and which is attached. (See Secto 28, July 17[3])

2. The President said he had told Eden it was impossible for us to put up the money to enable them to manufacture and give away Centurion tanks . . . . If, however, the British were prepared to carry a substantial part of the burden we might then do some of it. He said that in principle he favored the use in the Middle East of equipment of British design so as to minimize the burden upon us of replacement of spare parts in the event of war.

3. Eden said they were greatly worried about the Quemoy–Matsu situation and thought he should get the Nationalists out. The President said he had replied that it was easy to say this but not at all easy to do it. We had explored the possibility and found that out. Eden had said he would stand by us with regard to Formosa but did not want to get into a war about Quemoy and Matsu.

4. Eden had spoken of Nehru and felt that he was honest in his approach and his estimate of the Russian situation although perhaps a little too trusting.

5. Eden had spoken about convertibility and indicated that his Government felt that it was premature to change the situation at the present time.

The President said that he had suggested that he and I would have breakfast with Eden and Macmillan and go over these points together.

The President said that Eden also mentioned bicycles and the Chief Joseph Dam.[4]

John Foster Dulles[5]

---

[3] The aide-mémoire was transmitted to Washington in Secto 28 from Geneva. (*Ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 524)

[4] A copy of President Eisenhower's memorandum of this conversation is in the Eisenhower Library, Whitman File.

[5] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

---

179. Memorandum of a Conversation, President's Villa, Geneva, July 17, 1955, 5:30 p.m.[1]

PRESENT

The President
The Secretary of State (for latter part of conversation)
Prime Minister Faure
Mr. Antoine Pinay
Lt. Colonel Vernon Walters

---

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File. Drafted by Walters.

The President opened the conversation after greeting the two French ministers by saying that he had re-read his statement and not found anything substantial to change in it, and that he would deliver it in very much the form that the French ministers had seen.[2] Mr. Faure said he had read the draft of the President's statement with great attention and care and he felt that it was excellent and struck just the right note. He then inquired whether the President had seen his projected statement. The President said he had not, that he had been extremely busy in the afternoon and that it was in the hands of his staff who were translating it and would give it to him shortly. Mr. Faure said that he would make his projected statement considerably shorter. The President then said he felt that we should be very careful in mentioning anything concerning international organization as such. He did not feel that we should be specific in this respect and Mr. Faure said that he would express himself in this respect in extremely general terms.

Mr. Pinay then said that he had seen Mr. Molotov and the President indicated that Secretary Dulles had also seen the Soviet Foreign Minister.[3] Mr. Pinay then said that Mr. Molotov's visit was entirely a courtesy one and the President said that the same had been true of his visit to Secretary Dulles. Mr. Molotov had wanted to invite the President, and had appeared somewhat disappointed when the Secretary had explained why this could not be done. He had said that he would pass it on to his colleagues. The President said that he felt that it was important not to give the Russians the feeling that they were being discriminated against, and that these social contacts could have great value in creating an atmosphere of confidence. Mr. Pinay said that Mr. Molotov had also stressed to him the importance of these social contacts. The President said that he agreed that these private meetings and social contacts could do a great deal to create confidence. He had been dealing with the Russians since 1941 when in the War Department he had been working on helping them rearm themselves, and had worked with them frequently since then. He could recall in his previous contacts on several occasions, that when he asked the Russians exactly what they wanted, they had replied on these various occasions, "to be treated as equals in every respect". He said that he hoped that they would realize that their desire to be received into the family of civilized nations could only be realized if they began to behave like the civilized nations. The President felt that if an atmosphere of confidence could be created, and if we could feel that they were being honest, our problem would be solved. Mr. Faure said that the problem was to know when they were acting in good faith and when they were not. Up to the death of Stalin they had always acted in bad faith. Since then, the situation had been somewhat in a state of flux, and sometimes they had acted in good faith and sometimes not. Mr. Pinay said that the fact that they were behaving relatively well should not induce us to having unlimited confidence in them. The President said he would not want Mr. Pinay to believe that he was over optimistic, but he merely wished to quote a famous commander who once said, "Pessimism never won a battle nor a war." He said the problem was to know at what point they were acting in an honest way. If we could create a proper spirit among the chiefs of delegations, the confidence could develop in a satisfactory manner. If we could only have confidence in them as we have, for instance, in Mr. Eden, it would be an easy matter. If Mr. Eden would promise the French Ministers or us that he would do something, we would know that he would do it. If we could ever reach a situation where we have this kind of confidence in the Russians, the solutions to our problems would be relatively easy. The President said he felt that if they were negotiating in bad faith, we should carry on the talks because their evidence of bad faith would rebound against them, and if they were in good faith, we should encourage them along this path.

---

[2] President Eisenhower had shown Faure the draft at their luncheon meeting earlier in the day; see Document 176.

[3] See Document 177.

Mr. Faure said that he had recently received Mr. Ilya Ehrenburg, the Soviet writer, at his home in Paris as he had known him previously and Ehrenburg had been attacking the Paris Accords. Mr. Faure had explained to him that we must show confidence in the Germans now that they had good leaders. If we did not, we would get someone like Hitler who would ask for everything, and Ehrenburg had indicated that we should encourage the Russians in the same way. The President said it was interesting that Ehrenburg had been so frank and Mr. Faure said that the Russian's frankness had not really extended this far. He had only said that we should not limit that confidence to the Germans alone.

The President then said that in his opening statement he would speak briefly and frankly urging the development of friendly understanding and good faith between the conferees. Mr. Faure said he had read the President's speech and felt it was very good. As President, he spoke from a higher level and could set the tone of the conference. The President said that we should establish the proper spirit and let the conference develop. He was looking forward to the buffets that would, he understood, be served at the meeting place following the official sessions, because there they would be able to have long informal talks. The President said that as far as he was concerned, he hoped that the official and formal sessions would be short as possible, and that the informal and unofficial ones as long as possible. Mr. Pinay reiterated that Mr. Molotov had mentioned to him the importance he attached to these social contacts.

At this point, Secretary Dulles joined the conferees.[4] Mr. Faure said he did not wish to detain the President and would shorten his speech. He would not specify definitely concerning the organization he had mentioned in the morning, though he did not feel it should be in the framework of the United Nations. Some United Nations members did not have to disarm because either they were already disarmed, or they had very small armed forces. This proposal would affect only those nations who were armed to a point where a reduction of armament expenditures would have major implications for their budget.

The President said this was true, but he would not want to see us commit ourselves to any specific organization or method. Mr. Faure said he would phrase his statement along these lines.

The President, Secretary Dulles, and the two French ministers then spoke for some fifteen minutes on purely social topics.

---

[4] Secretary Dulles' memorandum of this part of the conversation, USDEL/MC/5, July 17, is in Department of State, Central File 396.1–GE/7–1755.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE, JULY 18–23, 1955

180. Editorial Note

Documentation on the Geneva Summit Conference comes from three principal sources in Department of State files. The most extensive set of records is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CFs 451–533A. Similar materials are *ibid.*, CFM Files: Lot M–88, Boxes 170–171. The third repository is *ibid.*, Central File 396.1–GE, which contains a smaller, but significant amount of documentation. These three sources duplicate each other extensively. In the Eisenhower Library, the White House Office Files (Office of the Staff Secretary) also have materials on the Conference which largely duplicates documentation in Department of State files.

Department of State, Conference Files: Lots 63 D 123 and M–88, in addition to considerable documentation on the preparations for the Conference, contain sets of the documents (CF/DOC 1–28), records of decisions (CF/DOC/RD 1–13), and administrative papers

(CF/ADM 1–16) of the Conference. They also include the United States Delegation verbatim minutes of the plenary sessions (USDEL Verb 1–8), memoranda of the conversations during the time in which the Conference sat (USDEL/MC 1–23), orders of the day (USDEL OD 1–7), administrative papers (USDEL/ADM 1–16), and records of the several meetings of the four Foreign Ministers. In general these records are more nearly complete in Lot 63 D 123. The Conference Files also contain complete sets of the telegrams to and from Secretary Dulles (designated Tedul and Dulte), telegrams to and from the United States Delegation (designated Tosec and Secto), and sets of the 15 series of delegation reference papers (designated SUM D), which are not present in Lot M–88. The material *ibid.,* Central File 396.1–GE is largely confined to the two series of telegrams although some of the memoranda of conversations and records of the plenaries are also present.

Supplementing these sources are two collections of documents on the Conference which were made public shortly after its completion. The first, a British publication, *Documents Relating to the Meeting of Heads of Government of France, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and the United States of America, Geneva, July 18–23, 1955, Miscellaneous No. 14 (1955)* (hereafter cited as *Cmd.* 9543), presents eight statements that were made at the Conference and includes the text of the final directive of the meetings. The second, a United States publication, *The Geneva Conference of Heads of Government, July 18–23, 1955* (hereafter cited as *Geneva Conference*), in addition to materials preceding and following the Conference, presents statements made during the meetings and documents of the Conference. Reference to these two publications has been used to provide citations for the full texts of statements which are otherwise summarized in the following documentation.

In addition to these official publications some of the participants in the Conference have left records of their impressions in published and unpublished accounts: President Eisenhower in *Mandate for Change,* pages 503–527; Major John Eisenhower and Ann Whitman in manuscripts in the Whitman File at the Eisenhower Library; Livingston Merchant in *Recollections;* and Ambassador Bohlen in *Witness,* pages 381–388. Prime Minister Eden and Foreign Secretary Macmillan recorded their views of the Conference in *Full Circle,* pages 327–345, and *Tides of Fortune,* pages 614–625; and First Secretary Khrushchev in *Khrushchev Remembers,* pages 392–400.

A further source of material on the Conference is a 346-page classified study, undated, which covers the plenary sessions and the meetings of the Foreign Ministers and includes a number of the Conference documents. A copy of this study is in Department of State, CFM Files: Lot M–88, Box 171.

In the documentation that follows the editors present in chronological order a full record of each day's activities during the Conference. The editors have not printed the verbatim records of the plenary sessions or of the Foreign Ministers meetings, because of their extensive bulk. An exception was made for those records of the restricted session on July 23. In some cases two or more records of a particular meeting or conversation have been included when they either represented markedly different accounts or when they reported on different parts of the event. It is not possible to give a complete record of the Conference even from the United States side, as many meetings were held for which no record was been found. In these cases the editors provide an editorial note describing the meeting and noting the source from which the available information was drawn.

July 18, 1955

181. Editorial Note

According to the records of the United States Delegation, Secretary of State Dulles met with Merchant and MacArthur at his villa at 8 a.m. Other than a notation on the delegation order of the day, no record has been found of this meeting. (USDEL OD–2a (1st revision), July 18; Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 520)

Following this meeting, Secretary Dulles, Merchant, and MacArthur were joined by Bowie, McCardle, Phleger, Bohlen, Thompson, and Beam for a small staff meeting, during which an intelligence briefing was given and the United States, foreign, and Soviet press reactions were analyzed. Other than a notation on the delegation order of the day (USDEL OD–2a (1st revision)) and another draft of the order of the day (SUM OD–1, July 18), no record of this staff meeting has been found. (*Ibid.*, CF 520 and CF 513, respectively)

182. Delegation Record of the First Plenary Session of the Geneva Conference, July 18, 1955, 10 a.m.[1]

The curtain rose on the Conference at 10 Monday morning July 18, after Dag Hammarskjold had welcomed the four Heads of Government on behalf of the United Nations whose facilities had been placed at their disposal. The First Plenary Session of the Conference was in the Council Chamber of the old League of Nations Headquarters, the Palais des Nations, overlooking the lake on the outskirts of Geneva. In the center of the ample floor was a four-sided table, open in the center. Around all four sides of the room and behind a railing were a half dozen or so rows of banked seats. Then higher a balcony overlooked the room. [Here follows a description of the chamber.]

In this chamber all the meetings of the Conference were held, except during the final tense days when, in the effort to resolve the impasse on the terms of the Directive, each Chief of Government, with only three members of his Delegation, retired to a smaller adjacent conference room.

[Here follows a description of the seating arrangements.]

There had been a bustle as the four Delegations drove up in rapid succession to the Palais des Nations. Dag Hammarskjold greeted the four Heads of Government at the entrance.[2] Then all trooped in to the Council Chamber. There were greetings of friends and acquaintances in the several Delegations. The President walked over to speak to Zhukov whom he had not seen for years. I looked at the Marshal carefully and was impressed by his dignity, his soldierly bearing and the intelligence in his face. Of all the Russians he made to me the best appearance by far.[3]

[Here follows a paragraph describing President Eisenhower's subsequent meetings with Marshal Zhukov.]

After ten minutes of shutter clicking the press balcony was cleared and the President opened the proceedings with friendly informality.[4] He offered to write letters on behalf of all four Delegations to the President of the Swiss Republic and to the Secretary General of the United Nations for their welcome and for all the facilities which had been provided.[5] All agreed. He then suggested that the Heads of Government meet again that afternoon but that thereafter, barring need, they meet only after lunch, leaving the mornings for the four Foreign Ministers to prepare the discussion for the Heads. This met with quick agreement for it had been worked out in advance.

---

[1] Source: Merchant, *Recollections*, pp 26–29.

[2] For text of Hammarskjöld's greeting speech, see *Geneva Conference*, p. 17.

[3] According to a brief memorandum of conversation, USDEL/MC/19, July 18, President Eisenhower shook hands with the eight principal members of the Soviet Delegation, and with Bohlen interpreting, also chatted briefly with Bulganin and Khrushchev. (Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/7–1855)

[4] The U.S. Delegation minutes (USDEL/Verb/1); its very brief summary of the proceedings, transmitted in Secto 35 from Geneva, July 18; and the records of decision, CF/DOC/RD/1, are *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 510, CF 524, and CF 510, respectively. For text of President Eisenhower's opening remarks, see *Geneva Conference*, pp. 17–18; for his account of this session, see *Mandate for Change*, pp. 513–516.

Faure, Eden and Bulganin, each in turn, responded briefly to the President's opening remarks. Each referred to the wide hopes aroused that this meeting would be fruitful. The Conference then got down to business.

The President spoke first.[6] What he said was short but it covered all the ground. He spoke with force and great earnestness. "We are here in response to a universal urge". He then went on to say that while we could not solve in a few days all of the problems of the world, it was "necessary that we talk frankly about the concrete problems which create tension between us and about the way to begin in solving them". Then the President undertook to catalogue and describe the issues he thought should be discussed: the unification of Germany by free elections, taking into account "the legitimate security interests of all concerned"; the right of peoples to choose their own form of Government and the fact that certain peoples of Eastern Europe had been deprived of this right, notwithstanding wartime pledges; the problem of communication and human contacts among our peoples; the problem of international communism and its 38 years of subversive activity throughout the world; and, finally "the overriding problem of disarmament". He spoke of the possibility of frightful surprise attacks and the need for effective mutual inspection. The President closed, after a reference to the need "to press forward in developing the use of atomic energy for constructive purposes", with an appeal to inject "a new spirit into our diplomacy; and to launch fresh negotiations under conditions of good augury". For all this he said he was sure "all humanity will devoutly pray". The statement was simple but eloquent. It set a tone which every intervention by the President thereafter would support and reinforce.

After the translation Faure spoke.[7] His statement was long—nearly three times the President's. He spoke well and confidently. The first two-thirds dealt exhaustively and effectively with the problem of Germany. To end the cold war it is necessary to end the

---

[5] Copies of these letters are in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 515.

[6] For the full text of President Eisenhower's statement, circulated as CF/DOC/1, see *Geneva Conference*, pp. 18–22; *Cmd.* 9543, pp. 7–9; or Department of State *Bulletin*, August 1, 1955, pp. 171–173.

[7] For text of Faure's statement, circulated as CF/DOC/3, see *Geneva Conference*, pp. 22–31, or *Cmd.* 9543, pp. 9–14.

"brutal fact" of the division of Germany, he said. Faure then disposed of the hypothetical solution of the German problem by the "neutralization" of Germany. He first stated and supported with detailed reasons why Germany "cannot and must not be neutralized". It was an impressive exposition and doubly so coming from a Frenchman.

Then Faure came to "the constructive organization of peace: Disarmament". He left the impression that his scheme for economic and budgetary controls which he had sprung on us the day before and from which the President and Eden had been unable to shake him—would provide all the necessary safeguards.[8] For my money his speech would have been infinitely more effective and realistic had he figuratively sat down when he had completed his analysis and his proposals on Germany. When Faure finished it was lunch time and the Conference recessed until 2:45 when Eden and Bulganin would have their turns.[9]

---

[8] See Document 176.

[9] Immediately following adjournment of the session at 12:40 p.m., Hagerty held a press conference. The verbatim transcript for the press conference is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 503.

---

183. Memorandum of a Conversation, Geneva, July 18, 1955, 1 p.m.[1]

USDEL/MC/7

PARTICIPANTS

United States	*UN*
The President	Mr. Hammarskjold
Mr. Dillon Anderson	
Colonel Goodpaster	
Colonel Walters	
Major Eisenhower	

SUBJECT

Dealing with the Communists

Principal points made by Mr. Hammarskjold were the following:

Before luncheon, he referred to a comment which the Soviet member of the Economic and Social Council had repeatedly stressed to him in identical words. It was the following: "We should start off, in our deliberations, from the things we have in common, rather than the things that divide us."

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/7–1855. Secret.

During luncheon, Mr. Hammarskjold cited three elements which he felt were of the highest importance in dealing with the Communist Chinese: unfailing courtesy; firmness; and being certain never to retreat from a position once taken. He indicated that the Chinese Communists were fiercely nationalistic and showed a pronounced desire for world recognition. He thought this was a desire on their part that they be taken seriously—to be accepted in world society reporting their prideful comment that now for the first time China has a centralized government. The point he sought to make seemed to be that nationalism meant more to them than communism. He did not appear to feel it was a demand arising out of a Tito-like feeling that they had accomplished great things with no outside help.

The Russians have shown a desire, beginning with their change of attitude several months ago, to support the principle of the UN whenever an issue arises in these terms. Along with this they have avoided controversy—he cited Molotov's comment after what was thought to be a rather firm speech by Secretary Dulles at San Francisco, "Mr. Dulles has said what he believes, and I have simply said what I believe". He made much the same comment in connection with Mr. Truman's remarks concerning the Korean War.

Discussing the relationship between the Chinese Communists and the Communist doctrine, Mr. Hammarskjold cited the reaction of a Chinese scholar high in the government who was not a member of the Communist party. Mr. Hammarskjold asked him in the presence of Chou En-lai about the freedom to entertain divergent views in the Communist world and the scholar responded, "What freedom" with a broad smile. (The point of this seemed to be that he did not hesitate to make a scoffing comment about freedom under Communist rule.) He also referred to a Harvard-trained administrator high in the

Chinese Communist government who makes it clear that he himself does not hold Communist beliefs.[2]

A.J. Goodpaster[3]
Colonel, CE, US Army

---

[2] Either at this luncheon or at the greeting ceremonies before the First Plenary Session (see the U.S. record, *supra*) Hammarskjöld gave President Eisenhower copies of the Swedish Minister's conversation with Chou En-lai on July 8 and the Secretary-General's reply thereto concerning U.S. prisoners in China. Copies were transmitted to Washington in Secto 39, July 18. (Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/7–1855)

In a related matter Secretary Dulles drafted a memorandum on July 26 in which he recalled:

"At Geneva, on a date I have now forgotten (probably July 18) I spoke to Mr. Hammarskjold and asked him whether or not he thought it would be helpful or the reverse if we should through direct contacts with the Chinese Communists seek to reinforce his efforts to get back the eleven US prisoners of war. He said he thought it would be helpful." (*Ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 516)

[3] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

---

184. Delegation Record of the Second Plenary Session of the Geneva Conference, July 18, 1955, 2:45–5:21 p.m.[1]

In the afternoon the President called on Eden.[2] He spoke briefly—about as long as the President had—and well. His languor in manner and in delivery is deceptive. He concentrated on Germany. "As long as Germany is divided, Europe will be divided" and later, "To reunify Germany will not of itself increase or reduce any threat which may be thought to exist to European security." Then Eden came to the real meat of the Western position as it had been developed in the past two months. It is worth quoting the key paragraph in full for it contained the heart of the new and bold offer we were prepared to outline in our all-out effort to achieve the unification of Germany. We had moved a great distance from the Berlin Conference where the central Western proposal was the "Eden Plan" for free elections.[3] Eden went to the heart of our new offer:

"As I have said, our purpose is to ensure that the unification of Germany and her freedom to associate with countries of her choice shall not involve any threat to anybody. There are no doubt many ways of doing this. To illustrate what I have in mind let me give some examples. These will consist partly of actions and partly of assurances. Let us take the latter first. We would be prepared to be parties to a security pact of which those round this table and a united Germany might be members. By its terms each country could declare itself ready to go to the assistance of the victim of aggression, whoever it might be. There are many forms which such a pact might take. We would be ready to examine them and to set out our views about them. We would propose to inscribe any such agreement under the authority of the United Nations. It would also be our intention that if any member country should break the peace that country would forfeit thereby any rights which it enjoys at present under existing agreements.

---

[1] Source: Merchant, *Recollections*, pp. 29–32. The U.S. Delegation verbatim minutes, USDEL/Verb/2, and the records of decision, CF/DOC/RD/2, for the second plenary are in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 510.

[2] For text of Eden's statement, circulated as CF/DOC/4, see *Geneva Conference*, pp. 31–34, or *Cmd.* 9543, pp. 16–18.

[3] For text of the Eden Plan, FPM (54)17, January 29, 1954, see *Foreign Relations*, 1952–1954, vol. VII, Part 1, p. 1177.

"Secondly, we would be ready to discuss and try to reach agreement, as to the total of forces and armaments on each side in Germany and the countries neighbouring Germany. To do this it would be necessary to join in a system of reciprocal control to supervise the arrangement effectively. All those represented here would we hope be partners in this, together with a united Germany. It would be understood that any proposals in this field would not exclude or delay the work of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, to which we attach great importance.

"Is there some further reassurance we can give each other? There is one which I certainly think should be considered. We should be ready to examine the possibility of a demilitarized area between East and West."

Eden closed with the expression of hope that before the Conference ended agreement could be reached on the outline essence of what had just been proposed.

All then turned to Bulganin. He spoke quietly and in a low voice.[4] He might almost have been the chairman of a large charity organization delivering his annual report. Almost—but not exactly.

First, Bulganin claimed to Russia's credit everything that in past months had relaxed international tensions: "the termination of bloodshed in Korea and the cessation of hostilities in Indochina"; the Austrian Treaty; the "normalization of relations between the USSR and Yugoslavia"; the Bandung Conference and Nehru's visit to the Soviet Union; and finally the Russian offer to establish diplomatic relations with the Federal Republic of Germany.

Then Bulganin went on to rehash the Soviet proposal of May 10 on disarmament.[5] Referring to the President's statement, he said he was in complete agreement with the need to eliminate artificial barriers between the two peoples. Bulganin droned on. The propaganda content was excessively high. He did insert a statement that Russia would contribute fissionable material to the Peaceful Atomic Energy Agency when established. The offer was a step forward but it didn't cost the Soviets much. He made a polite verbal bow to Faure's economic scheme for disarmament control as "worthy of careful examination".

---

[4] For text of Bulganin's statement, circulated as CF/DOC/2, see *Geneva Conference*, pp. 35–43, or *Cmd.* 9543, pp. 18–25.

[5] For text of this proposal, see *Documents* (R.I.I.A.) for 1955, pp. 110–121.

Bulganin then launched into his main thesis—European security was the important thing. It was clear any unity for Germany was a matter for the more distant future. "It must be admitted that the remilitarization of Western Germany and its integration into military groupings of the Western Powers now represent the main obstacles to its unification." His main proposal was the Berlin one of "a system of collective security with the participation of all European nations and the United States of America." The change from Berlin was to promote the United States from observer status to participation. There was also the twist of advancing in two steps instead of one. In the first the Warsaw Pact and the North Atlantic Treaty would remain in force. In the second stage they would be liquidated and thereby the presence of the United States driven from the continent of Europe. This has been and I am satisfied remains an unalterable objective of Soviet policy. Bulganin said plainly: "The Soviet Government is of the opinion that our eventual objective should be to have no foreign troops remaining on the territories of European states."

Bulganin then put in a plug for neutrality as a policy to be encouraged, supported and guaranteed. He brushed off the President's request that the satellites should be discussed. "To raise this question at this conference means interference in the internal affairs of these states." He then added that the subject of "so-called 'international communism'—cannot be considered appropriate." That was that. The further public and private urgings of the President and the Secretary would not budge the Soviet leaders one inch in the direction of discussing these two items.

Bulganin then turned briefly to the Far East. Taiwan, he said, has "become a dangerous hotbed of complications in the Far East" and to continue to deprive Communist China of "its" seat in the United Nations "is not only abnormal but also inadmissible". He closed by calling for "broad development of international cultural and scientific cooperation" and declaring that the Soviet Government "will do all it can in order that the conference may justify the people's craving for a peaceful and tranquil life".

The speech would be played and replayed in every propaganda media. It had about everything in it one expected. The stark fact stood out, however, that the Soviets were as adamant as ever on the reunification of Germany. This central issue with its link to European security was to be the real focus of all the debate and discussions of the next five days. I left the Council room discouraged but not surprised.[6]

---

[6] At 6:25 p.m. Hagerty held another press conference. A verbatim transcript of this press conference is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 503.

---

185. Memorandum of an Afternoon Meeting, Geneva, July 18, 1955[1]

USDEL/MC/8

After the meeting today, the President had a few minutes' talk with Bulganin, Khrushchev, and Marshal Zhukov. Bulganin complimented the President on his chairmanship today and said he thought the conference had gotten off to a good start. He said, speaking both for himself and Khrushchev, they had not attended conferences of this nature before and that from the information they had from others, this conference had gotten off to a better start than any previous one. Khrushchev expressed his agreement.

Bulganin said, in addition, he felt the very fact of making personal contacts was extremely important. The President agreed saying that if you had not met someone you were apt to think they were 14 feet high with horns and a tail at which the Russians seemed much amused.

The President took occasion to emphasize to the Soviets that the most that could be expected here was the start of a process of negotiation and not any miracles or decisions on outstanding questions. He said, however, that a new spirit might well be created which would greatly facilitate this process.

The President exchanged a number of personal reminiscences with Marshal Zhukov and recalled the fruitful and friendly fashion with which they had dealt with many important problems many years ago in Germany.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Conference Files, 396.1-GE/7-1855. Secret. Drafted by Bohlen.

186. Editorial Note

At 7 p.m. Foreign Secretary Macmillan met with Secretary of State Dulles at the latter's villa to review the events of the day and discuss the Middle East. The only record of this meeting is a one-sentence notation, which indicates that Merchant, MacArthur, Bowie, and Phleger were also present, in Merchant, *Recollections,* page 32.

---

187. Memorandum for the Record of the President's Dinner, President's Villa, Geneva, July 18, 1955, 8 p.m.[1]

USDEL/MC/9

PRESENT

U.S.	*USSR*
The President	Premier Nikolai Bulganin
The Secretary of State	Mr. Nikita Khrushchev
Mr. Hagerty	Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov
Mr. Merchant	General Georgiy Zhukov
Mr. MacArthur	Ambassador Andreiy Gromyko
Ambassador Bohlen	Mr. O.A. Troyanovsky (interpreter)
Ambassador Thompson	
Major John Eisenhower	

Before dinner in the garden the Secretary had a talk with Bulganin, with Ambassador Bohlen interpreting. When joined by Mr. Merchant, Bulganin was saying with great earnestness (patting his heart in an apparent effort to emphasize the point) that we must believe that the Soviets have no evil intentions with regard to us. On that he gave his personal word of honor. Continuing the conversation, the Secretary said that the Premier must understand that the subject of the satellites was a genuine source of tension between us. There were millions of Americans whose origins were in Central and Eastern Europe. They had very strong feelings over the captivity of the Eastern European countries. The Secretary went on to say that we had no desire that the Soviet Union should be ringed by a group of hostile states. In order to avoid this, however, it was not necessary that they be satellites. There was the example of Finland for instance. Bulganin (who visibly froze up at this point) replied in effect that these countries have governments of their own choosing and that our expressed position on this point was not one which could be usefully pressed. This was a situation which would take care of itself with the passage of time.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/7–1855. Confidential. Drafted by Thompson and Merchant on July 19. For three other reports on this dinner, see *infra* and Documents 191 and 192. For President Eisenhower's and Merchant's accounts, see *Mandate for Change*, pp. 517–518, and *Recollections*, pp. 32–33. John Eisenhower recorded his impressions of the dinner on pp. 13–19 of his diary. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File) At the same time that this dinner was taking place Colonel Robert Schulz, Army Aide to the President, gave a buffet supper for four of the Soviet security personnel. A brief memorandum of that conversation is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 515.

During the dinner, the conversation at the President's end of the table was carried by the President himself.[2] Bulganin was responsive. Until the latter part of the dinner Molotov did not enter to any appreciable extent in the conversation though he was an attentive listener. Among passages the following came up: The President described at length his experience from D-Day through the succeeding weeks. Bulganin was obviously interested and asked many questions. The President referred to the heavy damage caused by the unprecedented storm in the Channel ten days or so after the first landing. He referred to Stalin's interest in logistics during conversations with him in the latter part of the war. Bulganin asked if the story of the invasion had been written up. The President said that the Historical Division of the Army had completed a detailed history on the operation a year or so ago. Bulganin expressed an interest in reading it and the President promised to send him a copy. Bulganin said, "the campaign in the West, particularly the problem of the landings in France, is not well understood in Russia".

The President raised the question of the satellites. He explained that there were literally millions of Americans who had their roots and origins in Central Europe. The status of the satellites was a matter of very genuine concern to him. This was not a question on which we could be silent. Bulganin indicated that it was a subject which it would do no good to pursue at this conference: it would require time and an improvement in the atmosphere. Bulganin said that if he did anything about it at this conference he would not be allowed to return to the Soviet Union. The President said that Bulganin should not be misled into thinking that interest in the matter would subside in the United States.

Bulganin expressed the warmest feelings of friendship for the American people and government and for the President. The President said that these feelings were reciprocated by the American people and by him, but he wished to point out that no matter how well this conference should turn out, the press in the United States was not controlled and some of it would undoubtedly continue to say unpleasant things about the Soviet Union. Papers like the *Chicago Tribune,* for example, might continue violently to attack the Soviet Union even though this meeting had had some success in reducing sources of tension between the two countries. The President doubted, however, whether the press would say anything worse about Premier Bulganin than they might say about the President himself. Bulganin replied that it was similar in Russia, where they did not control the press and had to reckon with public opinion.

---

[2] President Eisenhower sat at one end of the table with Molotov on his left and Bulganin on his right. Secretary Dulles sat at the other end flanked by Zhukov and Khrushchev.

Premier Bulganin stressed that the conference had gotten off to a good start and that while there were many problems of great difficulty they could surely make progress at the conference given this good beginning. He mentioned that the Soviet Government entirely supported the suggestion that there should be greater contact between our people. In this connection mention was made that the agriculturists from both countries had arrived in the United States and the U.S.S.R. yesterday. The President observed that these delegations were small and said there should have been 200. Premier Bulganin said he quite agreed and they were prepared to increase such exchanges. The President pointed out that he would do his best to facilitate such exchanges but the development of the appropriate atmosphere would take time and he could not say what Congress would do in this connection but that the Premier could count on his support for developing these exchanges.

Later on in the discussion the President said he hoped Secretary Dulles could visit the Soviet Union and referred to the great pleasure and benefit he had personally had from his visit there.

When the time came for toasts, Molotov said that there had been many meetings of the Foreign Ministers, including ones at which he and Mr. Dulles had been at odds, but that it was his hope there would be generated a spirit at the Geneva meeting which would permit the "translation of words into deeds", and thereby ease the task of the Foreign Ministers at their future meetings and hence he would propose a toast to the successful work of the Foreign Ministers in the future.

The Secretary's reply was to the general effect that for ten years now he had participated in Foreign Ministers meetings with Mr. Molotov and that they had engaged in many debates. He felt that at the Geneva conference the lot of the Foreign Ministers was an easier one in that if things went wrong the responsibility would rest on the Heads of Government.

Toward the latter part of dinner Bulganin leaned confidentially toward the President and said that he would like to tell him something out of the hearing of Secretary Dulles. Russia was not weak. In fact it had never been stronger. Their production was high, their army, as Marshal Zhukov would testify, was strong and well-equipped, they had great natural resources and were not dependent upon trade even in the matter of the import of strategic materials. Moreover in two years their agriculture would show great increase in production. Finally they had their people solidly behind the government as never before. In fact they had been able to do a number of things recently which had increased public support. It would, therefore, be a great mistake to believe that they were weak and that their desire to improve relations with the United States sprang from weakness.

The President replied that the United States did not consider the Soviet Union weak but on the contrary a great and powerful country.

At one point in the discussion Ambassador Thompson remarked that one thing the United States and the Soviet Union had in common was the effect upon their national characters of the great size of their territories and the fact that their early history had been dominated by the fact that they had a vast territory in which to expand. The President picked up this theme and said that for this reason the Soviet Union and the United States, unlike many of the countries of Europe, thought in big terms and that small bits of territory did not have the same significance for them. Ambassador Thompson remarked that the final settlement of the Trieste question hinged on an area smaller than an American ranch. Bulganin nodded and said that during his recent visit to Yugoslavia he had visited a point from which he could look down on Trieste and said you could see the whole thing from this point.

[Here follows discussion of an unrelated matter.]

Bulganin during the entire evening appeared to fill the position of leader of the Delegation. There was an obvious effort, however, to push Marshal Zhukov forward and to enable him to have direct conversations with the President. Khrushchev was jolly in a rather folksy fashion but quite obviously on his good behavior.[3] Molotov was somewhat reticent. Gromyko gave evidence of making a major effort to appear agreeable.

---

[3] In another draft of this memorandum the following passage appeared at this point:

"When the cocktail orders were taken and the Russians asked for vodka, with the exception of Gromyko, who took water in deference to his chronic stomach difficulty, the vodka appeared in handsomely large tumblers with a cake or two of ice in them. Bulganin and Molotov expressed some trepidation and an order was immediately given for the highball glasses to be picked up while a tray of more moderately sized glasses full of vodka was brought. Khrushchev relinquished his large drink with obvious reluctance under the watchful eye of Bulganin. Khrushchev at no time made any effort to dominate the conversation. Molotov similarly was somewhat reticent. Gromyko was as sour as usual though gave some evidence of making a major effort to appear agreeable." (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 516)

Both during dinner and over coffee afterwards in the living room there was considerable discussion, principally between the President and Bulganin, on the futility of war in the atomic age. The President called on Ambassador Bohlen to repeat his earlier comment that whereas in the past "when diplomacy failed war took over", under existing circumstances "since war had failed, diplomats must take over". The President with great earnestness told Bulganin at the table that under present conditions he was an old-fashioned soldier. He said that the development of modern weapons was such that a country which used them genuinely risked destroying itself. Since the prevailing winds went east to west and not north to south, a major war would destroy the Northern Hemisphere and he had no desire to leave all life and civilization to the Southern Hemisphere.

The President's toast was to Voroshilov as Chief of State of the Russian people and to the hope that the friendship between the peoples of Russia and the United States which existed during the war would be restored.

Bulganin's toast in reply was lofty in sentiment and in effect to the birth of a spirit at this conference which would make it possible to deal successfully with the problems which confronted us. Some of these it would take time to solve.

Neither Mr. Merchant nor Ambassador Thompson noticed any conversation with respect to disarmament, the reunification of Germany or European security.[4]

---

[4] After dinner President Eisenhower, in front of all the Soviet guests, said that he hoped to have a chance to talk with Zhukov about their war experiences. As he was leaving Zhukov told Bohlen that he was ready at any time and date to meet the President. (USDEL/MC/20, July 30; *ibid.*, Central Files, 396.1–GE/7–2355)

---

188. Memorandum of Conversations at the President's Dinner, President's Villa, Geneva, July 18, 1955, 8–10 p.m.[1]

USDEL/MC/22

The following are non-consecutive accounts of certain exchanges which were heard at the President's dinner for the leaders of the Soviet Delegation on July 18th:

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/7–2355. Top Secret. Drafted by Bohlen on July 23. For three other accounts of the dinner conversations, see *supra*, *infra*, and Document 190.

Before dinner, the Secretary and Mr. Bulganin, together with Mr. Bohlen, took a short walk in the garden. The Secretary said he realized that there were some subjects which had been brought up by the US at this conference which the Soviet Government objected to. He named in particular the situation of the satellite countries and international communism. He said that these subjects were ones which were of great interest to the people of the US who had many persons of Eastern European origin and who felt very strongly on the question of the satellites. He said that the US realized very well the natural geographic interest that the Soviet Government had in this area and that there was no intention on our part to see established governments hostile to the Soviet Union or a recreation of the cordon sanitaire. He thought there might be something in between the present situation and the other extreme which we certainly did not desire, mentioning in this connection Finland as an example. Mr. Bulganin said he thought that that was not a question which could be "realistically" dealt with at this stage and felt that the formulation of the problem as set forth by the President this morning was not realistic. He added that this was a question which time alone would settle.

On more general subjects during the same conversation, Mr. Bulganin said one of the tasks before the four powers, and particularly the USA and the USSR, was to correct the errors of the past. At this point, the rest of the party came into the garden and the conversation was broken off.

During dinner, the Secretary mentioned to Mr. Khrushchev that one of the great obstacles towards the development of normal relations with the Soviet Union had been the activities of international communism in every country of the world and that insofar as the US and the Soviet Union, the country, were concerned there were really no problems of a major nature. He pointed out in this connection that the US had never had any major dispute with Russia and it was one of the few occasions in history between major powers where there had been no war. Mr. Khrushchev replied he thought there had been here a confusion between the Soviet Government and the international communist movement. He said that since the abolition of the Comintern in 1943, there had been no physical apparatus in the Soviet Union for giving direction and exercising control over the communist parties (by this statement, Khrushchev admitted that prior to 1943 such control had been exercised). He said that the Cominform was something different and since 1949, there had been no meeting of this party. He said that the Soviet Union was a highly centralized state but that it would not and could not direct the affairs of other countries in the socialist camp; to attempt to do so would be to turn the Kremlin into a madhouse. He concluded by saying that a distinction should be made between sympathy and moral support, which as a communist, he would not deny was forthcoming from the Soviet Union in regard to communist movements abroad on the one hand and the question of direction (*rukavodtsvo*) on the other.

At another stage of the conversation, Mr. Khrushchev said that the main purpose of this conference was to "sort out" the various questions which were points of division at the present time and deal with those which were susceptible of reasonable negotiation while leaving for a later date those which clearly could not be settled now. There was considerable discussion with Marshal Zhukov across the table concerning the fact that war had now reached the point where it was not advantageous or profitable for any country to undertake.

The Secretary pointed out that his initial diplomatic experience had been in 1907 when Mr. Carnegie, at the time of the Hague Peace Conference, had given an income of $10 million which would be sufficient to insure a lasting peace. The Secretary cited this as an example of how much more complicated matters had become. After hearing the Secretary describe the complicated ceremonials at the 1907 Conference at the Hague, Marshal Zhukov remarked that ceremonials had become simpler but that substantive questions had become more complicated.

In a conversation with Mr. Bohlen, Khrushchev said that there could be no greater mistake than to believe that the Soviet Union was now in major economic difficulties. He said their industrial picture was better than it had ever been and that in several years agriculture would be in a really satisfactory state. In reply to Mr. Bohlen's question concerning the current agriculture year, he said the winter and the new lands were not too satisfactory since in certain parts there had been drought and that in the Ukraine, Kuban and Volga and central Russian regions, there had not recently been such favorable prospects for a bumper crop [this was the preliminary impression of the Agricultural Attaché of the Embassy concerning the Kuban and the southern Ukraine].[2]

Charles E. Bohlen[3]

---

[2] Brackets in the source text.

[3] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

189. Memorandum of the Conversation at the President's Dinner, President's Villa, Geneva, July 18, 1955, 8:30 p.m.[1]

USDEL/MC/21

During a dinner tonight, I told Khrushchev[2] that I had been absent from Moscow for over a month and that I had heard there had been wide-spread rumors that he would take over the Premiership in addition to his party duties after the Geneva Conference. Khrushchev said he had heard these rumors which involved Bulganin replacing Molotov at the Foreign Office and another rumor that he, Khrushchev, was to take over the Ministry of Agriculture. He said there was no truth whatsoever in either of these rumors.

I said to him there had been a good deal of discussion about the importance of trust and confidence already at the conference and that I was, therefore, prepared to accept his word but that it would be very unfortunate if it turned out otherwise adding that, of course, I would not wish to pry into Soviet internal affairs.

He replied he could only repeat there was no truth in regard to these rumors. It was, however, interesting that they had been brought very specifically to his attention.

Charles E. Bohlen[3]

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-GE/7-2355. Top Secret. Drafted by Bohlen on July 23. For three other accounts of the dinner conversations, see Document 187, *supra*, and *infra*.

[2] Bohlen was seated between Khrushchev and Merchant to the right of Secretary Dulles at the table.

[3] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

---

190. Memorandum of the Conversation at the President's Dinner, President's Villa, Geneva, July 18, 1955, 8 p.m.[1]

USDEL/MC/28

PARTICIPANTS

United States	*U.S.S.R.*
The President	Mr. Bulganin
Secretary Dulles	Mr. Khrushchev
Ambassador Bohlen	Mr. Molotov
Mr. Hagerty	Mr. Zhukov

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-GE/7-1855. Top Secret. Drafted by Bohlen. For three other accounts of the conversations, see Documents 187 and 188 and *supra*.

Mr. Merchant
Mr. MacArthur
Ambassador Thompson
Major John Eisenhower

Mr. Gromyko
Mr. Troyanovski

The one noticeable difference between the behavior of the Soviet leaders now and during the time of Stalin is the greater freedom with which they comment to and about each other before foreigners.[2]

During Molotov's toast, the Secretary referred to the hard and difficult work the Foreign Ministers had done in the past. Khrushchev interrupted to say that was why Foreign Ministers were created.

My general impression was that the Soviet guests were very much on their good behavior last night and were avoiding any forms of behavior, . . . which might have been subject to subsequent criticism. Due to the setting of the table, it was not possible for any of them to dominate the conversation but neither before nor after dinner did there seem to be any attempt by Khrushchev to exercise a dominant role. In fact, it could not be said that any one of them was the spokesman, although naturally Bulganin, as Prime Minister and ranking guest, spoke for the group in reply to the President's toast.

The only distinct impression I received in regard to the interrelation among the Soviet leaders was that Molotov is no longer exercising the same dominant position in foreign affairs that he did earlier.

---

[2] In a draft of this memorandum of conversation the following two paragraphs appear at this point:

"Before dinner, when cocktails were being served on the terrace, several of the Soviet guests had expressed a preference for vodka which, however, was brought in highball glasses half filled with ice. There was a good deal of conversation with Mrs. Eisenhower on the subject of the strength of these drinks, and, at one point, Bulganin said he really did not drink much vodka and stuck pretty much to lighter alcoholic drinks.

"Khrushchev then told the following story which he asked me to be sure to interpret to Mrs. Eisenhower. He said there had been a very efficient and excellent Russian director of an industrial establishment who, however, drank vodka to excess. When this man was elected to the Supreme Soviet, it had been suggested that he stop drinking but the reports continued to come in that he was frequently drunk. Finally, Khrushchev said he had called him in and the man assured him that he had drunk no vodka since his election to the Supreme Soviet but confined himself exclusively to cognac. Khrushchev added that he felt his story was applicable to Bulganin—this was an obvious comment upon the widely spread rumor that Bulganin has a tendency to drink too much but that when he took the Prime Minister's job he was told to be more moderate." (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 516)

July 19, 1955

191. Editorial Note

At 9:15 a.m. Livingston Merchant, Douglas MacArthur, Robert Bowie, and Herman Phleger participated in a meeting of the Tripartite Coordinating (Working) Group at Prime Minister Faure's villa along with Harold Caccia, Sir Geoffrey Harrison, and Lord Hood for the British, and Armand Berard and Roland Jacquin de Margerie for the French. No record of this meeting, which was presumably held to coordinate the position of the three delegations for the first Foreign Ministers meeting at 11 a.m. (see Document 193), has been found. It is mentioned briefly in Merchant, *Recollections,* page 33, and appears as an entry in the United States Delegation order of the day, USDEL OD–3, July 19. (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 520)

From this meeting Merchant, MacArthur, Bowie, and Phleger went to Secretary Dulles' villa and then they drove with the Secretary to the delegation offices for a meeting with Foreign Ministers Pinay and Macmillan. No records for either of these meetings have been found, but both are mentioned briefly in Merchant, *Recollections,* page 33, while the second appears as an entry in USDEL OD–3 and indicates that Carl McCardle was also present. Probably Merchant *et al.* reported on the tripartite meeting in the session at Secretary Dulles' villa, while the three Foreign Ministers ironed out the last details in preparation for their meeting with Molotov, at the meeting in the United States Delegation offices.

At some point during the Foreign Ministers meeting Macmillan gave the United States Delegation copies of two messages from Con Douglas O'Neil, the British Chargé at Peking, dealing with the question of Ambassadorial talks to be held at Geneva. These messages were transmitted to Washington in Dulte 23, July 19. (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 522)

---

192. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Department of State[1]

Geneva, July 19, 1955—11 a.m.

Dulte 22. Eyes only Acting Secretary from Secretary. Following is my impression based upon developments up to 10 a.m. Tuesday, including particularly Bulganin's speech[2] and President's dinner for Soviet Delegation last night.[3]

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/7–1955. Secret; Niact.

1. There seems overwhelming desire on part of Soviet Delegation to create atmosphere of friendliness and good will. There is fraternization all along the line from Bulganin down to the lowest security officer. Obviously this is not spontaneous but in accordance with a well disciplined plan. That, however, does not necessarily prove that it is without significance.

2. I was particularly struck last night by the approaches made to me personally. It was to have been expected that there would be enthusiastic good will expressed toward President Eisenhower. However in addition Bulganin went out of his way to be friendly to me, recalling our brief meeting in Moscow in 1947 and his desire to get better acquainted and his statement that I was not nearly as bad as I had been represented. Also Molotov obviously through prearrangement spoke promptly after Bulganin's toast, offering a toast to me and walking around the table to touch glasses with me.

3. The Bulganin statement was clearly designed to be moderate in tone. Three matters which Molotov had indicated would be brought up were left out; namely (a) world economic conference (b) implementation of action against war propaganda and (c) six power Far Eastern conference. The treatment of Germany was very evasive and obviously designed to bury German unification under a mass of prerequisites. However, the statement avoided a direct collision.

4. The common denominator of the speeches is as anticipated (a) German unification (b) European security (c) disarmament, although Soviets would reverse order of first two items.

5. We are working in close cooperation with the UK but cooperation with French is difficult because of sharp rivalries between Faure and Pinay, and tendency of former to freewheel.

Dulles

---

[2] See Document 184.

[3] See Documents 188–190.

193. Telegram From the Delegation at the Geneva Conference to the Department of State[1]

Geneva, July 20, 1955—11 p.m.

Secto 43. Meeting of four Foreign Ministers this morning devoted mainly to question of agenda for today's meeting of heads of government.[2] Macmillan suggested that subjects common to all four speeches yesterday should constitute agenda; namely, German Reunification, European Security, Disarmament, Development East-West Contacts. Molotov agreed that subjects of common interest were disarmament, European security, German problem and development of economic and cultural contacts. However Bulganin had mentioned additional questions yesterday on which Soviets would welcome comment: (1) Termination cold war, (2) attitude toward neutrality, and (3) Far East.

Secretary agreed with Macmillan's proposal re list of subjects with following comments: Re development East-West contacts, President had spoken primarily about communication of knowledge and information rather than contacts of economic and cultural character to which Molotov had referred. Re three additional subjects suggested by Soviet Secretary said he thought omission of any reference to these subjects by President had occurred not through oversight but from feeling such subjects did not properly lend themselves to discussion here.

Pinay noted that Molotov had listed four common subjects in different order, and did not think the order would cause difficulty. Molotov said he had no objection to the order proposed by Macmillan. Pinay commented regarding end of cold war and re-establishment of atmosphere of trust, that once the four common questions above were solved, there would not be any cold war and trust would be restored. Therefore questioned usefulness including these items on agenda.

Molotov said Soviet Delegation had no objection to including communications in field of information along with contacts in economic and cultural fields.

Secretary indicated agreement with Pinay's view that end of cold war and restoration atmosphere of trust and confidence would come about as we made progress in other areas rather than as result achieved arbitrarily or through discussion. He pointed to Bulganin's refusal discuss problem of satellites and international communism which appeared to be major causes of distrust and tension so far as US concerned. Secretary stated that US had made its views clear re proposed declaration of neutrality by Austrian Government.[3] We doubted that policy of so-called neutrality should be encouraged generally because we believed in principle expressed in UN Charter that broadly speaking there was duty of nations, subject to minor exceptions, to be prepared take collective action for preservation peace and prevention and removal of threats to peace. Neutrality was an unrealistic policy for country with large population and geological location of Germany. US had tried neutrality in 1914 and 1939 and found that it was dangerous for us and our friends. We considered Far East questions not proper topic for discussion at this conference where Asian nations concerned (principally National Government of China and People's Republic) were not present.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/7–1955. Secret; Priority. Repeated to London, Paris for Perkins, Moscow, and Bonn. The U.S. Delegation verbatim record, USDEL/Verb/M–1, July 19, and the record of decisions, CF/DOC/RD/3, July 20, are *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 509. The meeting began at 11 a.m. and adjourned at 12:20 p.m. For Merchant's account, which is in substantial agreement with this record, see *Recollections*, pp. 33–34.

[2] See Document 197.

Agreed that press would be informed of decision on four items agreed for afternoon's meeting, and question of additional items would be left to decision of heads of government.

Molotov asked whether Foreign Ministers might not also exchange views on substance of questions on agenda as well as merely establishing list of items. Ministers agreed that insufficient time remained at this session, but no objection in principle to Foreign Ministers exchanging of views on the four common subjects if so desired by the heads of government.

---

[3] See Document 76.

---

194. Telegram From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Anderson) and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Radford) to the Secretary of State, at Geneva[1]

Paris, July 19, 1955—11:35 a.m.

191135Z. Our analysis of the four opening statements while perhaps not presenting basic new ideas which have not already occurred to you leads us to suggest the following:

Throughout the Soviet statement repeated references are made to the banning of atomic weapons but no suggestion is made as to the practical accomplishment of this objective which obviously can not be realistic merely from the standpoint of international declaration. It would seem desirable to emphasize as a matter of amplification of the President's statement the necessity for exploring the possibilities of effective inspections by the principals involved as a necessary prelude to any armaments control, emphasizing also that armaments control of necessity includes the whole of conventional and nonconventional weapons which separate parts can not be isolated. The establishment of an appropriate group to explore inspection mechanisms perhaps proceeding from the most elementary to the more complex would appear to be an affirmative proposal designed to determine the good faith of all concerned and is much more realistic than the Faure proposal of budgetary control which would always be subject to national systems of accounting which are both unique to the several countries and which are susceptible to change and manipulation. We believe that the Soviet statement regarding the satellite countries having elected their own systems of government should not go unchallenged. The Soviet statement declaring discussion of the activities of political parties as inappropriate is in fact an integral part of the same problem involving the satellite countries since one of the foremost aspects of what is described as the Cold War is in reality the subversive efforts of international communism to impose unwanted systems of government upon people who because of economic or social problems and unrest have not yet established adequate machinery to combat subversion or to achieve for themselves a form of govt acceptable to all people.

---

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File. Secret.

We are impressed with the negative attitude of the Soviet statement which seems to us an effort to couch in conciliatory language the basic unrelenting attitude of the Soviet Govt. Essentially what they are willing to concede is the superficial fruits of their own recent efforts such as the Warsaw Treaty to counter such organizations as the North Atlantic Treaty and the Paris Accords. Their other efforts at easing world conditions seem to be conditioned on the relinquishing by Western powers of the measures involved over a long period for their own security. We might also suggest with reference to the acceptance by the Soviets of the President's proposal for an international pool of fissionable material for peaceful purposes that consideration be given to a progressive increase in the rate of contributions. In this connection, the United States might challenge Soviet good faith by suggesting the exploration of a formula whereby nations which produce fissionable material would be required to progressively increase their contributions to the pool of peaceful fissionable material on an increasing scale. The negative approach of the Soviet statement with reference to the unification of Germany, international Communism, and the unwillingness to provide a forum for the discussion of the problem of the satellites suggests to us that if this position remains throughout the conference the attitude of the Soviets, then thought should be given to a sufficiently dramatic statement by the United States as to make plain to the world the real willingness and desire of the United States to make a sound and enforceable arrangement vis-à-vis the Soviet Union which could result in a peaceful world.

---

195. Memorandum of a Conversation, Geneva, July 19, 1955, 1 p.m.[1]

USDEL/MC/10

PARTICIPANTS

United States	*USSR*
Amb. Bohlen	Amb. Zarubin
	Mr. Soldatov

SUBJECTS

1. Exchange of Visits
2. U.S. Troops in Europe
3. Soviet Security Treaty Proposal

I had lunch today with Ambassador Zarubin and Mr. Soldatov, Head of the American Section of the Soviet Foreign Office. For the most part, Zarubin and Soldatov repeated the current line concerning the importance of re-establishing relations of confidence and friendship between the US and the Soviet Union. Zarubin particularly talked about the importance of the exchange of visits, cultural and otherwise, as a means of increasing mutual understanding, etc.

On the subject of the Conference itself, they both stressed the importance of personal contacts and the necessity of reinforcing security in Europe. In reply to my question on Germany, they made it quite plain, as was certainly confirmed this afternoon,[2] that the Soviet Government was not prepared to accept the entry of a unified Germany into NATO and that the proper procedure here was to recognize certain "realities" and agree what could be done in the light of these realities to prevent the development of tension and friction between the military organizations in Europe. While they did not depart in any important particular from Bulganin's speech of yesterday,[3] they certainly confirmed that what the Soviets have in mind is some sort of modus vivendi in Europe based on the status quo with particular reference to some form of contact between the two military set-ups along the lines indicated by Bulganin, namely, an agreement not to use force against each other but to settle any disputes by peaceful means and an undertaking not to increase existing levels of troops stationed on foreign soil.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 516. Top Secret. Drafted by Bohlen.

[2] See Document 197.

[3] See Document 184.

With reference to the three points raised by Molotov this morning for inclusion on the agenda,[4] they tended to dismiss those as general questions of principles but did not seem to attach much importance thereto. In reply to my observation that the restoration of the pre-1939 situation in Europe in regard to troops would, in effect, mean a complete departure of US forces from Europe, they took the line that that was a very long term proposition and one that they did not expect to be realized for many years. They maintained, however, that, in principle, this must be a proper long term goal whereby the troops of each country were confined to their own territory.

In discussing the Soviet security treaty as envisaged by them, I pointed out that, in effect, it would merely mean a re-creation of Europe as it was in 1949 before the creation of NATO; that Western Europe would have no cohesive, collective security arrangement of its own and no direct ties with the US, whereas Eastern Europe, whether or not the Warsaw Pact was formally abolished, would still be a tightly-knit monolithic bloc both politically and militarily. As was to be expected, they took great issue of this and attempted the usual line that the satellites were completely independent countries but would not either make a very convincing case or pursue the point very far. The only time any emotion was shown by Zarubin and Soldatov was when they were talking about the destruction that Germany had caused to Russia in two World Wars and that the Soviet Government did not take lightly the re-creation of German militarism. They professed to be completely unimpressed by my description of the safeguards built into NATO and WEU in regard to Germany, and Zarubin made the point that if a unified Germany was in that set-up, it would soon acquire a dominant position—a state of affairs which the Soviet Government was not prepared to accept.

Charles E. Bohlen[5]

---

[4] See Document 193.

[5] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

196. Editorial Note

At the same time Ambassador Bohlen was having lunch with the two members of the Soviet Delegation (see *supra*), James Hagerty held a press conference to review the day's proceedings. A verbatim transcript of the conference is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 504.

At 1:15 p.m. Secretary of State Dulles, accompanied by McCardle, Bowie, Phleger, and Beam, lunched with Prime Minister Faure at the Villa Pervoisier. No record of the conversation at the luncheon has been found in Department of State files.

Sometime during the afternoon of July 19 a member of the British Delegation gave Secretary Dulles an informal memorandum on the Vietnamese elections. No record of this meeting has been found in Department of State files, but the text of the memorandum was transmitted in Secto 42 from Geneva, July 19. (*Ibid.,* Central Files, 396.1–GE/7–1955)

At 3 p.m. the United States Delegation held its first full staff meeting at the Hotel du Rhone, attended by both President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles. No record of this meeting has been found in Department of State files, but it is described as lasting only "a few minutes". (Merchant, *Recollections,* page 34)

Apparently after the staff meeting, President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles met privately, presumably to discuss the Heads of Government meeting at 4 p.m. No record of such a meeting has been found in Department of State files or at the Eisenhower Library, but it appears as an entry in the President's appointments for July 19. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File)

---

197. Telegram From the Delegation at the Geneva Conference to the Department of State[1]

Geneva, July 20, 1955—10 a.m.

Secto 45. Third meeting Heads of Government convened 4:05 p.m. July 19, Faure presiding.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/7–2055. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Wolf and cleared by MacArthur. The U.S. Delegation verbatim record, USDEL/Verb/3, July 19, and the record of decisions, CF/DOC/RD/4/Corr. 1, July 21, are *ibid.,* Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 510. For three other similar accounts, see Merchant, *Recollections,* p. 35; *Full Circle,* pp. 331–332; or John Eisenhower's Diary, pp. 19–20 (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File).

Chairman referred to Foreign Minister's meeting this morning[2] and reported they had concluded four following questions had been discussed by all delegations: (1) reunification of Germany; (2) European security; (3) disarmament; (4) developments of contacts between East and West. Chairman believed there should be no objections and had contacted delegations and all considered it desirable hear views of various delegations on thoughts and proposals expressed by other delegations yesterday, as conference then might find grounds of agreement. He then asked all to express their views on procedural matters, on methods of work, and on proposals made by Foreign Ministers.

He then opened discussion on item (1) reunification of Germany, calling on Eden.

Eden expressed gratitude to Foreign Ministers for preparing agenda in short time. He stated his gratification that there is so much common ground between governments represented, at least that Germany should be united, and that this should be first matter to discuss. Said this means that differences are as to methods and timing in the main.

Noting ten years elapsed since end of war, said all should regard reunification of Germany not only as important but urgent. With respect to how to make progress toward reunification, referred to Eden Plan[3] and ideas he suggested yesterday[4] as illustrations of way in which subject might be further discussed. Said tone of Bulganin's statement yesterday[5] contributed to solution of problems.

Noting Bulganin's remark yesterday that "the creation of an effective system of security in Europe would bring about the necessary prerequisites for the unification of Germany", Eden emphasized great delay involved in reaching agreement on security pact involving all Europe, U.S. and Canada. Particularly pointed out problems of reconciling divergent views of European countries, problem of deciding how Germany would be represented in pact, and relation of pact to UN. Problems such as these had led him to suggest simpler project of mutual security pact between four powers and united Germany as part of reassurance for unification.

Eden referred to other suggestions on reassurances he made yesterday and asked Soviets to point out any insufficiencies or other suggestions they might have. He concluded, expressing deep concern on idea of postponing German unity while working out European security system.

---

[2] See Document 193.

[3] For text of the Eden Plan, see FPM(54)17, January 29, 1954, *Foreign Relations*, 1952–1954, vol. VII, Part 1, p. 1177.

[4] See Document 184.

[5] *Ibid.*

Bulganin opened by noting four points Foreign Ministers had agreed on but also recalled they had agreed that question of discussion of other matters would be decided by Heads of Government.[6] He here referred to three Russian proposals: ending of Cold War and strengthening of confidence among nations; question neutrality; and questions of Asia and Far East, and suggested these three additional subjects should be considered at end of today's meeting.

He then referred to "German question," stating this phraseology more correct than "question of unification of Germany". Said Soviet always considered German problem as one of most important and had always favored German unity along peaceful and democratic lines. German problem in Soviet view cannot be considered without taking account remilitarization of West Germany and its participation in military blocs.

Said unification depends on whether West Germany would turn into militarist state, taking part in military groupings, or whether different peaceful path corresponding to interests of German nation could lead to unification of Germany as peaceful and democratic state. Thus future of Germany and possibility of unification depends on position of signatories of Paris Agreements.

Said in speaking of unification we must not forget that there are now two states, two parliaments and two governments and views of both must be considered. Noted that in signing Warsaw Treaty, GDR proceeded from premise that united Germany would be free of commitments assumed by any one part under military treaties and agreements prior to unification.

Said it in interest of German people themselves and of peace in Europe for united Germany to be free of any commitments previously assumed by any other part and that united Germany should assume an obligation not to enter into any coalitions of military alliance directed against other states.

Said USSR does not raise question of Paris Agreements[7] or of West Germany's leaving NATO and WEU because this would be unrealistic. Then said that we are being told in so many words that united Germany should enter military groupings of West. To this, Soviet attitude is clear. He asked what would be attitude of Western powers if Soviet were to make unification of Germany dependent upon united Germany participating in Warsaw Treaty.

Therefore, conditions not yet right for German unity and problem should be solved in different manner: gradually step by step.

---

[6] A copy of Bulganin's statement, circulated as CF/DOC/5, July 20, is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 514.

[7] For texts of the Paris Agreements, signed at Paris October 23, 1954, see *Foreign Relations*, 1952–1954, vol. v, Part 2, pp. 1435 ff.

Said we should work together to create possibility for unification through relaxation of tensions and strengthening of confidence among nations. Adherence of any part or whole of Germany into groupings of nations directed against other nations would not contribute to strengthening of confidence among nations.

That fact appears to be recognized, and therefore mention has been made in some statements at conference about guarantees of Soviet security. A proposal for guarantees would be understandable if it were question of weak state unable to defend itself from military point of view. But in this case mention is made of guarantees for USSR.

USSR cannot place itself in position when [*where*] its security would depend on guarantees by other states.

But that is what is meant when guarantees mentioned with respect to united Germany joining NATO or WEU.

Therefore should work in light of existing conditions, beginning by reducing tension between groupings that have arisen in Europe without releasing members of those groups from commitments. Would be well if nations would agree to refrain from using armed force and to settle disputes through peaceful means. Participation in such pact by both parts of Germany pending unification would create a prerequisite for definitive settlement of German problem, and would contribute to rapprochement designed to strengthen peace in Europe that would be particularly important in achieving unity of Germany.

A further step would be liquidation of existing groupings and their replacement by European security system. This would eliminate barrier to unification of West Germany's participation in groupings and would create atmosphere conducive to unification. Therefore question of collective security in Europe should be viewed in connection with settlement of German problem. Life requires two halves of Germany draw closer together, and indeed this has been taking place. Trade within Germany has increased as has exchange of delegations. Our primary duty is to contribute rapprochement between two parts of Germany.

USSR prepared to do all it can therefore recently proposed diplomatic, commercial and cultural relations between USSR and GFR had met with favorable reaction throughout Germany.[8]

Bulganin then referred to statements made at conference on procedure for all German elections, saying they important questions which should be considered at appropriate moment. Said we would have to give due consideration to opinions and proposals of Germans themselves.

---

[8] On June 7 the Soviet Union had invited Chancellor Adenauer to Moscow to discuss the establishment of diplomatic, commercial, and cultural relations. For text of this note and the favorable reply of the Federal Republic, June 30, see *Documents* (R.I.I.A.) for 1955, pp. 245–249.

President Eisenhower then spoke, approving decisions Foreign Ministers reached in morning and subjects they listed for discussion.[9]

Referring to Bulganin's statement that other questions must be discussed President noted he had raised certain questions which Bulganin said USSR would not consider appropriate here: situation of satellites in East Europe, and activities of international Communism.

President said tensions caused by different things in different countries. Nothing causes greater tension in U.S. than satellites and international Communism. Referred to Congressional resolution deploring satellite situation and expressing hope they would soon have free choice of own form of government.

President then noted Bulganin had consented to deferment of consideration as to whether his points should be considered until end of session. President said he supported Mr. Dulles' statement in Foreign Ministers meeting on these points.

President then turned to German problem. He said he would like to talk a little about NATO as it was conceived, organized and administered, both in political sense and in military sense. Asked Zhukov to listen carefully saying he had known him for long time and that Zhukov would know he was speaking as soldier to soldier, having never uttered a single word he did not believe to be the truth.

President then referred to his return to Europe as head of SHAPE at end of 1949 and early 1950 and said he had taken job after having retired because he believed NATO to be true agency of peace. Said he would not have accepted that command had he conceived it to be an organization getting ready really to fight a war.

At that time, he said, Germany was one of great problems facing West. If allowed to become a military vacuum and again a fertile ground for propagation of a Hitlerism, it would be of gravest danger. At that time we were thinking of danger to Western Europe and not to Soviet Union. Referred to fact that German aggression had forced war on our allied friends three times in eighty-five years.

Said we should draw Germany into a position where she could not become a prey to a Hitler, a dissatisfied, unhappy nation, suffering from an inferiority complex; but rather we should create one which could play a respectable part in its own defense and which could not gain the power to attack.

President referred to fact that main activities of every Western nation are well known. There is free publication of information of every main military installation. Scale of our military operations well known to everybody. Pointed out that within U.S. it is impossible for Executive to declare war, which can only be done by Congress after free debate and vote, sole exception being when attacked by full-scale military attack and reaction is merely that of self-defense.

---

[9] For full text of President Eisenhower's statement, see *Geneva Conference*, pp. 45–47.

Pointed out NATO Treaty provides against aggression by any party thereto whether among themselves or against anyone else. Said Treaty is purely defensive and if any member nation attempts to act aggressively, it is immediately opposed by all other NATO members.

Pointed out that militarily Germany like all other nations in Western Europe has certain limits of forces which are both maximum and minimum. No forces allowed Germany are complete within themselves, but are intertwined with other Western forces making it impossible for them to conduct effective military operation by themselves. Suggested that French Delegation could speak to preoccupations of French Parliament concerning measures and agreements that would prevent Germany from getting into a position strong enough to attack France.

President said that under no circumstances would the United States, an important member of NATO, ever be a party to aggressive war. U.S. believes in negotiation and friendly conference, and only reason we will go to war when attacked in such a way that war is the only alternative.

President concluded, saying, "If there is any tendency to delay urgent consideration of the problem of German reunification because of the unhappiness or fear of the united Germany in NATO, then so far as it is possible for the United States to give the assurance of its pledged word, I say here and now: There is no need to fear that situation."

Faure then spoke. He noted difference between Eden's and Bulganin's statement, particularly with respect to difference in urgency on reunification. Said Bulganin seemed to have no objection to time factor that troubled Eden in Bulganin proposal, as Bulganin himself had emphasized time would be required. Faure's own view was we should not resign ourselves to fact of that time period before attaining unification.

Stated that Bulganin's words that Soviet Union, as a strong state, would not insist on guarantees and safeguards that other states would propose gave greater hope of agreement than previously could be expected.

But he believed security ought not to be taken to be a matter pertaining to individual countries or we would have to evaluate strength of individual states. Security is a general problem pertaining to all.

Stated that he was moved by President's statement. Said that France, a country much less powerful than USSR, considers that it has in NATO strong guarantees and safeguards. Such a system represents no threat to the much more powerful USSR.

Speaking on the Bulganin statement, Faure said he was concerned at the delay proposed by Bulganin for the reunification of Germany, a delay for an indeterminate period. The Bulganin proposal is that rapprochement between two parts of Germany would come about as a result of the participation of the two parts in a provisional security system and on the other hand, as a result of expansion in relations between the two Germanies. He would not wish to contradict Bulganin or to wonder whether these measures would really facilitate settlement but said there is no reason to expect that this method, after an indeterminate period would result in drastic change.

Faure said we must appraise duration of postponement otherwise it would, in fact, be rejection of unification not merely a postponement. The second thing is to have assurance, or at least likelihood that after postponement matter could be raised in a different manner; Bulganin had said that reunified Germany should no longer be bound by existing agreements and that it should undertake not to participate in coalitions.

These two conditions are quite different. Eden plan considers that a reunified Germany would not be bound by previous agreements. But it is another thing to demand that a reunified Germany should beforehand undertake not to participate in any system; it would be extremely difficult to demand such a thing from Germany once it had been reunited.

Referring to Bulganin's questions as to Western reaction if he proposed that reunified Germany should join the Warsaw Treaty, he could reply that Western plan gave unified Germany free choice between East and West. In all sincerity however there little chance Germany would make choice for East. As reunified Germany will most likely remain in NATO, which is purely defensive, then we should not ask Soviet Union to rely exclusively on guarantees given by such a system. Question is raised therefore whether some proposal along lines suggested by Eden or others to counterbalance the situation might not result in a more speedy reunification.

Eden followed. Said there are two proposals for guarantees. One is the Soviet proposal, which some of us remember from Berlin, for a pact covering all Europe[10] to which it is now suggested that the U.S. be added, and Eden thinks Canada too could be included. He finds nothing shocking in the idea of such a guarantee, and also finds nothing wounding to anybody in the idea of guarantee given by five countries instead of one given by the whole of Europe. Five countries would reduce delay. Therefore we might consider if the larger proposal is not possible how the smaller one might work to meet the difficulty of the longer delay entailed in the larger pact. In principle the guarantees would be the same whether by the Five or by all Europe. The UK has no objection to being guaranteed, in fact it rather likes it.

---

[10] For text of this proposal, FPM(54)47, February 10, 1954, see *Foreign Relations*, 1952–1954, vol. VII, Part 1, p. 1190.

In this context, Eden said, a guarantee means a system which will ensure that, as far as possible, a free and independent Germany will not again be a danger to Europe and the world. This is something no one, even the Germans, can take exception to and something we are right in trying to insure. There is nothing in it derogatory to any other power. Eden stated his complete agreement with President's statement on conception, purposes and powers of NATO. He said NATO consists of some very powerful states, like the U.S., and other less powerful states, all of whom have exactly same voice and vote in the organization. Everything is done by unanimity. It is hard to believe this collection of countries would even join in, or could in fact, organize offensive action against anyone.

If he were apprehensive of recurrence of German military power, as a Britisher, and Britain has had two experiences in this generation, as have had the Russians and all others around the table, he would much rather see German military power contained in NATO than loose about the world.

Eden concluded he would think it might be possible to try, as part of agreement on unification of Germany, to agree on total number of forces to be stationed in Germany and neighboring countries. The added value of such an agreement would be that it would give us first opportunity to practice some system of international supervision. That might help increase confidence between us. He had in mind that we should all join in this, and united Germany also, and there would be reciprocal supervision.

Bulganin then expressed gratitude for President's statement and position of U.S. on questions of war and peace and believed that it was an important and significant statement for peace among nations. He said "We, the leaders of the Soviet Union, know President Eisenhower as the Commander-in-Chief, as a soldier, and as President of a great nation, and we believe in his statements."

But he said after the President there came to Europe other military leaders who spoke in a different spirit about NATO and its defense purposes. As an example he said the Soviet once suggested that it enter NATO and was refused admission.[11] This led them to believe that there might be other purposes behind the organization.

---

[11] Reference here is to the Soviet note of March 31, 1954, and the tripartite reply of May 7, 1954. For documentation on this exchange of notes, see *ibid.*, vol. v, Part 1, pp. 487 ff.

The Warsaw Pact he said is also a defensive pact especially since it was created after NATO had developed its activities.

With reference to his earlier statements and Eden's suggestions Bulganin first turned to points of guarantees. Said we must bear in mind not only USSR but also countries such as Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary.

A system of European security must also guarantee peace of all European countries and of Germany herself. Therefore, as a first step, both parts of Germany should enter into a system of European security which could guarantee us from either of the two parts or from a unified Germany resurrecting militarism. With reference to comments by Faure and Eden on lengthy time involved in Bulganin proposal prior to unification of Germany, he said that we should bear in mind that Germany is not yet united and that this too would take time.

President then said that he understood function of Heads of Government at this conference to be to discuss principles in which the several governments believes and then turn problems over to Foreign Ministers to see whether they can develop a procedure whereby the differences expressed could be reconciled, maybe not right away but at least set up a machinery that would give some hope of doing so. President said that he thought subject had been just about exhausted and that he had nothing further to say.

Eden said that he would like to reflect a little on the discussion on Germany and might have some comments to make the next time the Heads of Government met.

Bulganin associated himself both with views expressed by the U.S. and the UK.

Faure said that discussion had now turned into a dialogue of questions and answers which may now give opportunity to think things over like Eden suggested. Although some disagreements apparent there appeared to him to be good ground to believe reconciliation possible. Indeed, nothing stated had contradicted the two principles stated at the outset: one, the reunification of Germany irrespective of delays and, two, concern for security not only for individual countries but for all.

Therefore, he stated, it seemed agreed that consideration of the German question should be adjourned but that matter not exhausted and chiefs of government should think problem over. Foreign Ministers could discuss this problem tomorrow morning and their role is not only prepare agenda but also to examine substance so as to facilitate plenary meetings.

Faure suggested Foreign Ministers should continue discussion problem in morning and might report back whether Heads of Government should revert to this matter tomorrow afternoon or whether they should discuss some other problem and come back to Germany later.

Eden reserved right of Heads of Government to come back to subject of Germany pending the life of the present conference. Faure said reunification of Germany remained on agenda as item 1 with debate being suspended. Foreign Ministers will consider matter and recommend whether it should be taken up tomorrow or later. All agreed.

Faure referred to Bulganin's statement he wished add three more questions to the list and the President's suggestion that he might have some items to add. Faure believed four questions already on agenda would take time and it inappropriate now to add thereto. Bulganin said it seemed appropriate to discuss additional items which had been mentioned in private discussions.

Faure then referred to public information. As debate had not been concluded believed too much should not be said and press officers should get together to agree on handling.

Next meeting set for four o'clock tomorrow. Meeting adjourned six three five p.m.[12]

---

[12] For a record of Dulles' conversation with Molotov at the buffet following this session, see *infra*.

---

198. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Secretary of State and Foreign Minister Molotov, Palais des Nations, Geneva, July 19, 1955[1]

USDEL/MC/29

SUBJECT

German Unification

The Secretary sent the following Memorandum to the President on July 19th[2] concerning a conversation he had with Molotov:

"A talk with Molotov in the buffet makes it clear to me that he at least hopes that the Conference will drop entirely the matter of German unification and leave Adenauer without any hope on this subject except such hope as he may derive from his prospective visit to Moscow.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/7–1955. Secret. Drafted by Dulles. This conversation took place following the Third Plenary Session.

[2] On another draft of this memorandum is a handwritten notation which indicates that it was handed to President Eisenhower on July 20. (*Ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 517)

"On the other hand, it is our policy, and it is Adenauer's hope, that we will get established here the principle that there should be an early unification of Germany and a directive to a future meeting of the Four Foreign Ministers to find a European security framework which will make German unification possible.

"Unless we can accomplish this latter result, our Conference here will, I think, be a failure. I think that it should be possible to get the principle of unification adopted and to get it remitted for study at a future meeting of Foreign Ministers along the lines of the draft resolution which I showed you this afternoon.

"Perhaps you will have a chance to drive this home to Zhukov, as what you say to him will carry more weight than all else that can be said around the conference table."[3]

---

[3] See Document 203.

July 20, 1955

199. Memorandum of the Conversation at the President's Breakfast, President's Villa, Geneva, July 20, 1955, 8:30 a.m.[1]

PRESENT

The President, The Secretary of State, Sir Anthony Eden, Mr. Harold Macmillan, Mr. Dillon Anderson

The discussion began with Secretary Dulles' request of Eden that he give us a little run-down on the events of last night.[2]

The British-Russian Dinner

Eden said that the Russians had been cordial, abstemious and well-behaved. (He noted a little interplay that he thought might have some significance—namely, Khrushchev had a way of butting into conversations, interrupting them and taking the play away from his comrades, then turning the talk off with some innocuous remark.)

---

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, White House Office, Project Clean Up. Top Secret. Drafted by Dillon Anderson. Another account, dictated by Anderson to Ann Whitman and virtually identical, is in her diary, pp. 6–11. (*Ibid.*, Whitman File)

[2] On the evening of July 19 the British held a dinner for Bulganin, Khrushchev, Molotov, Zhukov, and Malik. For Macmillan's account and another by Eden, see *Tides of Fortune*, pp. 618–619, and *Full Circle*, pp. 332–335 and 344–345.

Eden said that he had asked the Russians how they felt about their Yugoslav trip, and their reports were, in substance, that they felt it was a satisfactory result, that they had felt that something should be done in this connection to show the change in policy and their willingness to achieve normalized relations with Yugoslavia. They mentioned in this connection their attitude toward Germany as manifested by the invitation to Adenauer to visit Moscow.[3]

The Russians commented to Eden on the fact that during Stalin's lifetime, he had never been willing to leave Russia. They explained that they themselves had limited experience outside their own country, and they wished to promote visits back and forth with other countries. At this point the President mentioned what they had said to him about Mr. Dulles possibly coming to Moscow and thereby gaining a more personal impression of them and a better understanding of the Russians and their present attitude.[4] Sir Anthony said that within the four walls of the room he would like to mention something that had taken place last night. The Russians had urged that he come to Moscow himself, and he explained that he had been there several times and he doubted that anything would be gained by such a visit; they then indicated the desirability of one or more of them going to London, but no invitations were issued.

Sir Anthony stated that from the Russian comments he had concluded that they were *not* in a position to agree now to the unification of Germany, with the unified Germany free to join NATO. Sir Anthony made mention of the Russians' complaint to him the night before that they had been denied admission to NATO. He said he gathered from their statements that they felt "they could not go home" after agreeing to this kind of thing. The President asked "You mean the Politburo might kick them out?" Eden said he did not feel it was quite that bad, but he was certain that they were not in a position to make the agreement. The President recalled a statement made once by Stalin to the effect that whereas in a democracy you have to face elections, in a dictatorship you have to face revolutions; that he, Stalin, had been through two.

Mr. Macmillan then said that he felt we should be able to extract something from the Russians at this time on the subject of German unification, and Eden expressed the thought that if we left it just where it was, the German reaction to the seeming failure of the Western powers to support their aspirations would be unfortunate; in other words, that perhaps there should be some further effort to gain some ground in this area, else it would seem that we were accepting the idea of indefinite continuation of a divided Germany.

---

[3] For text of the Soviet note of June 7, inviting Chancellor Adenauer to Moscow, see *Documents* (R.I.I.A.) for 1955, pp. 245–248.

[4] See Document 187.

It seemed to be agreed in the breakfast meeting that the Western powers should press for a remitment of this subject to the Foreign Ministers to continue and work on the matter. It was pointed out in this connection that if the action went no further than this, it would leave the matter just about where it had been before the Conference began. Eden said that we might be able to get something more than this in the context of some character of security plan. This line was apparently adopted.

European Security

Eden said that he had explained to the Russians last night that the matter of getting Spain and all the other European countries (26 in all) to agree in the measurable future to an over-all security plan was a more or less bleak prospect. The Russians had appeared to recognize the practical difficulties involved in securing agreements of all other countries; that the prior consent or concurrence of other countries to be affected would be necessary. There was then a discussion with the Russians of some kind of agreement to include non-aggression pacts to be participated in by the NATO countries and Warsaw Agreement countries.

In further talks at breakfast about security arrangements, it was recognized by all that we are not prepared at this time to go into or approve the details of any such an arrangement; and that there would be the necessity of continuing consultations with the Germans, whose country would be the heart of such an arrangement. The President mentioned that we were constantly in touch with a representative of the Bonn government, and in fact Adenauer had himself talked fully about Germany's place in such an arrangement, and suggested a plan illustrated by a map. It was agreed between those at breakfast that the broad principles of a European security arrangement might be established at this Conference, with the task of elaboration thereof to be remitted to the Foreign Ministers.

Disarmament

The subject of disarmament was discussed next. The President indicated that he, Mr. Dulles, Governor Stassen, and others in our Government had been giving very intensive thought to this subject; that Governor Stassen would be in Geneva today;[5] that the President, Mr. Dulles and Governor Stassen had all reached the conclusion that the very heart of any such arrangement lay in the efficacy of the inspection system that would be parts of it; and that we were exploring possibilities in this regard.

---

[5] Harold Stassen and Nelson Rockefeller arrived at Geneva from Paris at 9 a.m.

Mr. Macmillan pointed out that the Russians were going to make considerable headway in world opinion by their oversimplified "Ban the Bomb" motto. It was agreed that the best way to counter this was to point out the incompleteness and inadequacy of the inspection system that the Russians had proposed, and citing possibly the fact that in Korea such a system had failed to work.

It was apparently agreed between those at breakfast that in this meeting we should propose consideration of a limited or test inspection plan in connection with the forces in opposition to each other in Europe.

There was some further discussion of Germany's position in this connection and the possibility of a demilitarized zone with forces on each side limited by agreement and subject to effective inspection. The point was suggested that such an inspection system might in the first instance be one that would exclude the Soviet Union but include East Germany and the satellite countries on the one side; that, on the other, the Eastern bloc would be permitted to inspect in all NATO countries except the United Kingdom and the United States. The President said he would be agreeable to some plan including all of our installations, since without an Iron Curtain on our side the Russians knew exactly where the installations were, and what they were, anyway. He said he would even be willing to go further and agree to mutual overflights of the two countries, Russia and the United States; he did not feel there would be anything lost to us in such a connection. Mr. Dulles mentioned the possibility of this being difficult in connection with war games and similar exercises. The President said he would just as soon let them witness these. He reemphasized the point that the Russians already have means of knowing most of the facts about our military installations and their locations. He cited the fact that in the Smyth report the complete map and plot of Hanford was illustrated—a perfect bomber's map.[6]

After the breakfast was over, Secretary Dulles stepped out of the room for a moment. The President and Eden stood and talked, and Eden seemed to me to press him for an agreement that the United States would agree in this Conference to the adoption of some specific arrangement of an arms limitation and inspection plan participated in between the Eastern and Western powers and applicable to Europe. This seemed to me to be an extension of the degree of commitment which had been contemplated before we came to Geneva; in other words, the U.S. policy had seemed to be that we would be prepared to explore mutually acceptable inspection systems, but not to agree at Geneva to a particular plan.

---

[6] Reference is to Henry D. Wolf, *Atomic Energy for Military Purposes*, Princeton, New Jersey, 1945.

China and the Far East

At this point there was some mention of the Chinese situation and I had to miss it, since the President asked me to give Chip Bohlen a call in relation to today's meeting which he is having with General Zhukov.[7] At any rate, there apparently was not a full development of the subject between Eden and the President on the subject of the Far East, because, after the breakfast broke up, it was agreed that this should be the subject of some serious discussions, possibly at breakfast in the morning.

The Russians Generally

At some point during the discussion the matter of the true attitude and position of the ruling group in Russia came up. The President expressed the idea that there were two kinds of ways to look at this dictatorship. One had been the accepted concept—namely, that these fellows were pursuing with religious zeal the ideologies of the Communist Party and determined by one means or another to see them spread around the world; the alternative concept was that they were simply a group of power-mad dictators whose first objective was to hang on to their power—and if this latter was truly the case now, the technique of dealing with them could be an entirely different one.

The Middle East

• • • • • • •

It was agreed that the matter of Iraq aid is an urgent one and must be dealt with promptly.[8]

Egyptian Armament

Mr. Dulles mentioned that the Egyptians had recently offered to buy from the United States a substantial (for them) quantity of tanks, guns and ammunition; that they had hinted that they would buy from the Russians if we didn't sell to them. Eden thought this latter would be bad, but doubted that the Russians would sell to the Egyptians.

---

[7] See Document 203.

[8] Another record of the discussion on the Middle East up to this point is included in a memorandum by Dillon Anderson to Secretary Dulles, July 26. (Eisenhower Library, White House Office, Four Power Meeting)

Mr. Dulles said he thought we would make the sale; that it couldn't be aid because the Egyptians would not make the kind of agreement in connection with aid that our laws require.

Eden said the British were furnishing some small amount of armaments to the Egyptians; that the French were too; that some of it was being resold through Libya to the Arabs and shot back at the French in Morocco and Algeria.

---

200. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Department of State[1]

Geneva, July 20, 1955—9 a.m.

Dulte 24. Eyes only Acting Secretary from Secretary. The second day was one of initial hope and subsequent deflation of that hope. At the morning session of the Foreign Ministers,[2] we were able fairly quickly to get agreement that the topics to be discussed by the Heads of Government would be those we desired and in the order we desired; namely, reunification of Germany, European security, disarmament and improved intercourse. We had expected the Soviets to insist on following the reverse order at least as regards the first three points.

However, at the afternoon meeting of the Heads of Government,[3] the Soviets showed no "give" in their initial position that it would be necessary to work out the European security system which would replace NATO, Brussels and Warsaw before it would be possible to consider the unification of Germany and that in the meantime the two Germanys would participate in the respective East and West security systems.

I had a private talk with Molotov at the buffet following the formal conference[4] at which he indicated that the Soviets were not disposed to remit the problem of German unification within a framework of European security to a future meeting of Foreign Ministers. My present guess is that they want this conference to be a "success" from social standpoint but a total "failure" as regards Germany unification, so that Adenauer will go to Moscow knowing that his only hope is such hope as the Soviets may give him and that the Western powers cannot help him.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-GE/7-2055. Secret.

[2] See Document 193.

[3] See Document 197.

[4] See Document 198.

I believe all three Western Powers are in agreement to try thwart this maneuver and we are now trying to get the agreement of the Three Powers on a proposed directive for presentation to the Soviets.

Dulles

---

201. Editorial Note

At 9:15 a.m. the Tripartite Coordinating (Working) Group held its second meeting with MacArthur, Merchant, Bowie, and Phleger attending for the United States. At 9:30 a.m. Ambassadors Bohlen and Thompson briefed Harold Stassen and Nelson Rockefeller, who had arrived at 9 a.m. from Paris, on the progress of the conference. At 10 a.m. Secretary Dulles joined MacArthur, Merchant, Bowie, Phleger, Bohlen, Thompson, and McCardle for a staff meeting, following which they, without the two Ambassadors, went to the Palais des Nations for a meeting with their British and French counterparts at 10:30 a.m. Meanwhile Stassen and Rockefeller drove to President Eisenhower's villa for a second briefing which lasted from 10:30 a.m. to 11:15 a.m. With the exception of the briefing at 10:30 a.m., no records for any of these meetings have been found in Department of State files, although all appear as entries in the United States Delegation order of the day, USDEL OD–4, July 20. (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 520) With regard to the 10:30 a.m. briefing, Colonel Goodpaster noted the following:

> "He [President Eisenhower] discussed with Governor Stassen and Mr. Rockefeller the development of the conference up to this time, commenting particularly upon Soviet attitudes and upon the make-up of their delegation and relationships within it." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Goodpaster, Random Notes—Geneva Trip)

202. Telegram From the Delegation at the Geneva Conference to the Department of State[1]

Geneva, July 20, 1955—11 p.m.

Secto 50. At 11 a.m. meeting Western Ministers forcefully developed logic their position on German and European security but Molotov simply fell back on previous Bulganin statements, adding nothing thereto.

Chairman Macmillan made clear urgency Western delegates attach German reunification. Soviet delegate had explained its system and plan for reaching same objective. Soviet plan seems to West distant and prolonged process whereas Soviets may consider our suggestions called for too rapid action. German reunification and European security closely linked together and solution of first may lie in solution of second.

Molotov said Soviet views on Germany fully stated yesterday. Would listen with interest to Western observations on Bulganin's remarks re European security.

Secretary explained we feel prolonged German division threat to European security whereas Soviets apparently feel division can be prolonged without danger to European security provided certain supplementary measures are adopted which they suggest. US ready accept apparent sincere Soviet conviction German unification would not bring increased security. We are equally sincere in wishing German unification occur under conditions which would increase security for all. Two sincere positions might possibly be drawn together if we could ascertain basis for Soviet feeling German unification would be danger. If Soviet Union, for example, fears German unification would mean advance eastward of threatening bases and military position, that is specific fear we could understand even though we did not agree. Same true re Soviet fear of enlargement German military establishments. If Soviets made their apprehensions clear in specific terms we could deal with them in specific practical way. US eager find common ground since does not wish create new cause of insecurity by eliminating one cause.

Pinay said task seek acceptable formula is part of four power responsibility for German unification. Bulganin had indicated no objection unification based on free elections and Molotov at Berlin had suggested adoption Weimar electoral law. Elections could be held quickly under control and supervision neutral commissions. Impossible restore unity otherwise, given differences which have developed West and East Germany. Prolonged process suggested by Soviets dangerous since would perpetuate cleavage and would make every step dependent on two regimes with possible East German veto. Molotov replied must keep in mind two real facts: Ratification Paris agreements and start of German militarization within Western grouping. Soviet answer given yesterday by Bulganin. Wished Western powers comment on Soviet proposals for European security.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/7–2055. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Beam and concurred in by Phleger. Repeated to London, Paris, Moscow, and Bonn. The U.S. Delegation verbatim record, USDEL/Verb/M–2, July 20, and the records of decisions, CF/DOC/RD/5, July 20, are *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 509.

Macmillan said useful bases established future study and governments should seek contemporaneous solution which avoid disadvantages of both a too distant solution and one too rapid for Soviets. European security had two aspects: (1) Treaty aspects involving exchange assurances such as Eden suggestion for pact between four powers plus united Germany. Bulganin had suggested all-European pact with some 20–6 [*26*] members. Possibly should study something in between, containing obligations enforceable under UN authority, (2) practical aspects in terms of action bearing on size and location of forces and armaments. Paris agreements had provided examples practical arms control such as checking stocks and prohibiting manufacture certain weapons. Re location of forces security could be helped by reducing contact at most sensitive points as suggested Eden's demilitarized area.

Secretary said President yesterday had given clear and eloquent comment on one of Bulganin's central proposals on security, namely, that security could be enhanced by withdrawal of foreign forces and reestablishment pre-World War II situation. President had spoken with triple authority as US Commander-in-Chief, as former leader Western portion victorious coalition, and as first NATO commander. President had expressed solemn and considered conclusion general security is promoted by integration different national forces which cannot operate offensively without a unanimous conjunction of [will] by independent states which in fact would be unobtainable. President had indicated presence in Federal Republic of UK, US, French and Canadian forces integrated with prospective Federal Republic forces will constitute great security for all. We should avoid reproducing conditions prior to World War II out of which war itself came and NATO liquidation suggested by Bulganin would not in fact promote security. US like USSR not member Brussels treaty which Bulganin suggested also be liquidated but by way of analogy Brussels treaty served both US and USSR security purposes by ensuring against type of Western European division which produced last two wars. US realizes NATO and WEU could be perverted although unlikely and can understand USSR not happy to have its security depend in part on arrangements to which it does not belong. USSR could usefully consider elements. Western nations could for their part usefully study elements in Bulganin opening statement such as adoption mutual commitments not to use armed force and obligation hold mutual consultations in event threat to European peace.

Pinay pointed out Bulganin had accepted Paris agreements as established fact and this being so security plans should be based on recognition this fact. Bulganin's reference to foreign troops and bases in Europe not pertinent since whole represents a consolidated system with pooling resources member countries. In order make headway could we have clear answer from Soviet delegation whether they in fact favored German reunification.

Molotov said clear reply given Bulganin's statement yesterday and should satisfy Pinay. Valuable views have been exchanged on European security and USSR will study them. Grateful for statement yesterday by President for whom Bulganin had expressed highest appreciation and respect. USSR in turn wished ask question: how would security of states such as Poland and Denmark be assured under British five power pact.

Pinay said not satisfied with Molotov answer since Bulganin described Paris agreements as fact. German unification should, therefore, recognize that fact.

Molotov recalled Bulganin had pointed out Western Germany now member NATO and WEU. Because of these facts Germany unity could not be accomplished immediately but must be solved gradually step by step.

Macmillan answering Molotov question said he supposed wise Foreign Minister would have nothing to add to what his head of government had previously said. Would, however, take risk and say that should Soviets propose extending pact to include security requirements of others UK might be ready study something between a pact limited to five and one including all European states.

Molotov indicated German discussion exhausted under Item 1 and afternoon meeting should proceed to second item, namely, European security.

Meeting agreed brief communiqué should be concerted by press officers.

203. Memorandum of the Conversation at the President's Luncheon, President's Villa, Geneva, July 20, 1955, 12:30 p.m.[1]

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.	*U.S.S.R.*
The President	Marshal Zhukov
Ambassador Bohlen	Mr. Troyanovsky

After he was met by the President at the doorway, Marshal Zhukov said he brought special greetings from Khrushchev and Bulganin for the President and their sincere thanks for the dinner the other evening.[2] He added that Khrushchev and Bulganin had been greatly impressed and taken with the President.

The President asked Marshal Zhukov to take back his greetings also and to say that he had enjoyed very much meeting them.

Marshal Zhukov said that the regard with which the President was held in the Soviet Union dated from the period of the War and that even since then when certain aspects of the United States and its policy had been criticized or even attacked in the Soviet press, this had not extended personally to Mr. Eisenhower.

The President said that he did not go in for bad words and tried never to indulge in invective, although at all times he tried to speak the truth.

Marshal Zhukov replied that this was realized by the Soviet leaders and by the people of the Soviet Union and that is why Mr. Eisenhower was held in such regard in the Soviet Union.

The President said we have in America some people who go for invective but personally he did not.

Marshal Zhukov then stated that unfortunately the good relations which had developed during the war and the joint work that he and the President had done in the Allied Control Council had not continued and that the friendship between the United States and the Soviet Union had been disturbed. It must be recognized that the relationship was not normal and that this not only was detrimental to the interests of both countries but also to the cause of world peace. He recalled that during the closing stages of the war, the Hitlerite leadership had based all its military and political calculations on the possibility of setting the United States and the Soviet Union at loggerheads and thus disrupt the alliance. In the postwar period certain "dark forces" had been actively at work in order to undermine Soviet-American relations. He said as a soldier he wished to state with the utmost responsibility that the Soviet leaders, Party and Government, as well as the people of the Soviet Union, desire to see restored the closest and most friendly relations with the United States. He believed that the President and the Soviet Government should do something in order to do away with fears and suspicion and resume the good relations which previously had existed. Bad Soviet-American relations were to the advantage of these "dark forces" and even permitted some nations to fish in troubled waters. He said these forces pictured the Soviet Union as planning aggression and attacks on other countries, but that he was in a position to state and he would answer with his head for these words, that no one in the Soviet Government or the Central Committee of the Party had any such intentions. No one wished war with the United States nor with any other country. He said that with complete sincerity and with a sense of responsibility for his words. The Soviet Union had no need of war and were fed up to the teeth with war. Their main task was to improve their economy and raise the standard of living of their people.

---

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers. Top Secret; Personal and Private. Drafted by Bohlen. A summary of this memorandum was circulated as USDEL/MC/13, July 20 (Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/7–2055), in the records of the U.S. Delegation and was transmitted to Washington on July 21. (Secto 59 from Geneva; *ibid.*, 396.1–GE/7–2155) Ann Whitman recorded the following statement by the President about Zhukov after the lunch: "He is not the man I used to know—he has been well trained for this performance." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman Diary, p. 11) For President Eisenhower's account of the lunch, see *Mandate for Change*, pp. 524–525.

[2] See Documents 188–190.

The President said his entire experience in Berlin with Marshal Zhukov had led him to place credence in his statements, and he therefore believed what the Marshal had just told him.

Marshal Zhukov said he urged the President to believe him on his word as a soldier. He added that it is sometimes said that the Soviet Union maintains forces in a state of readiness to attack others. He would not conceal the fact that they had powerful armed forces, a strong ground army and air force, stock-piles of atom and hydrogen bombs and a very important strategic bombardment air force, but they had no hostile or evil intentions towards other countries. He said from time to time they hear statements from leaders of NATO of the readiness of that organization to annihilate the Soviet Union from the bases located close to the Soviet frontiers. He inquired of the President, as a great military commander, what the Soviet Union could be expected to do under such circumstances except look to its defenses. These armaments were, of course, a burden on the Soviet economy, but they do not wish a repetition of 1941, and no more than the United States could afford to play fast and loose with their security. He felt the two countries should work very seriously towards a détente, and while he knew the United States was a rich country, he believed people would welcome a relief from the armaments burden.

The President said Marshal Zhukov could be sure of that.

Marshal Zhukov said he would not hide from the President the fact that the only reason he had come to Geneva was to be able to see him personally and to have a heart to heart talk with him and to tell him as a soldier what he had on his mind. He felt the President could do much to help restore Soviet-American friendship.

The President at this point mentioned he had asked Ambassador Bohlen to make notes in order to have a personal record of the talk, but that these notes would not be official or form part of the official records.

Marshal Zhukov remarked that he did not see there would be much harm even if their conversation became known.

The President said he agreed that toward the end of the war relations with the Soviet Union seemed to be steadily improving, and he also regretted the deterioration of these relations in the postwar period. He felt one important factor that they should recognize was one of a psychological nature; that in Moscow the Soviet version of events was put forth to their people and that in the United States the course of events was set forth as we saw them. As a result, many millions of people in both countries had developed a state of fear and distrust of each other which he felt was a very important factor. He said it might be easy for two people such as himself and Marshal Zhukov who were old friends to agree that an improvement in relations was desirable, but neither one of them could control these factors, such as feelings of people. It was therefore not to be expected that any improvement could occur overnight but would take some time until the present psychological state of distrust and fear were overcome.

Marshal Zhukov said he agreed with the President on this point.

The President said he thought that he might review briefly our view of the course of events which had led to the present situation, although he did not expect the Marshal would agree. After World War II the United States had demobilized its forces to such an extent that we did not have sufficient for occupation duties in Western Germany, Japan and South Korea. This had been done because the United States believed that we were entering an era of peace. However, following the reduction of our forces, we began to be pushed around. For example, our friends in Greece were confronted with armed action against them which was supported from Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. Then there was the Berlin Blockade and in order to maintain our position there, we had developed the airlift. In China our wartime ally, and there might be various views on Chiang Kai-shek but he was our wartime ally, began to be pushed around by the Communists, and then finally, most important of all, there was the war in Korea. As a result of these events we undertook a program of armament. We came to the conclusion that we would have to take firmer action. One of the measures which we developed was the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance. The Soviet Union, through the exercise of its control of neighboring countries in Eastern Europe such as Poland, Czechoslovakia, etc., had already set up a monolithic military system. NATO was in part a response to this situation. It was, however, also designed in some of its manifestations to give France a sense of protection against Germany in the future. Out of this general situation began the arms race with the piling up of atomic weapons, the creation of large air fleets. All this was very costly, and in the President's view would be unnecessary if, as Marshal Zhukov had stated, we could restore some degree of confidence and trust between our two countries.

At this point they proceeded into lunch.

Marshal Zhukov said he did not disagree entirely with what the President had said, although from their point of view there had been faults on the American side. Perhaps it was best to recognize that there had been faults on both sides and that it would be well not merely to review the mistakes of the past but to look to the future and see what could be done under present conditions.

The President agreed and said that as he had observed earlier situations of this kind could not be changed overnight because the feelings and concerns of millions of people were involved. He inquired where the Marshal saw a beginning.

Marshal Zhukov said it might be well to begin with small things, and possibly an end to polemics and invectives between our two countries might be a good beginning.

The President said that the Marshal must understand that in the United States there was a different system, and while he could control utterances of officials of the Executive Branch, he had no control whatsoever over the newspapers or over what Congress might say. What was necessary were some events or series of events which might change the psychological climate.

Marshal Zhukov said he fully realized the difference in the systems and agreed it would take time, but what was really important was the intention of the two Governments and that if there was a genuine desire to improve relations, that that was the central factor. Turning to disarmament, Marshal Zhukov said he thought that the arms race and some form of disarmament was important as well as a collective security system. He said no matter what might be said about military blocs, however much their defensive character might be stressed or believed in, a bloc remained a bloc, and personally, he was categorically against military blocs. He felt they generated suspicion and arms race and international tension by their very existence. It was important, therefore, to change blocs into friendly alliances based on a collective security system under which, if any member made trouble and threatened the peace, he would be put in a straight jacket by collective action.

The President remarked that this had been the purpose of the United Nations.

Marshal Zhukov agreed but said he did not wish to go into a review of UN history, but it did not fully achieve its purpose. He thought it important that gradually military blocs should be done away with.

The President said in the opinion of the Western Powers the Soviet control over Poland, Czechoslovakia and other countries of Eastern Europe constituted a solid, monolithic military bloc, whereas in the West their association was composed of independent countries, each with its own point of view. He added that having said that, he was inclined to agree that blocs do give rise to suspicion and since they are always regarded as directed against other countries, are in somewhat of a contradiction with attempts to improve relations with those countries.

Marshal Zhukov said he agreed with the President and said that in regard to their bloc in Eastern Europe set up by the Warsaw Conference, they would gladly dissolve it and integrate it into an all-Europe security system. He thought that Bulganin's proposal for gradual progress in two stages was a very useful proposal, but the Soviet Government would be glad to consider any other on this subject.[3]

The President said a very specific and important question in the disarmament field was that of inspection. He said it was realized that you could not inspect everything and if, in the United States, we wished to hide five hundred atomic bombs, no inspector could find them and the Soviet Union could do likewise, but nevertheless large installations such as airfields, long-range bombers and guided missile factories could not be hidden. He inquired whether the Marshal thought they could look forward to an institution of inspection of this type.

Marshal Zhukov said he was sure they could.

The President then inquired whether such inspection would be politically possible in the Soviet Union.

Marshal Zhukov said it would be entirely possible and while its detail should be studied, he was, in principle, in full agreement with the President's remarks. He added that they should work seriously on the subject of collective security and a system of inspection designed to create confidence and assurance and not to deceive each other. As he understood it, the President was concerned with the possibility of a surprise attack.

---

[3] Regarding Bulganin's proposal, see Document 184.

The President said this was true, but it was also necessary to convey a feeling of confidence to the people in general. He said the people were now living in mortal fear, and while these fears may be exaggerated, they were generally held by millions of people and the fear of atomic destruction was very real.

Marshal Zhukov said he agreed with that but he had studied and seen with his own eyes on maneuvers the deadly powers of these weapons, and he fully understood the President's concern.

The President said that not even scientists could say what would happen if two hundred H-bombs were exploded in a short period of time, but if atmospheric conditions were right, the fall-out might destroy entire nations and possibly the whole northern hemisphere.

Marshal Zhukov said that if on the first day of war the United States dropped three or four hundred bombs on the Soviet Union and they would do the same, it would be impossible to say what would happen to the atmosphere under those conditions. He said he was unqualifiedly for total abolition of weapons of this character.

The President repeated that before any such thing could be done there had to be genuine confidence among nations and that he had only mentioned the power of these weapons in order to emphasize the necessity of restoring confidence to the peoples of the world. He said if they proceeded step by step, they might begin in Central Europe where the experts could agree on the total number of forces to be stationed in that area and then have a system of reciprocal inspection. This inspection would not attempt to locate every bomb or weapon but would merely verify whether the force levels and installations agreed on were in conformity with the agreement. He envisaged this as a possible first step.

Marshal Zhukov said the main thing was to reduce forces.

The President replied that he agreed and had had in mind a reduction of the forces in this particular area.

Marshal Zhukov said that it should not be only in one area but should apply to the forces as a whole.

The President said he felt that the necessary first step was to have a demonstrably effective system of inspection and that while bombs could not be located in all cases, large installations could be.

Marshal Zhukov said that inspection is an important element in any disarmament system but the main thing was reduction in forces and abolition of atomic and hydrogen bombs. Controls would be the test of the good will of the participants. He felt, however, a first step in the general direction of restoration of confidence would be to start on a system of collective security. He said he attached great importance to this matter and felt that its members would have great responsibilities in restraining or punishing any would-be aggressor.

The President inquired whether he had any concrete suggestions in this field.

Marshal Zhukov replied that he thought the first step would be for the Four Powers assembled here in Geneva and all other European countries to agree on a treaty of collective security to which both parts of Germany could join, as a step towards eventual elimination of blocs.

The President inquired if this would be followed by reduction of arms and abolition of nuclear weapons.

Marshal Zhukov said without question, since he could not envisage a system of collective security that did not involve reduction of forces and abolition of nuclear weapons. He said such a system must be founded on friendship and confidence to which every participant would have a moral responsibility to prevent aggression.

The President said the Marshal was painting a picture of the ultimate stage about which we were all thinking but he felt we must go step by step and by stages.

Marshal Zhukov agreed, but he said the main thing was to set your goal and that the actual nature of the steps was a technical question. The main thing was the inclination and desire, regardless of other differences. He said, for example, that he and the President held different opinions on many subjects. This did not affect his respect for the President or the fact that he would value his friendship as long as he lived.

The President said he had the same feeling in regard to Marshal Zhukov. He said, however, that the Marshal had touched on a very important factor, that of difference of viewpoints. He said that many people had become acquainted with the writings of Marx, Lenin and Stalin, which dealt with the final destruction of capitalism, and in many parts authorized the use of force and violence if necessary. He said these views have not been repudiated by the Soviet leaders and this is one of the chief causes of alarm and apprehension on the part of the American people.

Marshal Zhukov stated that the alarm was not justified, that there was no apparatus in existence for the direction of Communist parties abroad and he could tell the President the secret and that was that the Cominform had had no meetings since 1949. He said if a directing center existed, they would unquestionably turn their attention to the American Communist party and endeavor in every way to increase its influence and enlarge its membership, but as is well known, the U.S. Communist party is the weakest of all Communist parties. This was a matter for the American people to decide for themselves. He continued that the theory of Marx had been in existence for over a century and that the political convictions were up to an individual. Furthermore, there were other theories such as capitalism and imperialism.

The President said he did not wish to get into an ideological dispute with Marshal Zhukov, but nevertheless the documents which he had referred to spoke of use of force in order to destroy capitalism. He was glad to hear from the Marshal that there was no central apparatus of direction, which appeared to indicate that certain parts of the doctrine had been forgotten or at least laid aside. He said he thought it was a pity that the two greatest countries in the world with the productive power which would have a great opportunity by working together to benefit themselves and the whole world, should have reached a point where their fears and suspicions interfered with any such relationship. He said he was equally anxious with the Marshal to do away with these barriers.

Marshal Zhukov said in regard to doctrine, he thought it was not a question of forgetting or laying aside any portion thereof. The Soviet Government believed that each country must find its way to a higher form of organization through its own means. Some might do so gradually and peacefully; others through war or revolution; and still others by different combinations. He said there is no single recipe applicable to all countries. Each country must decide for itself the nature of its own development. He said his country did not believe in interfering in internal affairs of other countries as this merely produced strains and tensions between them.

The President said this was an important statement since this problem had been the greatest single factor of fear and apprehension in the United States.

Marshal Zhukov said the Soviet Government was prepared to give any assurances on this point or sign any declaration to that effect.

The President said he had two points he wished to make to Marshal Zhukov of a somewhat different and possibly more minor nature. The first, which did not directly depend on the Soviet Government, and one that did. He said in the first instance he referred to Americans still held prisoner in China. He said when he came into the Presidency, he had wished to conclude an armistice in Korea, and one of the chief problems had been the action of the Chinese Communists in holding Americans prisoner. He said according to our information, there were some forty civilians and possibly around twelve military which the Chinese Communists still hold. He said he knew the Soviet Government did not control China, but he hoped Marshal Zhukov would do what he could as an exercise of his good offices to bring about the release of these men. He said it had been asserted that the United States was holding some Chinese students, but this was not so, and he would invite any form of inspection to verify the truth of this statement.

Marshal Zhukov replied that he had heard of thirteen American military personnel and that when he had received the President's letter in reply to his on the release of Lysikov, he had sent this request on to China.[4] The President was correct in saying that they had no control or influence over a matter which was a domestic affair of China, but that possibly the letter had had some effect in what he understood to have been the release of four Americans held prisoner. As to the others, he was convinced that if U.S. representatives would talk to representatives from China, the matter could be settled relatively easy if similar satisfaction was given to the other side.

Marshal Zhukov said that since the President had mentioned China, he would like to make some observations on the Chinese problem, the settlement of which was of great importance for the relaxation of tension. There was, first of all, the question of membership in the U.N. He was sure the President must recognize that in many respects it was abnormal that a nation of 600,000,000 people was not represented in this organization. He inquired why it was not possible to make them morally responsible for their international acts before world opinion in the U.N. He said there was also the question of these islands, Quemoy and Matsu, and he could not understand why they had not been evacuated. It merely served to inflame Chinese opinion and also that of the United States; that the Chinese regarded this as a matter of their national interest. He said they were not major issues in themselves but had a very bad effect on international affairs. Then, of course, there was the question of Taiwan itself. He felt that delay in settling these questions was not advantageous even to the United States.

The President said if he began to discuss the Chinese problem in the length of time they had reserved, and he agreed it was very important, they would be late for their meetings this afternoon. He said he could understand the Marshal's point of view, but the whole matter was extremely complicated and tangled. Our relations with Peiping had been far from fortunate, and it would take some time even to express to the Marshal the depth of feeling there was in the United States on this subject. He might make, however, one point which he was sure the Marshal as a soldier would understand, and that was that in spite of extreme provocation, he had restrained [*refrained*] from sending powerful forces to the area since there was no desire to become involved in war in that area.

---

[4] Correspondence concerning this matter is scheduled for publication in the compilation on Berlin in a forthcoming volume of *Foreign Relations*.

The President said that the other specific point he wished to take up was prisoners in the USSR itself. He said they had appeals from other countries—West Germans, Japanese, Norwegians and others concerning their nationals still held prisoner in the Soviet Union. In the case of the West Germans, these ran up in the hundreds of thousands. It had been said that some of these had been convicted as war criminals, but surely the time had come to review these cases. He had even had reports which had been taken up with the Soviet Government that there were some Americans in these camps.

Marshal Zhukov replied that he felt that the figures mentioned by the President were greatly exaggerated. He said insofar as he was aware, all Austrians had been released and that it was intended to negotiate in regard to prisoners with the West Germans. As to the others, he did not know, but would do what he could on his return to Moscow.

The President said he thought the time had come for their lunch to break up. He wished to say in conclusion that insofar as it depends on him that he would do everything he could to avoid invectives and similar statements in regard to the Soviet Union and would treat the Soviet Union with the respect it deserved. He felt that they with their new leadership, and that he as an old soldier might make some progress in the future. He said if the Soviet Government did something they did not like in the United States, he would take it up promptly either through our Ambassador in Moscow or the Soviet Ambassador in Washington, and he hoped the Soviet Government would do the same. He said, however, there was one matter he felt to be very important and that was reunification of Germany. It might not be possible to do it all at once, but the mechanism should be set up here at this conference in order to continue the study of this vital problem. He said he hoped that he and Marshal Zhukov would not be known primarily for their military campaigns, but rather as soldiers of peace, and he hoped that the new Soviet leadership would likewise be so known.

Marshal Zhukov said he agreed, and also said they did have a new leadership, a collective leadership, in the Soviet Union. He said the principle of leadership was seriously meant and had already in the last few years demonstrated that it was the best method under present circumstances for the Soviet Union. He said collective leadership was not confined only to the nine members of the Presidium of the Central Committee but was on a broader basis and included the Central Committee of the Soviet Government, the Central Committees and Governments of the constitutional republics, and even provincial administrations. He said the base was very broad and it had proved the efficacy. He continued that it had been said in the foreign press that collective leadership could not survive, but it had already proved itself and enjoyed the support of the people of the Soviet Union. He added that there was an economic upswing in the Soviet Union and great progress was being made in industry and very important efforts in agriculture. He said they wished to be able to devote their entire effort to the solution of economic problems and to raising the standard of living for the people. On Germany he agreed that efforts must continue in the direction of unification, and he felt on the basis outlined in Bulganin's speech. However, account must be taken of the existence of the GDR, and they could not be left to the winds of chance, and that the Soviet Union felt they must help them in their problems. He would ask the United States to take into account the fact of the existence of the GDR. As for the immediate period, he could not see why both Germanies could not be in a collective security system. He said unification of Germany could not be settled at this conference, but the aim should not be abandoned or the question brushed aside.

The President said that insofar as he was able, he would see to it that this problem was settled and Germany unified and there would be no persecution of any one in that area for their past political acts, convictions or beliefs.

On departing, Marshal Zhukov expressed his pleasure at having had the opportunity to talk to the President and said it had been a great honor and he felt he had been useful.

The President said it had been a pleasure to have had a talk with him and asked him to extend his greetings to Khrushchev and Bulganin.

---

204. Editorial Note

In addition to President Eisenhower's lunch with Marshal Zhukov (see *supra*) two other members of the United States Delegation held working lunches at 1 p.m. Livingston Merchant, accompanied by Coburn Kidd, dined in his hotel room with Herbert Blankenhorn, Chancellor Adenauer's special representative at Geneva. Merchant described the conversation as follows:

"We talked at length on the Soviet attitude on reunification. He said that Adenauer was deeply disappointed but not greatly surprised by the Russian obduracy and above all was reassured by the firmness of the Western position on this matter, so vital to him and his country." (Merchant, *Recollections*, page 38)

Douglas MacArthur II, presumably accompanied by Bowie and Phleger, held a working lunch with the Tripartite Coordinating (Working) Group at the same time. No record of this lunch has been found in Department of State files.

---

205. Memorandum of the Conversation at the Soviet Luncheon Between Secretary Dulles and Foreign Minister Molotov, Soviet Villa, Geneva, July 20, 1955, 1:15 p.m.[1]

USDEL/MC/14

I was seated between Prime Minister Bulganin and Foreign Minister Molotov, the only significant conversation took place between Mr. Molotov and myself.

He asked what our plans were for concluding the Conference. I said that I felt that we could discuss European security this afternoon and then could start on disarmament on Thursday and continue on Friday with a view to winding up on Friday or Saturday. Mr. Molotov indicated assent to this time table and to the topics. He then asked whether we had any proposed decision for the conference to take. He said that he assumed we had so many experts that we had come fully armed in this respect. I said that we had no proposals formulated but were awaiting the evolution of the conference. I said however we had begun to think in terms of a directive which would call for a meeting of the Foreign Ministers after a reasonable lapse of time to enable us to study the various interesting suggestions which had been made here. He asked what lapse of time I thought of and I said that I thought the Foreign Ministers might meet some time in October.

Mr. Molotov asked what subjects I had in mind that the Foreign Ministers might study and I said the problem of German unification, European security and disarmament, the latter to be studied either here or at the United Nations. Mr. Molotov said that he thought it was appropriate to continue to study the questions of European security and of disarmament but not the subject of German unification. He said it was premature to study German unification at this time.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 516. Secret. Drafted by Dulles. Also present from the U.S. Delegation were Dillon Anderson, Hagerty, Thompson, Rockefeller, and Stassen. Another memorandum of the conversation, USDEL/MC/4, July 20, by Thompson, is the same in substance, but concludes with the following sentence: "In the course of the conversation, Mr. Molotov expressed the hope that the conversation between President Eisenhower and Marshal Zhukov would facilitate the work of the Conference." (*Ibid.*)

I said that while I recognized that the subject could not be German unification except within the context of European security, it seemed to me that it would be inadmissible to ignore the problem of German unification for this would have a very serious impact on Germany, also that the problem of European security could not be realistically studied except on the assumption that there would be German unification. Mr. Molotov continued to insist that we should only study now disarmament and European security and that German unification should not be one of the topics designated for future study at this time.

I asked Mr. Molotov where he thought the Foreign Ministers ought to meet if they met again. He said he thought Geneva was a good place and asked me what I thought. I said that if there was a good result from this conference then we might meet here again but that if this conference did not make good progress then perhaps we should try out another atmosphere as, for example, that of San Francisco. Molotov said that if we were going to meet elsewhere than Geneva we might meet at Moscow or Leningrad. I said we had met at Moscow once and the results had not been very good. He said it might be different if we tried again.

After lunch I mentioned to Eden what Molotov had said about excluding German unification from the topics to be studied further by direction of the Heads of Government. Eden said that while he had gathered from last night that that was Molotov's view he did not think that it would necessarily prevail as against what he considered the more liberal views of Bulganin and Khrushchev.

---

206. Editorial Note

Following his lunch with Marshal Zhukov (see Document 203), President Eisenhower left his villa for a tour of the atomic research reactor at the Palais des Nations. A copy of his remarks to the press during the tour are in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 505.

After the tour the President met with Secretary Dulles, Harold Stassen, and other members of the United States Delegation at the Palais des Nations at 3:30 p.m., presumably to coordinate last-minute details before the Fourth Plenary Session at 4 p.m. No record of this meeting has been found in Department of State files or at the Eisenhower Library, although it appears as an entry on both the President's appointment list for July 20 and on the United States Delegation chronology of events for July 20. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, and Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 505) A record of the Fourth Plenary Session is *infra.*

---

207. Telegram From the Delegation at the Geneva Conference to the Department of State[1]

Geneva, July 21, 1955—10 a.m.

Secto 56. Fourth meeting Heads of Government convened 4:00 p.m., July 20, Eden in chair. Eden referred Foreign Ministers recommendation discussion should be on second topic of agenda, European security.[2]

Bulganin spoke first.[3] Soviets want to stress importance they attach to system of collective security for Europe. Only through joint efforts of all nations of Europe can security of countries of Europe be brought about. Maintenance of peace in Europe would have paramount importance for maintenance of universal peace. USA could also take part in system of European collective security. GDR and Federal Republic of Germany and later a united Germany could also take part. Soviets have already proposed a 2-stage system. During first stage nations would continue commitments under existing treaties but would refrain from use of armed force and settle all disputes by peaceful means. During second stage states would assume full commitments of system of collective security and NATO, Paris agreements, and Warsaw Treaty would be terminated. Overall collective security treaty should provide for necessary consultations when there is a threat of armed attack in Europe. Attack on one or several signatories would be regarded as attack on all signatories. Effective measures should then be taken by all available means including use of armed force for restoring peace and security.

Such system would improve atmosphere and bring about trust and confidence in relations between countries without which outstanding international issues such as German problem cannot be settled. Bulganin then tabled Soviet proposal sent separately Secto 49.[4]

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/7–2155. Secret. Copies of the U.S. Delegation verbatim record, USDEL/Verb/4, July 20, and the record of decisions, CF/DOC/RD/6, July 21, for this session are *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 510. For Eden's account of the Fourth Plenary, see *Full Circle*, pp. 336–337.

[2] See Document 202.

[3] The full text of Bulganin's speech was circulated as CF/DOC/7, July 20. (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 514)

[4] See Document 251.

President spoke next.[5] Described principal point of difference between Soviet and US thinking as urgency with which US views need for reunified Germany. Soviets seemed to believe new overall pact deferring for moment reunification Germany would contribute to security. US believes division of Germany contributes to insecurity. In US view two matters of unification of Germany and security of Europe are inseparable. To start on security pact without making move toward reunifying Germany would appear to confirm division of Germany. We should set up machinery for doing whole job and give some competent group job of working out what needs to be done.

Faure also stressed closeness of security problem to problem of German unification. Was willing to discuss problem of security with reservation that it could not be separated from problem of unification. Discussed Bulganin's two stages. Saw no difficulties involved in idea of prevention of the use of force and peaceful arrangements for settling disputes. Believed that Bulganin's idea of undertaking not to increase military establishments also worth studying. At first sight could see no objections.

In discussing Bulganin's second stage said there was difficulty arising from fact second stage seemed to link overall security organization, unification of Germany, and finally abolition of organizations[6] because states which were members would not want to proceed with this. Welcomed reference in Soviet proposal to rapid solution of German problem. Pointed out seeming discrepancy in specification of 2 or 3 years' length of time in article 12 with lack definition of time involved in later article. Thought that part of Soviet proposal which called for abolition of existing organizations was not very satisfactory. Questioned whether even if organizations were abolished Soviet proposal could in any way prevent setting up of defensive organizations outside the overall system. Said he was favorably disposed to the general idea of overall security system. With such a system there could be limitations on armed forces and armaments, agreed ceilings could be worked out and existence of ceilings might make it possible to bring about reductions. This was close to his own disarmament idea which he would discuss at later point on agenda. Concluded by suggesting that Soviets bear in mind the relationship between German unification and security which he thought was evident even in their own proposal.

---

[5] For text of President Eisenhower's speech, see *Geneva Conference*, pp. 51–52.

[6] In the outgoing copy of Secto 56 in the delegation records the following phrase followed here: "and groupings such as called for in the Paris Agreements. Thought there might be indefinite delay to abolition of existing organizations." (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 524)

Eden then stated UK would be glad to take part in any security proposals which would result in increased confidence in Europe. There were two broad aspects of the security question. First, treaty provisions including membership and second, question of timing. Five-power pact which he had proposed had same purpose as Soviet proposal.[7] If 5 powers were in agreement there would not be much risk of trouble in Europe. Such a pact could give assurance to smaller powers. British were ready however to consider extending membership of pact if that were generally desired. On the matter of membership a middle course might be practical. On timing, Eden stated there was clearly wide divergence of views. It would not be effective to try to build security pact with Germany still divided and Germany ought to be unified now. It might be worth studying the possibility of carrying out creation of pact and unification of Germany simultaneously but only if pact is not so wide in scope and membership that it would unreasonably delay German unity.

Bulganin spoke next, observing that USSR did not want to reopen discussion on subject considered yesterday, namely, reunification of Germany. Everything that could be said on that subject had already been said yesterday. Today should consider system of collective security in Europe. No doubt two questions are interconnected but they are not the same questions. Soviets prepared to consider proposals to improve their draft document. Referred particularly to considerations mentioned by Eden which Bulganin stated were of considerable interest.

President said that each delegation would study Soviet draft carefully.[8] Stated that from individual talks with members of Soviet delegation he believed they earnestly desired finding peace. Problem was to find a bridge between differing viewpoints. We were now discussing matters that we could not handle in detail in this conference because other countries would have to be dealt with. Noted Bulganin's statement of 15 July which said this conference could be only a beginning. If we could establish a real spirit of conciliation and an effort to get along together, Foreign Ministers and other agencies might solve some of problems and build kind of bridge he had described. Believe we should ask Foreign Ministers to suggest kind of machinery which should be set up or when they would like to undertake more detailed conference on subjects of unification of Germany and European security. Ministers could present recommendations in such a way that the Heads of Government could give them a directive.

---

[7] Regarding Eden's proposal for a five-power pact, see Document 197.

[8] For the full text of President Eisenhower's statement, see *Geneva Conference*, pp. 52–53.

Faure seconded the President's suggestions. Thought that Foreign Ministers might try to find principles common to all delegations and report tomorrow afternoon. This conference cannot enter into details nor draw up actual drafts, but they should not simply refer matters for study to Foreign Ministers.

Eden summed up discussion by saying that it was clear that all agreed that German unification and European security are intimately linked. He agreed with what the President had just said. A point had been reached on these two subjects where it would be profitable for Foreign Ministers to enter more detailed discussion to try to find common agreement on a practical plan. Ministers will need some directive from Heads of Government. We should try to settle our directive before conference ends. Suggested that directive might include following points: study of unification of Germany having regard to security of all concerned; study of security pact for Europe or part of Europe; study of limitation and inspection of forces and armaments in Germany and countries neighboring Germany; and finally, study of the possibility of creating a demilitarized area. Suggested that Foreign Ministers should discuss question of a directive for themselves and see whether it is possible to produce an agreed draft.

Bulganin thought that directive should be clarified by one additional amendment. Should include provision that problem of system of collective security in Europe should not be made dependent upon problem of German reunification.

President said that we are seeking peace in Europe because of its importance to the peace of the world.[9] Any advance should be made dependent upon nothing else whatsoever. Believed that the directive should come from the guidance Ministers have had from the discussions they have heard and see whether they can bring about something that represents an advance.

Faure supported suggestion made by Eden. Thought it satisfactorily summed up framework of the discussions. Thought that Foreign Ministers should proceed on basis of these discussions which would of course not prejudge right of Heads of Governments themselves to take decisions concerning the principles.

There was then general agreement to the statement of Eden that Foreign Ministers should be asked to meet tomorrow morning to consider whether they can frame proposals for their own directives to guide their study of the two subjects of European security and reunification of Germany.

Meeting adjourned at 5:42 p.m.

---

[9] For the full text of President Eisenhower's statement, see *ibid.*, p. 53.

208. Memorandum for the Record of a Meeting of the Delegation at the Geneva Conference, President's Villa, Geneva, July 20, 1955, 6 p.m.[1]

At a meeting at 6:00 p.m. on Wednesday, July 20, 1955, in the President's Villa at Geneva, the following attended:

The President
The Secretary of State
Mr. Livingston Merchant, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
General Alfred M. Gruenther, Supreme Allied Commander in Europe
Admiral Arthur W. Radford, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Mr. Robert B. Anderson, Deputy Secretary of Defense
Mr. Harold E. Stassen, Special Assistant to the President on Disarmament
Mr. Nelson A. Rockefeller, Special Assistant to the President
Mr. Dillon Anderson, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Colonel Andrew J. Goodpaster, White House Staff Secretary

Governor Stassen handed to the President and read a "Draft of Statement of President Eisenhower on the Subject of Disarmament".[2] A copy of that instrument is attached to the original of this memorandum.

---

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, White House Office, Project "Clean Up". Top Secret. Drafted by Dillon Anderson on July 21. For another account of the conversation, see *infra*. According to Merchant, who arrived just as the meeting began, the session went as follows:

"The President was in an easy chair by the fireplace with the Secretary beside him. Dillon Anderson was there and Andy Goodpaster was sitting by the door. All the others were recent arrivals from Paris: Al Gruenther, Supreme Commander for NATO in Europe, and long-time friend of the President; Harold Stassen and Nelson Rockefeller, Presidential Special Assistants; Admiral Radford, Chairman of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff; and Bob Anderson, Deputy Secretary of Defense and one of the most competent men in all the Government.

"The subject was Disarmament, which was on the Conference agenda for the next afternoon, and what the President's statement should contain. The forthcoming 'open skies' proposal was discussed at length. There was no argument raised against it or its unveiling on Thursday. The question most seriously debated was whether or not it should be included in a comprehensive statement by the President on disarmament in all its phases or whether he should confine his speech to putting forward the 'open skies' proposal. I felt strongly that when the President spoke on the subject of disarmament at the Summit Conference the entire world would expect him to deal at some length with the whole complicated subject and hence the 'open skies' proposal should be handled as one section in his statement or in a separate later intervention. I'm not sure the Secretary agreed with me but in any event after considerable discussion the President decided to make an opening statement covering the general subject. He did not apparently then decide whether to include 'open skies' in his opening remarks or leave that for later injection into the session." (Merchant, *Recollections*, pp. 37–38)

[2] Not printed. A copy of the draft statement is in Eisenhower Library, Whitman File.

The President expressed himself as being entirely in agreement with the principles enunciated in the paper, particularly with reference to the importance of an effective inspection system in connection with any kind of disarmament agreement. In the discussion which followed, those in attendance proceeded to consider the several possible areas and methods of inspection as a part of steps that might be taken to test the efficacy and practicality of disarmament programs.

The President reported briefly on his discussion at breakfast with the British Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary,[3] and the fact that the British were in accord with our view as to the importance of effective inspection as a part of any kind of disarmament program; also the desirability of exploring in this Conference the possibilities of progress in this direction.

There was a discussion of the possibility of armaments limitation in the context of a divided Germany; of limited armaments in zones in Germany in each side of a neutral zone; and of some kind of limitation of forces in NATO nations and in the nations participating in the Warsaw Agreement. (There was no mention of the matter discussed with the British as to the possibility of limitation of armaments and inspection by all participants in the Warsaw Treaty except Russia on the east, and all participants in NATO on the west except the United Kingdom and the United States.)

General Gruenther pointed out that there was a sort of inspection going on now, in the form of the so-called Potsdam teams—namely, representatives of the East were permitted to travel in West Germany, and a team from the West had not been denied access to any installations in East Germany. General Gruenther apparently seemed to feel that this was a program that was working.

When it was mentioned that this system might be extended, General Gruenther pointed out that from our standpoint we would have to be very particular about its going into effect, inasmuch as we had some very sensitive installations in adjacent areas—installations which had been so apparent from the heavy security surrounding them that a visiting Congressman recently had no difficulty in recognizing the location of these sensitive installations.

The President mentioned the fact that at breakfast with the British he had indicated to them his belief that a plan for mutual overflights in the East and the West, to include Russia and the United States, would not be unacceptable to him. (This subject likewise is dealt with on page 4 of the Stassen memorandum.[4])

---

[3] See Document 199.

[4] Reference is to the draft cited in footnote 2 above.

There was general agreement at the meeting that in the plenary session of Thursday afternoon the President could appropriately suggest consideration of a plan to permit such overflights and photographs if the Russians would do likewise. The President pointed out that in his opinion, the Russians already had the means of knowing the location of virtually all our installations, and that mutual agreements for such overflights would undoubtedly benefit us more than the Russians because we knew very little about their installations.

The question then arose as to whether it would be entirely appropriate for this idea to be advanced at the meeting Thursday afternoon without some advice to the British and French beforehand. It was decided that there would be no such disclosure or tripartite discussion of the plan, in view of the likelihood that the impact of it would be lost through a leak. It was likewise agreed that the President would not include it in his opening statement on disarmament, but would mention it, in more or less extemporaneous fashion, on the "second round".

After the meeting broke up I mentioned to the President that Secretary Anderson was prepared to discuss with him the possibility of further aid to Iraq along the lines suggested by Eden at breakfast; that I had called Bob in Paris and asked him to be in a position to indicate availability of funds to increase our offshore procurement of British Centurion tanks (up to 50, costing 100,000 pounds each) to give to the Iraqis in support of their adherence to the Northern Tier concept as represented by the Turko-Iraqi treaty; also in order to assist the present government of Iraq, which is an acceptable government to us and which is on a somewhat shaky footing at this time. The President and Secretary Anderson agreed to have some further talks about the matter this morning (Thursday, July 21[5]).

Dillon Anderson[6]
Special Assistant
to the President

---

[5] See footnote 2, Document 220.

[6] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

209. Memorandum for the Record of a Meeting of the Delegation at the Geneva Conference, President's Villa, Geneva, July 20, 1955, 6 p.m.[1]

PRESENT

The President
Secretary Dulles
Mr. Dillon Anderson
General Gruenther
Governor Stassen
Admiral Radford
Mr. Rockefeller
Deputy Secretary Anderson
Colonel Goodpaster

Governor Stassen handed out a draft statement on Disarmament,[2] of which the most striking idea was that of indicating willingness to agree to permit overflights of the U.S. and the USSR for aerial photography as a device for inspection. Mr. Robert Anderson indicated that the furnishing of lists of military installations should be coupled with that.

The President thought the great value of an inspection system placed in actual operations would be to begin to enable confidence to be developed on the part of the various nations as to just what military forces and installations existed in the other countries.

Secretary Dulles asked whether this proposal would pertain just to the United States and USSR or whether it would be applied to the NATO area, in line with the interest of the British. General Gruenther brought out that there are some special secure areas within Western Europe—some special geographical arrangements for putting the scheme into effect might therefore have to be developed. Governor Stassen commented on this scheme, as well as on schemes which have a zonal basis. He said that it would tend to fix the "iron curtain" more firmly. The President thought the effect would be just the opposite, if it were measured from the present—since there would be inspection teams going into areas now behind the iron curtain. Mr. Stassen also pointed out that inspection might let the USSR obtain information on our own advanced technology and insist on looking at our nuclear weapons, etc. in detail.

Mr. Robert Anderson felt that a scheme with the three principal elements—1) photograph; 2) application to the US and USSR; 3) concurrent ground inspection—would provide a useful beginning, and would not extend so far as to permit detailed inspection of new technological developments. The President asked if it would not be better to suggest that all four countries permit inspection of this type. Mr. Dulles said that if this proposal were made, we would be under some obligation to discuss it with our allies before advancing it. Mr. Anderson recalled his point of requiring that lists of military installations be furnished, but said that inspection would not be limited simply to the sites named in the list. General Gruenther asked whether there would be ground inspection, and Mr. Robert Anderson said there would be but not everything would be available for examination. Admiral Radford said that we would agree to a proposal of this kind, and Governor Stassen repeated that advanced technology should be excluded from the items to be inspected. General Gruenther said he felt that the overflight proposal had a great deal to recommend it. Mr. Stassen said this proposal could constitute a splendid opening step in the move toward disarmament. Mr. Dulles thought that from the standpoints both of drama and substance the proposal was very promising and should have a very great effect. He added, however, that if word got out in advance about this idea, much of the impact would be lost.

---

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File. Drafted by Goodpaster on July 25. For two other accounts of this conversation, see *supra*.

[2] Not printed. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File)

There was extended discussion as to the tactics to be used, resulting in agreement that it would be best for the President to make a broad and basic opening statement giving his over-all views in the matter, and then on the "second round" put forward the proposal for over-flights as a specific, more or less spontaneous, suggestion.[3]

A.J. Goodpaster[4]
Colonel, CE, US Army

---

[3] On July 22 Goodpaster drafted the following addendum to this memorandum of conversation:

"At the close of the discussion at 6 PM on 20 July separately reported by Dillon Anderson, Deputy Secretary Anderson suggested that Secretary Hoover might inform Senator George, Congressman Richards and one or two others of the proposal on inspection which the President has in mind to make. They would not be caught by surprise as a result. The President suggested to Secretary Dulles that he might do this at once, stressing the need for secrecy, and indicating that he hoped Congressional leaders would be able to express quick support of the idea. (This was done by Secretary Dulles' cable of early 21 July.)" (See Document 215.)

[4] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

210. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Department of State[1]

Geneva, July 20, 1955—7 p.m.

Dulte 25. Eyes only from Secretary to Acting Secretary. The President has given me his following personal comments for your use in briefing the legislative leaders:

"The usual gulf between the positions of the Soviets and the Western world is, of course, noticeable here at Geneva. The biggest change is the obvious and unshakable personal friendliness of the Russian Delegation and their evident desire to achieve some concrete result to which they can point as improving the Soviet world position. It seems to us that in a way they are competing with the Stalin leadership and that they are anxious to establish changes of various sorts, including better relations, on the surface at least, with the rest of the world.

Evidence of this kind of attitude is discernible in the number of personal contacts that they are establishing. They have given both dinners and luncheons, to which they have invited all delegations simultaneously and each delegation separately. Only last evening Bulganin stressed the importance of dealing with some of our knotty problems on a personal basis rather than on one of public debate.[2]

On the side of practical accomplishment, they seem to us to be more intent on establishing a recognition of the status quo in Europe than they do in any real attempt to improve that situation, although they do, of course, give lip service at least to the problem of German reunification. My impression is that in stressing the need for gradual and slow approach to that problem, they are really hoping that time will work for them in creating an acceptance of the status quo and possible weakening of West German ties with West. This, of course, we can never accept.

There are, of course, certain questions that they are obviously unprepared to talk about and which are important to us, but in these cases we can and do at the very least make certain that the record shows that we will not drop them merely because this particular conference cannot place them on the agenda for examination and recommendation.

The three Western Powers seem to me to be solidly united in support of basic principles and position and this of course gives hope that something concrete can be established.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/7–2055. Top Secret; Priority.

[2] Presumably a reference to Bulganin's statements at the Third Plenary Session; see Document 197.

In the matter of encouraging an interchange of visitors and information across the borders, the Soviets appear to be sincerely favorable. This of course may be only a temporary technique to convince us of the friendliness of their current attitude, but they have nevertheless given some evidence of sincerity by the wisdom with which they have issued invitations.

The next three days should give us a pretty good indication of the character of the relationships that we may expect of them for some time to come. We of course are not expecting any great results, but we continue to be hopeful that some practical progress will be achieved.

I have shown this to the Secretary of State who is in agreement with the opinions herein expressed."

Dulles

---

211. Editorial Note

While the meeting at the President's villa (see Documents 208 and 209) was taking place, Hagerty held a press conference at the Maison de Presse. A verbatim record of the press conference is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 505. Following the meeting at the President's villa, President Eisenhower had dinner at 8 p.m. with General Gruenther and Admiral Radford to discuss the next day's meetings. No record of their conversation has been found, but it appears as an entry in President Eisenhower's appointments for July 20 (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File) and is mentioned in John D. Eisenhower's diary.

Meanwhile, Secretary Dulles attended a meeting on Germany at the Hotel du Rhone with MacArthur, Merchant, Phleger, and Bowie at 9:30 p.m. No record of this meeting has been found in Department of State files, but Merchant recalled that it went on until after midnight. (*Recollections*, page 38) Secretary Dulles left the meeting well before midnight, however, to hold a press conference of his own at 10:30 p.m. A transcript of the conference was transmitted to Washington in Secto 55, July 21. (Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/7–2155)

July 21, 1955

212. Editorial Note

At 9 a.m. on July 21, the Tripartite Coordinating (Working) Group held its third meeting at Prime Minister Eden's villa with MacArthur, Merchant, Bowie, and Phleger attending for the United States. At 9:30 a.m. they joined Secretary Dulles and McCardle at the Palais des Nations for a meeting of the three Western Foreign Ministers. No records for either of these meetings have been found in Department of State files, but Merchant recalled that they were held to draft a directive for the Foreign Ministers to carry on the work of the Conference and that a Western text was easily agreed on. (Merchant, *Recollections,* page 39) According to an entry in the Order of the Day for July 21, a small staff meeting was also held at 9:15 at Secretary Dulles' villa with the six members of the United States Delegation mentioned above plus O'Connor, Bohlen, Thompson, Tyler, and McAuliffe. It seems unlikely that such a meeting was held, certainly not with the four United States members of the Tripartite Group present, and no other mention of it has been found in the records of the Conference. A copy of the Order of the Day, SUM OD–4, July 21, is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 513.

---

213. Memorandum for the Record, by the President's Staff Secretary (Goodpaster)[1]

Washington, July 25, 1955.

The President told me just after a phone call to Sir Anthony Eden at 10:30 on July 21 that Sir Anthony had asked him how soon he might be ready to come to some kind of agreement about offshore procurement of military items for Iraq (and perhaps other mid-East countries).

The President had indicated to Sir Anthony that he thought it would be possible to do some of this but the amount would have to be studied.

Sir Anthony asked the President what General Gruenther had thought of the disarmament scheme relating to NATO, and the

---

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, White House Office, Geneva—Notes and Observations.

President said he told Sir Anthony that his thought ran more in terms of an "over-all" arrangement.

A.J. Goodpaster[2]
Colonel, CE, US Army

---

[2] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

---

214. Memorandum of a Conversation, Palais des Nations, Geneva, July 21, 1955, 10:45 a.m.[1]

USDEL/MC/12

PARTICIPANTS

United States	*USSR*
The Secretary	Mr. Molotov
Amb. Bohlen	Mr. Gromyko
	Mr. Troyanovski

SUBJECT

Draft Directive

The Secretary accompanied by Ambassador Bohlen called on Mr. Molotov this morning before the Foreign Ministers' Meeting. Mr. Gromyko and Mr. Troyanovski were also present.

The Secretary said he wished to give Mr. Molotov a quick preview of the directive which the three other powers would present at this morning's meeting. Mr. Troyanovski translated into Russian the draft directive.[2] Mr. Molotov, after hearing the translation, said that this would require study as it was somewhat complicated and that the Soviet delegation had been thinking of a directive of a somewhat more general nature. In reply to the Secretary's question, Mr. Molotov said that they would have in rough a proposed draft of their own which he read.[3] The directive in essence: that the four heads of government instruct the Foreign Ministers to continue their examination of a European security system which would facilitate the reduction of international tension, strengthen confidence among nations, and facilitate the problem of German unification. The directive would instruct the Ministers to consider and work out a security treaty for Europe, or at least a part of Europe.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/7–2155. Secret. Drafted by Bohlen.

[2] See footnote 3, Document 217.

[3] See footnote 2, *ibid.*

The Secretary then inquired how they should proceed at this morning's meeting. Mr. Molotov said he thought the respective draft directives might be presented and that they could exchange views on them. The Secretary said he thought time would be needed to consider these drafts and suggested that they should hold a brief session this morning and possibly reconvene at 3:00 before the heads of government meeting. They could have this morning an initial exchange of views but time would be needed to think over the proposals. Mr. Molotov agreed but said he thought that the Ministers this morning should try to work on a formula which would bring the respective positions closer together. The Secretary said his first impression was that the Soviet draft had not intended to subordinate the problem of German reunification to that of European security. We believed the two questions should be considered as indicated in our draft on their merits, and separately.

---

215. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Department of State[1]

Geneva, July 21, 1955—11 a.m.

Dulte 26. Eyes only Acting Secretary from Secretary. Disarmament will probably be discussed by Heads of Government Thursday afternoon. President plans brief opening statement which will develop our philosophy along lines set out in his opening statement.[2] He may, however, speak a second time in which case he would illustrate concretely how certain inspection could be carried out so as to allay fear of surprise attack. In this connection he may refer to aerial photograph as opening vast new possibilities and may state willingness of US to permit Soviet aerial photography of US provided Soviet willing to let us do the same in respect of Soviet territory.

This challenge may be somewhat of a surprise and have spectacular appearance which will perhaps deprive the Soviet Union of their propaganda advantage in slogan "ban the bomb".

FYI. This type of inspection has been considered by State, Defense and Stassen for some little time and military advisers agree that we would gain more information than would Soviets. Radford is in complete accord and indeed enthusiastic.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/7–2155. Top Secret; No Distribution. Drafted by Dulles on July 20.

[2] Regarding President Eisenhower's opening statement, see Document 182.

Because we do not want any risk of prior leak, this will be handled on informal and spontaneous basis, suggested without prior coordination with British and French except perhaps the President may suggest the idea to them in the Council Chamber immediately preceding the convening of the conference.

You may in utmost confidence tell two or three congressional leaders whom you feel can be completely trusted that this is a possible development and that if it occurs, the President would be glad if there could be Congressional expression of approval. However, on account of British-French relations and necessity of dealing with this matter on an impromptu and somewhat unpredictable basis, it is of the utmost importance that no one in Washington should feel or intimate that this move if made, was premeditated and prearranged.[3]

Dulles

---

[3] This message was received at the Department at 6:28 a.m., July 21. At 10:47 a.m. the Department replied that the proposal had been discussed with Senators George, Knowland, and Clements and Representatives Rayburn, Martin, McCormack, and Richards and that no difficulties were expected. (Tedul 32 to Geneva; Department of State, Central Files, 110.11–DU/7–2155)

---

216. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Department of State[1]

Geneva, July 21, 1955—11 a.m.

Dulte 27. Eyes only Acting Secretary from Secretary. Yesterday's developments were significant primarily as indicating that Bulganin and Khrushchev may be less stubborn than Molotov on the subject of agreeing that the Foreign Ministers should begin promptly to study the problem of German unification alongside of the problem of European security. At luncheon yesterday I sat next to Molotov, who reaffirmed his opposition to studying German unification claiming that it was premature.[2] However, in the afternoon under pressure from the President, Bulganin seemed to give way on this point.[3] However, as we go into this morning's Foreign Ministers' session where Molotov presides, I suspect that his point of view will again dominate the Soviet delegation. There are also certain differences of views as between the British, the French and ourselves, but these, I think, can be reconciled because all of us are in accord on the main proposition that the problem of German unification should be promptly studied.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/7–2155. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Dulles.

[2] See Document 205.

[3] See Document 207.

President's private luncheon with Zhukov produced no surprises and had less significance than had been anticipated. Will cable separately on this point.[4]

Dulles

---

[4] Not found in Department of State files.

---

217. Telegram From the Delegation at the Geneva Conference to the Department of State[1]

Geneva, July 21, 1955—10 p.m.

Secto 61. At 11 a.m. meeting Molotov said all recognize importance problem European security and its inter-connection with German unification, but so far have no agreement on views necessary to draft directive from Heads of Government on that matter. Soviet Delegation feels establishment effective system European security would facilitate German unification. All must take into account realities and one such reality is fact Geneva Conference should contribute to lessening tensions. If European security were to be connected with German unification, postponement security problem would be implied. However, should be able achieve some progress at this stage.

Molotov proposed draft statement which said (*Begin verbatim text*), "Heads of Government of USSR, U.S., France and U.K. instruct Foreign Ministers continue consideration problem establishing system collective security in Europe, having in mind such development of that system as would contribute to relaxation international tension, strengthening confidence among nations, and facilitate settlement problem German unification. Ministers are instructed consider to that end any proposals relating conclusion security treaty or pact, for Europe, or, in first instance, for part of Europe, and also to consider any other possible proposals pertaining to settlement that task" (*End verbatim text*).[2]

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/7–2155. Secret; Priority. Repeated to London, Paris, Moscow, and Bonn. The U.S. Delegation verbatim record, USDEL/Verb/M–3, July 21, and the record of decisions, CF/DOC/RD/7, July 22, are *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 509.

Secretary then proposed agreed tripartite draft directive (*Begin verbatim text*), "Four Heads of Government agree:

1. That in the interest peace and general security;

> a) Germany should be reunified through free elections in conformity with national interest German people and security of Europe, thus discharging common responsibility Four Powers.
>
> b) Security for Europe should be sought by effective means which will respect and further legitimate interests of all, including inherent right of individual and collective self-defense.

2. That to further accomplishment these objectives, representatives Four Powers shall meet at (name of place to be designated) to consider and propose effective means (a) reunification of Germany and (b) security for Europe.

3. That Foreign Ministers Four Powers initiate such discussion during October (Sec added 'October this year') and shall determine organization of work.

4. In carrying out their responsibilities under para 2, representatives Four Powers shall give due consideration to such possibilities as: security pact extending existing undertakings relating to non-recourse to force and denial of assistance to an aggressor; limitation, control and inspection for forces and armaments; establishment of zone between East and West in which disposition of armed forces would be subject to mutual agreement; and such other possibilities as may thereafter be put forward." (*End verbatim text*)[3]

Secretary said concept that Germany being reunified in conformity with national interests of German people and security of Europe were precise words Bulganin's opening statement. Also concept that security for Europe should be sought by effective means which will further legitimate interests of all, including inherent right individual of self-defense, reflects Bulganin views. Para 4 contains major suggestions made by Heads of Government. Other possibilities must also be considered at future conference.

Pinay said Soviet proposal does not seem provide for thorough study German unification and also postpones consideration that issue until after study European security. France feels security cannot be achieved before achievement normal situation in Germany. Postponement Germany reunification will have extremely unfortunate effect upon German and world public opinion. Pinay asked Molotov what would be disadvantage tackling both problems at once. Western proposal takes into account Soviet point of view but Soviet proposal fails take into account Western suggestions. Soviet proposal also fails reflect agenda present meeting wherein all agree to discuss German reunification.

---

[2] The Soviet draft directive was circulated as CF/DOC/9, July 21, in the records of the conference.

[3] The tripartite draft directive was circulated as CF/DOC/8, July 21, in the records of the conference.

Macmillan said present meeting must be success and, to be so, must show advance in bringing together two points of view. Soviet proposal merely reflects feeling solution German unification must follow setting up system collective security in Europe. West, on other hand, maintains most urgent problem is reunification. However, West draft has struck fair balance between two views and can be basis for compromise view.

Molotov said necessary avoid turning discussion from businesslike meeting into propaganda exchange. All recognize connection between two problems. He agreed this conference cannot complete discussion this matter and should be continued in Foreign Ministers' meeting in October. At that time, Foreign Ministers should have tasks of more modest character, more within their capacity and it follows therefrom agenda coming conference might be more restricted. While Soviet draft largely reflects Soviet view, it has also tried meet Eden proposal inclusion smaller number European states in pact rather than merely reflecting Soviet idea inclusion all European states. Soviet draft could be amended include suggestions in para 4 Western proposal. Could also find common ground regarding paras 2, 3, and 4 Western proposal. Must then find ground for agreement on para 1.

Secretary said all appreciated Molotov remarks which indicate general desire reach agreement and not make topic matter propaganda discussion. Primary problem is unification Germany and there is really no need for new European security pact because entirely defensive nature NATO and Brussels pacts both of which are within U.N. Charter framework. However, we are willing put both problems on parity and hope Soviets will not insist subordination Germany reunification. We cannot postpone indefinitely either problem, since they are inseparable.

Molotov, as chairman, said he wished sum up meeting. First, all delegations had expressed desire study drafts, second, much common ground already exists and third, differences lie in para 1 of both Soviet and Western drafts. Matter will have to be discussed by Heads of Government. He asked suggestions for further procedure.

Secretary suggested 3:30 meeting to discuss directive before proceeding question disarmament. Others agreed.

Secretary said most important two draft proposals not be made available to press since difficulties not as great as two texts might suggest. Others agreed.

218. Memorandum From the Secretary of State to the President[1]

Geneva, July 21, 1955.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I attach a copy of the proposed directive which was agreed to by the three Western powers and presented this morning. I also attach a copy of the Soviet Union's proposed directive.[2]

Molotov indicated in conversation that he could take considerable parts of our directive, but reserved his position on talking about German reunification as of equal rank with European Security.[3]

In view of the fact that Faure does not always follow Pinay's line and that Faure tends to compromise rather easily, I suggest you ask him to hold firm for the three-power position during the first round of discussion at 3:30.[4] It is of paramount importance that we should not equivocate on the subject of German unification or seem to make it subordinate to anything else. We must hold Faure to this position, which Pinay fully shares. If the three powers get wobbly on this, the situation in Germany and Adenauer's position could deteriorate very rapidly.

JFD[5]

---

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File. Secret.

[2] No copies of the draft directives were attached to the source text, but see *supra*.

[3] For the discussion of the two draft directives, see *supra*.

[4] President Eisenhower was scheduled to meet with Faure at 2:30 p.m.; see Document 220.

[5] Initialed for Dulles by O'Connor.

---

219. Memorandum of the Conversation at the Soviet Luncheon, Soviet Villa, Geneva, July 21, 1955, 1 p.m.[1]

USDEL/MC/11

PARTICIPANTS

United States	*USSR*
The Secretary	Mr. Bulganin
Mr. Robert Anderson	Mr. Khrushchev
Mr. MacArthur	Mr. Molotov
Mr. Merchant	Gen. Zhukov
Amb. Bohlen	Mr. Troyanovsky
Amb. Thompson	

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/7–2155. Top Secret. Drafted by Bohlen. For another brief account, see Merchant, *Recollections*, pp. 39–40.

SUBJECTS

1. International Communism
2. German Unification & European Security

During the luncheon itself, the conversation was at first general, with frequent references from the Soviet side to desirability of re-establishment of good and friendly relations with the United States. Mr. Dulles said to Mr. Bulganin that the problem of the satellites and international communism was very important from the standpoint of the United States. We could understand that this was not a problem that the Soviets wanted to discuss around a big conference table, but that the United States would watch to see what, in fact, happened. Mr. Dulles said he hoped that developments would be responsive to the deep concern of the American people.

Mr. Bulganin and Mr. Khrushchev said that international communism no longer operated from Russia. Mr. Dulles said that much revolutionary literature was printed in the Soviet zone and sent abroad, e.g. to South America. Mr. Bulganin denied that it was printed in Moscow. Bulganin, at one point, said to Mr. Anderson that it would be well if the Ministers of Defense of the Soviets be prepared to show them their military establishments. Khrushchev picked this up and said he was in full agreement.

After luncheon the Secretary with Bulganin, Khrushchev, Molotov, and Marshal Zhukov with Troyanovsky, Mr. Anderson and Mr. Bohlen, had a brief conversation.

The Secretary said that he would like to talk about, it seemed to him, the real differences between the Directives that had been discussed by the Foreign Ministers this morning.[2] He felt that the Soviet Delegation wished to subordinate the problem of German unification to the concept of an all European Security Treaty, but the three Western Powers felt that the order should be reversed, and that it was only German unification that called for a consideration of the security problem in Europe. He felt that it seemed clear the joint Directive would not be able to give full satisfaction to either view, and that the problem was to find some acceptable middle line. In his view this could be done by sending both questions separately and concurrently to a future conference of Foreign Ministers.

Bulganin inquired whether the Secretary thought the Foreign Ministers had done all they could. The Secretary and Mr. Molotov said they thought that the Foreign Ministers should continue their work and try to bring the positions closer together.

---

[2] For texts of the two draft directives and their discussion by the Foreign Ministers, see Document 217.

Bulganin agreed, and said that as today's Chairman he thought it would be best not to have a discussion of the question, but merely ask the Foreign Ministers tomorrow to continue their efforts on this point.

The Secretary agreed and said he thought, however, that each of them needed some guidance from his Head of Government, but that this might be done privately and without discussion at today's meeting. Bulganin and Khrushchev agreed with this point.

The Secretary said he would like to discuss the general problem of NATO and European security. He said that one of the chief reasons for NATO was to associate Germany with nations which had already demonstrated their peaceful character and thus do away in Europe with the fear that Germany might arouse. He felt that this was an important and permanent feature of the NATO and the Brussels Pact, which should not be lost sight of. He said that he completely understood that each great power, in the event of German unification, would not wish to be left aside from the security arrangements which would be necessary to work out. He said that the United States, for its part, recognized this legitimate interest and would be prepared with the Soviet Union and other countries involved, to consider any additional measures necessary to insure security in Europe for all under the circumstances of a unified Germany. He said he thought it would be a mistake to give out the texts of the different Directives to the Press, since this would merely tend to accentuate the differences. The Soviets agreed with this point.

Khrushchev said that in the Soviet view, the problem of German unification was extremely complicated because of measures Western powers had taken, and would take a great deal of time, in view of the situation already existing in Germany, but they felt this security in Europe was a problem that was quite clear and could be dealt with immediately. He said, however, that he thought the Secretary's statement was very important and extremely interesting, to which Bulganin and Molotov agreed. Khrushchev said that he felt Mr. Eden's remark concerning the possibility of a demilitarized zone[3] was one that deserved serious consideration.[4]

---

[3] See Document 184.

[4] On July 22 Bohlen drafted a supplement to this memorandum, designated USDEL/MC/17 in the records of the U.S. Delegation, which reads as follows:

"Yesterday at luncheon Khrushchev was talking freely about the fact that they had been refusing no visas to Americans to come to the Soviet Union. I mentioned to him that I knew of at least six or seven correspondents who had outstanding applications, some for many months, who had no favorable action. He expressed surprise and said that as far as he was concerned they could all come in. He said he felt he didn't care whether they wrote critical articles or not. He then asked Ilyichev about this, who fixed me with a nasty look and said there were six Soviet correspondents who had had applications in for at least three months without any reply whatsoever coming from Washington. At that point the conversation on reciprocal visas for correspondents terminated." (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 516)

220. Memorandum of a Conversation, Palais des Nations, Geneva, July 21, 1955, 2:30 p.m.[1]

PRESENT

The President
The Secretary of State (part of conference)
Prime Minister Edgar Faure
Mr. Armand Berard
Lt. Colonel Vernon A. Walters

Prime Minister Faure opened the conversation by saying that he was very happy to visit the President as the conference developed.[2] The President replied that he felt that the afternoon session was so important that he was going to read what he would say. He was very anxious to see a system of inspection set up and he felt that one might point out certain possibilities in the budgetary approach. He would say that we, ourselves, had not been able to find a way of gaining real confidence. He felt that in the budgetary approach there might be some value as a check for some other system of control. If this could be developed, so much the better. What he would like to see done was the issuance of new instructions to the U.N. Subcommittee on Disarmament to examine all possibilities in this field. He would like to make a plea for the inspection system. He did not mind if Mr. Faure also put in a plea for budgetary controls. He did not feel that this would be mutually antagonistic. If a system for control of armaments were set up, it would require many checks in order to become a system in which the world would have confidence. The President said that the budgetary control system might be explained by Mr. Faure in a general way while he would make a plea for inspection, and felt that the budgetary control approach might be explored. He himself would personally make his plea for an adequate system of inspection and reporting.

Prime Minister Faure said he felt that there was no opposition between the President's ideas and his, and that something might well be worked out which would combine the system of inspection which the President advocated, and his system of budgetary control and a common fund. He did not want to do anything that would be in contradiction with an idea. The President said he would not like to see this idea develop so far in detail that it would lead us into doing anything more than to issue instructions to the U.N. Subcommittee on Disarmament, to study all the possibilities in this field. The President said that the point which Mr. Faure made concerning the sanction of extra expenditures for nations violating the agreement would, he felt, not be as forceful in his country as in Europe because in the United States there was a certain reserve taxable strength that without any invidious comparison, was greater than in Europe, and that if a violation were intended by paying additional amounts into the common fund, this would not be a prohibitive control. He felt that this should not be stressed as much as working out some arrangement which would provide for common inspection including that of the budgetary expenditures, as well as other phases of any armament program.

---

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, White House Office, Geneva—Notes and Observations. Drafted by Walters.

[2] Prior to this meeting President Eisenhower met at his villa with Anderson, Radford, Gruenther, Stassen, and Bohlen at 11 a.m.; with Radford, Stassen, and Major Eisenhower at 1 p.m. for a luncheon; and with Stassen, Rockefeller, Dillon Anderson, Radford, and Goodpaster at 2 p.m. No records of any of these meetings have been found in Department of State files or at the Eisenhower Library, but they are described in Goodpaster's notes on the Summit Conference and appear as entries in Eisenhower's appointment schedule. (*Ibid.*)

Prime Minister Faure said that if the President agreed, he would proceed as follows: He would present a memorandum setting forth his ideas and the conference might refer it to the U.N. Subcommittee on Disarmament where he would have the French representatives present it. He would give this draft to Mr. Dulles to make sure there was nothing that was in opposition to our ideas in it. He felt that the conference would not necessarily be called upon to accept it, but merely to refer it to the U.N. Subcommittee.

The President said that he believed that there had been some disagreement among the Foreign Ministers during the morning.[3] The Soviet Foreign Minister wanted to handle the agenda today in the same way as yesterday with the problem of German reunification way down at the bottom of the list and treated very lightly. He hoped that at the afternoon session, all of the Western Powers would stand firm in urging major consideration of the problem of German reunification. He believed that the Secretary of State had talked to Marshal Bulganin on this.[4]

At this point, Secretary Dulles joined the President and Prime Minister Faure. He said that he had talked to Marshal Bulganin on the matters which they were discussing now and on the question of disarmament. He had indicated that the Soviet Union was quite ready to permit the fullest inspection and we could know all we wished about the Soviet Union on the basis of reciprocity. The President said this would indeed be a tremendous thing if it were carried through. The Secretary of State indicated that Marshal Bulganin had taken the initiative of discussing this with him. Khrushchev and Zhukov had joined at the luncheon table after he raised the question of German reunification. He had explained to Marshal Bulganin the difference between the two points of view. The Soviets wished to talk about European security first and the German reunification only in a secondary way; whereas, we wished to discuss German reunification primarily, and felt that the only need to discuss European security was to establish a framework under which German reunification could be implemented. If progress were to be made, neither thesis could prevail and some middle ground must be found whereby the two could be discussed concurrently with equal dignity. Marshal Bulganin had said that he wanted to study the matter and he would ask in the afternoon session that speeches not be made on this subject, but that it be allowed to go over until the following day when he hoped the Foreign Ministers might present something in the way of an agreement. Secretary Dulles had replied that he felt that from the U.S. side, it might be justifiable to expect that the President would be willing to let this go over until the following day, and the President then confirmed this.

---

[3] See Document 217.

[4] See *supra.*

(Secretary of State Dulles left)

The President said that he felt that if we met at 3:30 to discuss these matters, he would hope that the business might be done today and this would give more time in the buffet. He had definitely received the impression that the Russians were very anxious to be treated as equals and welcomed. He felt that it was fun for them and that they were doubly anxious to be treated as equals by all the others. These buffets gave them an opportunity to meet and get together other than the opportunity they had around the table. Yesterday, they had said in the discussion, on inspection, that they wanted to belong to NATO. This would, of course, involve a common inspection. Mr. Faure said that he had not previously believed that inspection was practical, until he heard the President explain it, and then for the first time he believed it could be possible. He felt that this inspection should be tied into something, and if there was to be no limitation, he felt it might be tied into publicity and the control exercised by world opinion which would know the figures and expenditures. The President felt that this thought might well be helpful. Mr. Faure then said that before limitation could be worked out—and it was an extremely complicated thing—the idea of publicity might be helpful and combined with inspection to show that the figures submitted and made public were in fact true. He felt that an analogy might be drawn in this connection to labor management conflicts. The French were working out a new statute patterned on what existed in England and might well also exist in the United States. In cases of labor management conflicts, a mediator was appointed who had no power of decision himself, but he drew up a document which was made public concerning the conflict which gave the public a complete idea as to the wages of the workers and profits of management and all other pertaining data. This might, he felt, be applied to the question of disarmament, so that public opinion would at least be able to tell whether armaments were increasing or decreasing. The President felt that this idea might be valuable in the discussion.

Prime Minister Faure said that as the President would speak first and give particular emphasis to the importance of inspection, he would then, if the President agreed, introduce the idea of publicity as something that would facilitate frankness and confidence. The President then said that this seemed all right to him. Mr. Faure then said that after that he would make a passing reference to his plan for a common fund and state that his memorandum would be submitted later, however, he would want us to see it, to make sure that there was nothing in it in contradiction to the U.S. position. The President agreed to this.

(Secretary of State Dulles rejoined the Conferees)

Mr. Faure then said he would like to say one word on the subject of Indo-China. The French were worried by Diem[5] whom they were trying to support in common with the United States, but he was an extremely difficult man. He had been forewarned of these recent outbreaks.[6] He had been offered help by the French which he had refused. He felt it would be helpful if the U.S. and France could act in concert to overcome the problems presented by the fact that Diem was such a difficult person. The second matter was that Diem wanted the French out and wanted no collaboration of any kind with them. Mr. Faure said he was quite willing to withdraw all French troops there, but it must be understood that under those circumstances the French could not be later expected to defend anything. Regarding the elections, Diem still had one year before him, but his attitude now was that he was not going to hold them. Mr. Faure felt that this was not a good idea and that it would be far better if Diem would give the impression that he intended to hold these elections even if he did not. Mr. Faure said he received a telegram from Nehru criticizing the situation in Viet Nam and protesting against the French failure to provide adequate protection for the International Armistice Commission.

The President said he knew Mr. Diem was sometimes difficult, but we had been seeking for many years to find a figure who could be directly connected with popular aspirations. We needed someone from this area who could personify for Viet Nam that they were fighting for independence, and regardless of his faults, it would not be helpful to eliminate him as who else could be found. He has achieved independence but he hates the French and this weakens the whole structure. The President did not feel that it would be helpful to attempt to solve this problem by threats to undermine Diem, as it would be difficult to find someone who could replace him. The President, while saying he understood Mr. Faure's difficulties, felt that we did not have a free hand, because if we removed him, communism would triumph. He hoped that the Prime Minister could talk to Secretary Dulles right away, as Admiral Radford and Secretary Anderson, who were both very well informed on this situation, were in Geneva. He did not wish to do anything which would embarrass Mr. Faure in any way, and he felt that if we handled this matter skillfully, we would obtain better cooperation from Diem who was admittedly difficult.

---

[5] Ngo Dinh Diem, President of the Republic of Vietnam.

[6] On July 20, student riots in Saigon endangered the safety of the International Control Commission.

Mr. Faure said he had started to talk to Secretary Dulles on this matter and against the advice of some of his councillors, he had decided to support Diem. It was his desire to carry out a policy of association, not only in Viet Nam, but also in North Africa. He wanted to thank the President for the helicopters which had been given by the United States for use in North Africa. He felt it was very difficult to fight communism unless we could associate ourselves with the national aspirations. Mr. Faure said he felt it would be helpful if the U.S. could intervene with Diem to get in touch with North Viet Nam on the question of holding the elections and secondly, on the question of the French Expeditionary Corps in Viet Nam if he could be made to rally to a position which the U.S. and French would work out in common. The President said he felt it would be well if this matter could be studied. Mr. Faure said he would meet with Secretary Dulles, Mr. Macmillan, and Mr. Pinay.[7]

The Secretary of State then said we had already pressed Diem to make a more positive attitude toward the elections but had not obtained any results. An anomalous situation existed in that the French had signed the Accords, undertaking to hold the elections and that Diem who was the party that would hold the elections, had not signed. France had made the undertaking and Diem who had the power to carry it out did not want to do so to signify his disapproval of the Geneva agreement.

Mr. Faure said he had discussed this matter with Mr. Eden who had said that Diem was against the Geneva agreements, but if there had not been any Geneva agreements, there would not be any Mr. Diem. Secretary Dulles commented that Diem was not always logical.

---

[7] See Document 223.

Mr. Faure then said he felt that his talk with the President had been extremely helpful and he did not wish to detain him any further. He again apologized for arriving late and took leave of the President and the Secretary of State.

---

221. Telegram From the Delegation at the Geneva Conference to the Department of State[1]

Geneva, July 21, 1955.

Secto 63. Fifth meeting Heads of Government convened 3:35 p.m., July 21. Bulganin presided.

On Chairman's suggestion, agreed Foreign Ministers should continue attempt reach agreement on directive.

Bulganin then made new proposal. Said all agreed that proposals of all Powers made in course of discussion European security should be referred to Foreign Ministers. But work of Foreign Ministers would involve time. Situation in Europe requires measures be taken right now to prevent situation which might represent threat to peace and security of European States. Treaty to refrain from using armed force or threat thereof and to settle disputes by peaceful means between States parties to groupings now in existence in Europe might serve this purpose and contribute to lessening of tension and consolidation of peace. He then read following proposal:

Begin verbatim

"Basic principles of treaty between groupings of states now in existence in Europe.

"Guided by desire strengthen peace, and recognizing need contribute in every way to lessening international tension and establishment confidence in relations between nations.

"Soviet Union, United States, France, and United Kingdom agree that interests of maintaining peace in Europe would be met by conclusion of treaty between states parties to North Atlantic Pact and Western European Union on one hand and states parties to Warsaw treaty on other. This treaty might be based on following principles:

"First, states parties to North Atlantic Treaty and to Paris Agreements on one hand and states parties to Warsaw treaty on other, undertake not to use armed force against each other. That undertaking should not be prejudicial to rights of nations to individual or collective self-defense in case of armed attack, as provided for in Article 51 of United Nations Charter.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 524. Secret; Priority. Repeated to London, Paris, Moscow, and Bonn. Copies of the U.S. Delegation verbatim record, USDEL/Verb/5, July 21, and the record of decisions, CF/DOC/RD/8, July 22, for this session are *ibid.*, CF 510.

"Second, states parties to treaty undertake to enter into mutual consultations in case any differences and disputes arise between them which might represent threat to maintenance of peace in Europe.

"Three, treaty would be of temporary character and would remain in force until replaced by another treaty relating to setting up of collective security system in Europe."[2]

End verbatim text.

Bulganin asked whether Heads of Government should have preliminary exchange of views on his proposal or refer matter to Foreign Ministers, as text his proposal not yet circulated.

President said should be referred to Foreign Ministers, as it should be studied before presented to Heads of Government for decision.

President then asked permission to clarify statement he made yesterday[3] which had been taken out of context in press reports and made to appear something he had not meant. He referred to statement he made discussion European security, "consequently any advance should be made dependent on nothing else whatsoever". He said this had been taken to mean that he no longer meant another thing he had also said yesterday: that European security and reunification of Germany are inseparable. President said he wanted to make it clear that his later statement with reference to the fact that advances in security should be made dependent upon nothing whatsoever had not meant that he had forgone his conviction of the inseparability of the two questions referred to. He said he was sure this had not been misunderstood by the Conference, but wanted to clear up the point as it had been in the press.

Faure agreed Bulganin's new proposal should be referred to Foreign Ministers. Eden, while agreeable giving Foreign Ministers additional day to prepare directive, prepared discuss new proposal, but said it seems to be related to documents already remitted to Foreign Ministers.

Bulganin said proposal was not new, having been included in main statement of Soviet Delegation on European security. Asked Eden to agree as others had.

Eden noted matters referred to Foreign Ministers had been discussed before reference, which procedure he said was generally preferable. Said he did not object if others wish to refer matter, but would like to reserve right to put in paper to Foreign Ministers in view lack opportunity to discuss before. President asked Secretary Dulles comment on Ministers aspect of matter. Chair agreed. Secretary said that as one of Foreign Ministers he would like clarification. Yesterday Foreign Ministers instructed draft directive in light discussion up to that time. Said he thought it was sense of Conference that that phase of discussion, at least as far as Heads of Government concerned, had been terminated. Said he wondered whether directive to Foreign Ministers now changed from that of yesterday.

---

[2] Circulated as CF/DOC/10, July 21, in the records of the conference.

[3] See Document 207.

Bulganin called on Molotov who said directive to Foreign Ministers of yesterday remained in force and had not yet been accomplished. Said all realized that matters involved would require time to discuss and therefore question arose as to whether Geneva Conference could not come to a decision which would enter into force soonest. Said Soviet proposal follows out of discussion which had already taken place.

Bulganin said no decision had been taken as to conclusion of discussion on matter Heads of Government discussed yesterday.

President said new proposal should be studied by Foreign Ministers before Heads of Government can take any action, as Soviet proposal poses entirely new question on formulation of Treaty by Four Powers that effects some 25 or 30. Said he was not prepared to discuss proposal on an informed basis much less take decision at this time.

Eden had no objection to Foreign Ministers studying new proposal so long as study should be subsequent to report called for in yesterday's directive.

Bulganin suggested his proposal be referred to Foreign Ministers to make recommendations.

Eden agreed only on condition that it be dealt with as separate item, as was not based on two days discussion as was subject yesterday's directive.

Bulganin suggested refer matter to Ministers for consideration with Ministers taking into account observations made here. Agreed.

Bulganin then claimed privilege of chair and opened discussion of disarmament. Stated that on May 10 Soviets had made proposal regarding reduction of armaments prohibiting use of atomic weapons and removal threat of new war.[4] Said Governments US, UK and France had not yet given their views on this proposal and would like to know their position. Wide program disarmament would be possible only if end put to cold war and necessary degree of confidence established between nations and efforts should be directed towards that purpose. Soviets had made appropriate proposals on May 10.

---

[4] For text of the Soviet proposal of May 10, see *Documents* (R.I.I.A.) for 1955, pp. 110–121, or Department of State *Bulletin*, May 30, 1955, pp. 900–905.

Cold war is incompatible with good relations between nations. Advisable to present UN with joint recommendation to adopt such a declaration or similar one directed to termination of cold war. Soviets also think it advisable for Conference to agree about need implement certain basic measures in disarmament field. Would be well record agreement achieved regarding levels of armed forces Five Great Powers. Soviets agreed to Western proposals for establishment levels for USA, USSR and China of one to one and one-half million and 650 thousand for UK and France. Matters relating to Chinese armed forces are of course subject consideration with participation CPR. Level for other nations should not exceed 150 to 200 thousand which should be agreed in appropriate international conference. Soviet Government has agreed prohibition atomic and hydrogen weapons should be carried through by stages. Soviet offered appropriate proposals drafted in consideration of positions of US, Britain and France, in draft resolution which submitted for consideration by Conference.[5] Prior to entry into force agreement on full scale prohibition atomic and hydrogen weapons States should undertake not to use those weapons with exception purpose of defense against aggression, on decision of Security Council. Effective international controls should be established over measures to reduce armed forces and prohibit atomic weapons. Conference agreement on these matters would facilitate drafting of convention on disarmament in UN. Before any international convention is concluded which would require time, 4-Powers could agree not to be first to use atomic and hydrogen weapons against any country. Such agreement prior to complete prohibition would be big step forward in putting end to cold war.[6]

Bulganin then tabled Soviet draft resolution sent separately Secto 62.[7]

[Here follows a note in the source text which reads: "President then delivered statement on disarmament. Full text being sent by USIA." Because of the importance of the statement the editors have included here the full text of President Eisenhower's speech, as recorded in the United States Delegation record of the Fifth Plenary, USDEL/Verb/5, July 21. (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 510)

["President Eisenhower: Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, we are approaching here a very vast and complex subject, one that has troubled the minds of statesmen and soldiers for centuries. One could take a very great deal of time speaking of theory and philosophy in this matter. For my part, I think that each of us has formed his own conclusions in those fields and I want to try to bring this as nearly as I can to a practical basis. I don't want to be discouraging and in talking of practical material steps I would try to indicate, if I possibly can, those that I think it is practicable for us now to take and that we can move ahead in this field.

---

[5] For text of the Soviet proposal, see Document 252.

[6] The text of Bulganin's statement was circulated as CF/DOC/12, July 21, in the records of the conference.

[7] Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/7–2155) For text of the Soviet proposal, see Document 252.

["Disarmament of course is one of the most important subjects on our agenda, and I note on the agenda that subject is listed as disarmament. Now, this is also an extremely difficult subject. In recent years scientists have discovered methods of making weapons many, many times more destructive of opposing armed forces, but also of homes, and industries and lives, than ever known or even imagined before. These same scientific discoveries have made more complex the problems of limitation and control and reduction of armament.

["After our victory as Allies in World War II, my country rapidly disarmed. Within a few years our armament was at a very low level. Then events occurred beyond our borders which caused us to realize that we had disarmed too much. For our own security and to safeguard peace we needed greater strength. Therefore, we proceeded to rearm and to associate with others in a partnership for peace and for mutual security.

["The American people are determined to maintain and, if necessary, increase this armed strength for as long a period as is necessary to safeguard peace and to maintain our security, but we know that a mutually dependable system for less armament on the part of all nations would be a better way to safeguard peace and to maintain our security.

["It would ease the fears of war in the anxious hearts of people everywhere. It would lighten the burdens upon the backs of the people.

["It would make it possible for every nation, great and small, developed and less developed, to advance the standards of living of its people, to attain better food, better clothing, better shelter, more of education and larger enjoyment of life.

["Therefore, the United States Government is prepared to enter into a sound and reliable agreement making possible the reduction of armament. I have directed that an intensive and thorough study of this subject be made within our own Government. From these studies which are continuing a very important principle is emerging to which I referred in my opening statement on Monday.[8]

["No sound and reliable agreement can be made unless it is completely covered by an inspection and reporting system adequate to support every portion of the agreement. The lessons of history teach us that disarmament agreements without adequate reciprocal inspection increase the dangers of war and do not brighten the prospects of peace.

---

[8] See Document 182.

["Thus, it is my view that the priority attention of our combined study of disarmament should be upon the subject of inspection and reporting. Questions suggest themselves. How effective an inspection system can be designed which would be mutually and reciprocally acceptable within our countries and the other nations of the world? How would such a system operate? What could it accomplish?

["Is certainty against surprise aggression attainable by inspection? Could violations be discovered promptly and effectively counteracted?

["We have not as yet been able to discover any scientific or other inspection method which would make certain of the elimination of nuclear weapons. So far as we are aware no other nation has made such a discovery. Our study of this problem is continuing. We have not as yet been able to discover any accounting or other inspection method of being certain of the true budgetary facts of total expenditures for armament. Our study of this problem is continuing. We by no means exclude the possibility of finding useful checks in these fields.

["As you can see from these statements, it is our impression that many past proposals of disarmament are more sweeping than can be insured by effective inspection.

["Gentlemen, since I have been working on this little paper to present to this Conference, I have been searching my heart and mind for something that I could say here that could convince everyone of the great sincerity of the United States in approaching this problem of disarmament. I should address myself for a moment principally to the Delegates from the Soviet Union, because our two great countries possess, admittedly possess, this new and terrible weapon in quantities which do give rise in other parts of the world or reciprocally to the risks and dangers of surprise attack. I propose, therefore, that we take a practical step, and we begin an arrangement, very quickly, as between ourselves, immediately. These steps would include: To give to each other a complete blueprint of our military establishments, from beginning to end, from one end of our countries to the other, lay out the establishments and provide them to each other. Next, to provide within our countries facilities for aerial photography to the other country—we to provide you the facilities within our country, ample facilities for aerial reconnaissance, where you can make all the pictures you choose and take them to your own country to study; you to provide exactly the same facilities for us and we to make these examinations, and by this step to convince the world that we are providing as between ourselves against the possibility of great surprise attack, and so lessening the dangers, relaxing tensions, and making more easily attainable a more definite and comprehensive and better system of inspection and disarmament, because what I propose, I assure you, would, I think, be but a beginning.

["Now, from my statements, I believe you will anticipate my suggestion. It is that we instruct our representatives in the Subcommittee on Disarmament in discharge of their mandate from the United Nations to give priority effort to the study of inspection and reporting. Such a study could well include a step by step testing of inspection and reporting methods.

["The United States is ready to proceed in the study and testing of a reliable system of inspection and reporting, and when that system is proved, then to reduce armaments with all others to the extent that the system will provide assured results.

["The successful working out of such a system would do much to develop the mutual confidence which will open wide the avenues of progress for all our peoples.

["The quest for peace is the statesman's most exacting duty. Security of the nation entrusted to his care is his greatest responsibility. Practical progress to lasting peace is his fondest hope. Yet in pursuit of his hope he must not betray the trust placed in him as guardian of the people's security. A sound peace—with security, justice, well-being, and freedom for the people of the world—*can* be achieved, but only by patiently and thoughtfully following a hard and sure and tested road.

["(The lights went out at 4:42 p.m.)

["President Eisenhower: Well, I didn't know I would put out the lights with that.

["(Laughter.)"] [9]

---

[9] President Eisenhower's statement was circulated as CF/DOC/16, July 21, in the records of the conference. The proposal for aerial inspection immediately became known as the "Open Skies" proposal and became an integral part of the U.S. position on disarmament.

Its genesis lies in the Quantico Vulnerabilities Panel which met in June (see Document 134) and called for, inter alia, "free overflights of aircraft" (Part IV, paragraph 8) and "for a mutual inspection of military installations" (Appendix B). These concepts were subsequently discussed in Paris by Rockefeller, Radford, Stassen, Anderson, and Gruenther, who supported them, and recommended them to President Eisenhower in a telegram on Tuesday, July 19. (Eisenhower Library, White House Office, Geneva—Notes and Observations) President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles discussed the ideas further with Rockefeller, *et al.* when they arrived from Paris (see Document 208) and incorporated them into the text of the President's speech on disarmament. All agreed to keep the proposal secret from the rest of the U.S. Delegation and the British and French, although hinting that such a statement might be made. (Eisenhower Library, C.D. Jackson Papers, Time File–Log 1955)

For two accounts of the presentation of the speech, and the reaction immediately following it when the lights went out because of a thunderstorm, see Merchant, *Recollections,* p. 41, or the Diary of John D. Eisenhower for July 21. (Eisenhower Library,

Continued

Faure spoke next. Stated he was affected by interesting and moving statement of President. Agreed that disarmament was issue which should be treated in entirely practical spirit. Greatest enemy of disarmament is skepticism and that is an attitude to be overcome. Should proceed along parallel tracks as advocated by President. First, devise practical measures to overcome problem and second overcome skepticism in this field. Believed President's statement of over-riding importance. If people of world could have heard would agree that twenty-first of July marked change and opening of new course on question of disarmament. Faure paid tribute to work of UN Subcommittee. Believed work of Committee should not be interrupted by Conference and agreements that might be reached could be new impulse that work and arouse public support. Conference should give recommendations to representatives on Subcommittee. Question of control is at heart of question of disarmament. President's conviction and examples he has given should be convincing that something can be done in particular field of control. This should not preclude other ways and means for control. Faure believed some advantages inherent in system budgetary control to eke out control by inspection. Inspection or supervision must have contractual or legal basis and on this point Faure wanted to express views.

Central point of disarmament consists in reductions but first must be agreement on a given level which cannot be exceeded. Faure believed it might be useful to have such arrangements preceded by previous stage of publicity about armaments. His proposal for publicity not meant delay agreements on limitation or reduction. But publicity could be immediately organized. States could make known publicly levels armed forces and military programs from both budgetary and physical points view. Inspection and controls could be applied check accuracy of statements. Publicity system would promote frankness and sincerity in relations between States, and provide element confidence prior to armaments reduction.

Faure repeated proposition of Monday that reduction of armaments should lead to transfer resources to peaceful purposes. Believed this would provide automatic penalty against violation because if country had agreed make contributions would have made these regardless whether had actually reduced armaments. Faure stated he would table French memorandum on disarmament tomorrow.[10]

Eden spoke next. Said UK like US had reduced forces after war and later reluctantly had had to engage in rearmament. As part of that rearmament UK had made atomic bomb and now engaged

---

Whitman File) For President Eisenhower's account of this session, see *Mandate for Change*, pp. 520–521.

[10] See Document 255.

making hydrogen bomb. UK would like nothing better than comprehensive scheme disarmament. Eden referred Soviet proposals May 10. Welcomed proposals as including number points which UK and French had put forward and as bringing points view closer together. Hoped Soviet proposals and others would be pursued in UN Subcommittee at early date. Eden stated crucial point was necessity of establishing effective international control. Fully supported President's principle that no disarmament plan acceptable which does not contain adequate system inspection and reporting. Believed disarmament difficult problem because complex on technical side and because bound up with international confidence.

Soviets were right in proposals of May 10 to link disarmament with reduction international tension since two closely connected. Should not wait until confidence so strong that general disarmament could be adopted all in one move. Objective must be approached by stages. We should make a start now.

Eden said was deeply moved by sincerity and warm feeling for peace which characterized President's speech in putting forward proposals for exchange military information between US and USSR. If proposal could be adopted would make striking contribution to confidence between nations.

Endorsed Faure proposal for publicity and put forward his own proposal for setting up joint inspection of forces now confronting each other in Europe.[11] There could be specified agreed area of fixed depth on either side of line dividing East and West Europe. Should be supervision by inspecting teams appointed by military commanders. Suggestion could be practical experience in inspection of armaments and might help to establish sense of security in Europe. His proposal and wider proposal made by President would not cut across work of UN Subcommittee, but supplementary proposals might give fresh impetus to that work.

Bulganin stated Conference had heard frank statements by Heads of Government which would no doubt be of importance to reaching favorable solutions on question disarmament. Asked whether might not be feasible instruct Foreign Ministers draft agreed recommendation to UN.

President stated thought Bulganin had described exactly the way to proceed with question.

Faure agreed with suggestions made on procedure summed up ideas emerging from discussion as first of all President's idea of mutual inspection of military forces. Second, Eden's proposal for inspection forces in Europe on either side of demarkation line. Third, proposal which Soviets had tabled and finally his own proposals for publicity about armaments and study of reductions and transfers of resources.

---

[11] See Document 254.

Eden agreed that Foreign Ministers should determine procedure for further handling these suggestions.

Conference agreed that Foreign Ministers should meet at 10 o'clock July 22.

Meeting adjourned at 5:45 p.m.

---

222. Memorandum of the Conversation at the Buffet, Palais des Nations, Geneva, July 21, 1955, 6 p.m.[1]

USDEL/MC/15

PARTICIPANTS

The President
Ambassador Bohlen
U.S.S.R.
Mr. Khrushchev
Marshal Zhukov
Mr. Molotov

In buffet today, the President explained to Khrushchev and Molotov the idea he had had in proposing an exchange of military information and overflights in both countries.[2] The Soviet reaction, as expressed by Khrushchev, was 100 percent negative. They said it would not help the cause of disarmament or security at all but would merely mean that the intelligence services of the two countries would have confirmation of the present fragmentary information that they possessed. Khrushchev was extremely frank in stating this position although he was polite throughout and expressed his conviction that the President was sincere in his proposition but that he could not share the optimism which the Chairman (i.e. Bulganin) had expressed concerning today's meeting. He felt that today's meeting had lightened the task of the Subcommittee on Disarmament and that they would have very little to do.

Marshal Zhukov, who then joined the group, said that as a military man he associated himself with the statements of Khrushchev.

The President explained that he was trying to outline one first concrete step which might be done in order to dispel fear and suspicion and thus lighten international tension by reassuring people against the dangers of surprise attack.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/7–2255. Secret. Drafted by Bohlen. For President Eisenhower's account of this conversation, essentially along these lines, see *Mandate for Change*, p. 521.

[2] For text of President Eisenhower's statement, see *supra*.

Khrushchev, however, maintained his position that this was little more than a means of acquiring intelligence information on both sides and that the right way to proceed to a lessening of international tension in this field was to reduce armaments, whereas the President's proposal would let armaments remain as they are now and even envisaged the possibility of their increase.

The President in conclusion said to Marshal Zhukov he was sure during the war he would have given a great many rubles to have had good aerial photography of the enemy's positions. Both Marshal Zhukov and Khrushchev replied that that was true in time of war; to which the President answered that knowledge of this kind in time of peace would afford reassurance against surprise attack and be confirmation of their joint intention not to fight each other.

---

223. Telegram From the Delegation at the Geneva Conference to the Department of State[1]

Geneva, July 22, 1955—1 p.m.

Secto 64. 1. With Faure present and speaking for French, three Foreign Ministers this afternoon[2] took up Vietnam following Eden's receipt Nehru's telegram on Saigon riots and ICC protection.[3] Molotov has same message and apparently wishes raise matter. We agreed Eden should inform him French authorities will take appropriate measures protect ICC.

2. It was also agreed Eden should not raise election issue. But if Molotov mentions Viet Minh proposal of July 20,[4] Eden would indicate we will be in touch with Vietnamese on matter.

3. Faure discussed elections and consultations, stating it is indispensable Vietnamese make contact with Viet Minh. After some discussion it was agreed some contact desirable. Roux, Caccia, and

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 524. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Saigon, London, Paris, New Delhi, and Ottawa. Drafted by Kenneth Young, Director of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs. According to an entry in the U.S. Delegation Chronology of Events, the meeting took place at 6 p.m. (*ibid.*), while Merchant in *Recollections*, pp. 41–42, shows that it was held in Macmillan's office at the Palais des Nations immediately after the Fifth Plenary.

[2] July 21.

[3] See footnote 6, Document 220.

[4] See vol. I, p. 494, footnote 3.

Young[5] instructed prepare draft message to our representatives Saigon take up matter with Diem together or individually. Message would advise him contact Viet Minh and assure him our support on genuinely free elections.

4. French Delegation informed us Viet Minh asked French transmit July 20 letter officially to Bao Dai[6] and Diem, which they are doing.

---

[5] Jacques Roux, Minister and Director of Asiatic Affairs, French Foreign Ministry, and Kenneth Young.

[6] Emperor and Chief of State of Vietnam.

---

224. Telegram From the Delegation at the Geneva Conference to the Department of State[1]

Geneva, July 21, 1955—6 p.m.

Secto 60. For Hoover from Secretary. Following is summary of Geneva Conference for use by Acting Secretary in report to Cabinet meeting.

1. The discussions of the Heads of Government have highlighted the basic difference of position between the USSR and the West on German unity. As the President put it, the difference is primarily the priority we accord to the problem of German unification. The Soviets have not departed from their initial position, namely, that establishment of an overall European security organization is a prerequisite to German unification, and that German unification can come only after establishment of "confidence" in Europe and a considerable period of time. The Heads of the three Allied Governments have made it clear that German unity is a matter of urgency, that the division of Germany is in itself a major cause of insecurity, and that the problems of European security and German unity are inseparable.

2. The Soviets have struck one new note by recognizing that NATO and the Paris agreements are facts of life, and have indicated that for a period at least they are willing to deal with these facts of life. Their major proposal on European security however calls for the eventual abolition of the Western security structure and, in effect, postpones German unification until such time as the West might be willing to dismantle its security arrangements. All three of the West-

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/7–2155. Secret; Niact; Limited Distribution.

ern Heads of Government, and in particular the President, have made it clear that NATO and the Brussels Treaty involve no threat to Russian security and that German participation in NATO is helpful rather than harmful to the security interests of the Soviet Union.

3. The Heads of Government have directed the Foreign Ministers to draw up a directive to guide further discussion by the Foreign Ministers, at later conferences, of the problems of German unity and European security. The Foreign Ministers met this morning[2] to discuss a directive but did not agree because Russians insisted on almost exclusive emphasis on "European Security". However at lunch with SecState they indicated some "give".[3]

4. The Heads of Government have now proceeded to discussion of the remaining two items on the agreed agenda: disarmament; and East-West contacts.

5. The conference already has not been without significant aspects. Foremost among these is the undeniable impression that the President personally has made upon the members of the Soviet Delegation, as well as upon our allies. Illustrative of this was the Soviet reaction to the President's forceful statement of his personal reasons for believing that NATO could not be an instrument of aggression and his official statement, as President, that the United States could never be a party to aggression. The respects which both Bulganin and Molotov paid to the President's statement were indicative of the weight which his personality and his views have carried at this conference. Although the Russians have made no changes in their formal positions on substantive questions the effects of the face to face exposure of major Russian leaders to the President may well be significant for the future.

6. Also of significance is the obvious effort of Soviet leaders to establish an atmosphere of friendly relations with the West and conspicuously with the United States. From Khrushchev and Bulganin down to the lowest rank officers of the Soviet Delegation there has been a clear and certainly calculated attempt to develop a generally friendly climate of opinion.

7. There has been on the whole a useful concert between the three Western delegations. In spite of some free-wheeling by Faure, the unity of the Three Powers on the major issues has been clearly demonstrated. The Russian efforts to use this conference for divisive effect have thus far been without result.

8. We have stuck to our major objectives at this conference. We have frankly but without truculence presented our views on the main causes of tension, including the satellite problem and interna-

---

[2] See Document 217.

[3] See Document 219.

tional Communism. We have avoided details and we have not become involved in substantive decisions which could only be superficial at this stage. We may be able to lay the groundwork for useful further negotiations which will be necessary if any practical results are to be achieved.

---

225. Editorial Note

At 6:30 p.m. on July 21, President Eisenhower met with Nelson Rockefeller, Harold Stassen, Admiral Radford, General Gruenther, and Colonel Goodpaster at his villa. No record of this meeting has been found in Department of State files or at the Eisenhower Library, but it appears as an entry in the President's appointments for July 21. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File)

At about the same time Hagerty held a press conference at the Maison de la Presse. A verbatim transcript of the conference is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 506.

At 7 p.m. Herbert Blankenhorn, the Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council from the Federal Republic of Germany, visited the Secretary of State at his villa, while Massimo Magistrati, Director General of Political Affairs, Italian Foreign Ministry, met Livingston Merchant at his hotel. No record of the Secretary's conversation with Blankenhorn has been found in Department of State files. Merchant, *Recollections,* page 42, is the only record of the conversation with Magistrati, and it indicates only that Merchant briefed him on the progress of the Conference.

At 8 p.m. Beam and Merchant had dinner with Zarubin and Soldatov, while shortly thereafter President Eisenhower, Secretary Dulles, Ambassador Willis, James Hagerty, and John Eisenhower attended a formal State dinner given by the Swiss at the Palais Eynard for the four delegations. Records of these two meetings are *infra* and Document 227.

At 10 p.m., Stassen held a final press conference, a verbatim transcript of which is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 506.

226. Memorandum of the Conversation at Dinner, Cafe du Nord, Geneva, July 21, 1955, 8 p.m.[1]

USDEL/MC/23

PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador Zarubin
Mr. Soldatov, Head of the American Section, Soviet Foreign Office
Mr. Merchant
Mr. Beam

At Ambassador Zarubin's invitation, we had dinner with him last night at 8:00 at the Cafe du Nord. Ambassador Zarubin had been quite cordial in issuing the invitation several days ago, but when we arrived last night, he was obviously in a bad humor and remained generally uncommunicative throughout the evening.

He opened the conversation by saying that President Eisenhower's proposal of that afternoon for the exchange of military information had been a great disappointment and was unrealistic.[2] Mr. Merchant replied the President had put it forward with the utmost sincerity and we hoped that the Soviet Government would give it most serious attention. We consider the proposal as the best and simplest approach to the problem of instituting inspection and control of arms. This later question was really central to the issue of restoring trust and confidence.

Mr. Soldatov, who arrived about half an hour late, then reiterated Ambassador Zarubin's concern over the President's proposal which he thought would raise difficulties. Mr. Merchant said the Soviet Government must realize it is inconceivable that the United States would ever attack the Soviet Union. The President was a man of peace and in any event it would be utterly impossible for any U.S. Government to launch a war except in self-defense because of the controls of Congress and public opinion. Furthermore, the US and the USSR were bound by the UN Charter to refrain from the use of force.

Mr. Soldatov said that the Charter had been written before the coming into being of weapons of mass destruction, in particular the hydrogen bomb. In the light of these developments he thought it should be reinforced by a declaration that countries possessing these weapons should never use them against each other. Mr. Merchant reviewed the merits of the President's proposal and appealed for its serious consideration.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/7–2355. Confidential. Drafted by Beam on July 22. For Merchant's account of the dinner, which includes a detailed description of the multicourse meal, see *Recollections*, pp. 42–43.

[2] For text of President Eisenhower's statement, see Document 221.

Satisfaction was expressed on both sides with the apparent success of the exchange of agricultural delegations. Ambassador Zarubin and Mr. Soldatov said the Soviet Government was encouraging visits[3] and as far as they knew had not turned down a single visa application. Mr. Beam mentioned that Mr. Sulzberger of the *New York Times* had tried unsuccessfully for the last three years to get a visa. The Soviet representatives tried to laugh this off indicating Mr. Sulzberger's case was exceptional. Ambassador Zarubin and Mr. Soldatov complained about US practices requiring fingerprinting and signature of a declaration on entering the U.S. Mr. Merchant said the Soviets should realize fingerprinting had no criminal implications and was now practically universally applied as a means of identification in the U.S. and other countries. It was mentioned that the U.S. authorities would take under consideration the issuance of official visas to those visitors and delegates for whom the Soviet Government requested that status.

Ambassador Zarubin mentioned incidentally that he had known Khrushchev for many years and had attended secondary school with him. He explained that while Khrushchev had been born in the Ukraine his parents were Russian and Khrushchev apparently regarded himself as such.

---

[3] Ambassador Zarubin referred in particular to a prospective visit to Moscow by Secretary Dulles. [Footnote in the source text.]

---

227. Memorandum of the Conversation at the Swiss Government Dinner, Palais Eynard, Geneva, July 21, 1955, 8:30–11:05 p.m.[1]

USDEL/MC/26

PARTICIPANTS

United States
The Secretary

United Kingdom
Sir Anthony Eden

Russia
Marshal Bulganin
Mr. Molotov

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/7–2155. Secret. In his brief description of the dinner, John Eisenhower notes that in addition to the President and the Secretary of State, Ambassador Willis, Anderson, Hagerty, Walters, and Bill Draper attended for the United States. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, John Eisenhower Diary)

SUBJECTS

1. China—Industrial and Military Aid
2. *Tuapse* Crew

At dinner, I discussed with Marshal Bulganin a number of matters about China. He spoke of his visit there with Khrushchev a year ago and made some comments about the economics in the country.[2] He said he thought we should get in touch with the Chinese People's Government. I said that we had already taken steps toward doing so but they had apparently bogged down because the Chinese thought we had misspelled the word "Peiping". We had quite a little discussion about that, and Bulganin was obviously ignorant of the significance which the Chinese Communists apparently attached to the spelling. He asked whether we would talk just about the nationals on both sides or whether talks could be broader. I said we expected first to talk about the nationals but we had not excluded some broadening of the talks. However, I said do not expect much very fast. I mentioned to Bulganin that it had been 17 years before the United States recognized the Soviet Union, and I also asked whether there had not also been a long period of time when the Soviet Union did not recognize the Swiss Republic. He admitted this was so.

I spoke of the large amount of aid that Russia was apparently giving to China. He said they were giving a good deal of economic aid to help them industrialize. I said: you were also giving a lot of military aid.[3] He said: we are not giving them MIGs any more. We find the more we give them, the more they want. I repeated my inquiries so as to be sure there was no misunderstanding, and again got a categorical statement that they were no longer supplying direct military aid.

Later after dinner, Marshal Bulganin, Prime Minister Eden, Mr. Molotov and I sat together and resumed talking about China. We referred to the spelling matter, and no one of the group seemed to know what it was all about. Someone suggested that perhaps "Peiping" had been the spelling given by the Japanese.

Bulganin said he would look into the situation right away, as he was greatly interested in the matter and wanted talks to get started.

---

[2] Bulganin and Khrushchev visited China in October 1954 for the anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China.

[3] Another copy of this memorandum has the following two sentences at this point in the text: "He said: we were doing that, but we had now stopped. I said China is full of MIGs." (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/7–2255)

I spoke to Molotov about the release of the *Tuapse* crew. Molotov said he knew about the plans and that some were supposed to come to the United States. He said this would make a very bad impression in the Soviet Union. I said that I had worked very hard on this matter since he had talked to me in San Francisco and that I understood about 30 were going back to Russia. He said the number was 29. In reply to his statement that it would make a very bad impression that some were going to the United States, I said that it had made a bad impression when some American POWs had decided to go to Communist China, but that these were things one had to accept.

---

228. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Department of State[1]

Geneva, July 21, 1955—8 p.m.

Dulte 30. Eyes only Acting Secretary from Secretary. Today was highlighted by President's proposal for exchange of information with Soviet Union regarding military establishments and aerial photography to verify and to check on changes of military dispositions. This proposal while it took British and French unawares seems to have been well received by them and Pinay told me he had instructed French press officer to give it biggest possible play. Possibly Eden will be disappointed it somewhat overshadowed his own proposal for exchange of information on the East-West European fronts.

Following the conference and in the buffet Khrushchev, Zhukov, and Molotov reacted very negatively to President's proposal, saying this was merely an extension of the present intelligence efforts of both sides and that it was no substitute for banning atomic weapons and reducing armaments.[2]

At the bilateral luncheon today where I and others of US Delegation were guests of Soviet Delegation,[3] there was the usual atmosphere of friendliness and cordial toasting and some indication that Soviets might "give" on the directive regarding German unification and European security. However, their later act at the conference in unexpectedly introducing two new papers, one on European security, a subject presumably closed, indicated that surface indications are not trustworthy.[4]

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/7–2155. Top Secret; Priority.

[2] See Document 222.

[3] See Document 219.

Dulles

---

[4] For texts of the two Soviet papers, see footnote 2, Document 221, and Document 252.

---

229. Letter From Secretary of State Dulles to Chancellor Adenauer[1]

Geneva, July 21, 1955.

My Dear Chancellor: We constantly think of you as we struggle here. There has been a persistent unwillingness on the part of the Soviet Delegation to treat the unification of Germany as a present problem but rather one which can be indefinitely deferred. This attitude has been more marked in the case of Molotov than in the case of Bulganin. Although at luncheon yesterday Molotov[2] expressed himself as absolutely opposed to a directive to the Foreign Ministers to take up the matter of German unification, it seemed in the afternoon that Bulganin would agree to this.[3] The final test is still to come but you can be confident that we shall be faithful to our common purpose.

Your private observations to me about Faure seem to be confirmed. I hope you are getting a much deserved rest and that we will be able in the end to give you good news.

Faithfully yours,

Foster Dulles[4]

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 515. Secret.

[2] See Document 205.

[3] See Document 207.

[4] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

July 22, 1955

230. Memorandum of the Conversation at the British Breakfast, Eden's Villa, Geneva, July 22, 1955, 8:30 a.m.[1]

PARTICIPANTS

Secretary Dulles
Sir Anthony Eden
Foreign Minister Macmillan
Mr. Phleger

Eden said that he would like to discuss the China situation.

The Secretary recalled that the ChiComs had not yet agreed to the Geneva meeting. Their stated objection was the use of the word "Peiping" in the communication, which seemed out of proportion; perhaps it indicated that they had changed their minds. Macmillan said their acceptance might have been to get to Geneva when the Conference was in session, and when the date was put after its adjournment, they might have decided not to go ahead.

The Secretary explained the U.S. position. The offshore island situation was serious. The ChiComs were building up positions, and threatening to take the islands by force. The US had been attempting to pacify the situation by influencing the ChiNats not to be provocative.

Eden said the President had expressed the view that it was not wise to build up forces on the islands so that they assumed a prestige aspect, but they should be placed more in the position of outposts. The Secretary said this was so and the US had tried to convince the ChiNats of the wisdom of not continuing to build up the islands, so as to make their holding a matter of importance and prestige. Assistant Secretary Robertson and Admiral Radford had gone to Taipei to urge this but with negative results.[2]

The Secretary said the situation in China was no different than in other countries that were divided, like Germany and Korea, where no attempt was being made to use armed force. Time would be necessary to bring a solution. Many things could happen with the passage of time. Those who had influence with the ChiComs should point this out and the danger of attempting to force the matter by military means. Others do not resort to force, why should the Communists? "Because they have the means", Eden remarked.

Macmillan asked if the offshore islands were attacked, would the U.S. intervene. The Secretary said this could not be answered categorically. If they were overrun in 48 hours, the U.S. would not have time to act. However, if the ChiNats made a heroic defense and held out, public opinion for intervention would build up and might well get to the point where action by the U.S. would follow. U.S. reaction was strong about Dien Bien Phu where U.S. interests were not nearly so great. These islands might well be considered by the U.S. people as a symbol, somewhat like Berlin was considered when blockaded.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/7–2255. Secret. Drafted by Phleger.

[2] Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, and Admiral Radford visited the Republic of China at the end of April 1955.

The Secretary said that if the ChiComs wanted to make progress, they should act like civilized people, that their attempts by pressure and violence to achieve their ends was the wrong way to go about it so far as the American people were concerned. When Nehru had suggested there should be some quid pro quo for the release of the prisoners, the Secretary had pointed out that this was like paying a kidnapper and would have a very bad effect on the American public view of the ChiComs. Both Eden and Macmillan agreed with this.

The question was raised as to what had become of the Soviet suggestion for Six-Power Talks to include the Big Four, the Chinese Communists and India. Eden said that he thought this had been dropped, because when Nehru was in Moscow[3] and the Soviets brought the matter up, he had said that he did not think well of it.

The Secretary told of U Nu's statement that the ChiComs desired direct negotiations with the U.S. on matters affecting the U.S. and direct negotiations with the ChiNats on matters affecting the ChiNats. He was not sure that this correctly represented the ChiCom's view, although there had been some rumors to this effect. Macmillan said it was quite possible, and he also had heard such rumors. This was the way deals were made in the old days, and the ChiComs would make Chiang a Marshal in their Army.

The Secretary told of his talk with Bulganin in which Bulganin had said that the Soviets were not furnishing any military aid to the ChiComs at this time.[4] He also said that Bulganin did not seem to have any previous knowledge of the offer of the U.S. to have direct talks in Geneva with the Communists.

Before the meeting broke up, Eden said that when he had dinner with the Soviets tonight[5] he would point out the seriousness of the situation and of the consequences that might result were the ChiComs to resort to the use of armed force.

---

[3] Nehru visited Moscow in June 1955.

[4] See Document 227.

[5] For Eden's account of the Soviet dinner, see *Full Circle*, pp. 340–342. That part of the conversation at dinner dealing with Indochina is also summarized in telegram 293 to Saigon, July 26. (Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/7–2655)

231. Editorial Note

Following breakfast, Phleger, MacArthur, Merchant, and Bowie attended a meeting of the Tripartite Coordinating (Working) Group at 9:15 a.m. At 9:30 they joined the Foreign Ministers for a tripartite meeting at the Palais des Nations. No records of these meetings have been found in Department of State files, but they appear as entries in the United States Delegation order of the day, USDEL OD–6, July 22 (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 520), and in Merchant, *Recollections,* page 43.

At the conclusion of the second meeting, Secretary Dulles met briefly with Molotov who handed him the Russian text of a new draft directive. A seven-line memorandum of their conversation, USDEL/MC/16, July 22, is in Department of State, Central File 396.1–GE/7–2255. For a translation of the draft directive, see *infra.*

---

232. Telegram From the Delegation at the Geneva Conference to the Department of State[1]

Geneva, July 22, 1955—11 p.m.

Secto 66. Foreign Ministers at 11:00 meeting engaged in long procedural wrangle over directives to be addressed by Heads of Government to subsequent Foreign Ministers conference.

Molotov tabled following draft which he claimed took account previously expressed view of delegates:

"The Heads of Government of the USSR, the USA, France and the United Kingdom, guided by the desire to contribute to the relaxation of international tension and consolidation of confidence between states, direct the Foreign Ministers to continue the consideration of the following questions, on which views have been exchanged at the Geneva conference.

"1. European security. For the purpose of establishing a system of European security, which should be sought through effective means with due regard to the legitimate interests of all states and taking into account their inalienable right individual and collective self-defence, the Ministers are directed to consider proposals on the conclusion of a security treaty for Europe or first, for part of Europe, as well as other possible proposals pertaining to the solution of this problem. Moreover, they shall also consider proposals relating to: The elimination, control and inspection of armed forces and armaments; the establishment, between East and West, of a zone where armed forces will be stationed by mutual consent; and, the assumption by states of an obligation not to resort to force and to deny assistance to an aggressor.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/7–2255. Secret; Priority. Repeated to London, Paris, Moscow, and Bonn. The U.S. Delegation verbatim record, USDEL/Verb/M–4, July 22, which indicates that the session began at 10:15 a.m., and the record of decisions, CF/DOC/RD/9, July 23, are *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 509.

"2. Disarmament. The Ministers shall examine proposals submitted at the Geneva conference on the reduction of armaments and prohibition of atomic weapons, being guided by the necessity to prepare for the United Nations agreed recommendations that would provide for the establishment of definite levels of armaments and armed forces of states and the prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons, with the institution of effective international agreement. Success in this field would mean that vast material resources would be set free for the peaceful economic development of nations, improvement of their welfare, as well as assistance to under developed countries.

"3. German question. The Heads of Government have agreed that the solution of the German question and the reunification of Germany by means of free elections should be carried out in conformity with the national interests of the German people and in the interest of European security.

"The Ministers shall consider this problem with the participation of representatives of the German Democratic Republic and the German Federal Republic.

"4. The Foreign Ministers of the four powers will meet at (blank), shall continue the consideration of these questions and will determine the organization of their work".[2]

Long discussion ensued from which following points emerged. Secretary recalled Heads of Government had requested directive on German reunification and European security and draft recommendation to UN Sub-commission on Disarmament. These matters should be dealt with in order established by Heads of Government discussion. Pinay and Macmillan agreed, latter stressing Heads of Government had discussed German reunification first. Molotov claimed all three subjects important and none should be relegated, claiming special attention be devoted European security and disarmament and then German reunification. He suggested Foreign Ministers draft separate directives all three subjects leaving Heads of Government to determine order.

Meeting recessed at Secretary's suggestion and Western tripartite working groups drew up (1) draft directive on German reunification and European security and (2) draft recommendation to UN Subcommission on Disarmament. Documents presented at resumption meeting noon follow:

---

[2] This draft was circulated as CF/DOC/17, July 22, in the records of the conference.

"*Draft Directive (July 22) to the Foreign Ministers Proposed by the Delegates of France, the UK and the USA.*

"The Heads of Government of France, the UK, the USSR, and the USA, guided by the desire to contribute to the relaxation of international tension and to the consolidation of confidence between states, instruct their Foreign Ministers to continue the consideration of the following questions with regard to which an exchange of views has taken place at the Geneva conference, and to propose effective means for their solution.

> "1. Germany. The Heads of Govt, recognizing their common responsibility for the reunification of Germany, have agreed that the reunification of Germany by means of free elections shall be carried out in conformity with the national interests of the German people and the interests of European security.
>
> "2. European Security. For the purpose of establishing European security with due regard to the legitimate interests of all nations and which would take into account their inherent right to individual and collective self-defense, the Ministers are instructed to consider various proposals to this end, including the following: A security pact for Europe or for a part of Europe including provision for the assumption by member nations of an obligation not to resort to force and to deny assistance to an aggressor; limitation control and inspection in regard to armed forces and armament; establishment between East and West of a zone in which the disposition of armed forces will be subject to mutual consent; and also to consider other possible proposals pertaining to the solution of this problem.

"The Foreign Ministers of the four powers will meet at (blank) during October to initiate their consideration of these questions and to determine the organization of their work."[3]

"*Disarmament.*

"The four Heads of Government;

"Desirous of removing the threat of war and lessening the burden of armaments.

"Convinced of the necessity, for secure peace and for the welfare of mankind of achieving a system for the control and reduction of armaments and armed forces under effective safeguards.

"Recognizing that achievements in this field would release vast material resources to be devoted to the peaceful economic development of nations, for raising their well-being, as well as for assistance to under developed countries.

"Agree:

---

[3] This draft directive was circulated as CF/DOC/22, July 22, in the records of the conference.

"(1) for these purposes to work together to develop an acceptable system for disarmament through the sub-committee of the United Nations Disarmament Commission;

"(2) to instruct their representatives in the Sub-committee in the discharge of their mandate from the United Nations;

"(a) to take into account in their work of the views and proposals advanced by the Heads of Government at this conference;
"(b) to request the Sub-committee to give priority in its work to the study of the methods of instituting effective international control, including inspection, reporting, and publicity; and
"(c) to propose that the next meeting of the Sub-committee be held on August 29, 1955, at New York".[4]

Secretary explained new drafts had taken account views and proposals all four delegations. Molotov declined to consider since had not yet received Soviet text. He suggested meeting meantime discuss Soviet draft directive presented yesterday laying down principles in connection with establishment European collective security system (Secto 63[5]). Secretary suggested Soviet document of type to be referred by Heads of Government to Foreign Ministers meeting in October. Pinay and Macmillan agreed, pointing out need consult any other interested European government. Molotov agreed on condition Soviet proposal be discussed by October conference. Secretary and Macmillan said should be considered with other proposals.

Foreign Ministers resume at 3:00 before Heads of Government meeting.[6]

---

[4] This proposal was circulated as CF/DOC/18, July 22, in the records of the conference.

[5] Document 221.

[6] Regarding this meeting, see Document 235.

---

233. Editorial Note

At 11:30 a.m. Prime Minister Eden met with President Eisenhower at the latter's villa. One hour later the President met with Nelson Rockefeller. At 1 p.m. the President and Mrs. Eisenhower held a luncheon at their villa for President and Madame Petitpierre. Also attending were Secretary General and Madame Zehnder, the Chief of Protocol and Madame Dominice, Ambassador Willis, Major John Eisenhower, Consul General and Mrs. Gowen, Ambassador Thompson, and Colonel Walters. No records of any of these events have been found in Department of State files or at the Eisenhower Library, but all appear as entries in the President's appointments for July 22. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File)

---

234. Memorandum From the President's Military Aide (Schulz) to the President[1]

Geneva, July 22, 1955.

Secretary Dulles has asked me pass on the following to you.

The Foreign Ministers have been in session all morning drafting and re-drafting. They are now recessing and will meet again at 3:00 pm.[2]

He does not feel it will be well for the heads of government to meet before 5:00 pm. Shortly after 3:00 pm he will advise us as to the time agreed upon.

The reason for the delay is they have not clarified the basic issues which the heads of government will have to resolve. They are getting a good many minor questions settled, but the big questions have not been resolved.

---

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File.

[2] For a record of the morning session, see Document 232; a record of the afternoon session is *infra*.

---

235. Telegram From the Delegation at the Geneva Conference to the Department of State[1]

Geneva, July 23, 1955—6 a.m.

Secto 70. At resumption 3:00 p.m. Foreign Ministers meeting Molotov requested insertion phrase in German section of directive that Heads of Government recognize "common responsibility for solution of the German question" as well as reunification of Germany, et cetera. Also requested insertion provision Foreign Ministers will consider German matters with participation of GDR and Federal Republic and representatives other governments. In reply Secretary's question regarding difference between solution German problem and reunification Molotov said solutions wider than reunification and could include arrangements such as bringing together different parts of Germany before reunification.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/7–2355. Drafted by Beam. Repeated to London, Paris, Moscow, and Bonn. Secret; Priority. The U.S. Delegation verbatim record, USDEL/Verb/M–5, July 22, which indicates that the meeting began at 3:14 p.m. and adjourned at 4:45, is *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 509.

Molotov said he accepted text draft directive on security.[2]

Regarding disarmament Molotov presented following text amending Western draft proposals:[3]

"The Four Heads of Government,

"Desirous of removing the threat of war and lessening the burden of armaments,

"Convinced of the necessity for secure peace and for the welfare of mankind, of achieving a system of disarmament providing the establishment of definite levels of armaments and armed forces of states and the prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons with the institution of effective international controls over the implementation of an appropriate agreement,

"Recognizing that achievements in this field would release vast material resources to be devoted to the peaceful economic development of nations, for raising their well-being as well as for assistance to underdeveloped countries,

"Agree that the Foreign Ministers work out agreed recommendations on disarmament for submission to the United Nations, recognizing at the same time the need to:

> "a) Take account in their work of the views and proposals advanced by the Heads of Government at this conference;
>
> "b) Propose that the next meeting of the Subcommittee be held on August 29, 1955, at New York."

Following brief recess Secretary said could not accept draft on participation GDR and FedRep since consultation arrangements comprehended provisions re organization Foreign Ministers conference. Secretary accepted reference to solution German problem as being within competence four powers on understanding recognize ability Foreign Ministers consider arrangements for free elections, etc. which must precede reunification.

As regards need consulting East and West German authorities, in connection Foreign Ministers conference, Molotov said embarrassment had already ensued from failure consult Germany at present conference and would certainly be necessary arrange for participation authorized Germans at next stage. Pinay questioned advisability saying hard to distinguish between parties and organizations clamoring for participation. Suggested question be left to discretion Foreign Ministers at next conference.

---

[2] Reference is to paragraph 2 of the tripartite proposal in Document 232.

[3] For text of this proposal, see *ibid.*

Foreign Ministers meeting adjourned to make place for Heads of Government at 5:30 p.m.[4]

---

[4] A record of this meeting is *infra.*

---

236. Telegram From the Delegation at the Geneva Conference to the Department of State[1]

Geneva, July 23, 1955—3 p.m.

Secto 72. Sixth meeting Heads of Government convened 5:05 p.m. July 22, President presiding.

President said first unfinished item was directive to Foreign Ministers of day before yesterday. Asked Secretary to describe status.

Secretary said three tasks had been given Foreign Ministers: first, to draft instruction to Foreign Ministers to deal with problem of German unification and European security. Second in order of time was to draft recommendations re disarmament. Third, to make recommendations re paper submitted late yesterday by Soviet on principles to cover East/West European security pact.[2]

One unresolved basic question remained re first task: Order in which Foreign Ministers should be instructed. Certain delegations felt should follow order indicated in conference decision i.e., German unification and European security, but one delegation felt orders should be reversed.

Foreign Ministers still discussing whether there should be particular reference in paragraph re Germany to participation of representatives of GDR, GFR, and other interested states when adjourned for this meeting. All felt there would be occasion to consult representatives of German people. Three felt it was adequately covered in proposed paper stating responsibility and right of Foreign Ministers to determine organization of their work.

On disarmament, three Western Foreign Ministers had submitted paper[3] and Soviets proposed substitute which had not been circulated in time to give detailed consideration before this meeting.[4]

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/7–2355. Secret. Repeated to London, Paris, Moscow, and Bonn. Copies of the U.S. Delegation verbatim record, USDEL/Verb/6, July 22, and the records of decision, CF/DOC/RD/11, July 23, for this session are *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 510.

[2] For text of this Soviet paper, see footnote 2, Document 221.

[3] For text of the Western proposal on disarmament, see footnote 4, Document 232.

[4] For text of the Soviet proposed substitute, July 22, see *supra.*

Re Soviet proposal on principles E/W security pact, Foreign Ministers had agreed that Soviet paper would be one of proposals to be considered later by Foreign Ministers under proposed provision that they should consider other possible proposals pertaining to solution of this problem.

Secretary closed by noting hard work and spirit of conciliation that had gone into these discussions, which he thought very hopeful for future.

President summarized two points still at difference as (1) order of agenda and (2) whether instructions should include specific reference representatives East and West Germany.

Faure supported views expressed by Secretary.

Eden said practice at Berlin had been to have contact with interested parties but they had no need to express this in instructions. Understood anybody could consult interested parties at any time. Believe general instructions adequate.

Bulganin called on Molotov. Molotov said agreed Foreign Ministers would meet in October and Soviets had proposed they should consider (1) European security, (2) disarmament and (3) German problem in order of desirability of handling.

Agreed that Ministers had made effort to reach agreement and said results had followed by agreeing on giving of directive, kind of directive and text of directive. However, on German problem remaining issues were participation of representatives of German people, and restated Soviet case. Disarmament remains to be completed.

President proposed Foreign Ministers be given further time to consider disagreed points. Faure agreed.

Eden suggested might be desirable in interest of time to examine disagreed points in restricted session, but said would be guided by colleagues.

Bulganin supported President's suggestion and it was so agreed.

President suggested Foreign Ministers remain for about half hour to hear discussions on East/West contacts.

President then made statement, text sent by USIA.[5]

["Gentlemen, the agenda item for today's discussion is the development of contacts between East and West. Now, accordingly, then, today we might discuss methods of normalizing and increasing the contacts between our nations in many fields. I am heartened by the deep interest in this question, which interest implies a common purpose to understand each other better.

["Unfortunately, there exist unnecessary restrictions on the flow between us of ideas, of things, and of people. Like other questions that we have considered during the past four days, this one can not be considered independently or in isolation. All are related by their direct importance to the general objective of lessening world fears and tensions.

---

[5] The text that follows in brackets is taken from the verbatim record referred to in footnote 1 above.

["To help achieve the goal of peace based on justice and right and mutual understanding, there are certain concrete steps that could be taken:

["First, to lower the barriers which now impede the interchange of information and ideas between our peoples;

["Two, to lower the barriers which now impede the opportunities of people to travel anywhere in the world for peaceful, friendly purposes so that all will have a chance to know each other face to face;

["Three, to create conditions which will encourage nations to increase the exchange of peaceful goods throughout the world.

["Success in these endeavors would improve the conditions of life for all our citizens and elsewhere in the world.

["By helping eliminate poverty and ignorance we can take another step in progress toward peace. When restrictions on communications of all kinds, including radio and travel, existing in extreme form in some places have operated as causes of mutual distrust, in America the fervent belief in freedom of thought, of expression and of movement is a vital part of our heritage. Yet, during these past ten years, even we have felt compelled in the protection of our own interests, to place some restrictions upon the movement of persons and communications across our national frontiers. This Conference has the opportunity, I believe, to initiate concrete steps to permit the breaking down of both mild and severe barriers to mutual understanding and trust.

["Now I should like to turn to the question of trade. I assume that each of us here is dedicated to the improvement of the conditions of life of our own citizens. Trade in peaceful goods is an important factor in achieving this goal. If trade is to reach its maximum capability in this regard, it must be both voluminous and worldwide.

["The United Nations has properly been concerned in making available to the people of the underdeveloped areas modern technology and managerial abilities, as well as capital and credit. My country not only supports these efforts but has undertaken parallel projects outside the United Nations. In this connection, the new atomic science possesses a tremendous potential for helping raise the standards of living and providing greater opportunity for all the world. World-wide interest in overcoming poverty and ignorance is growing by leaps and bounds and each of the great nations should do its utmost to assist in this development. As a result, new desires, new requirements, new aspirations are emerging almost everywhere as man climbs the upward path of his destiny. Most encouraging of all is the evidence that after centuries of fatalism and resignation the hopeless of the world are beginning to hope.

["But regardless of the results achieved through the United Nations effort, or the individual efforts of helpful nations, trade remains the indispensable arterial system of a flourishing world prosperity. If we could create conditions in which unnecessary restrictions on trade would be progressively eliminated and under which there would be free and friendly exchange of ideas and of people, we should have done much to chart the paths toward the objective we commonly seek.

["By working together toward all these goals, we can do much to transform this century of recurring conflict into a century of enduring and invigorating peace. This, I assure you, the United States of America devotedly desires, as I know all of us do."]

Faure said contacts between individuals of paramount importance reducing tension, of which meeting Heads of Government a glowing example.

Recognition of two security zones in Europe does not imply final acceptance of division of continent. France believes in brotherhood and friendship between nations. Prerequisite for unity in Europe is freer exchange between peoples and economies; therefore France offers proposal designed for freer circulation of men, ideas and goods.[6]

First, Faure referred to freedom of movement for business and tourism; second, to developing exchanges in professional, artistic and scientific circles, including students and lecturers, books, journals, magazines, documentary films, etc.

Primary obstacle to this has been atmosphere of systematic hostility which now appears to have largely receded. Further, there is fear that exchanges in scientific, cultural, technical and artistic fields will be used for political propaganda purposes. To solve this could have committee of ministers of education or fine arts to devise safeguards.

Aid exchanges by radio should be amplified but broadcasts should not be used for propaganda. Suggested broadcasts on literary and scientific subjects.

Stated next problem is freedom of access to information. This would be easy re technical information, but more ticklish re political directives of opinion. Proposed Heads of Government should be able to make broad statements on general situation and other governments should give statements wide dissemination through press and radio.

---

[6] For text of the French proposal, circulated as CF/DOC/19, July 22, see Document 256.

On economic problems said there would be advantages in wide development of trade, but barriers cannot be removed all at once although they can be made more flexible and reduced to largest extent possible. Said there would be advantage in admitting countries of East and West Europe into common organizations, particularly, as Pinay said at Strasbourg, in areas of transport and power. Also views with favor creation of common investment fund in Europe for public works of general value.

Eden said that as conference hall was only place with simultaneous translation available, and as Foreign Ministers should get to work soonest, he would be ready to table his observations so Foreign Ministers could get to work and postpone further discussion this agenda item until Foreign Ministers had reported.[7] Bulganin concurred.

President adjourned meeting proposing Heads of Government meet 11 a.m. tomorrow to consider Foreign Ministers work, suggesting about four persons per delegation plus interpreters. Agreed. Adjourned 6:14 p.m.

---

[7] For text of Prime Minister Eden's statement, circulated as CF/DOC/21, July 22, see *Geneva Conference*, pp. 64–66.

---

237. Memorandum of the Conversation at the Buffet, Palais des Nations, Geneva, July 22, 1955[1]

USDEL/MC/25

PARTICIPANTS

United States	*USSR*
The President	Premier Bulganin
Admiral Radford	Mr. Khrushchev
Ambassador Bohlen	Marshal Zhukov
Mr. Anderson	

SUBJECTS

President's Conversation with Bulganin *et al.*

1. Exchange of Persons
2. Inspection
3. Disarmament

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/7–2355. Secret. Drafted by Bohlen on July 23. The conversation took place following the Sixth Plenary Session. A summary of this memorandum was transmitted in Dulte 33 from Geneva, July 23. (*Ibid.*)

In the buffet this afternoon, the President had a further conversation with Khrushchev, Bulganin and Marshal Zhukov. In the beginning it dealt mostly with fishing, and the President offered to send Marshal Zhukov a rod and spinner. The President presented Admiral Radford to the three of them and Zhukov remarked that he had heard a great deal of Admiral Radford. Khrushchev then said, picking up a theme at yesterday's lunch,[2] that he thought it would be a good thing if the US and the Soviet Union exchanged military visits and that that would be very interesting. Bulganin and Zhukov both agreed with this proposal.

Turning to the line he had discussed today at the Heads of Government meeting, the President said that he felt that there were many parts of our immigration law which were outdated and should be changed in order to permit greater exchange of visits between the US and the Soviet Union. He said some of these provisions had been taken by Congress under the influence of concern resulting from the postwar period, but that he was working in order to make them more liberal. He said however it would take some time, since laws were not easily changed in the US. The Soviets said that some of the provisions of the law, particularly that concerning fingerprints were very difficult for them to accept, that in the Soviet Union fingerprinting was connected with criminal activity and it was regarded as offensive by the citizens. Bulganin said imagine if the leading ballerina of the Moscow Opera was to go to the US and would have to give her fingerprints. The President explained that in the US fingerprinting had come to mean merely a system of identification and mentioned that all his grandchildren had theirs taken so in the event of accidents or other difficulties they could be easily identified. Mr. Bohlen at this point pointed out that he had already told Premier Bulganin in Moscow that another reason was the absence of police registration in the US and that when a foreign visitor was within the country, there was no means of checking on his movements, since we did not have a system of passport and police registration, as was prevalent in Europe. The President earlier had mentioned the fact that he felt that informal contact and discussions in many ways were more useful than the more formal proceedings of a conference to which the Soviet agreed.

At one point Premier Bulganin and Mr. Khrushchev jestingly said to Admiral Radford that now he would have to give them his military plans, and Khrushchev added, they must be the real plans, war plans, and no substitutes. Admiral Radford said 'Fifty-fifty".

---

[2] See Document 219.

After a few further exchanges in this light vein, the President said to Bulganin and Khrushchev that he wanted to make it very clear that while he could joke with them about this matter, he was very serious about it and his proposal had been a most serious one.[3]

Bulganin replied that they knew his proposal had been serious.

After some further conversation about the overflight proposal, Khrushchev interjected that anything along those lines must be accompanied by real disarmament measures. Khrushchev then added in a joking manner that sometimes someone would make a very far-reaching proposition expecting that the other person would not accept it; then if the other person were to accept it, the individual who proposed it would hardly know what to do.

The President quickly asked, "Do you want to try me?"

Khrushchev replied that he had not been thinking of the President and his proposal specifically. Zhukov interjected at this point that Khrushchev was referring to the Soviet disarmament proposals and hoped that the President would agree with them.

The President replied that he did agree with some of them, but that his own proposal should be put on top of them.

The President said that he wanted to get to the heart of the matter and that what he was really talking about was that if both sides could work toward producing a feeling of good will then it would be much easier to arrive at solutions to the really pressing problems. Both Bulganin and Khrushchev agreed. They then reverted to the suggestion that a good way to start would be for the Soviet Union and the US to exchange visits of military delegations. The President, looking at Admiral Radford and Mr. Anderson who were standing near him, said that this might be a way to begin.

---

[3] For text of President Eisenhower's "Open Skies" proposal, see Document 221.

---

238. Telegram From the Delegation at Geneva to the Department of State[1]

Geneva, July 22, 1955—noon.

Secto 69. Foreign Ministers reconvened at 6:18 p.m., Secretary presiding.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/7–2255. Secret; Priority. Repeated to London, Paris, Moscow, and Bonn. The U.S. Delegation verbatim record, USDEL/Verb/M–6, July 22, and the record of decisions, CF/DOC/RD/10, July 23, are *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 509.

Secretary called on Molotov to speak to question of participation other governments on Germany. Molotov said position unchanged. Macmillan suggested amendment in wording that might meet thoughts of all: "Foreign Ministers will make whatever arrangements they may consider desirable for consultation with other interested parties".

Molotov said must recognize existence of two Germanies both of which interested in German problem.

Secretary said Soviet proposal[2] gave other governments a right of participation which is perhaps ill-defined. Could interpret Soviet proposal to say that German representatives would have right to participate at all times and no decisions could be taken without concurrence of both of them. On other hand, we have no desire ignore representatives of both parts of Germany. Secretary hoped Soviets would accept Macmillan proposal subject to minor amendment: "Participation of or consultation with other interested parties".

Macmillan and Pinay accepted amendment. Molotov said might be possible accept such amendment and then went on to propose one of his own: "Ministers will examine this question with participation in conference for purpose of consultation of representatives GDR, etc."

Pinay said Molotov last proposal less acceptable than former one as it implied must have representatives two Germanies at table every point.

Macmillan said proposed text recognized responsibility of four powers for doing work on Germany, that certainly some consultation with a group or groups of Germans desirable, but four Ministers should remain masters of our own procedure.

Molotov said Austrian problem had been solved with Austria, and it might improve work on Germany if done in consultation with Germans.

Pinay said he would agree to consult Germans on Austrian basis, but we must first turn Germany into a state, having representative government following elections.

Secretary suggested this topic be dropped for time being and considered further early in morning. Secretary reviewed status of Soviet proposal and Macmillan proposal, Macmillan adding that his proposal could be added to paragraphs 1, 2 or 3.

Secretary referred to draft directive on disarmament proposed by three Western powers and compared it with Soviet text.[3] After noting opening similarities, remarked that Soviets had particularly referred to prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons. Said US had no objection to specific reference to atomic and hydrogen weapons where we speak of armaments and armed forces, but not possible for us to accept principle of prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons in view of fact recognized by Soviets in May 10 statement[4] that it is not possible to have checks or controls ensuring fact that atomic and hydrogen weapons may be used. Reference to armaments and armed forces including atomic and hydrogen weapons would leave situation, as in case of other weapons, where they would be subject to effective international controls and inspection.

---

[2] Under reference here is Molotov's proposal at the fifth Foreign Ministers meeting earlier in the day, see Document 235.

[3] For text of the Western proposal on disarmament, see footnote 4, Document 232; for text of the Soviet proposal on disarmament, see Document 235.

Macmillan expressed preference for original draft three Western powers.

Molotov said it was impossible to remember precise text of Soviet May 10 statement but it should not be difficult to find therein provisions on prohibition atomic and hydrogen weapons. There is no contradiction between present Soviet proposal and May 10 draft. Said system of disarmament must cover all kinds of armaments. If disarmament sub-committee is dealing with atomic weapons as well as conventional ones it would not be proper to have no mention of principle of prohibition of atomic weapons. Therefore should refer to need for definite levels conventional armaments and also to prohibition atomic and hydrogen weapons with institution of effective internal controls.

Secretary said that if substantive questions gone into, Ministers would get nowhere. We can accept general proposition of desirability of system of control and reduction of armaments including all armaments. Secretary then quoted precisely from part of Soviet May 10 statement on ability of nations to accumulate incontravention agreements large quantities of atomic explosives. In view thereof, could not agree to statement on matter thus shown to be impossible.

Macmillan suggested that Ministers should turn attention to specific terms of reference and then fill in preamble. Secretary agreed. Secretary said first difference is whether Foreign Ministers should try to agree, or whether conference should agree on point of view to be presented to UN. Western draft attempted to carry out what we thought was instruction of the Heads of Government, Bulganin having asked if it might be advisable to draft agreed recommendations to UN. Secretary pointed out sub-committee meetings August 29, then GA will meet and if Foreign Ministers do not meet until October and then are faced with heavy schedule, they would not be able to get forward with what is a very urgent task if new procedure, contrary to one agreed by Heads of Government were followed.

---

[4] For text of the Soviet disarmament proposal of May 10, 1955, see *Documents* (R.I.I.A.) for 1955, pp. 110–121.

Secretary reviewed points on which agreement reached. Molotov said would be embarrassing if only decision on disarmament would be to have sub-committee meet August 29. Macmillan said Molotov overlooked paragraph 2 (a) which asked representatives take account in their work of views and proposals advanced by Heads of Government in this conference. After referring to President's and Bulganin's statements of yesterday,[5] he supported Secretary's position with respect to atomic and hydrogen weapons and urged sub-committee be asked to study control problem particularly inspection, reporting and publicity. Subparagraphs (a), (b) and (c) could thus record work of Heads of Government, make a proposal useful in light of Soviet declaration of May 10 and provide practical piece of work to further function of sub-committee. Molotov said this conference could not instruct sub-committee, as only UN had authority to do so. Secretary said perfectly clear from English text that we propose to instruct our own representatives, not instruct sub-committee. To meet Molotov's point, he suggested deletion of "to give priority in its work" so clause would read "to request sub-committee to study as a matter of urgency the methods of instituting effective controls". Pinay and Macmillan agreed, but Molotov continued proposed deletion paragraph (d).

Secretary asked if Soviets would agree to referring matter to UN sub-committee rather than to Foreign Ministers. Molotov said subject discussed by Heads of Government were proper for further consideration by Foreign Ministers, including disarmament. Meanwhile results from work of sub-committee might be expected, as they could start before Foreign Ministers. Said Soviets had accepted Western proposals on security and hoped we could accept Soviet proposals here.

Secretary said referring disarmament to Foreign Ministers would not give matter prompt attention called for by its urgent nature. Pointed out President had designated representative of Cabinet rank to deal with disarmament, to give detailed consideration necessary, Secretary of State, though giving close cooperation and broad policy guidance had too many other duties. UN sub-committee fully familiar with work and could carry it ahead.

Pinay suggested sub-committee meeting August 29 be postponed. Secretary said this was logical but he hated to reopen only point in agreement. Pinay said matter should go to Heads of Government. Secretary then read points on which there were apparent agreement. Molotov pointed out Soviet proposals not included and remained to be discussed. Secretary then suggested discussing Western paragraph (b) on effective international control including inspection, reporting and publicity. Molotov position remained unchanged.

---

[5] See Document 221.

Secretary suggested short adjournment. Molotov pointed out Russians had invited British to dinner at eight o'clock, and suggested adjournment to 10 p.m.[6] Molotov suggested might meet early in morning as alternative, but then said postponing work until tomorrow might cause delay and noted President planning to leave early in afternoon and therefore might not be able to finish. Secretary proposed meeting at 10:30 p.m., but if mood is bad quick recess should follow until tomorrow morning.

Meeting recessed 8:10 p.m.

---

[6] For Eden's account of the dinner with the Soviet Delegation, see *Full Circle*, pp. 340–342; that part of the dinner conversation regarding Indochina is also summarized in telegram 293 to Saigon, July 26; see vol. I, p. 497.

---

239. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Department of State[1]

Geneva, July 23, 1955—9 a.m.

Dulte 31. Eyes only Acting Secretary from Secretary. I dictated this en route to 10:30 p.m. meeting July 22 of Foreign Ministers.[2] During the morning, we made fairly good progress in agreeing on terms of reference to October meeting Foreign Ministers in relation to unification of Germany and European security.[3] However, Soviets held out on two points: namely, (1) European security must be given priority over German unification and (2) there must be instructions to have participation by Federal Republic of Germany and German Democratic Republic.

We are resisting both propositions either of which would be very bad for Adenauer.

We then took up subject of disarmament and made very little progress—the Soviets (1) insisting on acceptance of principle of total prohibition of atomic weapons, (2) refusing our proposal that the UN subcommittee on disarmament should give priority or special urgency to methods of inspection and (3) insisting that the Heads of Government mandate should run not to UN representatives but to the Foreign Ministers. (The apparent purpose of this was to give the Foreign

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/7–2355. Secret; Priority.

[2] See *infra*.

[3] See Document 232.

Ministers another task which would preoccupy them and prevent consideration of German unification and also to hamper our dealing with our UN disarmament representatives except through proven machinery.)

It is normal that we should have a crisis at this stage of such a conference, and I believe that if we hold firm, we shall in the end get most of what we want, although probably not a direct priority for inspection as this involves a substantive decision of major significance which we could hardly hold out for at a conference not designed to take substantive decisions.

All the foregoing were matters dealt with by Foreign Ministers with a brief interlude for the Heads of Government to discuss the fourth item on the agenda, namely, better communications between East and West. Here, after statements by the President and Premier Faure, the other two agreed to submit their statements for the record without reading them so as to give more time to the Foreign Ministers.[4]

P.S. The 10:30 meeting merely confirmed the differences and identified them for reference to Heads of Government Saturday.

Dulles

---

[4] See *supra*.

---

240. Telegram From the Delegation at the Geneva Conference to the Department of State[1]

Geneva, July 23, 1955—5 a.m.

Secto 68. No progress made resumption Foreign Ministers meeting 10:30 p.m.

Secretary again summarized outstanding issues in following terms:

"There is, first, the question of the order in which we specify the subject of Germany and the subject of European security. Secondly, there is the question as to whether, in dealing with the matter of German unity we make a specific reference to participation by the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic, or whether we leave that to be covered by general language whereby the Foreign Ministers are authorized to organize their work with appropriate participation by other interested countries. In relation to disarmament, there is a question as to whether in the preamble there should be a specific reference to prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons. There is a question whether the disarmament task should be referred to the Foreign Ministers, or whether it should be referred directly to our representatives in the United Nations. And there is a question whether we should request the Disarmament Subcommittee to give priority of a special urgency to problems of inspection."

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/7–2355. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Beam. Repeated to London, Moscow, Paris, and Bonn. The U.S. Delegation verbatim record of this session, USDEL/Verb/M–7, July 22, is *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 509.

Pinay and Macmillan agreed and Molotov had nothing to add previous statements. Secretary argued for concurrent consideration German reunification and European security and against interposition Foreign Ministers as additional body between four governments and their reps in the UN. In reply Secretary's query why Soviets felt disarmament should be handled by Foreign Ministers rather than by UN Molotov said he was not opposing Foreign Ministers against UN but former ought continue deal with disarmament which had been discussed by Heads of Government. Macmillan supported Secretary's analysis.

There being no other speakers Secretary suggested reference outstanding points Heads of Government meeting Saturday 11:00 a.m.

---

241. Intelligence Briefing Note by the Estimates Staff Officer, Central Intelligence Agency (Cline)[1]

Geneva, July 22, 1955.

Soviet Views on Geneva Conference Developments

A reliable source reports the following Soviet views on Geneva Conference developments as expressed by Yuri Zhukov, assistant editor of *Pravda:*

1. Eisenhower's performance at the conference has been the subject of much comment in the Soviet delegation. Originally Yuri Zhukov thought that his conciliatory manner was nothing but propaganda but after all he has heard and read this week he admits that Eisenhower has impressed him as a man who does not give his word unless he means to keep it. Marshal Zhukov had said this was the case and always had been with Eisenhower. The Soviet delegation generally now believes Eisenhower is a very forceful and sincere man even though they disagree with him on many points.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 519. Top Secret.

2. The Russians feel they should not lose the opportunity created by the "friendship and conciliation" shown in Geneva this week by the US and the USSR, and the USSR will try to give some "evidences" of their good will.

3. With respect to Eisenhower's proposal to permit mutual free inspection, including overflights, as part of a disarmament plan, Yuri Zhukov said that the Russians had expected Eisenhower might pull a rabbit out of the hat but had been amazed when he pulled a "lion" out. Yuri Zhukov observed that he himself was an experienced propaganda expert and could appreciate highly dramatic propaganda maneuvers of this kind. He felt, however, from Eisenhower's performance all week that there was more than just propaganda in it.

4. The idea of a bridge between Marshal Zhukov and Eisenhower is in the best interests of both our countries no matter what differences occur in the course of negotiations. Marshal Zhukov would like to visit the United States but "could not go unaccompanied". Khrushchev would like to go along since he is a man of "infinite curiosity".

5. The USSR does not intend to press discussion of Far Eastern issues at this conference because the Russians do not want to embarrass Eisenhower. They feel this meeting has been a "great impetus for a détente". The USSR would, if it is necessary, be interested in holding another meeting of chiefs of government after the work of the foreign ministers and committees is finished. About this time next year would be a good time.

6. The conference is making satisfactory progress. "A bird does not build its nest in a day".

July 23, 1955

242. Editorial Note

At 7:30 a.m., Secretary Dulles had breakfast with President Eisenhower at the latter's villa. The Secretary then met with Merchant, Bowie, MacArthur, and Phleger at his villa, while the President entertained Marshal Zhukov at the Chateau. At 10:30 a.m., the President went to the Palais des Nations for a meeting with Eden and Faure and the three Foreign Ministers to consider Western strategy for the forthcoming restricted session of the conference. No records of any of these meetings, except that between the President and Marshal Zhukov, have been found in Department of State files or at the Eisenhower Library, although all appear as entries in the President's appointments for July 23 (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File) or in Merchant's *Recollections,* page 48, or in Ann Whitman's Diary of the conference (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, page 14). A memorandum of the President's conversation with Zhukov is *infra*.

243. Memorandum of a Conversation at the President's Villa, Geneva, July 23, 1955, 9:30 a.m.[1]

PARTICIPANTS

The President	Marshal Zhukov
Ambassador Bohlen	Mr. Troyanovsky

After greeting Marshal Zhukov, the President showed him into the library. Marshal Zhukov remarked that it appeared as though their work were coming to an end. The President replied that he hoped it would not be an end, but a beginning. Zhukov said he agreed completely with that and regretted that it had taken so long to establish personal contact between the Soviet and American leaders, with which the President agreed. Marshal Zhukov continued that if the Soviet leaders would ever have a chance to visit the United States, he thought this would be of great help in overcoming future difficulties. The President said everyone was so busy these days that it was hard to take time off, but he agreed that sooner or later something of that nature might be possible. Zhukov then said the President must have observed the respect and good feelings that Khrushchev and Bulganin and the rest entertained for the President. This was also an expression of their feeling for the American people, since they looked upon the President as the representative of the people of the United States.

The President replied that he had enjoyed meeting the Soviet leaders but hoped they would find something in this Conference which would encourage the people of the world. On the personal side, he felt that anyway the meeting had been worthwhile, and he was highly pleased with his contact with the Soviet leaders, which he felt would be helpful for future relationships between our two countries, and that he would do his best to promote just such a relationship. He said he wished to tell the Marshal, however, that that being said, he was disappointed in the course of the negotiations themselves. The Soviet Delegation had introduced a resolution in regard to an over-all security pact, which he initially had not wished to accept, feeling that it was cumbersome, complicated, and with so many countries involved would take a very long time to work out. However, his Delegation had urged him to accept it and he had done so. He stood by this decision, and they would work loyally with other Delegations to see if anything could be done in that field. However, after our having accepted this Soviet proposition, Mr. Molotov then had refused to accept the directive to the Foreign Ministers listing the subjects in the order they had been discussed by the Heads of Government. He said if they could not agree on this order, and place German unification at the head of the list, which corresponded to the order of discussion here, it was doubtful if they could get a directive to the Foreign Ministers. He said he realized that his old friend was not responsible for the actions of the Delegations here in every respect, but he wished to point out that in his country there were many people of German descent—in fact, he was, himself—who felt strongly on the question of German unification and that therefore to put it down at the bottom of the list for consideration would be very badly received by the America people. He said he had no desire to see hard feeling or bitterness develop between the two parts of Germany—that he thought the Foreign Ministers should try to work out something on this subject. The President then added that he was speaking of the acceptance for consideration by the Foreign Ministers of the various proposals which had been submitted here.

---

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers. Top Secret. Drafted by Bohlen. Attached to the source text was a note of transmission from Bohlen to the President, dated July 23.

Marshal Zhukov replied that big events are not dealt with in a hurry. He said he thought in general, in any case, that the meeting had been useful, and the President interrupted to agree. Even if they did not come to an agreement on points of common interest, he felt that the relations between the two countries would improve and then these problems might be more easily solved step-by-step in the future. The President said he agreed and had not meant to imply in any way that the meeting had been in vain. He thought our relations would be better in the future, but he had hoped to tell the American people on his return that something had been started on questions of substance. He would however, in any case, tell the American people of his impression that relations would be better in the future. Zhukov said he agreed with the President and that the Soviet people also expected some positive results and would be much distressed if nothing positive came out of the meeting. He felt the remaining time should be used in an attempt to bring our respective positions closer together. If nothing emerged from the meeting of a positive nature, not only the Soviet but also the American, British, and French people would not be satisfied with the work of their leaders.

As to the question of order, he said he thought the President's formulation was not right. The chief problem from the Soviet point of view was that of security, which was of worldwide interest. In fact, it meant whether developments would lead to peace or war. The German question was very important, and a question of principle, but it was still a special problem not comparable in his view with the great issues of war or peace. He said that speaking frankly, if there were no Paris Agreements and West Germany in NATO, with Eastern Germany in the Warsaw Pact it would have been easier to have agreed on Germany, and that these developments had greatly complicated the question. What was needed was time and the establishment of a European security system within the framework of which it would be easier to move toward a solution of the German question. He added that the entire Soviet people supported this point of view and it would be impossible for the Soviet Delegation, because of this fact, to recede from their position on this point. He said that as a friend and in the name of great interests, he hoped that the President would do everything to find a compromise, not only because of the feelings of the Soviet people but in the name of the friendship between our countries.

The President said he thought that every effort should be made to try to find a way to reconcile their positions, but that we felt just as strongly as they did on this matter and it would be a great pity if the Conference ended with only the hope for friendlier relations. This, in his opinion, was not enough. It had been generally agreed that the Foreign Ministers would meet in October and they should be told what they were to discuss. He repeated that the first point discussed here at Geneva was German reunification, and that therefore he felt this belonged in a similar place on the Foreign Ministers' agenda. He said, however, that he would try to find some way to resolve this difficulty and assumed that the Soviet Delegation would also make every effort to get the joint directive. He said that in any case he felt the contacts had been useful and that all members of his Delegation had told him that they had enjoyed meeting and liked Bulganin and Khrushchev, and he felt that after this meeting they would be better able to tackle their mutual problems in the future. He said possibly the fact that he and the Marshal had had these meetings might in itself be helpful. Marshal Zhukov said he agreed with the President but felt that up to the very final moment of the Conference every effort must be made to find a compromise, and he hoped the President and his colleagues would show wisdom and would reconcile the different points of view. If this could be done, everyone would breathe a sigh of relief. Otherwise, they would leave here in a somewhat somber mood. He said that speaking personally, since he had not discussed this with his colleagues, might it not be possible to deal with these questions separately, leaving for later the determination of their order on the agenda. He said the problems were important in themselves, in substance, that is, and could not they deal with them here without subordinating one to the other. He added he was not a diplomat, but was speaking frankly as a soldier to an old friend. The President replied that his experience in political life had not been long, but he would certainly give serious thought, as would his colleagues, to an endeavor to come up with something which might regulate the differences. He wished to assure the Marshal that our position was not taken lightly and in order to create difficulties, but was very deeply felt, just as we recognized that the Soviet position was likewise based on serious considerations.

Marshal Zhukov then said that in regard to Disarmament, would it not be possible to send that item both to the United Nations Disarmament Commission and also the Foreign Ministers' meeting. Their experience had been that frequently if a question got into a committee or sub-committee it tended to minimize its importance. The President said that on the contrary, he thought to send it to the Commission and then to the Foreign Ministers would emphasize its importance. Zhukov remarked that if a question is of great political importance it should go to a high political level, and he felt on this point a possible compromise was to send it to both. The President said he would consider this point and would discuss it with his colleagues. Zhukov remarked smilingly that the two of them seemed to be on their way to a decision. The President said, in a similar vein, that he and Marshal Zhukov had never had much trouble in agreeing. Zhukov said he thought they should help in every way they could to resolve the difficulties. The President agreed and said he was extremely pleased at the Marshal's courtesy in paying him a farewell visit and that he felt their visits were helpful.

The President said he had one more point to raise before the conclusion of the interview, though he felt sure the Marshal was as busy as he was. He said he was convinced the Soviet Government wants peace just as we do, and did not wish to have any wars, big or little. He said that among the problems were those of divided countries—that they had been able to settle Austria, the fighting had been ended in Korea and Indochina, and there were hopes for some progress on the German question. There was also the problem of a divided China, and in regard to that he wished to ask only that the Soviet Government should use its influence with the Chinese in order to persuade them that problems should not be settled by fighting. These problems take time and might be long in settling, but since we had settled Austria, Korea, and Indochina, it was important that the Chinese not do something which all would subsequently regret. He said he did not suggest that the Soviet Government was responsible, but was merely asking it to use its good offices to that end. Zhukov said he agreed and held similar views. He said insofar as he was aware the Chinese had no intention to have recourse to armed force. They had been waiting patiently for settlement of these matters and if some hope could be given them there was no doubt that they would continue to wait with patience. He felt that the initiation of direct conversations between the United States and China, possibly at first on minor matters and then later on larger questions, would give such hope. The President said we were not averse to such talks but that the Marshal should understand that the United States was very angry at the fact that the Chinese were still holding soldiers from the Korean war prisoner, but that he did not reject the idea that there might be some hope in negotiation.

Zhukov then said he had noticed in the President's statement on Disarmament that he had given no reaction to the Soviet proposals of May 10 involving a level of forces, inspection, and the abolition of nuclear weapons.[2] He would like to hear from his old friend the reaction to those proposals. The President said there were other countries involved and he had not had time to consult them and felt that it was a matter for study by Foreign Ministers or a commission of experts. In the present circumstances he felt it better to withhold comment. There was, however, one point he could mention and that was that he had noticed that in both his statement and the Soviet statement of May 10 there seemed to be agreement that there was no sure way to inspect or control stockpiling of atomic weapons. Therefore, he felt it was a mistake to jump to any hasty conclusions in the light of that situation. It required study. He did not exclude the examination of any proposal, and the Marshal could be sure that any proposal from the Soviet Government would be given the most careful study.

The President again thanked the Marshal for his visit, who replied that he considered it an honor to be received by the President. The President then sent his best wishes to the Marshal's family and the Marshal asked the President to send his greeting to Mrs. Eisenhower and the President's grand-children.[3]

---

[2] For text of the President's statement on disarmament, see Document 221; for text of the Soviet disarmament proposals of May 10, see *Documents* (R.I.I.A.) for 1955, pp. 110–121.

[3] John Eisenhower noted in his diary (p. 29) that this meeting was held "in the hopes of getting agreement on something concrete that afternoon." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File)

244. Letter From Prime Minister Eden to President Eisenhower[1]

Geneva, July 23, 1955.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Following our conversation about tanks for Iraq,[2] I write to let you know that the United Kingdom Government would be prepared to play their part in providing these, and would accept an expenditure of half a million pounds. As a Centurion with spares costs about 50,000 pounds, this would produce ten tanks.

Iraq requires about eighty Centurions. The gift of ten tanks by the United Kingdom would be complementary to the supply of the remaining seventy by the United States under off-shore purchases.

I agree with you that it is important the shipment of the tanks should begin at the earliest possible moment, and I am giving the necessary instructions so that we can get moving the moment we get the all clear from you.

Yours ever

Anthony[3]

---

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, White House Office, Project "Clean Up".

[2] See Document 199.

[3] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

---

245. Delegation Record of the First Part of the Seventh (Restricted) Plenary Session of the Geneva Conference, Geneva, July 23, 1955, 11:03 a.m.[1]

PRESENT

France
M. Faure, Chairman
M. Pinay
M. Joxe
M. de Margerie
(M. Andronokov, interpreter)

USA
President Eisenhower
Mr. Dulles

UK
Sir A. Eden
Mr. Macmillan

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 510. Secret. Although no verbatim record was made of this session, this account is a composite, prepared by Merchant, of three sets of notes taken by himself, Phleger, and Peter Wilkinson during the session. A notation on the source text reads: "Approved by the Secretary as the only complete and correct record of the meeting." For the records of the restricted Foreign Ministers meeting and the second part of this plenary, which are all part of a 26-page text, see *infra* and Document 247.

Mr. Merchant	Sir N. Brook
Mr. Phleger	Sir I. Kirkpatrick
	(Mr. Balacheff, interpreter)

USSR
Mr. Bulganin
Mr. Khrushchev
Mr. Molotov
Marshal Zhukov
(Mr. Troyanovsky, interpreter)

Mr. Wilkinson, Secretary General of the Conference

Faure (in the Chair) opened the meeting with the statement that there were five items still outstanding:

(1) The order in which the several items would be taken up at the meeting of Foreign Ministers;

(2) The question of possible consultation with representatives of the German Federal Republic and the German Democratic Republic at the meeting of Foreign Ministers;

(3) The question whether the section of the directive dealing with disarmament should mention prohibition of atomic and thermonuclear weapons (as the Soviets proposed);

(4) Whether the matters concerning disarmament should be referred to the Disarmament Subcommittee of the United Nations or be first considered by the four Foreign Ministers;

(5) The Soviet Proposal to delete that part of the draft directive on disarmament (2–b) concerning the priority to be given to the question of international control, inspection, and publicity.[2]

Last, Faure noted that no draft directive had yet been prepared on the question of improving East-West contacts (item number 4 on the Conference agenda). He asked whether all were agreed on this list. (All agreed.) Faure then proposed that discussion should begin with the question of the order in which the items would be taken up by the meeting of Foreign Ministers. He noted that the order proposed by the United Kingdom, the United States, and France was: (1) German reunification, (2) European security, (3) Disarmament. Whereas the order proposed by the Soviet delegation was: (1) European security, (2) Disarmament, (3) the German problem.

Eden said that the order proposed by the three Western Powers was that which, by agreement, had been followed in this conference. It therefore seemed natural to place the subject in the same order in the directive to the Foreign Ministers. He recalled that Mr. Macmillan had said last night that this did not exclude parallel study of the questions referred to the Foreign Ministers, nor simultaneous fulfillment of these matters, for example, of European security and German reunification.[3]

---

[2] For text of the Western proposal on disarmament, see footnote 4, Document 232.

[3] See Documents 238 and 240.

Bulganin said that he would like Molotov to speak on item one.

Molotov said that it was true that yesterday they had discussed the five outstanding questions and that the first was the question of the order in which the subjects were to be considered by the Foreign Ministers conference. The discussion showed that they were not in complete agreement on the order. The reason for this was that the Soviet Delegation believed that these matters should be discussed in the order of their importance and public interest. This meant that European security should come first, for it was the most urgent for all European people. The importance of the question of European security was emphasized by the fact that the Soviet Delegation had made at least two new proposals, rather three, and that the other Delegations also had made proposals, such as the Five-Power Security Pact proposed by Eden. The Soviet Delegation suggested that Disarmament be listed as the second item. Its importance was stressed by the number of statements made on this subject by the four Heads of Government at this conference. Finally would come the German problem. Its importance was recognized by the Soviet Government, which was in favor of having it discussed by the Foreign Ministers. Finally, with regard to the order of discussion proposed by the Chairman, the Soviet Delegation was of opinion that there should be a general exchange of views on all the differences in order that they might see where they stand and explore the possibilities of compromise.

Eisenhower said that in general the United States position had been already stated by Sir Anthony Eden. It happened that we agreed and he would not repeat it. He would like, however, to make a few personal observations. He had been impressed by the comradely and friendly spirit which had characterized these talks, and by the new friends he had made and the opportunity to talk with them here. He hoped that these opportunities would be enlarged in the future, for this was the spirit which must underlie all fruitful negotiations in the international field. It would be a pity if this spirit, which he had felt developing, could not be evidenced and proved to the world by real accomplishments. It would be impossible to do this unless the four Heads of Government could provide some directive to their Foreign Ministers. Since no one could have his full way, could there not be found some common meeting-ground on which we all might agree? It had been suggested that the items be dealt with in the order of their importance. This was a relative matter. It differs for different countries. The suggestion to include the topic of European security on the agenda of this conference, for example, had been accepted by him only after strong urging by others in his own delegation, since he considered it outside the scope of this conference. However, he had accepted it. In the United States the German question was of such importance that if the public read in their newspapers that the order had now suddenly been reversed, it would be difficult to give a plausible explanation which would be approved by the people. For the third time at this Conference he would like to refer to Mr. Bulganin's speech of July 15, in which Mr. Bulganin had said that we must find at this meeting machinery by which the solution of these problems can be furthered. Consequently his proposal was simple. It was that they should take up the questions in the order suggested by the Chairman, and that they should direct the Foreign Ministers to set up machinery for dealing with them simultaneously. These questions could be dealt with simultaneously because they were all interconnected, and by this means questions of priority, timing, and relative importance could be eliminated.

Faure said that after this first round he believed agreement could be reached on the solution proposed by the President, namely to give directives to the Foreign Ministers to set up machinery for dealing with the several questions at the same time.

Eden said he had nothing to add for the moment.

Bulganin said that the Soviet Delegation continued to proceed from the fact that European security and disarmament were the principal problems, and unless they were settled no progress could be made toward peace for the world or for Europe. Even if it were possible to settle the German question, as the Soviet Delegation desired, this would not assure European security. Therefore European security should be settled first. The Soviet Delegation maintained its position, firmly believing it to be right, that this question should be dealt with first. Suppose the German question were settled in the manner and way desired, two sides would remain in Europe: the NATO group and the Warsaw group. In so doing we should still not have arrived at a final settlement. Germany is only a part of the general European problem. The Soviet Delegation was therefore in favor of settling first the general questions of European security and disarmament, and then proceeding to the German problem.

Eisenhower said that in his previous comments he proposed what he had hoped would provide a common meeting ground. Since this had not been acceptable, he had nothing further to say. He saw no point in pursuing the subject further.

Faure said that he wondered whether some misunderstanding did not exist with regard to a practical fact. If they could agree on a practical procedure, he believed they should be able to agree on a text. The Heads of Government were going to draft directives for the Foreign Ministers about complicated and important questions. He would not debate with M. Molotov about their relative importance. In view of the scope of the problem it might well be said that disarmament as a world problem was more important than European security. He would not argue the matter. All were extremely important. He thought it reasonable that the Foreign Ministers should consider these questions concurrently, according to the wise proposal of President Eisenhower. He liked the President's suggestion that the Foreign Ministers should not wait to tackle the second item until they had finished the first. Therefore was it agreed on this practical approach, that the Foreign Ministers should not be required to finish one question before moving on to the next, as they had done at this conference? Or on the other hand, was any one of opinion that the last question could only be taken up after the earlier ones had been solved?

Eden said that he entirely agreed with the Chairman's definition of their position. First, they believed that there could be no security for Europe without German unification. Equally, when Germany was united it would be necessary to have a plan of European security. These matters had to be discussed together, decided together, and come into force together. Disarmament was important, but was not in the same category as the other two questions. He said this because a solution of the disarmament problem could not be reached at this table. It was a world problem. He would not wish to say that nothing was possible with respect to German reunification and European security until world agreement had been reached on disarmament. This did not exclude the Foreign Ministers discussing these three things together, as the Chairman had suggested. He could recall reasons why he would not wish an order written down here which would exclude simultaneous discussion of these topics. At Potsdam a list was agreed in which the Italian Peace Treaty came before the Austrian Treaty. When they wanted to discuss the Austrian Treaty, for two years they were told that the Austrian Treaty could not be discussed because they had not yet completed the Italian Treaty. He did not wish to be placed in that position again.

Faure said that he would like to ask again whether it was agreed that the Foreign Ministers were not required to complete one item before going on to another. He noted that Eden had replied in the affirmative. He would like to address the same question to Marshal Bulganin.

Bulganin said that he wished to reply to Sir Anthony Eden, who had said that there could be no European security without the unification of Germany. That was important, for it appeared to mean that German unification had to be completed before European security was dealt with.

Eden said: "I'm sorry. You misunderstood my position. I did not say that German unification had to be completed before European security was dealt with. I said that they should be completed together or at the same time."

Bulganin said that since united Germany would no doubt be in NATO, it would strengthen one side. How could this contribute to European security? He had his doubts on this score. In practice a simultaneous settlement of the two problems was impossible. Some order of priority would emerge. If Germany were united and in NATO, would this allay the fears of the European people and help European security? It would increase the power of NATO and would bring up the question of strengthening the Warsaw group. In any case, they had to find a procedure to facilitate the task of the Foreign Ministers. He thought that any attempt to suggest simultaneous discussion would only affect the form and could not change the substance of the matter. The difficulty would still remain. There were two different approaches to this problem. He therefore associated himself with President Eisenhower and suggested that they pass on to the next subject.

Faure said (addressing himself to Bulganin) that in his role as Chairman, not as Head of the French Delegation, he would like to establish an area of agreement, and therefore wished to clarify one thing: did Marshal Bulganin agree with the UK and US answers to the Chairman's question or did he not? That is, did he agree that the Foreign Ministers would not have to finish one subject before proceeding to another, or did he believe that they must first settle one before they went on to the next?

Bulganin said that he believed he had stated the Soviet position clearly.

Eisenhower said that although he had indicated that he had nothing further to say, he would like to make one thing clear. He had assumed that neither question could be solved without the other. The unification of Germany would contribute to stability in Europe just as stability in Europe would make a difference in unifying Germany. This seemed to the US Delegation clear-cut and indisputable. They therefore felt that the study of both problems should be by groups or by any other means that the Foreign Ministers might devise and that these studies should be conducted simultaneously. He had nothing further to say.

Faure said that this was a new proposal by President Eisenhower: that the different questions should be discussed by different groups. Was that the President's thought?

Eisenhower said that that was his original suggestion. Now he thought that the discussion of this item should be dropped, since there appeared to be no reason to believe that a common ground existed. In his opinion the two subjects were related. He had explained again why he thought so, but was not making any new proposal.

Faure asked whether Eden had any comment.

Eden said that he had nothing further to say on the merits at that time, but would like to see where they stood with respect to the texts of the directives. Thanks to the excellent work of the Foreign Ministers, the text relating to European security had been agreed and there appeared to remain only one difference with respect to Germany. It had been agreed that both questions could be discussed. Doubtless neither question could be finally settled without the other. It would be strange indeed if they should break down over the question of order.

Faure asked whether Bulganin had anything to add.

Bulganin said that he would like to make two remarks. The proposal upheld by the Soviet Delegation was not a procedural matter but one of substance for them. As for the suggestion about setting up groups or subcommittees, he thought that these were procedural matters to be determined by the Foreign Ministers. In conclusion, the Soviet Delegation had done all that they could to convince the others of their position, and he was sorry that they had been unable to do so.

Eisenhower said that he would repeat his suggestion that they go on to the next subject. That appeared to be the only thing to do.

Faure asked whether everyone agreed, noting that they did. (All agreed.) He said that the next question was how representatives of the Federal Republic, the German Democratic Republic, and other states should be consulted by the Foreign Ministers. Yesterday it had been suggested that it be left to the Foreign Ministers to make whatever arrangements they considered desirable for the participation and consultation of other interested parties. Was there agreement on that?

Eden said that a formula had been proposed by Mr. Macmillan yesterday. He would ask him to speak.

Macmillan said that his proposal was as follows: "The Foreign Ministers will make whatever arrangements they may consider desirable for the participation of, or for consultation with, other interested parties."

Khrushchev said that the Soviet Delegation agreed with that. The British Foreign Minister had made a good suggestion and it was acceptable.

Faure said that the second question was now settled. They might turn to the third of the five unagreed points, namely the Soviet proposal to introduce a reference to atomic and thermo-nuclear weapons. He would ask Mr. Bulganin to speak to this.[4]

---

[4] At this point (12:25) Mr. Phleger and Mr. Merchant left the room and were replaced by Mr. Stassen and Mr. Robert Anderson. Following the discussion of the three points relating to the directive on disarmament, Mr. Phleger and Mr. Merchant replaced Mr. Stassen and Mr. Anderson (12:40). [Footnote in the source text.]

Bulganin replied that he desired to meet the wishes of the other Delegations and would agree to omit reference to atomic and thermo-nuclear weapons.

Faure said that that appeared to leave only one question of difference: whether it was necessary for the matter to be remitted only to the Disarmament Subcommittee or whether the Foreign Ministers would have to tackle the question of disarmament themselves.

Eden said that it seemed to him that the work would have to be done by the Subcommittee which would meet before the Foreign Ministers. This would not exclude the Foreign Ministers from dealing with the problem.

Bulganin thought that it was possible to agree with Sir Anthony Eden's point of view.

Eisenhower said he agreed that there was no objection to the Foreign Ministers having this matter in their directive, since the Disarmament Subcommittee would continue and the Foreign Ministers would have to take note of its work.

(It was agreed that the United Kingdom Delegation would produce a text.)

Turning to the fifth question, Eisenhower said that the United States Delegation would not be outdone. Since it was the United States proposal that priority should be given to the question of international controls, inspection, reporting and publicity, he would be prepared not to insist on this point. However, he had not changed his views.

Faure said that this disposed of all the questions except one.

Eisenhower enquired whether they were going to discuss the question of increasing contacts between East and West.

Faure said that he would like to suggest a recess for lunch, during which they could each reflect on the still unresolved first question and meet early in the afternoon. Meanwhile the experts could be left to draw up texts reflecting the agreements that had just been reached.

Bulganin said that he would like to make an observation on the first item. He though that they had done so well on items 3, 4 and 5, that he was prepared to put disarmament in the third place and to move Germany up from the bottom to second place. The order would then read (1) European security, (2) Germany, and (3) disarmament.

Faure remarked that this was a new proposal and asked Eden whether he had any comment.

Eden said that this was certainly an improvement, since it brought European security and German unification together, as they were in fact.

Faure: "President Eisenhower?"

Eisenhower said that he agreed with Sir Anthony that this was an improvement, but he could not desert his position that these questions, German reunification and European security, must be dealt with hand in hand.

Faure said that all speakers recognized that there was a link between the two questions. M. Pinay had drafted a text on this point, which, if it were agreeable, he would ask M. Pinay to read out.

(All agreed.)

Pinay said that his suggestion would be to add at the end of the preamble the phrase "taking into account the close link between European security (*the reunification of Germany*?) and the problem of European security." He felt that this addition might be discussed along with the new proposal of Marshal Bulganin, and might lead to agreement.

Bulganin said that unfortunately he had had no chance to study this proposal. Why could they not let the Foreign Ministers look at it in a preliminary fashion, and then the Heads of Government could revert to it after lunch?

Eisenhower asked, at what time?

Faure said that they could reflect on it at lunch. Should they meet early? At 2 o'clock? Was that too soon?

Bulganin asked, who would meet at 2 o'clock?

Faure replied, the Heads of Government.

Eisenhower said that he would be glad to go without lunch if he could get his friends to agree with his point.

Khrushchev said that there was a saying that people became more generous and happy after they had eaten.

Faure remarked that Talleyrand had once said at an historical moment, "One must have one's lunch."

(The Heads of Government recessed at 12:45.)

[Here follows a two-page record of the Foreign Ministers restricted session; see *infra.*]

246. Delegation Record of the Eighth (Restricted) Quadripartite Foreign Ministers Meeting, Geneva, July 23, 1955, 12:50 p.m.[1]

France
M. Pinay
M. Joxe
M. Crouy-Chanel

USA
Mr. Dulles
Mr. Merchant
Mr. Phleger

UK
Mr. Macmillan
Sir I. Kirkpatrick
Mr. Caccia
Mr. Hood

USSR
Mr. Molotov
Mr. Malik
Mr. Zarubin
Mr Vinogradov

Pinay (in the Chair) opened the meeting.

Macmillan said that as he understood it, he was to work out by 2 p.m. the language for the disarmament directive. It would require some care in drafting. He would have it available to distribute later. He was also responsible for producing the text on the German consultation amendment as agreed.

Molotov asked whether they were to discuss M. Pinay's amendment. He said he would like to see a text of it.

Dulles said that there was also a question of who was charged with preparing a text on the fourth agenda item (contacts between East and West).

Pinay asked who it should be.

Macmillan commented that they had not had the pleasure of hearing Marshal Bulganin's speech on this subject. He wondered whether the experts could not draft a text for the directive while the Heads met later.

Pinay observed that it was difficult to consider the Bulganin speech without a translation.

Molotov replied that the UK view was not known either.

Macmillan said that he thought that a translation of Sir Anthony Eden's speech had already been circulated.

Molotov said that he had not seen a text yet and he had heard that there had been a lapse in its translation. They had understood that it would be heard at today's meeting.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 510. Secret. Regarding the drafting of this record, see footnote 1, *supra*. This section, drafted entirely by Merchant, comprises pages 12–13 of the composite record.

Macmillan said that if things went well, they might let the Heads of Government continue their discussion at 5 o'clock in the afternoon. It was up to the Heads of course to decide.

Pinay thought they lacked time. It would not be possible with President Eisenhower leaving.

Macmillan said that if they could reach agreement the Heads of Government could go into the council chambers and complete their speeches. They would all like to have the pleasure of hearing Marshal Bulganin's speech if all went well. There could then be a simple directive written telling the Foreign Ministers in October to take up this subject where the Heads left it off.

Pinay said that he agreed with Macmillan.

Molotov said that he agreed.

Pinay suggested that they adjourn.

(All agreed. Meeting adjourned at 1:10 p.m.)

---

247. Delegation Record of the Second Part of the Seventh (Restricted) Plenary Session of the Geneva Conference, Geneva, July 23, 1955, 2:03 p.m.[1]

At 2:03 p.m. the Heads of Government reconvened with the same advisers as at the morning session.

Faure declared the meeting open, saying that they had all had an opportunity to reflect on the proposal submitted by Bulganin that the directive have the following order: (1) European security, (2) the German problem, (3) Disarmament. In addition, M. Pinay had presented a suggestion that there be added to the preamble the following phrase: "taking account of the close link between the reunification of Germany and the problem of European security." He asked the others for an expression of their views.

Eden said that so far as M. Pinay's amendment was concerned, it was acceptable to him.

Bulganin said that he would like to suggest a small addition to M. Pinay's text. He thought it would be improved if the complete text read "taking into account" etc., as M. Pinay had proposed, with the addition of the words: "and the fact that the successful settlement of each of these problems would serve the interests of consolidating peace."

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 510. Secret. Regarding the drafting of this record, see footnote 1, Document 245. This section comprises pages 14–26 of the composite record.

Eisenhower said that along the lines of the proposal of the Soviet Delegation, the U.S. Delegation had been thinking the matter over at lunch and were of opinion that something might be added to the end of paragraph 3 of the directive as follows: "The Ministers should organize their work so as to insure that the unification of Germany will take place within the framework of European security." He thought that this proposal, together with that by M. Pinay, should make the present order of the agenda acceptable to all Delegations. It was intended to make clear that with the order remaining as it is the two questions were linked. The U.S. Delegation also accepted M. Bulganin's suggested addition to the proposal made by M. Pinay.

Faure asked whether all agreed to the addition proposed by M. Pinay as amended by M. Bulganin. (All agreed) Noting that all agreed, he said that there was next to be considered the U.S. proposal to add a supplement to paragraph 3. The French Delegation agreed.

Eden said that he agreed.

Eisenhower said that he would like to make clear that his proposal had been advanced in an effort to meet the Soviet viewpoint. If they did not want it, he would be quite prepared to withdraw it.

Faure asked Marshal Bulganin what was his decision, noting that the President's proposal had been accepted by the others.

Bulganin said that he would prefer to stick with the text as drafted and not to add the U.S. amendment.

Faure, summing up, said that the American proposal (to add a sentence to paragraph 3) had been rejected, but that the draft as it stood appeared to bring the different views very close together. Now how about the question of order of the two items? They had two views, those of the U.S. and of the USSR. He would like to ask M. Bulganin whether, with the Pinay proposal as amended (by the additional phrase proposed by Bulganin), he could now accept President Eisenhower's suggested order of priority, which accorded with the order of debate at this Conference.

Bulganin said that he would like to have the position clear. The proposal of the U.S. had been Germany first, European security second, then disarmament. The Soviet Delegation had proposed first, European security; second, disarmament; third, Germany. Then the Soviet Delegation had agreed to change their original order so as to make the German problem second and disarmament last.

Faure asked Eden whether he had any comment.

Eden said that the Chairman was addressing him out of order. So far as he was concerned, he could not agree to put anything above German unification. He had tried to put them together, so that unification might be considered parallel with European security. He could not agree to put anything above it.

Faure said that they had reduced the gap. It now appeared to be merely a matter of drafting. The problem of substance had been settled by agreement on the preamble. Could he suggest deleting the numbering 1, 2, 3, etc. so as to make it clearly apparent that there was no subordination?

Eden said that he had nothing to add. Due to the agreement on the preamble the order appeared to be of less importance. He preferred to abide by it, however, because it was the order in which the questions had been discussed here.

Bulganin said that the fact that the figures were suppressed would not change the substance. The Soviet Delegation continued to support its point of view.

Eisenhower said that he did not know what more could be done than to combine the two paragraphs (on Germany and European security) and put "and" in between, making it one long paragraph.

Faure said that this was a valuable suggestion. Could they delete the subtitles and put everything together under the title of "Germany and European security".

Eden said he thought that was a good idea.

Bulganin suggested that perhaps the figures could be suppressed, as the Chairman had proposed, leaving the items in the order of European security, German reunification, and disarmament.

Faure said that that would take care only of the subtitles. They had to start with one sentence. The directive speaks of an "exchange of views" in the preamble and the order proposed by the Soviets would not coincide with the order in which the subjects had been taken up at the Conference.

Khrushchev interposed that that prejudged the substance.

Bulganin said that disagreement remained on this point.

Faure said that the opening statement referred to the "following subjects" which had been discussed. It would be difficult to reverse the order of discussion at Geneva. A different order would prejudge the substance.

Bulganin said that the Soviet Delegation believed that the order was a question of substance, not merely one of procedure. The Soviet Delegation had compromised by putting Germany second, not third. But that this was a question of substance was borne out by the argument here.

Eisenhower said that he agreed it was a question of substance. That is why he had tried to make his position so clear. For this reason he had proposed making the subjects of equal priority rather than putting them into a serial relationship. He thought that this was a fair position.

Faure asked whether he might address himself to Marshal Bulganin. With M. Pinay's amendment, plus Bulganin's own amendment, which was certainly substantive, he thought that they had gone a long way to meet the Soviet position. He thought it was difficult for the Soviet Delegation to ask the others to reverse the order of discussion. It would be unfortunate if they were to indicate disagreement even before they had the Foreign Ministers' meeting. He asked whether Marshal Bulganin saw the present draft clearly. There was the preamble, then paragraph 1 running to the end of the present paragraph 2. Then paragraph 3 became paragraph 2.

Bulganin thought that the Chairman possibly had a way out of the difficulty. They could entitle the paragraph "European security and Germany" and leave the text as it was.

Eisenhower said that he would like to understand that. Did Marshal Bulganin propose that they make the title "European security and Germany" and leave the rest of the text as it was?

Bulganin said that the President's understanding was correct, but that the text would then have to be worded properly.

Faure suggested that they have the text typed out.

Eisenhower asked what Marshal Bulganin meant. It seemed to him that the text needed no change. They would have one paragraph headed "European security and German unification" and leave the text exactly as it was.

Bulganin said that in that case the text would have to be changed to correspond with the title. It would be improper to have the title "European security and the German Problem" and not have the text correspond.

Faure said that both the French and the U.S. Delegations had understood Marshal Bulganin's proposal to be intended as a compromise; that the Soviet idea was to be in the title and the others' idea in the text.

Bulganin said that was a special kind of compromise.

Eden suggested that they retype the text with Bulganin's subtitles and the President's order of text, and including the amendments to the preamble proposed by Pinay and Bulganin. He was not sure that he understood all the amendments that had been added.

Faure proposed that they adjourn for 15 minutes while the text was typed out.

Bulganin said that he thought they would only lose time by adjourning. It should be agreed now that the text should correspond to the title and vice versa. If the title were changed to read "European security and the German Problem," the text should be changed similarly.

Faure said that that was a new exaction and no compromise. If, after the others had accepted the change in the preamble, the Soviet

Delegation retained its demand for the order "European security" and then "the German Problem," the Soviet Delegation would have given no consideration to the others' concession. He would suggest that each Delegation type out the text according to its own views and that they then come back and compare them. Was there any objection? He heard none. Should they adjourn?

Bulganin interposed that the Soviet text had been circulated yesterday.[2] They had agreed as a compromise to move "Disarmament" to the bottom, putting "the German Problem" in second place, and leaving "European security" as the first. They had no other text to suggest. They could agree to suppress the subtitles, leaving a common heading for the two topics with "European security" first, if the text followed that order.

Eisenhower asked whether he might call attention to the fact that the Heads of Government formally made a decision on July 21 as follows:

> "It was agreed: (1) to ask the Foreign Ministers to frame and submit to the Heads of Government a detailed directive to guide the Foreign Ministers in their studies of the reunification of Germany and European security."

That was an agreed decision. He thought that they had gone very far in attempting to meet the Soviet view when they agreed to join the subjects in the title on an equal basis, just as though their priority had never been decided.

Bulganin said that the whole point, in the Soviet Delegation's view, was that the two questions could not be treated on an equal basis.

Faure said, addressing himself to Bulganin, that they had made a great concession in linking European security and Germany together in the title in that order, with the text as it was. He thought that the Soviet Delegation had received substantial satisfaction.

Bulganin said that he saw no great concession in that. It was their view that "European security" should have priority over "the German Problem," therefore if the title was combined, the text should be reversed to conform, putting "European security" first. That was the Soviet position and no other decision was acceptable to them.

Faure suggested that they adjourn for 15 minutes so that they might examine the retyped text.

(All agreed. Meeting adjourned at 3:10 p.m.)

At 3:30 p.m. the meeting resumed.

---

[2] A copy of this text, circulated as CF/DOC/20, July 22, is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 514.

Faure asked whether anyone wished to speak.

Eisenhower said that he had a suggestion to make. In this problem of trying to reconcile the different views of the Soviet Delegation and the U.S., it had occurred to him that just as they had combined the titles, "European security and Germany," so they might combine the text. The full sentence which was now paragraph one (concerning Germany) might be transposed to the end of the first sentence of paragraph two (concerning European security), which began with the phrase "The Ministers are instructed to consider". This would put the paragraph on German reunification down under the items that were to be considered, while giving priority of purpose to the establishment of European security, which is what the Soviet Delegation had emphasized.

(At the suggestion of the Chair there was a brief recess while this proposal was passed informally around the table. At 3:45 p.m. the meeting resumed.)

Faure said, addressing himself to Bulganin, that he would like to repeat President Eisenhower's proposal, if this might bring them nearer to a solution. The parties differed on the order. If they froze their positions there could be no agreement. The Soviet Delegation wished to place European security first while the others wished to place Germany first. The President's suggestion was to place "the German Problem" in the middle of "European Security", like a sandwich. There would be in all one general paragraph and three subparagraphs: first European security, second Germany, third European security again. Possibly the first paragraph was too general.

Eden said that he agreed to this proposal.

Bulganin said that it did not change the substance. He could not accept the proposal.

Faure asked Bulganin whether he could accept the draft if the preamble were strengthened with regard to security, or whether he had any other suggestion.

Bulganin indicated by his hands that there was no change in his position, and Khrushchev said "Nyet".

Faure commented that he would certainly not go down in history as a great chairman of this meeting. He felt at a loss how to proceed. Everyone had a part to play and some compromise was necessary.

Eden said that he now had a copy of the revised text. It showed the addition in the preamble stating the link between European Security and the German problem. He thought that this should be a sufficient safeguard for Marshal Bulganin and would fit everyone's views.

Faure asked Eden to read the text after the preamble.

Eden enquired, including the President's proposal?

Eisenhower said no, that this had been rejected.

Bulganin said that the suggestion of the Soviet Delegation, based on its former concession, was to bring the two subjects under a common heading, but in the order: "European Security", then "the German Problem". That was their second concession. The first had been when they placed Germany ahead of Disarmament. All this seemed logical, and should be acceptable.

Faure asked whether anyone had any new idea.

Eisenhower said that he had none.

Eden said that he would like to suggest an improvement in the draft. Suppose they moved the old first paragraph, originally titled "Germany" and now headed "European Security and Germany", to the end of the preamble, adding a sentence along the lines of "at the same time" to the new second paragraph (the present third paragraph, relating to European security).

Bulganin said that he was unable to agree with Eden's suggestion.

Eisenhower said that he had nothing to add. He might have a suggestion on the next round.

Faure said that he would like to make a new proposal. The United States Delegation and the Soviet Delegation had both made a step along the same road but from different ends. The Soviet Delegation had wanted to have Germany at the end of the list and had now placed it in the middle. The United States had wanted to put Germany at the beginning and were now ready to put it in the middle of the paragraph devoted to European security. Would it not be possible to go further and put the German question after the word "aggressor" in the second paragraph?

Bulganin said that he was sorry, but that would not be acceptable. According to the Soviet Delegation's idea the paragraph on "European Security" should come first. To move the German question into it would be in fact to make it first in the list of subjects to be discussed, because it would be the first thing to be considered under "European Security". The Soviet Delegation felt that the first thing to be discussed was a pact. Wording could not help the dilemma since it was a disagreement in substance.

Eisenhower said that he had an English text of the directive which, he was told, was the Soviet draft prepared during the recess. It put "Germany" after "European Security". He asked whether this was the Soviet draft.

(Eisenhower handed the text to the Soviet Delegation, asking Bulganin please to compare the translation from Russian into English of the key paragraph.)

Wilkinson (Secretary General) said that he was quite sure that it was the English translation of the Soviet text, but he would check.

(Brief recess until 4:15 p.m.)

Eisenhower said that he wished to speak directly from this text, which he understood to be the Soviet draft, but before speaking he wished to confirm that fact.

Bulganin said that he had studied the English text and in the main it corresponded with the Soviet Delegation's desires. There were only certain questions of wording, all minor points.

Eisenhower said that he referred particularly to paragraph 1.

Bulganin: "Quite right."

Eisenhower said that he considered it impossible for the world leaders assembled in Geneva to terminate the conference without results. They could not possibly face the people of the world, hungering for peace, with the fact that they had come to such an impasse on German unification and European security that they had been unable to agree on the draft of a directive for their Foreign Ministers. That was how matters stood. So he was going to accept the Soviet desires with respect to paragraph 1, but in so doing he wished to explain the spirit in which he did it. These directives were words—ideas—not deeds. The true test of these words would come in October when the Foreign Ministers met. Each Delegation around this table had stated many times that it had come here in a new spirit of conciliation and with a determination to ease tensions in the world. In the October meeting those statements of friendship and conciliation and the desire to approach problems in a new spirit would be put to the test. Only history could then tell. It might be the end of the year before they would know whether they had in fact made a real step toward bringing peace to the world, or alternatively had merely repeated the same old dreary exercises. It was his earnest hope and prayer that the record of the October conference would carry forward the spirit they had expressed here. They would see in October whether they could all work cooperatively together toward the ends so eloquently stated in the preamble of this paper (CF/DOC/25).[3] While he was definitely disappointed in certain aspects of this directive, he would do his best to carry it out loyally, and he hoped that his French, United Kingdom, and Soviet colleagues shared this view.

Faure said that, as Head of the French Delegation, he fully associated himself with the President's views and the spirit, expressed in such noble words, in which he had shown them their duty for the future.

Eden said that his Government likewise associated itself with the statement of the President, expressed with so much clarity and conviction. He believed that this document represented the greatest common measure of agreement that could be obtained around this table. It also represented, like so many others, another attempt by the four of them at this table to bring hope to mankind. Everything would depend on its execution. If they could really carry it out in the spirit of the words of the President, they would have no reason to be ashamed of their work.

---

[3] Document 257.

Bulganin said that what the President had just said fully conformed with the desires and intentions of the Soviet Delegation, and he would also like to associate himself with what had just been said by Sir Anthony Eden. The Soviet Government would make every effort to bring into effect the provisions of this document. It would do all it could to put into practice its noble purposes.

Faure said that there remained certain practical questions. First, the experts would have to put the text into proper form and then the Heads of Government would have to agree to it. Was it agreed that one expert from each Delegation should meet and decide on a common text?

(All agreed.)

Eisenhower asked whether the meeting should not also decide on the place where the Foreign Ministers would convene in October.

Faure agreed, recalling that there was also the question of the directive with regard to improvement of contacts between East and West. What place was suggested?

Eden: (Shrugged.)

Bulganin thought that that should be up to the Foreign Ministers. They would be the ones to meet.

Eisenhower proposed Geneva.

(All agreed.)

Faure said that there was then the question of the third directive on East-West contacts. Did Marshal Bulganin wish to make his speech on that subject now?

Bulganin said that he preferred to consider his speech as having been made. He had filed the text.[4]

Faure said that the experts should then draft the directive on "contacts" between East and West. The subject might be left with the speeches of the President and himself and the filed statements of Marshal Bulganin and Sir Anthony Eden.[5]

(Brief recess.)

Eden asked, how about a communiqué?

---

[4] Bulganin's remarks on East-West contacts were circulated as CF/DOC/23, July 23. (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 514)

[5] For the concluding statements of the four Heads of Government, circulated as CF/DOC/24 (Rev. 1), CF/DOC/26, CF/DOC/27, and CF/DOC/28, see *Geneva Conference*, pp. 26–82, or *Cmd.* 9543, pp. 25–29.

Eisenhower proposed that the Head of each Delegation make a short speech in the plenary session, which would be published, and which would thereby permit them to dispense with a communiqué.

Faure asked whether it was agreed that they should publish the Directive and consider everything else completed by the four speeches.

Bulganin said that the Soviet Delegation considered it desirable to have a communiqué. It was necessary to sum up the week and the prospects for the public.

Eisenhower said that his own feeling was that the directives were the best communiqué. At the plenary session each of them could state their hopes. He recommended that they eliminate the agonizing language-negotiation of a communiqué.

Bulganin said that the Soviet Delegation would not insist.

Faure said that they appreciated the generous words of President Eisenhower and the happy conclusion of their work. Should the Heads of Government resume the meeting at 5:30?

(After brief discussion it was agreed to resume at 6:30 p.m.)

Eisenhower said that the Secretary of State had to leave almost immediately for Washington. Mr. Merchant would take his place in any dealings henceforward. The President had a suggestion for the experts who would draw up the directive on contacts between East and West. It was a short paragraph. He did not insist on the exact words, but he thought that the idea was good.

(Eisenhower then read that part of the text as it finally appears, para. 3 of CF/DOC/25.)

Bulganin said that the Soviet Delegation associated itself with that text.

(All agreed.)

(The meeting then adjourned to reconvene at 6:30 p.m.)

248. Memorandum of a Conversation Between Secretary Dulles and the Director of Political Affairs of the Italian Foreign Office (Magistrati), Palais des Nations, Geneva, July 23, 1955[1]

USDEL/MC/27

The Secretary saw Ambassador Magistrati in Geneva on Saturday afternoon, July 23, just before the final Plenary of the Conference of Heads of Governments. Magistrati had been pressing for a talk with the Secretary, in order to impress Italian opinion with the importance of the role which Italy continues to play as a NATO partner in the eyes of the United States. Magistrati had seen the other Foreign Ministers before seeing the Secretary but did not reveal anything of significance in his brief reference to his visit with them.

The Secretary told Magistrati that on the whole he felt real progress had been made in Geneva. The West had not achieved all that it would have liked; but, on the other hand, the West had moved forward without making concessions on any basic principle. He said the problem of German reunification would be considered by the Foreign Ministers in relation to the broader problem of European security. He added that, with regard to disarmament, it had been agreed to refer the matter to the United Nations Subcommittee.

The Secretary said that at all times the United States had kept in mind the importance of the participation and consultation of its NATO allies, wherever possible, in the discussions which would take place. He pointed out that Italy, like other non-member nations, had access to various committees and agencies of the United Nations. The Secretary said that we look forward to the possibility of broadening out the membership and functions of the United Nations Subcommittee on Disarmament so as to give Italy an increased role in these matters. Similarly, the terms of the Foreign Ministers meeting which would be held in October would provide for the participation and consultation of other countries on appropriate issues. The Secretary stressed the importance which the United States attaches to the NATO front remaining fully united and well informed.

Magistrati expressed his belief that the results of the conference seemed a real achievement. He thanked the Secretary, and said he greatly appreciated his having given him this time while he was under such tremendous pressure. He added that he had that afternoon talked with Blankenhorn, who had expressed himself as well satisfied, and reassured that Germany had not been abandoned by the West.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/7–2355. Confidential. Drafted by William Tyler on July 23. A summary of this memorandum was transmitted in Secto 78, at 7 p.m. on July 23. (*Ibid.*)

---

249. Editorial Note

The Eighth and final Plenary Session of the Conference was held from 6:30 to 7:28 p.m. on July 23 at the Palais des Nations. The Directive to the Foreign Ministers (CF/DOC/25, Document 257) was approved and each of the Heads of Government made a closing statement. For texts of these statements, see *Geneva Conference,* pages 76–82, or *Cmd.* 9543, pages 25–29. The United States Delegation verbatim record of this session, USDEL/Verb/8, July 23, and the record of decisions, CF/DOC/RD/13, July 23, are in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 510.

---

250. Telegram From the Consulate General at Geneva to the Department of State[1]

Geneva, July 24, 1955—1 a.m.

179. From Merchant. I had Kidd get in touch with Blankenhorn this evening, who found German Delegation in very happy mood, offering congratulations for effective work of Western spokesmen.[2] They had instructed Von Eckhardt, their press man, to endeavor set tone of German press as one of recognition of positive accomplishment of Western powers in support of German interests. They would make point that unwavering unity of three Western representatives with regard to unification issue was one of first fruits of Chancellor's policy of close alliance with West. They realized that Bulganin's closing statement[3] offered little hope for near future, but thought important thing was that German question had been referred to Foreign Ministers for further consideration this autumn.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-GE/7–2455. Secret; Priority.

[2] The meeting took place during the evening of July 23. Kidd took with him a message from Secretary Dulles to Chancellor Adenauer the text of which reads:

"It has been tough going, but I believe that we have brought the subject of German unification into the area of practical politics." (*Ibid.,* Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 515)

[3] See *Geneva Conference,* pp. 77–80, or *Cmd.* 9543, pp. 25–28.

Blankenhorn said that when Kirkpatrick had consulted him at noon, latter indicated that it was hopeless to expect Soviets accept reference to German question before European security. In view of this fact, recognition of which Blankenhorn understood to be West's common position and under impression that Kirkpatrick was speaking on behalf of the three, Blankenhorn was of opinion that it was more important to establish link between unification and security questions than to waste further time on sequence in which points listed in directive. He had checked with Chancellor who entirely agreed. In general they were very satisfied with outcome and considered the major objectives achieved: (1) German unification would be on agenda of Foreign Ministers, (2) the link was recognized, (3) reference to GDR by name had been avoided.

Chancellor had asked Blankenhorn to convey his warm appreciation for Secretary's message of July 21.[4]

I sent word that we would be glad to have an officer give Chancellor personal report if so desired, and explained your regret at having no opportunity to see him, since circumstances required your immediate return to Washington for purposes report to Congress. Kidd invited to see Chancellor on Monday, when Brentano, Hallstein, and Blankenhorn will be in Muerren for conference on results Geneva.

Gowen

---

[4] Document 229.

DOCUMENTS OF THE CONFERENCE

251. Proposal of the Soviet Delegation[1]

CF/DOC/6 *Geneva, July 20, 1955.*

Item 2 of the Agenda: System of Security in Europe

GENERAL EUROPEAN TREATY ON COLLECTIVE SECURITY IN EUROPE

(Basic Principles)

I

For the purpose of ensuring peace and security and of preventing aggression against any state in Europe,

For the purpose of strengthening international cooperation in conformity with the principles of respect for the independence and sovereignty of states and non-interference in their internal affairs,

Striving to achieve concerted efforts by all European states in ensuring collective security in Europe instead of the formation of groupings of some European states directed against other European states, which gives rise to friction and strained relations among nations and aggravates mutual distrust,

Having in view that the establishment of a system of collective security in Europe would facilitate the earliest possible settlement of the German problem through the unification of Germany on a peaceful and democratic basis,

European states, guided by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations conclude a General European Treaty on Collective Security in Europe the basic provisions of which are as follows:

1. All European states, irrespective of their social systems, and the United States of America as well, may become parties to the Treaty provided they recognise the purposes and assume the obligations set forth in the Treaty.

Pending the formation of a united, peace-loving, democratic German state, the German Democratic Republic and the German Federal Republic may be parties to the Treaty enjoying equal rights with other parties thereto. It is understood that after the unification of Germany the united German State may be a party to the Treaty under general provisions hereof.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 514. Translation. This proposal was made at the Fourth Plenary Session of the Heads of Government, July 20; see Document 207.

The conclusion of the Treaty on Collective Security in Europe shall not affect the competence of the Four Powers—the U.S.S.R., the U.S.A., the United Kingdom and France—to deal with the German problem, which shall be settled in accordance with decisions previously taken by the Four Powers.

2. The States-parties to the Treaty undertake to refrain from aggression against one another and also to refrain from having recourse to the threat or use of force in their international relations and, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any dispute that may arise among them by peaceful means and in such a way as not to endanger international peace and security in Europe.

3. Whenever, in the view of any State-party to the Treaty, there is danger of an armed attack in Europe against one or more of the States-parties to the Treaty, they shall consult one another in order to take effective steps to remove the danger and to maintain security in Europe.

4. An armed attack in Europe against one or several States-parties to the Treaty by any state or group of states shall be deemed to be an attack against all the Parties. In the event of such an attack, each of the Parties, exercising the right of individual or collective self-defence, shall assist the state or states so attacked by all means at its disposal, including the use of armed force, for the purpose of re-establishing and maintaining international peace and security in Europe.

5. The States-parties to the Treaty undertake jointly to discuss and determine as soon as possible the procedure under which assistance, including military assistance, shall be provided by the States-parties to the Treaty in the event of a situation in Europe requiring a collective effort for the re-establishment and maintenance of peace in Europe.

6. The States-parties to the Treaty, in conformity with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, shall immediately inform the Security Council of the United Nations of any action taken or envisaged for the purpose of exercising the right of self-defence or of maintaining peace and security in Europe.

7. The States-parties to the Treaty undertake not to participate in any coalition or alliance and not to conclude agreements the objectives of which are contrary to the purposes of the Treaty on Collective Security in Europe.

8. The States-parties to the Treaty undertake to promote a broad economic and cultural cooperation among themselves as well as with other states through the development of trade and other economic relations, the expansion of cultural ties on a basis excluding any discrimination or restrictions which hamper such cooperation.

9. In order to implement the provisions of the Treaty concerning consultation among its Parties and to consider questions arising in connection with the task of ensuring security in Europe, the following shall be provided for:

(a) Regular or, when required, special conference at which each State shall be represented by a member of its government or by some other specially designated representative;
(b) The setting up of a permanent consultative political committee the duty of which shall be the preparation of appropriate recommendations to the governments of the States-parties to the Treaty;
(c) The setting up of a military consultative organ the terms of reference of which shall be specified in due course.

10. Recognising the special responsibility of the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security, the States-parties to the Treaty shall invite the Government of the Chinese People's Republic to designate representatives to the organs set up in accordance with the Treaty in the capacity of observers.

11. The present Treaty shall not impair in any way the obligations of European states under international treaties and agreements to which they are party, provided the principles and purposes of such agreements are in conformity with those of the present Treaty.

II

12. The States-parties to the Treaty agree that during the first period (two or three years) of the implementation of measures for the establishment of the system of collective security in Europe under the present Treaty they shall not be relieved of the obligations assumed by them under existing treaties and agreements.

At the same time the States-parties to existing treaties and agreements which provide for military commitments shall refrain from the use of armed force and shall settle by peaceful means all the disputes that may arise between them. Consultations shall also take place between the parties to the corresponding treaties, and agreements in case any differences or disputes arise among them which might constitute a threat to the maintenance of peace in Europe.

13. Pending the conclusion of agreements on the reductions of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons and on the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territories of European countries, the States-parties to the Treaty undertake not to take any further steps to increase their armed forces on the territories of other European states under treaties and agreements concluded by them previously.

14. The States-parties to the Treaty agree that on the expiration of an agreed time-limit from the entry into force of the present Treaty, the Warsaw Treaty of May 14, 1955, the Paris Agreements of October 23, 1954, and the North Atlantic Treaty of April 4, 1949, shall become ineffective.

15. The duration of the Treaty shall be 50 years.

---

252. Proposal of the Soviet Delegation[1]

CF/DOC/11 *Geneva, July 21, 1955.*

DECISION OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT OF THE FOUR POWERS ON THE REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS AND THE PROHIBITION OF ATOMIC WEAPONS

I

To lessen tension in the relations between States, to consolidate mutual confidence between them and to remove the threat of a new war, the Heads of Government of the Soviet Union, the United States of America, the United Kingdom, and France recognise the need to strive to achieve the earliest possible conclusion of an International Convention on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons.

As a result of the exchange of opinions on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons they have agreed on the following:

1. The level of the armed forces of the USA, the USSR, and China shall be established at from 1 to 1.5 million men for each; that of the United Kingdom and France, at 650,000 men for each, while the level provided for China as well as other questions bearing on the armed forces of China shall be the subject of consideration in which the Government of the People's Republic of China is to participate.

The level of the armed forces of all other States shall not exceed 150,000 to 200,000 men and shall be agreed upon at an appropriate international conference.

2. After the armed forces and conventional armaments have been reduced to the extent of 75 per cent of the agreed reductions, a complete prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons shall come into

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 614. Translation. This proposal was made at the Fifth Plenary Session of the Heads of Government, July 21; see Document 221.

effect. The elimination of such weapons from the armaments of States and their destruction shall be completed in the course of the reduction of armaments, covering the final 25 per cent of the agreed reductions. All atomic materials shall thereafter be used exclusively for peaceful purposes.

3. Simultaneously with the initiation of measures to effect the reduction of armaments and armed forces, and before the entry into force of the agreement on the complete prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons, the Four Powers shall solemnly pledge themselves not to use nuclear weapons which they shall regard as prohibited to them. Exceptions to this rule may be permitted for purposes of defence against aggression, when a decision to that effect is taken by the Security Council.

4. As one of the first measures for the execution of the programme for the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons, States possessing atomic and hydrogen weapons pledge themselves to discontinue tests of these weapons.

5. Effective international control shall be established over the implementation of measures for the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons.

6. The Heads of Government of the Four Powers have instructed the Foreign Ministers to endeavour to reach necessary agreement on the still unsettled aspects of the above-mentioned Convention, which is to be considered in the United Nations.

II

At the same time, the Heads of Government of the Soviet Union, the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France, fully determined not to permit the use of atomic and hydrogen weapons, which are weapons of mass destruction of people, and to deliver nations from the threat of a destructive atomic war, solemnly declare, that:

Pending the conclusion of the International Convention on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons, the Soviet Union, the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France undertake not to be the first to use atomic and hydrogen weapons against any country and they call upon all other states to join this Declaration.

253. Proposal of the French Delegation[1]

CF/DOC/13 *Geneva, July 21, 1955.*

MEMORANDUM ON DISARMAMENT

At the opening session of the Geneva Conference, the French Prime Minister explained the reasons which lead him to believe that the first condition of a lasting peace is progress towards disarmament.[2] Assistance to the peoples of the under-developed territories in improving their general living conditions constitutes a second reason.

The French Government believes that these two forms of activity should be carried out side by side, and that the possibility of establishing an organic link between them should be investigated. Such a link would make it possible, at least in part, to solve the problem of control and of sanctions in regard to disarmament.

The French Government proposes that a reduction in the amount of military expenditure borne by the states be agreed by them, and that the financial resources thus made available be, either in whole or in part, allocated to international expenditure on equipment and mutual aid.

The essentially financial aspect of these proposals must be stressed. It will allow an overall view to be taken of military problems at a high level, and will make possible the transfer of military expenditure to productive expenditure at international level, for which purpose the national framework has been shown to be too limited.

A variety of problems will be created by the application of these provisions—the collection and distribution of the financial resources, and the methods of administering them—and this memorandum is designed to make certain proposals in that regard.

(1) In order to establish the basis of the contribution to be made, each of the governments concerned would declare annually the amount it intended to appropriate for military expenditure during a period of twelve months, in effect, the amount laid down in the budget.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 514. Translation. This proposal was made at the Fifth Plenary Session of the Heads of Government, July 21; see Document 221.

[2] Regarding Faure's statement at the First Plenary, see Document 182.

The first statement would concern the twelve-monthly period covered by the budget for the current year.

The declarations made by the states would be sent to an International Secretariat, whose chief task would be to ensure that a common definition of military expenditure was interpreted in the same sense by all the states. In order to make this possible, the Secretariat would receive copies of the civil and military budgets presented by each government to the parliamentary organs which, according to the constitution of its own state, have to vote or approve the budget. The Secretariat would also lay down a common nomenclature for all states, and would draw up a list of the categories of military expenditure, subject to any agreements reached, and according to the programme for the progressive application and control of disarmament.

The percentage reduction of military expenditure in any annual budget in relation to a preceding budget could be laid down for future years by agreement between the governments concerned. This would make it possible to calculate the amounts to be allocated to the International Fund for Equipment and Mutual Aid.

The amounts to be levied during the years concerned should be progressive, in order to lay stress on the need for disarmament. These amounts could be related either to the figure of actual military expenditure, or, if the Powers fix a common "normal" level of military expenditure in relation either to their national expenditure or to some other criterion, they could apply to the excess of such expenditure over the normal figure thus defined. This second formula would have the advantage of linking the size of the allocation more closely to the unduly high level of military expenditure maintained by some states.

(2) The use of the resources of the I.F.E.M.A. would be supervised by the International Secretariat, whose task it would be to ensure their use according to four criteria:

(i) In order that the peoples of the states concerned may be associated with the results of disarmament, the amount of contribution due from each state should be reduced, on the basis of the formula laid down, by part of the reduction in expenditure effected in the military budget between one financial year and the next. Each country would thus be able to make internal transfers according to whatever method it liked.

(ii) Each state contributing to the fund should be in a position to use a portion of its contribution, to be defined, for the benefit of states of territories with which it is constitutionally linked. All that would be necessary would be to prove to the International Secretariat the need for such expenditure.

(iii) A part of the remainder of the available funds would have to be used to place orders of all kinds in the countries providing the funds. This provision would prevent the reduction of armament expenditure from reacting unfavorably on the level of economic activity of each country by guaranteeing the existence of a certain number of orders to take the place of orders for military supplies.

(iv) The balance would be used at international level, without any special restrictions, on equipment for underdeveloped territories. This allocation would be made in close cooperation with the international organisations within the framework of the United Nations, or even by those organisations themselves. It is, perhaps, worthwhile to stress the point that any states increasing their military expenditure would exclude themselves from the benefits to be obtained from the I.F.E.M.A

(3) The United States, the U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom and France would, of course, be associated with the procedure to be laid down. As, however, these four nations are all represented on the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission of the U.N. of which Canada is also a member, it might be best to entrust to that Sub-Committee the task of determining the methods of applying this plan for disarmament and transfer.

I should like to submit the following merely as suggestions:

a) The administration of the fund could be carried out by a managerial organ associated with the International Secretariat. Both these bodies could come under a common political authority on which, for instance, the appropriate Ministers of the Four Powers might sit.

b) The use of the resources of the fund might be supervised by the managerial organ, which would necessarily be composed only of representatives of the Four Powers and of the nations prepared to adhere to the principles set out in this memorandum, but also of representatives of countries benefiting from the resources of the International Fund for Mutual Aid.

c) So far as the application of the job is concerned, recourse to existing organisations such as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and certain organs of the United Nations might be considered to avoid the creation of an international administrative organ, which would duplicate the work of those already functioning to the general satisfaction.

d) The political authority alone would be competent to fix the amount of the contribution from each state. There might be alternative methods of procedure, according to whether the state concerned accepted financial supervision or not. If it refused, the contribution would be arrived at by applying the progressive rate of the levy to the figure of military expenditure declared for the first year. If it accepted, the contribution would be fixed on the figure of military expenditure for the current financial year as verified by the International Secretariat. The only choice open to the political authority, voting according to a procedure to be defined, would be between the figure determined by the International Secretariat and, in case of rejection, the contribution of a lump sum.

The proposals contained in this memorandum could be studied immediately by the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission of the U.N., if the Four Powers represented here gave the necessary instructions to that effect to their respective delegates.

---

254. Proposal of the British Delegation[1]

CF/DOC/14 *Geneva, July 21, 1955.*

DISARMAMENT

The United Kingdom Delegation propose that, as a means of increasing mutual confidence in Europe, consideration should be given to the establishment of a system of joint inspection of the forces now confronting each other in Europe. In specified areas of agreed extent on either side of the line dividing Eastern and Western Europe joint inspecting teams would operate by mutual consent.

This project would provide opportunity for the practical test on a limited scale of international inspection of forces in being and would provide valuable experience and lessons for use over a wider field in the future.

The willingness of the Four Governments to accept such inspection would moreover demonstrate their determination to reduce international tension in Europe.

The system of inspection here proposed is without prejudice to the work of the United Nations Disarmament Sub-Committee. It is also distinct from the proposals put forward by the United Kingdom Delegation from the limitation, control and inspection of forces and armaments in connection with European security.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 514. This proposal was made at the Fifth Plenary Session of the Heads of Government, July 21; see Document 221.

255. Proposal of the French Delegation[1]

CF/DOC/15 *Geneva, July 22, 1955.*

DECISION ON DISARMAMENT

So far as disarmament is concerned, the French Government suggests that the four Governments should state their agreement on the three following proposals:

(1) A disarmament programme, based on the different proposals made by the Sub-Committee of the U.N. Disarmament Commission, shall be completed as quickly as possible. To be effective, this programme must include control, which the Four Powers have recognised to be necessary, and the practical methods of applying such control, which they request their representatives on that Sub-Committee to determine at an early date, particularly as concerns mutual inspection of military installations of every kind belonging to these states, and common inspection of the armed forces stationed in certain areas of Europe.

(2) Part of the reduction effected in military expenditure shall be allocated, in a form to be determined, to raising the living standard of under-developed countries. The Sub-Committee of the U.N. Disarmament Commission, which consists of representatives of Canada in addition to those of the Four Powers represented here, shall be invited to decide on the methods to be used for financing, supervising and distributing the proposed funds made available for transfer.

(3) The military expenditure of each state, shall, without delay be widely publicized. To make this possible, a properly qualified body, which might be the Secretariat of the U.N. Disarmament Commission, shall, receive declarations from these states, make certain that the definition of military expenditure is interpreted by all of them in the same sense, and verify that their armed forces and military installations really correspond to the statements in the budgets remitted to it.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 514. Translation.

256. Proposal of the French Delegation[1]

CF/DOC/19 *Geneva, July 22, 1955.*

THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONTACTS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST

Believing that the organisation of peace does not consist merely in seeking military methods of decreasing international tension, but also involves a progressive return to closer and more trusting relations between the peoples who are divided today; that, although the existence of two security zones in Europe at the present time has to be recognised, that by no means implies a final acceptance of the division of the continent; that, on the contrary, the French Government is convinced that, so long as Europe remains divided, the peace of the world cannot be firmly established; and that the condition of the progressive re-establishment of European unity is the creation on both sides of the line which now too positively divides the two worlds, of closer relationships between the peoples, easier contacts between individuals, and wider exchanges between their economic systems;

The French Government puts forward the following proposals aimed at facilitating the free movement of men, ideas and goods:

(1) Travel facilities for individual tourists;

(2) Exchanges between professional, scientific, technical and artistic groups;

(3) Exchange of professors and students, as well as of lecturers;

(4) Exchange of books, newspapers, scientific reviews, and documentary films;

(5) Free access to sources of information in the different countries, especially facilities for the press;

(6) Exchange of all types of statistics between the different countries;

(7) The development of international trade relations for the mutual benefit of the countries concerned;

(8) Association between the countries of Eastern and Western Europe in common organisations, particularly in the spheres of transport and power;

(9) The creation of a common investment fund in Europe for the institution of public works of general value, from which the different countries would benefit in common.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 514. Translation. This proposal was made at the Sixth Plenary Session of the Heads of Government, July 22; see Document 236.

257. Directive of the Heads of Government of the Four Powers to the Foreign Ministers[1]

CF/DOC/25 *Geneva, July 23, 1955.*

The Heads of Government of France, the United Kingdom, the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A., guided by the desire to contribute to the relaxation of international tension and to the consolidation of confidence between states, instruct their Foreign Ministers to continue the consideration of the following questions with regard to which an exchange of views has taken place at the Geneva Conference, and to propose effective means for their solution, taking account of the close link between the reunification of Germany and the problems of European security, and the fact that the successful settlement of each of these problems would serve the interests of consolidating peace.

1. *European Security and Germany.* For the purpose of establishing European security with due regard to the legitimate interests of all nations and their inherent right to individual and collective self-defence, the Ministers are instructed to consider various proposals to this end, including the following: A security pact for Europe or for a part of Europe, including provision for the assumption by member nations of an obligation not to resort to force and to deny assistance to an aggressor; limitation, control, and inspection in regard to armed forces and armaments; establishment between East and West of a zone in which the disposition of armed forces will be subject to mutual agreement; and also to consider other possible proposals pertaining to the solution of this problem.

The Heads of Government, recognizing their common responsibility for the settlement of the German question and the re-unification of Germany, have agreed that the settlement of the German question and the re-unification of Germany by means of free elections shall be carried out in conformity with the national interests of the German people and the interests of European security. The Foreign Ministers will make whatever arrangements they may consider desirable for the participation of, or for consultation with, other interested parties.

2. *Disarmament*

The Four Heads of Government,

Desirous of removing the threat of war and lessening the burden of armaments,

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 514. This directive was approved at the Final Plenary Session of the Heads of Government, July 23; see Document 249.

Convinced of the necessity, for secure peace and for the welfare of mankind, of achieving a system for the control and reduction of all armaments and armed forces under effective safeguards,

Recognizing that achievements in this field would release vast material resources to be devoted to the peaceful economic development of nations, for raising their well-being, as well as for assistance to underdeveloped countries,

Agree:

(1) for these purposes to work together to develop an acceptable system for disarmament through the Sub-Committee of the United Nations Disarmament Commission;

(2) to instruct their representatives in the Sub-Committee in the discharge of their mandate from the United Nations to take account in their work of the views and proposals advanced by the Heads of Government at this Conference;

(3) to propose that the next meeting of the Sub-Committee be held on August 29, 1955, at New York;

(4) to instruct the Foreign Ministers to take note of the proceedings in the Disarmament Commission, to take account of the views and proposals advanced by the Heads of Government at this Conference and to consider whether the four Governments can take any further useful initiative in the field of disarmament.

3. *Development of Contacts between East and West*

The Foreign Ministers should by means of experts study measures, including those possible in organs and agencies of the United Nations, which could (a) bring about a progressive elimination of barriers which interfere with free communications and peaceful trade between people and (b) bring about such freer contacts and exchanges as are to the mutual advantage of the countries and peoples concerned.

4. The Foreign Ministers of the Four Powers will meet at Geneva during October to initiate their consideration of these questions and to determine the organisation of their work.

REPORTS ON THE CONFERENCE

258. Editorial Note

On July 25, 1955, President Eisenhower addressed the nation over radio and television concerning the results of the Geneva Conference. For the full text of his address, see *Public Papers of the Presidents* *of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1955,* pages 726–731, or *Geneva Conference,* pages 83–87. On the same day, Secretary Dulles testified before an Executive session of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the course and results of the meeting. For the text of his testimony, see *Foreign Relations Committee,* pages 717–735. On the following day Secretary Dulles offered his analysis of the conference at a press briefing. For text of his statement on this occasion, see Department of State *Bulletin,* August 8, 1955, pages 218–219, or *Geneva Conference,* pages 87–88.

---

259. Memorandum of Discussion at the 256th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, July 28, 1955[1]

[Here follows a list of participants.]

1. Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security

[Here follows discussion of the situation in Indonesia and the Philippines.]

• • • • • • •

The President then told what took place following his statement calling for the exchange of blueprints and mutual aerial reconnaissance. Bulganin, who was Chairman, indicated that the USSR would study the U.S. proposal. The meeting then adjourned and the delegates gathered in the buffet. Khrushchev approached the President and said he did not agree with the Chairman (i.e., Bulganin) because he believed the President's proposal was impractical and primarily a propaganda move. Khrushchev asked the President to accept the Soviets' inspection plan of May 10. The President replied that he was prepared to take the Soviet plan if the Soviets would take the U.S. proposal. Khrushchev made no reply, and "ran out". The next day Khrushchev stated to a group, including the President, that there were always people at a conference who made proposals, in the full knowledge that such proposals would be turned down, only to gain a propaganda advantage. The President said he looked Khrushchev directly in the eye and said, "Take me up on my proposal." Khrushchev's response was to say that his generalization did not, of course, include the President or refer to the President's proposal.

---

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Bromley Smith on July 29.

These two incidents, in the President's opinion, revealed a difference among the Soviet delegates, some of whom apparently accepted the U.S. suggestion as a serious proposal.

The Director of Central Intelligence called to the President's attention the concern that he and Mr. Streibert shared regarding the effect of the Geneva Conference in the European satellites. He said that "run-away" hope before the Conference had been followed by a let-down in the Soviet-controlled satellites.

Mr. Streibert called attention to the informal Soviet statements alleging that there was no International Communist Movement and that the Communist parties were indigenous. He said our propaganda media would either have to reject these statements and continue attacks on the International Communist Movement as a conspiracy directed from Moscow, or halt this type of propaganda.

The President said this situation should be given careful study. After consideration of the study by the Secretary of State and by himself, any necessary policy changes could be made.

The National Security Council:

a. Noted and discussed an oral briefing on the subject by the Director of Central Intelligence, with specific reference to political developments in Indonesia and the Philippines; the status of Soviet military assistance to the Chinese Communists; foreign reactions to the President's Geneva proposals for exchange of blueprints and mutual aerial photography; and probably reactions in the satellites, particularly East Germany, to the Geneva Conference.

b. Noted the President's request that the Director of Central Intelligence and the Director, U.S. Information Agency, prepare, on an urgent basis for consideration by the Operations Coordinating Board, a study on the psychological implications arising out of the Geneva Conference as they affect U.S. information programs relating to the European satellites and the International Communist Movement.

Note: The action in b above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director, U.S. Information Agency, and the Operations Coordinating Board.

2. Report on the Four-Power Conference

Mr. Dillon Anderson recalled to the President and to the Secretary of State expressed willingness to report to the Council on the Geneva Conference.

The President said he believed he had already stated everything that would be helpful or that had not already been heard by those present.

Secretary Dulles began his report by summarizing the Geneva developments relating to Germany and European security. He said the Soviet leaders were not eager to talk about German unification.

They revealed they are prepared to see two sovereign German states continue indefinitely, both to be members along with other states, of an European security arrangement. He said the Russians tried to force the West to accept in the Directive[2] the following order: (1) security, (2) disarmament, and (3) German unification. The Russians finally agreed on the following wording in the Directive: ". . . taking account of the close link between the reunification of Germany and the problem of European security."[3] Secretary Dulles added that Soviet policy positions will probably only become known at the October Foreign Ministers meeting.

Secretary Dulles said all members of the U.S. Delegation had tried to get the Soviet leaders to state why they feared the unification of Germany—did they fear the twelve German divisions now planned, or did they fear NATO armies on a Soviet frontier? The Russians were told that the West was prepared to reassure the Soviets if they were fearful of German aggression or the revival of German militarism. Our Delegation was unable to get any response from the Russians. Secretary Dulles concluded that the Russians did not really fear German rearmament or German military power, but were afraid that any course of action leading to the eventual liquidation of the East German Government would upset their satellite system. Secretary Dulles cited present uneasiness in the satellites as an indication that the liquidation of East Germany now would bring about the situation which the Russians feared.

Secretary Dulles said he would be greatly surprised if the Soviets presented Adenauer with a serious offer of German unification during the Chancellor's trip to Moscow in September.

The Secretary said the West must keep pressing the German unification issue. He predicted, but did not wish to be held to his prediction, that we might get unification in the next two years.

Secretary Dulles said that prior to the October meeting in Geneva, the West should agree on a concrete plan for German unification, including precise provisions, dates, etc. This plan would be put on the table in order to keep pressing the Russians to accept German unification. At the same time, the West should present a European security plan containing the general terms of a security treaty which would become effective only when a united Germany had signed it. The Secretary recognized there would be major difficulties within our own Government and with our allies in arriving at the kind of specific proposals which he had in mind. He felt, however, that the West should keep the initiative which it now has on the

---

[2] Document 257.

[3] Ellipsis in the source text.

German unification issue, and make it as difficult as possible for the Soviets to oppose unification.

Secretary Dulles then reviewed the developments in Geneva with regard to the control of armaments.

The first problem, he said, arose over our desire to avoid reference in the Directive to the Russian proposal to ban the bomb. Both the British and French stated they were not in a position to oppose inclusion of the bomb prohibition. Our Delegation, however, succeeded in keeping the bomb prohibition out without public notice, which could have been awkward for the U.S., particularly if we had been the only power among the four to have opposed its inclusion. Secretary Dulles indicated that we now had time to prepare public opinion so that our opposition to the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons cannot be used to attack us as being opposed to disarmament.

Secretary Dulles then referred to the President's proposal on exchange of blueprints and mutual aerial reconnaissance.[4] He said the President convinced the Conference that the proposal was not a mere propaganda move. The Secretary added that although the proposal was dramatic, it was also a serious means of initiating a program of disarmament.

Secretary Dulles stated his belief that no state would initiate nuclear war unless it was certain that it would not be destroyed by a nuclear retaliatory blow. He said the President's plan could prevent nuclear war by making a surprise attack impossible. Secretary Dulles stated that the number of reconnaissance planes involved might be relatively few. He made this point in rebutting an argument against the plan held by Senator Knowland, who envisages hundreds of Soviet planes over the United States dropping nuclear bombs simultaneously during their "peaceful" reconnaissance.

Secretary Dulles urged that we not follow up on the President's plan as if it were a propaganda stunt. He urged that it be handled seriously, and suggested that a specific note, elaborating additional details of the plan, be sent to the USSR. He indicated that we should not belabor the Soviets for not accepting the plan at least for a month.

Governor Stassen interrupted to say that his task force was already at work developing the plan and drafting an appropriate note. He added that it should be made clear that the exchange of nuclear weapons design was not involved in the President's plan.

The President commented that of course nuclear weapons designs were not involved. He said the purpose of the plan was to end the possibility of massive surprise attack. The President said Khrushchev attacked the U.S. proposal on the ground that it had nothing to do with the reduction of arms. The President said he replied that the U.S. plan would ease international tensions and, in the resulting improved political climate, reduction of arms.

---

[4] See Document 221.

Secretary Dulles stated that the Soviets may seriously want to reduce the economic burden of armaments in order to divert Soviet resources to consumer goods.

Secretary Wilson stated that the essence of any disarmament plan is inspection, adding that the President's plan was a practical beginning of inspection. In addition, the plan would reduce fear, because states would know the location of potential enemy forces.

The President noted that we had wanted to include in the Geneva Directive a special directive to the UN to concentrate on the inspection problem but had given in to Soviet objections in order to get the statement in the Directive linking German unification to the problem of European security. The President said he had told Khrushchev that the Soviet plan covering inspection at ports and airports was impractical because of the large number of inspectors required. He said Khrushchev replied that the Soviet plan aimed at revealing any forward movement of national forces. The President pointed out that Khrushchev's reply indicated that the Russians were preoccupied with land warfare and with the movement of large bodies of armed men. He suggested that we should keep pushing the U.S. proposal, even to the extent of accepting some of the Soviet inspection proposals if necessary.

Secretary Dulles stated that the magnitude of the issues discussed at the Conference was best revealed by the fact that the Soviet announcement of its intention to join the International Atomic Energy Agency was all but forgotten. He pointed out that the Russians had decided to join after nearly two years of efforts to persuade them to do so. The Soviet decision is important, even though it was buried by other Geneva issues. Although not publicly announced, the USSR has agreed to contribute to the International Agency 50 kilograms of fissionable material as "an appropriate amount". The UK has agreed to contribute 20 kilograms, probably plutonium. The U.S. first offered 200 kilograms, and later doubled this amount. Secretary Dulles wondered whether any meaning could be attached to the USSR contribution of 50 kilograms as an "appropriate" amount, when they knew that the U.S. had contributed 200 kilograms. . . .

Secretary Dulles said the question of developing contacts between East and West was dealt with so briefly that it was not possible to discover how the Russians really felt about this issue. He said the language in the Directive was drafted by the U.S. and accepted on the last day of the meeting without debate, possibly as a Soviet gesture of good will to overcome impressions of intransigeance created during the debate earlier that afternoon. He said our Delegation stressed the issue of free communications—information, books, etc.—but that the Russians, in their personal conversations with members of our Delegation, stressed the desirability of exchange of people.

Secretary Dulles said the reference to "peaceful trade" in the Directive was an attempt to deal with the trade problem while avoiding the subject of restrictions on trade in strategic items.

Secretary Dulles recalled that one of the serious differences between the West and the USSR involved Soviet insistence that further discussions on disarmament be handled by and controlled by the four Foreign Ministers. He said the Russians finally gave in to Western insistence that further discussions on disarmament be held within the UN framework.

With reference to Soviet control of the European satellites, Secretary Dulles said our Delegation made very clear to the Russians that Soviet treatment of the satellites would be to us a barometer indicating their real intentions. Our Delegation had numerous opportunities to tell the Russians that good relations between the USSR and the U.S. could never be achieved unless the Russians relaxed their control over the satellites.

With regard to the issue of international Communism, Secretary Dulles said the Russians maintained in their private conversations that Communism was an internal matter in each state and not internationally controlled, that there had been no meeting of the Cominform for years, and that the West was beating a dead horse when it continued to attack "international Communism".

In summary, Secretary Dulles said the Geneva meeting was very much on the plus side for the West; that the USSR had been put on the defensive. This result, he added, was not achieved without cost. The cost was the breaking down or the blurring of the moral barrier between the Soviet bloc and the free world. As a result, he said, we must re-think our basic strategy in order to meet this new situation.

As evidence of the different situation which we will face in the post-Geneva period, Secretary Dulles referred to a statement by Tito to the effect that because the danger of war had practically disappeared, further U.S. military equipment was not essential to Yugoslavia, in effect inviting the U.S. to halt shipment of equipment to Yugoslavia. Secretary Dulles referred to the lessened sense of danger of global war and the new impetus given to neutralism. The effect on United States strategy would be that we would no longer be able to use the same policies and expect to get the same results—that there would be less dependence in other countries on U.S. military aid, that we could place less dependence on alliances.

Secretary Dulles urged that fundamental review of our policies be made so that we can deal with foreign countries in ways which are responsive to the new situation. He cited specifically our policy toward the satellites, Asia, and the Middle East.

Secretary Dulles concluded that the new situation was not brought about solely by the Geneva meeting, and would have taken place even if there had been no meeting. He added that we never wanted to go to Geneva, but that the pressure of people of the world forced us to do.

The President said he agreed with Secretary Dulles' conclusions but not with his premise. The President said that Geneva was our recognition of the fact that a blurring of the distinction between the USSR and the free world was taking place. The purpose of the Geneva meeting was to correct the false picture of the U.S. which many people had come to accept in the months preceding the meeting.

Secretary Dulles said that this was exactly what he had meant to convey.

The National Security Council:

Noted oral reports by the President and the Secretary of State on developments at the recent Four-Power meeting, with particular reference to their relation to national security policies.

[Here follows discussion of item 3, "Report on the ICBM Program".]

Bromley Smith
Senior Member
NSC Special Staff

MEETING OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE UNITED KINGDOM, FRANCE, AND THE SOVIET UNION, OCTOBER 27–NOVEMBER 16, 1955

PREPARATIONS FOR THE MEETING, JULY 26—OCTOBER 26, 1955

260. Telegram From the Consulate in Switzerland to the Department of State[1]

Geneva, July 26, 1955—2 p.m.

198. From Kidd. Two-hour visit with Adenauer and Blankenhorn yesterday, in which I found Chancellor in excellent mood after press conference in which he had laid German position very positively on the line. Substance of his statements to press was that within limits of what Geneva Conference had set out to do it had been success, Western powers had conclusively demonstrated their consideration of German interests, were never more united than at Geneva, and this was one of results of Federal Republic's close alliance in Paris Pacts.[2]

Chancellor listened very thoughtfully to description of background and atmosphere of conference and appeared more interested in personalities of Soviet representatives and their basic problem than in fact value of positions they stated . . . [3] was struck by difference of deportment of Soviets at Geneva and Belgrade[4] and impression Soviets gave of acting as team which perhaps included members who had remained in Moscow. Particularly struck by Soviet reserve, change in atmosphere, and defensive attitude after President's disarmament proposals at Thursday session.[5] Considered President's proposals of decisive importance. Also asked especially whether it was not our view that with all the problems the Soviets had to face, both internally and externally, they were not over-extended. I said there were differences of opinion on this. Some felt that the Soviets could keep up the pace for a time. "For a time" or "for ever" he said. "That was important distinction".

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/7–2655. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution. Repeated to Bonn for Conant and Lisbon for Merchant.

[2] For text of the Paris Agreements, concluded at Paris in October 1954, see *Foreign Relations*, 1952–1954, vol. v, Part 2, pp. 1435 ff.

[3] Ellipsis in the source text.

[4] Khrushchev and Bulganin visited Belgrade, May 26–June 2, 1955.

[5] For text of President Eisenhower's "Open Skies" proposals, see Document 221.

In sum, he felt Geneva had demonstrated that Soviets wanted very badly to be accepted into "decent company" again. Also felt conference demonstrated more than ever importance of tripartite unity. In this respect said he was most worried about possible results of French elections next year. Would do anything within his power to strengthen position of Pinay, for whose efforts during Conference and with respect to Faure he was grateful. Chancellor felt that something should also be done to revive or strengthen European idea.

Date for trip to Moscow tentatively set around September 8 or 10. Said that we could be sure he would not give up anything at Moscow. If Soviets offered unification at price of Germany withdrawing from Western alliances, Chancellor had thought of an argument (much like President's statement re NATO at Tuesday session of Conference[6]) . . . . Line of thought was that if Soviets genuinely interested in security, Germany in NATO would be the most interested in keeping peace since its territory would inevitably be first battleground. If, however, Soviet interest was in breaking up unity of Western Europe, they would be creating conditions under which a future Germany could be as dangerous as in past. (In subsequent conversation Hallstein inclined to doubt that Soviets would offer Chancellor unification proposals so early in the game. Brentano on other hand feels that they may, not with hope of reaching any agreement but of discrediting him in eyes of German people as leader who stands in way of reunification.)

All the Germans have extraordinary interest in visit to Moscow and appear a little at a loss as to just what they should do and how. In this connection Chancellor suggested sending Blankenhorn to Washington for consultations around September 1 unless, better still, Merchant could come to Bonn for couple days consultation around September 4. I mentioned comment Merchant had made that Geneva Conference reminded him most vividly of importance of sense of timing. Chancellor said that on basis of lifetime experience he could say nothing more important in politics than "warten koennen" ("to know how to wait").

---

[6] For text of President Eisenhower's statement at the Third Plenary, July 19, see *Geneva Conference*, pp. 45–47.

Detailed memo of conversation follows by pouch.[7] Chancellor's letters to President and Secretary transmitted by separate telegrams.[8]

Gowen

---

[7] Not found in Department of State files.

[8] Adenauer's letter to Dulles is printed *infra.* His letter to President Eisenhower, dated August 1, is printed in Department of State *Bulletin,* August 15, 1955, p. 259. Copies of both letters are also in Department of State, Central File 396.1–GE/7–2655.

---

261. Letter From Chancellor Adenauer to Secretary of State Dulles[1]

Mürren, July 25, 1955.

My Dear Mr. Dulles: I was very pleased with the message which you sent to me at Mürren[2] during the difficult negotiations at the Geneva Conference and also with the second communication which Mr. Coburn Kidd delivered to me today on your behalf.[3] At the same time you relieved my anxieties greatly. These tokens of your thoughtfulness have moved me; they are the expression of a friendship which binds us together.

I believe that the Western Powers achieved their aims at this conference. The standpoints of the two sides became clear. No sensible person can indulge in any illusions about the real aims of the Soviet Union. I consider it a positive result that it was possible to commit the Russians to a new conference of Foreign Ministers in October of this year and to agree on a common agenda for it which does justice to the interests of the West.

I know that the positive result of this conference and the unanimity which the three Western Powers have shown are due in large measure to your tireless and consistent work. For this, I should like to convey to you my great admiration and sincere thanks.

With the conclusion of the Geneva Conference we have entered into a new phase of the East-West relations which is no less dangerous than the preceding one. We shall have to reckon to an increasing extent with so-called détente maneuvers by the Soviets, designed to deceive public opinion in our countries about the real aims of the

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/7–2555. Secret. Translation. The original German language text of the letter is attached to the source text; see *Erinnerungen,* pp. 472–473. A slightly different translation was transmitted in telegram 197 from Geneva, July 26. (Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/7–2655)

[2] Document 229.

[3] Not further identified.

Soviet Union, lull our peoples to sleep, and thereby at the same time weaken the defensive strength and solidarity of the West and destroy its unity. I believe that today, more than ever, watchfulness and close cooperation by the Western governments are necessary in order to counter this new Russian tactic effectively. I consider the results of the past conference, however, as a good omen for the cooperation of the Western nations in the difficult coming negotiations with the Soviet Union.

From everything that I have heard about the course of the conference the Soviets do not seem to feel very much at ease. The unity and solidarity of the West have undoubtedly made an impression on them. I regard the proposal of President Eisenhower concerning the inspection of armaments from the air[4] as a very important contribution to the solution of the disarmament problem and only hope that it will be discussed in detail in the UN Commission. I hardly believe that this proposal suited the Soviets very well.

I hope that after all the exertions of the last few weeks you have some time for rest, which you have deserved as few others.

Thanking you once more, I wish to convey my best regards and wishes also to your esteemed wife.

Faithfully yours,

K. Adenauer[5]

---

[4] For text of President Eisenhower's "Open Skies" proposal, see Document 221.

[5] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

---

262. Letter From President Eisenhower to Chairman Bulganin[1]

Washington, July 27 1955.

Dear Mr. Chairman: Now that the Four Power Conference has become a part of history, I want you to know how deeply I believe that our combined efforts during the past week produced an effect that will benefit the world. Good results should certainly spring from the solemn and repeated assurances by the leaders of both East and West that we intend, hereafter, to discuss our differences in conciliatory fashion and to seek in every case an answer that may satisfy the requirements of each side.

---

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File.

I do not minimize the gravity of the problems which must be solved before world tranquility can be achieved. In your opening statement at Geneva,[2] you named some of the matters that so greatly trouble the Soviet Union. In turn, I specified others profoundly disturbing to the entire population of the United States. Only statesmanship of a high order and an unshakeable resolution not to revert again, on either side, to some of the practices of the past, will permit progress toward and final solution of these critical problems.

I personally feel that some of the world tensions, of which we so often spoke at Geneva, have been eased by the fact of our meeting face to face and, during that eventful week, giving to the world a record of long and meaningful discussions and debate without either side, in any single instance, challenging the sincerity of the other or resorting to invective.

Since last Saturday evening, I have been thinking over your farewell words to me, which were to the effect, "Things are going to be better; they are going to come out right." To you and to your associates, I renew my own expressions of friendly interest and intent, and my lasting appreciation of the opportunities that were mine at Geneva for joining with you, Mr. Khrushchev, Mr. Molotov and Marshal Zhukov in so many fruitful discussions.

If we can continue along this line, with earnest efforts to be fair to each other and to achieve understanding of each other's problems, then, eventually, a durable peace based on right and justice will be the monument to the work which we have begun. This is the profound hope of our Government.

Will you please convey my greetings to those who accompanied you to Geneva[3] and with best wishes to yourself,

Sincerely,[4]

---

[2] For text of Bulganin's opening statement, see *Geneva Conference*, pp. 37–43; for a report on the First Plenary Session at which it was made, see Document 182.

[3] On July 27 Eisenhower also wrote to Zhukov, expressing his pleasure at seeing the Marshal again and sending him some fishing equipment. A copy of this letter is Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower Papers, Whitman File, DDE Diaries.

[4] The source text is not signed.

263. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, August 1, 1955[1]

SUBJECT

Preparations for the October Foreign Ministers Meeting in Geneva

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary of State
Sir Roger Makins, British Ambassador
Mr. Maurice Couve de Murville, French Ambassador
Mr. F.J. Leishman, First Secretary, British Embassy
W. Barbour, EUR

The Secretary asked the British and French Ambassadors to call today and discuss with him in a general way some of his preliminary thinking as to the preparations which will be necessary for the four-power Foreign Ministers' meeting in October. He indicated that in his view it is important that the three Western powers maintain the initiative achieved at the Heads of Government Geneva meeting and in this connection said that he is thinking of the desirability that the West be prepared to table fairly specific papers on Germany and European security. On the former, he would have in mind a revised Eden plan,[2] possibly dressed up to include dates when the proposed steps might be taken. Clearly in order to maintain the initiative it would be a desirable technique to continue to keep German unification to the fore with the idea that the more expectation of unification generated, the more pressure to that end is exerted on the Soviets. The Secretary mentioned this continual reiteration technique as a major factor in the successful conclusion of the Austrian treaty. In the Secretary's opinion the Soviets currently are more concerned with the effect of the unification of Germany on their Eastern European position than they are with European security as a problem. The recent developments in Eastern Europe, particularly the Austrian treaty, the Soviet-Yugoslav conversations have jeopardized Soviet control of its satellites and the loss of East Germany would further threaten the Soviet position in that area. Soviet concern at these developments was indicated by the visit to the GDR of the Soviet Geneva delegation.

On European security the Secretary envisages a security treaty similarly dressed up with specifics to the extent possible. However, he noted that yesterday he had tried his hand in a preliminary way at a draft of such a treaty and the exercise had emphasized the problems involved. He referred particularly to the importance that the paper not mention the Warsaw organization which would tend to perpetuate it and said that to avoid such mention he had come to the thought that probably NATO could not be mentioned specifically either. The paper thus might specify only individual countries. In any event, it is clear that considerable preparation will be necessary before the October meeting which leads to the problem of establishing the date for that meeting. The Secretary inquired whether the Ambassadors' governments had expressed any views on the date. The French Ambassador was without instructions. Sir Roger said his government was thinking of as late in October as possible, and having in mind the scheduled NATO Defense Ministers meeting in the early part of the month and WEU Council Meeting on the 17th, is disposed to suggest October 24, a Monday. The Secretary said he would prefer October 31, which is also a Monday. The Secretary proposed that when the three governments decide on the most desirable date, it should be suggested to the Soviets in Moscow through the senior Ambassador there i.e., French Ambassador Joxe.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/8–155. Top Secret. Drafted by Barbour.

[2] For text of the Eden Plan, FPM(54)17, dated January 29, 1954, see *Foreign Relations, 1952–1954*, vol. VII, Part 1, p. 1177.

The Secretary then turned to the problem of prior consultations noting that the Foreign Ministers would presumably be present at the opening of the General Assembly in New York in September, which would provide occasion for consultations at least between the three and possibly as might be desirable, including Molotov in regard to procedures. The Secretary asked whether it could be assumed that Macmillan and Pinay would attend the General Assembly opening and, although neither had any specific indication, both Ambassadors thought such attendance likely. It was noted that there is as yet no indication whether Molotov will attend, but if he did not intend to do so, he would no doubt be stimulated to come for such four-power discussions.

There followed a discussion of the role of NATO in the preconference work. The Secretary raised the question as to whether SHAPE should not be asked to produce its thoughts on European security, with particular reference to problems of a zone wherein armaments would be established by agreement, etc. Sir Roger and de Murville both thought that SHAPE could only appropriately provide such appraisal in response to directives from the NATO Council, and de Murville raised the matter of the role of the Standing Group in such a matter. It was generally concluded that the NATO Council would have to be consulted at an early stage in any case and the concern of Italy for a greater consultative role through NATO was also commented on. Although greater NATO participation would complicate matters materially, the Secretary remarked that it would be impossible to table at Geneva any specific draft of a security treaty in which the NATO powers would be expected to participate without pretty thorough advance consultation. Consequently, such consultation seems inevitable.[3]

---

[3] At a similar meeting on August 5 the Ambassadors and Dulles agreed to propose October 27 as the opening day for the Foreign Ministers meeting and to meet in New York on September 27. They discussed further the steps that would need to be taken in preparation for the four-power meeting. (Memorandum of conversation by Barbour, August 5; Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/8–555) On August 8 Ambassador Bohlen reported that he discussed the date of the meeting with Molotov who agreed to October 27. (Telegram 304 from Moscow; *ibid.*, 396.1–GE/8–855)

---

264. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State[1]

Moscow, August 6, 1955—3 p.m.

290. Soviet press today published text of FedRep's note of June 30 and Soviet reply August 3 (Embtel 252[2]). Soviet note makes it plain that they intend officially at least to confine discussions solely to establishment diplomatic, trade and cultural relations with FedRep and reference to "no preliminary conditions" for establishing such relations appears designed to make clear that German unification, and related matters will not be officially discussed. From information we received at Geneva I do not believe that this intended apply release POWs which Soviets would be prepared settle but not however as condition recognition. Soviet note also makes plain that while agreeable preliminary exchange unofficial views in Paris between Ambassadors actual recognition will be worked out during expected visit Chancellor.

We have already discussed from here previously certain implications (Embtel 2196, June 8[3]) FedRep willingness establish relations with Soviet Union. When I was in Bonn in discussion with minor German officials Foreign Office it seemed to me that West German Government had not fully thought out certain these implications, particularly the quasi legalization division Germany inherent in acceptance formal diplomatic relations with Soviet Union which at same time maintains to say least full diplomatic relations GDR. There also related problem in such circumstances of West German attitude towards GDR which Russians will certainly stress to Adenauer as only course towards unification in present circumstances. I also found these German officials very much concerned at practical problems in connection with Chancellor's visit, such as security, code communications, et cetera in absence official FedRep mission in Moscow.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 661.62A/8–655. Secret. Repeated to London, Paris, and Bonn.

[2] Telegram 252 reported that the Soviet Government accepted the German proposal that their Ambassadors in France discuss the preliminaries for establishing diplomatic relations and Adenauer's visit to Moscow. (*Ibid.*, 661.62A/8–255) For text of the two notes, see *Documents* (R.I.I.A.) for 1955, pp. 249–250.

[3] Telegram 2196 reported that the timing of the Soviet invitation had not been forecast, but its substance was not unexpected. (Department of State, Central Files, 661.62A/6–855)

Since it is now apparent that Soviet Government will not officially at least undertake discussion with Adenauer on German unification it is difficult to see what advantage there would be to West German Government and to West in general by personal visit prior to establishing diplomatic relations. In general, more orderly and proper form would be to work out at lower level actual recognition rather than unprecedented step of Chancellor visiting country with which his government has no diplomatic relations. Unless matters therefore progressed too far in regard to visit consideration might usefully be given by West German Government to reversing order and postponing visit until after formal relations have been established. Soviets obviously greatly prefer visit prior established relations but I believe they are sufficiently anxious establish relations with Bonn primarily as considerable step in direction legalization position GDR as to give FedRep considerable bargaining power as to method and timing his visit. It would also have additional advantage giving West German Government somewhat more time to think through thoroughly implications established relations with Soviet Union.[4]

Bohlen

---

[4] On August 9 the Embassy in Bonn commented that Adenauer and his advisers seemed well aware of the "pitfalls and complications" of the visit and the considerations set forth in this telegram, and stressed that if the Soviets were intransigent about the visit, it would be canceled or postponed. (Telegram 453; *ibid.*, 661.62A/8–955)

265. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the President and the Secretary of State, White House, Washington, August 11, 1955, 9:15 a.m.[1]

1. I showed the President a copy of the translation of Adenauer's letter to me,[2] delivered August 10, which the President read. He expressed himself as disturbed. I said that I felt confident that Adenauer was wrong and had not yet adjusted himself to the new possibilities which I felt made more likely than ever before the unification of Germany. I said that it was difficult for a man of Adenauer's age—about 80—to adjust himself to a new line of thinking after he had been dedicated to another line for so long.

I expressed the view that the new atmosphere meant not a perpetuation of the status quo but rather the greater opportunity for change. The "security" arguments of the Soviet Union had been downgraded and they did not have the same justification of "security" for holding on to East Germany and the satellites. The important thing, I said, was to make it perfectly clear that we did not identify increased hope of peace with increased solidification of the status quo but rather the contrary, and that we now expected there to be changes in the European situation, as evidenced by the unification of Germany and greater freedom for the satellites. I referred to my book *War, Peace and Change*[3] as indicating my great belief that we could not have peace for long unless there was peaceful change.

The President expressed himself as in complete agreement with this philosophy and said he felt it would fit well into a speech he was planning to make in honor of John Marshall about August 25.[4] He said he would take a look at the speech from this standpoint and then send it over to me to work on.

I said I expected to write to Adenauer and also probably to ask Livie Merchant to go over to talk to him before he went to Moscow. I said that Adenauer obviously felt nervous about his forthcoming Moscow trip; that he had no Embassy to take refuge in and no place to talk without almost certainly being overheard by various devices.

The President agreed with this program.

[Here follow paragraphs 2–8 in which Dulles reported on Yugoslavia, Mexico, Americans in Chinese jails, tariffs on bicycles, tanks for Iraq, a possible trip to South America, presidential appointments, and the Pakistani Ambassador.]

---

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers. Top Secret; Personal and Private. Drafted by Dulles.

[2] For text, see *Erinnerungen*, pp. 478–480.

[3] Reference is to Dulles' book *War, Peace and Change* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1939).

[4] For text of President Eisenhower's address to the Annual Convention of the American Bar Association at Philadelphia, August 24, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1955*, pp. 802–809.

9. I spoke to the President about the necessity of keeping in touch with him as I prepared for the October Foreign Ministers meeting. He suggested we should meet in Washington on August 23 when he would be back for his speech in Philadelphia. I said I would probably want to see him shortly before going to Geneva and he said he could arrange to have me flown out on his plane.

JFD

---

266. Letter From Secretary of State Dulles to Chancellor Adenauer[1]

Washington, August 15, 1955.

My Dear Chancellor: I have your letter bearing date August 9.[2] I am indeed happy that you feel free to write me so intimately about your preoccupations. I value it highly that we should always keep in close and understanding contact with each other.

It may not be entirely beside the point for me to recall sentiments which I had when, shortly following the Armistice, I saw the destruction which had been wrought in Germany. If I have told you before, it nevertheless bears repetition. I had at that time been reading Toynbee's *Study of History*, in which, reviewing the ages, he develops the thesis of "challenge and response". I felt that few people had ever confronted a challenge more severe than that which confronted the German people at that time. I said to myself that if the Germans met that challenge, then indeed they will have proved their greatness.

The challenge has been met, largely under and through your leadership, and I bestow the tribute of greatness.

I also have great confidence in the dependable qualities of my own nation.

I believe that if our two peoples can work together for the future as, happily, we have during recent years, then we can look hopefully to the future.

Your letter portrays one interpretation of the Geneva Conference. It may be, no doubt it is, the interpretation which many are giving it. It is not, however, the interpretation of the President and myself, and I do not think that it is the correct interpretation.

---

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Strictly Confidential. Secret; Personal and Private.

[2] For text, see *Erinnerungen*, pp. 478–480.

Let us first of all remember that the present policies of the Soviet Union are born not out of its strength, but out of its weakness; not out of its successes, but out of its failures. It was they, not we, who made extraordinary efforts to bring the Summit Conference about.

Mr. Molotov, in his San Francisco speech, listed the steps which they had taken—the Austrian Treaty, the pilgrimage to Belgrade, the May 10 disarmament proposals, the invitation to you and the offer to make peace with Japan.[3] Also, concertedly, all Soviet officials changed their demeanor to one of cordiality toward Western officials. It may be said that much of this was spurious and without substance. Of course it was. But even so, the sum total is a striking measure of their anxiety for a change of pace.

Why did they want this?

The reasons, I think, are fairly obvious. Their foreign policies of toughness and hostility had failed. The resiliency and unity of the free nations had been increasingly demonstrated through eight years of cold war. The climax was their effort to bring about the defeat of the London–Paris Accords,[4] and when this effort failed, it was obvious that they had to resort to different policies.

This need was accentuated by their domestic situation, where there was obvious strain. They were trying to maintain a military establishment which would equal that of the United States in terms of modern weapons and means of delivery, and they were also trying to maintain a vast army of foot soldiers. At the same time, they were trying to develop, in a spectacular way, their capital plant.

All of this involved an abnormal diversion of productivity away from consumers' goods—manufactured and agricultural. While perhaps no immediate crisis existed, it was obvious that they could not maintain their present pace indefinitely, and that they needed at least a respite during which they could give their people more of what they craved. They needed what we in NATO two years ago called a "long haul" policy as against emergency policies which were an excessive drain on the economy.

If it was the Soviets who particularly wanted the "spirit of Geneva"—and that, I think, is demonstrable—it is probable that they will pay something more than the prepayments Molotov listed in order to preserve this spirit. How much they will yet pay remains to be seen. But it is certainly the intention of the United States to press them in this respect.

---

[3] For text of Molotov's speech on June 22, see *Tenth Anniversary*, pp. 103–115.

[4] For text of the Paris Agreements signed in October 1954, see *Foreign Relations*, 1952–1954, vol. v, Part 2, pp. 1435 ff.

The President and I do not consider that the "spirit of Geneva" means acquiescence in the status quo or the perpetuation of present injustices, notably the partition of Germany, the satellite rule and the reduction of hundreds of millions of people to what, by our standards, is slave labor. It is our intention to make our views in this respect perfectly clear. The President will, I think, soon speak out on this subject. Above all, we expect to make the unification of Germany the touchstone. If it is not possible to make some concrete progress along this line at the October Geneva Conference, then there will be a serious question as to whether "the spirit of Geneva" can be preserved so far as we are concerned.

You mention the fact that the present Soviet mood is less favorable to the unification of Germany than it was at Berlin.[5] That is not my estimate of the situation. The "spirit of Geneva" has deprived the Soviets of their stock arguments for holding on to East Germany for purposes of "security". The fact that the Soviets are announcing a large reduction of their armed forces because, they say, tension has been relaxed not only proves their need for a greater productive labor force, but also provides us with a cogent argument for the unification of Germany because, by the Soviets' own admission, the "security" situation has been improved.

I do believe that the Russians are worried about how to dispose of the GDR and are fearful that, if they pull the rug out from under the GDR, that will greatly weaken their position in all of Eastern Europe. They are, I think, the more concerned because their "peace" with Tito may encourage Tito in the thought that some of these satellites, e.g. Hungary, may be brought to follow his example and establish, in association with Yugoslavia, a Communist nationalistic bloc competitive with the bloc that Moscow rules.

I believe that the unification of Germany is, as I put it at a recent press conference, "in the air" and that we must keep it there. I was struck by the fact that, in Chou En-lai's recent major speech of July 30, he talked about the unification of Germany in terms quite different from that of the Soviet Union. He put the unification of Germany first and European security second. I enclose a copy of that part of his speech in case you do not have it.[6]

Let me mention, in passing, that we do not have any confirmation of what you refer to as the news that the Russians are stationing troops in Hungary and in Czechoslovakia. Even if this were true, which we doubt, it would be an evidence of fear not of confidence.

---

[5] For documentation on the Four-Power Conference held at Berlin in January and February 1954, see *ibid.*, vol. VII, Part 1, pp. 601 ff.

[6] Not printed; for text of this speech, see *People's China*, August 16, 1955, pp. 3–8.

I, too, have spent some time in studying Russian history, particularly since 1917. I agree that they reckon with long periods—as Lenin and Stalin often put it, an entire historical era. But it is also true that they teach the tactics of retreat, in order to gain a respite, and if they now want this respite, which seems to be the case, we have, I think, a possibility of getting the unification of Germany as the price they must pay. Whether, and how quickly, they will pay that price remains to be seen. But I think there is a good chance that unification, on your terms, can be achieved in a couple of years if we are stout.

So far as the United States is concerned, we do not intend "the spirit of Geneva" to mean either that the Soviet rulers can conduct covert aggression with impunity, or that we should abandon our strength and vigilance and thus expose ourselves to future overt attack, or that we should abandon our collective security arrangements, or that we should accept the status quo of injustice, of which a most glaring example is the division of Germany.

I do not yet know how fully the United Kingdom and France will make their policy accord with ours but so far there is every reason to hope and believe that they will, particularly if you yourself give the lead. If we can all work together in this spirit, then I feel confident that we are on the eve of better things.

It occurred to me that it might be useful if Livie Merchant should come to Bonn to have private and informal talks with you before you go to Moscow. He is very experienced in these matters and played a leading part in the Geneva Conference, ranking on our Delegation only after the President and myself. I would like to come myself but I am afraid that would be a bit too conspicuous, and embarrassing rather than helpful. But Livie can speak from intimate knowledge of our highest-level thinking.

If you think Merchant's trip would be useful, I suggest you send me a private message as to what day would be convenient for him to be with you.

I talked over all of these matters with President Eisenhower yesterday (Sunday) before he left for Denver. We are in complete accord on the point of view which I express here. The President has asked me to transmit to you his very warm greetings and his expression of great confidence.

With my own best wishes, I am, dear Chancellor Adenauer,

Always faithfully yours,

John Foster Dulles[7]

---

[7] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

267. Paper Prepared in the Department of State[1]

Washington, August 15, 1955.

UNITED STATES POST-GENEVA POLICY

1. The unconcealed anxiety of Soviet rulers to obtain a "relaxing" of tension with the Western world came about, we believe, not because of any change in their basic purposes but because of their own need, external and internal, for new policies.

(a) Externally, the "tough" foreign policies of the Soviet Union were producing diminishing or counter-productive results. The ten years of cold war, including hot war in Korea, had been met by unity and resiliency on the part of the free nations. A final proof of the ineffectiveness of Soviet policies of hostility was the inability of the Soviet Union, by rough tactics, to block the consummation of the London–Paris Accords on Western European unity.

(b) Internally, the Soviet Union faced a heavy task in seeking to maintain a vast military establishment, both in terms of footsoldiers and in terms of modern weapons and means of delivery. The burden can be appreciated when it is recalled that the industrial base of the Soviet Union is less than one-third of the United States and that its agricultural production is not keeping pace with its population growth. The Soviet leaders have been attempting to expand rapidly, even sensationally, their industrial base through vast capital expenditures. This has accentuated the diversion of economic effort away from consumers goods, manufactured and agricultural. This has not produced a crisis, but it was an economic distortion which could not be endured indefinitely. Apparently, Soviet policies needed to be adjusted to what the West, two years earlier, had defined as the need for a "long haul" basis. There has been cumulative evidence that Soviet leaders would like at least a temporary period when they could meet more fully the craving of their people for better living conditions.

2. When Soviet opposition to the London–Paris Accords became doomed to failure, the Soviet leaders took in rapid succession a series of steps which doubtless had been prepared well in advance for possible use in this contingency. These steps were listed by Molotov in his San Francisco speech of June 22, 1955; and included notably the signature of the Austrian Treaty, the pilgrimage to Belgrade to make peace with Tito, the invitation to Adenauer, the May tenth disarma-

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/8–1755. Confidential. No drafting information is given on the source text. According to a memorandum of conversation by Dulles, dated August 15, this paper grew out of a meeting with Streibert and Allen Dulles at which the Secretary expounded his views on the significance of Geneva and post-Geneva policy. (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President) It was discussed and approved by the President on August 15 and sent to all U.S. posts and to interested agencies within the U.S. Government on the same day.

ment proposals, and the offer to Japan to conclude a peace treaty. Also, all Soviet officials concertedly altered their social demeanor to one of apparent cordiality toward others.

3. These moves were designed to meet, and did measurably meet, the Western demand for "deeds" as a prerequisite to a meeting at the "summit"—a meeting which Sir Winston Churchill had suggested two years earlier (May 1953) and which had caught the public imagination.[2]

4. It was foreseen by the United States that the Geneva "Summit" conference would create a new atmosphere, barring a complete failure which was, of course, not desired. In a memorandum of July 6, 1955, the Secretary of State listed "Soviet Goals at Geneva" and put as their presumed first goal "An appearance that the West concede the Soviet rulers a moral and social equality".[3] He added "The Soviet will probably make considerable gains in this respect". We accepted this consequence with our eyes open. We knew that it would create problems, but less problems than to refuse to confer. We also foresaw that the meeting could be made to create opportunities.

5. Geneva has certainly created problems for the free nations. For eight years they have been held together largely by a cement compounded of fear and a sense of moral superiority. Now the fear is diminished and the moral demarcation is somewhat blurred. There is some bewilderment among leaders and peoples of the free nations as to what happened at Geneva, and as to how to adjust to the new situation.

6. It is the view of the United States that nothing that has yet occurred justifies the free world relaxing its vigilance or substantially altering its programs for collective security. The strength sought has never been excessive and the unity sought has never been aggressive.

We must assume that the Soviet leaders consider their recent change of policy to be an application of the classic Communist maneuver known as "zig zag", i.e., resort to "tactics of retreat" "to buy off a powerful enemy and gain a respite" (Stalin). We must not be caught by any such maneuver.

On the other hand, it is possible that what the Soviet rulers design as a maneuver may in fact assume the force of an irreversible trend. Our own conduct should be to encourage that to happen, without at the same time setting up, on our side, an irreversible trend toward accommodation which would expose us to grave danger if the

---

[2] For text of Prime Minister Churchill's proposal, made to the House of Commons, May 11, 1953, see *H.C. Debs.*, 5th series, vol. 515, cols. 883–898.

[3] This memorandum listed nine goals which the Soviet Union would try to achieve at the Summit Conference. (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, International File)

Soviets pursue covertly, or later resume overtly, their aggressive designs.

Thus, within carefully controlled limits, we shall pursue the policy of reciprocating the present Soviet attitude and demeanor, and of according the Soviet leaders a certain relaxation which *they* want. But we shall not now alter our basic programs, and we shall strive for some of the things which we want in the interest of international order and justice.

7. The United States does not acquiesce in the present power position of the Soviet Union in Europe or in those policies of the Soviet Union which have made Soviet rule justifiably feared and hated in most of the world. There are gross international injustices which need to be corrected. Human freedoms need to be restored in the vast areas where they are now denied. Soviet military threats and subversive efforts still create an intolerable sense of insecurity and a diversion of effort from creative purposes. Particularly to be noted are: the unnatural partition of Germany now in its second decade; the denial of a truly independent national existence to the satellite states, many with a long, proud record of national existence; the subjugation of hundreds of millions of people to what, by our standards, are slave labor conditions; and the subversive activities promoted through the underground apparatus of International Communism.

8. The spirit which the United States contributed to produce at Geneva is designed to promote a change in these conditions by depriving the Soviet leaders of the former "security" excuses for their present policies and by affording them a slight foretaste of the better life their nation can lead if it follows more decent policies.

As the risk of war has diminished, so have become downgraded the security reasons which are the pretext for the Russians holding on to East Germany and maintaining a tight rule over the satellite countries. Also, we believe that the relaxing of tension resulting from Geneva should bring the Soviet-ruled people to expect, and to receive, consumer goods representing a much higher percentage of the product of their labor.

9. It will be the policy of the United States in coming months to emphasize these aspects of Geneva and, particularly at the October Conference of Foreign Ministers, to test the willingness of the Soviet leaders to move toward the unification of Germany and the elimination of barriers which now serve to deprive the Soviet bloc countries of normal contacts with the outside world. Both of these matters will be on the agenda of the Foreign Ministers Conference.

Also, both at the Foreign Ministers Meeting and at the United Nations, we shall press for such reciprocal inspection procedures as will greatly reduce the risk of surprise attack and lay the basis for ending the build-up of armaments. We regard the President's proposal for aerial inspection as not merely imaginative but thoroughly realistic.

We shall also watch closely for signs of evolution in the satellites toward greater independence. Both the President and the Secretary of State at Geneva told Bulganin and Khrushchev that the satellite states would be watched as a barometer of Soviet real intentions. We shall also observe closely the activities of International Communism to see whether the tempo is reduced.

We shall seek to bring the Soviet leadership to the realization that our government and people will expect some developments along these lines, and that their failure to occur will inevitably undermine the atmosphere generated at Geneva and lead to revival of the old state of distrust and tension.

10. We believe that the Soviet leaders will not want this reversion and that they will pay some appreciable price to avoid it. Just how much they will pay or how soon they will pay it, remains to be seen. The October Foreign Ministers Conference will provide one significant opportunity to gain insight as to this.

11. In sum, we do not consider that relaxation of tension and a more peaceful atmosphere permit us either to scrap programs for individual and collective self-defense, or to tolerate covert aggression and to sanctify the injustices of the status quo. Rather the spirit of Geneva means an opportunity for peaceful change which will dispel fear and remedy injustices. Therefore, if the atmosphere of Geneva is perverted by the Soviet leaders either into a cover for covert aggression or into an excuse for perpetuating present injustices, then that atmosphere cannot continue.

12. We believe that the initiative for peace, security and justice, which was seized by the Western Powers at Geneva in July, particularly by President Eisenhower, can be and should be maintained by resourcefully implementing the broad policy here outlined.

---

268. Memorandum of a Conversation, Dulles' Residence, Washington, August 28, 1955, 10 a.m.[1]

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary
Mr. MacArthur, C
Mr. Merchant, EUR

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 551. Secret. Drafted by Kidd on September 16. Circulated as POM MC–20.

Mr. Kidd, GPA
Mr. Appling, S/S–RO
Ambassador Krekeler of Germany

Ambassador Krekeler conveyed the Chancellor's greetings from Murren. The Secretary commented that we must keep pushing and pushing on the German unification issue, and asked what the Chancellor's plans were for Moscow.

The Ambassador said that at the special meeting of the Chancellor's advisors at Muerren, they had spent the greater part of an entire day (August 23?) working on the Chancellor's opening statement. The German plans envisaged this visit purely as a preliminary contact. No substantive decisions were expected. Minister of Economics Erhardt would not be a member of the delegation, as an indication that no material agreements were contemplated even in the field of trade. The Germans had in mind the establishment of four commissions as a means of maintaining contact with the Soviets while the various problems were being worked out:

(1) A commission on economic matters;
(2) A commission on cultural matters;
(3) A commission on PW's and detainees;
(4) A commission for general political questions, such as the resumption of diplomatic relations and related questions (unification, European security, etc).

If the Soviets did not agree, if there were no progress at all on the questions of PW's and reunification, the Germans would not be disposed to have full diplomatic relations, but merely to exchange "diplomatic agents".

The Secretary asked whether the Political Commission would include reunification. Krekeler said yes: "diplomatic relations, reunification and related questions". In the German view, fully satisfactory or normal relations could not be expected so long as the country remained divided.

The Secretary said that it was important to stress the point of reunification from the start. Krekeler said that this would be mentioned in the Chancellor's opening statement, in which the Chancellor would point out that there was an obligation upon the four Powers to reestablish German unity.

The Secretary asked Mr. Merchant whether there was not something in the Directive to the Foreign Ministers[2] about the "responsibility of the four Powers". Mr. Merchant said yes.

Krekeler said that the reference in the Chancellor's speech would be pointed to the forthcoming Geneva conference as the proper forum for solution of the question. The second point which the Chancellor would make was the responsibility of the German people for their internal and external status. And a third point: the link between the restoration of unity and European security. The Chancellor would then endeavor to show the Soviets that reunification would be to their advantage. He would mention the dangers of unrest that would arise from the continuation of the split. The point might be brought home to the Soviets that such divisions nourish nationalism, as the examples of Alsace-Lorraine after 1870 and the Saar. These nationalistic movements could turn against the Soviets. The Germans were not at all optimistic about their arguments, but thought that if a beginning were made, perhaps in the long run the Soviets could be convinced that German unification was also in their interest. The Chancellor would also include in his opening statement a reference to the defensive character of WEU and the German renunciation of certain armaments. The Chancellor would avoid any detailed discussion of a security system, as something that fell within the province of the four Powers. He would, however, be interested in learning our views, how far we had come with our study of the British and the Heusinger proposals.[3]

---

[2] Document 257.

The Secretary said that he felt that these ideas had rather dropped into the background. He wondered whether Adenauer felt strongly about such proposals as a demilitarized zone.

Krekeler said that the Germans had put forward their ideas merely as a possible contribution to the thinking on the subject.

The Secretary said that the idea of a demilitarized zone appeared risky to him. It would create a vacuum. Once the principles were accepted, it would be hard to draw the line. He thought that limitations of forces with provisions for some form of inspection might be more useful concepts. He recalled that even Eden had not pushed the proposal for demilitarized zone at Geneva. He did not know whether there had been any recent developments along these lines, but he hardly considered it a feasible subject for discussion at Moscow.

Krekeler repeated that the idea had been advanced only as a contribution that the Germans might make, since they were obviously in no position to say anything about inspections etc. He thought that the Chancellor would probably not be insistent upon the idea.

The Secretary said that so far the three Western Governments had been doing their homework on these subjects. There had not yet been any meetings to draw the threads together. Mr. Merchant's trip would give the process a start.[4] There were no agreed positions as yet.

---

[3] For text of the Eden Plan, FPM(54)17, dated January 29, 1954, see *Foreign Relations, 1952–1954*, vol. VII, Part 1, p. 1177. Regarding the Heusinger proposals, see footnote 3, Document 138.

Krekeler said that Adenauer had no intention of discussing these matters at Moscow, but would be interested in the US views.

The Secretary thought that it would be useful for Merchant to give the Chancellor our ideas. While the problem was largely one for the three Powers and the Soviets, the importance of the German role should not be ignored. The Germans would be a major factor in this aspect. As the Secretary had hinted in his letter to the Chancellor,[5] occasions might arise where if the Germans and the US were in agreement, the British and French would come along. The possible participation of the Federal Republic in these security questions would be welcome and desirable.

Krekeler said that he would inform the Chancellor that the Secretary in general approved of the German positions, including the political commission.

The Secretary reflected that it was difficult to make a strong appeal to reason with the Communists, as to why they should agree on unification. He thought that often an emotional appeal carried more weight than one to cold reason. It was important for the Soviets to receive the impression that by sitting on top of the German situation, there might be an explosion. As the President had said, if there is not peaceful change, then violent change; but one cannot stop change. This need not be uttered as in any sense a threat, but as a law of life. There has got to be some solution, or despite all the efforts of statesmen there will be explosions. June 17th in Berlin was an example.[6] This was a spontaneous event, and unpreventable despite all the Soviet arms at hand. The Secretary thought that perhaps the strongest rational appeal was that the peace of Europe can only be founded upon greater European unity. The separateness of the European nations was in large part a cause of the past wars. There are three choices: either a united Germany integrated with the West; a Germany identified with the East, or a Germany endeavoring to stand in between. The last seemed unthinkable, and would moreover be a contributing cause of conflict. Therefore it was necessary to choose between East and West. But the Federal Republic, representing three-fourths of Germany, had already cast its lot with the West; and it was unthinkable that this might be reversed. Germany was always a Western European country. With regard to the question "where will Germany's integration take place?", there was admittedly a theoretical choice, but not a practical choice. If anyone tried to block its choice of the West, the most that could happen would be to drive Germany into the dangerous third position of trying to balance between East and West. That is the heart of the matter. Such reasoning would probably not appeal to Moscow; but it was true; and there was no harm in saying it.

---

[4] Regarding Merchant's trip to Europe, see Documents 270 and 271.

[5] Document 266.

[6] For documentation on the uprising in East Berlin, June 17, 1953, see *Foreign Relations*, 1952–1954, vol. VII, Part 2, pp. 1544 ff.

The Secretary was still of opinion that if it were not for the problem (for the Soviets) of the GDR, much progress would be possible toward unification in the context of a European security system. He felt that after the Austrian Treaty and the reconciliation with Belgrade, the Soviets probably did not dare face the liquidation of the GDR. We had no way of meeting this. The Soviets were fighting a rear-guard action. They cannot stop it. Sooner or later they will realize that they had better accept more independence and greater conditions of freedom for the satellite states in their orbit than eventual enemies. The United States has no desire for a cordon sanitaire of enemy states to the Soviet Union. It is up to the Russians whether they create this themselves.

Krekeler said that the Chancellor was also concerned about the Saar. Perhaps we had noticed the strong statement of the CDU (rather than the Chancellor personally) in favor of acceptance of the Saar Statute.[7]

The Secretary and Mr. Merchant replied that it had been a good statement.

Krekeler said that the statement had criticized Hoffmann, but also the opponents of the Statute.

The Secretary asked what was likely to happen.

Krekeler said that it was still an open question. Public opinion polls indicated that there might be a majority against, but he believed that it was still an open question. The population was angry with Hoffmann and confused the two issues.

The Secretary said that it would be very awkward if the Statute were rejected.

Krekeler said the the CDU statement was strong, it could not be more so at present.

Mr. Merchant said that a question had occurred to him regarding the proposed Political Commission mentioned by the Ambassador earlier. He thought that there was a problem of drafting in connection with the terms of reference of the Political Commission. Obviously the Chancellor must keep the reunification issue in the forefront, but the terms of reference must be carefully framed in order to control the proponents of bilateral negotiations rather than four Power.

---

[7] For text of the Saar Statute, signed at Paris, October 23, 1954, see *Documents* (R.I.I.A.) for 1954, pp. 116–118.

Krekeler said that he thought this was taken care of by the Chancellor's opening statement.

Merchant said that the people who read the final communiqué might not have read, or remembered, the opening statement.

The Secretary said that we should avoid being whip-sawed, with the Soviets claiming that it is a matter for bilateral negotiation with the Germans. The Germans must indeed continue to press for reunification, but the role of a German-Soviet continuing commission in relation to the four-Power work at Geneva could be tricky.

Mr. MacArthur said that this was particularly so with regard to Soviet negotiating tactics. This was just the sort of thing they would take advantage of, and move in on, and put their hooks into.

The Secretary commented that the problem could be handled by some such formula as "the Commission will work on this in aid of the work of the Foreign Ministers". We had to press for reunification and it would appear odd if the Political Commission did not deal with the subject; nevertheless, in a supplementary manner rather than as a substitute for the four Powers.

Krekeler asked whether, if the visit went sour on the second or third day, the Secretary would be prepared to give Mr. Reschke (chief correspondent for German News Agency) a written interview answering two or three questions to the effect that "this was a bad sign, a bad omen for Geneva, where we had hoped to make progress". Krekeler said that this might prove most helpful. Mr. Reschke could send his questions to Duck Island.

The Secretary asked: While Adenauer was still there? One of the great difficulties with respect to the Soviets was that one never knew where they were going to come out until the last hour. They were able negotiators of a certain type; whether it was a good type was another question. At Berlin, only half an hour before adjournment, they had given in on the question of participation of the Chinese Communists.[8]

Krekeler said that the Chancellor was concerned about contact with us during the Geneva negotiations. The Secretary said that this should be even closer than before and that the modalities would be considered carefully.

---

[8] For documentation on the Four-Power Conference at Berlin, January–February 1954, see *Foreign Relations*, 1952–1954, vol. VII, Part 1, pp. 601 ff.

269. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, August 31, 1955[1]

SUBJECT

Preparations for the Geneva Meeting of the Four Foreign Ministers

PARTICIPANTS

US	*French*
The Secretary	Ambassador Couve de Murville
The Under Secretary	M. Jacques Vimont, Minister
Mr. MacArthur	
Mr. Bowie	*UK*
Mr. Phleger	Sir Robert Scott, British Minister
Mr. Beam	Mr. Adam Watson, Counselor
Mr. Galloway	

The Secretary said that he had asked the French Ambassador and Sir Robert Scott to call because he thought it would be useful to discuss in a preliminary way the problem of European Security in the context of the forthcoming Geneva meeting. He noted that the Department had received some papers from the British Embassy which set forth the present British line of thinking.[2] He said that he and his principal advisers had also been giving thought to this problem and had produced a draft European Security treaty which might be considered on the assumption that Germany is reunified.

The Secretary said he thought that we should contemplate putting forward a definitive proposal for the reunification of Germany at the Geneva meeting and that the discussion on European Security should take place only within this context of German reunification. As for the proposal on German reunification, it would be necessary to bring the Eden Plan up-to-date, with such additional specifications as might be necessary.

The Secretary then gave copies of a draft European Security Treaty, together with a commentary thereon and a paper setting forth general U.S. views on the European Security problem (POM D–1/1, D–1/2 and D–1/3[3]), to the British and French representatives

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 551. Top Secret. Drafted by Galloway. Circulated as POM (Wash) MC–10, September 1.

[2] Reference is to a British paper on a European security pact and a draft five-power treaty, dated August 15, handed to Merchant by Makins on August 18, and a paper on the limitation and control of forces and armaments and a demilitarized zone, dated August 20, given to the Department on August 29. Copies of these papers, circulated as POM B–1/50, August 18, and POM B–1/53, August 29, are *ibid.*, CF 547.

[3] The draft European security treaty, POM D–1/1, dated August 29, contained 14 articles and included Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, France, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, the Soviet Union, the United

Continued

and briefly explained the background considerations of some aspects of the draft treaty. He said the draft treaty really had two main parts. The first part was designed to carry out that provision of the directive to the Foreign Ministers[4] relating to renunciation of the use of force and providing for denial of assistance to any state violating the obligation not to use force. The draft treaty actually goes further in that it contains a provision of the directive to the Foreign Ministers relating to renunciation of the use of force and providing for denial of assistance to any state violating the obligation not to use force. The draft treaty actually goes further in that it contains a provision that an act of aggression would be considered as a danger to the peace and security of the Parties and that the Parties would take action in accordance with their constitutional processes to meet the situation. In devising this provision, care had been taken to make clear that it would be operative only in the case of an attack against the NATO powers which were Parties to the treaty or by the NATO powers against any of the other Parties to the treaty. The provision would not apply in the case of an attack by one of the eastern Parties against another eastern Party.

The second main aspect of the draft treaty was designed to meet the other part of the directive to the Foreign Ministers regarding the limitation, control and inspection of forces within a given area. The draft took as a starting point the present area covered by the Brussels Treaty, assuming a reunified Germany as part of this area, and added to this an area contiguous and approximately equivalent in size to the east. In the western part of this area, the forces would be limited in accordance with the limitations prevailing under the Brussels Treaty, and US and Canadian forces would be limited approximately in accordance with existing strengths in the area. There would be agreed limitations on forces stationed in the eastern part of the area. (At this point the Secretary explained that in the draft that he had passed out, we had been careful not to deal with the Warsaw Pact as such, since that would imply an equality between the Warsaw Pact and the Brussels Pact or NATO, which we wished to avoid.) The draft provides for initial and periodic reporting on levels of forces and changes in dispositions and strengths, with a provision for consultation in regard to changes. It provides for verification of this reporting by means of aerial and ground inspection. The Secretary

---

Kingdom, and the United States as signatories. The U.S. views on the draft treaty, POM D-1/2, dated August 29, started from the premise that a general European security treaty was justified only when Germany had been reunited and had joined NATO and WEU. The commentary, POM D-1/3, dated August 29, reviewed the draft treaty article by article and provided an explanation for the language or ideas in each. Copies of these documents are *ibid.*

[4] Document 257.

noted that the treaty would place no limits on UK, US and Canadian forces not in the area defined, nor would it place any limitations on Soviet forces outside the defined area. He said he thought the concept of the area was a justifiable one, and although a case might be developed for changing or contracting the area, it had seemed logical to start with an existing zone, the Brussels Treaty area, and specify a roughly equivalent area to the east.

To Sir Robert Scott's question, the Secretary explained that Austria and Yugoslavia were not in the defined area, nor were any of the NATO countries except for those which were members of the Brussels Pact.

The French Ambassador asked if the limits on forces in the defined area would apply to all forces in the area, noting that under the Brussels Pact, the limits applied only to those forces in the area assigned to SACEUR. The Secretary replied that under the concept of the present draft, the limits would apply to all forces in the defined area but not to French forces in North Africa.

Sir Robert Scott said that he had been instructed to make clear certain points in relation to the two British papers which had been given to the Department and to the French Foreign Office. These papers presupposed a reunified Germany or at least that the act of reunification would be completed before any European Security pact or treaty would enter into force. In this connection, Sir Robert noted that it had been agreed by the three governments that a reunified Germany should be free to make her own alliances. Referring to the draft treaty which the Secretary had just given to him, Sir Robert noted that it made explicit that a reunified Germany would be a member of NATO as well as the Brussels Pact.

The Secretary replied that we fully understood that a reunified Germany would be free to make her own choice, but that unless Germany elected to be in NATO and the Brussels Pact, a new situation would obtain and a treaty such as the present draft would not apply.

Sir Robert then referred to the paper prepared by the British Joint Chiefs of Staff relating to inspection of forces within a specific zone. He explained that the concept of this paper was that the proposal could be carried out whether or not Germany was reunified. The paper was limited in scope and had been intended to suggest only a practical experiment in disarmament in the context of inspection and control of forces within a specified area. It was the UK view that if real progress were made on the question of European Security, then the pilot inspection proposal would be unnecessary. Sir Anthony Eden had in fact explained this proposal before the House of Commons and drew attention to the fact that it was very limited in scope.[5] Sir Robert went on to say that the UK Government was alive to the consideration that this proposal should not be handled in any way that might compromise the negotiations on European Security and was aware of the need for coordination between the three governments. The Secretary said that he understood that Sir Anthony Eden had put forward this suggestion as a pilot test case in disarmament that might be undertaken. However, he asked that Sir Robert let Mr. Macmillan know that he felt it was dangerous to contemplate that such an experiment might take place in the area proposed. He feared that since such a proposal would in fact deal, although in a limited way, with the matter of European Security, it would be interpreted by the Russians as meaning that the question of European Security could be developed apart from the reunification of Germany. A second drawback was that such a project would have to be conducted under conditions of a divided Germany, thereby encouraging the Germans to feel that we accepted the division of Germany as a more or less permanent fact. The proposal might also give sanctity to the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet hold on East Germany and the satellites. The Secretary felt that if such a pilot project were to be conducted, it should be in an area not subject to political hazards such as are inherent in the German area. It might be done in relation to Norway or Turkey where there were national boundaries to deal with rather than divided countries.

There was then discussion of how the representatives of the three governments should proceed in their further preparatory work. The Secretary noted that not much time was left and that it would be necessary to move quickly so as to draw together the lines of thinking of the three governments. Mr. MacArthur noted that the Department, after further study, would wish to comment on the UK papers, and he assumed that both the British and French Governments would wish to study and comment on papers which we had given to them. He thought it would be useful for further exchanges of views to take place between now and September 19 when the working group was due to convene.

The Secretary remarked that he thought it would be most useful for the discussions to proceed as quickly as possible and that every effort be made to work out common approaches to the various questions in advance of the Foreign Ministers meeting in New York. The more the various views could be brought together in advance, the more useful would be the Foreign Ministers discussions in New York.

---

[5] For text of Eden's speech in the House of Commons on July 27, reporting on the Geneva Conference and describing the inspection proposals, see *H.C. Debs.*, 5th series, vol. 544, cols. 1212–1221.

Mr. Watson then said he would like to ask a question in regard to tactics. He wondered whether a draft European Security Treaty should be put forward at the outset of the Geneva Conference. He said he thought that the British Foreign Office saw the problem in two aspects: the first was the development of a European security pattern which the Western powers would hope ultimately to achieve, and the second was the tactical question of just what and when anything specific should be put forward at Geneva.

The Secretary said he thought Mr. Watson had identified a very real problem. He said that he had felt in the past that the Soviets, on numerous occasions, had gained the initiative by laying specific proposals on the table, even though these proposals were designed more for propaganda purposes than otherwise. The Western powers were less prone to act in this manner. Actually, it was more difficult for them to do so because it was necessary to reach agreement among the three before definite steps could be taken, whereas, for the Soviet Union it was simple since a proposal could be put in for propaganda purposes and then quickly changed in any way they deemed necessary simply by the decision of one man.

The Secretary believed, however, that the Western powers should be ready to put in a specific proposal on the reunification of Germany. He thought that such a proposal would not be difficult to develop since the Western powers had progressed to an advanced stage on this question at Berlin. The only further work required would be to bring the Eden Plan up-to-date.

The Secretary thought further consideration needed to be given to the tactical problem of whether the West should accompany the proposal on German reunification with a European Security plan or let the Soviet Union come forward with proposals on European Security. It might be desirable that the Western powers develop a skeletonized proposal on European Security rather than a specific draft treaty. The Secretary thought, however, that whatever the decision in regard to tactics, it was necessary that the three Western powers reach agreement among themselves on the substance of the European security questions. It would be dangerous not to reach full agreement among the three powers just because for tactical reasons the full substance of the Western position might not be used at Geneva. In this connection the Secretary noted that it might possibly prove unnecessary at Geneva to put forward specific proposals on European security, since the Soviet Union might not move past the initial premise of the Western position, i.e., a reunified Germany within NATO and the Brussels Pact as a precondition to a European security arrangement. On the other hand, we must be prepared to put forward positive proposals. As for possible results at Geneva, the Secretary noted that he did not expect that agreement would be achieved at Geneva to reunify Germany but he was hopeful of making real progress along this road.

The British and French representatives signified their agreement with the Secretary's remarks.

The Secretary reverted briefly to the U.S. draft treaty to say that it had received the concurrence of the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He also noted that various details, such as those relating to inspection, verification, etc., obviously would need to be more fully developed.

Mr. Phleger then said he thought it would be useful if some thought were given to the other matters with which the Foreign Ministers would be faced at Geneva. He had in mind the question of German representation at Geneva. Also, there was the problem of how the actual work would be carried on. Should panels be set up to work on the various items on the directive?

The Secretary said that with relation to the question of German representation, he believed the three governments should not attempt to form any definite views until Chancellor Adenauer had returned from his Moscow visit. He thought the Chancellor's views on this question would be determinative and that the three governments would be able to agree with whatever arrangement the Chancellor desired.

With respect to the possibility of setting up panels to deal with the different items in the directive, the Secretary believed that in regard to item 1—European Security and German reunification—there should be no separation of the two problems. They had been combined only after great difficulty at the Heads of Government meeting, and it would be most unwise to separate them for study by different panels since that would weaken the position which we had gone to such great pains to establish.

With respect to the second item—disarmament—work would be proceeding in the United Nations Subcommittee. The Foreign Ministers were directed only to take note of the developments and see whether there was something further they could contribute. If progress were being made in the United Nations Subcommittee, the Foreign Ministers at Geneva might deal with this item very quickly. One possibility would be to have the four governments' representatives on the Disarmament Subcommittee report to the Foreign Ministers, and the matter might be disposed of in a perfunctory way unless the Soviets tried to shift the emphasis away from the United Nations back to the Foreign Ministers. They originally tried to do this at Geneva and finally agreed to proceed in the United Nations forum only after determined resistance to their original proposal was encountered.

With respect to the third item—East-West contacts—the Secretary thought it might be handled by a panel of experts or deputies. He said that we were now trying to organize our own work within the U.S. Government on this matter and would have clearer ideas about it later. The French Ambassador pointed out that the directive authorized the Foreign Ministers to deal with this item by means of experts. He supposed that the Foreign Minister might wish to appoint experts who would proceed with their work after the Foreign Ministers had met. Mr. MacArthur said that there were two possibilities: Experts could be appointed immediately after the opening of the Geneva Conference and instructed to meet while the Ministers were discussing the first two items and make a report before the Ministers finished their work, or experts could be appointed to meet after the Foreign Ministers had completed their work. The Secretary thought that some work should be done on this item during the conference, otherwise public expectations might not be adequately met. The general consensus was that the preferable course probably would be to have experts begin their work during the Foreign Ministers conference and perhaps continue, if necessary, after the Foreign Ministers adjourned.

The Secretary made clear that the views which he had expressed indicated the present line of his thinking and should not be taken as final and definitive.[6]

---

[6] On August 30 Merchant discussed the draft European security treaty with Pinay, de Margerie, and Crouy-Chanel in Paris. Merchant outlined the major points of the proposal and then talked about Adenauer's upcoming trip to Moscow. Memoranda of his conversations are included as Items I and II of POM MC-12 (Europe). (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 547)

---

270. Memorandum of a Conversation, Palais Schaumberg, Bonn, August 31, 1955, Noon[1]

PARTICIPANTS

Chancellor Adenauer
Foreign Minister Brentano

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 551. Secret. Drafted by Kidd and O'Shaughnessy. Merchant was in Europe August 30–September 1 visiting Paris, Bonn, and London to discuss the U.S. draft European security treaty and Adenauer's upcoming trip to Moscow. Twelve memoranda on his talks, including this memorandum which is number VI, are included in a 36-page composite document that was circulated as POM MC-12 (Europe) within the Department of State. (*Ibid.*, CF 547) The first four memoranda cover the talks in Paris, memoranda V–X cover those in

Continued

State Secretary Hallstein
Ambassador Blankenhorn
Mr. Merchant
Mr. Dowling
Mr. O'Shaughnessy
Mr. Kidd
Chancellor's interpreter

The conversation which had been desultory and disorganized in the anteroom immediately became organized and to the point under the Chancellor's direction.[2] He was in a sunny, gentle, and confident frame of mind, pleased at the greetings Mr. Merchant conveyed on behalf of the Secretary and gratified at the Secretary's approval of the German plans. In explaining the framework in which he intended to touch upon the subject of German unification in his discussions with the Russians, the Chancellor asked Mr. Merchant to report to the Secretary that he would speak strictly as John the Baptist in the wilderness, making it plain to the Russians that they would receive the true gospel at Geneva. He would do all that he could not to prejudice the Geneva talks and not to give the Soviets a chance to point out the differences of opinion which might exist among the Western powers. He did not intend to make reunification the main topic in his Moscow talks because it is an item which properly belongs to the Geneva conference; besides, the reunification of Germany is the responsibility and obligation of the four occupying powers.

Mr. Merchant replied that the Secretary had heard from Ambassador Krekeler on the subject of the Moscow talks[3] and he fully approved the proposed tactics, and general approach which the Chancellor had in mind. The Secretary believed that reunification should be discussed and should be kept in the forefront of our activities and statements. The Secretary also agreed as to the responsibility resting on the Four Powers to achieve reunification and was glad to see the Chancellor attempt to reinforce and support the Geneva conference.

Mr. Merchant said that there was one minor point in the German plans, which Ambassador Krekeler had reported, that might require careful presentation, namely the Political Commission to deal with reunification and the establishment of diplomatic relations. Mr. Merchant said that although the reunification point should of course be pressed home, some misunderstanding might be created if this subject were named especially in the directive for the Political Commission, as though it were henceforth to be within the scope of bilat-

---

Bonn, and the last two describe conversations in London. Memoranda I and II are summarized in footnote 6, *supra;* memorandum XI is printed *infra.*

[2] This conversation was covered in memorandum V of POM MC-12 (Europe). (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 547)

[3] See Document 268.

eral negotiations rather than within the jurisdiction of the Four Powers at Geneva. The Chancellor said that he was glad Mr. Merchant had mentioned the point. Although Ambassador Krekeler had reported correctly as of the date he had left Muerren, there had since been an evolution in the German thinking on this detail, precisely to take care of the point raised by Mr. Merchant. They had decided to omit specific mention of reunification in the directive for a Political Commission, and to confine the stated purpose to establishment of diplomatic relations. Any political considerations, such as the German views on reunification and reservations regarding recognition of the Eastern frontiers, could be introduced as appropriate in the course of the Commission's deliberations.

Brentano said that the Political Commission would not be one in the true sense but only a device to discuss the establishment of diplomatic relations and other matters such as the recognition of the GDR and related problems.

The Chancellor said there was another problem which he would like to discuss. The Soviets would probably talk of a security system in which case the German delegation could only express good will but obviously could not enter into details of such a system until agreement had been achieved between the Four Powers on the form of it.

With regard to the question of economic relations, the Chancellor said that they would approach this matter with caution and reserve. He pointed out that some economic groups in Germany thought that the economic side of the talks should be emphasized. These individuals were not particularly pleased to see other western countries consolidate their economic relations with the Soviet Union and the Satellites at West Germany's eventual expense. On the whole, however, there was little in the Soviet trade that Germany needed.

Blankenhorn thought it would be of interest to the Chancellor if Mr. Merchant reported the conversation of the Soviet and Greek ambassadors in Paris, which de Margerie had mentioned. When Mr. Merchant reached the point about Vinogradoff's belief that the Soviet Government had already offered three substantial concessions—diplomatic relations, a trade treaty, and a cultural convention—the Chancellor laughed out loud. What, he demanded, could the Soviets offer them? The Germans were interested in two things, the return of German prisoners of war and detainees, and reunification. The Germans had not asked for diplomatic relations; they did not need Russian trade; and as for receiving cultural benefits from the Soviet Union—!

With respect to diplomatic relations, the Chancellor said that he was quite clear in his mind that if all the Soviets wanted to do was to normalize the abnormal situation of the two Germanies, there was not enough in it for the Federal Republic. He would be prepared to establish a contact and to appoint an agent with diplomatic powers, but there could be no true normalization as represented by full diplomatic relations so long as the Soviet Union maintained the GDR regime.

. . . .

Mr. Merchant said that we agreed that the Soviets were having their difficulties in trying to balance agriculture and industry, nuclear weapons, and ordinary weapons as well. He added that the combination of pressures on the Soviet system and the failure of their European policy requires continuing pressure to be applied on them. Geneva created the climate which made negotiation easier and it is up to the West to get into a position to make the Soviets pay a high price for any settlement. If no progress is made at the second Geneva conference and in the UN disarmament talks and the Russians continue to refuse to move in the right direction the Geneva spirit will evaporate. We must therefore continue to press them in the negotiations.

Turning to Mr. Merchant, the Chancellor said he would like to ask a direct question. He was going to Moscow with little hope of success; he thought that four days would be long enough to disclose whether there were any possibilities; and he did not wish to cut the thread which now connects them to the Russians since all the problems were interrelated. If, however, the Russians refused to satisfy them with regard to the prisoners of war, remained intransigent about reunification, or otherwise proved themselves impossible during the negotiations at Moscow, the Chancellor was prepared to break off the negotiations and return to Bonn; would Mr. Merchant approve? Mr. Merchant said Yes; it was his personal opinion that one should never enter into any negotiations with the Soviets unless he had some minimum acceptable point in mind beyond which he would be prepared to break. Mr. Merchant believed it improbable that the Russians would create such a situation. It would not be in their interest nor would they have extended the invitation if this had been their purpose; but he agreed that if the Soviets were adamant on these points there was no reason not to break off the negotiations. The Chancellor appeared very pleased with this answer.

Summing up, Blankenhorn said that it was not the German intention to reach final decisions, certainly none that might in any way prejudice the work of the Foreign Ministers at Geneva; and if the Germans met with an entirely unsatisfactory response, to break off negotiations if necessary. At the same time, they hoped that the latter contingency would not be necessary, and that they might establish a means of continuing contact with the Russians. This was what they had in mind with regard to the four Commissions which they would propose (Economic, Cultural, PW's, and Resumption of Diplomatic Relations). Their aim, thus, was something in between the two extremes of full relations and the present state of affairs where there were no relations whatsoever.

Hallstein thought that there was a possible middle solution between the two extremes of breaking off negotiations and establishing full relations. After the establishment of commissions to do the preparatory work for the establishment of diplomatic, cultural and economic relations, an agent with quasi diplomatic status could be established in Moscow. This would not represent normal diplomatic relations but it would provide for some form of relations while the commissions went about their work.

The Chancellor then raised the question of how to maintain contact with us, first, during the Moscow talks and, secondly, after they were terminated. Mr. Merchant suggested that relations could be easily maintained either through Ambassador Krekeler or through Ambassador Bohlen and since Dr. von Brentano is going to New York this might provide a good opportunity to exchange ideas following the Moscow talks.

Mr. Merchant then said that he would like to outline the Secretary's thinking with regard to a European security treaty, and leave a copy of the draft text,[4] if that would be of interest to the Chancellor. The Chancellor replied that they would be particularly grateful, as this would provide guidance for their talks at Moscow, not as something to be repeated to the Russians but to bear in mind in presenting the German case. Mr. Merchant then went over the treaty, point by point, as he had done for the French in Paris. He explained that the Secretary was transmitting copies to the British and French Ambassadors in Washington, and that the matter should be treated in confidence for the present. The Chancellor gave orders that the document was to be made known only to those officers in the room, plus Dr. Grewe. Weber should translate it.

The Chancellor listened to Mr. Merchant's exposé with careful attention and with several exchanges of a glance with Hallstein, who was obviously delighted. It was evident that the subject matter and some of the ideas had been anticipated by the Germans and had been the subject of previous discussion. Mr. Merchant's explanation confirmed their views.

The Chancellor inquired as to whether the Pentagon had given this plan its approval and inquired as to its duration. He also asked whether negotiations on disarmament would go on independently of this pact. Mr. Merchant said yes, and explained the point of duration.

---

[4] Regarding the draft European security treaty, see footnote 3, *supra*.

At the end, the Chancellor said that it seemed very good to him; the draft treaty would be studied with attention so that they might present their views in due course. The Document was entrusted to Hallstein (by the afternoon it was in Grewe's hands), and the Chancellor suggested that the meeting adjourn for lunch.

---

271. Memorandum of a Conversation, Butterworth's Residence, London, September 1, 1955, 1:15 p.m.[1]

PARTICIPANTS

Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick
Sir Harold Caccia
Mr. Merchant
Mr. Butterworth
Mr. Foster
Mr. Kidd

At lunch Kirkpatrick mentioned Blankenhorn's visit to him that morning to report on the German preparations for the visit to Moscow. Kirkpatrick had no adverse comment to make. He thought it a good thing for the Germans to hold up on the establishment of full diplomatic relations, as they planned, if they could manage this. He mentioned the desire of the Germans to improve their liaison arrangements at the next Geneva conference by having a senior official of the US, UK, and French delegations take over the task for a week at a time in turn.

Mr. Merchant said that the problem of liaison with the Germans gave him less trouble than that with NATO, and outlined our thinking on the subject. Kirkpatrick and Caccia agreed with our views.

After lunch Mr. Merchant briefly reported on his visits to Paris and Bonn, mentioning the fact that he had given a copy of the draft Security Treaty[2] to the Chancellor for study. Mr. Merchant enquired about the reported British plans to raise Eden's proposals for a pilot European security plan in the UN Disarmament Subcommittee, which we thought ran some risk of detaching the European Security theme from German reunification.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 551. Secret. Drafted by Kidd. Circulated as memorandum XI of POM MC–12 (Europe) (see footnote 1, *supra*).

[2] See footnote 3, Document 269.

Caccia said that Mr. Merchant's information was perhaps out of date. That cloud which had appeared so threateningly on the horizon a couple of days had collapsed completely, after it was disclosed to rest on pure misunderstanding. The matter was entirely settled now. The British plan had had no necessary application to the dividing line in Germany; it could as easily be applied along the Soviet-Norwegian frontier or in any other part of Europe.

Kirkpatrick said that apropos of the US draft Security Treaty, which he had not really had time to study but only to read through once, he had the following initial reaction:

Although it might sound odd, he had the impression that the draft was perhaps too favorable to ourselves. He meant by this that it concededly had little chance of adoption. The Russians would not agree to it. To all of our existing advantages it added a few more. The Germans would perceive this. We must think of the situation from the long term point of view. The whole exercise depends very much on what the Germans will take, what German public opinion will support. There is agreement on that, is there not? And when we think of the Germans, it is not merely the Chancellor or the present Government, but the Socialist's opposition as well. From the long-term point of view, if we do not succeed in obtaining unification for the Germans, they will one day set out to obtain it for themselves. That is what we must bear in mind. Consequently our proposals to the Soviets must be such as to offer them some inducement to get out of Germany—rather like a birthday cake, we must make the icing attractive. Kirkpatrick thought that the US draft was perhaps deficient in this respect. Of course, if the Germans would go along, he would have no objection, but we must take their opinion fully into account. He rather thought that it might appear too one-sided to them.

Kirkpatrick said that from a tactical point of view he was rather inclined to smother the Soviets with all sorts of proposals. Make one; when the Soviets turn it down, say "very well, here is another"; when they turn that down, say "here is a third which we happen to have in our pockets"; and keep going until the Soviets end up by turning down their own proposals, as in the case of the Austrian Treaty.

Merchant said that he disagreed with this. It was not so easy to make proposals to the Soviets and then to consider them withdrawn. The Soviets would nail each new proposal as a concession or commitment from which they could start afresh. Accordingly, although he agreed with Kirkpatrick that it would be good to bring the Soviets to the point of disagreeing with their own proposals, he doubted whether the tactics proposed by Kirkpatrick would accomplish this result.

Caccia said that to sum up, the UK would study the US draft; there would be a Working Party to pull things together at Washington on September 19—the Foreign Office would probably send Lord Hood to this; the Foreign Ministers would meet in New York on September 27 and 28; the Working Party would reconvene in Paris on October 10th; then the NATO briefings just before the Foreign Ministers met in Geneva on October 27th.

Looking at his watch at about 3:00 o'clock, Kirkpatrick rose to go, saying that he had the ————[3] ambassador coming in to see him shortly. He said that on occasions like this he was reminded of Herbert's dictum that foreigners were either redundant or insanitary. (Earlier Kirkpatrick had told a nice story about Edward VII and his barber, Sutter (?). It seems that his barber once took a holiday trip to the Continent, and upon the advice of his distinguished patrons, went to Carlsbad. When he came back the King asked him how he had enjoyed his vacation. Quite well, Sutter said, but he had found it rather a mixed company at Carlsbad. "Ah well," Edward replied, "we can't all be hairdressers.")[4]

---

[3] There is a blank at this point in the source text.

[4] At 4 p.m. on September 1 Merchant, Kidd, and Butterworth met with Foreign Secretary Macmillan and reviewed the discussion reported in this memorandum. A memorandum of this conversation is memorandum XII of POM MC-12 (Europe).

---

272. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State[1]

Moscow, September 10, 1955—2 p.m.

600. Chief issues in current Soviet/German negotiations were clearly drawn by statements yesterday.[2] Both sides are using word "normalization" in diametrically opposed meanings. As Bulganin made plain, Soviets envisage normalization as immediate establishment formal diplomatic relations between Federal Republic and

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 661.62A/9–1055. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to London, Paris, and Bonn.

[2] The German Delegation, headed by Adenauer, arrived in Moscow on September 8 at 5 p.m. For the Chancellor's account of his trip, see *Erinnerungen*, pp. 487–556. It is also described briefly in *Witness*, p. 387 and *Khrushchev Remembers*, pp. 357–362.

Soviet Union with Embassies in respective capitals and other questions to be discussed subsequently. There is no change evident in Bulganin statement on key subject unification. Adenauer's statement makes plain that "normalization" in German view will only result when causes of abnormal situation, i.e. division of Germany, are removed. While POW issue is of course of great interest to Germans, it is in effect secondary to chief issue of diplomatic relations.

German official position (Embtel 597[3]) is still that Chancellor intends to remain absolutely firm in his refusal to accept diplomatic relations without some agreement or commitment leading to German unity. While this is unquestionably present intention, Chancellor, and Blankenhorn, as reported in telegram under reference, maintains that Chancellor can and will return home empty-handed rather than yield from this position, he has not as yet been confronted with possibility deadlock. Von Walther last night in great confidence told me that he thought it might be rather more difficult for Chancellor to have complete failure here in Moscow and intimated that in part Chancellor's present position was based on belief that if sufficient firmness was shown Soviets might yield sufficiently on unification issue to permit some form of agreement here. Von Walther, who is only one of German delegation with Soviet experience, does not share this view. He is inclined to believe that serious attempt will be made to devise some formula, and he mentioned specifically idea of "Secretaries General" of proposed commissions which while not genuine diplomatic representatives would nonetheless act as agents to maintain contact between two governments for further consideration mutual relations. He mentioned in this connection possibility, although he emphasized no decision had been made, that Germans might seek Soviet agreement that GDR would not establish diplomatic relations with any countries other than those which maintain such relationship. He seemed to feel that this would underline temporary nature of GDR and might be of value to Adenauer's position.

While it is too soon to arrive at any conclusion as to results Moscow talks, and we should know more this afternoon following Blankenhorn briefing Western Ambassadors at 3 pm, I believe all factors taken into consideration that some attempt will probably be made to arrive at formula which while not constituting full diplomatic relations may be sufficiently ambiguous as to permit each side to interpret it in light of its present positions. If Soviets, as they well might, maintain their insistence on full de jure recognition then talks will break down but possibility of formula is at least inherent in situation.

---

[3] Telegram 597 reported Bohlen's conversation with Blankenhorn on September 9. Blankenhorn gave his impression of the first day's events and asked Bohlen whether Adenauer should meet with the Soviet leaders alone. (Department of State, Central Files, 661.62A/9–955)

Since judging from Blankenhorn's statements yesterday Adenauer attaches greatest importance views US Government, and while I fully realize we cannot become directly involved, indication of Department's attitude towards some intermediate formula between full diplomatic relations (which I am confident Adenauer will not accept) and Chancellor's idea of four study commissions might be helpful and possibly necessary.[4]

Bohlen

---

[4] This telegram was received in the Department of State at 9:45 a.m. on September 10. At 5:43 p.m. the Embassy in Moscow was informed that the United States had no objection to some intermediate formula if the Germans wanted it and a suitable one could be found. (Telegram 281; *ibid.*, 661.62A/9–1055)

---

273. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State[1]

Moscow, September 11, 1955—11 p.m.

606. Three Western Ambassadors met at 4 pm at French Embassy with Blankenhorn today. He said this morning's meeting was totally negative and Germans had been surprised at frankness and even brutality Soviet positions as outlined. On chief points at issue Soviets maintained following positions:

1. Unification. There were no prospects for immediate unification and if diplomatic relations were made dependent on this point current talks would not lead to anything. GDR was sovereign government enjoying relations with number countries, including two of "Great Powers", USSR and Communist China. Paris Accord was obstacle as Soviet government had warned and Chancellor was advised to establish contact with GDR as means furthering progress towards unification for which in principle Soviet government stood.

2. On prisoners Soviets stated there were no POWs but only war criminals numbering 9,626 as of September 1 in Soviet Union who had been sentenced for crimes against Soviet population. Soviets on this point gave long statements of number victims Soviet occupation which they asserted war criminals in question had been direct perpetrators. Future negotiations on this subject were conceivable but only

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 661.62A/9–1155. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to London, Paris, and Bonn.

with participation representatives GDR which Soviets were not suggesting since they knew it would be unacceptable to Chancellor.

Soviets strongly maintained position that diplomatic relations should be without any conditions or consideration other questions and insisted upon exchange of Ambassadors.

These positions were initially outlined by Bulganin but there were several interventions on general subjects by Khrushchev reinforcing and re-emphasizing Soviet position. Molotov merely echoed Bulganin's statements. Adenauer and Brentano maintained strongly German position to effect that normalization i.e. diplomatic relations could not be based upon abnormal situation of division Germany. On prisoners Adenauer made strong plea on humanitarian grounds and for not dwelling on war. He admitted that Soviets had been victim of German attack but said Hitler's sins should not be visited on present government. In oblique response to reference German crimes in Soviet Union he mentioned that many terrible things had also happened in Germany. This reference provoked strong reaction from Khrushchev who stated that no crimes had been committed by Soviet troops and that he could not accept comparison.

During one his interventions Khrushchev said that Soviet government had warned on Paris Accord, considered NATO as non-defensive, hostile alliance directed at USSR and other peaceful countries and that therefore "Soviet Union was doing everything it could to weaken NATO." He added, however, that Soviet government was not asking dissolution NATO or abandonment FedRep participation since this would be "unrealistic", important thing was co-existence and Soviet government had advanced proposals for all-European security treaty which would be discussed at Geneva, and all they suggest at present time to FedRep was establishment diplomatic relations and exchange Ambassadors.

Chancellor at one point said GDR could not claim to have confidence of East Germans and could not be recognized as legitimate government, to which Bulganin made strong defense of GDR as sovereign country and member Socialist camp.

Meeting ended with suggestion by Khrushchev, which was accepted that Foreign Ministers should get together Monday in order to see where delegation stood. (Embtel 597[2]) Khrushchev, Bulganin and Semenov (apparently in capacity interpreter) were meeting at 5 pm with Chancellor, Brentano and German interpreter.

At close meeting Bulganin said he wished to publish his opening statement to which Adenauer replied he would publish his remarks. Subsequently Soviet Foreign Office has suggested to German delegation that entire discussion be published and although Blankenhorn was not aware final decision Chancellor, he believed, would agree on basis that intransigeance Soviet position would be useful for public opinion, especially in West Germany.[3]

---

[2] See footnote 3, *supra*.

At one point at close meeting Chancellor suggested that economic questions which were discussed in general but not specifically, might be discussed later at which point Bulganin inquired if Chancellor had in mind setting up special commission to which Chancellor said he had in mind some delegation to continue consideration subject. No decision was reached although Soviets made no objection.

Today's meeting confirmed previous expectation complete deadlock with both sides maintaining their positions intact. Fact that Soviets desire publish record today's meeting would indicate positions adopted were not merely for bargaining purposes. Germans were of opinion that primary Soviet interest was to demonstrate strength their support GDR and their determination engage in no deal or arrangement with Adenauer which might be interpreted as indicating willingness to accept its elimination. Germans were also of opinion that Soviets seemed envisage possibility deadlock although they were interested in failure Soviets to react negatively to Chancellor's suggestion re economic commission.

In view probability publication this evening of record today's meeting will not send fuller account unless event does not materialize.

Blankenhorn indicated that Chancellor would like see three Western Ambassadors some time tomorrow afternoon at his dacha in country where conversations would be secure. Probable time will be somewhere around 5 or 6 pm and therefore if Department has any message or guidance would appreciate receiving it by that time.[4]

Bohlen

---

[3] The statements were all printed in *Pravda*, September 11 and 12.

[4] On September 12 Bohlen reported the three Western Ambassadors were also briefed by Adenauer late in the afternoon of September 11. The Chancellor confirmed the details of the meeting on Saturday, September 10, gave his impressions of the Soviet leaders, and emphasized that the positions on prisoners and unification were so far apart that there was virtually no chance for agreement. (Telegram 614, Department of State, Central Files, 661.62A/9-1255)

274. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union[1]

Washington, September 12, 1955—10:47 a.m.

282. Urtel 606[2] received too late to offer any suggestions for your meeting with Chancellor Sunday afternoon. At next opportunity you should however convey following personal message from Acting Secretary:

American public as well as US Govt is following meetings in Moscow with keenest interest.[3] German positions prepared in advance seem to us sound and Chancellor has presented them skillfully and with dignity. It would be our inclination to stand on them as firmly as German public opinion will allow. Of this he is best judge but from course of conversations as they have developed so far we should imagine that German public opinion would find his positions much more reasonable than anything Soviets have yet offered (particularly Soviet support of the GDR and Khrushchev's defense of Red Army behavior in Germany).

There is no indication that Soviets will alter their stand on unification at this time. With respect to prisoners and diplomatic relations however Chancellor should bear in mind that Soviet concessions, if any, usually come in the last hour (of which you can give examples). We are not surprised at hardness of initial Soviet position which resembles their attitude in current conversations with Japanese regarding Japanese peace treaty. However so long as Chancellor retains German opinion behind him, failure of meeting may well prove in long run more embarrassing to Soviets than to him. It will throw very different light on their pose as champions of peace and détente, which they were at such pains to establish at San Francisco and Geneva. Chancellor's handling of discussions inspires every confidence.

Hoover

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 661.62A/9–1155. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Kidd and cleared in draft with Beam, Merchant, MacArthur, Murphy, and Hoover. Repeated to Bonn, Paris, London, and the Denver White House.

[2] *Supra.*

[3] At this point the following sentence was deleted before transmission: "So far, it seems to us, all the material and political strength represented by the Soviet Union does not outweigh the moral strength of Chancellor's position."

275. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State[1]

Moscow, September 13, 1955—1 a.m.

618. Eyes only for Acting Secretary. Blankenhorn, who was meeting with three Western Ambassadors at 10 p.m. this evening at Spaso, called early to say that he would like to talk with me before arrival of other two. He arrived at 9:30 and informed me that there had been a new and very serious development in talks here on which Chancellor wished my reactions. After a completely negative day between Molotov and Brentano in morning and between Delegations this afternoon at 4 o'clock during which Soviets had not given an inch on anything Bulganin at reception had made following proposition to Adenauer: Release of all German nationals at present detained or imprisoned in Soviet Union in return for diplomatic relations with Federal Republic and exchange of Ambassadors. This proposition was made originally by Bulganin at Kremlin reception at which German Delegation and Soviet leaders were seated. Bulganin then turned to Khrushchev who was sitting on other side Chancellor and asked Khrushchev if he did not agree. Khrushchev after some hesitation said he was in accord and view of Chancellor on this proposition was asked. Chancellor replied he wished to think it over. This proposal came as a complete surprise to Germans after today's negative and occasionally acrid discussion both this morning and this afternoon. In fact, in afternoon session Khrushchev became quite violent in his remarks on Paris Agreement, German remilitarization and even went so far as to compare Chancellor to Hitler. Germans had thus thought deadlock was complete and were planning to leave tomorrow without any results whatsoever. All German proposals concerning commissions (Embassy's 615[2]) and even offer to accept participation GDR at technical level for prisoners question had been rejected by Soviets.

Blankenhorn said he is not entirely sure that Chancellor has all details fully in mind but that very animated discussion on this point was going on this evening in German Delegation with large majority in favor of acceptance. Blankenhorn believes that Adenauer will not be able to resist appeal on return of prisoners and will probably, although final decision not yet reached, agree to Soviet terms. He said Chancellor envisages three letters, (1) accepting principle of diplomatic relations, (2) stating in writing Soviet commitment on prisoners, and (3) reservation on part of Federal Republic concerning any relations with GDR. Soviets apparently requested that concession on prisoners be held secret for time being.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 662.62A/9–1355. Top Secret; Niact. Received September 12 at 9:05 p.m.

[2] Telegram 615 speculated, among other things, that the Soviet Union might be attempting to use the prisoner question to force contact between the Federal Republic and the German Democratic Republic. (*Ibid.*, 661.62A/9–1355)

Told Blankenhorn that I could not undertake to advise Chancellor on this and that matter was for his decision. I promised, however, to communicate immediately with my Government and to transmit any views it might have but I felt certain that US Government would not attempt to tell Adenauer what he should do faced with this choice. Parenthetically, I might add that at reception this evening proposition was preceded by inquiry from Bulganin as to whether Chancellor had any commitments with three Western Powers which precluded him from establishing relations to which Chancellor replied he had none whatsoever and was entirely free to make his own choice. I did, however, tell Blankenhorn that in my personal view choice was clear, i.e., prisoners against legalization division of Germany and that I doubted whether any letter of reservation in regard to GDR would change that basic fact. On arrival British and French Ambassadors Blankenhorn recounted circumstances to them. They took same attitude I did, namely that they could not offer advice to Chancellor and decision was his. French Ambassador, who I feel shares more closely my views as to consequence this action, offered similar observations as to its consequence. British Ambassador, reflecting views of British Government which apparently views with equanimity possibility diplomatic relations, took somewhat different line stating that he was not sure that diplomatic relations would in themselves legalize existing situation or impair chances of unity.

Blankenhorn made it quite clear that probabilities of Chancellor's accepting were quite high but that tomorrow Delegation would attempt to formalize and make more precise Soviet proposition. All three Ambassadors impressed upon him that if Chancellor's decision was to accept proposal it was extremely important that exact number of prisoners should be stated in letter or agreement and that Soviet request for secrecy should not be accepted if agreement on diplomatic relations was to be made public.

Delegations are meeting tomorrow at 10 a.m. to explore this proposal further with Soviets and therefore any views which Department may have on this subject which it desires to have conveyed to Germans should reach me by that time.

The possibility of such a trade has been inherent in situation from moment acceptance by Adenauer of invitation to Moscow but in yesterday's conversation he was very strong against any such deal unless some satisfaction in regard to unity was obtained. Germans and Chancellor himself are obviously worried about Western reaction but as of this evening probabilities of acceptance if Soviets confirm dinner table offer are high.

Department repeat as desired.

Bohlen

---

276. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union[1]

Washington, September 13, 1955—12:36 a.m.

285. Eyes only Ambassador. Urtel 618.[2] Our impression that negotiation has now reached typical hardcore stage which could be foreseen and for which Germans were in a sense prepared with their plan for counter-proposals falling short of full diplomatic relations. The only great surprise is brutal nature of proposal. You should advise them that if we were in their place we should not forthwith accept this Soviet offer but endeavor as strongly as possible to press counter-offer. We should not refuse, but would try counter-offer for all it was worth.

Re Soviet commitment in writing on number of prisoners, we would suggest getting this in as broad language as possible, i.e. if a figure is mentioned, add a clause to effect that right of repatriation should apply "not only to X figure but to all German nationals in Soviet Union."

You correctly informed Blankenhorn that matter is for decision of Chancellor. You may add however that if in the end he feels in his own judgment that proposal must be accepted, we would fully understand.[3]

Hoover

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 661.62A/9–1355. Top Secret; Niact. Drafted by Kidd and cleared in substance with Appling, Merchant, Murphy, and Hoover.

[2] *Supra.*

[3] In telegram 286 Hoover reported that he had discussed telegram 618 with President Eisenhower who fully concurred with telegram 285. Bohlen was instructed to "inform Chancellor on President's behalf that he is keenly aware of the problem confronting Chancellor at this difficult stage and that he will stand behind Chancellor in whatever decision Chancellor believes right." (Department of State, Central Files, 661.62A/9–1355)

277. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State[1]

Moscow, September 14, 1955—1 a.m.

630. Eyes only Acting Secretary. Three Western Ambassadors met at 10:30 last night with Blankenhorn who gave us results of final agreement reached between Adenauer and Soviet Govt. Germans have agreed to establishment full diplomatic relations with exchange of Ambassadors when and if this decision is approved by the Cabinet and Bundestag in Bonn and Council of Ministers and Presidium of Supreme Soviet in Moscow. This agreement is embodied in exchange of letters[2] between Adenauer and Bulganin but will, according to Blankenhorn not be published for two to three weeks. Letter makes platitudinous reference to fact that establishment diplomatic relations between FedRep and USSR will contribute to solution of main problem affecting German people, namely unification of Germany as democratic state.

Germans attempted to obtain Soviet acceptance as part of exchange of letters dealing 1) with reservations concerning future German frontiers and 2) reservation concerning relations with GDR. Soviets categorically refused and after originally envisaging separate letters on these subjects, which would have expressed diametrically opposing points of view on both subjects, after intervention Khrushchev this afternoon against additional letters subject dropped and understanding was merely that Germans would unilaterally send such letter to Soviet Government containing two above reservations.

On prisoners Germans obtained no written agreement whatsoever and accepted "word of honor" of Soviet Government that 9 thousand odd prisoners would be either repatriated or returned respectively to West or East German courts for review as criminals under sentence depending on place of domicile. On civilian category Soviets said they did not know of any but would be prepared to investigate any genuine German nationals under detention in Soviet Union if FedRep would submit detailed lists.

Communiqué[3] which had still not been fully agreed on at time of our meeting will merely state mutual intention to establish diplomatic, cultural and economic relations subject to approval Governments and Parliaments with exchange of Ambassadors. Chancellor will have press conference tomorrow and with Soviet agreement he will indicate nature "gentlemen's agreement" on prisoners and announce contents of unilateral letters on two reservations outlined above which he will send tomorrow morning to Soviet Government. Soviet response to these letters was left completely up in the air.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 661.62A/9–1455. Top Secret; Priority.

[2] For text of these letters, dated September 13, see *Documents* (R.I.I.A.) for 1955, pp. 253–254.

[3] For text of the communiqué, dated September 13, see *ibid.*, pp. 251–253.

Blankenhorn informed us that discussions had been very difficult today. Soviets in connection with prisoner issue referred to alleged ten thousand Soviet citizens imprisoned in West Germany. Soviets this afternoon showed Adenauer and German delegation sample of balloons which they claimed launched by US from Germany into USSR containing three hundred pounds propaganda, including forged copies *Pravda*. Soviets asserted that there had recently been eighteen hundred such balloons and requested Chancellor to do something to bring this to an end. Adenauer promised Soviets to take this matter up with US authorities. When Blankenhorn told me of Chancellor's "promise" and implied acceptance by him that US Government was involved in these activities I told him that I was very much surprised at Chancellor's statement, particularly coming on heels of strong expression of personal confidence in Chancellor from President of the United States,[4] and that I felt it to be my duty to report the Chancellor's statement to my government. I added that I hoped he would inform the Chancellor to that effect and that I wished to add as a personal note that I particularly appreciated the advice that he had found it necessary to send through me on Sunday to the US Government confirming absolute necessity of firmness in dealing with the Soviet Union. My observation to Blankenhorn had in part been provoked by expression of appreciation from the Chancellor for the President's message.

There is hardly any comment to be made in regard to the complete collapse of the West German position during these negotiations. It would have been at least understandable had the Germans obtained any genuine or concrete satisfaction on prisoners question and, while I believe Soviets will conceive it to their interest to return in the form indicated the nine thousand war criminals, they have successfully established that they are indeed war criminals and will deal with both GDR and FedRep.

Soviets have achieved probably their greatest diplomatic victory in post-war period. Far more important is real reason why Germans accepted this agreement in flat contradiction insofar as I can judge from every assurance given Western Powers both prior to and during the Moscow talks. I find it difficult to believe that Adenauer would accept this arrangement, implications of which he was surely aware, unless he had received something more substantial than oral promises on partial solution prisoners question. I have no information on the subject and I do not wish to promote unjustified suspicions of

---

[4] See footnote 3, *supra*.

West Germany policy, but given facts available tonight to me it is difficult to conceive that arrangement which will be in part announced tomorrow does not have some other basis of understanding than that given us this evening by Blankenhorn. I do not need to elaborate a point which I have made in previous telegrams concerning effect of this development on our position against acceptance status quo in Europe.

In accordance with my correspondence with Secretary I am leaving Moscow on Thursday Sept 15 on leave but if Dept desires I can come to Washington for immediate consultation.

Department repeat as desired.

Bohlen

---

278. Telegram From the Embassy in the Federal Republic of Germany to the Department of State[1]

Bonn, September 15, 1955—9 p.m.

877. For Merchant from Conant. At 6 o'clock this evening Francois-Poncet, Mr. [Allen?] British Chargé and myself, together with Hallstein and Brentano had a rather lengthy session with Chancellor. Chancellor spoke 45 minutes almost without interruption, 35 minutes of which was taken up with account of what Khrushchev and Bulganin had said to him in course of long conversation, most of which has been reported previously from Moscow, also his general impressions of Russian scene and attitude of government, all of which I will report in later telegram.[2]

The offer to free 9,000 so-called war criminals in exchange for diplomatic relations was made at social gathering on Sunday night by Bulganin who said Chancellor would have his prisoners in eight days if diplomatic relations were established. Before this proposal Chancellor was prepared to leave Moscow feeling there was no chance of accomplishing anything. In his exposition Chancellor gave no clear reason why he accepted this proposal. But later during one-half hour of exchange of comments between Francois-Poncet and himself, it became clear that neither he nor Brentano nor Hallstein were very happy about what had happened.

In answer to Francois-Poncet's piercing questions as to whether they were not worried about the Soviet Embassy in Bonn being used as an espionage and propaganda center, they agreed they were but added the size of the two embassies was to be settled by later negotiations between Hallstein and Molotov.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 661.62A/9–1555. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Moscow, London, and Paris.

[2] Not further identified.

They then proceeded to justify their decision, the Chancellor by referring to 1957 elections and his fear of what would happen if Socialist opposition should win. Francois-Poncet pointed out that a good deal more could happen in 24 months, but all three Germans present reiterated what great difficulty Chancellor and his government would have been in if Russians had publicly announced their offer and Chancellor had refused it simply on basis that Germans were unwilling to have a Soviet Embassy established in Bonn. This they all said would have placed Chancellor in an impossible position, from which I concluded that a threat of this nature, either direct or implied, had a great deal to do in change in Chancellor's attitude.

In reply to my question as to whether Chancellor was worried lest Soviets try again to bring his government and Pankow into relationship by one method or another, he replied in negative because they knew how strong his opposition to any recognition of Pankow would be. Brentano disagreed and said he thought they would try.

There is no question of Cabinet or Bundestag approval. Chancellor reported his party had reacted very favorably because of human element involved in release of prisoners. All three Germans felt very bitter about Soviets using 9,000 human beings as method of forcing diplomatic relations. Chancellor seems convinced that Russians require a breathing space, though is quite as firm as ever on his conviction of their ultimate objectives. He emphasized that at no time did Soviets propose that Federal Republic should leave Atlantic Pact though they said Paris treaties were an unpleasant reality for them.

Conant

---

279. Telegram From the Embassy in the Federal Republic of Germany to the Department of State[1]

Bonn, September 16, 1955—7 p.m.

896. Chanc started report on Moscow trip by citing at some length his conversation with Khrushchev and Bulganin which was not concerned directly with issues involved with negots.[2] In his con-

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 661.62A/9–1655. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to London, Paris, and Moscow.

[2] For the rest of Adenauer's report, see telegram 877, *supra*.

versation Chanc seemed to be impressed by sincerity of Russian fear of US. Khrushchev and Bulganin said they were now convinced of President's and Secy's desire for peace but that Pentagon was source of their anxiety. This anxiety required them to continue to spend vast sums of money on their armament. Chanc replied that US felt forced to keep its armaments high because of fear of attack by Russia and if Russia felt concerned to keep its armaments high also because of fear of US, it seemed to him there should be some way for two exchanging views over a period of time to avoid this tremendous expenditure of money which could so much better be spent for peaceful purposes. Russians boasted to him of their military power particularly in re to air. They bragged this time about planes which could fly from Moscow to Peiping in six hours and of a plane which could take off from a very small area and land again on the same small area because of jet power as a brake. These claims and others were accepted by the Gers with many grains of salt. Russians also told Gers that all inhabitants of Moscow could be accommodated in deep air raid shelters as part of their subway system, an underground construction so vast and complete that it would accommodate all inhabitants of Moscow without danger from any kind of bombardment. Even the air system was so arranged that no poisonous gases could be introduced. To what extent Gers believed this story in its entirety, I am not sure.

In this and other conversations Bulganin and Khrushchev spoke of the vast need of Russians for building up their industrial resources and detailed some of projects, particularly proposed electrical installations which would require large expenditures and which they could not undertake as long as armament race with US continued. Chanc and Hallstein were both interested in Russian statement that they had no plans for use of atomic energy on large scale for industrial purposes in near future. They seemed to discount this probability and felt Brit plans, to which Chanc referred, were extremely optimistic.

From these statements of Russians Chanc drew conclusion that while he believed overall objectives of Sovs had not changed, they sincerely desired and required breathing space. He and his delegation were impressed by emphasis on historic traditions of Russia and sensitivity of Russians to prestige of Russia. Indeed, in answer to question of Francois-Poncet towards end of meeting, he said he thought primary reason why Russians wanted Embassy in Bonn was because of prestige. He also said categorically that reason there was no reference made to release of prisoners in final communiqué was that Russians insisted question of establishing diplomatic relations should be a freely entered into arrangement and not a bargain. In negots, however, Russians were extremely tough and Chanc, Brentano and Hallstein repeated more than once their indignation at way Russians used 9,000 Ger prisoners as bargaining card in connection with establishment of diplomatic relations. Size of staffs of two embassies to be established in Bonn and Moscow and all details are to be settled by subsequent negots between Molotov and Hallstein.

In re personalities of Russians, Chanc reported that military was not in evidence at any time, that Molotov was very much in background, and Khrushchev and Bulganin seemed to work effectively as team. On basis of few conversations Chanc said he had gotten good impression of Malenkov, to which Brentano objected and said it was only a relatively good impression. In answer to question from Francois-Poncet, they all agreed they put no trust whatsoever in what Russians said but on point of return of prisoners were convinced they would keep their word.

On question of 100,000 more Gers which Chanc and his delegation claim are in Russia, Gers have relatively little hope of getting many of them back. This they admitted freely but are going to make an attempt. When Chanc told Russians he had letters with exact names, dates and places from 100,000 Gers now in custody of Russians, Russians replied these letters were forged by Americans and were part of Cold War tactics. In answer to question from Francois-Poncet about Russian statement as to existence of 220,000 Russians in FedRep, Chanc said Russians claimed they were working with American troops, I judge, as laborers. When he or Brentano offered to have Russians send representative to FedRep to check this claim subject was dropped.

Ger delegation was surprised at contrast between luxury of their entertainment, including superb ballet performance, and the looks of people on streets. They were surprised at how ill clad they were and how hard they had to work and shocked at number of women laborers. In whole conversations and in discussions very little was said about relation between Sovs and Govt of GDR.

To attempt to sum up the three-quarters hour of report by Chanc to reps of US, UK and France, I might say that he was shocked by toughness of Russians in negots and surprised at contrast between their personal rudeness in these negots with friendliness in social gatherings. He seemed to be convinced of anxiety of Russians as regards US and their sincere desire for breathing space in order to enable them to get ahead with their industrial expansion for both heavy goods and consumer goods. While recognizing dangers of having Russian Emb in Bonn, he and Brentano seemed to feel this danger was at minimum, and as to any recognition of GDR being involved in this step, Chanc and Hallstein were firmly in negative.

In response to number of questions from Brit Chargé Hallstein emphasized importance of statements made by Gers in their official declaration as to right of FedRep to speak for whole of Germany and in re Eastern boundary. He admitted Russians had refused to accept these statements but this made no difference from point of view of their validity since they were incorporated in statement made by FedRep itself. Point was not further argued by any of us present.

Conant

---

280. Editorial Note

From September 19 to 23, a tripartite Geneva Working Group met at Washington to discuss questions associated with the upcoming meeting of the Foreign Ministers at New York. The United States Delegation was led by Merchant and MacArthur; those of the British and French by Minister Scott and Ambassador Couve de Murville. At the first meeting on September 19, the three delegations were joined by one from the Federal Republic of Germany, headed by Grewe, which participated in the discussion of items related to Germany.

The second, third, and fourth meetings took place without German participation on the afternoon of September 19 and in the morning and afternoon of September 21. The Working Group drafted a 33-page report with three Annexes. The report was broken down into eight sections as follows: I. Agenda and Tactics; II. European Security and Germany; III. Disarmament; IV. East-West Contacts; V. German Participation; VI. NATO Consultation; VII. Date for the Paris Working Group; and VIII. Points to Raise with Molotov on September 27. It was never formally approved by the participants, but was considered by the Foreign Ministers at New York (see Document 284) and revised in light of their comments. It was circulated in the Department of State as POM B–7/53A, October 3.

Memoranda of the four meetings of the Working Group and copies of the various papers submitted during this work are in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 542. A copy of POM B–7/53A is *ibid.*, CF 549.

281. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State[1]

Bonn, September 20, 1955—8 p.m.

920. Chancellor today held press conference which 35 foreign correspondents were invited to attend. His conference seems to have been mainly a rehash of his conference of last Friday in which he defended the results of his Moscow talks. After the conference he asked the American correspondents to remain. A total of seven did, including Handler of *Times*, Coblenz of *Herald Tribune*, Bell of *Time-Life*, Long of *Newsweek* and Agoston of INS. The conference was off the record. There follows in some detail what the Chancellor said according to notes taken by Agoston and Handler:

"There have been hard words on the State Department statement[2] and I am advised that they did not use the term 'misleading public opinion' but it seems that some US channels in Moscow are under what we believe an erroneous impression about the proceedings. Throughout our stay in Moscow, we kept the US Ambassador and his two counterparts fully briefed. On Sunday night we told them we regarded the situation as hopeless and sent for our planes, making it clear that we were expecting to leave on Tuesday. Monday night came the twist. It is our belief that the proceedings that night were misunderstood by the US Ambassador in Moscow. Blankenhorn had his last talk with Bohlen Tuesday. This occasion was charged with electricity and has undoubtedly touched off an atmosphere. Bulganin told us that in one year one thousand and sixty (1060) balloons launched in West Germany had landed in the Soviet Union. We were told these balloons endangered aircraft travelling in international airways. Mind you, there was no complaint about the actual material disseminated; they only stressed the danger of interference with international airways. I told them I had never heard of these balloons and wanted to see one. Within thirty minutes they brought one in for me. I couldn't help noticing that they were made in the USA. It was there for anyone to see. They asked me to look into this situation; they were launched from West German territory and I told them I would talk with the US Government about this. My own feeling is that, of course, these leaflets have no effect. Most people are too scared to pick them up and therefore I am not concerned with this aspect of the matter. When Blankenhorn told Bohlen about this, Bohlen got very excited, told Blankenhorn that he had betrayed the US Government. Blankenhorn told Bohlen that this was unfair and, after all, the balloons clearly were marked 'made in the USA'. Blankenhorn informed Bohlen that he had not known about the balloon campaign. The entire conversation, I am told, was conducted on somewhat undiplomatic lines. I am not certain but I wonder whether this dispute did not influence the Ambassador's reporting of the conference to Washington.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 661.62A/9–2055. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Berlin for Conant and to Moscow.

[2] Reference is to a statement by Henry Suydam, Chief of the News Division, on September 14. For text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, September 26, 1955, pp. 494–495.

"Chancellor was asked if, he thought these leaflet operations were useless and, if so, did he feel they should be abandoned? Answer: 'I have no doubt that they endanger international airways, would knock out an aircraft if it happened to bump into it.' He then reiterated, 'If you knew atmosphere Soviet Union, how scared people are; I cannot imagine that anyone would dare touch 30 kilos of leaflets and distribute them.'

"Chancellor was then asked what he thought of the Suydam statement. Chancellor replied, 'the State Department evaluation is not as incorrect as it was made out to be provided the statement is made to apply to the Federal Republic only,' and then Chancellor referred to statement made by Minister Tillmanns during Cabinet session when this matter was discussed. Chancellor quoted Tillmanns as saying that the Soviets have definitely changed their tack regarding Germany and that he was satisfied that the Soviets have decided to give up their immediate aim of communizing the Federal Republic.

"Several of the American reporters put questions to the Chancellor after his statement about Mr Bohlen. When these questions were answered, Handler asked the Chancellor, in German, for permission to speak in English. Handler wished to raise the issue of the Chancellor's remarks about Mr. Bohlen in such a manner so that there would be no misunderstanding. He therefore chose to speak in English.

"He said, 'I wish to refer to your remarks about Mr. Bohlen. I have known Mr. Bohlen a long time and I cannot accept as fact that he would accuse the German Delegation of having betrayed the United States. It is not in his character.

" 'Mr. Bohlen is one of our best diplomats, if not the best in our service. His reputation is based on his objective reporting and his absolute loyalty. He could not possibly have made the remarks attributed to him.'

" 'I am not challenging the accuracy of what you, Mr. Chancellor, have said to us here but the accuracy of the information given to you about the scene in the American Embassy.'

" 'I was not in Moscow but I do know that when Mr. Bohlen appeared at the Moscow airfield to bid you goodbye he was approached by American correspondents for his opinion of the Moscow negotiations. I can assure you that Mr. Bohlen did not offer one word of criticism of the Moscow negotiations to the American reporters present.'

"Bell (*Time*) raised his hand and said to the Chancellor, 'Mr. Chancellor, I was present at the Moscow airfield with Mr. Bohlen and I can assure you that Mr. Bohlen did not say one word of criticism of the Moscow conference to us.'

"The Chancellor was obviously taken aback and he replied to Handler, 'I am glad that you have raised this point. Mr. Blankenhorn is in Paris and when he returns I shall discuss the matter with him. I do not want any misunderstanding with Mr. Bohlen.' Handler remarked thereupon to the Chancellor, 'it is because I feel it would be unfortunate for a misunderstanding to arise between the German Government and a man of Mr. Bohlen's quality that I have spoken about this matter here.' "

It is difficult to conceive why the Chancellor at this time chose to make this attack on Bohlen. From all indications, he has been upset by what he believes to have been unfavorable foreign reactions to his Moscow trip. It may also be that some members of his entourage may have put him up to this. Also, he may have been confused by Reston's story in the *Times* of September 15.

I propose to discuss matter tomorrow with Hallstein who was at the conference.[3]

Conant

---

[3] On September 21 O'Shaugnessy reported that he had been unable to talk with Hallstein. (Telegram 931; Department of State, Central Files, 661.62A/9–2155) On the following day the Embassy in Bonn was informed that Ambassador Krekeler would be told that the Department of State regretted the Chancellor's complaint to the American newsmen, "particularly in view of the close relations between the Federal Republic and the United States." (Telegram 838; *ibid.*, 511.61/9–2255)

---

282. Letter From Chancellor Adenauer to Secretary of State Dulles[1]

Bonn, September 23, 1955.

DEAR MR. DULLES: You will of course have been informed concerning the course of our conversations in Moscow. May I however communicate to you some personal observations and ideas for your private information.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.62A/9–2355. Personal. Translation. Given to Dulles by Brentano in New York on September 27. Regarding the meetings of the Foreign Ministers at New York, September 27–28, see Document 284.

1.) Bulganin–Khrushchev. Bulganin told me that he and Khrushchev were as one person, that they had worked together for thirty years and were in complete agreement with each other. Khrushchev confirmed this statement. While Khrushchev, being the more temperamental of the two, puts himself more in the foreground—he spoke very often and very long in Moscow—I believe nevertheless that Bulganin is the more intelligent and farsighted of the two, and that he exercises a decisive influence.

2.) Both gentlemen want to raise the Soviet Union to the level of the civilized countries within as short a time as possible. They clearly realize that this is a gigantic task which will require enormous manpower and expenditure of every kind. The large expenditure they have at present for armaments interferes with this work. Khrushchev said literally that it was very disturbing for them to have to spend so much on armaments and thus to be forced to postpone other tasks.

Please do not understand this to mean that the Soviet Union finds itself in momentary but passing difficulties. Only they do realize that the armaments programme prejudices the other programme. To this must be added that they have certain preoccupations, frankly mentioned by them, on account of China. They spoke of the annual excess of births in China amounting to 12 million and of the burden of the commitments they had undertaken with regard to China.

They are aiming at a breathing spell in armament expenditure in order to be able to devote themselves more forcefully to their other tasks. Considering the magnitude of their task I should think that such a breathing spell would probably extend over a period of many years. They are, or at least pretend to be, absolutely convinced of the truth of the Marxist-communist doctrine and believe that capitalism is condemned to perish, and that this will happen automatically.

3.) They frankly said that they were disturbed by the armaments of the United States and felt threatened by the American bases. They said they were encircled. They expressed their respect for the vigour of the Federal Republic of Germany. They did not seem to attach a particularly high value to the vigour of France nor to that of Great Britain. They seem especially to fear an association between the United States of America and the Federal Republic of Germany. I tried to dispel their fears with regard to the United States, taking some time to explain to them that the United States is not a military, let alone aggressive, country. They said they believed that President Eisenhower wants peace. They added incidentally that he had already written Bulganin three letters since Geneva.[2] As regards you personally, they mentioned that at first they had not trusted you, but were now convinced of your love of peace. They expressed the opinion that Eden, Faure and Pinay also wanted peace, but that the Pentagon did not. I demonstrated to them that the United States, in turn, on account of what had happened so far, felt that the Soviet Union was aggressive and that protective measures against such a Power were called for. I added that I believed that a general easing of tension throughout the world was nevertheless possible once mutual distrust was eliminated in perhaps repeated negotiations.

4.) I tried to explain to them somewhat at length why we want European integration. I told them that today no European country including Great Britain was a Great Power in the real sense of that term any more, that the integration of Europe was a purely European necessity for this continent on economic and political grounds, and that the integration of Europe constituted no threat for any country.

5.) I told them that we could not negotiate with the leaders of the German Democratic Republic because their rule was not based on democratic principles. I said that 90 per cent of the population of the Soviet Zone were against these leaders. Bulganin contradicted me, but not very resolutely.

6.) In the question of the re-establishment of the unity of Germany their declarations were less peremptory and negative than the statement made by Bulganin before the Supreme Soviet on 4 August 1955. They advanced two counter-arguments:

a) the Communist achievements must be maintained for the inhabitants of the Soviet Zone;
b) it was too much to ask them to strengthen the potential of NATO by releasing the Soviet Zone.

I believe this objection to be very weighty. It could, however, be disposed of fairly easily.

7.) We talked very frankly about the reservations which the Federal Republic had to make for reasons of international law. They showed that they understood why we made those reservations. They said that the form in which they were made was immaterial to them. They stuck to their own view of the matter, of course.

8.) The turning point in the negotiations as a whole came on Monday 12 September during the reception at the Kremlin. Until then I had considered the entire situation so hopeless that I had ordered our planes which were in Hamburg to come at once so that we could fly back on Tuesday rather than on Wednesday as originally envisaged. Whether this order which of course became known to the Russians caused that turn of events is beyond my ken, but I think it very likely.

---

[2] For text of the letter dated July 27, see Document 262; a second letter, dated August 3, transmitted photographs of the Heads of Government meeting at Geneva; the third letter was a cover for some books on World War II that the President sent to Bulganin. Copies of the second and third letters are in Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Letters to Bulganin.

In its sittings of 22 and 23 September 1955 the German Bundestag has debated the Moscow conversations. It gave its approval unanimously. The opposition, while emphasizing that by their votes they did not approve the foreign policy of the Federal Government as conducted so far, thought it possible that more of a meeting of minds might result in future.

Our papers carry the news that the American columnist Pearson has asserted that I had secret negotiations with the representatives of the Soviet Union. While I naturally assume that you will not give credence to such allegations, I nevertheless want to declare explicitly that no [*not*] one word is true of this or similar reports.

If it should be possible to arrive at a cold peace, it would at all events have to comprise the re-unification of Germany. This is not only a national and humanitarian issue for the German nation keeping it in a state of restlessness, but it is also an eminently important problem for the entire free world because it is extraordinarily dangerous for all of us that the Russians have a stronghold, so far advanced to the West, of Communism in Europe. If the Russians could be prevailed upon to give up this stronghold, the very dangerous Communist movements in France and Italy would thereby suffer a considerable setback.

Such a period of cold peace, if it lasted long enough, would possibly accustom the population of the Soviet Union to higher living standards than they have now and might thus perhaps lead to internal changes within the Soviet Union which would render it less dangerous. I am convinced that the size of the country, its dictatorial form of government, and the Communist fanaticism prevailing there will continue for a long time to constitute a great menace for all the other peoples, a menace that is both physical and spiritual and in the face of which one cannot be too vigilant. I believe in particular that this spiritual danger is considerable in view of certain peculiar tendencies among the young intellectual classes of all free peoples.

I hope that you have somewhat recovered from your recent strenuous work so that you can tackle with new vigour the so difficult and responsible negotiations in front of you.

With warm greetings, I am,

Yours as ever most faithfully,

Adenauer[3]

---

[3] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

283. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State[1]

Moscow, September 25, 1955—6 p.m.

740. As we interpret Soviet behavior immediately following the departure of the German Federal Republic delegation, Adenauer would be well justified in pondering Jeremiah's wicked men who "lay wait, as he that setteth snares; they set a trap, they catch men". The Embassy must defer to the Department's and Bonn–Berlin's judgement upon the legal and practical impact in Germany of the Soviet–German Democratic Republic arrangements and of the Soviet pronouncements seeking to destroy Adenauer's reservations, but the nature and rapidity of developments here since September 14 seem to make the Adenauer visit appear remote and even implausible, and the coming Geneva Conference unpromising. With the Finnish and East German negotiations, which Soviets in their haste scheduled with overlap, now concluded and with Austrian negotiations as example in background, it is evident that weak powers have advantage at present in dealing with Soviet Union, to whom it can make gestures without giving anything from its security especially if contrasted to image of West Germans engaging Soviet prestige by pronouncing beforehand their terms for diplomatic relations. (Khrushchev's remarks to Japanese Parliamentary delegation on this score seem opposite: Embtel 736.[2]) First by the agreement on relations with German Federal Republic and then by statements and communiqués and now the East German arrangements, the Soviets either by pushing German Federal Republic down or the German Democratic Republic up, have as a practical matter placed on a level of equality the rival German Governments and qualified them for consultation at Geneva. There should be little doubt now as to the Soviet position on Germany at Geneva in October. The only terms on which Soviet Union states it will discuss unification are those under which the all-German Government would be a truly democratic one in the Soviet definition, short of "agreement" between the two Germanies on something else acceptable to the Soviet Union; i.e., no NATO, et cetera.

The Soviet–German Democratic Republic documents state with clear candor that what the Western powers do for the Federal Republic the Soviet Union can do equally well or better for the East German regime. All "decisions" henceforth made by the East German

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 661.62A/9–2555. Secret. Repeated to London, Paris, and Berlin.

[2] Telegram 736 reported the highlights of a conversation between Bulganin and Khrushchev and a group of Japanese parliamentarians on September 21. (*Ibid.*, 661.94/9–2455)

Government are those of a sovereign independent country, according to the treaty. Provision is made for consultation and joint measures in connection with the issues threatening the peace; for economic and other cooperation. The Berlin "proposal" to withdraw foreign troops is repeated in the somewhat negative form that Soviet troops will remain provisionally with East German consent, under conditions to be agreed upon until all foreign troops are withdrawn.

The escapes there have been to avoid treating the East Germans as a legal government appear now to have been closed, excepting insofar as Western representatives and position in West Berlin are concerned, although even that is described as temporary "until an appropriate agreement is reached" whatever this may signify. Embassy looks forward with interest this connection reading Bonn analysis responsive to Deptel 826 (347 to Moscow[3]).

The alternatives the Soviet Government now offer, nevertheless are unification on Soviet terms or negotiations between Germans on equal footing as between East and West, and unless the cognizance the Secretary took in his United Nations speech of Soviet concern for "security" is accepted by Soviets as a new basis for four-power negotiations of re-unification, a stalemate before Geneva is even convened seems certain on item 1.

It is obvious at this end, anyway, that the "spirit of Geneva" which the Soviets consistently invoke is atmosphere that signifies no relaxation of their perseverance in the pursuit of policies relating to their estimate of security needs.

Walmsley

---

[3] This telegram reported that the United States should make clear to the Soviet Union that, despite the treaty with the German Democratic Republic, it was still responsible for the execution of four-power agreements on Berlin, and asked for an analysis of the implications of that treaty. (*Ibid.*, 661.62B/9–2155)

---

284. Memorandum of a Conversation, Dulles' Suite, New York, September 28, 1955, 10:15 a.m.[1]

PARTICIPANTS

US	*UK*
The Secretary	Mr. Macmillan
Mr. Merchant	Amb. Makins

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 551. Secret. Prepared in the Department of State, but no drafting information is given on the source text. A cover sheet of September 30 indicates it was designated POM(NY) MC–9.

Mr. MacArthur
Mr. Phleger
Mr. Bowie
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Kidd
Mr. Wolf

Germany:
Dr. von Brentano
Prof. Dr. Hallstein
Prof. Dr. Grewe
Dr. Krekeler
Dr. von Eckardt
Dr. Boeker
Dr. Limbourg
Dr. Pauls
Dr. Heiser
Mr. Weber (Interpreter)

Sir G. Harrison
Lord Hood
Mr. Young
Mr. Hancock

France:
M. Pinay
Amb. Couve de Murville
Amb. Alphand
M. Daridan
M. Soutou
M. Sauvagnargues
M. Baraduc
M. Fromont-Meurice
M. Andronikof

The Secretary opened the meeting by extending a welcome on behalf of the three Foreign Ministers to Von Brentano. He suggested that the first subject for consideration might be the statement on Germany, which the three Foreign Ministers had agreed to issue in response to the German Government's notes.[2]

Brentano said that he had read the statement, for which he wished to express the grateful appreciation of his Government. He accepted it without qualification.

Pinay suggested that the word "they" in the fifth sentence be changed to "their three Governments". This was agreed.

Brentano asked whether this would be given to the press or transmitted to Moscow. The Secretary said that this would be released to the press immediately in New York, and a separate note would be sent to Moscow.[3]

Before turning to the report of the Working Party,[4] the Secretary reported on the conversation with Molotov[5] the preceding evening, and the agreement reached with regard to use of the Directive[6] as an agenda for Geneva, reference of the question East-West contacts to experts (with Ministerial discussion of this question on Monday, October 31). Molotov had inquired whether other questions could be discussed by common consent. The Western Ministers were agreeable, provided that there was time at the end of the conference. Molotov considered the proposed duration (three weeks more or less) acceptable. He had not raised the question of participation of Germany.

---

[2] On September 23 Ambassador Krekeler handed Merchant a note that reiterated that the Federal Republic of Germany was the only government entitled to speak for Germany in international affairs. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 661.62A/9-2355) No other note has been found in Department of State files. For the statement under reference, see *Documents on Germany*, pp. 461-462.

[3] For text of the note to the Soviet Union, dated October 3, see Department of State *Bulletin*, October 17, 1955, p. 616.

[4] See Document 280.

[5] On September 27 Secretary Dulles met with Pinay and Macmillan at 10:30 a.m. and 3:15 p.m. to discuss the report and preparations for Geneva. At 9:30 p.m. the three of them met with Molotov for further discussions on the preparations. At 10:30 p.m. Dulles drew Molotov aside and told him that due to President Eisenhower's heart attack he would not be able to acknowledge Bulganin's September 19 letter on disarmament. Memoranda of all these conversations are in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 551. For text of Bulganin's letter, see Department of State *Bulletin*, October 24, 1955, pp. 644-647.

With regard to the Working Party report, the Secretary explained the points of emphasis or revisions suggested for page 4 ("not to reveal too hastily the positions, etc."); on page 5 (opportunity for NATO to indicate their approval of treaty, in case all members of NATO were not members of treaty); page 6 (revision of introductory statement); page 7 (question of proceeding by stages from the military provisions to the final political assurances). With regard to the last point, all the Ministers, including Brentano, found it a good idea and acceptable in principle, but agreed that it needed further study and elaboration of detail in the Working Group. The Secretary explained that it was not three treaties, but one, which the Ministers had in mind; the concept of stages applied to the possible implementation.

The Secretary explained the revision on page 8 ("NATO members" change to "Western States"); and the important point on page 12 (mutual assistance). With regard to this point the Secretary expressed the view that an undertaking by the United States to engage itself on the side of the Soviet Union in the event of a war in Europe, was an engagement of such magnitude that the United States would not wish to offer it explicitly as an initial proposal. In accord with the principle expressed on page 4 ("not to reveal too hastily", etc.) we would wish to indicate this point less specifically. We should not wish to peddle around this proposal and cheapen it at the beginning. It had, therefore, been agreed that the Working Group would revise this text to make it less technical and precise; it would in effect read: Such an attack would constitute a threat to peace and security, and the parties would take appropriate action to meet the danger. The objection to the present text was that it used precise treaty language, which was very serious language. If the Soviets were interested, and asked "What does this mean?", we would then be prepared to come to a text like the present one. But we did not wish to cheapen such a momentous decision by pressing it upon the Soviets even before they had asked for it.

---

[6] Document 257

Brentano thought this important, and was in complete agreement. The Secretary said that he believed that the Senate would consent to such a provision if it were necessary and if we could thereby obtain reunification and German membership in NATO and WEU. However, the Senate probably would not be interested unless it were necessary, and we should need some proof. We could not say it was necessary if we offered it at the outset. Brentano said that he perfectly understood the difficulties, and that our aim should be to offer guarantees to the Soviets only if they were willing to sign such a treaty, permitting German reunification and its freedom of alliance.

The Secretary explained the point on page 13 ("suitable provision for consultation"). He then inquired whether the Germans had seen the proposed revision for page 14 (dropping the third paragraph and adding the following sentence to the first paragraph: "In the parts of the zone which lie closest to the point of contact between East and West, there might be special measures relating to the disposition of military forces and installations"). Brentano said that this sentence appeared to leave open the question of a demilitarized zone or a zone for the thinning out of forces without prejudicing the decision whether it should be more or less. He found it acceptable, and was agreeable to suppression of the third paragraph and inclusion of such a sentence in the first paragraph.

The Secretary then explained his concept of the presentation of our security proposals (page 24, concluding paragraphs). The Secretary recalled the vagueness with which the Soviets had always shown with regard to reunification, and explained that this project would be a means of indicating to the Soviets that they could obtain certain reassurances if they permitted reunification. If they turned down our proposal, it would prove that they were not really pre-occupied with security, but with a question of policy to hold on to their satellites. Brentano thought this a good idea, and important for public opinion. Macmillan said that he considered this point quite important. The Russians wished to talk about security, while we wished to talk about reunification. Security was brought in only in order to meet any genuine fears that the Soviets might have. We could make it clear that if the Soviets did not want this, it would prove what the Soviets really wanted, namely, to hold on to their zone. The Secretary said that he thought we could make an effective presentation. Our security proposals went far; if they were not good enough, why? Once the Soviets became specific, they would be lost. If the Soviets merely wanted the dissolution of the NATO, we would indicate that this has no bearing unless it is related to German reunification. We might as well ask for the dissolution of the USSR, which we could propose on as good grounds as the Soviets demand the dissolution of NATO. There was no occasion for such demands, unless they had some bearing upon the reunification of Germany.

The Secretary asked Brentano whether he had any thought to express on the possible question of zones. Brentano said that he recognized that this was not only a political problem, but a military and strategic problem. He did not think that the time was ripe to put forward this problem at the outset. The discussion should be so conducted that if the Russians raise the matter, there would then be an opportunity for us to go into it e.g., that NATO would not move into the Eastern Zone, or that there could be a thinning out of forces on both sides in a given zone. But we should first ascertain from the Russian positions whether they felt that they really had a security problem to which these proposals might be a solution. If we were any more specific than the language now contained in the introductory statement and on page 14, the Soviets might take advantage of it to demand the neutralization of all Germany.

The Secretary then explained that questions of tactics and German participation would be further studied by the Working Group before decisions were reached. He asked Brentano for his views with regard to German participation.

Brentano made the following statement: "Various possibilities with regard to German participation in the Geneva conference are discussed in the report of the Working Group. I had received a report about the discussion of this problem in the Working Group, and we again carefully examined the question in Bonn. We reached the conclusion that any direct participation in the conference of a delegation of the so-called GDR—whether it was only in a consultative character or in a temporary restricted hearing—contained great risks. The Federal Republic has very recently again reaffirmed and given precision to its viewpoint that it regards itself as the single freely elected legitimate German government, and that it denies any right of the regime of the so-called GDR to act as a German Government, be it even only for the middle German area de facto ruled by it.

"On this ground we believe that a German participation in the Geneva conference is only possible in the same form employed at the first Geneva conference and at the Berlin conference of Foreign Ministers in 1954. For the Federal Republic this is, of course, a somewhat unsatisfactory restriction insofar as it will not be in a position to express the German viewpoint in the conference itself. It is believed, however, that this is the lesser of two evils, since the dangers in any other solution are preponderant."

After some discussion, in which Macmillan emphasized that the Conference as a whole should not consult either the GDR or any NATO ally, that private consultation with others should not be raised with the Russians as being beyond the purview of the Four, and that we could thus deal with Soviet gestures of seeking to consult the Federal Republic now that it is recognized by the Russians, Brentano went on to say that at a later stage, if progress were being made on the question of free elections, there might of course be some technical representation of both parties.

The Secretary said: "In other words you are willing to invite the GDR to its own funeral."

Brentano agreed, and Macmillan and Pinay thought that the German point of view was prudent.

The Secretary noted that there had been some question in the Working Party of inviting the Federal Republic as the government recognized by all four of the participants at the conference. He was not sure whether this raised difficulties or not. He mentioned the matter as a tactical question, whether it would be desirable to make some affirmative proposal with regard to the Federal Republic. Then, if the Soviets insisted upon participation of the GDR, the rest of us might say that we do not recognize the GDR, which was not an objection that the Soviets could make with regard to the Federal Republic. Brentano said that the Federal Republic had given consideration to this, but on balance considered the risks too great. The Federal Republic felt that they must try by all means to avoid bringing this non-existent state into international discussions. The Secretary said that there had been no question of that; the point was that we did not wish to take the onus of seeming to oppose the participation of Germany. Pinay supported the point of view of the Secretary. Macmillan was inclined to share the apprehensions of Brentano, that the Soviets would seek by indirect means to get the GDR's foot into the door, perhaps as parties to the case or as witnesses.

The Secretary summed up by suggesting that the question required further study by the Working Group. He thought that Macmillan had made a good point; it could be argued that the Directive speaks of "interested parties" rather than "governments". We might have to take the position that the consultation provided for by the Directive does not require corporate action, but can be parcelled out to each side.

This concluded the discussion of substantive points, and the four Ministers proceeded to the question of a Communiqué. After some discussion and minor revisions, the Communiqué as issued was agreed upon. The meeting closed at 12:15.

285. Memorandum From the Secretary of State's Special Assistant (Jackson) to the Secretary of State[1]

Washington, September 29, 1955.

SUBJECT

Recommendations for US Position at Geneva Conference on East-West Contacts

The United States approach to negotiations at Geneva on Agenda Item III "Development of Contacts Between East and West"[2] should be guided in the first instance by the fact that President Eisenhower, in his statements at the Summit Conference and in his subsequent report to the nation,[3] took a most positive stand favoring the lowering of barriers which now impede free travel and the interchange of information and ideas between peoples. This stand was welcomed throughout the world as an encouraging sign indicating a general relaxation of tensions. Our position at the Foreign Ministers Conference must be consonant with the spirit of the President's statements. The greatest risk in connection with Item III at the conference is, I think, that caution on our part may be exploited publicly as a rejection of the spirit of Geneva, a repudiation of the President's expressed hopes and even a reflection of the diminished influence of the President himself due to his illness.

There are, of course, risks in proceeding too rapidly in the field of East-West contacts. There is the risk of misunderstanding of the implications of our actions which the President sought to correct in his address at Philadelphia.[4] The spirit of Geneva did not involve acceptance of the status quo, including such things as the division of Germany, the domination of captive countries, and the existence of an international political machine operating within the borders of sovereign nations for their political and ideological subversion.

"Very probably," the President said, "the reason for these and other violations of the rights of men and nations is a compound of suspicions and fear."

In your statement of August 15, 1955, on United States Post Geneva Policy[5] it was again made clear that the spirit which the United States contributed to produce at Geneva is designed to change conditions by depriving the Soviet leaders of the former "security" excuses for their present policies.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 606. Secret.

[2] Reference is to Item 3 of Document 257.

[3] For text of President Eisenhower's address to the nation, July 25, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1955*, pp. 726–731.

[4] For text of President Eisenhower's address to the Annual Convention of the American Bar Association, August 24, see *ibid.*, pp. 802–809.

[5] Document 267.

To the extent that fear, suspicions or feelings of insecurity are causes of the conditions the President deplored, then improved contacts between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., presumably reducing fear and suspicions, might be openly sought without acceptance of the status quo or condonation of any conditions of slavery or subversion.

The U.S. position on East-West contacts thus does not present an insoluble dilemma in which we must either refuse to develop further contacts with the Soviets or condone the conditions they have created. Nevertheless, closer and more cordial contacts between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., based on apparent American acceptance of Soviet good faith, can be, and in fact have already been, taken by satellites as steps toward abandonment of their interests. Our actions can also be misunderstood in the free world, for example in Latin America where we have continually warned our neighbors against contacts with the Communists.

In addition to the danger that closer contacts between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. may give rise to misunderstanding in other countries, it also must be kept in mind that the Executive Branch cannot itself bring about any immediate lowering of the legal barriers impeding visits and travel of aliens from the Soviet bloc in this country, since action to remove such barriers is the responsibility of Congress. There are also risks that concessions to Soviet citizens visiting this country in delegations or as individuals, such as waiving fingerprint requirements, may cause adverse political reaction here.

Despite these risks and these factors which counsel caution in our approach to East-West contacts, they should not be accorded disproportionate weight in our planning. In the first place the risks of misunderstanding or of political objection to action taken in the field of East-West contacts are relatively minor weighed against risks relating to the national security or defense. We have much to gain in developing certain types of contacts with the Soviet bloc. . . . Granted that nothing has occurred to justify the free world in relaxing its vigilance or altering its programs of collective security, the recent conciliatory trend in Soviet policy insofar as it may extend and so long as it may last can perhaps be exploited to our advantage. On the basis of the past ten years it is obvious that we cannot trust Soviet officials. Nevertheless, the Soviets could be sincere in now seeking closer contacts with us. We should be willing to probe the extent and depth of this sincerity by making specific proposals. It can at least be hoped that some of the barriers to free communications can be removed at Geneva and some arrangements for exchange of persons and freer travel can be made. This hope must then be parlayed into the more remote hope that the trend toward better understanding thus engendered may not be easy for the Soviet Government to reverse.

These considerations lead me to the conclusion that we should advance at Geneva a positive program for increasing East-West contacts. However, the heart of this program should be the elimination of barriers to freedom of information and communication. This theme, which is a vital part of our own heritage, is one which the three powers could all support, each taking a different aspect of the theme but ending up with the same conclusion—that barriers to information and communication should be removed. The elimination of such barriers is an objective which can be pursued by the U.S. without possibility of misunderstanding and with few if any of the risks incident to exchange of persons and freer travel. Furthermore, except for our laws applicable to subversive material, there should be no difficulty in our reciprocating to the fullest extent any Soviet elimination of barriers to free communications. Finally in this field, as distinct from exchange of persons, we might properly join with the French and British in pressing for a specific four party agreement covering particular points involved in freedom of communications and information, such as jamming, censorship and distribution of publications.

While concentrating in our presentation on the freedom of communications theme, we cannot lose sight of questions concerning the exchange of persons. We can derive value from certain types of exchanges, and we can expect that the Soviets will present proposals for exchanges. In this field, we should formulate specific projects on the basis of their feasibility under our laws and on the assumption that expansion in this field should be positive but gradual.

Attached are brief papers on specific points which, if you concur, could be included in our presentation at Geneva.

Attachments:[6]

Tab A—Jamming
Tab B—USIA Center and Related Activities
Tab C—Radio and Film Exchange
Tab D—Exchange of Publications
Tab E—Exchange of Persons
Tab F—Travel and Tourist Facilities
Tab G—Special Problems

---

[6] None printed.

286. Memorandum of a Conversation, Washington, September 30, 1955, 3:30 p.m.[1]

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary	Mr. Stoessel
Mr. MacArthur	Mr. Beam
Mr. Jackson	Mr. Goodkind
Mr. Bowie	Mr. Galloway
Mr. Merchant	Mr. Sturgill
Mr. Phleger	

Mr. Jackson explained that his purpose in asking for this meeting was to outline his general approach and ascertain, before doing more outside work or drafting, whether the Secretary approved his approach. He suggested that the Secretary look over his written report.[2] After reading the summary portion of the paper, the Secretary said he thought it was a good approach.

Mr. Jackson said there was great risk in being too cautious; the US would be too vulnerable if it did not go along with the hopes of the President as expressed at Geneva. While there were some dangers in going too fast in attempting to lower barriers, there was less danger of misunderstanding with regard to the free dissemination of information than with regard to exchange of persons. The Secretary remarked that so far as he was aware the only restrictions involving dissemination of information were those of the Post Office Department on subversive materials. Mr. Jackson added that the US probably could reciprocate any USSR proposals in the field of freedom of information since the Soviets probably would not want to go very far. There would be great advantage in this connection, the Secretary said, in having on hand something to trade for something the USSR would be willing to give.

Mr. Jackson again drew the Secretary's attention to his written report, pointing out that the summary had been expanded by means of a series of short papers on individual items attached as annexes. He said that if the Secretary agreed with the thinking reflected in these papers, he would proceed along those lines. For example, there was the problem of Soviet jamming of radio frequencies. Mr. Jackson said he thought this should be raised at Geneva but that we should not negotiate on it, since we have nothing to concede. The Secretary agreed. Mr. MacArthur noted that the French had told him jamming involved some complications for them, although they did not say what they were. The Secretary wondered whether the French objections related to broadcasts to Africa and in Africa—Cairo radio for example. Mr. Stoessel said the French also had mentioned the matter of jamming to him and had indicated that almost any arrangement precluding jamming would be desirable. Mr. Jackson agreed that further consultation would be necessary with the French on this point.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 606. Secret. Prepared in the Department of State but no drafting information is given on the source text. A cover sheet indicates it was circulated in the Department of State as POM(Wash) MC-23.

[2] *Supra.*

Introducing the subject of a USIA center in Moscow, Mr. Jackson said that if the US made such a proposal, the Soviets would demand reciprocity. He would have no fear of this, he said, for by means of it the US would be getting information into places we had been unable to get into before. The proposal, he thought, had obvious advantages. After a short discussion, the Secretary said the Soviets would be able to control the US center better than we could control the Soviet center. Moreover, they could show films in their center in Washington with a real impact—a selection which would give a particularly distorted picture of their society. The Secretary mentioned as examples the films given to Hammerskjold portraying the life of American prisoners in China. Mr. Jackson said he would hate to argue that we were unwilling to have a USSR information center in the US. Such a center would be subject to close surveillance and we should be able to withstand any propaganda put out by it. The Secretary asked what the US now had or now permitted in the way of foreign information activities. There followed a short discussion revolving around the USIA establishment in Hungary and the Hungarian information office here. Mr. Beam said they both had been very modest establishments where books, news bulletins, etc. had been available. The Secretary asked just what it was that our own information people wanted, and Mr. Jackson replied they simply wanted the beginning of a center containing books and films and other things of a like nature by means of which news could be disseminated. The Secretary asked whether the decision to permit a Soviet information center in the US was entirely within the discretion of the Executive Branch, with no limitations. Mr. Jackson said he thought it was. The Secretary then asked whether CIA's views were known. Mr. Jackson replied that it was his guess that CIA would want every possible contact behind the Iron Curtain. The Secretary commented that J. Edgar Hoover would not like the idea of an information center in the US. However, the Secretary said he thought we could go ahead on the idea of a USIA center in Moscow and that we should explore it further with interested agencies. Mr. Phleger remarked that any USSR personnel coming into the United States in connection with the center should be labeled official for the purpose of better controlling them. The Secretary agreed, pointing out that such personnel then could be declared persona non grata if we wanted to get rid of them.

Mr. Jackson noted that Rumania had made a tentative offer to permit a USIA center in Bucharest and USIA was anxious to explore this further with the Rumanians. Would this be satisfactory? The Secretary indicated agreement, and mentioned that, in general, he felt USIA centers in the Satellites would be more valuable to us than one in the USSR.

Mr. Jackson raised the matter of exchange of broadcasts. The Secretary noted that US radio interests were in private hands, and Mr. Jackson said the Department would have to figure out ways to buy time for the Russians, although he did not think the USSR could present a decent program, particularly on TV, that any US station would be willing to present. Mr. MacArthur pointed out that there were millions of TV sets in the US but not in the USSR, so that an exchange of TV programs would work to our disadvantage. Radio would be a different proposition. The Secretary said these exchanges were worth thinking about in terms of radio but not TV.

Mr. Jackson brought up the matter of fingerprinting, saying that so far he had made no outside inquiries. The President had spoken frankly at Geneva about liberalizing the McCarran Act.[3] Although he did not know specifically what the President was alluding to, he understood that fingerprinting was included. He added that if the Secretary considered this to be a concession the US might make, he would explore it outside the Department. The Secretary said he thought it was worth exploring. Mr. Jackson remarked that such exploration probably would involve contacting members of Congress through Assistant Secretary Morton. The Secretary suggested that J. Edgar Hoover be contacted initially, after seeing the Attorney General, since Congress would follow his lead. Mr. Phleger agreed. Mr. Stoessel said Warren Chase in SCA had raised this matter with the working level in the FBI. They had not shown a disposition to stand in the way of a change but indicated they would not propose a change. The Secretary said if the US were going to make a concession, it would be a very important concession. Fingerprinting was now considered routine by many people in the US, although at first it had been opposed.

In introducing a discussion of exchange of persons, Mr. Jackson said it was important that exchanges be on a basis of reciprocity and of a type which we could accept without difficulty under our laws. Mr. Stoessel explained our stand on recent visits proposed by the Soviets in plastics, automation and tractors. Our position is that such visits should be on the basis of reciprocity. The Secretary agreed. The

---

[3] Reference is to the Internal Security Act of 1951, which, inter alia, prohibited from entry into the United States anyone who had been a member of a totalitarian organization.

Secretary raised the matter of the bearing of such exchanges on US policy regarding restricted areas. Mr. Jackson said he thought the exchanges would be conducted within those limitations. The Secretary asked whether any outline had been prepared of the advantages and disadvantages of such exchanges in view of those limitations. Mr. Jackson replied that there was a separate paper on this subject[4] and that it was the Department's hope to reduce the number of restricted areas in both the USSR and the US. The Secretary asked whether the Soviet Union had ever complained about the restrictions. Mr. Beam said no, and Mr. MacArthur added they had taken the whole thing lying down. Mr. Phleger pointed out however that exceptions had been made in the past.

The Secretary said he had never thought our controls were worth much, but that the FBI seemed to think they helped in making surveillance easier.

The problem arising in the exchange of students, Mr. Jackson said, was whether or not to encourage exchanges for a period as long as an academic year, when such a period was apparently more than current NSC policy contemplated. The Secretary remarked that this would involve a more drastic revision of the McCarran Act, and Mr. Phleger agreed with Mr. Jackson that it also involved the question of extensions. Mr. Stoessel said there was an NSC paper approving "short visits"; the question was whether one year would fall within the definition of "short".[5] The Secretary said he was not clear about the relative advantages of student exchanges and asked what case could be made for bringing Russian students to the US. Was the intention to indoctrinate them? Mr. Jackson replied that the more people the US could place behind the Iron Curtain the greater would be our advantage; and the only way to accomplish this was to take Russians in return. No final answer was necessary now. This was a problem which was being studied, and a memorandum on its pros and cons would be forthcoming. Mr. Stoessel noted we were thinking in terms of a very limited exchange at Geneva of graduate students, such as five or ten. The Secretary indicated that this should not be too much of a problem, and that he had thought we were talking of much larger numbers, which would cause legal difficulties.

Mr. Jackson asked what form agreements on exchange should take, if any such agreements were made. Mr. Phleger replied that an agreed recommendation should be formulated which the governments involved could implement according to their laws. The Secretary asked whether executive agreements could be made in this field. Mr. Phleger replied affirmatively.

---

[4] Presumably reference is to Tab E of Jackson's report, *supra.*

[5] Presumably Stoessel is referring to NSC 5508/1, March 26, 1955, entitled "Admission to the U.S. of Certain European Non-Official Temporary Visitors Excludable Under Existing Law". (Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351)

Mr. Jackson then raised the problem of the integration of his study with work to be done on East-West trade. The Secretary remarked that the USSR undoubtedly would push for trade agreements, and he asked whether Mr. Jackson was familiar with his conversation with Molotov in New York.[6] Mr. MacArthur said the problem was whether or not to set up two separate groups of experts. The Secretary asked when the Department would come up with a position on East-West trade. Mr. Goodkind replied that a presentation would be made to the Dodge Council sometime next week.[7] Mr. MacArthur said it was very important to reach a position by the end of next week. Mr. Jackson thought the two areas (trade and cultural) were entirely different, but Mr. Goodkind pointed out that there were a number of overlaps, for example statistics. The Secretary inquired about the matter of airplane flights. Mr. MacArthur said he had been in touch with Defense to obtain JCS views. Then about ten days ago Nelson Rockefeller had written Admiral Radford for his views. The Admiral had responded negatively without first clearing in Defense so that now there was a snafu in Defense. Mr. MacArthur said he had written a letter yesterday to Gordon Gray as a matter of urgency, and there the matter stood.[8] The Secretary remarked that these were commercial flights. Mr. MacArthur agreed but said the Department wanted JCS views on the security angle. He hoped an answer would be forthcoming by the first of next week. Mr. Jackson said the British and French also were interested in this subject. The Secretary said he thought this was a matter which should fall within Mr. Jackson's jurisdiction. Mr. Goodkind said he had talked with Mr. Kalijarvi on this subject and that Mr. Kalijarvi was anxious to have Mr. Barringer attached to the group studying the question.

The Secretary reverted to the matter of procedure and said that two separate groups should be set up, one on East-West trade and one on other East-West contacts. He was afraid, he said, that if there were only one group, it would get into considerable argument about the agenda, with the Soviets wanting to discuss trade first. Mr. Goodkind drew attention to a portion of the Dodge Committee report on East-West trade[9] which made the point that the USSR might want to make concessions in East-West contacts and ask in return for Western concessions on trade. The Secretary said he understood that the US position was the one prepared for the Summit, in other words, only non-strategic aspects of East-West trade would be considered for discussion. Even if the validity of the point made by the Dodge Committee were admitted, he said, it would not mean that the US had to discuss all these matters at the same time. If a single body of experts were set up to handle Item 3,[10] there would be too much wrangling. He asked whether there was any guidance in the directive issued by the Heads of Governments, and, after listening to a reading of the pertinent section remarked that it did not help very much. Mr. MacArthur proposed that there be experts broken up into two groups, one to study trade, and the other to take up jamming, student exchanges, other exchanges, etc. Mr. Jackson interposed that the Secretary might want to postpone this decision. Mr. MacArthur said this was a subject which would be considered by the Paris Working Group. Mr. Phleger thought that UN bodies which had dealt with these subjects should not be overlooked.

---

[6] The three Western Foreign Ministers discussed the question of experts working on East-West contacts with Molotov in New York on September 27. Molotov raised no objection to having a group of experts work on the question, but thought it would be advisable to have a preliminary discussion among the Foreign Ministers. A memorandum of this conversation is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 551.

[7] East-West trade was discussed at the 28th meeting of the Council on Foreign Economic Policy on October 11. At that time the Council approved the text of CFEP 501/7, a position paper submitted by the Steering Committee on Economic Defense Policy. A record of this meeting is in Eisenhower Library, CFEP Records.

[8] Not found in Department of State files.

The Secretary asked Mr. Jackson whether he now intended getting in touch with other agencies. Mr. Jackson replied he would do so beginning on Monday.

---

[9] See footnote 7 above.

[10] Reference is to Item 3 of Document 257.

---

287. Letter From Secretary of State Dulles to Chancellor Adenauer[1]

Washington, October 3, 1955.

Dear Mr. Chancellor: I am grateful for your letter of September 23rd,[2] giving the impressions of the Soviet personalities and situation in the Soviet Union which you received on your trip to Moscow. These were of much interest to me. Although I was on my island during your visit to Moscow, I kept myself informed by radio and could well imagine your bizarre experiences in the Kremlin during those difficult negotiations and the perhaps equally arduous entertainment. I want you to know how much I shared the feeling expressed by the President in his personal message,[3] that we appreciated the difficulties with which you were faced and would stand behind you in whatever decision you believed to be right. It seems to me that it would have been unintelligible to the German people if you had refused the offer with regard to the prisoners of war after the Russians had changed their position on this. I regard the establishment of diplomatic relations as entirely natural. To have done so is indeed a far cry from the Soviets' public professions of even twelve months ago.

---

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Name Series. Secret and Personal. Drafted by Merchant and Kidd.

[2] Document 282.

I have no doubt that the Soviets will make a great play of their recognition of two Germanies as an argument for the rest of us to do the same, and that they can use this situation to create problems, particularly with regard to Berlin. If we remain united in our policies I am confident that we can meet whatever new problems arise, as successfully as we have overcome difficulties in the past. Perhaps the most important thing is for the Federal Republic to proceed surely and steadily about its defense measures within the Western alliances, to which I know you have been undeviatingly faithful.

Your remarks about Bulganin and Khrushchev were interesting. I gather that they were more in the foreground than Molotov. I suppose that this is natural in Moscow, where, to the Russian people, they are much more symbolic representatives of the Communist Soviet State than the Minister of Foreign Affairs. However, I regard Molotov as one of the most adroit ministers I have known, of whom, as you may recall, I wrote in 1950 that I had never seen diplomatic skill superior to that of Molotov's at the 1945 session of the Council of Foreign Ministers. Whether or not he has been responsible for the basic turns in Soviet foreign policy over the past decade (which I doubt, since these were certainly decisions taken by Stalin before he died and in all probability by the collegium since then), he is nevertheless a skilled executor of Soviet foreign policy.

I see no reason to doubt the sincerity of the views expressed by Bulganin and Khrushchev to you. We have been struck by the fact that in many recent pronouncements the Soviets have been at no pains to disguise the views which they apparently hold, and thus that their policy does coincide with what they say it to be. They have certainly been very frank about NATO and their disinterest in German unification. I think the problem is to perceive correctly what this represents and to draw the correct conclusions for the future. I am by no means sure whether the Russian leaders themselves have firmly settled precisely what it is that they want and the best means of going about it. There is no doubt that their country has undergone, and continues to undergo, profound changes, and that decisions made now, with regard to the opportunities of choice that confront them, will greatly affect the future of their country. Although Soviet diplomacy in recent months has moved with considerable skill with respect to limited objectives, I think that in the larger questions, relating to the fundamental choice between peace or war and the organization of their internal economy, the Soviet leaders are to a certain extent feeling their way. They are no doubt influenced by conflicting motives. On the one hand, there are the national objectives of the Great Russian state, of which they have obtained possession of the machinery of government. On the other hand, they are concerned with the objectives of international Communism. Despite the lectures of *Pravda,* these objectives by no means completely coincide. The national aims of the Russian state could be accommodated to an equilibrium in Russia's relations with other states. Competitive coexistence with the rest of the world could then be tolerable. In contrast, the limitless objectives of international Communism demand a political dynamism on the part of its disciples which can lead to nothing but ceaseless conflict, interrupted at best by tactical pauses. There can be no easy coexistence with this.

---

[3] Not further identified.

We have seen in the past sometimes the one and sometimes the other of these motivations become temporarily predominant. Current Soviet policies are evidently directed toward disguising the features of militant Communism. By this we should not be misled. The disguise is thin in the Far East. However, I think we do have an opportunity in the present situation to make it clear to the Soviet leadership and to the world at large that by one course of action, which would serve the legitimate interests of the Russian state, the Soviet leaders can obtain the advantages of peace abroad and a respite for the completion of necessary tasks at home, whereas by the other course of action they will merely cement and reinforce the defensive measures of the free world which they profess to fear. I conceive that our principal task in the coming negotiations is to make this choice clear to the Soviets. I think our principal line of action at Geneva should be, while continuing to oppose the program of international Communism in any of its forms, to hold out to the Russians the possibility of reaching peaceful settlements if the understandable objectives of the Russian state become uppermost in the minds of the Soviet leaders. As regards the test case of Germany, there can be no plausible reason for the Russian state to maintain the division except from apprehension that unified Germany may constitute or increase a supposed security threat. We are prepared to meet this concern. If an arrangement can be proposed at Geneva which safeguards the security of any member of the existing Western or Eastern groups of states, from aggression by any individual state of the opposite group, and the Russians turn this down, it will be fairly clear that they are maintaining the division of Germany purely as a springboard for the further spread of revolution in Europe as soon as the rest of us relax our vigilance. In any case we must continue to strengthen existing Western unity and to develop and maintain a prudent defensive strength, to which the German contribution is vital.

I have had good talks with Minister von Brentano,[4] who carries to you my best wishes and greetings.

Faithfully yours,

John Foster Dulles[5]

---

[4] Dulles met with Brentano on September 28, see Document 284.

[5] Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.

---

288. Editorial Note

By the beginning of October, three groups were meeting on different aspects of the Directive from the Heads of Government. In Bonn representatives from the three Western Embassies and the Federal Republic had begun discussions on September 16 on various aspects of the Eden Plan and all-German elections. Their work was a continuation of deliberations before the Geneva Conference, and on October 13 they completed the "Report of the Bonn Working Group on the All-German Electoral Law and Supervisory Commission" and the "Report of the Bonn Working Group on the Eden Plan". Copies of these two reports are in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 558.

A second group consisting of representatives from the British and French Embassies and the United States Government was meeting in Washington to discuss disarmament. On October 19 it submitted the "Final Tripartite Working Group Report" of the Disarmament Working Group. No copy of this report has been found in Department of State files, but a subsequent draft, dated November 7, which reflects certain revisions after the start of the Foreign Ministers meeting at Geneva, is *ibid.,* CF 561.

The third group met in Paris and consisted of representatives from the French Foreign Ministry, the Department of State, and the

British Foreign Office with occasional participation by officials from the Federal Republic. The working group report was transmitted in telegram 1934 from Paris. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 396.1–GE/10–2055)

---

289. Letter From the Director of the Office of German Affairs' Special Assistant (Kidd) to the Director (Reinstein)[1]

Paris, October 17, 1955.

DEAR JACQUES: Many signs here point to a very fundamental difference with the British, which we are papering over in the Working Group,[2] but which will probably come out in due course either when the Ministers meet or at Geneva. These signs are perhaps merely straws, but the wind blows them all in the same direction.

. . . .

3. At the New York meeting of Ministers,[3] when [name deleted] objected to the clause in our draft declaration about having no intention of recognizing the GDR, he told me that, although he did not care to say it publicly or officially, the British felt that a time might well come when it would be necessary to recognize the GDR and that they did not wish to prejudice their position in advance by statements of intention such as we had proposed.

4. The next thing was the hurriedly called special meeting of the Working Group at Bonn last week, in which the British proposed the possibility of separate elections in the East Zone and the West Zone (Bonn's 1202[4]).

5. This past weekend Bill Tyler noticed the following articles in the newspaper:

"I would like to draw your attention to the editorial in Saturday's London *Times*, on the Geneva Conference. It is quite orthodox most of the way and then, suddenly, before the end, uncovers the idea of a 'provisional security treaty' which would come into force even if there were no agreement on the reunification of Germany.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/10–1755. Confidential; Official-Informal. Copies were sent to Dulles, Merchant, MacArthur, Bowie, Phleger, and Hoover.

[2] Kidd was at Paris as a member of the U.S. Delegation to the Paris Working Group. See the editorial note, *supra*.

[3] See Document 284.

[4] Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/10–1455) Regarding the Bonn Working Group, see the editorial note, *supra*.

Thus, the hopes of mankind would be given something to chew on instead of stark failure.

"I noted on Sunday an article in the Sunday paper: *Journal du Dimanche*, by an influential and well-informed commentator on foreign affairs called Claude Veillet-Lavallee who is also foreign editor of *France-Soir*.

"Without reference to the London *Times* article, Veillet-Lavallee also mentioned the 'provisional security treaty' idea and more or less implied that it is being considered by the Working Group."

Boeker this morning told me that the Germans had been quite concerned about these articles, and on Saturday Herwarth[5] went to Kirkpatrick especially to inquire about them. The Germans felt that Kirkpatrick had not given a very satisfactory response: he depreciated the articles as mere newspaper speculation, perhaps proceeding from something which *Pravda* might have said.

6. This morning in the Eden Plan Working Group, during a discussion of the signatories of the European Security Treaty, [name deleted], perhaps by inadvertence, mentioned that both the Federal Republic and GDR might be signatories of the provisional or interim arrangements, pending the accession of an all German Government after it should have been formed.

The direction to which all these signs point, in my opinion, is that at a given stage of the coming negotiations we shall hear British proposals to the effect that half a loaf is better than none at all, even though this involves temporary recognition of the GDR and its participation in "interim measures" of the type which the Soviets might be willing to settle for. I might mention one more point which I heard from Grewe yesterday, that Schaefer had been told . . . to go slow on the German military build up. This may have been merely . . . professional talk . . . , but the Germans were inclined to think that it had political implications also. I may perhaps be overly suspicious in this matter, but I find that all the straws of evidence have a remarkable consistency. Perhaps you may have an opportunity to discuss this with Livie before he departs.

Yours,

Coburn

---

[5] Hans-Heinrich Herwarth von Bittenfeld, Ambassador of the Federal Republic in the United Kingdom.

290. Memorandum of Discussion at the 262d Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, October 20, 1955[1]

[Here follow a list of participants and brief discussion of unrelated topics.]

1. Forthcoming Foreign Ministers Meeting

Secretary Dulles reminded the Council that the forthcoming meeting of the Foreign Ministers at Geneva had been agreed upon by the chiefs of state last July as a means of carrying out in practice the so-called "Spirit of Geneva". The Foreign Ministers would face three main tasks: (1) European security and German unification; (2) disarmament; and (3) East-West contacts.

Of the three agenda items, the most urgent and difficult was the first. Secretary Dulles said he could say this without in the least minimizing the importance of the disarmament task because this task would be primarily carried on under the aegis of the United Nations rather than by the four Foreign Ministers.

. . . .

These developments, continued Secretary Dulles, were certainly weakening the European NATO structure and if we press the NATO Powers of Europe beyond the point they are willing to go in view of their own judgment and their own public opinion, we will merely contribute to accelerating the process of NATO's disintegration. Essentially, our effort should be now to see how much of the original NATO structure can be salvaged rather than to devote ourselves to trying to preserve every part of it in the form we desire in the United States.

By way of illustration of the above point, Secretary Dulles pointed out that in the first months of the Eisenhower Administration we had come up with what we called "the long haul" concept for application to NATO. This move had turned out to be very wise. If we had not put it into effect, the whole NATO structure might have collapsed. At the present moment we are in another stage when it will again be necessary to make an analogous decision. We simply cannot stand pat and browbeat our NATO Allies into accepting our entire position. For example, it might be that a plan for European security which puts rather more emphasis on a reunified Germany, friendly to the West, would be more effective than a plan which puts all the emphasis on securing German membership in NATO and the Brussels Pact. With reference to this point, Secretary Dulles mentioned a recent cable from General Gruenther to Secretary Wilson and the Joint Chiefs of Staff[2] which had put the matter very well indeed. Secretary Dulles summarized and quoted General Gruenther's cable. Our optimum hope, according to General Gruenther, was a reunified Germany's membership in NATO and WEU. In such a contingency our present NATO strategy would continue as is. Secondly, if Germany does not join NATO and the Brussels Pact but even though neutral is oriented to the West, our NATO strategy would have to be readjusted to deal with this fact. . . .

---

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted on October 21 by Gleason.

• • • • • • •

Governor Stassen expressed the opinion that the Western European Powers were relying too much on the deterrent capabilities of the United States. While we should not, as the Secretary of State had been saying, press them too hard to accept our views about NATO, these Powers should not act as if the deterrent power of the United States was something that could be taken for granted for the indefinite future. Their real security rests on the shield provided by the United States and unless they act in general in a certain way, they cannot count on the continued existence of this shield. Governor Stassen said that he did not mean that we should pressure the NATO Powers but rather that they should recognize this very significant fact.

Secretary Dulles replied that the concept which Governor Stassen had just advanced appealed more to the "classes" in Western Europe than to the "masses", that is, to those who understood the problems of military strategy, not to the man in the street. Secretary Humphrey pointed out that one of the weaknesses in Governor Stassen's argument was that the Western European Powers are very well aware indeed that the United States cannot permit the Soviets to overrun and occupy Western Europe. Governor Stassen admitted that this was the case but argued that the Western Europeans were primarily concerned with deterring a Soviet attack rather than in ways and means of countering a Soviet attack in a war which would be waged in Western Europe.

Admiral Radford then stated that he desired to state the position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the problems of European security and German reunification as outlined by Secretary Dulles. He pointed out that, of course, the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff had been formulated from the military point of view. The Joint Chiefs agreed in general with the position formulated by the Secretary of State but they were well aware of the dangers inherent in the situation. Certainly the decision now confronting the National Security Council on the issue of European security and German unification was one of the most important decisions that the NSC would ever be asked to make. Accordingly, all possible plans should be laid out on the table.

---

[2] Not further identified.

. . . .

The Vice President then inquired of Secretary Dulles what he anticipated regarding the Soviet position at Geneva. Secretary Dulles predicted that the Soviets would say they are not prepared at this stage to discuss German unification at all. They would say they are more than willing to discuss the first stage of a European security treaty in order to prepare the way for subsequent discussions of German unification which Secretary Dulles said meant after NATO had been destroyed. The Vice President asked Secretary Dulles how our Western Allies would react to this Soviet position. Secretary Dulles said he believed they would stand strongly with us and that together we hoped at the very least to be able to induce the Russians to discuss a European security treaty and German unification at the same time. The Vice President then asked whether the Russians were willing to consider giving up their control of East Germany. Secretary Dulles replied in the negative and said the Russian position was not based on security reasons alone but because they fear the effect of the loss of control over East Germany on the satellites. The Vice President then asked whether this Russian position did not provide Secretary Dulles with a little stronger position than was readily apparent at the outset. Secretary Dulles replied that this Soviet position could indeed be used to put the U.S.S.R. in a very bad light from the point of view of world public opinion. Unfortunately, however, there were various ways and means to which the Russians could resort to get themselves out of this bad light.

Secretary Dulles then informed the Council that he was obliged to take his leave in order to meet with the Congressional leaders at eleven o'clock. He believed that a pretty adequate treatment had been given to this item on the agenda.

Governor Stassen informed the Council that work on the second item on the agenda for the Foreign Ministers meeting at Geneva, the disarmament item, had been actively proceeding among the representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom and France. While agreement among the three was not yet complete, a considerable amount of headway had been made. The President's Special Committee on Disarmament had been kept advised of developments.

. . . .

No final position had yet been achieved on the problem of preparing further forward moves by the Secretary of State which had been staffed and agreed in advance and which Secretary Dulles could, if he chose, lay on the table at Geneva.

In closing his statement, Governor Stassen commented on what he described as a "peculiar development." The Soviet Union had called for a meeting tomorrow of the full United Nations Disarmament Commission despite an agreement reached earlier that no such meetings would occur until after the Geneva Conference had been concluded. Governor Stassen said that we do not know what prompted this Soviet move but in any event the Disarmament Commission would meet tomorrow morning.

Governor Stassen closed with the comment that, all in all, "our record was in pretty good shape". The Vice President inquired of Governor Stassen as to the reaction in the Soviet press to the President's letter replying to the letter of Premier Bulganin.[3] Governor Stassen replied that as yet he was aware of no reaction in the Soviet press to the President's letter. Mr. Allen Dulles stated that he would report on this matter when the information was available.

Governor Stassen went on to comment that ever since the President had made his great proposal at the Geneva Heads-of-Government meeting, the United States had enjoyed the initiative on the disarmament issue and that world opinion had been on our side. This had done much to squelch the Soviet propaganda theme of "Ban-the-Bomb". While public opinion was thus apparently moving favorably as far as the United States was concerned, it was still full of dangers for us. Accordingly, the Secretary of State may well find himself obliged to take further forward steps at the forthcoming Geneva meeting in order to maintain the initiative that we had enjoyed. On the other hand, Governor Stassen stated that the substantive content of such steps would only be taken within existing NSC policy.

The National Security Council:

a. Noted and discussed oral reports:

(1) By the Secretary of State on the U.S. positions with respect to the meeting, particularly the agenda item on German reunification and European security.

(2) By the Special Assistant to the President on Disarmament with respect to the agenda item on disarmament as a continuation of the discussion at the last Council meeting.

---

[3] On September 19 Bulganin wrote to President Eisenhower concerning his proposal (Open Skies) on the exchange of military information and aerial inspection. On October 11 the President made an interim reply and promised to consider the letter further when his doctors allowed him to do so. For texts of both letters, see Department of State *Bulletin*, October 24, 1955, pp. 643–647.

b. Concurred in the above-mentioned U.S. positions.

c. Recognized that the Secretary of State should have discretionary authority in developing these positions in the actual course of negotiations.

Note: The above action subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of State.

[Here follows discussion of United States security, the NATO Defense Ministers meeting, the United States information program, Iceland, South Asia, Secretary Dulles' meeting with the legislative leaders, and the Near East.]

S. Everett Gleason

---

291. Editorial Note

Secretary Dulles left Washington on October 21 for the Geneva Foreign Ministers Conference. He arrived in Rome at 6 p.m. and for the remainder of that day and part of the following he met with various Italian officials and Ambassador Luce.

Dulles left Italy early in the afternoon of October 23 and arrived at Orly Field outside Paris about 4:30 p.m. He remained in Paris until the afternoon of October 26, holding meetings with NATO officials, British, French, and Federal Republic representatives on the forthcoming Geneva meeting, and the staff of the Embassy in Paris and the United States Representative to the European Regional Organizations.

The documentation that follows presents only the records of the most significant of these discussions.

---

292. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Department of State[1]

Paris, October 24, 1955—4 p.m.

Dulte 6. Eyes only from Secretary for Hoover. Macmillan said privately to me that he would want to discuss the question of how long at Geneva we should be toyed with by the Russians while they are perfecting in the Middle East the gravest possible threat to Western Europe and capitalizing in Italy and France on the "spirit of Geneva" to make the Communist party respectable allies of the Socialists.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/10–2455. Top Secret; Priority; No Distribution. Drafted by Dulles.

I fully sympathize with Macmillan's viewpoint that it may be necessary at Geneva to take some drastic action. However, there is obvious danger in doing this at a time when the President is ill and when even though he expressed agreement with our action the whole world would feel that he did so in a perfunctory manner and that the world had been plunged again into the danger of war because he was not actively at the helm.

You many wish to discuss this matter very privately with such trusted associates as Nixon, Brownell, Humphrey, and Adams and perhaps at some stage it may be necessary to talk to some Congressional leaders although I would not suggest this latter unless and until it is apparent that we are not making any real progress at Geneva on the goals which are important to us, notably reunification of Germany.[2]

Dulles

---

[2] Hoover replied on October 26, that he, Nixon, Humphrey, Brownell, and Adams were planning to meet on October 28 and he would welcome any further suggestions to present to them. (Tedul 13; *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 620)

---

293. Memorandum of a Conversation, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, October 24, 1955, 5:20 p.m.[1]

USDel/MC/47

SUBJECT

Quadripartite Meeting

PARTICIPANTS

Secretary of State Dulles and Advisers
Foreign Minister Pinay and Advisers
Foreign Minister Macmillan and Advisers
Foreign Minister Brentano and Advisers

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 564. Secret. Drafted by Kidd. A telegraphic summary of the meeting was transmitted to the Department in Secto 16 from Paris, October 24. (*Ibid.*)

The Chairman (M. Pinay) welcomed Brentano and asked whether Brentano had any observations to make, since he had had an opportunity to read the revised text which the three Ministers had agreed upon in their earlier meetings.[2]

Brentano said that he would like to ask a question with regard to the bracketed passage at the bottom of page one. He believed that this had been a suggestion of the German Delegation, and wondered whether it would be agreeable to the other Ministers. Pinay, Macmillan, and Dulles said that it was acceptable, and it was agreed to drop the brackets.

Dulles said that he had a question with regard to the phrase on page two "if the Soviet Government professes to desire". He suggested that if this were reworded to read "according to the desire expressed by the Soviet Government", it would sound less offensive. This was agreed.

Brentano said that he would like to raise a question with regard to point VII of the memorandum. He was in agreement with this point, but he wondered whether the new second sentence would not create an additional problem. The fundamental concept was that Germany should join both the Security Treaty and NATO; this was self understood. However, he preferred the language of the earlier draft where it appeared as point three. He wished to emphasize that the idea was acceptable, but he believed that the new formula might enable the Soviets to raise new difficulties.

Pinay said that this question had been discussed at length in the morning session, and the Ministers had finally settled on this formula. He asked Brentano whether the latter had any suggestions.

Brentano said that he would agree then.

Dulles said that he was not sure whether we had found the best formula to express the idea. If Brentano had any suggestion, the meeting would be glad to consider it.

Pinay said that this was an extremely difficult and important question.

Brentano explained that he had only just seen the revised text, and the German Delegation would need a few minutes to consider the matter. Perhaps he could return to it later, and meanwhile the discussion might proceed with regard to the other points.

Pinay commented that whatever the formula, the Soviets would be bound to raise difficulties. He asked Brentano whether he had any other objections.

---

[2] The Foreign Ministers met at 10:30 a.m. and 3:30 p.m. on October 24 to discuss a draft memorandum on European security to give to the Soviets at Geneva. The U.S. Delegation reported on the two meetings in Sectos 10 and 11 from Paris, October 24. (*Ibid.*) For text of the memorandum, see Department of State *Bulletin*, November 7, 1955, pp. 729-732, or *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 27–33.

Brentano said no.

Pinay asked whether he might inquire whether the German Delegation would raise any further questions or have any objections at the NATO meeting tomorrow.

Brentano said that they would have none; they would take a positive attitude. He continued, that the other Ministers might have some question with regard to the Federal Republic's position on German participation in the Geneva conference. He assumed that the Ministers had seen the German reply to the Secretary's letter.[3] He stated that it was the German opinion that any participation of the Federal Republic would lead the Soviets to demand the same for the GDR. He believed that in this indirect way, the Soviets would seek to, and could realize, their aim to give the Soviet Zone regime the same status as the Federal Republic, at least in the eyes of the public. Since arrangements had been made to assure constant consultation with Federal Republic representatives at Geneva, his Government felt that it might renounce any further direct participation in order to avoid such participation for the GDR.

Pinay said that, in sum, the German position remained the same as it was at New York.[4]

Brentano said yes, adding that the Federal Republic would have a representative at the disposal of the other Ministers at Geneva at all times.

Pinay said, then there would be no direct participation of the Federal Republic.

Brentano said that was correct.

Pinay said that they would therefore take the position that the three Western Powers would be in permanent consultation with the Federal Republic, while the Soviets might do the same with the GDR.

Brentano said that if it were agreeable, he would like to distribute an exposé of the position of the Federal Republic on this point.[5]

Dulles said that we could of course accept the formula suggested by the Federal Republic. However, the Ministers had wished to be quite certain that the Federal Republic had studied this question au fond. Molotov would argue that there could be no discussion of the issue of German reunification in the absence of the Germans, and would contend that the Western Powers and the Federal Republic stood in the way of this. The Western Ministers would not want to have to change their position mid-stream. They wanted to be sure that the Federal Republic would continue to maintain its position after Molotov had made his point.

---

[3] Dulles' letter to Brentano was transmitted in telegram 1112 to Bonn, October 19. (Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/10–1955) Brentano's reply was transmitted in telegram 54 from Bonn to Rome (1305 to the Department of State), October 22. (*Ibid.*, 396.1–GE/10–2255)

[4] See Document 284.

[5] Not found in Department of State files.

Brentano assured the other Ministers that the German Government had carefully studied this question and had reached a unanimous decision. Molotov could of course be expected to make propaganda out of the point. However, the German Cabinet was agreed that in any event one must say no. The position of the Federal Republic was that the decision in principle with regard to German unification was a responsibility of the Four Powers, which must be taken by them; as soon as this should occur, the Federal Republic would have no objection to contact with the East Zone authorities with regard to implementation of the decision in principle; but not before. His Government wished at all costs to avoid the possibility of the Soviets maintaining that the two parts of Germany were now in contact upon a mutual basis before any of the basic decisions had been reached.

Brentano said that he had a question with regard to point number IV [*III*] of the Memorandum, relating to "Special Measures".

Macmillan said that before they came to that, he would like to go back to the point mentioned in paragraph 4 of Annex II,[6] where he noted the language "each Delegation should be free to consult such German Representatives it wishes". He wished to be clear about this; did this mean that the Three Western Powers could consult the Federal Republic, while the Soviet Union would be free to consult both the GDR and the Federal Republic? Was that right?

Brentano said that there was of course the theoretical possibility that on the basis of the Moscow agreement the Soviets might wish to consult the Federal Republic. The Federal Republic would not consider doing this except upon the basis of prior consultation and agreement with the Three Western Powers, and would of course later give an account to the Three Western Powers. On the basis of such prior agreement, he felt that the Federal Republic might listen to the Soviets if this should arise. Pinay asked whether this satisfied Mr. Macmillan.

MacMillan said that the phrase was not quite clear: the meaning seemed to be that any of us could consult with the GDR.

Brentano emphasized that it was not the wish of the Federal Republic that there should be any such consultations, and they would certainly not take the initiative. If, however, the Soviets wished to take the initiative by demanding consultation with them, the Federal

---

[6] Reference is to Annex II of the Report of the Paris Working Group; see Document 288.

Republic would do so only on the basis of prior consultation with the Western Powers.

Macmillan said that he thought the formula about written evidence was right. However, suppose that the Soviets took the line that they would refuse to accept Federal Republic evidence. Would the Federal Republic then wish the Western Ministers to accept or refuse?

Brentano said that the Federal Republic did not wish any written explanation; if there was no quadripartite agreement on this, the suggestion would fall.

Macmillan said that it was a good formula: any written document from the GDR could reach the conference only through the Soviets, whereas any such document from the Federal Republic would be transmitted to all Four Governments. If the Soviets refuse to accept this procedure, he understood that the Federal Republic would give its information privately to the Western Ministers.

Brentano confirmed this.

Brentano said that he would like to make a suggestion with regard to the last paragraphs of Section C of Annex VII (Special Measures).[7] It was the view of the Federal Republic that at an appropriate time some assurance should be given that NATO forces would not occupy territory evacuated by the Soviets. They felt that this point should be made, not necessarily on the first day or when the subject was first broached but perhaps before negotiations on this were broken off, especially if the negotiations had gotten nowhere.

Pinay said that at New York it had been agreed to omit any reference to demilitarized zones.

Hallstein said that it would be necessary to give some explanation of the special measures mentioned in point III of the Memorandum.

Pinay said that it would be difficult to speak of this matter without the advice of General Gruenther.

Macmillan said that he wished to get this matter quite clear. As he understood the situation, Brentano's idea appeared to be the same as the UK's. If the conference made any progress, then the Ministers could agree to the discussion of these special measures by their advisers and military experts. That seemed fairly simple. After agreement had been reached on broad principles, the details would be studied by experts. On the other hand, if the conference went badly, they would not want the Soviets to be able to say that the West had made unreasonable demands, proposing immediately to march 20 Western divisions into the territory evacuated by the Soviet Union. They wanted to be able to answer this objection without being too precise; they would like to be able to say that they saw the point, and were prepared to meet it, without going into detail. Was not that Brentano's position?

---

[7] Annex VII of the Report of the Paris Working Group is not printed.

Brentano said yes.

Pinay interjected that General Gruenther had said he was against any idea of a demilitarized zone.

Brentano said that they wished to be able to say, however, at the right moment, that no one demanded that the Soviets should go away and that at the next moment the rest of us would come in with troops. They surely wanted to be able to say that this point would be taken care of in the discussion of details.

Pinay asked whether Brentano did not fear that if such a proposal were put forward, the Soviets would turn it against us to demand comparable measures in the Western zones.

Brentano said no. The Federal Republic was not occupied by the Soviets. If we merely asked the Soviets to get out, this would appear one-sided; but if we say that we will not incorporate the evacuated territory into the NATO area, this will make our proposal less one-sided and will answer their objection that we are increasing the threat to the Soviet Union by adding this territory as a military *Stutzpunkt*. The question seemed to him to be the following: at what moment of the conference should such a proposal be made.

Pinay said that we must get this point clear between ourselves. The Soviets would reply with "do the same".

Dulles said that he thought that this was an idea that deserved further study. We had communicated with General Gruenther about this. He said that he would recommend against any demilitarized zone. He said that if it should become necessary for political reasons to accept a demilitarized zone, he would desire the opportunity to comment. The Secretary said that the concept was attractive, but that the practical application of the idea was difficult and dangerous. For example, suppose that there were riots or disturbances in the East zone, could the German Government send in troops to restore order? Could recruits be trained in that area? What would happen to the seven GDR divisions already existing in that area; would they all need to be moved to West Germany? These were difficult problems. There were others in addition. He thought that there might be a possible serious exposure if part of the country were demilitarized. The idea that we should do this only toward the end of the conference for propaganda purposes was attractive, but we all knew that the Soviets usually reserved their position until the last minute. Concessions made at the end of this conference might plague us at the beginning of the next conference. He accordingly felt that the concept needed to be examined further before it would be acceptable to the US Government.

Brentano (referring to the next to last paragraph of Part C, Annex VII, Page 13) said that he thought the question left open was merely that of when the matter could be mentioned.

Dulles said that as he understood the matter, not filling up an area with NATO forces was not the same as demilitarization.

Pinay stated emphatically that the French Government would wish to make the same reservation as the US. The US was not alone in its views.

Macmillan said that he felt that there was more agreement than might appear on the surface. He agreed that it was unwise to define any special measures, especially as a demilitarized zone. But would it not be wise to find a formula that would not appear to make such an offensive demand of the Soviets? He thought that this could be done safely, and that we could make our point of what we meant by special measures. The point would be that we did not intend to move into the area when the Soviets got out. He thought that this was good propaganda, it could be safely made.

Dulles said that the fact that we were not far apart could perhaps be made clear from something that he had said at Geneva. He had employed some such phrase as the following: "if the Soviets feared that by getting out we would move in, that was a specific point which we could meet".

Macmillan said that was a good formula, they could take that phrase and make something out of it.

This was agreed.

Brentano said that he would like to raise another question with regard to plans for inspection and control. He explained that it was the position of the German Government that any such plans should only take place upon the supposition of German unification.

Pinay said that he agreed. Any inspection area would need to take place within the framework of German unification.

Macmillan said that he agreed absolutely. When they came to the discussion of Disarmament, any suggestion such as Sir Anthony Eden's Plan for a pilot inspection scheme[8] would appear in this context, like the President's aerial inspection proposal, rather than in the discussion of European security. The Prime Minister had made his proposal; the Prime Minister does not withdraw his proposal; but the British would like it considered as a Disarmament problem rather than in connection with European security.

Brentano said that the Federal Republic had felt that Disarmament was, of course, an essential element; but when in the course of the discussion German unification is shoved off for a plan of inspection within the field of Disarmament, the status quo is implied as the point of departure. This was unthinkable for the Federal Republic unless the precondition of the German unification was made quite clear. They could agree to inspection and controls, but not unless there were parallel or preliminary decisions with regard to reunification.

---

[8] Document 254.

Pinay expressed his agreement.

Macmillan repeated that the Prime Minister had put forth his plan at Geneva. Molotov would probably ask what had become of it. Macmillan felt that he owed it to the others to indicate the kind of reply that he would give: he would say that that plan, so far as it bore any relation to European security, had become merged with our proposals here made concerning German reunification and European security. What remained of it was a general idea in the same category as President Eisenhower's suggestion for aerial inspection: it was a general suggestion for consideration apart from European security which presupposed German unification.

Brentano said that he was more in sympathy with the view expressed by Pinay. The Germans were not against any general disarmament, but they were afraid that if plans for inspection in the context of Disarmament became separated from the question of German reunification, it would be dangerous. The Soviets would undoubtedly press for European Disarmament, and would depart from the point of the status quo. Chancellor Adenauer had just written a letter to Sir Anthony Eden with regard to this matter.[9]

Pinay said that he perceived danger in any suggestion which would involve the participation of the two Germanies.

Macmillan said that he would, of course, take note of what his colleagues had said, but the difficulty was that the Prime Minister had made the proposal and the Soviets would push for it. He wished to be sincere. He proposed to say that the Prime Minister's proposal had two aspects: one aspect was that of the demilitarized zone, etc., etc., and he would explain that anything of this nature had been merged into our Security Plan, that is the security and the European aspect. The other aspect would be that before one tried out vast schemes of inspection, it might be better to have a pilot scheme, not necessarily in the European field at all. It was merely that you do things on a small field first. That should get us out. It would be explained as a general idea, not related to any specific field.

Brentano said that the Germans would merely like to take the position that no plan for disarmament and inspection in Europe should take place on the basis of the participation of two Germanies.

---

[9] Reference is presumably to the letter of October 24 that Adenauer describes in *Erinnerungen, 1955–1959*, pp. 34–35.

Dulles said that he would like to ask Macmillan whether, if this scheme were to operate in Central Europe, it would be only within the framework of our security plan. It could be operated elsewhere, for example in Norway or in other parts of the world.

Macmillan said yes. . . . Dulles asked whether Brentano had any further comments with regard to the new paragraph 7.

Brentano explained again that he agreed with the purpose and sense of this paragraph, but he believed that the last half of the sentence reading "unless these forces are present in the territory concerned under collective defense arrangements" was complicating. He wondered whether this part of the sentence could not be dropped, as something which was self understood.

Pinay said that now we were falling back into the morning's discussion. If we pressed this part of the sentence, Germany could demand the withdrawal of NATO forces.

Brentano said no.

Pinay said yes.

Brentano said no.

Pinay said yes, that Germany could stay out of NATO.

Brentano said that NATO gave the right to station troops.

Pinay said that there was nothing in NATO that obliged Germany to keep the Allied troops.

Brentano said that when the Federal Republic had joined NATO, and when united Germany should adhere to NATO, it accepted all the obligations of the Alliance including the right to station NATO troops. He said that as he had explained before, he had nothing against the purpose of this sentence, but he was of the opinion that it would give rise to debate. However, if the others wished, he would acquiesce.

Pinay said that they had discussed this question all morning and had reached this conclusion.

Brentano said "all right". Brentano added that he had no further questions, except perhaps with regard to the arrangements made for NATO consultation tomorrow.

Pinay explained that Dulles would present the European security aspect, Macmillan the Disarmament aspect, and he (Pinay) would do the East-West contacts.

Macmillan said that he would like to raise the question of the press at Geneva. This time there would be documents. He thought it was important for the press to be able to publish documents that were tabled. How would this matter be handled?

Pinay said that he felt that perhaps the best method would be for the conference to issue a general memorandum each day. Macmillan asked whether all the documents could not be published.

Pinay said no, only a general memorandum.

Macmillan asked whether this would then be the same procedure as before. Pinay commented that it was difficult to decide this question in the absence of Molotov.

Macmillan asked whether the Eden Plan could in any event be published.

Pinay said not before the first session.

Macmillan said that this was a problem which must be thought about. One way would be to publish all the documents and to keep the discussions secret. At present we only had the Eden Plan on the table, which went back to Berlin. It was old hat.

Brentano said that it would have more impact on the public if the West should demonstrate its initiative by giving out both plans (Eden Plan and European Security Plan) on the first day.

This was agreed.

Macmillan said that that was the question he wished to pose. Very well, they would publish on the first day.

Pinay then read the draft of a communiqué of the Ministers' meeting, which was agreed. The meeting closed at 6:45.

---

294. Telegram From the Delegation at the Tripartite Foreign Ministers Meetings to the Department of State[1]

Paris, October 25, 1955—midnight.

Secto 26. At meeting between Secretary and Macmillan Oct 25 latter inquired whether it was our intention, as he had been informed, to have question of East-West Trade removed from Item 3 of Geneva talks and put under Item 2. Secretary replied in negative and said US position was we are not prepared discuss question of strategic goods at Geneva. If, as result of Geneva talks, greater security achieved and tensions go down, then list of strategic goods placed under ban would probably also go down. Secretary referred to Macmillan's statement yesterday[2] that Communists put restrictions on all goods and said we agree we should not permit ourselves to be attacked because we have comparatively small restrictions.

Macmillan said he thought our strategic list should be reviewed. Secretary said that in light developments at Geneva we would be willing consider reviewing list following Geneva with view discussion this problem with British on bilateral basis and thereafter with

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 565. Secret. Drafted by Russell and cleared with MacArthur and Merchant. Repeated to London.

[2] *Supra.*

French. Macmillan agreed we would not discuss matter with Soviets at Geneva but that thereafter our two countries would discuss problem on bilateral basis.

Macmillan said he also desired talk some time about lowering level China controls to those of Soviet list. Secretary said while willing discuss China controls with UK with view to possible lowering, we did not agree that they should be lowered to correspond with Soviet list.

---

295. Telegram From the Delegation at the Tripartite Foreign Ministers Meetings to the Department of State[1]

Paris, October 25, 1955—midnight.

Secto 27. Secretary and Macmillan October 25 agreed US and UK would seek conclude Geneva meeting by November 19 when Macmillan plans proceed Baghdad. Secretary recalled New York agreement with Molotov[2] that meeting would last three weeks more or less and said by November 19 we would have time reach agreement on principles if Soviets mean business. Macmillan said if clear no agreement on Germany possible, prolongation Geneva Conference likely do more harm than good. Secretary agreed, commenting we need ponder, if things go badly, what net impression we wish leave on world opinion. Is Geneva spirit still blooming, or is another look necessary? Macmillan agreed this very important.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/10–2555. Secret. Drafted by Russell and cleared with MacArthur and Merchant. Repeated to London.

[2] A memorandum of the three Western Foreign Ministers conversation with Molotov in New York on September 27 is *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 551.

296. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Department of State[1]

Geneva, October 26, 1955—11 p.m.

Dulte 15. Eyes only Acting Secretary from Secretary. Re Tedul 13[2] I told Macmillan that if there was to be anything like a break at Geneva I felt British and French must be well out in front because my position was somewhat weakened by the President's illness and there was danger that if I was in the lead it would be alleged that this was because the pacific purposes of the President have been abandoned when I acted without his guidance. Macmillan said he recognized this situation and would be prepared, if necessary, to take the lead. However, I question whether in fact Eden will back him up in this respect and also interpretation which will be put on events even though British do initially take the lead.

Dulles

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/10–2655. Top Secret. Drafted by Dulles. After conversations with Macmillan in the morning and Foreign Minister Sharett of Israel in the afternoon, Dulles left Paris at 4:45 p.m., arriving in Geneva at 6:10.

[2] See footnote 2, Document 292.

MEETINGS OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS, OCTOBER 27–NOVEMBER 16, 1955

October 27, 1955

297. Editorial Note

On October 27, Secretary Dulles began the day with a meeting with Robert Bowie at 8:55 a.m. This was followed by a meeting at 9 a.m. with the senior members of the delegation to discuss the Secretary's opening statement. At 11 a.m. Dulles and nine members of the delegation met with their British and French counterparts at Foreign Minister Pinay's residence. At noon Dulles met briefly with Foreign Secretary Macmillan to discuss voting in the United Nations Security Council. Three short meetings with delegation members followed before he paid a courtesy call on Foreign Minister Molotov at 3:55 p.m. Immediately thereafter, at 4 p.m., the first quadripartite Foreign Ministers meeting began at the Palais des Nations which lasted until

7:30. Following the meeting Suydam briefed the press. (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 567, Chron–5)

No record of the meeting with Bowie, the senior staff, the three short meetings, or the courtesy call on Molotov have been found in Department of State files. Records of the other meetings are *ibid.* The delegation telegraphic summary of the first meeting is printed *infra.*

---

298. Telegram From the Delegation at the Foreign Ministers Meetings to the Department of State[1]

Geneva, October 28, 1955—3 p.m.

Secto 57. 1. First session Conference of Ministers opened October 27 with Pinay presiding. In discussion procedural points it was agreed that (a) Directive of Heads of Government[2] would serve as conference agenda; (b) Conference deliberations would be secret but documents and general statements not involving give-and-take of debate could be published as in summit meeting; (c) There would be no communiqué to press except on common agreement. Relations with press would be handled by separate delegations with respective press officers consulting together after each session; (d) Ministers would meet each week-day at 3:00 pm and not on Saturday or Sunday with exception October 29. Also meetings would not be held November 1 and November 7 (these being French and USSR holidays).

2. At conclusion his opening statement Pinay proposed and Ministers agreed send message of good wishes for President's recovery (Secto 45[3]).

3. Three Western Ministers in opening speeches[4] pointed to historic responsibility of conference to seek clear and concrete solutions problems singled out by Heads of Government. Pinay made point that German reunification and European security would have to be

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/10–2855. Secret. Repeated to Paris for USRO. Copies of the U.S. Delegation verbatim record of the first Foreign Ministers meeting, USDel/Verb/1 (Corrected), October 27, and the record of decision for the meeting, MFM/DOC/RD/1, October 28, are *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 567.

[2] Document 257.

[3] Secto 45 transmitted a brief message for Eisenhower's prompt and complete recovery and included a summary of the discussion by the Foreign Ministers concerning the message. (Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/10–2755) The message is printed in *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, p. 26.

[4] For texts of the opening statements by Pinay, Macmillan, and Dulles, circulated as MFM/DOC/2, 6, and 5, see *ibid.*, pp. 14–18 and 24–25.

linked to make progress on either. He said disarmament would require long effort, which should be begun by taking first practical steps as outlined in President Eisenhower's proposal.[5] Encouragement of East-West contacts should help foster understanding between East and West Europe and benefit both. Three agenda items should be approached in spirit of seeking practical solutions based on legitimate interests all concerned. Macmillan associated himself with Pinay's statements. Secretary made statement (text transmitted wireless bulletin) saying all four governments recognize present situation is not satisfactory basis for secure peace. At same time each has concern that changes in present situation should not impair its security. Yet time has come move forward in series common actions designed restore confidence. He stated that Western Ministers have proposals to make on each agenda item which would not impair security of either side but would enhance security of all by removing existing sources instability and tension.

4. After voicing Soviet Government support for telegram to President, Molotov stressed importance contribution President and other Heads of Government had made toward easing international tension, ending cold war and creating durable peace. Molotov then listed steps Soviet Government had taken to relax tension: (a) reduction of armed forces, (b) withdrawal from Prokkala and Port Arthur which were only two military bases Soviet Government held outside USSR, (c) establishment diplomatic relations with Federal Republic and recent agreements with GDR both of which contribute to "regulation of German problem". Molotov then repeated standard arguments in support priority European security over German reunification and referred to previously advanced European security proposal[6] as only solution. NATO Bloc, foreign bases and German militarism major obstacles to security and must be liquidated. Growth of militarism in Federal Republic and West German membership in NATO create situation in which reunification of Germany as democratic and peaceful state can be brought about only gradually and after rapprochement of two German states. In commenting on Western idea of achieving security in stages, Molotov said this could not be accepted if merely intended mask German remilitarization by stages. Two Germanies have different social systems and social progress in GDR cannot be sacrificed for sake of unity. "Mechanical" merger two parts Germany therefore unacceptable. Since reunification is matter for Germans themselves, four powers should assist them in finding solution rather than attempt impose four-power plan.

---

[5] For text of President Eisenhower's "Open Skies" proposal, see Document 221.

[6] Reference is to Document 251. For full text of Molotov's statement, circulated as MFM/DOC/3, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 18–23.

5. Molotov stated disarmament most important problem. He repeated usual Soviet line re reducing military forces and assuring prohibition atomic weapons. While acknowledging necessity of controls and inspection, Molotov charged it was unconvincing to talk about them while continuing arms race. He referred USSR May 10 disarmament proposal[7] and said four powers have subsequently achieved large measure agreement many points. Recent correspondence between President and Bulganin[8] also said to have helped clarify certain important aspects. Soviet Government prepared consider all proposals designed advance solution of disarmament problem.

Finally Molotov said Soviet Government thinks considerable possibility exists for progress in field East-West contacts. While stressing desirability eliminating obstacles international trade and finance he also spoke favorably of opportunities for agreement improve exchange information and persons in fields culture, science, technology, tourism, industry, and agriculture.

After first round initial statements, Pinay opened discussion Agenda Item 1 (European security and German reunification) with brief remarks in rebuttal Molotov statement regarding NATO. He then tabled dual Western proposal on security and reunification.[9] After Macmillan called on as next speaker, Molotov raised procedural question regarding desirability of commencing discussion Agenda Item 1 toward end of meeting. Molotov requested that consideration Agenda Item 1 be commenced Friday so that all delegations would have opportunity address themselves to subject. Because of lateness hour Western Ministers agreed, whereupon Molotov urged that postponement of discussion Item 1 implied that Pinay's document had not been tabled and could not be considered as conference document until morning. Pinay as presiding officer pointed out that discussion Item 1 had in fact already begun without objection at the time from any delegation and that proposal was already in hands of secretariat and process circulation. On ensuing hour-long argument Molotov insisted that consideration Item 1 had not begun with consent Soviet Delegation and could not begin except by general agreement. Meeting eventually closed upon suggestion of Macmillan that three Western Ministers would consider discussion Item 1 to have begun while Soviets free to retain their interpretation. In informal tripartite meeting after adjournment Western Ministers agreed not publish memo tabled today.

---

[7] For text of the Soviet proposal of May 10, see *Documents* (R.I.I.A.) for 1955, pp. 110–121, or Department of State *Bulletin*, May 30, 1955, pp. 900–905.

[8] For texts of Bulganin's letter to Eisenhower, dated September 19 and Eisenhower's interim reply, see *ibid.*, October 24, 1955, pp. 643–647.

[9] For text of this proposal, circulated as MFM/DOC/7, October 28, see *ibid.*, November 7, 1955, pp. 729–732, or *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 27–33.

October 28, 1955

299. Editorial Note

On October 28, Secretary Dulles began the day with a staff meeting at 9:15 a.m. with all the members of the delegation. Following this he met with Francis Russell at 9:40 and at 11:15 with Foreign Minister Macmillan at the latter's villa to discuss the Middle East. At 12:40, he participated in a meeting with MacArthur and Bowie on disarmament and, following lunch with Secretary of Defense Wilson, met with five members of the delegation to discuss presentation of the German problem. At 3 p.m., while Dulles was meeting with McCardle, Bowie discussed disarmament with his counterparts in the British and French Delegations. The Secretary then held a press conference which was over in time for the second meeting of the Foreign Ministers at 4 p.m. The second session ended at 7:20 following which Suydam held a press briefing and Secretary Dulles met with Phleger, Merchant, and Ambassador Johnson to discuss China. (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 568, Chron–6)

No records of the meeting with Russell, the meeting on disarmament, the meeting on the German problem, the meeting with McCardle, or the meeting on China have been found in Department of State files. A memorandum of Bowie's conversation on disarmament and the delegation telegraphic summary of the second meeting of the Foreign Ministers follow. For Johnson's report (Letter no. 16, November 1) on the discussion of China, see volume III, page 149. Records of all the other meetings are in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 568, Chron–6.

---

300. Memorandum of a Conversation, Geneva, October 28, 1955, 3 p.m.[1]

PARTICIPANTS

United States
Mr. Robert R. Bowie
Col. William B. Bailey

United Kingdom
Mr. I.T.M. Pink
Rear-Admiral G.A. Thring
Mr. A.R.K. MacKenzie

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/10–2855. Secret. Prepared in the U.S. Delegation but no drafting information is given on the source text.

France
M. Bernard de Menthon
M. Genevey

SUBJECT

Disarmament

Mr. Pink opened the conversation by saying that the U.K. had general reservations regarding the advisability of submitting a substantive declaration, such as contained in the Tripartite Working Group Report (DWG–9a[2]). He said that a substantive declaration acceptable to the West would be subject to Soviet amendments which would, in turn, be difficult for the West to counter without entering into a long discussion of substance, the very thing we are anxious to avoid.

M. de Menthon said that on the other hand it was important that the Western powers show initiative on the subject of disarmament.

Mr. Pink replied that the U.K., and he presumed the U.S., do not now have a disarmament policy position worked out in detail. Soviet amendments to the Western declaration would therefore prove embarrassing. He observed that a great deal depends on the tactical situation and that it may be preferable to agree on a declaration which would merely put the Subcommittee back to work and which could be accepted by the Soviets without the precipitation of a substantive discussion.

Mr. Bowie remarked that it [was] now too early to judge the tactics to be employed and the West might better wait to see how the conference was developing. In any case he indicated that it would not be difficult to draft a purely procedural paper later if one were required.

Mr. Pink stated that the Washington draft declaration would be unacceptable to the Soviets in its present form and certainly would be amended by them to include the prohibition of nuclear weapons and the provision of definite force levels. He questioned whether we would want to discuss these points of substance now because to do so would—

1. Reveal lack of position; and
2. Prove embarrassing to the U.K. and France because of their previous positions on these questions.

---

[2] Not found in Department of State files. A subsequent draft, DWG–9c, dated November 7, is *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 561. For text of this declaration as it was submitted to the meeting of the Foreign Ministers on November 10, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 199–201, or Department of State *Bulletin*, November 21, 1955, pp. 831–832.

Mr. Bowie remarked that we would certainly accomplish something if we were to achieve agreement with the USSR on the basis of the Washington declaration. He noted that the essential point was to prevent our lack of position being exploited by the Soviets as a lack of interest in achieving disarmament on the part of the U.S.

Mr. Pink then stated the U.K. fear that a Western rejection of the probable Soviet amendments of the declaration would provide the USSR with a great propaganda advantage.

Mr. Bowie observed that the Soviets already are in the position of having put forward various disarmament proposals which the West has not been able fully to deal with.

M. de Menthon then pointed out that the Western powers would be in serious difficulty during the General Assembly debate on the disarmament question if the Foreign Ministers could not agree on something more than just a procedural draft.

Mr. Bowie suggested that the working group go over the Washington draft to see to what extent agreement could be reached, in order that the paper would be ready in case a decision was made later to introduce it. This was agreed.

The working group then proceeded to examine alternative language suggested for paragraph 3(a) of the Four-Power Declaration, and after some discussion the following language was accepted by all:

> "(a) the renunciation, in accordance with the U.N. Charter, of the use of nuclear weapons or any other weapons except in defense against aggression;".

Concerning the split language on paragraphs 6 through 9, Mr. Bowie explained that the U.S. found the French alternative acceptable and hoped that the British could accept it also.

Mr. Pink replied that he felt that the U.K. position represented the only conditions under which the U.K. could associate itself with a substantive declaration. However, he promised to reconsider the U.K. position overnight.

There is attached a translation of a second French alternative suggestion for paragraphs 6, 7 and 8,[3] which presumably will be considered at the next meeting. It was agreed that this would be held on October 29 at a time to be mutually determined.

---

[3] Not printed.

301. Telegram From the Delegation at the Foreign Ministers Meetings to the Department of State[1]

Geneva, October 29, 1955—10 a.m.

Secto 70. At second session of Foreign Ministers this afternoon, Macmillan, in chair, opened discussion by speaking to Western proposals for reunification Germany and security tabled yesterday by Pinay.[2] In explaining Eden Plan, he emphasized need hold free elections soonest possible, thereby permitting participation German people in reunification. Emphasized freedom all-German Government assume or reject such international engagements its constituent parts as it considers wise. Said he was glad hear Molotov's remarks yesterday that it is up to Germans themselves to organize their reunification. Only one way accomplish this, i.e., by free election representatives with genuine mandate from German people. Went on to say Soviets have argued creation reunified Germany free to ally itself with Western powers would create threat to Soviet security. We do not accept this view. NATO and WEU checks make impossible for Germany launch aggressive action. But since Soviets unable accept these assurances, agreed at summit to establish close link between European security and German reunification. Molotov yesterday asked for reliable guarantees German militarism will not again threaten Europe. If this all that stands between German people and their yearning for reunification and if this all that prevents ending of two Germanys, Macmillan believed West has devised plan bridge this gulf. Should be clear, however, West cannot dismantle its valuable arrangements for self-defense. In this connection, pointed out Soviets seemed to recognize own defensive arrangements necessary since nothing in Bulganin Plan[3] to weaken comprehensive system bilateral military defense arrangements with Eastern European countries. Soviet proposal also deficient in failure provide for reunification Germany. Western powers have more satisfactory solution in mind, which Macmillan then proceeded explain. Urgently commended documents to serious consideration Soviet Government, emphasizing sincerity with which put forward.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/10–2955. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to London, Paris for USRO, and Bonn. Passed to Defense. Copies of the U.S. Delegation verbatim record of the second meeting of the Foreign Ministers, which took place at 4 p.m., USDEL/Verb/2 Corrected, October 28, and the record of decisions for the meeting, MFM/DOC/RD/2, October 28, are *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 568.

[2] For text of Macmillan's statement, circulated as MFM/DOC/12, and the Western proposal on German reunification and European security, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 27–37, or *Cmd.* 9633, pp. 10–13 and 99–103. Regarding the first meeting of the Foreign Ministers, see Document 298.

[3] Document 251.

Molotov spoke next,[4] pointing out European security and Germany joined together, but conference should not forget directive places European security first, which also reflects substance of matter since problem has decisive importance all European nations. Said quadripartite agreements during and since war have emphasized need prevent revival German militarism. Any attempt minimize importance of this as principal problem cannot be justified. Must prevent Europe again being drawn into conflagration with resultant spread to other areas. Both world wars preceded by formation European military groupings. Way to peaceful life for Europe not through such groupings but through joint action all European nations in interest peace. Then recalled proposal tabled by Soviets at summit which had not been commented on by Western powers. He hoped this would be remedied at this meeting. In view apprehensions Western powers re liquidation existing military groupings, Soviets have proposed establishment collective security in two stages, during first of which groupings would remain in existence. Believe this should facilitate agreement. Also has advantage testing in action in first stage system based on joint efforts all European states to maintain peace. Idea of collective security widely supported not only in Europe but in other countries of the world. Ever-increasing number of countries are condemning policy of building up military blocs as they realize this increases danger of new war. This true of number of Asian, as well as European countries, which regard attempts draw them into military groupings as threat their security and national independence. Moreover, military groupings lead to armaments race. In '48–'49 budget year, direct United States military expenditure amounted 33 percent Federal Budget but 69 percent for 1953/54. In same period, UK military expenditures rose from 24 to 38 percent. In France, military expenditures rose from 24 percent in 1949 to 33 percent in 1954. Paris agreements[5] compelled Soviet Union make greater effort secure its defenses and in 1955 military expenditures therefor constituted about 20 percent all budget expenditure. Danger of armaments race emphasized by production and stockpiling nuclear weapons, despite increasing popular demands prohibit such weapons. Conclusion treaty along lines Soviet proposal would facilitate settlement other international problems through setting up effective system European security and through gradual rapprochement between two German states. Would serve create prerequisites for Germany's development as peaceful country. Soviet Delegation will make appropriate proposals on German problem at appropriate stage of conference. At that time, should consider question of participation representatives both German states in conference discussion. Then addressed himself to Western proposals, welcoming fact that western powers thought it necessary propose not only German problem but also problem of European security. Some provisions of Western proposals require further discussion and Soviets would study them attentively. Nevertheless, certain observations seemed in order. Then maintained formulation of proposal does not correspond directive from Heads of Government which placed European security before German reunification. Said one gets impression that Western proposals would make situation in Europe even more acute and increase tension by strengthening existing military groupings in Europe. Proposals are inconsistent with provisions in Eden Plan for free elections,[6] since they decide now, irrespective what German people may say at those elections, that United Germany must become member Western European military groupings. Restrictions on armament and controls do not under existing Western agreements represent brake on present unrestrained armaments race. All this shows that acceptance Western proposals would mean Soviet Union would contribute to revival German militarism in turning over to it all of Germany. No one can really expect that. Nor does Eden Plan correspond purpose of holding genuinely free all-German elections. Soviets do not refuse consideration any proposals really designed create genuine security in Europe and will do their best facilitate agreement that important problem. Then tabled again the paper entitled "General European Treaty on Collective Security in Europe" which Bulganin tabled in Geneva last July 20.

---

[4] For text of Molotov's statement, circulated as MFM/DOC/9, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 38–45, or *Cmd.* 9633, pp. 13–18.

[5] For texts of the Paris Agreements, signed at Paris on October 23, 1954, see *Foreign Relations*, 1952–1954, vol. v, Part 2, pp. 1435 ff.

After recess, Secretary spoke in support Western proposals and rebuttal of Molotov's remarks. Full text carried by USIA.[7]

Pinay ended today's debate by emphasizing urgency reunification Germany and addition to security which would result if Germany integrated in Western defensive alliances which bring security to all states and which, if they had existed in 1939, would have obviated Second World War.[8] NATO and WEU not simply military alliances but provide for consultation and collaboration on all planes government activity. Western proposals would meet any legitimate concern Soviets may have and Pinay earnestly commended them Soviets careful consideration, emphasizing historic nature of commitments which US has indicated willingness undertake in Europe.

---

[6] For text of the original Eden Plan, see FPM(54)17, January 29, 1954, *ibid.*, vol. VII, Part 1, p. 1177.

[7] For text of Dulles' statement, circulated as MFM/DOC/10, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 48–52, or *Cmd.* 9633, pp. 18–21.

[8] For text of Pinay's statement, circulated as MFM/DOC/11, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 52–55, or *Cmd.* 9633, pp. 21–23.

---

302. Telegram From the Department of State to the Secretary of State, at Geneva[1]

Washington, October 28, 1955—9:30 p.m.

Tedul 25. Eyes only Secretary from Acting Secretary.

1. After Cabinet today I met with Nixon, Adams, Humphrey and Brownell. I showed them again Dulte 6, Dulte 15, and Secto 27.[2]

2. Governor Adams reported that the President had made extraordinary strides during the last two weeks, that he was reading the newspapers and taking an active interest in public affairs. The doctors further stated that there was every indication that he could assume an active office schedule by early January, and the decision on whether he wished to continue beyond next year would be primarily one of his own choosing and not one in which they would take part other than to caution a less punishing workload.

3. I said that I believed we should pass on to Denver a considerably greater volume of traffic than we had in the past, and Governor Adams agreed fully. In fact, he said that without such information the President might perhaps gain faulty impressions from access to the newspapers alone. In addition to other material, I plan to forward the Morning Summary each day with marked items which Governor Adams can show him. I believe, however, that he will probably read the entire document.

4. It was the consensus of feeling that the President must appear to be in complete and frequent touch with you at Geneva and every effort will be made at this end to substantiate this impression. It was believed most desirable that whenever possible you might send him a personal telegram giving your interpretation of developments and events together with the substantive problems with which you are faced. While the suggestion was made that they should not be too long, nevertheless there should not be any avoidance of the primary issues which may be involved.

5. It was further suggested that for the sake of appearance it might be desirable for me to visit Denver on a weekly basis in order to demonstrate the President's participation and intimate contact

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.11–EI/10–2855. Secret. Drafted by Hoover.

[2] Documents 292, 296, and 295, respectively.

with the development of foreign affairs. I would of course give no statements to the press on the purpose of these talks other than that they were to keep in touch currently with the President. The decision in this matter was left in your discretion.

6. Governor Adams further stated that the President would now like to be fully informed on developments so that wherever it might be helpful he could take a hand in issuing statements in support of any positions that you might think wise.

7. With regard to the substantive matters raised in your telegrams, particularly those referred to in paragraph 1, it was the consensus of opinion that the President would of course hope to avoid a "break" or "drastic action" as mentioned in your wires, until all possible means had been exhausted to preserve the so-called spirit of Geneva. They share with you your apprehension that while Macmillan would undoubtedly want to be helpful, nevertheless Eden might not be willing to back him up.

Hoover

October 29, 1955

303. Editorial Note

On October 29, Secretary Dulles began the day with a full staff meeting at 9:15 a.m. At 10 he discussed the Middle East with Ambassador Byroade and Francis Russell, and at 11 the Middle East, trade controls, and conference strategy with Pinay and Macmillan at the latter's villa. Then Dulles returned to the delegation conference room for a meeting with his senior staff members on East-West contacts at 12:30 p.m. At 3 he attended the third meeting of the Foreign Ministers at the Palais des Nations.

Following this session Dulles again met with his senior staff at 5:45, with Macmillan at 5:50, and with Pinay at 6. At 7:45 he briefly discussed East-West contacts with William Jackson and MacArthur, and then received a courtesy call by Ambassador Bonbright. At the same time Suydam held the daily press briefing and Merchant and Kidd informed Blankenhorn of the progress made during the day. (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 569)

Records of the third session and the meeting with Blankenhorn are printed as Documents 305 and 306. Records of the full staff meeting, the tripartite ministerial meeting, and Suydam's press briefing are in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF

569. A telegraphic report on the discussion on trade controls was transmitted to the Department of State in Secto 72. No records of the other meetings have been found in Department of State files.

---

304. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Department of State[1]

Geneva, October 29, 1955—noon.

Dulte 23. Eyes only for Acting Secretary from Secretary for President.

"Dear Mr. President:

We had yesterday first round of substantive discussion on German reunification and European security. The three Western Ministers each made effective presentations. Molotov merely put in the proposal for all European security which Bulganin had put in when you were here and which in turn was a close replica of the proposal made at earlier Berlin conference. Their proposal wholly ignored the problem of German unification but contemplated that the two Germanies should be party to the European security treaty and that this relationship would continue for an indefinite period of time. Molotov did however say that he might subsequently make a proposal on German reunification.

The initial Soviet position was thus precisely what we had confronted at Geneva last July and there was a tendency to ignore our hard-won gains in having the directive provide that German unification and European security were closely linked problems.

This is not surprising and not necessarily discouraging because if there is any 'give' at all in the Soviet position on German unity it would not be expected to be divulged until the last moment.

We shall keep plugging ahead along present plans and hope at the end to get a break.

I expect to see Molotov on Sunday to discuss Near Eastern matters in accordance with your message to Bulganin[2] that I would do so.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/10–2955. Secret. Received in Washington at 9:06 a.m., October 29, and relayed to the Denver White House at 3:53 p.m.

[2] On October 20, Bulganin wrote to President Eisenhower concerning arms sales to Egypt. The President replied on October 24 that Secretary of State Dulles would take the matter up with Molotov in Geneva. (*Ibid.*, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Eisenhower–Bulganin)

Faithfully yours,
Foster"

Dulles

---

305. Telegram From the Delegation at the Foreign Ministers Meetings to the Department of State[1]

Geneva, October 30, 1955—4 p.m.

1. Secto 80. In opening speech October 29 Secretary compared degree to which Western and Soviet proposals responsive to directive of Heads of Government.[2] Made following points:

(a) Western proposals conform to first instruction of directive[3] regarding close link between European security and German reunification. Soviet security proposal[4] not linked reunification in any way but appears assume indefinite division of Germany.

(b) Soviet security proposal ignores nearly all substantive provisions in security section of directive. Only point this section carried by Soviet proposal was obligation not resort force and to deny assistance aggression. Western proposals on other hand included this plus following:

(1) Limitations, control and inspection armed forces and armaments;

(2) Establishment between East and West of zone in which disposition armed forces subject to mutual agreement;

(3) Constructive proposal for effective warning against surprise attack including provision for overlapping radar system. Soviets merely repeated sterile clauses of old Berlin proposal[5] which antedates directive and fails take latest thinking into account.

Apart from security guidance directive contained mandatory instruction settle German question and reunify Germany by free elections, West has put forward detailed plan for this in conscientious effort to carry out directive in both letter and spirit. Soviet proposal ignores German reunification. Accordingly recommended that Western proposals be taken as basis further conference discussion item 1.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/10–3055. Secret; Priority. Repeated to London, Paris for USRO, Bonn, Moscow, and Berlin. Copies of the U.S. Delegation verbatim record of the third Foreign Ministers meeting, which took place at 3 p.m., USDel/Verb/3 Corrected, October 29, and the record of decisions, MFM/DOC/RD/3, October 29, are *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 569.

[2] For text of Secretary Dulles' speech, circulated as MFM/DOC/14, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 55–58, or *Cmd.* 9633, pp. 23–25.

[3] Document 257.

[4] Document 251.

[5] Reference is to FPM(54)46 and 47, February 10, 1954, printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1952–1954, vol. VII, Part 1, pp. 1189 and 1190.

2. Pinay echoed Secretary's points regarding inadequacy Soviet proposal.[6] He attacked Soviet requirement that NATO be dissolved and made it clear once again NATO not negotiable. He listed security and non-military aspects NATO which benefit both member and non-member European countries. Soviet proposal relax tension through simultaneous elimination NATO and Warsaw Pact would be fools bargain for West. Monolithic Eastern bloc based on bilateral pacts would remain as threat to Western security. Balance essential for coexistence now provided by NATO would be destroyed. Soviet substitution of military vacuum covered only by legal guarantees is no solution. Therefore second stage Soviet security plan totally unacceptable. First stage Soviet plan calls merely for maintenance status quo to which Soviet security guarantees add nothing. Based on continued division of Germany, this would only aggravate matters by indicating to Germans that four powers had abandoned reunification. If Soviet Government really concerned about its security, Western plan should allay all its anxieties.

3. Macmillan briefly underscored remarks Pinay and Secretary critical of Soviet proposal and similarly supported NATO.[7] In discussing benefits to USSR of Western security proposals Macmillan stressed fact that section 8 would guarantee Soviet Union against attack by any NATO member also party to treaty of assurance. This would include Germany and possibly additional countries since West willing discuss how treaty membership might be extended. This offer goes far beyond any made before. It difficult see how USSR could ask for more under circumstances contemplated, i.e., if united Germany chooses remain in NATO.

Must make it clear that so far as West concerned Germany would have complete freedom choose between NATO or not. Our proposals also designed reassure Soviets event Germany does not join NATO. Germany would not as Soviets claim be forced along path of remilitarization and aggression. It would of course have its own armed forces. West not alone in this nor the first to begin rearming Germany. Federal Republic does not yet have single soldier whereas East Germany has 100,000 men under arms and equipped with tanks and heavy artillery. Since both West and Soviets envisage armed forces for united Germany, question is whether such forces better controlled under Western proposals or Soviet proposal. By recapitulating NATO and WEU controls applicable to Germany and pointing out that new controls in Western security plan would be added to theme Macmillan gave effective emphasis to concreteness Western proposals.

---

[6] For text of Pinay's speech, circulated as, MFM/DOC/15, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 58–63, or *Cmd.* 9633, pp. 25–29.

[7] For text of Macmillan's statement, circulated as MFM/DOC/16, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 63–66, or *Cmd.* 9633, pp. 29–31.

4. Molotov in reply said fact Soviet Delegation plans present separate German proposal does not mean USSR refuses recognize link between security and unity.[8] Soviet Government interprets directive as making consecutive consideration of two parts item 1 appropriate. Since directive mentions security first and security more important because it affects all European nations, Soviet Delegation wishes consider it fully first. Soviet Government has proposals on other items related European security as well as on German reunification. It would appear conference already giving emphasis to European security. This impression confirmed by fact no one has brought up question of German participation in conference which directive instructs Ministers to consider in connection with German problem. When time comes take up German question, Soviet Delegation will raise question of participation. In refuting Macmillan point that divergent Soviet aims excluded USSR from NATO Molotov said basic Soviet objectives of defending peace and insuring security for four powers and for world are same as NATO objectives. Four powers have common purpose of seeking understanding on means achieving these objectives despite difficulties. Positive significance of Western draft proposal is that it deals with problem of European security which was ignored by West at Berlin Conference. Although Soviet gratified East and West positions getting closer, Western proposals have formal character, stressing certain declarative statements and merely referring to possibility of consultation. Main shortcoming is that everything in them including reunification seems subordinated to task of integrating reunified and remilitarized Germany into NATO plan. It is only in that event that draft provided for special guarantees in connection German reunification.

It had been explained that if organized Germany joined Warsaw Pact it would not be up to three powers to give guarantees regarding Germany, but no one mentioned possibility free Germany might elect join either NATO or Warsaw. Western powers had given no convincing clarification covering this contingency. Seemed to Molotov that four powers should assist Germans make own free choice rather than reunify it merely to draw it into one bloc or another. All this requires agreement on principal problem, that of security of European countries. Molotov then put following question to conference and requested views of other Ministers on it before proceeding further:

---

[8] For text of Molotov's statement, circulated as MFM/DOC/13, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 66–72, or *Cmd.* 9633, pp. 31–36.

"Whether it would not be possible for us to agree to regard the problem of security not from the point of view of this or that grouping of powers but from the view of strengthening point of view of the security interests of all the countries in Europe; or in any case from the point of view of all those European States which suffered so much in the past from German militarism and which are so desirous of preventing the revival of German militarism and any aggression on its part?"

5. Secretary replied that progress had been made in two day's discussion and question now was how to continue. West has presented proposals of both parts item 1. Though not complete they were full exposition point of view of three governments. Most questions put by Molotov had been answered with adequacy required at this stage. When we get detailed elaboration treaty of assurance, more detailed exchange views re treaty drafting would be in order. What we need to know now is Soviet Government position on German reunification, since Western proposals on security start from premise Germany will be reunified. Until clear whether Germany will be reunified, it cannot be established whether foundation upon which Western security proposals rest can be laid. In this indeterminate situation, it is premature to answer hypothetical questions such as that used by Molotov.

6. In subsequent exchange Macmillan and Pinay supported Secretary's position against repeated pleas of Molotov that Soviet Delegation's question be answered. Molotov argued that while Heads of Government recognized link between security and reunification, it was up to Ministers to decide how link should be brought about. Soviet view was that completion of consideration on security problem would make it easier arrive at some conclusion on German question. Molotov noted Secretary's statement that Western proposals subject to possible improvement or modification and said that this had been important debate on European security, leading to better understanding. Soviet Delegation willing to make certain additional proposal on European security at next meeting. Secretary said it would be helpful if Molotov presented his additional proposals of both security and reunification in interest advancing work of conference.

7. Agreed that October 31 meeting would first take up question of E-W contacts as planned and then resume discussion item 1.

306. Memorandum of a Conversation, Geneva, October 29, 1955[1]

SUBJECT

German Participation

PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador Blankenhorn
Dr. Grewe
Mr. Boeker
Mr. Merchant
Mr. Kidd

At this evening's meeting with the German representatives, Mr. Blankenhorn asked whether the US would be disposed to break off the conference if the Soviets refused to take part in any discussion of item 1 (b) of the agenda (German reunification). He said that he supposed that the Soviets would preface their position on this point by a request for participation of representatives of the GDR and Federal Republic. He understood that the Western Ministers would thereupon express a willingness to hear the Federal Republic but not the GDR, which was in accord with the position taken by Foreign Minister Brentano. If the Soviets at that point maintained that it would be useless to have any further discussion of Germany, and proposed that the conference take up items 2 and 3 of the agenda, what would the Western Ministers do? Would they refuse to go on? Mr. Boeker thought that it would be a considerable success for the Soviets if the Western Powers agreed to go on without further discussion of Germany.

Mr. Merchant replied that this was a problem especially for the Federal Republic. Grewe (not quite accurately) said that this situation had not been considered by the Working Group when they reached their decision, which was directed primarily to the Soviets raising the question on the first day. Blankenhorn said that the question obviously needed further consideration by the Germans and perhaps consultation with Bonn, which they would undertake in the next few days.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/10–2955. Secret. Drafted by Kidd. Copies of this memorandum, approved for distribution by Merchant, were sent to Dulles, MacArthur, Merchant, Phleger, Bowie, and Beam.

October 30, 1955

307. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Department of State[1]

Geneva, October 30, 1955—9 p.m.

Dulte 32. Eyes only Hoover from Secretary. Following is for transmission to President in whole or in part at your discretion. If you or Sherman feel it is too strong meat act accordingly.

"Dear Mr. President:

I had a busy Sunday. This morning we went to the American church where the service was conducted by the same young minister whom we enjoyed last July. The rest of the day was not so agreeable, including a one hour conference with Molotov about Egyptian arms matter and then an hour and a half with Sharett on the same subject. In my talk with Molotov I referred to your exchange of correspondence with Bulganin[2] and Bulganin's statement that you "need have no concern" on account of the Egyptian arms shipment. I pointed out that in fact this shipment was making war more likely in the Near East and also creating a wave of anti-Communist sentiment in the US and that on both counts I thought not only we should have concern but that they should have concern. Molotov was entirely noncommittal. I feel he was impressed by my presentation and it may have some good consequences although we shall probably never know for sure.

I told Sharett in substance that nothing that had yet happened leads us to feel that we had to abandon our present basic policies of friendship for both Jews and Arabs and avoidance of armaments race and aggression by either side. Sharett is not happy but the stakes are too big for us to be guided by domestic political considerations. We do not want to lose Arab good will unless the Arabs themselves in conspiracy with the Soviets force this result upon us.

I am not without hope that the situation will work out.

As far as the conference is concerned we shall know this week whether the Soviets are serious or not. Yesterday I taxed Molotov very hard on the fact that he was holding back his full proposals on European security and on German reunification.[3] I said this was not according to the directive. We had put our cards on the table with respect to both matters. He promised to put forward his further proposal at least on European security and I think we shall know where we are toward the end of the week.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/10–3055. Secret; Priority. Received in Washington at 6:35 p.m. and transmitted to the Denver White House on October 31.

[2] See footnote 2, Document 304.

[3] See Document 305.

I have decided to go to Madrid next Tuesday which is a holiday and our conference will not be in session. The Spanish Govt has for a long time asked me to come and since I am going to Belgrade next Sunday I thought it would be useful to go to Madrid also as somewhat of an offset.

I am delighted to hear the good news of your increasingly rapid recovery of strength. Foster Dulles"

Dulles

October 31, 1955

308. Editorial Note

On October 31, Secretary Dulles began the day with a senior staff meeting at 9 a.m., followed by a meeting with Macmillan and Pinay at which the Foreign Ministers discussed the Middle East, China, East-West contacts, German reunification, and European security. At 2:50 p.m., Dulles and Bohlen met briefly with Molotov before attending the fourth quadripartite Foreign Ministers meeting at the Palais des Nations from 3 to 7:55 p.m. At the end of the meeting Dulles talked briefly about his planned trip to Madrid the following day. Suydam held the delegation press briefing at 8:15, and at 9 Dulles, Wilson, Merchant, Bohlen, Phleger, and Bowie attended a dinner given by Molotov. (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 571, Chron–9)

No records of the senior staff meeting or the conversation with Molotov have been found in Department of State files. Records of the tripartite and quadripartite meetings of the Foreign Ministers follow; a telegraphic report (Secto 104) on the discussion with Pinay and a transcript of the press briefing are *ibid.*

309. Record of an Informal Tripartite Foreign Ministers Meeting, Geneva, October 31, 1955, 11 a.m.[1]

GERMAN NEUTRALITY

The Secretary, referring to the emphasis Molotov would be likely to give to German neutrality, said this was a basic question. Neutrality for a reunited Germany would be dangerous since it would leave that country in a bargaining position and would be the cause of future trouble.

Mr. Pinay said he had expressed his views on this many times.

The Secretary said it is difficult to express our concern without annoying the Germans since it is a reflection on them. We all know German neutrality would be inacceptable but our talking about it too much would have a bad effect on German public opinion. (At this point the Secretary gave Mr. Pinay a copy of Molotov's October 1939 speech bitterly criticizing the British and French.)

Mr. Macmillan said we cannot abandon our position of German freedom of choice. Perhaps we should go back to German statements that Germany cannot be isolated in the modern world. Our line should be the following: Two-thirds of Germany are already in NATO and if the Germans stick to their present position a united Germany would also participate. We are trying to work out arrangements whereby the Soviets will not be endangered, as they claim, if the other one-third joins NATO as a part of reunified Germany; in our plan we have tried to deal with this in advance in order to reassure the Soviets.

The Secretary pointed out that the GDR and the German Socialists, however, favor neutrality. We should concentrate on the strongest statements Adenauer has made against neutrality.

Macmillan recommended that in the conference we should revert to the need for reunification by means of free elections. Molotov says the USSR is entitled to a security treaty; we must say the Germans are entitled to reunification.

Mr. Kirkpatrick suggested we might point out to Molotov that if a reunified Germany chooses neutrality and leaves NATO, that would be an advantage to the Soviets and consequently need not be discussed as part of Soviet concern for security. We should try to brush this question off.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 571. Secret. No drafting information is given on the source text. The Foreign Ministers also discussed trade controls, and Dulles reported on his conversation with Molotov on October 30 (see *supra*). Dulles' report on this conversation was transmitted in Dulte 35, October 31. (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 571)

The Secretary pointed to the likelihood that Molotov will develop the theme of German neutrality and suggested the experts study the question further. Mr. Bowie would represent the US Delegation.

---

310. Telegram From the Delegation at the Foreign Ministers Meetings to the Department of State[1]

Geneva, November 1, 1955—2 a.m.

Secto 107. Summary of discussion of item III at Foreign Ministers Conference, October 31.

1. After introductory remarks by Secretary, Pinay delivered opening speech in which he made following points.[2]

a. Organization of peace not exclusively political or military problem. Necessary to re-establish confidence to ensure peace. France attaches great importance to re-establishment freer contacts and easier exchanges. France has tried always to respect free expression of thought and through constant comparison of ideas to promote the objective formation of opinion. Such freedoms pushed to such extent in France that occasionally they are condemned as excessive; but Frenchmen prefer to run such risks to loss such privileges.

b. France has noted with satisfaction signs of Soviet interest in a more liberal attitude toward cultural exchanges and a more objective presentation of news. France favors development East-West trade. However decrease in such trade is not a consequence of natural developments but rather a consequence of Eastern Europe's trade policy. Trade sector covered by security controls too small to encourage hope that their removal would result in substantial increase in trade.

c. While France favors broader contacts France does not hesitate to refer to obstacles arising from different structure of the two civilizations. Recognizing such obstacles may help in exploring the means of overcoming them.

d. France wants to know USSR as she is and insists that people of USSR should know France as it really is. Cooperation can produce fortunate results only if devoid of ulterior motives and if based on mutual truthfulness.

e. Pinay proposed that (1) information centers in respective capitals be established, (2) newspapers, books, and periodicals cross borders more freely and (3) that French correspondents in USSR have free access to normal sources of information.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/11–155. Secret. Repeated to Moscow, London, Paris, Bonn, and New York for the Mission at the United Nations. Passed to Defense. Copies of the U.S. Delegation verbatim record of the fourth Foreign Ministers meeting, which took place at 3 p.m., USDel/Verb/4 Corrected, October 31, and the record of decisions, MFM/DOC/RD/4, October 31, are *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 571.

[2] For text of Pinay's statement, circulated as MFM/DOC/17, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 228–230, or *Cmd.* 9633, pp. 135–136.

2. Macmillan emphasized that it is through free passage of ideas and free intercourse of individuals that countries gain proper appreciation both of common interest and differences and learn to compose or at least adjust differences.[3]

a. Urged realism and emphasized that real and lasting value or progress on item III will depend on progress made on first two items. We must not be content with papering over cracks. We must try to fill them.

b. After referring to recent UK-USSR exchanges of delegations and the establishment of Soviet Relations Committee of British Council, he stressed that to multiply group visits without reducing obstacles to free communications is to aim at the superficial and to ignore the essential.

c. Root cause of the artificiality of present contacts is systematic regulation of opinion which is part of Soviet system. While we understand historical reason for this, it is the free passage of ideas which we regard as the clue to progress on this part of our work. Problem remains so long as Soviet people presented with single official view of our policies and actions, so long as our broadcasts are jammed, so long as other means of conveying news and views so limited as to be almost non-existent.

d. Root cause of current low level of trade not our system of strategic controls. These controls are result of a lack of confidence and not one of its causes. Low level of trade caused by Soviet Government's own trade policies. Since World War II USSR's policy of self-sufficiency extended to include associates in eastern Europe. UK nevertheless ready to consider sympathetically any proposal likely to lead to mutual increase in peaceful trade.

3. Molotov referred to summit directive[4] and to August 5 resolution of Supreme Soviet on Bulganin report of Geneva Conference,[5] emphasizing "sovereign rights and non-interference in internal affairs".[6] He then stressed need for exchange of opinions as to scope and direction of work of experts committee. Referring to reservations accompanying Pinay, Macmillan statements, he asserted that Soviet position based on interests Soviet people (not on privileged social groups), on interests of defense of peace and friendly relations among nations.

---

[3] For text of Macmillan's statement, circulated as MFM/DOC/21, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 231–233, or *Cmd.* 9633, pp. 137–139.

[4] Document 257.

[5] For texts of Bulganin's report to the Soviet Council of Ministers and the Supreme Soviet resolution, August 5, see *Current Digest* of the Soviet press, vol. VII, No. 29, pp. 13–21. The texts were also published in *Pravda*, August 5.

[6] For text of Molotov's statement, circulated as MFM/DOC/24, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 234–239, or *Cmd.* 9633, pp. 139–143.

a. In Soviet view development of East-West contacts would be successful only if based on development of economic relations between states. This inconceivable without normal development of trade. Each country should be in position to buy and sell without hindrance. Nevertheless a number of obstacles and artificially created barriers impede normal development of trade. Discriminatory measures generally known. These include embargoes on exports, violation accepted practices in credit field and hindrance to free navigation of merchant ships. They create distrust in relations between countries and should be abandoned. Argument sometimes advanced that Soviets have no goods for development of trade, does not take into account fact that volume USSR external trade has increased fourfold since prewar period.

b. Soviets believe that experts should first examine problem of abolishing existing discriminatory measures hampering development economic relations. In current atmosphere of relaxation these barriers should be removed and most favored-nation principles should be applied in trade and navigation.

c. Returning to Macmillan point on regulation of public opinion in USSR, Molotov stated that all familiar with history USSR can easily judge how freedom-loving Soviet peoples are and how decisively they freed themselves from Czarist yoke. Work of Soviet Government imbued with desire to raise welfare of people and provide for people full freedom of development.

d. Molotov then listed recent Soviet actions promoting East-West contact. He mentioned parliamentarians, exchanges of 20 delegations with UK, expansion France-Soviet cultural ties, improvement in US-USSR cultural relations and suggested that much has still to be done.

e. Speaking about the objectives which should guide work of the experts, Molotov summarized main points of Soviet resolution on development of East-West contacts which he later tabled. (Text cabled separately.)[7] In this summary he made point that account taken of wishes re East-West contacts expressed by large number Western businessmen, scientists, etc.

4. Full text Dulles statement being transmitted through USIA channels.[8]

Following completion speeches Pinay tabled joint British-French-US memorandum (sent separately).[9] Molotov announced that Vinogradov, Soviet Ambassador to France, would be Soviet expert on item III. Baillou, Deputy Director for Cultural Relations in Quai d'Orsay will represent France and Hohler to represent UK. It was agreed that Committee of Experts would organize its own work, taking into account the tabled memoranda; its deliberations would be secret and work would begin eleven am Wednesday November 2. Experts would report back to the Foreign Ministers by November 10.

---

[7] For texts of Molotov's statement and the Soviet proposal, circulated as MFM/DOC/24 and 18, respectively, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 234–240, or *Cmd.* 9633, pp. 139–143 and 163. The text of the proposal was transmitted in Secto 103 from Geneva, October 31. (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 571)

[8] For text of Dulles' statement, circulated as MFM/DOC/20, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 240–245, or *Cmd.* 9633, pp. 143–146.

[9] For text of the tripartite proposal, circulated as MFM/DOC/19 Rev. 1, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 245–248, or *Cmd.* 9633, pp. 164–166. The text of the proposal was transmitted in Secto 102 from Geneva, October 31. (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 571)

---

311. Telegram From the Delegation at the Foreign Ministers Meetings to the Department of State[1]

Geneva, November 1, 1955—2 p.m.

Secto 113. 1. Second half October 31 meeting opened with Molotov request that Federal Republic and GDR representatives be invited participate in conference discussions of German problem.[2] He said while Soviet Government has relations both German Governments other three powers have relations only one and hence deprived possibility hearing GDR views. Molotov cited Bulganin summit statement that it not possible discuss Germany without representatives of German people. This particularly so now that two sovereign German states exist. If Ministers wish expedite settlement German problem they must help Germans come together. Soviet Government sees no reason prevent German participation since this would enable Germans express views on conference proposals thus far submitted and those which may be submitted. Soviet Government proposes invitations be sent to Bonn and Pankow Governments.

2. Secretary replied it not possible for US accept Soviet proposal. US does not recognize GDR nor feel it represents views of German people. All four-powers recognize Federal Republic and we see no reason why invitation should not be sent Adenauer as suggested. So far as GDR concerned there is coincidence views between it and Soviet Union which could speak for it.

3. Pinay said Western Powers accept principle Germans should be associated discussions concerning their own fate. Only way implement this principle is hold free elections throughout Germany to obtain qualified representatives. Confrontation Bonn and Pankow representatives would be false symmetry of regimes established by freedom and fiat and could lead only to useless polemics. In absence

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/11–155. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to London, Paris for USRO, Bonn, Moscow, Berlin. Passed to Defense. Regarding this meeting, see footnote 1, *supra.*

[2] For text of Molotov's statement, circulated as MFM/DOC/22, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 75–76.

free all-German elections only acceptable procedure would be to hear freely elected representatives of Federal Republic.

4. After brief statement by Macmillan, who made points similar to Secretary and Pinay, Molotov pleaded West acknowledge reality of German situation. He said recognition of governments one thing but dealing with matter involving territory of sovereign government quite another. USSR has experienced same difficulties in trying forge ahead despite obstacles set in path by others who had not recognized it. Life has way taking care such things in time. Refusal hear both German Governments would be to ignore facts and to refuse settle problem before use. Other three Ministers apparently intend deny Germans opportunity be heard. Soviet Government for equal treatment both German Governments and urges acceptance its proposal.

5. During ensuing debate Molotov said Western refusal accept Soviet proposal would have negative effect on remainder conference consideration German problem and this would be realized by German people. Secretary then stated three Ministers reject GDR hearing not merely because regime not recognized nor because its representatives might fail reflect wishes German people but because it is certain GDR would misrepresent German views. Macmillan then said to amusement three sides of table that he recalled GDR regime returned to power last time by 99 percent vote. In his 32 years politics he had taken part in ten elections and could say any party or any man polling such percentage could be regarded only as "walking miracle". Secretary as chairman then took play from Mol[illegible]v by proposing immediate invitation to Federal Government since four agreed on its participation. Molotov forced admit this unacceptable and matter of German participation was closed with agreement each side could consult such Germans as it wished outside conference hall.

6. Secretary said would be helpful have previously announced Soviet proposals to study over holiday. Molotov then introduced new Soviet security proposal with agreement that despite different approaches question European security revealed in conference thus far, Soviet Delegation holds possibility reaching positive results this problem not yet exhausted. Taking into account Western suggestions made at two Geneva Conferences particularly those of Eden at summit, Soviet Delegation proposed treaty comprising four powers plus other parties WEU and Warsaw as well as Federal Republic and GDR. Other European countries such as Yugoslavia and Denmark could also be parties. Treaty (text cabled Secto 108[3]) tabled contained the following provisions:

---

[3] Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/11–155) For texts of Molotov's statement and the Soviet draft treaty, circulated as MFM/DOC/23, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 76–82, or *Cmd.* 9633, pp. 36–39 and 106–107.

(a) Parties to treaty undertake not use armed force against one another and refrain from recourse threat force in relations each other and settle any disputes among them by peaceful means.

(b) In event one or several parties to treaty subjected to armed attack in Europe by any party or group of parties to treaty, other parties shall immediately render state or states so attacked all such assistance including military assistance as may be deemed necessary for purpose reestablishing and maintaining international peace and security in Europe.

(c) Parties to refrain from rendering under any pretext direct or indirect assistance to attacking state in Europe.

(d) Parties shall consult whenever in view of any one of them there arises danger of armed attack in Europe against one or more parties in order to take effective steps remove any such danger. They shall immediately undertake necessary consultations reestablishment of peace in event of attack on any party.

(e) Signatories shall by common consent establish special body or bodies for purpose holding above mentioned consultations and taking such other steps assure security as may be found necessary in connection fulfillment undertakings this treaty.

(f) Parties agree undertakings this treaty shall not infringe upon undertakings assumed by them under existing treaties and agreements.

(g) Assumption by states of undertakings under this treaty shall not prejudice right of parties to individual or collective self-defense in event of armed attack as provided Article 51 UN Charter.

(h) Treaty is of provisional character and shall remain in effect until replaced by another more extensive treaty on European security which shall replace existing treaties and agreements.

In written statement (text cabled Secto 109[4]), Molotov explained that Soviet Government in submitting this proposal proceeds from premise that "afterwards" existing treaties and agreements (NATO, WEU and Warsaw) shall become ineffective and military groupings based on them liquidated. He said Soviet Government proposes neither concrete term of validity for treaty outlined above nor specific time for its replacement by more extensive all European treaty. Soviet Government finds it possible merely mention that treaty proposed here will remain in force until replaced by broader treaty which in turn will provide for dissolution existing treaties and agreements. Molotov also expressed concern for security countries which suffered heavily from German aggression, mentioning specifically Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Greece. In passing he pointed out Western security proposals failed indicate whether states bordering Germany included. He asked for clarification on this point.

7. Molotov then referred to Eden proposal at summit creation special zone where armaments would be subject to limitation and inspection and recalled that Bulganin took favorable position on this.

---

[4] Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/11–155)

He cited directive recommendation concerning establishment between East and West of zone in which disposition armed forces will be subject mutual agreement. He then argued that zone "between East and West" must mean dividing line should fall between East and West Germany rather than East of reunified Germany. Western Powers security proposal therefore does not correspond actual state affairs. Soviet Government considers this question deserves serious attention and that positions relating to it should be reconciled since on number points Western Powers and USSR have much in common. Molotov then suggested agreement by both on following:

(a) Zone of limitation and inspection of armaments in Europe shall include territory of Federal Republic, GDR and all or some neighboring states.

(b) Agreement on zone shall envisage ceiling for strength troops of four powers stationed on territories of other states in zone. Question of troop levels subject additional consideration.

(c) Obligations pertaining limitation and control of armaments assumed by states under appropriate agreement shall be agreed upon by these states which are free in taking decisions on this matter in accordance their sovereign rights.

(d) To fulfill obligations pertaining limitation armaments in zone, joint inspection of armed forces and armaments of states parties to agreement shall be established. In concluding remarks Molotov said attainment of such an understanding would make solution disarmament problem easier because feasibility measures in Europe would have been demonstrated and could subsequently be carried out on larger scale. He said Soviet Delegation hoped its proposals would serve "as suitable basis for bringing our positions closer together and will facilitate reaching of necessary understanding among four powers on European security."

8. In preliminary comment Macmillan stated Soviet proposal contained certain points which seem at first sight make considerable advance in certain discussions but decisive point is that whole plan appears based on division of Germany. Three powers have made it quite clear that no matter how ingenious a security plan may be there can be no real security in Europe as long as Germany remains divided. For this reason we cannot fully appreciate Soviet security proposal until it has presented companion proposal on German reunification. Secretary seconded Macmillan's argument and urged Soviets delay no longer in presenting reunification proposal.

9. In brief response to Macmillan Molotov said it not secret that two German states now exist and our task is help reestablish united Germany in such way as take into account existing realities. Soviet Delegation believes at next meeting views could be exchanged on proposals just tabled by Soviet Delegation after which Soviet Delegation intends make certain proposals directly on German problem.

November 1, 1955

312. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Department of State[1]

Geneva, November 1, 1955—midnight.

Dulte 38. Eyes only Acting Secretary from Secretary. For President:

"I dictate this returning from Madrid. I had there a very useful day. I talked for two hours with Franco discussing the broad lines of our foreign policy as regards the Soviet Union and our estimate of the situation in the Near East and explained our policy toward Yugoslavia which is not well understood in Spain. I also urged the desirability of cooperation between Spain and France in relation to North Africa. After this meeting with Franco the Foreign Minister gave a large official luncheon, where I talked with him and with the Ministers of Commerce, Agriculture and Air.

"Everywhere the reception was most cordial. There were many in the streets who waved greeting and thousands at the airport for my arrival and departure who clapped and cheered.

"General Franco sent his warmest greetings to you and recalled your courtesy to his daughter in Washington. At luncheon a toast was drunk to your better health.

"Yesterday's developments at Geneva indicated what at first glance might be a very considerable acceptance by the Soviet Union of our security proposal. The main defect seems to be that it is premised upon a continuing division rather than reunification of Germany but it seems to accept an area comprising Germany and all or parts of Poland and Czechoslovakia much like that which we had proposed where there will be agreed levels of forces, inspection and the like. Also in contrast to prior proposals which called for withdrawal of foreign forces, it accepts a level to be determined for US, UK and French forces within the treaty area.

"I have not yet come to a final conclusion as to whether this proposal represents a trap to perpetuate the division of Germany or whether it represents a real advance toward our position. At least it is something more interesting than the initial position which they took which was little more than a repetition of the barren European security project of Berlin and your meeting at Geneva.[2]

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 110.11-DU/11-155. Secret; Priority. Received in Washington at 7:28 p.m. on November 1 and transmitted to the Denver White House at 10:35 a.m. on November 2.

"Faithfully yours, Foster Dulles" **Dulles**

---

[2] On November 3 Secretary Dulles received the following reply from the President: "My grateful thanks for the report in your Dulte 38. I shall pray that the new Soviet proposals are genuine steps in the direction of peace rather than mere tricks to throw us off guard." (Tedul 49 to Geneva, November 2; *ibid.*)

November 2, 1955

313. Editorial Note

On November 2, Secretary Dulles began the day with a delegation meeting at 9:15 a.m. At 11 the Working Group on East-West Contacts held its first meeting and at noon the three Western Foreign Ministers met at Pinay's villa for lunch. The fifth session of the Foreign Ministers meeting was held from 3 to 7:20 p.m. at the Palais des Nations. At 3:30 Russell met with Henri Roux, officer in charge of African and Levant Affairs in the French Foreign Ministry, to discuss the Middle East. Following the meeting of the Foreign Ministers, Dulles held a press conference at 7:30 p.m. and Suydam held one at 7:40. (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 573, Chron–11)

Records of the meeting of the Working Group and the fifth session of the Foreign Ministers follow. Records of the delegation meeting, the tripartite Foreign Ministers lunch, at which Dulles reported on his talk with Franco and Pinay discussed the Middle East, and the two press conferences are *ibid.* A memorandum of Russell's conversation with Roux is *ibid.*, CF 609.

---

314. Telegram From the Delegation at the Foreign Ministers Meeting to the Department of State[1]

Geneva, November 2, 1955—9 p.m.

Secto 131. East-West contacts.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/11–255. Secret. Repeated to Moscow, Paris, London, Bonn, and the Mission at the United Nations. The first meeting of the Committee of Experts on East-West Contacts took place at 11 a.m.

Overwhelming portion first meeting Committee of Experts this morning devoted to wrangle over procedures governing organization of experts work, with Soviets obstinately insisting that general discussion of two papers on Item III, tabled yesterday in meeting of ForMins,[2] must precede establishment procedures on how work of the experts should be organized. Objective of Western delegations on other hand was to obtain agreement on establishment 2 working parties (one on trade and the other on information and ideas, and exchange of persons) and to put them to work at earliest opportunity in order cover wide range of problems and prepare report in brief time allotted experts.

Vinogradov paraded whole range of arguments supporting Soviet position that general discussion of substance essential to appropriate orientation of such working parties as may be established. Issue deadlocked almost 2 hours when Western delegations agreed that Vinogradov could make his comments on the substance of 2 proposals, provided it were agreed (a) that meeting tomorrow would be convened at 10 a.m., (b) that general discussion would not be extended beyond 11:15 a.m. tomorrow, (c) that working groups would then be established and other problems such as chairmanship of working groups and the nature of the report to be submitted by Nov. 10 would be considered. In this way Western viewpoint prevailed on important matters of procedure debate on which consumed much time.

Vinogradov statement essentially a rehash of Molotov treatment of E-W contacts yesterday.[3] He asserted that Western memorandum not prepared with the view to becoming eventually joint proposal of the 4 powers, that it addressed itself essentially to contacts between the 3 Western powers and the USSR while the summit directive spoke of East-West contacts. He added that the Western document also contains number of points which Soviets cannot give consideration since they pertain to the internal jurisdiction of states. Soviets could also raise certain questions and make critical observations, he said, but refrained therefrom because would not prove constructive. While Soviet Delegation believes in the primacy of trade expansion, trade placed at very end and dealt with only incidentally in Western memorandum, without any reference to abolition of barriers to trade and the free development of trade. Thus Vinogradov said, it seems evident that although proposal of Western powers contains certain proposals deserving consideration, it cannot become the basis of discussion for the Committee of Experts.

---

[2] For texts of proposals on item III, MFM/DOC/18 and 19 Rev. 1, tabled on October 31, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 239–240 and 245–248, or *Cmd.* 9633, pp. 163–166.

[3] See Document 310.

Vinogradov then proposed that the Soviet document be made the basis of discussion for the experts, since it contains provisions which may be acceptable to all 4 powers. Sovs have made no attempt to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries, he said, and have tried not to emphasize differences. Sovs consider that the most important question under Item III is the free development of economic relations. Trade should be given top priority in the consideration of Item III because the basis of the life of peoples is economic. All countries are interested in free trade and the elimination of barriers to free trade, he added. At present normal economic relations do not exist owing to the introduction of discriminatory measures in trade and restrictions on credit and free navigation. Sovs cannot accept Western interpretation of the causes for these restrictions.

At present a certain détente exists and we all wish to strengthen and develop this trend. We must therefore consider elimination of discriminatory barriers artificially set up to restrict trade. The Western proposal gives the impression that trade should be increased only in commodities not on embargo lists. This not in accord with desires Heads of Govt and does not correspond with wishes of businessmen and the people. Can leave items not on lists to traders who have only to agree on terms. We must concern ourselves with articles which now cannot be bought and sold he said and added it appears necessary to observe that on the question of what goods should be placed on strategic lists there are differences of opinion. Vinogradov then pointed out that there is no embargo in the USSR on export of goods. One can find among Soviet exports a number of articles considered strategic by Western powers. He concluded by remarking it was not normal 10 years after the war that navigation in some parts of the world should be dangerous and not free.

Before adjourning meeting Baillou, who chaired, put following question to Vinogradov: Does the fact that in his exposé Vinogradov omitted reference to exchange of information and ideas well as exchange of persons signify that Sovs consider these unimportant and that they should not be considered? Vinogradov replied that Sovs regard these exchanges as very important and wished only to emphasize Sov view that widening and strengthening economic links constitutes the best basis for developing East-West contacts.

315. Telegram From the Delegation at the Foreign Ministers Meetings to the Department of State[1]

Geneva, November 3, 1955—noon.

1. Fifth meeting November 2 with Pinay presiding commenced by statements Western Ministers in which they emphasized that encouraging progress toward achieving common position European security made it all more desirable that Soviet Government now present its reunification proposals.[2] Macmillan pointed to improvements in second Soviet security proposal[3] and noted indefinite postponement dissolution of NATO in this connection. Macmillan repeated warning Western powers did not intend dismantle NATO nor accept European security on basis divided Germany. Secretary reviewed similarity in approach between current Soviet security proposal and Western security plan[4] indicating that both seek to deal with (a) renunciation use of force, (b) denying aid aggressor, (c) establishment substantial zone for agreed limitations forces and reciprocal inspections, (d) concept of consultation, (e) recognition inherent right collective self-defense and (f) concept that there should be reaction against aggression. Concept in Western proposals that foreign forces should be withdrawn on demand might be implied in third point Molotov's exposition October 31 re exercise of sovereignties. Thus despite important remaining differences, Secretary said Ministers had made sufficient progress in security discussions to hope for eventual agreement on European security under terms Heads of Government Directive. Secretary said no further progress possible until we know Soviet views re closely linked problem German reunification by means free elections. Pinay underscored foregoing points emphasizing significance Molotov statement that Western proposals concerning limitation and control of forces and armaments deserved serious attention.

2. Molotov associated himself with Secretary's statement re progress made on European security despite failure agree all matters.[5]

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/11–355. Secret; Priority. Repeated to London, Paris, Bonn, Moscow, and Berlin. Copies of the U.S. Delegation verbatim record of the fifth Foreign Ministers meeting, which took place at 3 p.m., USDel/Verb/5 Corrected, November 2, and the record of decisions, MFM/DOC/RD/5 Corr. 1, November 2, are *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 573.

[2] For texts of the statements of the three Western Foreign Ministers, circulated as MFM/DOC/26, 27, and 30, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 82–89.

[3] For text of the Soviet security proposal, see *ibid.*, pp. 79–80, or *Cmd.* 9633, pp. 106–107.

[4] For text of the Western security plan, submitted at the first meeting of the Foreign Ministers on October 27, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 27–33, or *Cmd.* 9633, pp. 99–103.

[5] For text of Molotov's statement, circulated as MFM/DOC/29, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 89–97, or *Cmd.* 9633, pp. 43–49.

He repeated argument that denial Federal Republic and GDR opportunity appear at conference tantamount closing door on fruitful discussion of German problem. German problem in any event subordinate European security since only German solution consistent with security was one which prevented recurrence militarist German state. In commenting on Western security draft Molotov again raised questions whether it was applicable states bordering Germany and whether it would enter into force only simultaneously with integration united Germany in NATO.

3. Molotov then took up discussion German reunification by referring to GDR appeal. He stressed development different social systems Federal Republic and GDR and argued political economic and social achievements latter could not be sacrificed by "mechanical" merger to two states. He said Soviet Government favors free all-German elections and confident time will come for them. First necessary find ways rapprochement between two states within European security framework. Unified Germany should be free of obligations assumed earlier by either part Germany under existing military and political agreements with other countries and should give undertaking not enter any coalition or military alliance directed against other states. So far only GDR has agreed to this.

4. Molotov then made following proposal (not tabled). "As one of the steps the Soviet Government proposes that foreign troops be withdrawn from the territory of Germany and within their own national frontiers within a three months' period with the retention in Germany of only restricted contingents. Furthermore, in the interests of European security and in order to bring about conditions favoring rapprochement between the two parts of Germany it should be possible to come to an arrangement by agreement with the German Democratic Republic and the German Federal Republic on limiting the strength of their armed units. The Government of the German Democratic Republic, it will be recalled, has already expressed its willingness to come to an agreement with the Government of the German Federal Republic on that point."

5. Molotov then tabled proposal for creation of all-German Council along lines suggested in GDR appeal published November 1 (text Soviet proposal being transmitted separate cable[6]). He argued that such Council would play important role in bringing together two German states in their cooperation with other countries particularly insofar as European security concerned. Council would "contribute to

---

[6] Secto 142 from Geneva, November 3, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/11–355) For text of the Soviet proposal, circulated as MFM/DOC/25, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 98–99, or *Cmd.* 9633, pp. 107–108.

creating both external and internal prerequisites for settlement German problem."

6. Secretary answered Molotov's questions re Western security proposals by stating treaty would enter into force with reunification of Germany and that all-Germany government could accept or reject NATO membership.[7] However parts of treaty could come into effect progressively at stages to be agreed. West willing discuss this with Soviet Government at appropriate time. With respect applicability treaty to border countries, Secretary said intent and effect Western proposals was that they benefit all European countries. Article 8 refers "armed attack any party not NATO member" and treaty area would embrace parts Poland and Czechoslovakia. Secretary expressed discouragement with what he hoped were only initial Soviet proposals re Germany since they were impractical and ignored Ministers' responsibility under directive for German reunification by means free elections. He rejected Soviet argument that GDR social progress should be preserved at expense delayed German reunification by pointing out this strictly matter to be decided by Germans during campaign for and as result of free elections. Secretary urged Soviet Delegation submit proposal on free elections.

7. Pinay said Molotov's statement that different social structures two Germanies stand in way of reunification would if taken literally seem to exclude all hope of reunification.[8] On premise that ten years during which Germany divided have created situation which constitutes obstacle to reunification, Soviets paradoxically conclude that agreement should be reached which would have effect of prolonging German division further. Now that Western security proposals have removed external obstacles to reunification, Soviet Government has taken step backward and created internal obstacles. Aim appears to be impose economic, social and political structures of predetermined nature on all Germany. In a word this would be imposition on Germans of minority Communist dictatorship. We want whole German people manage their affairs under freely elected government.

8. Macmillan supported statements of Secretary and Pinay. He urged agreement on goal of united independent Germany free to determine its foreign and home policies and brought about by free elections. Like an elephant free elections hard to define but recognizable on sight. They can be easily recognized by one who is candidate in them and much more exciting than other forms since results not known in advance. Macmillan expressed hope that Molotov would

---

[7] For text of Secretary Dulles' statement, circulated as MFM/DOC/28, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 99–102, or *Cmd.* 9633, pp. 49–51.

[8] For text of Pinay's statement, circulated as an undated press release, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 102–105, or *Cmd.* 9633, pp. 51–54.

have second thoughts on reunification coming closer to Western proposals as did second Soviet security plan.

9. In concluding statement of meeting Molotov gave defensive and repetitious series of arguments in support of all-German Council proposal. He expressed hope that after full study Western Ministers could bring their position closer to that of Soviet Government on German question.

November 3, 1955

316. Editorial Note

The United States Delegation began work on November 3 with a meeting at 8:45 a.m. attended by Phleger, Bowie, Bohlen, and McCardle. Following this all officers of the delegation met at 9:15. At 9:30 representatives of the three Western delegations discussed East-West contacts, and at 10 the Experts on East-West Contacts met. At 1:15 Secretary Dulles, Bowie, MacArthur, and Wainhouse attended a lunch at Macmillan's villa and discussed disarmament. From 3 to 6:55 p.m. the Foreign Ministers held their sixth meeting at the Palais des Nations. At 7:30 Suydam held a press briefing and at 8:30 Dulles hosted a dinner for the senior officers of the four delegations. On the evening of November 3, three other meetings were held. During one Kidd briefed Blankenhorn on the course of the conference; in a second MacArthur, Pink, and de Margerie discussed Algeria; in the third Tyler received Ha Vinh Phuong, First Secretary of the Vietnamese Embassy in Paris. (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 574 and 609)

Records of the Quadripartite Experts meeting, the lunch at Macmillan's villa, the sixth session of the Foreign Ministers, and Kidd's briefing of Blankenhorn follow. No records have been found for the meeting at 8:45 a.m., the tripartite meeting of Experts on East-West Contacts, or Secretary Dulles' dinner. Records for the remaining meetings are *ibid.*

317. Telegram From the Delegation at the Foreign Ministers Meetings to the Department of State[1]

Geneva, November 3, 1955—11 p.m.

Secto 157. Following is brief summary second meeting Committee of Experts, November 3. Jackson opened with sincere appeal to find maximum area of agreement. However necessary point out certain misconceptions in Soviet draft proposal and Vinogradov's presentation yesterday:[2] (1) Area of trade covered by strategic controls is in fact a small portion of total potential trade between East and West and cannot be correctly regarded as an obstacle to peaceful trade; (2) US Delegation at loss understand references to navigation and hope the specifics would be brought forward in working group; (3) Believed only possible for experts to speak for their own nations, important to clarify this basic jurisdictional limitation with reference entire Soviet proposal; (4) With this in mind paragraph 4 Soviet proposal which suggested four-power declaration in favor participation in international specialized agencies of all states so desiring could not be considered within purview this conference; (5) Re Soviet reference to new conference on use atomic energy for public health wished point out US had sponsored specialized UN agency for peaceful uses, and believed advisable leave question conference on public health to WHO; (6) However, paragraph 5 Soviet document referred to cultural exchanges, exchanges of people, publications, etc., and as suggested was in substantial agreement with Western proposals and should be carefully discussed in working group; (7) Finally, US Delegation cannot accept the Soviet proposal as the sole basis for the work of the committee or its working groups but could accept as one of the papers for discussion and as representing some of the items worthy of further exploration.

French expert Baillou explained joint Western proposals which had been criticized yesterday by Vinogradov as both too narrow and too wide and not representing a four-power position. It was the purpose of the West to obtain four-power agreement on as many of the listed items as possible. He made following points: (1) Minister Pinay had made it clear in his speech of October 31 introducing the three-power memorandum[3] that there was no desire whatsoever to interfere with the internal jurisdiction of any nation; (2) The document is believed to be wholly in accord with the summit directive; (3) In answer to Soviet reproach of subordination of trade item, memorandum followed summit directive by mentioning contacts first and trade second; it would be improper to put all the emphasis on trade as suggested by the Soviet Delegation; (4) He emphasized distinction between peaceful trade and that small portion of trade covered by strategic controls; (5) Three-power memorandum gives proper emphasis to concrete proposals in the field of cultural and scientific exchanges which if accepted would give rise to improvement in human relationships.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/11–355. Confidential. Repeated to Paris, London, Bonn, Moscow, and the Mission in New York. Passed to Defense. The second meeting of the Committee on Experts on East-West Contacts took place at 10 a.m.

[2] For text of the Soviet proposal, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 239–240, or *Cmd.* 9633, p. 163; for a report of the first meeting of experts, see Document 314.

[3] For text of the tripartite memorandum on East-West contacts, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 245–248, or *Cmd.* 9633, pp. 164–166.

UK expert Grey then followed with two general observations: (1) Studies of the working groups should not be confined to those areas on which agreement already exists or even those items listed in the two documents but discussions should be free to cover all problems that may exist in East-West contacts; (2) UK wish to reserve right to introduce new items not contained in either document either in working groups or in the committee. Then as chairman he suggested that the two working groups now be constituted as agreed previously and called for the other experts to nominate spokesmen for each group. This procedure was accepted and the following were nominated: Group one—contacts: UK, Hohler; French, Manac'h; USSR, Kemenov; US, Stoessel. Group two—trade: UK, Tippetts; French, D'Harcourt; USSR, Cheklin; US, Goodkind. Separate cables follow on working group meetings.[4]

---

[4] The Working Group on Contacts met twice on November 3 but was unable to agree on any matter including the agenda for their work. (Secto 160 from Geneva, November 4; Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/11–455) The Working Group on Trade meet for 3 hours, agreed on an agenda, discussed most-favored-nation treatment, and agreed to ask whether civil aviation and shipping problems should be considered under their jurisdiction. (Secto 159 from Geneva, November 4; *ibid.*)

318. Memorandum of the Conversation at a Luncheon of the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, Geneva, November 3, 1955, 1:15 p.m.[1]

USDel/MC/21

SUBJECT

Disarmament

PARTICIPANTS

United States	*United Kingdom*
The Secretary	Mr. Macmillan
Mr. MacArthur	Mr. Pink
Mr. Bowie	Mr. Hancock
Mr. Wainhouse	Mr. Thring
	Mr. MacKenzie

France
M. Pinay
M. De Menthon
M. Genevey
M. Sauvagnargues

At lunch given by Foreign Minister Macmillan today, the following points came up during a discussion of Agenda Item II, "Disarmament."

1. With respect to the tactics to be employed at the Conference, it was generally agreed that there would be a general round of views on disarmament by the Foreign Ministers, this possibly taking two meetings. It was thought that Mr. Molotov would probably table a paper on the opening day of the discussion.

2. It was agreed that following the general round of views we should consider having a "restricted session" for the discussion of the draft declaration[2] but we should retain the right to make the declaration public since the Soviets, if they table a paper, will probably make theirs public.

3. In general, there was agreement on the text of the declaration. The French, however, submitted a revision of paragraph 3–a. No decision was taken on this revision which is to be considered by the Experts.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 574. Confidential. Drafted by Wainhouse on November 5.

[2] Reference is to a draft tripartite declaration on disarmament that had been discussed by the Tripartite Working Group on Disarmament in Washington; see Document 136. For text of this declaration as submitted by the Western powers on November 10, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 199–201, or *Cmd* 9633, pp. 132–133.

4. The Secretary surmised that Mr. Molotov will table a resounding resolution dealing with reduction of forces and prohibition of the bomb. Mr. Macmillan stated that we were not in a position to make detailed proposals since both the US and the UK were in the midst of reviewing their policies. He felt that if we came out with a Four-Power declaration that would be something. The Secretary stated that the problem public opinion-wise was to tide over the next three months. Mr. Bowie felt that (a) the President's proposal;[3] (b) inspection and control; and (c) our position that we are willing to make reductions, if there is an effective system of inspection and control, should help us to tide over.

5. Since the US review of its disarmament policy is not likely to be ready before January 15, with the British likewise engaged in a review, it was felt that the Subcommittee of the United Nations Disarmament Commission should not meet before February, for following the firming up of the US position there should be tripartite meetings with the Canadians also included to develop an agreed position for US, UK, France, and Canada to take in the Subcommittee.

6. It was generally agreed that the Foreign Ministers should (a) emphasize the President's proposal as a prelude which would facilitate getting on with the Disarmament problem; (b) stress the importance of inspection and control; and (c) express strong interest in the reduction and limitation of armaments under proper safeguards.

7. It was agreed that the Tripartite Disarmament Working Group should continue to work together on disarmament and that when "Disarmament" is being discussed at the conference they should meet every morning to discuss and recommend tactics to the three Ministers.[4]

---

[3] For text of President Eisenhower's "Open Skies" proposal, see Document 221.

[4] The Tripartite Disarmament Working Group met on November 5 and revised the wording of paragraphs 3 and 6 of the draft declaration. In the discussion which followed it was agreed that each side would prepare answers for questions that might be raised during the consideration of disarmament by the Foreign Ministers and that these would be exchanged before the item was discussed. A memorandum of the conversation at this meeting, USDel/MC/23, November 5, is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 609.

319. Telegram From the Delegation at the Foreign Ministers Meetings to the Department of State[1]

Geneva, November 4, 1955—9 a.m.

Secto 158. 1. Sixth session Foreign Ministers November 3 began with statement by Secretary noting Soviet Delegation failure comment on Western reunification proposals submitted at outset conference.[2] He proceeded compare Western and Soviet proposals[3] on German problem on basis four elements directive: reunification, free elections, national interests of German people and European security. He said that while revised Eden Plan[4] fulfilled these provisions Soviet proposal on Germany was lacking in all respects since it based on continued division Germany contrary to German national interests and conducive insecurity in Europe. Secretary said Soviet claim that social gains of GDR could not be sacrificed amounts to elevation of sectional viewpoint above national freedom of German people to determine own internal and external policy. This was retrogression from Soviet position at Berlin Conference.[5] Secretary reviewed provisions Brussels Treaty which operate to limit military capacity of Federal Republic and together with NATO commit it to purely defensive posture indefinitely.

He asked what Soviet Government found objectionable about this. Recalling mistaken policy of Versailles Secretary urged that four powers benefit by this lesson in history and avoid creating militant nationalism in Germany which would be inevitable result prolonged delay of reunification. He said Germans themselves wished cooperate in creating situation designed avoid further folly of aggression. Four powers should help them toward this end by true effort bring about German unity now.

2. Pinay said directive clear on substance German problem as well as method for its solution.[6] He rejected Molotov's theory that

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/11–455. Secret. Repeated to London, Paris, Bonn to pass to Berlin, and Moscow. Copies of the U.S. Delegation verbatim record of the sixth meeting of the Foreign Ministers, which took place at 3 p.m., USDel/Verb/6 Corrected, November 3, and the record of decisions, MFM/DOC/RD/6, November 3, are *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 574.

[2] For text of Dulles' statement, circulated as MFM/DOC/31, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 105–112, or *Cmd.* 9633, pp. 54–59; for text of the Western reunification proposal, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 27–33, or *Cmd.* 9633, pp. 99–103.

[3] Presumably Dulles is referring to the November 2 Soviet proposal for the establishment of an all-German Council. For text of this proposal, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 98–99, or *Cmd.* 9633, pp. 107–108.

[4] The Eden Plan was circulated as part of the Western proposal on German reunification.

[5] For documentation on the Berlin Conference, January 25–February 18, 1954, see *Foreign Relations*, 1952–1954, vol. VII, Part 1, p. 601.

[6] For text of Pinay's statement, circulated as MFM/DOC/33, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 112–114.

only a certain social system can bring about peace-loving state. Such theory contrary facts of history and would make Soviet thesis re peaceful coexistence ridiculous. He said French Government would be most responsive if Soviet Union would pursue path of German unity and get down to "when" and "how" of free elections throughout Germany.

3. Macmillan said conference to date had only one proposal before it for reunification.[7] Soviet proposal for all-German Council is collection irrelevant prerequisites and procedures which would delay reunification for years. Unlike Eden Plan, Soviet proposal does not meet tests of speed, acceptability to German people and assurance of European security. An appointed all-German Council would be unrepresentative body incapable reaching representative decisions. Apparent intention that it not be proportionate to populations also objectionable. Since East German members could not be considered as representing any portion of German people, they would form tiny minority capable of blocking decision. Eden Plan provides for rapid reunification by free elections which acceptable to German people thus enabled choose own leaders. Nothing "mechanical" about free elections. Only "mechanical" elections are type in which results known in advance and turn out to be say "ninety-nine percent". Eden Plan should be examined fully and adopted by all four Ministers as basis conference discussion on German problem.

4. Molotov then reviewed documents submitted thus far by Soviet Government pointing to fact that preamble to proposal on all-German Council quoted language of directive on reunification as evidence proposal intended fulfill instructions of Heads of Government.[8] In long statement repeating many previous arguments, Molotov attempted defend total Soviet position on terms directive. He argued that Soviet proposal on Germany was only realistic and practical proposal before conference in light emergence two sovereign German states and advent Paris Agreements[9] since Berlin Conference. Apparent Paris Agreements were imposed on German people since socialists, Communists and workers throughout Germany as well as majority GDR population opposed them. Molotov said single-list elections represented utmost democracy though they admittedly only suitable in those countries such as USSR and GDR where population had achieved sufficient unity of purpose. Single-list elections need not be model for all-German elections. This ques-

---

[7] For text of Macmillan's statement, circulated as MFM/DOC/32, see *ibid.*, pp. 114–119, or *Cmd.* 9633, pp. 59–62.

[8] For text of Molotov's statement, circulated as MFM/DOC/34, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 119–126, or *Cmd.* 9633, pp. 63–68.

[9] For text of the agreements signed at Paris, October 23, 1954, see *Foreign Relations*, 1952–1954, vol. v, Part 2, pp. 1435 ff.

tion should be decided by Germans themselves. Molotov urged that all-German Council be tested. No chance that one part of Germany could impose its will or system on other part under Soviet proposal. Decisions would be put to vote. Soviet Delegation regrets point out nothing else can move German matter forward on practical basis.

5. During speech Molotov returned to criticism of Western security proposals pointing out inter alia that they (1) had dropped Eden suggestion that demarcation line of special zone might be Federal Republic-GDR border, (2) were not clear what would happen if reunified Germany rejected all treaties and took independent course and (3) failed explain how security of states bordering Germany such as Poland would be guaranteed. Molotov said Western statements designed to clarify second and third points had not been satisfactory.

6. Secretary stated Heads of Government had agreed on close link between reunification and security in directive. Their instructions were that Germany shall be reunified through free elections. Soviet Government has not submitted any plan for reunification through free elections nor has it considered Western proposals for same. Secretary concluded by stating that conference now confronted with problem whether it was going to try in good faith to carry out directive. He said he wished to think about that before commenting further.

---

320. Memorandum of a Conversation, Geneva, November 3, 1955[1]

USDel/MC/19 *Geneva, November 3, 1955.*

PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador Blankenhorn
Dr. Grewe
Mr. Boeker
Mr. Kidd

SUBJECT

German Reactions to Conference

After I had reported to the Germans on the Thursday Session,[2] Blankenhorn said that he would like to mention a few points arising out of a three hour visit with the Chancellor on Wednesday.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/11–355. Secret. Drafted by Kidd.

[2] See *supra*.

First, the Chancellor's health continued to improve markedly. He was now recovering his strength and was looking forward to resuming a more active role again. He did not intend to leave his home for any period of convalescence.

Blankenhorn and the Chancellor discussed at length the foreign reactions to the successive events of the last couple of months (the Moscow visit, continued delay on German rearmament, and the Saar vote[3]), and were in agreement on the necessity of the German Government's demonstrating more than ever its solidarity with the West in order to dispel the unfavorable reaction which these recent events had caused. The Chancellor was highly pleased with the Western Ministers' handling of the Conference and of the German question. He supported it entirely, and thought that their presentation of the Western case had been effective.

However, with regard to the future, he continued to think of the necessity of some sort of European integration scheme in order to hold Germany firmly in its present path. His thinking had not yet crystalized into anything definite, but the idea of steps that might be taken towards some appropriate form of European union was still germinating. The Chancellor continued to believe that good Franco-German relations should be the keel of his policy. He wondered whether it would be possible for Pinay to meet him in Bonn, perhaps this week-end, to discuss the Conference, the most desirable way for the Conference to end, and plans for the future to enable the West to resume an initiative in the European field. (Blankenhorn said, for our entirely personal information, that the Chancellor had two things in mind in this: 1, that it would be good to discuss these matters with Pinay, and 2, that it would obviate any excuse for Brentano to go to Geneva. Brentano wishes to come to Geneva in order to demonstrate that the Germans were doing everything possible to keep the reunification alive. The Chancellor was not very keen about this, and thought it could only lead to confusion, especially if Brentano saw Molotov while in Geneva.) Blankenhorn said that the Chancellor had authorized him to contact Pinay directly about this, but he would not like to do it if it would meet with a refusal, and he thought Pinay might be much more susceptible to the idea if the Secretary should see a way of suggesting it.

Blankenhorn was very pleased at the appointment with the Secretary for 2:15 on Friday, and hoped that he might discuss the above matters with him.[4]

---

[3] On October 23, the inhabitants of the Saar voted against the Statute for the Saar, which had been agreed by France and the Federal Republic 1 year earlier. This vote defeated the Franco-German proposal for Europeanization of the Saar.

[4] No other record of this appointment has been found in Department of State files.

I took up with Blankenhorn the Handler article in the *New York Times* on November 3 (Tosecs 134 and 125[5]). He denied that there was any truth in this. He said that the German Delegation and the Chancellor had been more than pleased with the good liaison this time, which was incidentally going much more smoothly than at the first Geneva Conference. The Germans were most embarrassed about this article and greatly regretted it. Dr. Grewe had spoken over the impression of the close cooperation between the German Delegation and the other Western delegates, and Blankenhorn intended to do the same tonight. They also intend to speak with Handler and to do what they could do to correct the mischief of his article.

I mentioned to Blankenhorn the feelers which we had received about the desire of the socialists leaders, Ollenhauer and Wehner, to see the Secretary. I explained about the Secretary's extremely heavy schedule, and said that Mr. Merchant would be prepared to see them if the appointment were made and they were accompanied by someone such as Dr. Grewe from the German Delegation. Blankenhorn said that the Chancellor would probably be upset, and would consider it no favor to him, if the Secretary saw these leaders of the opposition, particularly at Geneva, who would try to make political capital out of the fact that they were more energetic on behalf of German interests than the German Government. However, Blankenhorn said that he saw no harm at all, and that it might do some good, if Mr. Merchant would see them, particularly if he would do this with Dr. Grewe present. Moreover, this appeared to him in keeping with proper protocol, and would avoid any misimpression that the Socialists were working behind the Chancellor's back.

---

[5] Tosec 134 reported that the *New York Times* had carried a front-page story on November 2 stating that the West German Delegation at Geneva was dissatisfied with its relations with the Western powers, feeling that they were second-class allies. Tosec 125 reported that it was transmitting a summary of the article. (Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/11–255)

---

321. Telegram From the Delegation at the Conference of Foreign Ministers to the Department of State[1]

Geneva, November 3, 1955—2 p.m.

Secto 147. Following may be helpful to Acting Secretary in NSC.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/11–355. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Repeated verbatim to the Denver White House on November 4 as Toden 11. Copies were also sent to Sherman Adams, Vice President Nixon, Secretary of the Treasury Humphrey, and Attorney General Brownell. (*Ibid.*, 396.1–GE/11–455)

After first week's discussions of Item I,[2] conference has carried discussion on European Security as far as Western Powers deem advisable. It will be Western tactic henceforth focus attention as exclusively as possible on German reunification which they have emphasized throughout is indissolubly linked to European security.

Discussion of European security question has resulted in forcing Soviets to make some concessions to Western viewpoint. Thus, they have, as Secretary pointed out yesterday,[3] incorporated in their latest proposals most of political and military commitments contained in Western proposals. At same time, they have also dropped their earlier demands that agreement must be reached on dissolution of NATO and WEU within definite period. This apparent progress does not, however, obscure the fundamental fact that their security proposals are premised on division of Germany, reunification of which Western Powers have consistently emphasized, is the essential premise for any system of European security.

We have now reached point of identifying and driving home to German and world opinion basic issue dividing East and West on Item I. By emphasizing similarity Eastern and Western views on European security, we have in fact forced Soviets to place their emphasis on political and ideological considerations which prevent them from making progress on this question. This, we feel, constitutes the weakest ground for them to defend. Molotov has in effect served notice that Soviets will not risk jeopardizing their position in East Germany. By stressing necessity for maintaining "social gains" of GDR and by pointing out contribution which free elections made to rise of Hitlerism, he is taking a position in favor of an imposed German settlement at an indefinite future time without benefit of any genuinely free elections.

It will be Western tactic at sessions ahead to hammer at free elections and at freedom of German peoples to make own domestic and international decisions. A same time, we will continue, as we have consistently, to quote directive with respect to decision of Heads of Government that Germany shall be reunified under free elections and to point up failure of Soviet proposals to carry out this decision. We shall also keep in forefront fact that reunification of Germany in freedom is basic premise for any system of European security.

Molotov has given no indication that he will yield on position he has taken on Germany. We think unreasonableness and deviousness of his position can be readily demonstrated to our benefit and his detriment. We shall try to sharpen this picture as much as possible.

---

[2] European security and Germany.

[3] See Document 315.

We must expect that Soviets will make every effort in Germany to exploit following themes:

1. That it was Western Powers who prevented German participation in conference;
2. That a natural solution of German problem would be for two Germanies to get together;
3. That Western military groupings and West German participation therein are major obstacle to German reunification.

There has been no discussion as yet on Item II,[4] but this likely reached middle next week.

On Item III,[5] the Soviets today accepted Western procedural proposal. On substance their tactic is to try to break down system of strategic controls. Three Western Powers have stood firmly in refusing discuss these controls and have placed emphasis on freedom of communication, which Soviets have resisted as interference in domestic affairs.

In general, tone of conference has been moderate. Molotov has kept polemics to minimum. In this respect, atmosphere resembles the Heads of Government meeting more that that of Berlin. Offsetting this, of course, has been consistently stubborn and negative attitude of Soviets towards German reunification. On Western side unity and vigor of our allies have been especially noteworthy.

---

[4] Disarmament.

[5] Development of contacts between East and West.

---

322. Telegram From the Department of State to the Delegation at the Conference of Foreign Ministers, at Geneva[1]

Washington, November 3, 1955—4:50 p.m.

Tosec 141. For Jackson. Longer range acceptability US Government program for exchange of persons with Soviet Union may depend from point of view US public opinion on development of plan in which US advantage can clearly be seen. Best basis for creating public understanding of program is US insistence on high degree of reciprocity. It would be possible merely continue with program built around invitations to US (most difficult side exchange equation) proposed by Soviets or American organizations. In turn we could demand Soviets admit American group our choosing. However, our propaganda position on such exchanges would be vulnerable and we might force higher level exchanges than US desires.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/11–355. Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Moscow.

Part of solution may lie in joint planning with Soviets of exchange programs in specific fields, with each side proposing number and type projects it desires for given year, then negotiating satisfactory balance between requests. In first days exchange program, this would form good basis for public understanding and for seeking open cooperation US organizations and individuals. Statement by Molotov on importance mutually acceptable and profitable exchange program and remarks senior officers Soviet Embassy Washington indicate Soviets may be willing consider at least limited joint planning at this time.

Accordingly Department suggests U.S. experts, in bilateral phase Item III Geneva discussions, sound out Soviet experts on their Government's willingness arrange pilot project in one field. Best field at present would appear to be medicine, where there are already several Soviet and many U.S. requests arrange exchanges and because of its humanitarian and largely non-sensitive nature. (See upcoming telegram for documentation this point.[2]) However medicine would be only one of several fields in which projects might be developed jointly with Soviets in first year of program.

In coming year several groups medical field could travel each direction, each group to consist about 5 members drawn from Government and private sources. Another possibility is that program could be built around participation in American medical meetings since appears probable Department would be under pressure admit Soviet doctors for such meetings in any case. Department in conjunction HEW and other interested agencies is engaged in development list priority projects medical field which list could be made available soonest on your request.

Best U.S. delegation could probably hope to accomplish is to get agreement Soviet government to conduct negotiations for development systematic program for coming calendar year in this and several other fields mutual interest. Further negotiations specific projects could follow conference and take place Washington where Department would be able readily consult other government agencies and private groups. Exchange medical publications could also be discussed at some time with additional participation on U.S. side of Office Strategic Information.

---

[2] Tosec 156 to Geneva, November 4, transmitted a summary of previous and proposed exchanges in the field of medicine with the Soviet Union. (*Ibid.*, 396.1–GE/11–455)

HEW has been consulted in this regard.

Hoover

---

323. Telegram From the Delegation at the Foreign Ministers Meetings to the Department of State[1]

Geneva, November 4, 1955—5 p.m.

Secto 166. For Acting Secretary from Secretary. Suggest you transmit to President in accordance with Dulte 46[2] following message classified "secret" from me to Adenauer.

Let me first express my wishes your health will soon be completely restored. I follow bulletins on your health with intense interest and welcome good news of progress.

We here have been heavily engaged in discussion of critical first agenda item of conference—German reunification and European security.

I think we have made good progress from tactical standpoint. Our security proposals[3] were so solid that Soviet Union scrapped its original security proposal and advanced a new proposal which closely corresponds with our own, at least in words.[4] The result is, we can say, that so far as security is concerned, there are no major obstacles to German reunification. Indeed we are saying that and this has forced Soviet Union into position of defending continued division of Germany on ground this is necessary to preserve "social gains" which have been achieved in Soviet zone.

This is not a position which will gain much sympathy in non-Communist world and I would think it would not gain much sympathy in Germany.

I recall little penciled note which I wrote you from Heads of Govt conference last July when I said I felt that real obstacle to German reunification was not security but political attachment to

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/11–455. Secret; Limited Distribution. Passed to the Denver White House on November 4. The method of delivery to Adenauer is not known.

[2] Document 328.

[3] For text of the Western proposal, October 27, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 27–33, or *Cmd.* 9633, pp. 99–103.

[4] For texts of the Soviet proposals of October 28 and 31, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 45–48 and 79–80, or *Cmd.* 9633, pp. 104–107.

GDR.[5] This is more and more becoming apparent, and I think we have gained a considerable tactical success in bringing that into open.

I do not dare hope that it will bring about any great positive result at this conference. But I think position we have used here can if properly followed up during coming weeks make Soviet position untenable.

I know neither of us expected to bring about German reunification at this particular conference. We did hope to create conditions so that we would thereafter be able to move in that direction and I think we are in a good way toward doing that.

I trust our liaison with your representatives in Geneva has been satisfactory. Perhaps it is too much to hope that it has been wholly satisfactory because we get so deeply engrossed in day-to-day matters we do not always find all the time we would like. However, we want relationship to be close and would welcome any suggestions which you or von Brentano may have to make.[6]

---

[5] Reference is unclear; neither the note of July 21 (Document 229) nor July 23 (see footnote 2, Document 250), deals specifically with this topic.

[6] In a brief letter, dated November 7, Adenauer thanked Dulles for keeping him abreast of developments at Geneva and for his determined stand on reunification and European security. He expressed his appreciation for proposing a date for free elections, thus making it apparent who did not want reunification, and hoped that Dulles would succeed in bringing into full relief the East German demand to "Bolshevize" Germany. (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Name File)

November 4, 1955

324. Editorial Note

On November 4, Secretary Dulles began the day with meetings of his senior staff and all officers of the delegation at 8:45 and 9:15 a.m., respectively. At 9:30, the Western experts on East-West contacts met to discuss strategy for their meetings with Soviet experts at 10. At 11:30, Dulles briefed Italian Ambassador Bova-Scoppa on the course of the conference and briefly discussed with him the Middle Eastern situation. At 12:30 p.m., Dulles and his four senior advisers attended a tripartite Foreign Ministers meeting at Eden's villa to discuss strategy for the afternoon meeting of the four Foreign Ministers. After the tripartite meeting, MacArthur talked with Blankenhorn about West German plans for a meeting between Pinay and Adenauer. From 3:30 to 6:55 the seventh session of the Foreign Ministers took place at the Palais des Nations. Following the session Suydam held a press conference at 7:20. (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 575)

Records of the quadripartite meetings on East-West contacts and trade and the seventh Foreign Ministers meeting follow. No records for the senior staff meeting, the tripartite meeting on East-West contacts, or the tripartite ministerial meeting have been found in Department of State files. Records of the remaining meetings are *ibid.*

---

325. Telegram From the Delegation at the Foreign Ministers Meetings to the Department of State[1]

Geneva, November 4, 1955—10 p.m.

Secto 173. East-West contacts. Third session Contacts Working Group convened 10 am Friday with Kemenev producing list of items which in Soviet view corresponded with subject matter contained in both tripartite Western memorandum and in Soviet proposal.[2] This Soviet listing omitted points 1, 2, 4, 8, 10, 11, 16 and 17 of joint Western memorandum as well as items in Soviet proposal relating to UN specialized agencies and immigration barriers. Kemenev then urged that discussions re procedure be terminated and that important substantive work be started in order to record progress.

Western delegations immediately emphasized that while they prepared to discuss items listed by Soviets as acceptable for agenda, Soviet listing could constitute only part of agenda. They stressed that each delegation should have right to raise for discussion other matters which they regard as important to development East-West contacts. If Working Group restricts itself to points on which agreement easy, work would be confined to small segment of broad subject referred to Working Group. Would be unfortunate if we could find agreement here only on those things on which substantial agreement exists even before discussion initiated. This would be tantamount to merely confirming exchanges now substantially under way and would not correspond with our task to develop East-West contacts. This sort of approach to our work would not accord with first part of summit directive which calls for elimination of barriers interfering with free communications.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/11–455. Secret. Repeated to Paris, London, Bonn, and Moscow. Passed to the Mission at the United Nations and to the Department of Defense. Regarding the first two meetings of the Working Group on Contacts, see footnote 4, Document 317.

[2] For texts of the Western and Soviet proposals on the development of contacts between East and West, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 239–240 and 245–248, or *Cmd.* 9633, pp. 163–166.

Accordingly each Western delegation reserved right to raise questions on matters not included in Soviet listing and endeavored to obtain Soviet agreement that Tuesday would be reserved for discussion of items not contained in Soviet listing but included in Western memorandum and Soviet proposal. When Soviets evasive on precise timing of such discussion, using argument that they could not agree in advance since it might be necessary to give careful study to questions which Western delegations might raise, Western delegations (a) again reserved right to raise important questions on subject matter not on Soviet listing, (b) indicated that they would submit in advance list of items they would raise for discussion Tuesday so that Soviets would have ample time to study them and (c) emphasized that Western lists would consist of items contained in 17 point Western memorandum with which Soviets already familiar. Soviets then finally agreed that they would be prepared discuss balance of 17 Western items (those not on Soviet listing such as censorship and jamming) 19, Tuesday.

Procedural wrangle ended at 12:40 when substantive discussion of items on Soviet listing began. Here again Soviets employed kind of obstructionism which has characterized their conduct thus far on Item III. Kemenev droned on and on without visible signs of fatigue, endeavoring to force Western acceptance of language in Soviet proposal. Although only substantive item considered was attendance at scientific and cultural meetings, more than two hours of discussion failed to produce agreement on this item. US backed by other Western powers stressed necessity of prior knowledge by both govts, sponsorship by reputable organizations, reciprocity, and that admittance Soviet representatives to US would be in accordance with US laws and regulations. US cited revised policy on exchange-visitor visa designations as step already taken. Soviet representative agreed as to reciprocity and stressed that Soviet laws do not hamper entry foreign scientists invited to USSR. He ignored point re prior governmental knowledge, attacked sponsorship point as irrelevant since govts cannot instruct scientists as to what constitutes reputable organizations.

326. Telegram From the Delegation at the Foreign Ministers Meetings to the Department of State[1]

Geneva, November 5, 1955—10 a.m.

Secto 175. Second and third meetings Trade Working Group. Follows summary report second and third meetings Trade Working Group of the Committee of Experts November 4.

Soviet Rep Cheklin, chairman for day, attempted to show that US regulations and prohibitions were discriminations directed against USSR, citing renunciation trade agreements Soviet bloc countries as proof MFN principle abandoned. Quoted US-Soviet import-export figures as indication of "miserably" low level of trade. Discriminations not confined to US in 1954. Soviet attempt to place orders totalling 400 million pounds with UK was frustrated by strategic restrictions. Very existence such restrictions a negative influence on all trade. USSR sells all goods listed its export nomenclature. Has no strategic lists. Western Powers have even created organization to restrict trade instead of promoting it. With détente now on horizon trade discrimination must cease. Trade is basic pre-requisite for all other contacts which cannot develop until trade completely free. US Rep agreed low level US versus bloc and West versus bloc trade levels but disagreed as to cause. Quoted statistics showing strategic controls effected very small portion potential trade and cited extensive list of items not subject control. Reasons for low level East-West trade must be looked for in policies Soviet trade authorities. While US did not deny right Soviet Government determine level trade by Governmental decision not to import or export this was in fact basic cause current low levels and should be acknowledged. Cited Soviet trade data and statements foreign trade policy and asked if there is now basic change in policy, if so, great progress could be made in moving from general answer to discussion of specific detail.

French Rep reminded chairman that question of strategic controls was discussed at length previous meeting. Assignment of group was to study concrete measures. Such measures proposed in first trade paragraph tripartite memorandum submitted by Pinay.[2] Quoted French-USSR trade statistics to show steady increase trade since 1948.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/11–555. Secret. Repeated to Paris, London, Moscow, Bonn, and the Mission at the United Nations. Passed to OSD. Regarding the first meeting, see footnote 4, Document 317.

[2] For text of this proposal, dated October 31, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 245–248, or *Cmd.* 9633, pp. 164–166.

UK Rep asked why in paragraph 1 Soviet proposal[3] the word "peaceful" had been replaced by "international" in qualifying trade. Quoted Secretary Dulles' remarks on non-strategic trade and called for adherence to summit directive.[4] Pointed out only small portion of much advertised 400 million pound shopping list covered by controls. Cited figures showing apparent Soviet lack of interest UK trade and emphasis Soviet build-up intra-bloc trade. However noticed encouraging up-swing East-West trade last few months and echoed US question whether this might suggest new Soviet policy.

Chairman Cheklin opened afternoon session with another speech designed to show current low trade levels result primarily from strategic controls. These controls were facts which were not denied and had no connection with certain alleged but non-existent trends in the USSR. Did Western Powers introduce controls to prove existence of autarky in USSR? Was surprised lack of comprehension Soviet policies which as announced by Bulganin favored greater development foreign trade based on sound commercial practices and mutual trust. Recalled UK and French Reps had indicated improvement of level of trade whereas US had argued trade declined because of Soviet policy. Called for the liquidation of strategic lists. Concluded by saying that West had not commented on substance of Soviet proposals especially the MFN principle.

US Rep repeated that Soviet had taken little advantage of wide opportunities available in peaceful trade. Unless Soviet had a real interest in developing trade West could do nothing. Feels that Soviet foreign trade policy still not clear, particularly in light of Molotov's two-world market statement before the Supreme Council of Soviets February 1955.[5] Who was the West to believe—Bulganin or Molotov? Must conclude in light actual trade experience that such statements for internal consumption as that of Molotov reflect true picture Soviet policy which therefore inconsistent appropriate development peaceful East-West trade.

French and UK Reps proposed moving next agenda item but USSR did not wish to conclude discussion his paragraph one until clear answer to Soviet proposal given.

US Rep found Soviet proposal too generalized, mere parroting of directive except unwarranted substitution international for peaceful trade. Committee of Experts was instructed to study measures. No purpose in agreeing on generalities. First trade paragraph in the tripartite memorandum stated Western thesis trade initiative up to Soviet Bloc so discussions should now progress by having Soviet suggest specific measures.

---

[3] For text of the Soviet proposal, dated October 31, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 239–240, or *Cmd.* 9633, p. 163.

[4] Document 257.

[5] For text of Molotov's report on the international situation and Soviet foreign policy, February 8, see *New Times*, No. 7, February 12, 1955, pp. 11–29. The text is also printed in *Pravda*, February 8, 1955.

French Rep stated France did not control decision businessmen and traders and can only encourage foreign trade which already does. By contrast Soviet controls all commerce and can do much more to open markets. Asked directly if Soviets intend propose any measures other than abolition strategic controls which outside scope of directive and competence experts. UK Rep pointed out Soviet Rep has done nothing except call repeatedly for removal strategic controls. These not in competence this group, therefore we must deal with other specific measures.

Cheklin again defended Soviet proposal at length repeating arguments ending with request for elimination of strategic lists. French Rep asked if this was the only measure advanced by Soviets, Cheklin answered this is the primary obstacle but there are many other discriminatory policies previously described and not useful repeat.

Next meeting will be 1100 November 5 recessing thereafter until November 8.

---

327. Telegram From the Delegation at the Foreign Ministers Meetings to the Department of State[1]

Geneva, November 5, 1955—noon.

Secto 176. 1. Secretary opened discussion seventh session Nov. 4 by summing up proposals made both sides to date.[2] In reviewing progress made toward bringing security positions closer together Secretary emphasized fundamental defect Soviet proposal[3] which ignores link between security and reunification. He said subject to this fundamental difference and without minimizing difficult task of converting general security proposals into concrete treaty clauses, there is considerable measure agreement in principle on how to get security in Europe. Fact that Molotov continues ask questions that have been answered perhaps attributable to difficulty in reaching complete meeting of minds until we know both sides proceeding from premise German reunification. Soviet proposal on Germany[4] totally unresponsive directive because it says "German people are deprived of possibility living in a united state." Soviet Government has neither submitted unification proposal nor considered that of Western powers.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/11–555. Secret; Priority. Repeated to London, Paris, Bonn, Moscow, and Berlin. Copies of the U.S. Delegation verbatim record of the seventh Foreign Ministers meeting, which took place at 3:30 p.m., USDel/Verb/7 Corrected, November 4, and the record of decisions, MFM/DOC/RD/7, November 4, are *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 575.

[2] For text of Dulles' statement, circulated as MFM/DOC/35, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 127–130, or *Cmd.* 9633, pp. 68–70.

[3] For text of the second Soviet proposal on security, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 79–80, or *Cmd.* 9633, pp. 106–107.

2. Pinay repeated previous criticisms Soviet proposal for all-German Council. Said if any better way known permit people exercise free will than through free elections it would have been brought up at Heads Government meeting. Pinay had gained hope with second Soviet security proposal but felt "short-changed" when Soviets announced their German plan. Pinay urged that Ministers had duty on humanitarian grounds put quick end to senseless and unjust cleavage of families, culture, resources and science which Germans rightfully desire have united again.

3. Referring to Soviet arguments concerning "realistic situation" Macmillan said fact that two political entities exist is not bar to reunification but reason for it.[5] Dissimilar social structures not an obstacle to unity if one is willing let Germans choose. He repeated his earlier points about comparative degree rearmament in Federal Republic and GDR and asked why hundreds of deserters per month left East German military forces and fled to Federal Republic if latter militaristic. Macmillan then said if Molotov certain that majority Germans East and West opposed Paris Agreements, he should not be concerned about letting same Germans have free choice in reunified country as to whether join NATO or not. In effort pin Molotov down on Eden Plan Macmillan reviewed it step by step and asked Molotov if he agreed that:

(1) It desirable reunify Germany at earliest opportunity instead of keeping Germany divided for present?

(2) Ministers should be prepared discuss method for carrying out instructions of directive instead of reverting delaying tactics?

(3) Safeguards proposed by Western powers would be sufficient insure genuinely free elections?

(4) Four Powers have duty not only arrange free elections but make sure they are carried out under conditions of freedom?

(5) Freely elected representatives of German people are right persons to draft constitution?

(6) It desirable that we should start negotiations for peace treaty as soon as possible with representatives who have been chosen for task by whole German people?

---

[4] For text of the Soviet proposal for the establishment of an all-German Council, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 98–99, or *Cmd.* 9633, pp. 107–108.

[5] For text of Macmillan's statement, circulated as MFM/DOC/37, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 130–136, or *Cmd.* 9633, pp. 70–75.

(7) After ten years it is good thing set up democratic all-German Government representative of German people?

4. Molotov dodged Macmillan questions by insisting his own more important questions re Western proposals still unanswered. These were:

(1) Why Three Powers willing discuss German reunification only from viewpoint getting rearmed and reunified Germany into NATO?
(2) Why Western powers refuse discuss security guarantees for Germany's neighbors?

Molotov then proceeded reiterate familiar and dreary arguments in defense position taken by Soviets on Item I this far. On German question he said "it should be clear to us all that we have common ground in that we all favor settlement German problem and reunification Germany through free all-German elections. Question is what method should be adopted fulfill that task." He added that Soviet answer was to have representatives of German people attend conference in accordance instructions directive. Proposal for Council defended again as practical and immediate step in contrast evident desire Western powers make mere declaratory statement rather than seek real agreement.

5. Secretary then tabled three power proposal for free elections in September 1956 and establishment of Commission of Experts (text forwarded Secto 174[6]). Secretary said Federal Republic initiative also behind proposal as well as fifty million German people whom it represents. He had no doubt it also reflected wishes of Germans in Soviet zone. He hoped this proposal would commend itself to Soviet Delegation as concrete and practical.

6. Molotov promised careful study of proposal and in preliminary comments merely suggested again that Germans should attend conference to express their opinion on proposal. He also remarked that allied draft isolated German problem from European security in contradiction link called for in directive.

---

[6] Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/11–555) For text of this proposal, circulated as MFM/DOC/36, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 136–137, or *Cmd.* 9633, p. 108.

328. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Department of State[1]

Geneva, November 4, 1955—4 p.m.

Dulte 46. Eyes only Hoover from Secretary. Please pass to President:

"Dear Mr. President:

"Since the conference debate shifted its emphasis from problem of European security to problem of reunification of Germany by free elections the Soviet position has been very stubborn. This of course is not unexpected. We of course have put in our proposal for the holding of all-German elections.[2] Molotov has refused to go further than to propose that the representatives of the two German states shall jointly establish a council for cooperation. He so far refuses to make any proposal which complies with directive which says the Heads of Government 'have agreed that reunification of Germany shall be carried out by means of free elections'. Also Molotov will not even discuss our proposal for unification by free elections. British, French and ourselves are hammering him hard on his 'deviation' from Directive but so far he is immovable. Undoubtedly the Soviet tactic is to convince the Germans that Western Powers can do nothing for them and that they must deal with Moscow on Moscow's terms.

"You may be interested in letter which I wrote Adenauer last night which sums up situation as I now see it.[3] (Hoover transmitting to you in separate message.)

"We go back to the charge today and then there is three-day recess during which I go to Vienna Saturday night for gala reopening of opera and then to Brioni on Sunday to talk with Tito.

"At a dinner I gave last night for Foreign Ministers Molotov indicated he might go back to Moscow during this period. If so, he may return with new instructions. I surely hope so.

"Faithfully yours, Foster"

Dulles

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/11–455. Top Secret. Transmitted to the Denver White House on November 4.

[2] For text of this proposal, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 136–137, or *Cmd.* 9633, p. 108.

[3] See Document 323.

November 5, 1955

329. Editorial Note

At 10 a.m., Secretary Dulles held a meeting with his senior staff to discuss disarmament. At the same time the Working Group on Contacts met in the Palais des Nations Council Chamber to continue its work, and at 11 the Working Group on Trade began its fourth meeting in Room 1 of the Palais des Nations. At 11:30, the Tripartite Working Group on Disarmament met at the Villa le Chene to work on the draft declaration. Following lunch, Secretary Dulles departed for Vienna. (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 576, US OD/8)

No record of the senior staff meeting has been found in Department of State files. Records of the meetings of the Working Groups on Contacts and Trade follow. Regarding the meeting of the Working Group on Disarmament, see footnote 4, Document 318. Dulles' visit to Vienna was a social function to attend the reopening of the Vienna Opera, and only the schedule of his activities there has been found. (*Ibid.,* Chron–14)

---

330. Telegram From the Delegation at the Foreign Ministers Meetings to the Department of State[1]

Geneva, November 5, 1955—6 p.m.

Secto 187. East-West trade. Fourth session Trade Working Group took place today. Goodkind in chair.

French Rep asked for more contacts between French and Soviet traders. This especially needed because of different systems with differing methods and requirements. Asked greater freedom Western businessmen live and travel USSR. Also, as particular matter Franco-Soviet economic relations, asked Soviet Trade authorities reconsider practice selling exports c.i.f. and buying f.o.b., thus depriving Western firms opportunity participate insurance and shipping business.

UK Rep supported proposal facilitate contacts of Western businessmen, mentioning also difficulties occasioned for smaller traders because unrealistic ruble exchange rate. As separate proposal pointed out Soviet lack adequate protection industrial property rights real deterrent to trade.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/11–555. Confidential. Repeated to London, Paris, Bonn, Moscow, and the Mission at the United Nations. The meeting took place at 11 a.m.

US Rep associated self with French and British statements concerning business representation in Soviet Union, exchange rate and industrial property rights. Elaborated on patent problem, particularly respect right of priority and exchange patent data. Made long statement calling on USSR make available more information on production, markets and foreign trade. Reserved right make certain proposals civil aviation later when question which appropriate working group clarified.

Soviet representative then made extended speech attempting show again that Western strategic controls only obstacles to trade worth discussing. Obstacles mentioned by Western reps could hardly account for lack of interest Western businessmen visiting USSR. Recalled 1952 Moscow Economic Conference to which large numbers Western businessmen invited. Majority Western businessmen, particularly in US, did not respond because of political atmosphere in West and because the regimes for controlling trade made discouraging statements.

Similarly interest Western firms in Russian furs has been discouraged even though furs of such high quality that if situation reversed West would put on embargo lists. Businessmen now regard trips Moscow dangerous their reputations especially if later applying for visas enter certain Western country. Despite such discouragement Soviet Govt gratified number Western businessmen particularly British and French visiting Moscow constantly increases and reached total 758 in 1954. (*Note:* Can Dept supply figure approximate number foreign businessmen entering US in 1954?)

Cheklin cited instance British firm prosecuted for attempting send 100 tons lead to USSR. Thought lead was peaceful goods in international trade. There is even a metals exchange London to facilitate international trade metals like lead. Before coming Geneva Cheklin canvassed Soviet foreign trade organizations for instances obstacles to peaceful trade other than strategic controls. Not one mentioned such matters as patents or other matters raised by Western reps. However Soviet trade organizations had many letters in files from American and other Western businessmen regretting inability fill Soviet orders on account of strategic controls. One example cotton picking machinery, export of which US Commerce Dept said would be contrary national interest.

Cheklin read several such letters in English and concluded they prove real obstacles peaceful trade are strategic controls. Said not talking of tanks, guns, atom bombs, which no one wanted to buy but of peaceful goods such as those mentioned.

Meeting closed with UK Rep's plea for discussion of topics other than strategic controls which outside term of reference. Cheklin said strategic controls did not hurt USSR which would buy elsewhere or produce at home but if experts were to discuss removal of obstacles peaceful trade the only way to do this was remove obstacles and discriminations on Western side.

Next meeting Tuesday morning.

---

331. Telegram From the Delegation at the Foreign Ministers Meetings to the Department of State[1]

Geneva, November 6, 1955—10 p.m.

Secto 195. East-West contacts. Contacts Working Group spent seven hours Friday [*Saturday*] in two sessions which produced almost no agreement and very little progress on work before it. Meeting began with discussion UK paper (circulated Friday night[2]) identifying items in tripartite memorandum[3] not accepted by Soviets for agenda, on which Western dels proposed to speak on Tuesday. Soviets indicated they had no objection discussion these items Tuesday if Soviet items not on agenda could be discussed also. Stoessel who chaired then suggested that Working Group proceed to second point of agreed agenda (items 6, 7, 12 of Western memorandum together with 5(a) and 5(b) of Soviet proposal[4]).

Before work could begin Kemenov returned to first point of agenda advancing interpretation to effect that West had accepted in principle substance of item three in Soviet proposal. This necessitated round of Western statements repeating what Western dels had already made clear: (a) That subject to full understanding of agreement or disagreement on all items which may come before it. Western dels had agreed in principle that it would be desirable to widen such contacts in scientific field as were to the mutual advantage of countries concerned; (b) That precise formulation of understandings should be left for later consideration.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/11–655. Secret. Repeated to Paris, London, Bonn, Moscow, and the Mission at the United Nations. Passed to Defense and USIA. The fourth and fifth meetings of the Working Group on Contacts were held on November 5.

[2] Not found in Department of State files.

[3] For text of the tripartite proposal, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 245–248, or *Cmd.* 9633, pp. 164–166.

[4] For text of the Soviet proposal, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 239–240, or *Cmd.* 9633, p. 163.

Kemenov then suggested that he was hopeful of persuading Western dels re desirability of convening atomic energy conference in public health field and Professor Khvostov read paper on this subject.[5] This compelled Western dels to restate their position this matter. Here Kemenov returned again to question of language, urging that language of final draft report to Ministers should reflect concrete and practical Soviet proposals.

Thus exposition by Western dels of their proposals re films, exhibits and exchange expert delegations along lines agreed tripartite position finally got underway. US placed major emphasis on exhibits with British and French concentrating on other two items. Both UK and French spoke frankly about obstacles; UK on imbalance in films field where only one British film sold to USSR since 1951 and French referring to past Soviet practice selecting individuals for ideological rather than scientific qualifications. UK with tongue in cheek also offered to make available to Red Army Museum exhibition of UK contribution to war effort which turned down in 1948.

When Hohler indicated that Soviets must decide whether their purpose to establish closer relations with UK scientists, etc., or to lend support to organizations which do not represent broad masses of British people, Kemenov complained that Hohler remarks do not contribute to creation friendly atmosphere.

Kemenov then criticized exposition Western dels observing that nothing said about Soviet points 5(a) and (b) which should be discussed simultaneously with relevant items in tripartite memorandum. He requested Western views on Soviet points. When Western dels explained that they had given detailed explanation own proposals and would be in better position comment on Soviet items, on which they expected Soviet exposition, when they had heard what specific, concrete matters Soviets wished to convey with their rather general language, Soviet stalling and obstructionism went into high gear.

Kemenov first suggested that session should terminate at 6 pm and he would provide explanation Tuesday. When Western dels indicated prepared to stay until 7:30, Kemenov claimed there had been agreement to end at 6 pm (this untrue); besides had important engagement which he must keep. Western dels then suggested Sunday meeting. This also rejected by Kemenov with false claim that agreement existed for no Sunday meetings with lecture about the uselessness of making agreements if they are to [be] broken. Here Western dels emphasized their understanding that Tuesday would be devoted to discussion non-agenda items of tripartite and Soviet proposals. Kemenov then attempted so-called "compromise" gambit suggesting that he would supply explanation items 5(a) and (b) of Soviet proposal Tuesday morning and that Tuesday afternoon would be set aside for non-agenda items. This, he said, in accord with practice adhered to by Foreign Ministers.

---

[5] Not found in Department of State files.

Western dels stuck to guns, however. They pointed out that Foreign Ministers frequently interrupted discussion items to consider other matters and insisted that prior agreement existed to devote Tuesday to non-agenda items. Meeting broke up on very discouraging note at 7:20 with complete impasse on agenda for Tuesday discussion and with chairman Stoessel undertaking to refer issue to four experts (Jackson, Vinogradov, etc.), for their determination.

At meeting later in evening experts met and achieved compromise arrangement on procedure for Tuesday which offers some hope that certain agreements may yet be reached to justify continuation of exercise which thus far has resulted only in disappointment and frustration.[6]

---

[6] The Working Group on Contacts met for 7 hours 45 minutes on Tuesday, November 8, without any progress. The Western representatives encouraged Kemenov to make accommodations in the area of information and ideas, but none was forthcoming. The U.S. Delegation reported that it was becoming apparent "that Soviet objective is to continue and if possible to expand exchanges of persons assuring USSR valuable technical know-how without making corresponding concessions in areas of particular interest to West." (Secto 224 from Geneva, November 9; Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/11–955)

November 7, 1955

332. Editorial Note

Since Molotov was still in Moscow, each delegation spent November 7 in separate meetings. Secretary Dulles met with the United States members of the Working Group on Contacts and the Working Group on Disarmament at 10 and 11:30 a.m., respectively. Between these meetings he discussed the Middle East with senior staff officers. At 12:30 p.m. he met officials from the United Nations Refugee Program, and at 3 he discussed the course of the conference with Erich Ollenhauer, leader of the SPD Party in West Germany. The Secretary concluded the day's work with an interview with Pierre Hans of the International News Service. (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 578, Chron–16 and US OD/9a)

A memorandum of the conversation with Ollenhauer is *infra*. A report on the Middle East discussion was transmitted in Dulte 51.

(Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 578) No records of the other meetings have been found in Department of State files.

---

333. Memorandum of a Conversation, Geneva, November 7, 1955, 3 p.m.[1]

USDel/MC/26

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary of State
Herr Ollenhauer, Head of the German Social Democratic Party
Dr. Grewe, German Delegation
Mr. Merchant
Mr. Kidd

Herr Ollenhauer opened the conversation by asking whether the Secretary had any hopes that progress would be made at this Conference with regard to German reunification within the framework of European security.

The Secretary said that he always entertained some hope, although the attitude of the Soviet Delegation so far had not given much ground for expectation that agreement would be reached at this stage. However, it must be borne in mind that when Soviet agreements were forthcoming, this usually happened at the last minute, and therefore one could not yet speak conclusively with regard to the results of the Conference.

Herr Ollenhauer said that the Socialist Party naturally attached the greatest importance and had given much study to the question of how to bring about free elections for all Germany. The Socialist Party wondered whether there was much chance of getting the Soviets to state their real position with regard to free elections and unification until there had been some prior clarification of Germany's eventual military status. They wondered therefore whether it would be possible for the Western Ministers to press the Soviets for an answer with regard to the final military status of Germany, in order to clear the way for a clear-cut answer with regard to free elections.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 578. Secret. Drafted by Kidd on November 9. In a briefing memorandum for Merchant, dated November 7, Kidd cautioned that Ollenhauer's meeting with Dulles represented "a big Socialist play for the benefit of their position in internal German politics," and that the Secretary of State should give it the most careful treatment. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 396.1–GE/11–755)

The Secretary said that one could indeed always ask questions of the Soviets, but it was more difficult to obtain an answer. He said that the Soviets were falling back more and more upon the position of protection of the "social gains" in Eastern Germany. The plain truth appeared to be that they were against any solution which would involve the liquidation of Pankow. He thought that they took this position because of the dangers to their entire satellite system if they once permitted free elections to be held anywhere within that system. If one tried to pin them down on the military conditions which would justify their consent to free elections, the Soviet Delegation would probably reply that that question could be gone into after we had established relations between East and West Germany. They would be elusive.

Herr Ollenhauer agreed that this appeared to be the case at present. However, he wondered whether the Soviets were really committed to saving Pankow at all costs. He thought that it might very well be even more important for them to maintain the possibility of better relations or some sort of an agreement with the US, and for this, under certain circumstances, they might be prepared to recede somewhat from their support of Pankow. He did agree that the question of the satellites was probably decisive for them at present, and that they wish to avoid anything which could be used as an example against their control of the satellite states. But in that event, he wondered whether the Western Powers could not be a little more positive in demonstrating the length to which they were prepared to go with regard to reunification. For example, they might point out that under their plan for free elections united Germany would have a free choice and was not committed to any military alliance in advance.

The Secretary asked Mr. Merchant whether we had not already come close to doing just that. He said that we had stated the general proposition; it was now up to the Soviets to reply. If the Soviet Delegation answered the question, they would probably say that some form of neutrality was what they had in mind, with limitations upon German national forces. The Secretary doubted that they would say even that now, but would continue to evade the issue by references to the social gains made in the GDR. The Secretary said that it should not be very satisfactory to the Soviet Union to look forward to a neutral Germany in the center of Europe with bargaining power to play off East and West against each other. This would certainly not be conducive to peace in Europe. The Secretary said that both the President and he believed very strongly in the necessity of some form of European unity or integration for the future. It was of course a juridical fact that the new all-German state would have freedom of choice, but he could frankly state that he would not be happy if the reunited Germany should exercise this freedom of choice to disassociate itself from the West. Some degree of unity among the Western European states was almost necessary for the future. Therefore, although the choice would exist, we should certainly not wish to push Germany toward a choice which would represent disaster for Europe.

Herr Ollenhauer said that he hoped the Secretary would believe that the Socialist Party also had not thought of Germany's being put into a vacuum. That seemed to them entirely unrealistic. The question, however, that had occurred to them was whether it might be possible for united Germany to take part in some form of security arrangement which would not necessarily be the same as the existing arrangements. What they had in mind was something which would not imperil the security of the West, but might satisfy the security concern of the Soviet Union sufficiently to obtain its consent to free elections.

The Secretary demonstrated by a sketch on a yellow pad the type of zonal arrangement which the Western Powers had proposed. He explained that under the Western proposals there would not be a high level of military forces within this zone, but a comparatively low level. There was no intention that Germany would be built up as a military power. It was left open for discussion what level of forces would be maintained within the zone. The Western case was so strong that there was not much room left for the Soviets to argue about their security apprehensions, and in fact the broad principles of such a security arrangement seemed to be acceptable to both sides. The result was that military considerations were no longer a major obstacle to reunification. The Western proposals had forced the Soviets to base their objections to reunification not so much on military grounds related to security as upon political grounds, the alleged social gains in the Eastern Zone. The Western Powers had put forward proposals on security which were so reasonable and flexible that it could not be claimed that military considerations were the obstacle. The Secretary added that it seemed to him that from the security standpoint there was much more danger for the Soviet Union from a divided Germany than from the security system which the West had proposed. Although Molotov continued to talk about NATO, when pressed as to just what it was that worried him about reunification he had no answer except to point to the necessity of protecting social and economic "gains". The Secretary said that he felt that this narrowing of the issues represented progress in the Conference. He supposed that whether the Soviets would give in on other aspects depended largely upon the extent to which they were willing to undermine Pankow. The GDR seemed desperate to stay in power, and the Soviets now seem to be backing them up fully. We should not really know whether there was any give in this situation until the end of the Conference. The Secretary thought that the key to the situation lay in the political relations of Moscow to Pankow and the satellites.

Herr Ollenhauer stated that the Soviet proposals with regard to an all-German council were as unacceptable to the Socialists as to the Government. They were united in this view. However, the Socialist Party wondered whether it would not be possible to arrange technical level contacts between Bonn and Pankow by means of a mandate given by the Four Powers to the two German Governments. The Socialist Party did not wish to recognize Pankow, but they believed that with the division of Germany continuing, it might be possible to facilitate contacts between the two parts of Germany, which would maintain the moral unity of the people, without prejudicing the Western position concerning recognition of Pankow or increasing political difficulties in Germany.

The Secretary commented that the Soviet proposal about an all-German council contained no word with regard to free elections and amounted to merely establishing a quasi-diplomatic relationship between two separate states. He said that we assumed that if agreement could once be reached with regard to elections, contacts would as a matter of course take place between representatives of the two Governments with regard to carrying out that decision. He asked whether the responsibility in such matters did not lie largely with the Federal Republic.

Mr. Merchant mentioned the example of the road tolls case, where discussions at the technical level have taken place.[2]

The Secretary added that trade agreements were also a field in which he understood that contacts took place at the technical level. We had never put any obstacle to this type of contact.

Dr. Grewe said that if he might be permitted to depart from the role of translator for a moment in order to state the viewpoint of the Federal Government, he could say that much reflection and study had been given to the proposals of the SPD. However, the Government felt that the GDR was in a position to bring various forms of pressure upon the Federal Republic. The Government felt that if the Four Powers gave any such mandate for discussions between representatives of the two Governments, this would not suffice to solve the problems but would probably involve the eventual recognition of Pankow. Hitherto the Three Western Powers had refused to recognize Pankow, and the Federal Government considered it politically important to maintain this position, whether there was a mandate or not. Dr. Grewe felt that the SPD view might have been quite correct for the conditions prevailing in 1949 but now that there were claims of sovereignty on both sides, the recognition problem could not be avoided.

---

[2] Reference is to tolls imposed by the German Democratic Republic on access roads to Berlin.

The Secretary said that we should of course not wish to get into internal German matters. He thought that the Western Powers would not wish either to impose or to prohibit such contacts so long as they did not impair Quadripartite responsibility. Herr Ollenhauer would no doubt recall the position that we had taken with regard to maintenance of Quadripartite responsibility for Berlin. The Secretary felt that there might be certain disadvantages in calling on the two German states to take action in this or that specific field, since this would appear to put them on a parity. He felt that it was perhaps better to conduct these technical-level contacts on a de facto rather than de jure basis.

Herr Ollenhauer said that he had no more questions. The Secretary, calling his attention to the map on the wall, discussed for a few moments the extravagance of the Soviets' efforts to bring about disunity in this small area of Western Europe in comparison with the enormous expanse of territory which constituted a unified bloc from the Baltic to the Pacific. He recalled again his astonishment last July when Bulganin had stated the Soviet aim of bringing Europe back to the condition in which it was in 1939. Herr Ollenhauer agreed.

---

334. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Department of State[1]

Geneva, November 7, 1955—9 p.m.

Dulte 54. Eyes only Acting Secretary from Secretary. I am thinking about circumstances under which present conference will terminate, presumably toward end of next week.

Adenauer is very anxious there should be another conference so that he will not be left alone to deal with unresolved problem of German reunification.

Undoubtedly British and French will not want this conference to mark a break. On other hand, I have difficulty in seeing possibility of recording enough progress to justify holding a new conference.

It has occurred to me today best solution may be not to regard this conference as ending, but merely as recessing to reconvene and continue its work some time in the spring. That will avoid giving our communiqué anything like finality and will greatly ease task of preparing it. It will avoid necessity of having to have conference judged as a complete conference which will have either "failure" or "success". Neither is probably accurate but best solution, it strikes me, might be merely to say conference was not yet over.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/11–755. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Dulles. Transmitted to the Denver White House as Toden 17 at 8:25 p.m. on November 7.

You will recall original invitation of Three Powers pointed out "solution of these problems will take time and patience. They will not be solved at a single meeting nor in a hasty manner".

If this recessing formula were adopted now, same formula could be adopted next spring and perhaps tide over election period without bringing up issue of success or failure and survival or death of "spirit of Geneva".

I feel Directive of Heads of Government could be regarded as a continuing directive, at least for a year or more, and we should not consider the possibilities are fully exhausted by meeting together on approximately 15 days or a total of 60 hours, of which one half is interpretation.

These are somewhat rambling thoughts which have just developed in my mind. I would appreciate reaction within next day or two, as, if we adopt this thesis, we must develop it with our allies. You might give idea to President and perhaps get a slant from Vice President and some Cabinet members.

Dulles

---

335. Memorandum From the Ambassador to the Soviet Union (Bohlen) to the Secretary of State [1]

Geneva, November 7, 1955.

SUBJECT

Soviet policy and tactics on Item 1

In connection with the discussion of the present status and future prospects to be adopted in regard to Point 1 of the Agenda, I hope the following comments concerning the Soviet policies and tactics in pursuance thereof being pursued by Molotov will be of some assistance.

Molotov is faithfully carrying out the lines of Soviet policy laid down by Bulganin at the Summit meeting, repeated in his Supreme Soviet speech and consistently emphasized in all Soviet commentary on the subject of general unification and its relation to European security. The policy objective being sought is obvious and requires little elaboration. Its principal purpose is the maintenance of status quo in regard to Germany and in particular the maintenance and protection of GDR. Whatever slight variations Molotov might bring from Moscow on German unification, there is no reason to believe that the Soviet Government will change this primary purpose. In this sense a failure on the German unification issue at this Conference will be regarded by Moscow as a success. So strong is the Soviet determination in regard to GDR that I do not believe Molotov is really embarrassed by being forced to declare his position on free elections. In fact, I gain the impression that far from attempting to disguise this opposition, he seems interested in proclaiming it, in order, I believe, to convince West German opinion that there is absolutely no hope of any progress on unification via the Four-Power route and that the only chance lies in West German negotiations.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/11–755. Secret.

In general, however, in view of the adamant Soviet position, we are on strong grounds on the question of German unification but we should perhaps, in arguing the point tomorrow, avoid helping the Soviets to create the above impression in West German opinion.

The problem of European security is admittedly more complicated and even dangerous. In essence our position suffers from the inherent disadvantage of putting forth specific proposals on the basis of a hypothetical situation, in this case the unification of Germany. Molotov, I would say, is clearly aware of this factor and is seeking to concentrate discussion on security without however having the slightest intention of meeting the basic condition on which our proposal rests. There are a number of advantages he may hope to extract from this situation. One, to develop, as he has, the thesis that the Western proposals are designed to force Germany into NATO and that this is the sole Western interest in German unification. He has not yet, however, pushed this point to the full and has refrained from pressing the Western Ministers as to what would be the nature of a security treaty in the event that a united Germany is not a member of NATO. He is doing this not because he does not see possibility of embarrassment that he might cause to the Western positions but for other reasons. By avoiding a complete frontal attack on our proposals and in stressing the similarity of certain faults in the two drafts, he hopes to move towards some form of limited security arrangement or assurances between East and West, based on the present line of demarcation in Germany. His references to Eden's proposal at the Summit meeting make this quite evident. By stressing the similarity between the two drafts on zones, inspection and limitation of forces, he is trying to establish the position that these aspects of security are admitted by both sides to be good in themselves in order to make it more difficult for the West to refuse to put them into effect on the basis of a divided Germany. If, as is our policy, we should refuse to consider any arrangement based on the division of Germany, he would charge that the Western proposals were merely "declaratory" and not based on a genuine desire to enhance European security but only to force Germany into NATO.

If it becomes apparent, which is by no means yet the case, that the Western Powers will not entertain any form of arrangement or even virtual assurances based on status quo, he may then turn to a more specific and detailed attack on our proposals with a view to bringing out more clearly that they would have little teeth in them if Germany is not a member of NATO and at the same time try to draw the Western Ministers into a discussion of a hypothesis of a neutral Germany which Soviet propaganda could then use in Western Germany to undermine support for West German membership in NATO and WEU. In general, I believe that we should avoid any further discussion if possible of the security proposals but make absolutely clear our view that if Germany is to remain divided this essential cause of insecurity cannot be papered over by any assurances or arrangements in the security field. To do so, even in the most innocuous language, such as the willingness to renounce force, would be, in effect, to give our acquiescence to the maintenance of a divided Germany. An unwillingness to discuss the various hypotheses concerning a united Germany's position in Europe might have the disadvantage of appearing to support Molotov's assertion that we only envisage a united Germany in NATO but, on balance, I believe it would be less disadvantageous than the dangers of being drawn into a discussion of security on the assumption of a neutral Germany.

November 8, 1955

336. Editorial Note

On November 8, the Conference of Foreign Ministers resumed full operation. Following the United States Delegation staff meeting at 9 a.m., senior members of the three Western delegations met at the Villa le Chene at 9:30 to discuss tactics and to consult with Blankenhorn on the progress of the meetings. At 10 and 10:30, the Working Groups on Contacts and Trade met. Also at 10:30, Secretary Dulles discussed disarmament with his principal advisers in preparation for a meeting at 11 of the tripartite Working Group on Disarmament. At 12:30 p.m., he held a brief meeting with representatives of the World Council of Churches and at 1:30, had lunch with Georges Bidault. From 4 to 6:50 p.m. the eighth session of the Foreign Ministers met at the Palais des Nations. Following this meeting, Dulles discussed China with Phleger and Ambassador Johnson while Suydam held the daily press briefing. At 8:30, Dulles attended a dinner given by Pinay. (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 579, Chron–17 and US OD/10a)

Records of the 9:30 a.m. tripartite meeting, the meetings of the Working Groups on Trade and Disarmament, and the eighth meeting of the Foreign Ministers follow. Regarding the meeting of the Working Group on Contacts, see footnote 6, Document 331. Records of the staff meeting, and Suydam's press briefing are in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 579, Chron–17 and US OD/10a. No records of the other meetings and discussions have been found in Department of State files.

---

337. Record of a Tripartite Meeting of Experts, Villa le Chene, Geneva, November 8, 1955, 9:30 a.m.[1]

Mr. Kidd reported briefly on the meeting of Ollenhauer with the Secretary.[2]

M. deMargerie reported on the Soviet dinner with the French last Friday night.[3] This dinner had been very relaxed; there was no political conversation of any importance except within the half hour from 10:15 to 10:45. The French were most struck by the fierceness of the Soviet views with regard to Germany. Molotov did not avoid the subject of free elections; he stated that the Soviets were, of course, in favor of free elections; but it was necessary to proceed very cautiously in such a matter. After all, there had been considerable social progress in the East Zone. There was no question of imposing one regime on the other, but nevertheless one could not throw away achievements lightly.

M. Pinay expressed the view at this point that in spite of the social gains of which Molotov spoke, workers seemed to be much better off in West Germany. Molotov's reply took a more philosophical turn: he reproached the French with basing their positions on purely temporary conditions. He commented that there was, of course, much economic prosperity in Western Germany, and it was difficult for him to imagine that the UK and France did not realize that their own economic prosperity would soon be swallowed up by the Germans. However, in other respects French policy seemed to be very shortsighted in basing itself upon temporary conditions in Germany: these conditions would inevitably lead to crises in the course of time, economic, then social, and eventually political; the German worker would then see which German state takes care of him best. Molotov added that the Soviets had of course nothing to fear from a crisis in Germany: "Nous tiendrons le cou." With regard to the Western security proposals, Molotov said that it was mockery to pretend that these contained any genuine guarantees. deMargerie said that it was obvious that Pinay was exercising the utmost restraint at this point to refrain from referring to 1939. deMargerie said that the most striking fact was the persistence with which Molotov dwelt on the German theme. Molotov asked how France could ever believe that Germany would remain reliable and not drag its neighbors into adversity. Molotov added that next time the Soviets would liquidate Germany to the bitter end. At this point Vinogradoff commented to Soutou: "All the way to the Rhine". Molotov said that there could be no talk about free elections at least for another year. Pinay said that if this were the case, why did not Molotov say so frankly at the Conference? Molotov recoiled, stating that such things must occur gradually, by stages, the Soviets felt that a slower pace could be adopted. Molotov said that he was surprised that the French were not more sensitive with regard to such matters; France and the Soviet Union had much in common; they should always be mindful of the dangers of a German revanche.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1/11–855. Secret. Drafted by Kidd.

[2] See Document 333.

[3] November 4.

Bowie asked whether the French had the impression that the violence of the Soviet thinking with regard to Germany was genuine or merely a technique.

deMargerie replied: "technique—well rehearsed."

Molotov kept emphasizing the fact that the French were deceived by the West Germans. deMargerie thought that Soviet feelings were distinct from their policy, but that their genuine feelings with regard to Germany helped them to further their political objectives; it enabled them "to put their heart into it."

Harrison thanked deMargerie for this information, and raised the question of the tactics for today.

MacArthur said that we thought it would be useful for the Three Western Ministers to meet in the Secretary's office at the Palais at 3:00 today. In principle, we should be happy to wind up the discussion of item 1 today, perhaps with the provision that we could revert to this item later if appropriate. The Russian press representatives were busy yesterday spreading a rumor, which was backed up by Molotov's remarks at the airport, effect that their Minister was coming back from Moscow "with interesting things in his valise." The Secretary would be Chairman today. The situation as it was left on Friday was that our proposals were for Soviet consideration. There thus appear to be two alternatives on procedure: either Pinay and Macmillan could speak briefly first, or the floor might be given to Molotov for his comments on our proposals of Friday. If Molotov came back with nothing new, would it be wise to suspend further discussion on item 1, perhaps with provision to come back to it if necessary? On the other hand, if Molotov brought back something new, would it not be desirable to continue the discussion tomorrow? Instead of attempting to answer Molotov extemporaneously, it might be better, after preliminary remarks, to indicate that we would study his new proposals and give our further comments tomorrow. If Molotov spoke first, it would probably be a long speech, which would bring us to 4:30; that would still leave time for some preliminary observations. But if his new proposals contained anything tricky, it might be better to take the night to study them rather than to attempt to deal with them off the cuff. If Molotov merely presented the same old propositions in a new dress, we could no doubt brush the matter off tonight, passing on to the disarmament item tomorrow, but leaving the possibility open of returning to the German question later (as we did at Berlin). The motive for this was that it might be useful to have carefully prepared statements by each of the Three Western Ministers, which was hardly feasible for this afternoon's session.

Harrison said that the British had been working on the assumption that Molotov would not bring up anything new. They had prepared a final speech for Macmillan. They would like to have a clean-cut finish of item 1 tonight.

deMargerie said that it was his understanding that the Germans preferred a slightly different procedure: winding up item 1 now, but finishing the conference with a new short discussion on German unification which would clearly demonstrate how the situation lay.

Harrison said that there was no conflict in these views: there would no doubt be final summation speeches, looking towards a further meeting next year, and at that point one could indicate the balance sheet on the German item.

deMargerie indicated that he still had some reservation about this procedure. In this connection he wished to mention last Saturday's deplorable *Herald Tribune* article, publishing everything that Blankenhorn had told the Western representatives on Friday, including the reference to German fear of eventual bilateral dealings with the Soviets. This article had certainly not been helpful. It had also not been helpful to Pinay that the Germans had widely reproduced Pinay's speech, and had publicized the fact that they were so doing. This did not help Pinay at home.

MacArthur commented that Gaston Coblentz had of course all sorts of threads to pick up information at Geneva. MacArthur did not think that the Secretary meant to come back to item 1 and spend a whole session on this; we merely had in mind leaving the possibility open.

Harrison said that the British felt that we were in a very good situation now, and that it would be most desirable merely to tot up the score in the final speeches of the Conference.

deMargerie said that he wondered whether this was good enough. The French continued to have a very bad press in France.

Harrison said that the British press was getting better.

MacArthur said that the US press also appeared to be improving.

deMargerie repeated that the French press was still bad, particularly the influential "Le Monde".

Bowie said that if Molotov brought up anything new, would he not be most likely to concentrate on the point of the alleged precondition of German membership in NATO?

Harrison and Hood said that the British felt that there were still three questions which had not been answered by the West: (1) Whether there would be no security treaty until Germany joined NATO; (2) how the Soviets could be sure that the treaty would not be lifted by the parties (to which there were two answers: in the first place, the other members would not permit it, and in the second place the Soviets would share in the controls); (3) whether our security treaty provided for the security of Germany's neighbors (to which our answer would be that we propose to include Poland and Czechoslovakia as members of the treaty). Harrison said that if Molotov spoke first, giving his views with regard to our Friday proposal,[4] it would not be certain whether we would have the possibility to answer these questions. On the other hand if Pinay and Macmillan spoke first, these three questions could be answered.

Bowie commented that there appeared to be a danger in switching subjects in mid stream.

deMargerie commented that French public opinion required the answer to these questions.

MacArthur asked whether it would not be best to get the Soviet answer with regard to our Friday proposal before opening up discussion on these security points.

Harrison said that we could answer with regard to both.

---

[4] For text of the Western proposal on the reunification of Germany by free elections, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 136–137, or *Cmd.* 9633, p. 108.

deMargerie said that if the Western Ministers spoke first, they could take some of the wind out of Molotov's sail. There seemed to be advantages in our speaking first. But perhaps it would be useful to try to figure out what sort of new proposal Molotov might come up with.

Bowie said that he thought Molotov would try to focus on the NATO connection. Molotov should recognize that in terms of Western opinion, he was on a weak spot with regard to "social gains". Molotov would probably try to get us into the position of clinging just as much to the NATO connection as a precondition, in order that the German reaction would be "a curse on both your houses". It was the only vulnerable point we had.

deMargerie recalled that at the end of the first Geneva Conference Bulganin had put forward the suggestion of a non-aggression pact among the Big Four. It was conceivable that the Soviets would do something like that again. In that case, it would be better for Pinay and Macmillan to speak beforehand, in order to divide the scoring points on this round.

Bowie asked whether the topic would then be security or reunification. He thought that Macmillan had delivered himself of a very good list of questions last Friday, and that it might be good to go over this list of questions again in order to place the emphasis on the reunification question.

deMargerie said that he felt that there was some point to our reemphasizing the guarantees which we were prepared to give.

Bowie said that the danger of shifting subjects could perhaps be avoided if our whole focus was to the effect that "we have tried to make it possible for you to talk free elections, and now you won't talk free elections." deMargerie said that this appeared to be a good approach.

Bowie said that Macmillan might then pick up with his list of questions.

(Harrison and deMargerie indicated agreement.)

MacArthur commented that this would help us timewise.

Harrison said that if there were then nothing new, we might adjourn for tea, and come back to fire off our final speeches.

deMargerie said that he thought we could work on that basis. Pinay would speak first, noting that Molotov had refused free elections. He would say that he could not understand why. He would then develop all that we have offered in order to make this possible. (A 15-minute speech).

Harrison said that the British could then in turn speak fifteen minutes, which would bring us to 4:30, and then Molotov could speak until 5:30.

MacAruthur said that we could then check signals at the recess.

deMargerie referred to the French paper which had been given to us yesterday, and asked us to note the questions on page 3.[5] He asked whether we must refuse any agreement envisaging the participation of both Germanies, or whether we could accept something along the polite lines of Ollenhauer's suggestions to the Secretary. Or could we accept a non-aggression pact, limited to what was contained in the UN Charter, which in fact had been proposed as long ago as the Palais Rose in 1951.[6] Or how should we deal with the Soviets if they revert to the Eden Plan proposal[7] for a pilot inspection scheme which had been mentioned last summer?

Harrison said that the British had the answer on that. They would reply that the substance of the Eden Plan on inspections had either been incorporated into the Western proposals or should be discussed in terms of general disarmament. The British had had a paper prepared for this eventuality throughout the conference.

Bowie said that in ditching the subject to disarmament, he assumed that the British would indicate that the scheme was not necessarily applicable to Germany.

(Harrison nodded agreement).

deMargerie asked: "What about a non-aggression pact?"

MacArthur said that our whole concept had been what we could do in order to obtain German reunification. The Soviets had rejected this with brutal frankness. If we were to change this theme, we would be led down the slippery slope that there were other things to do besides obtaining reunification. This would in effect amount to acceptance of the Soviet thesis.

deMargerie said that he saw the point; per se a non-aggression pact was meaningless; but there was the necessity of satisfying public opinion, which would demand why we rejected something harmless. Public opinion would not see that the whole context had changed since 1950, but would find it difficult to understand a rejection of the same words as those that appeared in the UN Charter.

Bowie emphasized the point that we should take care of this by demonstrating that our proposals had been meant seriously and that we were not interested in window-dressing plans.

Harrison said that that would be a good answer in the UK.

MacArthur said that any non-aggression pact would make a very bad impression in the US. The press was stating that the Secretary needed to come home with something positive. That was non-sense. The Secretary did not need to come home with anything. In fact, a non-aggression pact of this nature would require a lot of explanation in an election year at home.

---

[5] Not further identified.

[6] For documentation on the quadripartite Deputy Foreign Ministers meeting at the Palais Rose in Paris in the spring of 1951, see *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. III, Part 1, pp. 1086 ff.

[7] For text of the Eden Plan, circulated as part of the Western proposal of October 27, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 27–33, or *Cmd.* 9633, pp. 99–103.

deMargerie apologized for mentioning it, but said that he was obliged to point out the press play on the contrast between Dulles's optimism and the more conservative views of Pinay and Macmillan. Why did the Secretary take such a line? MacArthur explained what the Secretary had had in mind in explaining to the press the views which he had expressed to the other Ministers on Thursday. The press had overplayed the first half of the Secretary's remarks, almost without catching the equally important qualifications of the last part of his explanation. This had been unfortunate, and the Secretary regretted it.

deMargerie said that he had been obliged to mention the point. It had put the French into very great trouble. Bidault was now insisting upon the contrast between the Secretary's position and Pinay's. A message had been received from Paris this morning that the French press continued to emphasize the point. There had been some new contact with the Secretary yesterday. The greatest trouble was with *"Le Monde"*. Its correspondent was a clever but difficult man by the name of Schwebel; Soutou had endeavored to persuade him and deMargerie also had seen him, but yesterday evening Schwebel said that he had listened to the Secretary of State's views and was more convinced than ever that the contrasting attitude of Pinay was wrong. Schwebel had perhaps merely been in touch with certain American correspondents.

Harrison wondered whether it would be helpful to the Germans if the West Germans submitted a document to the Conference explaining why they support the West positions.

deMargerie said that if we suggested such an idea, he would caution us about the necessity of having a careful look at the German document first.

Harrison said that we could think this over; in any event there was no time to deal with it this morning.

deMargerie said that if Molotov continues to harp on the necessity of cooperation of the two Germanies, we might usefully point out the fierce answer of the GDR to our election proposals: How could people with such conflicting views be asked to sit at the same table?

(At 10:35 the Germans joined the meeting.)

Harrison asked whether the Germans had any idea what Molotov would be bringing back with him.

Blankenhorn said that they had none, had the Western Delegations?

MacArthur mentioned the hints by Soviet press men yesterday and Molotov's statement about "interesting things in his baggage."[8]

Harrison said that up until last night, the British had rather thought that Molotov would not have anything new.

Blankenhorn inquired what we proposed to do if Molotov refused the Western proposal.

Harrison explained that there were two alternatives, either to pass the ball to Molotov, or to have Pinay and Macmillan speak first. The latter seemed preferable. Pinay would show the efforts which had been made by the West to put forward security proposals that would enable us to obtain an answer from Molotov with regard to elections. Macmillan would then pick up, end on his seven questions,[9] and leave Molotov with his questions concerning reunification. Molotov would then probably throw our project out the window or produce something new. If the former, we would finish item 1 today; if the latter, we would take a little time to study it. There was a question how we should break off the discussion of item 1. Should it be broken off cleanly now, or should we revert to it at the end of the conference: and if the latter, we could either have another formal discussion, or the matter could be merely picked up in the closing speeches of the Ministers.

Blankenhorn said that he thought it was good to break off the discussion of item 1 at this stage and not resume debate on it at the end of the conference (that is, if Molotov brings up anything new). The Ministers could then cover the matter by way of summation in their final speeches. Blankenhorn said that he would also like to ask the following question: In discussing our security proposals at the beginning today, would we elaborate our ideas further or would we remain the same as before? That is, would the Western Ministers become more concrete, for example with regard to the phasing?

deMargerie explained that it was our idea to show how we have made it possible for Molotov to accept free elections, by our fair proposals, which would be explained again in a general way.

Blankenhorn said that he agreed.

MacArthur said that we would not wish to go into details, but merely to pull the discussion together.

Blankenhorn asked whether we would take the opportunity to make the point that NATO would not be advanced into territory evacuated by the Soviets. MacArthur and Bowie pointed out that this would be dangerous, providing Molotov with a handle to divert the discussion away from German reunification. We could no doubt suggest the point but it would be most unwise to become involved in details.

---

[8] Upon his return to Geneva, Molotov stated that he had brought "interesting things in his baggage". However, the Embassy in Moscow reported that Bulganin's reception on November 7 gave little evidence to support Molotov's statement, and that although it would be unwise to exclude the idea of some Soviet flexibility at Geneva, the substance of the conversation at the reception had not revealed any. (Telegram 1084 from Moscow, November 8; Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/11–855)

[9] Regarding Macmillan's seven questions, see Document 327.

Blankenhorn felt that it would be a good point to make in order to prove that the West had gone very far in order to obtain reunification.

MacArthur said that he thought we would accomplish this purpose by the general effect of our speeches, without confusing the clean cut break on reunification.

deMargerie said at this point that he had received word that his Minister was back, and the French would like to leave in order to consult with him.

MacArthur asked whether Blankenhorn had any other points which he wished to raise.

Blankenhorn said "none" and the meeting adjourned at 10:50.

---

338. Telegram From the Delegation at the Foreign Ministers Meetings to the Department of State[1]

Geneva, November 8, 1955—9 p.m.

Secto 222. East-West trade.

1. East-West Trade Working Group held its fifth meeting Tuesday morning at 10:30 a.m. D'Harcourt in chair. Tippetts, UK, reviewed discussions to date. Said had hoped could avoid recriminations about strategic controls as outside terms of reference and that Soviet Representative, mindful of recent upward movement East-West trade would give Western powers some reason for hoping Soviet had abandoned old policies self-sufficiency in favor larger reliance on trade. Also had expected reasonable discussion concrete proposals put forward Western side as constructive measures. Instead, UK Rep went on, we have heard about nothing from the Soviet Rep but strategic controls. The issue of Soviet trade policy, moreover, had been confused by the Soviet Rep telling us USSR has never followed policy of self-sufficiency. The Soviet Rep has suggested no measures other than the abolition of Western strategic controls and has not replied meaningfully to proposals put forward on

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/11–855. Confidential. Repeated to London, Paris, Bonn, Moscow, and the Mission at the United Nations. Passed to Defense.

Saturday by Western reps. Thus the Soviet posture in the Working Group essentially a negative one, the Western position much more positive. Once more he (the UK Rep) would ask his Soviet colleague: Does he have no other positive measures to suggest? Does he have no response to make to the specific proposal made by Western reps?

2. After US Rep associated himself with preceding statement, Cheklin made long statement largely repeating points made earlier statements to which, he observed, his colleagues were apparently not attentive. Gist of Western position is that wide opportunities for East-West trade exist despite strategic controls but level of trade is low because of Soviet policy. USSR cannot accept such statements. Impossible speak of free access to trade when there are so many discriminatory restrictions placed on trade with the USSR and the Peoples Republics. Of this he had already given abundant documentation and could give more if needed. As to the trade policy of the USSR, it consists, as Bulganin has said, of seeking trade with all countries on an equal basis regardless of political or social structures. So far from being an obstacle to trade Soviet policy was devoted to the expansion of trade as a means of developing confidence and therefore promoting peace. Mention had been made of autarky. The USSR had pursued a policy of industrialization; was this autarky? Have not all Western countries sought to industrialize? Does industrial development destroy the basis for trade? Obviously not; trade is highest between developed countries. Considering the blockades and restrictions directed against the USSR at various times is it any wonder that the USSR has striven to develop its industry? We are not for autarky but for a balanced trade, but we must be free to develop our own industry. What would happen to the USSR if it did not produce ships, machinery, oilwell drilling equipment, etc? Nevertheless this does not undermine the foundations of trade with the West. In fact we are now exporting machinery and equipment and Western businessmen should be quite interested in seeing some of the new products we have to offer.

Continuing, Cheklin referred to assertions Trade Working Group could not discuss strategic controls but should discuss removal other obstacles to trade. What are these obstacles? French Rep had cited list of things French could sell; also commodities France interested in obtaining. Trade in these commodities goes on. The USSR is not aware of any restrictions. If there are difficulties, such as the matters mentioned in connection with transportation, terms of delivery, insurance, price, quality, etc., these technical matters are not for the Foreign Ministers to discuss. The ECE has a number of technical committees to deal with such problems or they can be left to the buyer and seller to settle.

It is true, the Soviet Rep went on, certain obstacles existed also in respect of commodities not on the prohibited lists such as import restrictions, lack of MFN treatment and complex licensing procedures, but these obstacles were also the result of the political attitudes existing in the West toward all East-West trade. Thus these obstacles were clearly covered by the USSR draft. As far as the problem of patents and copyrights mentioned by the UK Rep, the Soviet Rep felt we do not have to deal with this here. No one argued that any particular transaction fell through on account of such matters. If there were any real problems here he would refer them to appropriate agencies in Moscow. One cannot seriously maintain such obstacles are crucial.

Concluding Soviet Rep would reply to the questions put so dramatically by his British colleague as to concrete proposals. The Rep of the USSR is amazed that the USSR is accused of lack of initiative. It is not for the USSR to show initiative but for the Western powers who are responsible for the restrictions and prohibitions on trade. The USSR has often showed its initiative in the past; now let other countries show some by dealing with the prohibited lists in accordance with the Soviet draft resolution which presents a real basis for agreement.[2]

The above is reported rather fully to give the full flavor of Soviet intransigeance on the question of strategic controls and also because no verbatim record of the Trade Working Group discussions is being kept.

There being no further discussion of the two trade paragraphs of the tripartite Western memorandum,[3] it was then agreed to discuss paragraph 2 of the Soviet memorandum[4] (freedom of navigation) and paragraph 17 of the French memorandum[5] (civil aviation).

Principal adviser Soviet Ministry Foreign Affairs, concerning history of adherence three Western nations to concept of freedom of the high seas, then spoke generally of recent instances of interference, detention and some of these were Soviet, Polish and UK ships, concerning which respective governments have protested and even US had indicated action was not legal. Other cases of discrimination involved annulments of charters and refusals to bunker. He then referred to the wording of paragraph two of the Soviet memorandum and described it as a general formula to which all delegations should have no difficulty agreeing. He did not propose immediate removal of restrictions but a gradual lifting. Avoided specifics to avoid embarrassment.

---

[2] For text of the Soviet proposal on contacts between East and West, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 239–240, or *Cmd.* 9633, p. 163.

[3] For text of the Western proposal of contacts between East and West, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 245–248, or *Cmd.* 9633, pp. 164–166.

[4] The proposal in footnote 2 above.

[5] The proposal in footnote 3 above.

US took position Soviet paragraph 2 irrelevant to studies of experts. Referred briefly to the directive requesting this conference study obstacles freer contacts and assumed reference could only be to those obstacles over which nations represented had control. Pointed out Soviet Rep had not alleged any hindrance for which US or any of three Western powers were responsible. US ports and international waterways under US jurisdiction are open to Soviet vessels provided they observe due and nondiscriminatory procedures. US has not deviated from principle freedom of seas. Not task of Experts Committee to discuss broad principles having no application in present conference.

US Reps then introduced proposed memorandum of understanding on civil aviation[6] in behalf three Western Dels indicating that while all other forms of transportation between Soviet and Western countries were free of artificial barriers, direct air navigation still not possible. An understanding at this conference in principle for the establishment of direct air transportation services between the Soviet and Western nations to be initiated by the conclusion of bilateral agreements would be one concrete response to the summit directive. Explained that prerequisite commercial rights almost invariably exchanged on reciprocal basis. However, on many occasions nations have not desired immediate exercise such rights but in all cases welcomed early inauguration of services by airlines of other nations in order to meet legitimate demand for transport without delay. Recited briefly many mutual benefits through air services in relation freer contacts, exchanges, tourism, mail and cargo. Tabled proposed memorandum of understanding. While closely following previous agreed tripartite position, memorandum was couched in non-controversial terms designed to facilitate possible Soviet acceptance as quadripartite recommendation.

No time available after introduction aviation paper so discussion postponed until Wednesday.[7] Attitude Soviet Del and Soviet expert Vinogradov's statement, see Secto 195,[8] today appear to indicate that planned Soviet tactic this item had been to defer as long as possible and avoid direct reply. Tabling of conference document should have effect of obtaining maximum Soviet concession.[9]

---

[6] See Tab C to Document 362.

[7] In the discussion on Wednesday, November 9, Cheklin stated that air agreements were a matter for bilateral negotiations and should not be considered at the Foreign Ministers meeting. He reiterated this opinion when pressed by the three Western representatives. The U.S. Delegation speculated that this indicated the Soviet Union would attempt to play the Western states and their airlines against one another to meet their own ends. (Secto 229 from Geneva, November 9; Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/11–955)

[8] Document 331.

---

[9] On November 7, Jackson and Goodkind had lunch with Cheklin in an effort "to smoke out" the Soviet position on trade. The U.S. Delegation reported that the meeting was friendly but without any positive indications. When the U.S. Representatives brought up the question of trade in agricultural products, the Soviets indicated no interest. (Secto 213 from Geneva, November 8; Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-GE/11-855)

---

339. Informal Minutes of a Meeting of the Tripartite Working Group on Disarmament, Geneva, November 8, 1955, 11 a.m.[1]

PEOPLE IN ATTENDANCE

United States	*United Kingdom*
Mr. Wainhouse	Mr. Pink
Mr. Donkin	Mr. MacKenzie
Colonel Willis	Mr. Thring
Captain Blouin	

France
M. de Menthon
PM. Genevey
One other representative

1. M. de Menthon raised the question of when and with whom we should be prepared to discuss the specifics of an arms and inspection agreement in the event that our Ministers arrived at *some* agreed position in Geneva. Suggested disarmament Subcommittee as possible solution. Pink said that he liked Mr. Bowie's previous comment in the Saturday meeting[2] to the effect that it might be desirable to have discussions between our military personnel. These discussions might even take place prior to the reconvening of the Subcommittee. Pink further observed that certainly the specifics should be discussed in the Subcommittee as well but that there might be some advantage in "getting on with it" earlier. He did not believe USSR would accept President's proposal. Wainhouse noted that if Molotov did accept the Eisenhower proposal[3] then presumably we *would* get to work immediately on discussions specifically on the subjects contained in para-

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-GE/11-855. Secret. No drafting information is given on the source text.

[2] See footnote 4, Document 318.

[3] For text of President Eisenhower's "Open Skies" proposal, see Document 221.

graphs 6, a (i), and 6 a (ii) of the draft declaration.[4] Pink asked Wainhouse how, where and in what forms these discussions would proceed. Wainhouse said that that would have to be mutually agreed to by the USSR and the US.

2. Pink then observed that any agreement must *not* be a bilateral one. Captain Blouin stated that it should be bilateral as a beginning. Pink said that this was impossible in view of the stated Russian position in the September 19 Bulganin letter.[5] Donkin observed that this would not necessarily follow. Could it not be assumed for this discussion that USSR *would* accept? Pink stated that it was the British view that it was not to be bilateral and that "this was the first that they had heard of the idea." Thring stated as an absolute minimum, from a military point of view, the British must be at least provided the results of the aerial reconnaissance. He went on to substantiate the requirement for a multilateral approach by noting other areas of the world which must become involved, i.e., New Zealand, SEATO countries, etc. Wainhouse said that he was glad to know the British views regarding their minimum position. de Menthon stated that the French "gave agreement to the Washington tripartite text[6] on the basis that it would be multilateral." And then very emphatically pointed out that it would be extremely embarrassing if the United States emphasized a *bilateral* approach at Geneva. Pink said that it was the British view that when ground control posts are mentioned it naturally indicated that more countries than just the U.S. and USSR would be involved; that the ground armies which are the real threat to peace are facing one another in Western Europe; therefore, it would be necessary to have inspection posts in Western European nations, since U.S. troops in U.S. were no threat to Soviet troops in USSR.

3. Wainhouse stated that from the beginning the Eisenhower proposal had been a bilateral approach to the USSR. First with the President's informal conversation with Mr. Bulganin at Geneva[7] (Pink said that he had not heard of this before) and then followed up by the interchange of letters.[8] Any reference to acceptance of ground

---

[4] Reference is to the draft declaration on disarmament which was included in the Report of the Tripartite Working Group on Disarmament; see Document 288. For text of this draft as submitted by the Western powers on November 10, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 199–201, or *Cmd.* 9633, pp. 132–133.

[5] For text of Bulganin's letter of September 19 on disarmament, see Department of State *Bulletin*, October 24, 1955, pp. 644–647.

[6] See Document 288.

[7] Presumably Wainhouse is referring to the informal conversation on July 22; see Document 237.

[8] For text of President Eisenhower's reply to Bulganin's letter, October 11, see Department of State *Bulletin*, October 24, 1955, pp. 643–644.

control posts would not necessarily include other countries because it was quite clear that the President could not be speaking for states other than the United States. He could not commit them. de Menthon re-emphasized that the French would be most embarrassed if we insisted on the bilateral approach unless the Soviets themselves indicated some acceptance on the bilateral basis but that we (the United States) should not in stating our position insist on bilateral approach. Pink reaffirmed that the British could not possibly have accepted a text (reference here again to the tripartite paper) that intended a bilateral approach. Thring followed this up by saying that the British could not *even* accept the plan multilaterally unless the "17 questions"[9] were answered. MacKenzie stated that the United States should not "present their case" over the next few days on a bilateral basis. Donkin asked why UK and France raised this point at this time since paper was already agreed upon. Wainhouse replied that this was discussed in private talks in New York, and aired in the Tripartite talks in Washington.[10]

4. Wainhouse then asked that if the Soviets accepted the Eisenhower proposal on a bilateral basis, will the British and French object? de Menthon observed that the French would not object publicly. Pink stated that they were not prepared to answer that question. Blouin asked if they would agree to a bilateral *arrangement* under a multilateral agreement. de Menthon answered that they probably could agree to that if it were shown that the French would become involved through "progressive steps," and added "by bilateral or any other means," but did not want to commit the French Government. Further that the Secretary of State must not under any circumstances "highlight" bilateralism.

5. The subject was then changed and there was some discussion on what the Foreign Ministers should agree to on the question of specific subjects for the forthcoming Subcommittee meetings. Pink suggested an approach to the question of conventional arms regulation and to what extent we could commit ourselves to a more comprehensive arms regulation. Wainhouse asked if he were referring to force levels, because if that were the case, we were *hopeful* that we might be able to discuss this subject in the Subcommittee but we could not commit ourselves to do it here. It was at this point that both the French and the British alluded to the fact that they as well were uncertain as to what would be valid force requirements for each of their countries. Pink reiterated that in the British view, discussion

---

[9] Not further identified.

[10] Regarding the tripartite and quadripartite meetings at New York, September 27 and 28, see Document 284. The tripartite talks in Washington were the meetings of the Working Group on Disarmament.

of control of conventional weapons would be an area in which some progress might be made; that it was quite impossible to make any progress in the nuclear weapons field. And the subject was dropped.

6. The British and French submitted lists of possible Soviet questions with proposed answers.[11] Wainhouse said US was redrafting US questions and would have them available shortly.

7. There was general agreement that it was imperative that the 3 Foreign Ministers get together to work out tactics.

8. There was some discussion about the timing of the submission of the Western declaration. It was generally agreed that this should not be tabled early in the discussions on Item No. 2. Rather, we should wait until the Soviets had given some indication of their position. It was felt all around the table that this "should be played by ear" and the declaration brought out at such time as it would do the Western Powers the most good.

9. Thring said he had been advised by Sokolovsky in England that USSR would surely raise on Item 2:

a. Force levels (as previously)

b. "Disarmament before inspection" instead of "inspection before disarmament"

c. "Control posts must control something and the something is disarmament."

10. UK was concerned that high level Congressional committee would hold public hearings on Disarmament while Security Council was considering problem. Pink wondered if Stassen documents would be made public. Donkin said no—documents had executive privilege, and would be discussed with no one. Wainhouse said Congress would not hold public hearings that would embarrass international negotiations being conducted.

---

[11] Neither list has been found in Department of State files.

340. Telegram From the Delegation at the Foreign Ministers Meetings to the Department of State[1]

Geneva, November 9, 1955—11 a.m.

Secto 223. 1. Eighth Ministers Session November 8 began with review by Pinay of present status discussion Item 1.[2] He said it would not be prudent hide fact little progress had been made during past few days. He characterized Western position as one providing broad basis for conciliation and stated belief that Molotov had failed realize its actual scope. Western security proposals should allay Soviet anxiety as well as safeguard security other European countries. West prepared consider amendments of initial proposals in order reach agreement, but feels justified in maintaining principle that they provide real security for all. Destruction of West European security cannot be considered essential to security of USSR. Pinay rejected Soviet contention that security guarantees proposed by Western powers would enter into effect only in event reunited Germany joins NATO, pointing out some guarantees would go into effect upon reunification and before unified Germany exercises its freedom of choice under Eden Plan provisions. He emphasized contractual nature of most security guarantees offered by West and concrete aspects of control and inspection system in which Eastern Europe would play its part. As for security of countries neighboring Germany, West would consider it desirable that they participate in treaty in the event reunified Germany should elect join Warsaw Treaty, latter would have to be modified in order to provide West similar guarantees which West offering USSR if united Germany elects NATO. With regard theoretical possibility that unified Germany might join neither pact, it would be involved in European system of reciprocal security guarantees which would make uncontrolled development German military power impossible.

2. Macmillan developed similar line of argument, stating his main purpose was remove obstacles to full understanding and seek path to compromise.[3] He said it was apparent there was no intention of any of Four Powers to impose demilitarization upon Germany since even Soviet proposals here and at Berlin Conference envisaged

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/11–955. Secret; Priority. Repeated to London, Paris, Bonn, Moscow, and Berlin. The U.S. Delegation verbatim record of the eighth Foreign Ministers meeting, which was held on November 8 at 4 p.m., USDel/Verb/8 Corrected, and record of decisions, MFM/DOC/RD/8, both dated November 8, are *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 579.

[2] For text of Pinay's statement, circulated as MFM/DOC/38, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 137–140, or *Cmd.* 9633, pp. 75–78.

[3] For text of Macmillan's statement, circulated as MFM/DOC/40, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 141–144, or *Cmd.* 9633, pp. 78–80.

German armed forces. Practical problem then was how to devise arrangement prevent rearmed Germany from threatening European security. Western proposals met this problem squarely for Soviet Union, as well as countries bordering Germany including Poland and Czechoslovakia. Macmillan also countered Soviet arguments that unified Germany might violate all agreements and that NATO and WEU controls might be unilaterally relaxed. He stressed fact that other parties to security agreement including Soviet Union would be in position to take necessary preventive action under terms of treaty. Macmillan said Western security proposals purposely drawn up in outline form in order leave possibility translate them into precise terms as result negotiations. Macmillan concluded by urging Molotov to focus on German reunification by means free elections to which he had stated agreement in principle. He asked that his questions on Eden Plan directed to Molotov at previous meeting[4] kept in mind when Soviet Delegation gives its considered response latest Western proposal for 1956 elections.

3. Molotov rejected Western proposal re 1956 elections and establishment Commission of Experts at outset of long and harshly negative speech.[5] He said latest Western proposal did not represent anything new as compared initial Western proposals this conference. Purpose of latter was to bring about remilitarization not only of Western Germany but also of Eastern Germany and to draw both into North Atlantic bloc directed against Soviet Union and not only against Soviet Union. He said Soviet Government cannot contribute to implementation of these proposals. Fact that Western powers made no attempt take into account GDR statement was reason why Western proposals "are removed from the realities of life". After repeating his familiar argument regarding necessity recognizing changed situation in Germany where two sovereign states now exist, Molotov referred to creation of GDR as turning point in history of Germany and Europe. He said it could not be accepted that it impossible to bring about European security prior to reunification of Germany. Participation of both GDR and Federal Republic in European security system would represent important contribution to peace. GDR has established diplomatic and commercial relations with other states and enjoys sovereign freedom to decide on matters of internal and foreign policy. Existence of strengthened GDR with population of eighteen million can neither be ignored nor minimized. Whether some people like it or not GDR is standing firmly on its feet and developing successfully. Molotov then referred to treaty recently

---

[4] See Document 327.

[5] For text of Molotov's statement, circulated as MFM/DOC/39, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 145–152, or *Cmd.* 9633, pp. 81–86.

concluded between USSR and GDR[6] as basis on which Soviet Union is developing its relations with GDR. Soviet Government cannot and will not agree to any violation this treaty. He said that this state of affairs must be taken into account in considering matters relating to Germany. Western proposals ignore these realities and are devoid of constructive character. Molotov said that question of all-German elections was not simply question of changing government but of determining fate of country. Western reunification proposal artificial and ignores views of Germans. Mechanical merger through the so-called free elections under Eden Plan might deprive GDR working people of factories, land, and wealth which impossible to accept. Reunification of Germany cannot be brought about otherwise than by mutual consent of two existing German states. It is direct responsibility of Four Powers to contribute to rapprochement between two parts of Germany and development normal relations between them and other states. Under present conditions paths leading to German reunification along peaceful and democratic lines "can be neither short nor easy". Establishment of all-German Council is necessary first step. Council could resolve many questions in such fields as commerce and movement between Western and Eastern Germany where agreed decisions would benefit all Germans. From this Molotov concluded that "further consideration of German problem would be useful when Germans themselves find a common language and take task of preparing settlement of that problem into their own hands." Proposals of Western powers would lead to revival of imperialist Germany by spreading Paris Agreements throughout Germany and to re-establishment of monopolists, junkers, and militarists. Democratic and social transformation as well as freedom won by working people of GDR would be liquidated. Resultant aggressive German militarism would enhance danger of new war in Europe. Fact that US has not recognized GDR irrelevant. Recognition merely a question of time and GDR has great future as workers' and peasants' state supported by strong and loyal friends. Although true that Soviet Union considered all-German elections possible in 1954, intervening events such as Paris Agreements and fact that Western Germany has placed itself in opposition Germany now make it impossible to speak of all-German elections. Western attempts to speak to Soviet Union from position of strength cannot yield success in German problem or any other problem. Despite fact that Western and Soviet security proposals have some points in common, such principal matters as assuring European security through liquidation of military groupings, and the question of German participation in a European security system have not been agreed. Soviet Government proposals in accordance with directive take into consideration interests of European countries and national interests of German people. They do not hold promise for an easy solution of complicated international problems we face particularly the German problem "but unfortunately no such easy solution is existent".

---

[6] For text of the treaty between the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic, signed at Moscow, September 20, 1955, see *Documents* (R.I.I.A.) for 1955, pp. 200–202.

4. After brief recess Secretary said that implications of Molotov statement seemed so serious in terms of the directive and hopes with which we came here that he preferred study matter over night before speaking. Pinay and Macmillan voiced agreement with Secretary's statement and meeting was adjourned an hour earlier than usual.

---

341. Memorandum of the Conversation at Dinner, Hotel Beau Rivage, Geneva, November 8, 1955, 8:30 p.m.[1]

SUBJECT

East-West Trade

PARTICIPANTS

Mr. Tippetts, British Delegation, Working Group
Mr. d'Harcourt, French Delegation, Working Group
Mr. Cheklin, USSR Delegation, Working Group
Mr. Goodkind, U.S. Delegation, Working Group

By prearrangement among the three Western teams Mr. Tippetts, leader of the British Delegation in the Working Group on Trade of the Committee of Experts, was host at an official dinner on the night of November 8, 1955, for the leaders of the other three Delegations in the Trade Working Group, namely, M. d'Harcourt (France); Mr. Cheklin (USSR); and Mr. Goodkind (US). The affair took place in a private room at the Hotel Beau Rivage. All the conversation was in English, and the atmosphere during the dinner and the conversation following dinner was very friendly and relaxed. Most of the conversation was of a casual and social nature, but in the course of the evening Mr. Cheklin made a number of significant remarks, which may be noted as follows:

When pressed again to indicate what he thought should come out of the discussions of the Trade Working Group, or how the matter should be presented to the Ministers, Cheklin refused to indicate any ideas of his own saying only that the Experts (meaning the four top Experts) should discuss this problem among themselves as "they have more authority than we do". In further response to questions he indicated that he regarded the Experts as being members of the two working groups and already apprised of all that had gone on in these groups and that there was no need for the Working Group on Trade to report as such to the Experts.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/11–1055. Confidential. Drafted by Goodkind on November 10.

D'Harcourt pressed Cheklin on the strategic controls, noting that he had said these controls did not injure the Soviet economy and in fact had benefited it since it had led the Soviets toward building up certain industries which otherwise they might not have done. He, therefore, asked why Cheklin was so concerned about strategic controls. Cheklin said, "Well, you know, sometimes it is a matter of prestige".

Later Cheklin referred to Soviet-Danish trade relations, recalling that the Soviet Union had broken off negotiations for a trade agreement with Denmark when the latter refused to sell two tankers. In the face of this attitude Cheklin said the Soviet Union decided to deal elsewhere and it had not suffered by this decision since it had gotten the goods it wanted from other countries which had not taken this discriminatory attitude toward the Soviet Union.

Cheklin slyly baited Tippetts about rolling mills, noting that the Soviets had presented a very juicy order worth some 10 million pounds but then had been told that it would be contrary to the national interest for the UK to export this equipment. Now, he said, we are negotiating with the West Germans. When Tippetts remonstrated that the West Germans could not sell the Soviets anything that the UK could not sell, Cheklin laughed and replied that the West Germans were saying they were willing to sell all kinds of things, and he noted the rise of West Germany as an exporter in competition with the British (Tippetts and d'Harcourt later professed not to swallow these assertions which they recognized as the familiar device employed by the Soviets to drive a wedge between the Western countries).

With reference to certain points that had been made during one of the Working Group meetings about manganese, Cheklin said to Goodkind that he (Cheklin) could have replied in the Working Group that the Soviets had not cut off the supply of manganese to the United States. The facts were, he said, that about 1947 the Soviets had run into difficulties having their ships unloaded in US ports, and now they found that their manganese suffered a tariff penalty in competition with manganese from Western sources. Goodkind indicated that the MFN tariff problem was one of those questions requiring Congressional action; that it had stemmed from the general public apprehensions in the United States over the acts and intentions of the Soviet Union, and that substantial improvement in relations generally probably would have to precede any amelioration of the tariff problem. He then asked Cheklin what difference the tariff differential made anyway, since the Soviets could put any price they cared on their manganese. Cheklin said that it was true that they could adjust their price, but their trading organizations liked to get certain prices and did not care to sell to one lower than to another, and in fact often would not sell at all if the price were not right.

D'Harcourt asked Cheklin if he were really serious that the Soviet Union did not apply controls over the export of strategic materials and would sell such materials to anyone. Cheklin replied solemnly that they did not have such controls and would sell to any country what they had available for export. D'Harcourt then asked whether they would be willing to sell uranium to France, and Cheklin said he didn't think they had uranium available for export. He then made it clear that his assertions about a non-discriminatory export policy of the Soviet Union applied only to the list of goods which were considered available for export.

Goodkind asked Cheklin if the nomenclature of Soviet goods for export to which he had referred in the Working Group meeting was available and if it was the same for all countries. Cheklin said that it was the same and he was sure it was available, and would attempt to get it for us. He said that he might ask Moscow to send it to him.

There was a discussion about the Soviet procurement system in which it was made clear that the plans are fixed for several years ahead, that the trade agreements are negotiated by the Ministry of Trade and that then the Soviet trading organizations take the actions to fulfill the buying plans without having to deal through the Ministry of Trade. Goodkind asked whether this system did not preclude the exercise of Western initiative in trade with the Soviet Union since the Soviet trading organizations would buy only what was already provided for in their own planning. Cheklin said that there were always exceptions that one could not foresee all needs and possibilities in planning ahead over a period of several years and that the goods they were interested in procuring were not always available so that there remained room under the plans for additional procurement. For these reasons the trading organizations would often come to the Ministry of Trade and ask for exceptions in order to buy something different.

Tippetts and Cheklin had a discussion about difficulties Western traders have with the Soviet trading organizations over contract provisions. Cheklin passed these difficulties off as simply bargaining problems, but agreed with Tippetts that it would be a good thing if standard contracts with standard terms could be developed and that this work should go forward in the ECE.

D'Harcourt stressed the difficulties that Western importers had in obtaining data about Soviet goods. Cheklin said that these importers need not come to the Soviet Union since the Soviet Union maintained trade missions in Western countries. D'Harcourt said these missions often were unable to supply adequate data about prices, delivery dates, specifications and so forth. Cheklin said that if this were so, the trade missions were not doing a good job and he was glad to be notified of such facts.

After Cheklin had gone the three Western representatives agreed that the Soviet delegation had consistently displayed a political and a negative attitude toward the trade questions on the agenda, and that there seemed no alternative but merely to report this fact separately to our own Ministers, who might then wish to make strong speeches about the Soviet attitude on the Trade aspects of Item III.

---

342. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Department of State[1]

Geneva, November 8, 1955—8 p.m.

Dulte 60. Eyes only Acting Secretary for President at Adams' discretion.

"Dear Mr. President: Molotov returned from Moscow this morning and this afternoon delivered one of the most cynical and uncompromising speeches which I have ever heard.[2] It involved a sweeping rejection of all Western proposals for European security and German reunification. It repudiated the provision of directive that reunification and European security were closely linked. It stated we could not now speak of 'all German elections' as agreed in directive, and in effect said Soviet Union would never permit Eastern Germany to be reunified with Western Germany except under conditions which clearly implied the Communization of all of Germany.

There was not in all of his speech a single phrase which was conciliatory or which gave even lip service to your agreement at 'summit'.

At close three Western Ministers agreed not to make a reply today and I as presiding officer merely stated that implications of Molotov's speech were so serious I did not want to reply without deliberation overnight. Pinay and Macmillan took same line.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/11–855. Secret; Niact. Transmitted to the Denver White House, November 8, at 4:05 p.m. as Toden 19.

[2] See Document 340.

We shall have to reply tomorrow at four o'clock Geneva time and I do not see how I can avoid taking position that the clear breach of summit directive creates a condition where no confidence can be placed on agreements with Soviet Government and that we shall have to conduct our relations accordingly. I feel Soviet position was taken with full recognition of consequences and without any apparent desire to avoid them. It means I am afraid that further debate on disarmament and contacts will have little substance and we shall probably quickly reach end of our agenda.

Macmillan, Pinay and all our advisers agree on this analysis of Molotov's speech. I think Pinay is prepared to react strongly but Macmillan seemed to have been softened up, presumably by Eden, on his weekend visit to London.

I should welcome any guidance you can get to me by tomorrow. I am deeply disappointed as I know you are at this apparent frustration of the hopes which were born at Geneva and to which you contributed so greatly. However, this development here coupled with developments in Near East seems to me to indicate deliberate Soviet decision to take measures which they must have seen would inevitably involve a sharp increase of tension and resumption of cold-war struggle. The fact Molotov went to Moscow before making speech seems intended to show that it represents highest Soviet policy.

Prior to today's developments we had contemplated recessing this conference end of next week with view to reconvening next spring. However, I would not now want to commit myself to another conference prior to return and personal consultation.

Faithfully yours, Foster"

Dulles

---

343. Telegram From the President to the Department of State[1]

Denver, November 8, 1955.

Dento 6. From the President to the Secretary of State.

Dear Foster: Of course do not have the text of Molotov's speech, but I think I sense its character and tone from the language of your message to me, Toden 19.[2] I agree with the conclusion you have reached in your paragraph beginning "We shall have to reply tomorrow at four o'clock" and ending "We shall probably quickly reach the end of our agenda." The question arises whether or not you should include in your reply a statement that you had communicated with me and that I had expressed astonishment at what appears to be, so far as we can see, a deliberate repudiation of prior intentions, in fact, a breach of good faith. If you see any advantage in quoting me to this effect, I approve of your action in advance.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/11–855. Top Secret; Niact. Transmitted to Geneva at 9 p.m., November 8, as Tedul 70.

[2] See *supra*.

In such atmosphere, and specifically, with the repudiation of the prior agreement that German reunification and European security were closely linked, there seems to be little value in dragging out the conference. While I think we should be careful to maintain for them a line of retreat from the posture they now seem to assure, if they voluntarily choose to do so, I must say that at this point there certainly seems to be little reason for believing that they want to change. However, we must always maintain the position of reasonable men, willing to give them a chance to explain away such statements if they truly desire to do so.

Finally, I agree with the last paragraph of your statement. I know how frustrated and saddened you must feel at the development you have encountered. You have the satisfaction of knowing no human could have done more.

With warm regard,
As ever,

Dwight Eisenhower

November 9, 1955

344. Editorial Note

The United States Delegation began November 9 with the usual staff meeting at 9 a.m. At 9:45, Secretary Dulles discussed the Middle East with Macmillan at the latter's villa. At 10 and 10:30, the Working Groups on Contacts and Trade held their last meetings. At 10:45, the three Western Ministers met at Pinay's villa to discuss the course of the conference. They were joined at 11:30 by Brentano. At 4 p.m., the ninth meeting of the Foreign Ministers sat at the Palais des Nations until 7:29. At 7:45 Dulles met briefly with Brentano and Blankenhorn, and at 8 Suydam held a press briefing. At 9:15 the Secretary of State discussed disarmament with his principal advisers. At some point during the day Stassen reviewed the United States position on disarmament with Ambassador Bova-Scoppa. (Department of

State, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 580, Chron–18 and US OD/11b)

Records of the sessions of the working groups and the ninth meeting of the Foreign Ministers follow. For a summary of the meeting between Dulles and the two German officials, see footnote 11, Document 347. Records of the staff meeting, Stassen's discussion with Bova Scoppa, and the press briefing are in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 580, Chron–18 and US OD/11b. No records of the tripartite Foreign Ministers meeting or Dulles' discussion of disarmament have been found in Department of State files.

---

345. Telegram From the Delegation at the Foreign Ministers Meetings to the Department of State[1]

Geneva, November 10, 1955—11 p.m.

Secto 240. East-West Contacts. Contacts WG devoted Wednesday, November 9, to remainder unagreed items as well as consideration undiscussed items common agenda. Morning session began with discussion tourism and ruble rate. Hohler pointed out that by free right of travel British mean people being free buy ticket and travel where like. He then turned to question exchange rate and emphasized that this affects virtually all forms contact between Soviet Union and Western countries. Stoessel referred United States initiative in sponsoring March 31 resolution of ECOSOC on the development international travel as concrete indication positive United States stand on increase private tourism. He also noted removal passport validation restriction announced by Secretary Dulles on October 31. Kemenov emphasized his disagreement with statement that tourist travel USSR very expensive. Soviet tourist organizations, he said, grant especially favorable conditions facilitating travel USSR for foreigners. If foreigner travels more than 1,000 kilometers on Soviet railways he gets reduction up to 50 percent. For football match between teams USSR and Western Germany more than 2,000 Germans went Moscow. Kemenov added that question ruble exchange rate not within competence Soviet experts who are unprepared discuss matter here.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/11–1055. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Paris, London, Bonn, Munich, and the Mission at the United Nations. Passed to USIA. The seventh meeting of the Working Group on Contacts meet at 10 a.m. on November 9.

WG then proceeded subject restrictions imposed on diplomatic missions. Manach indicated Western delegations have in mind restrictions on freedom movement, possibility establishing contacts with population and access sources information available other countries to members diplomatic missions. He referred also to photographs and import quotas. Hohler and Stoessel expressed agreement with French presentation. Stoessel noted need for better housing diplomats Moscow and stated if Soviet Government manifests intention remove restrictions imposed upon United States representatives USSR, then United States would be disposed to consider proportionate reduction restrictions placed on Soviet diplomats in United States. Stoessel then delivered rebuttal to Khvostov statements on radio broadcasting in which he made following points: (a) Radio Free Europe private non-governmental organization which does not broadcast in Russian language. (b) We unable on short notice examine VOA broadcasts identified by Khvostov. USDel convinced dispassionate review VOA output directed USSR would show these broadcasts objective in character. Approximately 50 percent content straight news and remainder objective news commentary and features on matter topical interest. (c) Neither United States nor USSR party Geneva Convention 1936 but both are parties Atlantic City Telecommunications Convention 1947, Article 44 of which deals specifically with harmful interference. (d) Montevideo UNESCO resolution addressed itself substantially to condemnation harmful practice of jamming. (e) United States believes it entirely possible to devise technical procedures fairly accommodating broadcasting needs two governments (such accommodation would be facilitated if Soviets would take steps eliminate jamming) United States note of December 3, 1953.[2]

Kemenov, responding to Western statements on diplomats, stated restrictive measures being taken against members Soviet diplomatic missions in Western countries, therefore any questions this matter fall within province negotiations between Ministries Foreign Affairs concerned.

Having completed discussion unagreed items WG resumed discussion remaining items on common agenda, taking up first Soviet item 5C and Western items 3 and 5. Khvostov indicated Soviet item corresponds closely with Western item on exchange government publications, and best way tackle item 3 relating to distribution in USSR of official Russian language publications is through direct negotiations. Stoessel then set forth Western positions on both government publications and American-type magazines. Manach noted Soviets already distributing *Etude Sovietique* in 30,000 copies and French would like to ask for reciprocity with adequate guarantees re distribution in USSR. Hohler pointed out re government publications that considerable difficulty arises from non-availability lists, moreover number Soviet publications not available and impossible for Embassy purchase. Soviets then asserted their item 5C should be entirely acceptable to all and could be basis for agreed text.

---

[2] Transmitted to Moscow in instruction A-53, November 27, 1953, for delivery to the Foreign Ministry. (*Ibid.*, 962A.40/10-353)

WG then proceeded to Soviet item 5D and Western items 14 and 15. On tourism and sporting exchanges Kemenov expressed doubts concerning wisdom reference to principal cultural institutions and sporting organizations arguing this constituted rather controversial matter. On exchanges students he expressed view concrete projects should be subject bilateral negotiations. Stoessel indicated United States attaches particular importance this phraseology re principal institutions and added United States Government wishes be informed in advance on cultural and sporting exchanges in order make careful plans. This principle, he said, essential to orderly exchanges of benefit both countries.

WG now turned to Soviet 5B and Western item No. 9. Khvostov expressed view Soviet Delegation WG could prepare measures changing existing abnormalities in radio broadcasting field and fruitful solution could be found for cooperation in radio broadcasting using radio strengthen confidence between peoples and exclude possibilities warmongering. He said it would be possible elaborate specific proposals on bilateral or multilateral basis and draft agreement for cooperation in broadcasting field. Such cooperation could also include exchanges technical experience in radio broadcasting and television. Such an agreement, he said, would lead to removal necessity restrictive measures in broadcasting field. In response Stoessel again identified systematic jamming as the basic obstacle interfering with cooperation this field and remarked from statements Soviet Delegation did not appear USSR dispose take steps relinquishing jamming. Hence, our item 9 as described by Secretary October 31 would benefit both countries. Manach indicated France prepared to develop exchange artistic TV and information programs. Half hour information programs each week would, of course, have to be objective. Rennie, speaking for United Kingdom, pointed out 5B of Soviet proposal did not specifically mention radio. Consequently Soviet Delegation has raised matter which goes beyond original document they produced. Kemenov's reply emphasized that in view its importance radio subsumed under expansion cultural relations. He then stated Stoessel statements to effect jamming fundamental obstacle and USSR not ready put end systematic jamming both erroneous. He added that since Soviet proposal goes considerably further than proposals made by United States in that Soviet proposals considerably wider and more "fascinating" Khvostov then repeated that agreement in broadcasting field would lead to suppression necessity restrictive measures in radio broadcasting. Morning meeting adjourned 1:25.

In afternoon session convened 3:30 Stoessel reemphasized fundamental character jamming problem and again cited United States note December 3, 1953. Manach referred to broadcasting station East European country which broadcast program concerning French, more particularly matters pertaining to Algeria. He also mentioned pirate broadcasts emanating from another East European country entitled "This Evening in France" and "This Morning in France", both of which interfered in internal affairs France.

Hohler expressed British view Soviet proposals too large and diffuse for discussion in committee and expressed belief Western proposal[3] simply one which could be accepted on merits. Rennie then delivered remarkably eloquent and effective speech which made following points: (a) All looked forward at end last war to termination terrible distortion and misuse one of world's greatest inventions. (b) Refuses believe inventors radio intended we should go back to using radio devices to make series horrible noises. (c) We should not let go by opportunity not replying any charge or implication that people who entered international conferences on radio had any but highest motives or were not serious when they signed agreements. Rennie then expressed personal view that interference conducted on a general principle without relation content. In support his statement he pointed out BBC Russian broadcast containing statement by leaders Soviet Agricultural Delegation jammed. BBC broadcast sermon preached in London by metropolitan of Minsk also jammed as well as statements as worded by Russian leaders at Summit talks. He then discussed nature BBC broadcasting to USSR pointing out 33 percent BBC Russian output straight news, 33 percent news commentary and 25 percent projection of Britain. Talking at random BBC script he pointed out how many news items dealt with reports favorable to USSR. "I do hope", he concluded, "that when we get into discussing what can be done about this situation, we shall not find ourselves in a game of character assassination by allusion, and so on, with things which are not in fact happening".

In reply which immediately followed Kemenov twisted sense Stoessel remarks suggesting USDel had concurred in importance arriving at agreement concerning collaboration in broadcasting field. This necessitated second restatement by United States of its position. Meeting adjourned 5:35 p.m. with agreement experts would meet 11 a.m. Thursday.

---

[3] For texts of the Soviet and Western proposals on East-West contacts, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 239–240 and 245–248.

346. Telegram From the Delegation at the Foreign Ministers Meetings to the Department of State[1]

Geneva, November 10, 1955—5 a.m.

Secto 231. East-West Trade. Trade Working Group held sixth and final meeting Wednesday with Tippetts, UK, in chair. D'Harcourt, French Rep, said he supported proposals made by US in field civil aviation but felt that problems raised by Dr. Tunkin (USSR) regarding freedom of seas were political not legal and could hardly be dealt with by Trade Working Group.

UK Rep said of course UK attaches greatest importance concept of freedom of seas but the matters raised yesterday[2] did not concern obstacles created by the Four Powers and little point Trade Working Group discussing them. Said UK supported US proposals civil aviation tabled yesterday.[3]

Tunkin then declaimed again subject interference merchant shipping high seas. Referring Western position that these matters outside direct jurisdiction Four Powers Tunkin quoted paragraph three Geneva directive to support contention any interference communications or trade between peoples proper subject Foreign Ministers discussion, especially where possible action in United Nations involved.

Tunkin proceeded specify obstacles Soviets had in mind including seizure *Tuapse,*[4] aerial inspection Soviet shipping areas Japan Sea, China Sea and Yellow Sea and UK refusal Singapore bunkers to Soviet merchant ship *Nicolaev* bound Odessa to North Vietnam. In case *Tuapse* said US not completely innocent since vessel fired upon by armed forces under US control and since in such cases US aircraft conduct reconnaissance to inform Formosa forces to enable latter to make their attacks. Said aerial inspection by US aircraft increasing, involving 454 vessels 1953, 633 in 1954 and 736 from January 1, 1955 to October 23, 1955. Could cite many other examples obstructions to shipping which contribute to increase of international tension. Thus there are no grounds for Western powers refusing discuss these problems.

As to proposals in the field of civil aviation Tunkin said Soviet view was that present air transport arrangements did not constitute an obstacle to trade and they could see no reason to discuss in working group. Bilateral air transport agreements could always be negotiated through normal diplomatic channels and would be considered each on its merits.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/11–1055. Confidential. Also sent to the Mission at the United Nations. Repeated to London, Paris, Bonn, and Moscow. Passed to Defense. The sixth meeting of the Working Group on Trade met at 10:30 a.m. on November 9.

[2] See Document 338.

[3] See Tab C to Document 362.

[4] The Soviet Union claimed that the *Tuapse* had been seized by the United States in June 1954 off Taiwan. For documentation concerning the *Tuapse*, see *Foreign Relations*, 1952–1954, vol. XIV, Part 1, pp. 472–542, *passim*.

US Rep asked if USSR now disposed to negotiate bilateral air agreement with the US. As to the shipping problems raised by Soviets, allegations regarding US responsibility *Tuapse* seizure without foundation in fact and offensive US. Regarding aerial reconnaissance, said US shouldering large burden protecting world security in Far East and undoubtedly US aircraft made many flights over waters far Pacific. US could not see how such activity constituted hindrance free passage merchant vessels. As for withholding bunkers from vessels carrying strategic goods Communist China this merely logical corollary UN embargo resolution designed implement embargo strategic goods Communist China.

As to Tunkin's contention violations principle freedom of seas came within purview Geneva directive and terms reference working group US Rep said doubted as practical matter if powers represented here could concern themselves with obstacles not due to or maintained by own actions. Noted that many other legal and political principles dear to hearts of Western peoples (and possibly also Soviet peoples) such as freedom press, speech, worship, trial by jury, free elections, etc. Not business working group formulate grandiose declarations principle but to consider concrete measures.

D'Harcourt (France) had nothing say on shipping matters raised by USSR except to note France had offered good offices in connection repatriation seized vessel and crew. Asked French colleague Morel speak on civil aviation. Morel said West agreed Soviet Rep's civil air agreements would have to be negotiated bilaterally but would like some declaration indicating all parties agreed in principle desirability concluding air agreements. Noted USSR had concluded number such agreements with Eastern European countries plus Finland, Yugoslavia, Austria.

UK Rep adverted briefly to bunkering controls which he said not discriminatory since applied in pursuance UN resolution May 18, 1951, and merely intended enforce on vessels other nations same restrictions as to carriage strategic goods observed by British shipping. Asked if USSR agreed desirability undertaking negotiate bilateral air agreements Western powers soon as possible.

Cheklin (USSR) then complained that when real problems brought up like that of trade discriminations or restrictions of free passage ships in Far Eastern waters his colleagues plead lack of competence. Said large area of East containing millions of people deprived of peaceful conditions normal trade by these restrictions which the powers can not ignore if they wish to comply directive.

Not enough merely to give reasons for restrictions, which in any case Soviets could not accept.

US Rep again emphasized unwillingness Soviet Reps face up to specific proposals of Western powers, citing failure reply to questions on desirability civil air agreements, as well as proposals relating to eliminating difficulties for private traders, protection industrial property rights and availability economic data. Added up to palpable unwillingness take initiative or see anyone else take initiative develop peaceful trade.

Morel (France) again spoke to Western proposals civil aviation dwelling on difficulties caused travellers by necessity transferring Prague or Helsinki. Asked whether when Soviet Rep said bilateral agreements would be considered on merits he had in mind agreements providing reciprocal landing rights. In reply Cheklin said he saw nothing in present arrangements which constituted obstacle to trade but that proposals should be made through diplomatic channels.

In concluding round D'Harcourt regretted lack of progress made in working group. Cheklin deplored tendency Western powers blame everything on USSR. Cited drop in US-Soviet trade since 1947 and asked what patents and civil aviation problems had to do with this. Hoped experts would look at these problems in different light and discuss real obstacles to trade. Chairman expressed gratification at cordial atmosphere of meetings and adjourned.

---

347. Telegram From the Delegation at the Foreign Ministers Meetings to the Department of State[1]

Geneva, November 10, 1955—1 p.m.

Secto 232. 1. Macmillan opened ninth session November 9 with expression of regret that Molotov returned from Moscow with even more negative approach.[2] He said Geneva spirit meant moving out of immobility characteristic of much previous discussion into field of flexible negotiation. But it now appears that directive which in world opinion marked distinct advance has been repudiated. Soviet Government no longer accepts free elections throughout Germany. This constitutes grave situation in which it does not seem useful continue discussion of Item 1. Failure on Item 1 must gravely affect spirit in which we approach Items 2 and 3. Despite some encouraging progress on security, Molotov's latest statement if not revised will result in loss of guidance for future. Soviet Government now on record that Germany cannot be reunified until NATO and WEU abolished. Soviet Government is prepared use happiness, unity and independence of German people as pawns in its game to break up Western defense system. Moreover, Germans would still lack freedom of choice according to Soviet position and would be forced accept odious system of East Germany or remain divided. Brutal fact is that for Soviet Government only acceptable guarantee for reunification Germany is Bolshevization of whole country. This is Soviet Government's contribution to Geneva spirit. Soviet Government making very grave error because Western powers not prepared sacrifice NATO and WEU and German people unwilling accept alien system and loss of independence as price of unity. So long as Soviet Government persists in this policy present state of affairs will continue with all its dangers and with diminishing hopes for a just solution.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/11–1055. Secret; Priority. Also sent to Berlin. Repeated to London, Paris, Bonn, and Moscow. The U.S. Delegation verbatim record of the ninth meeting of the Foreign Ministers, which took place at 4 p.m. on November 9, USDel/Verb/9 Corrected, November 9, and record of decisions, MFM/DOC/RD/9, November 10, are *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 580.

[2] For text of Macmillan's statement, circulated as MFM/DOC/43, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 153–165, or *Cmd.* 9633, pp. 86–88.

Macmillan urged Soviet Government not to incur such grave responsibility before history.

2. Molotov waived his turn, Secretary stated he was now in position express views his government on grave implications of Molotov's statement.[3] Secretary first declared that Soviet persistence in present position would perpetuate conditions which jeopardized peace of Europe. He said fair interpretation of directive was that Heads of Government recognized European security would be endangered if Germany was not reunified. This certainly US view as indicated by President's statement at July conference that continued division of Germany creates basic source instability in Europe. He also quoted President concerning inseparability European security and reunification. Secretary then reviewed positive nature Western proposals which he said would give Europe security it has not known for hundreds of years. Molotov had said on October 31, 1939 that it was German efforts to shed fetters of Versailles Treaty which led to Second World War. But Versailles Treaty fetters were nothing compared with cruelty and injustice of dividing German people. He cited refugee statistics as evidence German anguish and said situation cannot be indefinitely perpetuated without grave risk. Yet it is to

---

[3] For text of Dulles' statement, circulated as MFM/DOC/41, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 154–159, or *Cmd.* 9633, pp. 88–91.

perpetuate this very risk that Soviet Union rejects far-reaching and solid security proposals of Western powers. He urged Soviet Government adopt wiser statesmanship. In addressing himself to effect of the Soviet position upon international relations generally, Secretary recalled Bulganin July statements regarding relaxation of tension and re-establishment necessary confidence among nations. Heads of government had agreed to reunification of Germany by means free elections. US Government believed this agreement at very least meant Foreign Ministers would engage in serious discussion of both security and reunification questions. Soviet Government has refused, however, consider German reunification at all despite clear instructions of directive. Soviet proposal for all-German council[4] did not even purport to charge that council with any responsibility for reunification but made proposal with intent perpetuate German division. This grave breach agreement heads of government bound affect adversely over-all relations Soviet Union with other countries including US. Secretary said he would be less than frank if he did not say that so far as US concerned what has happened here has largely shattered confidence that was born at summit conference. Although there can be peace and limited degree of working relations between nations not having such confidence, relations under those conditions are bound be difficult and restricted. Discussions of disarmament and East-West contacts will benefit us little if we cannot feel that we can rely upon agreements between us. He expressed great fear that conference failure this item would be viewed with grave discouragement and concern throughout world. It is not desire or intention of US so far as we can control it to revert to conditions prior to July. It is our purpose continue strive by all means in our power for just and durable peace. Secretary said, however, he deplored setback to European security and damage to spirit of Geneva which has been inflicted by Soviet Union. It is still our hope that Soviet Union may give loyal substance to heads of government agreement that Germany shall be reunified by free elections.

3. Pinay said one is forced to deduce from Molotov's statement November 8[5] that German policy of Soviet Government is to consolidate Communist government of Eastern Germany and prepare for extension of Communism over whole of Germany.[6] Apparently Soviet Union will agree to free elections only when they can be carried out in manner insuring Sovietization of all Germany. He asked Molotov how Bulganin could have agreed in July to directive provid-

---

[4] For text of the Soviet proposal, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 98–99, or *Cmd.* 9633, pp. 107–108.

[5] See Document 340

[6] For text of Pinay's statement, circulated as MFM/DOC/44, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 159–162, or *Cmd.* 9633, pp. 91–93.

ing for German elections if Soviet Government now finds it impossible talk about elections. Pinay then repeated his previous criticism of Soviet proposal for all-German council. He accused Molotov of ignoring his patient responses to questions posed by Soviet Delegation and reviewed Western position again regarding: (1) point at which security treaty would become effective, (2) impossibility unilateral German revocation treaty safeguards, (3) insurance of security for neighbors of Germany and participation Eastern Europe in controls and (4) possibility of amending and improving Western proposals. Pinay said Soviet Government refusal consider Western proposals indicated that its concern was promoting unilateral political aims rather than achievement security. If Soviet proposals accepted, security of France and other neighbors of Germany would be very gravely threatened.

4. In long reply Molotov repeated most of his arguments presented at previous session although tone somewhat milder.[7] He reasserted Soviet position entirely consistent with directive which placed European security first and thus gave it priority. He pointed out Bulganin in concluding statement at July conference[8] rejected "mechanical merger" of two parts of Germany and called for establishment collective security system with both parts of Germany participating on equal basis. Directive did not state that unified Germany should necessarily enter NATO nor that West Germany should engulf East Germany. Soviet Government cannot accept these suggestions. Molotov repeated argument that main condition for entry into force of Western treaty was membership unified Germany in NATO and WEU. Soviet Government by the way "is not requesting so-called guarantees" of Western treaty. Pinay has offered no proof that Western treaty would provide so-called guarantees for Poland and other neighboring countries. He need only consult opinion of Polish Government to learn that Poland just as skeptical and negative regarding those so-called guarantees as Soviet Union and some other countries. Molotov repeated argument regarding German participation at conference at some length. Soviet Government has always been full-fledged supporter of German reunification and free all-German elections but question not yet ripe for solution since Germans have not been able get together. On Federal Republic side there is no desire to meet and there is evidence of arrogance toward other side (GDR). That state of affairs cannot last long. Leader of West German SPD believes as many technical contacts as possible should be established between two parts of Germany. Need for such contacts if not recog-

---

[7] For text of Molotov's statement, circulated as MFM/DOC/54, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 162–168, or *Cmd.* pp. 93–97.

[8] For text of Bulganin's statement, see *Geneva Conference*, pp. 77–80.

nized today will surely be tomorrow. Molotov rejected Western interpretation of Soviet Government aims as Sovietization of Western Germany. He said sense of his speech on previous day was that it is time to refer German question to Germans and to recognize fact that until they agree and refer some common proposals to Four Powers any attempts to impose solution on Germans from outside will fail. Attempts by Western Ministers to show Soviet position inconsistent with spirit of Geneva represent strange logic. It appears that Geneva spirit could be maintained only by agreement on Western proposals and that any other proposals are contrary to that spirit. It also seems wrong to Soviet Delegation to play with such words as "confidence" and "lack of confidence". Soviet Government serious in believing that establishment of confidence is in interest of all states. Molotov concluded with statement that to work in spirit of Geneva meant to make further persistent efforts narrow down differences on fundamental matters still outstanding.

5. After intermission Macmillan said that Soviet Delegation refusal to consider all-German elections made it seem useless pursue Item 1 further. He moved adjournment further discussion Item 1 in order allow Molotov to consider his position and proposed passing on to Item 2 tomorrow. Molotov then pointed out that Western Ministers had not responded to Soviet proposal that within three months all foreign troops be withdrawn from German territory within their national frontiers leaving only strictly limited contingents in Germany. He asked for indication of attitude other delegations to that proposal. Secretary said that Soviet Delegation had refused submit any proposal in response to German provisions in directive and consequently recommended that Ministers go on with remainder of agenda. He recalled my agreement[9] that additional items might be discussed at end agenda upon unanimous approval. There then ensued series of exchanges in which Pinay as chairman sought to adjourn session in accordance with Macmillan motion in face of several statements by Molotov which were out of order. During course of his questions regarding meaning of Macmillan motion Molotov indicated Soviet Government had additional proposal for 50 percent reduction of Foreign troops on German territory and still another proposal which Bulganin had made at July conference on basic principles of treaty to be concluded by existing groupings in Europe.[10] After considerable argument over question of suspending Item 1 and whether additional Soviet proposals in fact related to

---

[9] See Document 284.

[10] The proposal on troop reduction was never submitted to the conference. For text of the Soviet treaty proposal, circulated as MFM/DOC/42, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, p. 168, or *Cmd.* 9633, pp. 108–109.

Item, Macmillan clarified his motion by stating that adjournment on Item 1 did not mean that discussion on it would be brought to an end. He stated he had made this motion because Soviet Government declaration yesterday put such complete bar to any discussion of German reunification. Molotov then agreed to postponement further consideration Item 1 pending discussions Items 2 and 3. Meeting was adjourned on understanding discussion Item 2 would begin at next meeting November 10.[11]

---

[11] Following the ninth meeting of the Foreign Ministers, Dulles discussed the day's developments with Blankenhorn and Brentano. Dulles suggested that the three Western powers should issue a declaration on Germany at the conclusion of the conference. The German representatives agreed to prepare a draft for the statement, and asked whether Dulles would have time to stop at Bonn following the meetings. (USDel/MC/29, November 11; Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 609)

---

348. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Department of State[1]

Geneva, November 9, 1955—midnight.

Dulte 64. Eyes only for Acting Secretary from Secretary. For President.

"Dear Mr. President:

"I thank you for your prompt reply to my message of yesterday.[2] It is very comforting, at these difficult moments, to know of your support and confidence.

"I have just made a conference statement,[3] the text of which will doubtless reach you otherwise. I hope it meets with your approval.

"Macmillan made a good strong statement, despite earlier evidences of some weakness. Pinay on the other hand, turned out to be less forceful than expected. He had a quite bitter argument with Molotov at dinner last night and perhaps this exhausted him. More likely, Faure intervened. The French are very conscious of national elections next month.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/9–555. Secret; Priority. Transmitted to the Denver White House at 7:33 p.m., November 9.

[2] See Documents 342 and 343.

[3] For text of Dulles' statement at the ninth session of the Foreign Ministers, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 154–159, or *Cmd.* 9633, pp. 88–91.

"I did not use your authority to quote you as I felt your voice would carry more weight later, after you had had a full report. However, I showed your cable privately to Macmillan and Pinay and this knowledge of your position helped.

"We now go on to discuss disarmament and contacts, although the Soviets may introduce new proposals under Item 1. In field of contacts, Bill Jackson and the experts have been working with the other delegations. Here also the Soviets have recently toughened their position.

"I rejoice that you are now returning to Washington and Gettysburg. I shall probably be seeing you there end of next week.

Faithfully yours, Foster"

Dulles

November 10, 1955

349. Editorial Note

The morning of November 10 held a very full schedule for the United States Delegation. Following the morning delegation meeting at 9:15, Secretary of State Dulles met at 9:30 with the Ceylonese Ambassador to discuss his country's prospective membership in the United Nations. At 10, the Tripartite Working Group on Disarmament met; at 10:10, Russell discussed the Middle East with Shuckburgh; and at 11, the Committee of Experts on East-West Contacts held its final meeting. At noon, the three Western Foreign Ministers met for a discussion of strategy during the consideration of disarmament. At 1 p.m., Secretary Dulles attended a luncheon given by the Swiss Government. The tenth meeting of the four Foreign Ministers was held at 4. Following the meeting Suydam briefed the press at 7:50, and Dulles attended a dinner given by Macmillan. (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 581, Chron–19 and US OD/12)

Records of the tripartite and quadripartite meetings of the Foreign Ministers and the final meeting of the Committee of Experts follow. Reports on the staff meeting, the conversation with the Ceylonese Ambassador, Suydam's press conference, and the dinner with Macmillan are *ibid.* No records for the other meetings have been found in Department of State files.

350. Telegram From the Delegation at the Foreign Ministers Meetings to the Department of State[1]

Geneva, November 10, 1955—4 p.m.

Secto 235. East-West Contacts. At plenary session four experts morning November 10, Vinogradov as Chairman suggested experts review proposals contained in Western and Soviet documents submitted October 31[2] in order to work out common language for inclusion in agreed Four-Power report.

Jackson then made statement (reported in separate cable[3]) that there had been no agreement in working groups on most important questions and that therefore he believed only appropriate course was for each expert submit individual report to his Minister.

French and British experts supported US statement.

Vinogradov then stressed seriousness with which Soviet Delegation had sought agreement on East-West contacts. After Western representatives had made brief responses to his remarks, Vinogradov declared meeting adjourned.

We are now considering with British and French line to be taken by Western Foreign Ministers when East-West contacts comes up for Ministerial discussion, probably on Monday or Tuesday. We are also working out language for joint Western statement of position which could be helpful in countering paper which Molotov will probably submit outlining Soviet stand on East-West contacts.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/11–1055. Confidential. Repeated to Moscow, Paris, Bonn, London, and the Mission at the United Nations.

[2] For texts of the Western and Soviet proposals, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 239–240 and 245–248, or *Cmd.* 9633, pp. 163–166.

[3] Transmitted in Secto 236 from Geneva, November 10. (Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/11–1055)

---

351. Memorandum of a Conversation, Villa le Chene, Geneva, November 10, 1955, Noon[1]

USDel/MC/40

SUBJECT

Tactics for Item 2 and Future Work of the Conference

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 609. Confidential. Drafted by Wainhouse on November 15.

PARTICIPANTS

United States
The Secretary
Mr. Stassen
Mr. MacArthur
Mr. Merchant
Mr. Bowie
Mr. Gray
Mr. Wainhouse
Col. Bailey
Mr. Matteson

United Kingdom
Mr. Macmillan
Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick
Sir George Young
Mr. Pink
Mr. MacKenzie
Mr. Hancock

France
M. de Margerie
M. de Menthon
Gen. Genevey

Mr. Pink, on behalf of the officials on the working level, submitted four points for the consideration of the three Ministers:

1. *Who speaks first*? With Mr. Macmillan in the chair it was thought that Mr. Molotov would speak first, said Mr. Pink.

2. After Messrs. Molotov, Dulles, and Pinay have spoken, Mr. Pink thought it would be desirable to have a break and discuss whether or not to introduce the Three Power Declaration.[2] The answer to this question would depend, he said, on what Mr. Molotov says.

3. *Is there to be a "restricted session"*? Mr. Pink reported the officials thought it would be a mistake to press for such a session since it would give rise to speculation that something was in the offing.

4. *What lines are the Ministers taking in their speeches*? Mr. Macmillan said with him in the chair he would call on Molotov to speak first and after Mr. Dulles and M. Pinay had spoken he would suggest a break in the meeting and during the break we could discuss, he said, whether to table the Tripartite Declaration. That indeed would depend upon what Mr. Molotov says. Mr. Pink broke in to say that if Mr. Molotov puts forward the usual line it would be very strange to put in a Declaration. It would be preferable to defer the tabling of it for later.

Mr. Dulles felt that it would probably be wise to hold it back and not put it in on the first day for the reasons stated. Our proposal, he said, is not responsive to the kind that Molotov might submit. Our proposal, he said, is really a basis for a General Assembly resolution. However, Mr. Dulles went on to say that he saw no harm in giving this question on whether we should table our declaration during a break in the session further thought.

---

[2] For text of the proposed declaration on disarmament, submitted to the conference during the tenth plenary, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 199–201, or *Cmd.* 9633, pp. 132–133.

Mr. Macmillan then inquired whether we ought to have a restricted session. The unanimous opinion was that we should not.

Mr. Macmillan then asked what the respective lines of the Ministers would be. Mr. Dulles outlined briefly what he would say as did M. Pinay.

The Secretary felt that we might be able to wind up Item 2 on Friday, and if not, we might have a meeting on Saturday morning to end it. That would leave us Item 3 for next week and on that there is not much to say. It appears that nothing very fruitful has as yet come up from the Experts. The Secretary felt that two days would be sufficient for Item 3.

Mr. Macmillan thought that the Russians were holding back.

The Secretary felt that the most important thing to do is to meet with Molotov on Friday, the 11th, and go over the timetable which Mr. MacArthur had distributed and seek agreement on it. The Secretary reminded the other Ministers that we have an agreement to hold the Conference down to three weeks.

Mr. Macmillan then asked how we are going to end this Conference. The Secretary replied that it was most important to start drafting a communiqué now. Mr. Macmillan stated that if we finish Item 3 with the Tuesday morning meeting and Item 1 on Tuesday afternoon, that would give us Wednesday to discuss the communiqué. The Secretary suggested that during the break, Mr. Macmillan ask Molotov to meet with him tomorrow to consider the future work of the Conference.[3]

---

[3] The three Western Foreign Ministers discussed the future work of the conference with Molotov at 3 p.m. on November 11. Macmillan proposed, and Molotov agreed to, the following schedule: November 11 and 12, disarmament; November 14 and morning November 15, East-West contacts; afternoon November 15, European security and German reunification and any other business; November 16, final communiqué. The U.S. Delegation reported on this meeting in Secto 255 from Geneva, November 11. (Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/11–1155)

352. Telegram From the Delegation at the Foreign Ministers Meetings to the Department of State[1]

Geneva, November 11, 1955—3 p.m.

Secto 251. 1. Tenth Ministers session November 10 began consideration disarmament with single round of statements.[2] Molotov tabled Soviet resolution (Secto 246[3]) and Macmillan introduced Western proposal.[4]

2. Molotov speech noteworthy chiefly for (1) new criticism of President's inspection proposal,[5] (2) renewed notice USSR unwilling accept proposal dependent of comprehensive disarmament agreement, (3) failure to link President's proposal and Soviet ground control plan.[6] Review Soviet May 10 proposals and stressing areas of agreement, Molotov implied lack of progress result of US position. On problem of control, after praising Soviet plan as guarantee against surprise attack, he admitted existence technical difficulties, yet argued confidence could be developed nevertheless by agreement condemning nuclear weapons. On President's proposal, he reiterated position that Soviet attitude would depend upon degree it (1) stopped arms race and (2) reduced danger of war. President's proposal said to fail on both points. Molotov repeated Bulganin's criticism that President's plan does not cover US bases or allies. In addition, he charged aerial photography would involve enormous cost, would not guarantee against surprise attack since it does not embody ground control posts, and would increase tensions by providing foreign state with military information which might be used for surprise attack. Amplifying Bulganin's letter to President,[7] Molotov concluded USSR would regard US plan favorably as one form of control in connection with the "concluding stage" of implementation of an international

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/11–1155. Secret; Priority. Repeated to London, Paris, Bonn, Moscow, and the Mission at the United Nations. Passed to Defense. Copies of the U.S. Delegation verbatim record of the tenth meeting of the Foreign Ministers, which was held at 4 p.m. on November 10, USDel/Verb/10 Corrected, and the record of decisions, MFM/DOC/RD/10, both dated November 10, are *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 581.

[2] For texts of the statements by the four Foreign Ministers, circulated as MFM/DOC/46, 48, 49, and 50, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 177–184 and 186–199, or *Cmd.* 9633, pp. 110–125.

[3] Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/11–1055) For text of the Soviet proposal, circulated as MFM/DOC/45, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 184–186, or *Cmd.* 9633, pp. 131–132.

[4] For text of the Western proposal, circulated as MFM/DOC/47, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 199–201, or *Cmd.* 9633, pp. 132–133.

[5] For text of President Eisenhower's "Open Skies" proposal, see Document 221.

[6] For text of the Soviet proposal of May 10, see *Documents* (R.I.I.A.) for 1955, pp. 110–121.

[7] For text of this letter, September 19, see Department of State *Bulletin*, October 24, 1955, pp. 644–647, or *Documents* (R.I.I.A.) for 1955, pp. 139–144.

agreement to reduce armaments and prohibit atomic weapons. Acceptance Faure plan[8] similarly qualified. Eden pilot plan[9] uncriticized and called worthy careful consideration.

3. Secretary emphasized necessity of building confidence and stressed President's initiative in that connection. He underscored value of combining US and Soviet inspection plans as decisive first step toward improving international atmosphere. Although combined system no cure-all, it would be unprecedented in history and could signal end of arms race. Pointing to US demobilization record as evidence US peaceful purposes, Secretary asserted US learned hard way the need to remain strong. He warned US will maintain strength until USSR helps restore confidence, but US continues seek comprehensive system for reduction armaments under effective inspection and control. Foreign Ministers can best contribute by improving atmosphere. Detailed negotiations in UN subcommittee need face realities, recognizing inspection and control crux of problem, but no effective system for nuclear weapons present known.

4. Pinay called for recognition basic facts: disarmament impossible without effective controls and disarmament presupposes disappearance of mistrust. Accordingly, under present circumstances, necessary to recognize objectively that we are not in position to set up general disarmament plan. Consequently most fruitful course is to seek agreement on certain preliminary measures which might later be joined in comprehensive scheme. These preliminary measures would not be inconsequential and once implemented would contribute to security and confidence. As examples, Pinay listed (1) combined US and Soviet inspection plans, (2) Faure budget-review proposal, (3) Eden pilot plan, (4) UN subcommittee consideration technical difficulties inherent in nuclear control.

5. Recalling Soviet admission of possibility for evading nuclear control, Macmillan launched frontal attack against concept of comprehensive disarmament plan at this time. To admit possibility of evasion and at same time call for total abolition nuclear weapons called misleading. In absence of effective control, agreement to abolish nuclear weapons would involve unacceptable risks, since, unlike conventional weapon slight margin of error or deception would have decisive effect. Until means of effective control are discovered, acceptance of complete nuclear disarmament would contribute to false sense of security. Conclusion of all-embracing convention bound to be protracted by need to increase confidence and develop scientific detection. Accordingly, more limited preliminary agreement suggested, including (1) installment disarmament which might achieve a bal-

---

[8] See Document 253.

[9] See Document 254.

ance of forces—principally conventional—at reduced levels, thereby helping to reduce tensions and taxes yet not endanger security either side, (2) confidence—build pilot schemes, such as merger US and Soviet inspection proposals.

---

353. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Department of State[1]

Geneva, November 10, 1955—9 p.m.

Dulte 66. Eyes only for Acting Secretary from Secretary. For President.

"Dear Mr. President:

Today we opened on disarmament. Harold Stassen and Gordon Gray were here to help me. Molotov opened with speech which largely concentrated on your aerial inspection proposal. He said you were undoubtedly well-intentioned but your proposal was too costly and it would reveal so much it would be frightening rather than reassuring. However, he said they might take aerial inspection as part of a comprehensive disarmament plan because then the people would be reassured by disarmament program. This was something because they never yet accepted aerial inspection on any terms.

My statement was largely a repeated exposition of your viewpoint. Three Western powers tabled rather comprehensive proposal[2] which we had worked out through much anguish over preceding weeks and which gives us united platform on which to stand here and later on at UN when it takes up this topic.

On whole it was calm day in comparison with two preceding days.

This message may reach you in Washington. It will indeed be a happy event when you return to your official home. I cannot adequately express degree of sympathy which has been expressed by all whom I have met in Italy, Spain, Austria, Yugoslavia and Switzerland.

Faithfully yours, Foster"

Dulles

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/11–1055. Secret; Priority.

[2] For text of the Western proposal, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 199–201, or *Cmd.* 9633, pp. 132–133.

354. Memorandum of the Discussion at the 265th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, November 10, 1955[1]

[Here follow a list of participants and discussion of item 1 on an unrelated matter.]

2. Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security

Secretary Hoover said that the National Security Council would undoubtedly be interested in an exchange of communications between the President and the Secretary of State with respect to developments at the Geneva Foreign Ministers Conference. Secretary Dulles had addressed a message to the President on November 8[2] after Molotov's devastating speech rejecting the Western proposals for German reunification and European security. Secretary Dulles had informed the President that Molotov's speech was utterly cynical and constituted a flagrant breach of the agreements on this subject reached at the Heads-of-Government Conference at Geneva last July. Moreover, in view of Molotov's stand on this agenda item, Secretary Dulles had expressed grave doubts whether significant progress could be achieved on the other agenda items. In his reply to Secretary Dulles,[3] the President said that he believed that the Soviets were engaged in actions of complete duplicity, and expressed complete confidence in the position which Secretary Dulles was taking at Geneva. Secretary Hoover added that he had seen the President yesterday and had reported to Secretary Dulles what the President had said to him at this time.[4] Among the points the President made was one to the effect that the Soviets obviously regarded East Germany as the key to their entire satellite structure. Furthermore, the President had said that while we could not trust the Soviets, on the other hand we must not say that we are through and walk out on the Conference.

---

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted on November 11.

[2] See Document 342.

[3] See Document 343.

[4] Hoover transmitted the following report to Dulles in Tedul 73 to Geneva, November 10:

"The President said he was very greatly depressed by Molotov's performance of yesterday. I suggested that in the past they had often acted tough and then, when the airplanes were waiting, had softened up a bit. He agreed, saying 'you can't trust them when they are talking nice and you can't trust them when they are talking tough'. He made the point that, based on Molotov's speech alone, we should be careful not to say 'We are through' and walk out.

"I pointed out that obviously the Soviet concern must to a great extent involve the reactions of the German people, and a desire to impress them with the idea that the Western powers could be of no help in gaining reunification. The President agreed and felt further that 'if East Germany gets independence as a free nation the pull on the other satellites would be tremendous. The Soviets regard East Germany as the keystone of their satellite army.'

"The President several times expressed admiration of and complete confidence in your handling of the conference." (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 620)

Secretary Hoover concluded with a brief outline of Secretary Dulles' reply[5] to the President's message of confidence, but expressed his pessimism on the likelihood of any additional progress on the remaining two agenda items. Secretary Hoover added that while the planes which were to bring the U.S. Delegation home had originally been scheduled to come to Geneva on Saturday, they were now scheduled to arrive on Wednesday of next week.

The Vice President asked Secretary Wilson if he had any impressions of the Foreign Ministers Conference which he would like to outline at this time. Secretary Wilson said that the most encouraging feature observed by him while at Geneva was the remarkable teamwork of the three Western Foreign Ministers. He added that it was personally very clear to him that the Western proposals to the Soviet Union on German reunification and European security were of such a nature that the Soviets could not afford to buy them from their own point of view.

The Vice President commented that if the present Geneva Foreign Ministers Conference proved to be a "bust", public opinion in the United States, and hopefully elsewhere in the world, was going to have a pretty good idea of which power was responsible for the bust.

The Director of Central Intelligence said he would like to draw attention to a historical parallel to the statement of Molotov finally rejecting the Western proposals for German reunification. If one harked back to the early days of the Marshall Plan, one would recall that Molotov made a devastating statement designed to prevent the cooperation in the Marshall Plan of any of the Soviet Bloc countries. If one compares this earlier statement with the tone and temper of Molotov's statement yesterday, it becomes clear that in each case the underlying problem was the same. In short, the Soviet Union dared not take any course of action which threatened its hold on its satellites.

Secretary Wilson wondered if Molotov was going to be made the goat for the Russian failure at Geneva. Mr. Allen Dulles said that in any case he believed that the Russians now regarded Molotov as expendable.

Mr. Dulles then said he wished to refer to the most recent nuclear test in the Soviet Union. On November 6 a large nuclear airburst explosion had occurred. Its precise location was still being checked, but preliminary indications suggested that it had occurred in an area considerably to the east of the regular Soviet atomic proving ground at Semi-Palatinsk. While by no means all the evidence was in, the explosion was judged to be quite large, 500 KT or larger. There was no sure evidence as yet as to whether or not it was a thermonuclear explosion, but it appeared to be the second largest bomb exploded by the Soviets. If agreeable to the Council, it was proposed to have Admiral Strauss make a brief announcement this evening.

---

[5] *Supra.*

Secretary Hoover said that the proposed announcement had been cleared with Secretary Dulles, but the latter had desired to be sure that the British received 24 hours advance notice of the fact that the U.S. was making this announcement. Admiral Strauss said that such advance notice had been provided to the British, and that they had agreed to the announcement.

Mr. Dulles went on to point out that because of the peculiarities of the location in which the explosion seems to have occurred—namely, in wild and inaccessible country—it was possible that the explosion indicated some kind of guided missile. It was too early to be sure.

The National Security Council:

a. Noted and discussed oral reports by the Acting Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense on developments with respect to the Foreign Ministers meeting at Geneva, and the Near East.

b. Noted and discussed an oral briefing by the Director of Central Intelligence on the subject, with specific reference to Molotov's most recent speech at Geneva with respect to German reunification and European security; a new Soviet nuclear test; and the Philippine elections.

[Here follows discussion of items 3 and 4, Berlin and atomic energy.]

S. Everett Gleason

November 11, 1955

355. Editorial Note

The United States Delegation began November 11 with the usual staff meeting at 9:15 a.m. At 10 and 10:30, tripartite coordinating groups met to discuss disarmament and German reunification. In the afternoon, Merchant and Beam discussed the course of the conference with former Hungarian Prime Minister Nagy. The four Foreign

Ministers met informally at 3 p.m. to consider the future work of the conference, and at 3:30 the eleventh session of the conference began. Following the session, Secretary Dulles met with Macmillan at 7:30 and with French General Billotte at 8 to discuss Algeria. At 8, Suydam also briefed the press. (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 582, Chron–20 and US OD/13)

A record of the eleventh session of the Foreign Ministers is *infra.* Regarding the meeting with Molotov at 3 p.m., see footnote 3, Document 351. Records of the staff meeting, the conversation with Nagy, the meeting with Billotte, and Suydam's press conference are in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 582. No records of the other meetings have been found in Department of State files.

---

356. Telegram From the Delegation at the Foreign Ministers Meetings to the Department of State[1]

Geneva, November 12, 1955—10 a.m.

Secto 262. 1. Eleventh Ministers session November 11 continued consideration disarmament in four-hour deadlock.

2. Secretary first answered Molotov's five criticisms yesterday of President's inspection proposal and stated, if USSR accepts proposal, US prepared negotiate with other countries and USSR on extension on reciprocal basis both US and Soviet inspection plans to cover overseas bases and forces of other countries.[2] He repeated President's plan only an initial step, but would serve as deterrent to surprise attack. He expressed hope Molotov's statement yesterday[3] not last Soviet word on proposal. Turning to Soviet resolution,[4] insofar as it dealt with atomic matters, Secretary said (1) US prepared accept restrictions on nuclear tests if agreement reached to limit or eliminate nuclear weapons under proper safeguards; (2) Soviet-proposed

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/11–1255. Secret; Priority. Repeated to London, Paris, Bonn, Moscow, and the Mission at the United Nations. Passed to Defense. The U.S. Delegation verbatim record of the eleventh Foreign Ministers meeting, which met at 3:30 p.m. on November 11, USDEL/Verb/11 (Corrected), and the record of decisions, MFM/DOC/RD/11, both dated November 11, are *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 582.

[2] For text of Dulles' statement, circulated as MFM/DOC/51, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, p. 201–206, or *Cmd.* 9633, p. 125–129; for text of President Eisenhower's "Open Skies" proposal, see Document 221.

[3] See Document 352.

[4] For text of the Soviet proposal on disarmament, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, p. 184–186, or *Cmd.* 9633, p. 131–132.

pledges not to use nuclear weapons would be only promises on which US unwilling stake its security and moreover UN Charter already commits members to refrain from use of force; (3) Soviet proposal to eliminate atomic weapons contradicted by Soviet May 10 admission[5] that no assurance at present that evasion can be detected. Secretary stressed need for continued scientific research to make inspection effective as well as need for atmosphere of trust, to which Soviet position at present meeting has failed to contribute.

3. Pinay in brief statement argued that Foreign Ministers could only establish certain principles, while UN Subcommittee worked out details; asserted UN Charter already gave moral prohibition sought by USSR; and urged Molotov to agree to Western proposals as a preliminary step.[6]

4. Macmillan concentrated on three points:[7] (1) level of forces, where he felt progress possible; (2) level of armaments, which he criticized Soviet resolution for over-looking; (3) need for effective control, concerning which he asked Molotov three questions: (A) does USSR agree international inspectors should be established in all participating states and be ready to work before disarmament begun; (B) what rights of access and communication would USSR grant inspectors; (C) what USSR means by its term "objects of controls"?

5. Molotov focused on charge Western powers had retrogressed on disarmament.[8] Western proposal yesterday called retreat from UN 1946 and 1954 resolutions, Western positions in disarmament talks in June 1954 and September 1955. Technical difficulties of nuclear inspection dismissed as pretext to avoid disarmament and progress termed still possible by Soviet proposed condemnation of nuclear weapons. Macmillan's three questions side-stepped by comment that reply would be forthcoming once detailed discussions begun. Controls without end of arms are denounced as lulling vigilance of people. Soviet view of own control scheme somewhat spelled out by statement that establishment ground control posts should not be taken by itself but as one of the measures provided for by a general disarmament plan.

6. Following recess,[9] Pinay and Macmillan pointed out Molotov had based charges of Western retrogression on incomplete and inac-

---

[5] For text of the Soviet proposal on disarmament, dated May 10, see *Documents* (R.I.I.A.) for 1955, p. 110–121.

[6] For text of Pinay's statement, circulated as MFM/DOC/55, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, p. 206–208.

[7] For text of Macmillan's statement, circulated as MFM/DOC/52, see *ibid.*, p. 208–211, or *Cmd.* 9633, p. 129–130.

[8] For text of Molotov's statement, circulated as MFM/DOC/53, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, p. 211–217.

[9] During the recess, Dulles talked to Molotov about an agreed conference statement on disarmament. Molotov thought the idea was good, and the Secretary of State

Continued

curate measurement of earlier Western position. Secretary returned to contradiction in Soviet position, with May 10 statement admitting possibility of evasion of nuclear inspection, yet Soviet proposal calling for effective nuclear control. Molotov avoided answer by quoting different section of May 10 proposal and maintaining no contradiction. Secretary replied by rereading pertinent section May 10 proposal, but received no response, since when Molotov's turn to speak again, he suggested adjournment.[10] Secretary concluded that despite technical difficulties, something could be done regarding disarmament, asserting problem is to find out what can be controlled and then to agree to control it.

7. Macmillan undertook to sum up, maintaining all agreed on need for mutual confidence and all, despite propaganda charges, in favor of disarmament. He divided problem between unconventional and conventional weapons. Regarding former, he stressed more complete control necessary, since no mistake could be tolerated. Failure yet to find scientific answer to nuclear control should not lead to despair. Control of conventional weapons is different problem and within grasp of governments, provided adequate control established.

8. Ministers scheduled to terminate disarmament discussion at 10:30 Saturday morning session.

---

suggested that the Soviet Delegation see how much of the tripartite declaration was acceptable. (Memorandum of conversation, USDEL/MC/34, November 13; Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 582)

[10] For text of Dulles' final remarks at the eleventh session, circulated as MFM/DOC/51 (Add. 1 and 2), see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, p. 217–220.

---

357. Intelligence Briefing Note[1]

IB No. 29 *Geneva, November 11, 1955.*

Informal Soviet Hints at Deal on German Reunification

. . . [2] two Communist journalists in Geneva— . . . —separately and independently hinted at Soviet willingness to make a deal on Germany despite Molotov's uncompromising speech of 8 November.[3]

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 608. Secret; Limited Distribution.

[2] One half line is omitted in the source text.

[3] See Document 340.

The line of discussion taken by the . . . journalist on 10 November and echoed—though only in broad outline—by the . . . the same night, was as follows:

> The heart of the matter at issue between the US and the USSR is Germany. Molotov has hinted at the terms of a deal, but the West has not touched on any realistic proposition.
>
> The terms of a possible deal are clear: Germany must stay out of NATO and come within the framework of a general European security agreement; the quid pro quo would be Soviet agreement to so-called free elections.
>
> Of course the Communists would lose free elections in a reunified Germany, but they might get about 15 percent of the vote, and that would be satisfactory to the USSR.
>
> There would have to be some sort of advance agreement to protect the social gains of East Germany—simply some understanding that the government would not destroy the social experiments of the opposition, as the Conservatives in England did not destroy the nationalized industries set up under the Labor Government.
>
> The Russians wonder if the United States might not suggest a realistic deal along these lines at some point, and are speculating on whether Secretary Dulles has the authority to make such a proposal. In particular they wonder if a deal is possible now or if it will have to wait until after the 1956 election.
>
> The Russians also wonder if the US intends to propose another conference before the 1956 US elections. The USSR will not press for one.

Comment: The Soviet delegation has made it very clear that the USSR is unwilling to agree to reunification of Germany at any price less than the exclusion of Germany from NATO. This report is the first reliable evidence received during the Foreign Ministers Meeting that the USSR might wish to make a deal at this price.

Soviet intent to explore the chances of such a deal may in part explain Molotov's unwillingness on 9 November to end the discussion of agenda item number one.

Ray S. Cline[4]
Adviser, U.S. Delegation

---

[4] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

358. Editorial Note

At 10:15 a.m. on November 12, Molotov visited Secretary of State Dulles at the latter's office to discuss an agreed statement on disarmament. The four Foreign Ministers then met for their twelfth session from 10:40 to 10:53. Following an adjournment until 12:05 p.m., the Ministers reconvened for 1 hour. In the interim Dulles met with his Western counterparts and then with Molotov to discuss further the agreed statement. Following the second part of the twelfth session Dulles, Macmillan, and de Margerie met at the French villa to consider United Nations membership, the Middle East, and Vietnam. Dulles then had dinner with Ambassador Luce, and Suydam held the daily press briefing. (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 583, Chron–21)

Records of the first meeting with Molotov and the twelfth meeting of the Foreign Ministers are printed below. The second meeting with Molotov is summarized in footnote 3, *infra.* A transcript of the press briefing is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 583. No records of the other meetings have been found in Department of State files.

---

359. Memorandum of a Conversation, Palais des Nations, Geneva, November 12, 1955, 10:15 a.m.[1]

USDel/MC/30

PARTICIPANTS

Mr. Molotov
Mr. Gromyko
Mr. Troyanovsky
The Secretary
Mr. Merchant
Amb. Bohlen
Governor Stassen (later joined the meeting)

At his request Mr. Molotov called on the Secretary in his office at 10:15 this morning. Mr. Molotov said he had asked to see the Secretary in regard to their conversation yesterday as to the possibility of an agreed resolution on Point 2 of the agenda. The Soviet Delegation had drawn up a text which might serve as a basis for an agreed resolution in which they had tried to include provisions on which their points of view seemed to be close. Mr. Molotov said he had only the Russian text but an English translation would be forthcoming very soon. Troyanovsky then read a copy of the Soviet draft (a copy of which is attached).

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/11–1255. Secret. Drafted by Bohlen.

The Secretary said he would have to study more closely the text when received in English but that from hearing it he felt there were some things in it that would not be acceptable but he would wish to examine it more carefully before deciding whether it could serve as a basis for resolution or not. He mentioned that as he heard it read it apparently involved the acceptance of the principle of the prohibition of atomic weapons which was not acceptable to the United States unless means of control and inspection which at present do not exist could be found. The best thing would be to get it translated and to study it. It would perhaps be preferable not to introduce it formally at the conference this morning but to have it studied privately. He added that of course if Mr. Molotov desired he had the right to introduce it. Molotov said he agreed and did not consider it necessary to introduce this paper at the session this morning. The Secretary inquired whether Mr. Molotov had any objection to his discussing it with the British and the French. Mr. Molotov said he had none and inquired what they would do at this morning's session. The Secretary said he thought that they might meet and then recess for an hour or an hour and a half while the Soviet suggestion could be studied. If upon study there appeared to be a basis for an agreement it might perhaps be wiser to reassemble in restricted session. Mr. Molotov said he saw no objection to that procedure. The Secretary said he wished to point out, however, that if the Soviet Delegation could accept nothing less than a reaffirmation of the principle of total suppression of atomic weapons, the United States could not agree. Mr. Molotov replied that they had no reaffirmation of that in this paper but he felt that it would not be understood if there was no mention made of atomic weapons which after all was contained in the Directive from the Heads of Government. The Secretary said he had no objection to a reference to atomic weapons. In fact in regard to the non-use of atomic weapons there were similarities in the two drafts submitted yesterday [*November 10*].[2] The Western Powers state that the weapon could be used only in conformity with the UN Charter whereas the Soviet proposal on this point states that the weapon should not be used except with the approval of the Security Council. There was thus a similarity on this point. He did not wish to be understood, however, to mean that the United States would accept the right of veto on this question but there was similarity in recognition that for some time atomic weapons would exist and that under certain conditions could be used.

---

[2] For texts of the Soviet and Western proposals on disarmament, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 184–186 and 199–201, or *Cmd.* 9633, pp. 131–133.

The Secretary said that as chairman today he would suggest that if no one wished to speak they would recess for an hour or an hour and a half.[3]

[Attachment][4]

Paper Prepared by the Soviet Delegation

Geneva, undated.

DECISION OF THE MEETING OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE FOUR POWERS ON QUESTIONS OF DISARMAMENT

Guided by the desire to contribute to a lessening of international tension, strengthening of mutual confidence in relations between states and ending of the armaments race,

The Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union, the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France recognize the need to continue to seek agreements on a comprehensive program for disarmament which will promote international peace and security with the least diversion for armament of the world's human and economic resources.

The Ministers note that on some important matters pertaining to the reduction of armaments and prohibition of atomic weapons the positions of the four powers have come considerably closer. This relates first of all to the limitation of the levels of the armed forces of the five powers—France, the United Kingdom, the U.S.A., China and the Soviet Union—and also to the procedure of implementing measures for the prohibition of atomic weapons and the need to institute effective international control. As for the matters on which agreement has not yet been achieved, the Ministers have agreed that the Four Powers together with the other states concerned shall direct their efforts to remove existing differences on these matters and thus to elaborate an acceptable system of disarmament, including strict control and inspection.

---

[3] Dulles consulted with the British and French concerning the Soviet draft, and then met Molotov at the latter's office at 11:40 a.m. to say that it was unacceptable in its present form. Dulles proposed that the three Western delegations draft a new paper for consideration of the Soviet Delegation. This procedure was approved by Molotov. (Memorandum of conversation, USDel/MC/31; Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-GE/11-1555)

[4] Unofficial translation.

It has been agreed that the steps taken in the states concerned, for the study of methods of control over the implementation by states of their undertakings regarding the reduction of armaments and prohibition of atomic weapons shall be designed to facilitate the settlement of the disarmament problem.

Agreement has also been achieved on the need to devote to the peaceful economic development of nations, for raising their well-being, as well as for assistance to less developed countries, the material resources that would be released by agreements in the disarmament field.

The Ministers have agreed that it is necessary in this connection to consider first of all the following provisions:

a) In the proposals of the USSR of May 10 and July 21[5] of this year on the reduction of armaments, the prohibition of atomic weapons and the elimination of the threat of a new war;

b) In the proposal by the President of the United States of July 21[6] on aerial photography and exchange of military information;

c) In the proposals by the Government of the United Kingdom on disarmament submitted on July 21 and August 29;[7] and

d) In the proposal by the Government of France on the financial control over disarmament and on the conversion of the resources thus released for peaceful purposes.[8]

---

[5] For text of the Soviet proposal of May 10, see *Documents* (R.I.I.A.) for 1955, pp. 110–121; for text of the July 21 proposal, see Document 252.

[6] See Document 221.

[7] For text of the July 21 proposal, see Document 254.

[8] For text of the French proposal of July 21, see Document 253; for text of this proposal as revised and submitted to the U.N. Disarmament Subcommittee on August 29, see *Documents* (R.I.I.A.) for 1955, pp. 122–124.

---

360. Telegram From the Delegation at the Foreign Ministers Meetings to the Department of State[1]

Geneva, November 12, 1955—9 p.m.

Secto 271. 1. Twelfth Ministers session November 12 concluded disarmament discussion with four delegations agreeing exchange had been useful in defining areas of agreement and disagreement.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-GE/11-1255. Secret; Priority. Repeated to London, Paris, and Moscow. Passed to Defense and the Mission at the

Continued

2. Speaking in Pinay's absence, De Margerie reiterated Western position. Other three Ministers declined to speak and meeting was recessed for one hour.

3. After recess Secretary reviewed disarmament debate,[2] pointing out Western powers put emphasis on need for development of inspection and control whereas USSR stresses priority of reduction of arms and prohibition of nuclear weapons, relying on moral force of world opinion to insure compliance. Western powers do not feel moral sanctions are yet an adequate assurance and continue to seek effective inspection methods as part of prudent advance towards substantial reduction of arms. Secretary recalled point in his November 10 statement[3] on possibility of finding effective means to control future output of nuclear weapon-grade material, despite special problem of accounting for past production, and suggested four powers and Canada might usefully study possibility.

4. Molotov returned to theme that most important task is to end arms race.[4] Unless general agreement reached on this point, difficult to agree on details of disarmament. He admitted problem of technical difficulties, but argued for moral condemnation of nuclear weapons as way to move ahead. He called for four powers to declare they would not be first to use nuclear weapons and pointed to 1925 Geneva convention on chemical warfare as example of moral undertaking.

5. Secretary observed Soviet demand for mobilizing public opinion against nuclear weapons ran risk of being interpreted to mean other kinds of war all right and expressed hope that moral opinion could stop all kinds of war.[5] Regarding 1925 Geneva convention Secretary asserted reason gas was not used was because of mutual deterrent rather than moral effect of convention on Hitler.

6. Molotov concluded by suggesting useful if four powers would express unanimously their intention to refrain from use of force.

7. Ministers will take up Item 3 Monday afternoon.

United Nations. The U.S. Delegation verbatim record of the twelfth Foreign Ministers meeting, which took place at 10:30 a.m. on November 12, USDEL/Verb/12 (Corrected), and the record of decisions for the meeting, MFM/DOC/RD/12, both dated November 12, are *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 583.

[2] For text of Dulles' statement, circulated as MFM/DOC/57, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting,* pp. 220–222.

[3] See Document 352.

[4] For text of Molotov's statement, circulated as MFM/DOC/56, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting,* pp. 222–225.

[5] For text of Dulles' second statement, circulated as MFM/DOC/58, see *ibid.,* p. 225.

361. Letter From Secretary of State Dulles to Prime Minister Segni[1]

Geneva, November 12, 1955.

My Dear Mr. Prime Minister: It has occurred to me that you might like to have some of my thoughts about this Conference. First of all, it is clear that we can expect no result on the important issues which have been at the heart of our discussions here. The position of the Soviet Union with regard to German reunification has remained completely inflexible and Mr. Molotov has repeatedly made it clear that under no circumstances will the Soviet accept any arrangement which would involve giving up Eastern Germany. We have been able to expose to the world the fact that the principal obstacle to agreement is not consideration of the security of the Soviet Union, but Soviet insistence on preserving the so-called German Democratic Republic.

The Soviet position with regard to disarmament holds little promise for progress at this time. Mr. Molotov has merely repeated the arguments of the Soviet proposals of May 10, 1955, and has heaped criticism on the President's proposal of last July. However, discussion will continue in New York, and in my statement on November 10, 1955, I pointed out that at a later stage the time will come when other nations should be associated with the task of the Disarmament Commission. I appreciate the interest of your Government in this field and Italy was in my mind when I made that statement.

As you know, we have not been able so far to make much headway on the 3rd item of the Directive either. The Soviet Union seems to favor only those exchanges of persons and information from which it can hope to derive political or technical advantages. It shows no sign of willingness to remove the real barriers to freedom of speech and information, so as to create conditions for genuine progress in the field of East-West understanding.

In fact, the only evidence of the "Geneva spirit" on the part of the Soviet delegation at this Conference has been their abstention from diatribe. The substance of what Mr. Molotov has had to say reveals no sign of a more conciliatory attitude toward the West and no intention to abide by the letter, or the spirit, of the Directive of the Heads of Government.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 583. Personal and Confidential. Drafted by Tyler.

As you know, I paid a brief visit to Marshal Tito a week ago[2] and I believe that this was of real benefit. We had an interesting and frank exchange of views on the current situation. I might mention that the subject of Italian-Yugoslav relations was not discussed, nor did Marshal Tito raise this topic in any form. Kardelj did observe that relations were now much better.

It is my feeling that the course of this Conference makes it more than ever clear that the free countries of the West must remain firmly united, and conscious that the chief aim of the Soviet Union is to create division and friction among them, now as in the past. I hope very much that Mr. Pinay and Mr. Spaak will be able to talk with Chancellor Adenauer this weekend on the desirability of further efforts toward European integration. I am mindful of the important role which your country has always played in the effort to unite Europe. I believe that we must continue to strengthen NATO. In these tasks of partnership I greatly value the contribution of Italy.

I am glad to have been able to talk with Ambassador Bova Scoppa. We have done our best to keep your Government informed through him of the course of events at the Conference.

Sincerely yours,

John Foster Dulles[3]

---

[2] Secretary Dulles left Vienna for Pula, Yugoslavia, at 9:45 a.m., November 6, and spent the day with Marshal Tito discussing questions of mutual concern. He returned to Geneva shortly after 11 p.m.

[3] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

---

362. Memorandum From the Secretary of State's Special Assistant (Jackson) to the Secretary of State[1]

Geneva, November 12, 1955.

SUBJECT

Report on Work of the Committee of Experts on Item III—East-West Contacts

The Committee of Experts began its work of studying measures for the development of East-West contacts without a fixed agenda. However, it did have for consideration two documents: the joint Western memorandum tabled by Foreign Minister Pinay (Tab A) and the Soviet proposal—tabled by Foreign Minister Molotov (Tab B).[2] These documents, you will recall, are very different in character.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/11–155. Confidential. A marginal note on the source text indicates that Secretary of State Dulles saw the memorandum.

The first order of business, therefore, was organization of the work of the Committee. Here, the Western delegations had two objectives: (a) to split the committee into two working parties and in this way to prevent the Soviets from assigning the lion's share of time to discussion of trade matters, and (b) to assure proper consideration to items of primary interest to the West. While we were successful with respect to the former, we achieved little success on the latter since Vinogradov announced at the outset that the Soviet document should, but that the Western memorandum *could not,* become the basis of discussion for the Committee of Experts. A number of points in the Western memorandum, he said, involve matters relating to the internal administration of the Soviet Union, and as such are inadmissible.

We could not accept the Soviet document as the basis of our discussions. The Soviets would not accept ours.

Contacts Other Than Trade

A great deal of time was spent by the Working Group on Contacts other than Trade in discussion of procedural matters. In an effort to get on with the work we were compelled finally to accept a list of items, common to both proposals, submitted by the Soviets as acceptable for substantive discussion. After a hard struggle we were given opportunity to set forth our case for the relevancy of those of our items which the Soviets refused to admit to the agenda. But the Soviets would not yield.

Thus the Western items of Censorship, Information Centers, Exchange of Books, Periodicals and Newspapers; items on Jamming, Treatment of Foreign Journalists, Tourism and the Ruble Rate, and Restrictions on Diplomatic Missions were never recognized as eligible for admission to the agenda. For the most part these were the very proposals to which the Western delegations attached the greatest significance since they pertain to barriers obstructing the free exchange of information and ideas.

The 9 points of the Western memorandum which were accepted by the Soviets as eligible for substantive discussion fared little better. Roughly half of these concern information and ideas. Among these the only item to which the Soviets seemed really to agree was the one relating to Exchange of Government Publications. Items on *Amerika* magazine, Films, and Exhibits were consigned by the Soviets to subsequent, detailed bilateral discussions. And although the Russians did discuss Exchange of Uncensored Broadcasts they made it very plain that what they really want is a general agreement for "cooperation" in the field of radio broadcasting. Judging from the Soviet discussion of this subject, what they have in mind under "cooperation" is cessation of Radio Free Europe broadcasts, changes in the content of VOA broadcasts, and abandonment by the US of radio frequencies claimed by the USSR.

---

[2] Neither printed. For texts of the Western and Soviet proposals on East-West contacts, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting,* pp. 245–248 and 239–240, or *Cmd.* 9633, pp. 163–166.

In short, the Soviets appeared truly interested only in exchanges of delegations, though even here they expressed a number of reservations and criticisms of the Western points. They seemed to want exchanges supplying the Soviet Union with essential technical knowhow without making corresponding concessions in the areas to which we attach importance.

During the deliberations of the Contacts Working Group I pointed out on two occasions that if we did not make more progress and reach quickly the stage of very frank discussion of mutual concessions leading to agreements on a substantial number of items of interest to all the parties concerned, we would not achieve a sufficient measure of agreement to justify a report of any progress to our Ministers.

Trade and Transport

The Trade Working Group held six meetings devoted to substantive discussions, during which they elaborated and considered numbered paragraphs 1 and 2 of the draft Soviet resolution; the two paragraphs on trade of the tripartite Western memorandum; three positive proposals made orally by the Western Powers for elimination of specific minor obstacles to peaceful East-West trade; and the tripartite proposal tabled by the U.S. supporting the early negotiation and conclusion of bilateral air agreements between the Western Powers and the USSR (Tab C).

General Soviet Position

With regard to trade, the Soviet representatives made it clear that their principal demand was for the elimination of Western strategic export controls. They argued that the very existence of these "discriminatory restrictions" destroyed confidence and made normal trade relations impossible. They denied the Western contention that strategic export controls applied to only a small area of potential trade, citing the drastic decline in US-Soviet trade after 1947. The Soviet representatives insisted that the USSR favors expanded trade with all nations regardless of political or social differences, but claimed that this objective could not be realized so long as the strategic controls were in existence. The Soviet delegation wrapped its whole approach in the cloak of the most-favored-nation doctrine, under which, they asserted, all governments should leave the fields of trade and navigation free from all restrictions.

General Western Position

The Western Powers, citing the Directive's reference to peaceful trade, held that discussion of strategic controls was a security matter and outside the competence of the experts. They also pointed out that it was not their strategic controls which were responsible for the comparatively low level of East-West trade, since these controls applied to only a relatively small area of trade. The basic reason for the low level of this trade, they argued, must be found in Soviet foreign trade policy, which has always emphasized economic self-sufficiency for the USSR and now aims at building a new form of regional autarky for the Soviet bloc as a whole. That such policies are inconsistent with a high level of trade with the West has been made evident by the authoritative Soviet pronouncements proclaiming the existence of two parallel (and opposed) world markets.

The Western representatives noted that an increase in East-West trade had taken place in the last 18 months and that this was an indication of the possibilities for further expansion of peaceful trade provided the Soviet Union so desired.

Specific Western Proposals

The representatives of the Western Powers put forward a number of concrete proposals in the interest of facilitating further expansion of such trade, including proposals for greater freedom for Western business men to establish and maintain representation and the customary business and maintenance services in the USSR; for more adequate protection of Western industrial property rights and copy rights, including Soviet recognition of the right of priority and Soviet agreement to publish patent data; and for more information from the Soviets on production, marketing, price and trade data. These proposals were brushed aside or wholly ignored by the Soviet representatives as unimportant matters. And the Soviet representatives met with complete silence intimations to them on the side by the US representatives that ways might be found to make US agricultural surpluses available for dollars at world prices or by barter for non-perishables if the Soviets were interested in exploring such possibilities.

Similarly the Soviet representatives refused to make any undertakings, even in principle, in regard to the desirability of negotiating air transport agreements, saying only that this was a problem to be pursued bilaterally through diplomatic channels and the question of negotiating bilaterally with any country concerning it had to be considered separately on the merits in each case. At the same time they called for elimination of interference with merchant shipping in Chinese waters and of other restrictions on shipping, and complained about refusal of bunkering facilities for certain Soviet ships. The representatives of the Western Powers denied that any of them had interposed obstacles to the passage of merchant ships of other flags. They pointed out that bunkering controls are merely a feature of the enforcement of the United Nations embargo on the shipment of strategic goods to Communist China and are not discriminatory, and that questions relating to security and political matters in the Far East did not lie within the competence of the experts.

Evaluation

It is clear that the Soviet attitude toward trade with the West is negative and political. They are no more interested than ever in the real possibilities of peaceful trade; they are more intent than ever on destroying the strategic controls, and particularly the cooperative export control system, which represents a political alliance damaging to their prestige; they are also manifestly concerned to free their ally, Communist China, from the trade and transport restrictions which apparently are seriously annoying to them both. The British and French experts agree with our appraisal of the negative and political approach of the Soviets to the trade aspects of Item III, and it is therefore clear that unless the Western Powers were to yield concessions in regard to strategic controls, no quadripartite agreement could be reached on trade matters in the framework of this Conference.

Conclusion

At the final meeting of the experts on November 10, I indicated that there was insufficient agreement between the Western Delegations on the one hand and the Soviet Delegation on the other to justify a joint report to the Foreign Ministers. I conceded that through some general and imprecise phraseology a form of words could be found which could express a few over-all conclusions about the work of the experts. However, this would be misleading since it would simply be an attempt to gloss over with generalities our lack of agreement on the most important questions we have been asked to consider.

As I see it, no useful purpose is served by trying to hide the fact that we could not agree, or that we approached a meeting of minds only on those activities in the field of East-West contacts in which we were engaged even before the conference began.

[Tab C]

Paper Prepared by the United States Delegation

Geneva, undated.

CIVIL AVIATION

Discussion

1. The Foreign Ministers of the Four Powers were instructed by the Four Heads of Government, under paragraph 3 of the Directive, *Development of Contacts between East and West,* by means of Experts to study measures—which could (a) bring about a progressive elimination of barriers which interfere with *free communications* and peaceful trade between people and (b) bring about such *freer contacts* and *exchanges* as are to the mutual advantage of the countries and peoples concerned.

2. The early inauguration of direct air transport connections between the Soviet Union and Western countries would make an important contribution to the development of free communications, contacts and exchanges. It is regrettable that ten years after the war it is impossible to fly directly between Moscow on the one hand and, for example, London, Paris and New York on the other, particularly in view of the long distances involved. These distances make air transportation the only really convenient means of travel between the Soviet Union and the countries of the West.

3. Exchanges of air traffic at third country points, as they now exist, are burdensome and unduly delaying to the traveller; and mere expansion of such interline arrangements between Soviet and Western airlines for traffic exchanges at third country points would be an inadequate response to the Directive from the Four Heads of Government and provide no real remedy to the present difficulties of communication between East and West.

4. On the other hand, an agreement *in principle* to reciprocal exchanges of air transport services with Western nations, when brought into effect by the negotiation of detailed bilateral air transport agreements between the Soviet Government and governments of the Western nations, would be a most practical and concrete response to the Directive from the Four Heads of Governments and would provide for early establishment of an efficient means of communication.

5. Such agreement in principle will require subsequent bilateral negotiations between the Soviet Government and the various Western nations encompassing detailed consideration of technical and other pertinent matters not appropriate for this Conference.

6. The objective of these negotiations will be the early establishment of through air transport services under normal reciprocal bilateral air transport agreements containing the liberal principles espoused in a great number of existing agreements. The Western Powers understand that the Soviet Union has concluded air transport agreements for direct air services with several Eastern European countries and also recently with Yugoslavia, Finland and Austria.

7. For the foregoing reasons it is clearly desirable that the inauguration of direct services follow without delay the conclusion of bilateral agreements.

Conclusion

The Experts considered the question of the establishment of direct air links between the Soviet Union and Western nations and were in agreement that bilateral negotiations looking toward the early establishment of such links under normal bilateral air transport agreements should be undertaken as soon as possible.

November 13, 1955

363. Editorial Note

On Sunday, November 13, Secretary of State Dulles held a meeting on disarmament with his senior staff at 9 a.m. At 10, he and Foreign Minister Molotov met at his office in the Palais des Nations to consider United Nations membership, trade controls on China, the tanker *Tuapse,* the future work of the conference, and the Middle East. Following the meeting with Molotov, Dulles and Merchant had lunch with Macmillan. In the evening, the Secretary and his principal advisers discussed East-West contacts, and at 6:50 Dulles reviewed the disarmament question with Stassen. (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 584)

A record of the meeting with Molotov follows. A brief memorandum of the lunch with Macmillan is *ibid.* No records have been found for the other meetings in Department of State files.

364. Memorandum of a Conversation, Hotel du Rhone, Geneva, November 13, 1955, 10 a.m.–Noon[1]

USDel/MC/45

PARTICIPANTS

United States	*U.S.S.R.*
The Secretary	Mr. Molotov
Mr. Merchant	Mr. Sobolev
Ambassador Bohlen	Mr. Troyanovsky

SUBJECTS

1. Embargo on Trade with Communist China
2. The Tanker *Tuapse*
3. Conference Matters
4. Middle East Situation

[Here follows discussion of the first two subjects.]

3. Conference Matters

Mr. Molotov said he would like to discuss the status of the Conference if the hour was not too late and he was not keeping Mr. Dulles from his visit to the country.[2]

The Secretary said he was always ready to sacrifice his hours in the country if any positive results could be accomplished. Mr. Molotov agreed that this was their duty.

He said Mr. Dulles knew the positions of the Soviet Government on the questions discussed at the Conference and wished to know if he had any views as to how the Conference could be concluded.

The Secretary replied that unfortunately we did not have any great agreements to record. He would say that the discussion on Item 1 had been a great disappointment. On Item 2, however, he felt the discussions had been useful, and hoped they had brought about a better and more sympathetic understanding of our respective points of view. He said that the task of solution in this field lay with the United Nations Sub-committee, and he did not believe the Ministers here could come to any settlement, but he felt that by their discussion they might have contributed to the work of the Sub-committee.

The Secretary said the Ministers still had to discuss Item 3, but the work of the Experts had shown little progress in this field. He thought that since the Ministers were meeting by direction of the Heads of Government, they should each respectively report to their

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 584. Secret. Drafted by Bohlen on November 17.

[2] Dulles was having lunch with Macmillan at 12:15. A memorandum of their conversation, in which Dulles reported his discussion with Molotov, is *ibid.*

Heads of Government in regard to the progress or lack of progress under each Item, and then leave it up to them. He was not, of course, suggesting that they should meet again, but that each Head of Government should examine the report from his Foreign Minister, and then if desired they might communicate through diplomatic channels.

Mr. Molotov pointed out that the Heads of Government, in any case, always have the possibility of communication with each other.

The Secretary enquired if Mr. Molotov had any ideas on termination of the Conference. Mr. Molotov said he had nothing new to contribute to their joint discussion. He said the Soviet Delegation had been very desirous of reaching agreement on Items 1 and 2 and had put forward proposals to that end. He believed, however, that there had been certain favorable results from the discussion.

On Item 1, the three Western Heads of Government had been well aware, after the July Conference, of the Soviet position on this Item, and the proposals and drafts which he had put forward here simply confirmed positions which the Soviet Government had held during the Heads of Government meeting.

On Item 2, they had felt that this was a matter which in the first place was of concern not only to the members of the Sub-committee but to all members of the United Nations, and secondly, that a discussion of this subject by the Foreign Ministers would contribute to progress on this question.

On Contacts, the Soviet Delegation considered that the Heads of Government had submitted this point in a desire to contribute to progress in this field. All recognized the desirability of bringing about the reduction of international tensions, and they believed that commercial contacts would have great importance in this field—of course, along with political contacts. On the cultural contacts, they had hoped here to make progress and to work out some practical steps to that end. However, they did not consider it advisable to deal here with matters which were essentially internal questions of this or that country. For example, the rate of the ruble and analogous questions did not seem to them appropriate. They were, however, interested in developing contacts in cultural, scientific, and economic fields, and also tourism. This question was rife, and they should be able to take some practical steps, possibly bilaterally, on a general basis, however, which might be agreed here.

The Secretary said he thought also that these fields lent themselves more to bilateral than multilateral agreements. But, here, he felt, progress would be less on the basis of an agreement than by each state taking voluntarily such measures as conformed with its interests and those of international relations in general. There were many areas of international trade which might be advantageously developed, and if there were any specific trade items of interest to the

USSR and the U.S., these particular items might usefully be discussed bilaterally. For example, he said he was revealing no great secret if he said that the U.S. had substantial surpluses of agricultural commodities. If the Soviet Government was interested in that type of trade, they might profitably discuss it. As to the ruble rate, he recognized that this was predominantly an internal matter, but felt it was appropriate to point out the fact, and it was a fact, that the ruble rate did constitute a barrier to the exchange of persons. What was done in regard to the ruble was, of course, up to the Soviet Government, but he thought it was quite appropriate to point out the fact that it did constitute a limitation. He did not think the rate of the ruble could, of course, be the subject for either a multilateral or bilateral agreement.

The Secretary said they had hoped to have worked out more facilities for an exchange of information, press, and radio, but he gathered from the report of the Experts[3] that they had not made much progress in this field. Mr. Molotov said they wished to repeat their view that it would be natural to find some serious basis for the development of economic relations. He did not mean merely in regard to any one type of commodity such as agricultural supplies, but an agreement for the removal of obstacles to trade which had at the present time lost their purpose. He said that on the cultural and other types of contacts, he felt they could reach some useful results if all were desirous of so doing.

He then enquired whether the Secretary had any further subjects to raise. The Secretary said he did not think so. He had already touched on the question of the satellites and international Communism, which as Mr. Molotov knew, we loved to discuss. But, we never found any comparable desire on their part.

Mr. Molotov said he felt it would hardly be useful unless they wished to enter into a very complicated discussion here. The Secretary said he had earlier said he was willing to postpone his luncheon if they could accomplish some results, but he doubted if discussion on these subjects could do this. However, if Mr. Molotov could guarantee positive results, he would be prepared to forgo his luncheon.

Mr. Molotov said they would have something to say on these subjects, but he said it would not be very pleasing to Mr. Dulles.

4. The Middle East Situation

As the meeting was breaking up, the Secretary said he assumed Mr. Molotov had nothing new on the Arab-Israel situation. Mr. Molotov replied there had been no new developments requiring special consideration, but he was of the opinion that things were quieting down in that area. The Secretary said he certainly hoped so.[4]

---

[3] Presumably a reference to Document 362.

---

[4] Molotov and Dulles also discussed U.N. membership.

November 14, 1955

365. Editorial Note

At 9 a.m. on November 14, Secretary of State Dulles began the day with a meeting of his principal advisers in his office at the Hotel du Rhone. At 11, the three Western Foreign Ministers met at Pinay's villa to discuss tactics for the next plenary. The thirteenth quadripartite meeting was held at the Palais des Nations from 3:30 to 7:25 p.m. Following the meeting, Suydam briefed the press at 7:45; Dulles and Stassen briefed the Vietnamese Ambassador on the course of the conference; and then dined at 8:30. (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 585, Chron–23 and US OD/15)

Records of the tripartite and quadripartite Foreign Ministers meetings follow. Records of the press briefing and the conversation with the Vietnamese Ambassador are *ibid.* No records of the staff meeting or the dinner conversation have been found in Department of State files.

---

366. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Department of State[1]

Geneva, November 14, 1955—2 p.m.

Dulte 78. For the Acting Secretary. In tripartite coordinating meeting UK tabled following draft final communiqué:

Begin UK text: In compliance with directive issued by four Heads of Government after their meeting in Geneva in July, Foreign Ministers of France, UK, USA, and USSR met in Geneva from October 27 to November 16. They had full discussion of three items entrusted to them in directive.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/11–1455. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by MacArthur.

Foreign Ministers agreed to report result of their discussions to their respective Heads of Government and to recommend that the question of a resumption of their discussions in spring or early summer should be pursued through diplomatic channels. *End UK text.*

After studying UK text, US suggested following:

Begin US text: In compliance with directive issued by four Heads of Government after their meeting in Geneva in July, the Foreign Ministers of France, UK, USA, and USSR met in Geneva from October 27 to November 16. They had frank and comprehensive discussion of three items entrusted to them in directive.

Foreign Ministers agreed to report result of their discussions to their respective Heads of Government and to recommend that future course of discussions of Foreign Ministers should be set through diplomatic channels. *End US text.*

Thinking behind both above drafts is that in absence any real agreements with Soviets at this conference we should not in final communiqué try to produce impression there is agreement on substantive matters where this does not exist, although Soviets may press for communiqué that gives appearance agreement on fundamentals. Also we are reluctant to have specific mention of meeting next spring or early summer since even as phrased in UK draft this might be interpreted as commitment to such meeting, which might be extremely difficult for us in view fact Congress will be adjourning about that time and situation will be further complicated by forthcoming US elections.

We are also considering issuing separate tripartite statement on disarmament at conclusion conference reaffirming Western position.

Your comments requested.

Dulles

---

367. Telegram From the Delegation at the Foreign Ministers Meetings to the Department of State[1]

Geneva, November 15, 1955—noon.

Secto 296. East-West Contacts Meeting of Foreign Ministers convened 3:35 p.m., November 14, with Pinay in chair. Macmillan began speech by confessing sense of frustration in reading account work of experts.[2] He welcomed the fact that here for first time we were able to raise in detail with Soviet representatives all those barriers to communications which prevent free and spontaneous passage ideas and persons. Referring to Western memorandum[3] he pointed out that 17 points divide into three parts: 5 items on removal barriers, 7 on free exchange of ideas and 5 on exchange persons. Twelve contained sincere and specific offers for improved contacts. Yet of 17 points in Western memorandum we had no satisfactory response on any of these, he said and the only barriers which Soviets suggested as important to remove were strategic controls which clearly excluded from directive. Of 18 meetings, Soviets permitted only 2 on subjects such as censorship and jamming.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-GE/11-1555. Secret. Repeated to London, Paris, Bonn, Moscow, and the Mission at the United Nations. Passed to Defense and USIA. The U.S. Delegation verbatim record of the thirteenth meeting of the Foreign Ministers, which was held on November 15 at 3:30 p.m., USDel/Verb/13 (Corrected), and the record of decisions, MFM/DOC/RD/13, both dated November 14, are *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 585.

Referring to proposals in Soviet document tabled October 31[4] Macmillan called them frills with which Soviet delegation seeks to clothe nakedness of their ideas on how ordinary, simple intercourse between people East-West can be made into reality.

On issue of trade, short answer to Soviets, Macmillan stated, is that if they want more trade they should trade more. "What can we make of an attitude which proclaims unlicensed freedom in trade, and then asks us to accept as beyond question prohibitions and controls of most illiberal nature in all other fields of human intercourse," he queried.

Re jamming, he said, UK does not claim to force British opinions on Soviet people. We only make modest request that Soviet people be allowed to know what our opinions are. To jam everything is not censorship, he said. Censorship implies selection but to jam everything is total exclusion. Soviets not only jam BBC broadcasts to Russia but also BBC broadcasts in Finnish, Hebrew, Turkish and German languages. Soviets seem, therefore to judge not only what own people sought to hear but what other people ought to hear also. Re Soviet complaint concerning frequencies, he remarked: "If you force man to talk to you through brick wall you can hardly complain if he raises voice."

After expressing regret Western delegates got no encouragement on reading rooms and official publications (*America*), he expressed view that wider understanding Western point of view and policies which derive therefrom would aid in solution of political problems which now divide us and some real progress on Item III might well have assisted, even if indirectly, progress on first two items.

---

[2] For text of Macmillan's statement, circulated as MFM/DOC/60, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 248–253, or *Cmd.* 9633, pp. 146–149.

[3] For text of the Western proposal of October 31, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 245–248, or *Cmd.* 9633, pp. 164–166.

[4] For text of the Soviet proposal, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 239–240, or *Cmd.* 9633, p. 163.

Molotov, in his statement,[5] referred to directive heads of government and declared that proposals contained in Soviet document formulated in accord with that directive. He reiterated arguments which he presented October 31[6] concerning importance of trade in East-West contacts, stating that there can be no normal development of contacts between East and West without elimination of Western discriminatory measures. Molotov then referred to Western memorandum and stated it contained number of proposals representing attempts at interference internal affairs certain countries. Western memorandum, he said, not only reflects claims for changes in legislation and administrative regulations of some countries it also advances claim for modification exchange rate of currency (we do not, he said, conceal fact that in USSR, neither before nor hereafter will such freedom for exchange of ideas be afforded which would authorize freedom for war propaganda and propaganda of atomic attack) nor can we agree, he added, to so-called freedom for exchange of persons which would enable dregs of society to conduct unrestricted subversive activity in countries of socialism and democracy although we know many millions spent for these purposes. Every honest person will recognize, Molotov declared, that broadcasting stations disguised under "Free Europe" label do not serve cause of freedom but cause of darkest reaction, incitement to enmity among peoples and undermining of peace and preparation of new war.

Recognizing that experts unable to agree on a number of important points he asked: What is then to be done as regards drawing up of resolution by this conference on East-West contacts? Molotov then proposed that Soviet draft on East-West contacts be accepted as basis for agreement on certain fundamental matters facilitating development contacts. Soviet delegation he said could also accept as basis draft proposals presented to conference of heads of government by Premier Faure on July 22.[7] A number of paragraphs from Western memorandum could also be included he said. Bilateral and multilateral agreements between states, he explained, would deal with concrete questions relating to the development of scientific, technical, sports and other ties, and also to broadcasting, exchange of printed matter, et cetera. Appropriate bilateral agreements could thus embody points which most concern the countries in question. This, he concluded, would be in accord with directives received from heads of government.

---

[5] For text of Molotov's statement, circulated as MFM/DOC/62, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 253–256, or *Cmd.* 9633, pp. 150–152.

[6] See Document 310.

[7] See Document 256.

Full text Dulles statement cabled by USIA.[8] At 5:30 p.m. immediately following conclusion Dulles speech meeting suspended.

After recess Pinay delivered speech[9] in which:

(a) He listed areas of general agreement reached by experts and expressed gratification therewith.

(b) He voiced disappointment at restricted scope such agreements and emphasized that Soviets excluded progressive elimination of barriers interfering with free communication between people.

(c) He stated that Soviet proposal sacrificed exchange of ideas for technical and cultural exchanges.

(d) He pointed out that since no serious understanding reached on basic points French delegation could not agree to vouch before public opinion for the value of results obtained by experts.

(e) He listed items on which French government ready to conclude long range commercial contracts with USSR. Here he mentioned proposal re civil air links.

(f) He cited figure 768 used by Soviet delegation concerning number of Western businessmen who visited USSR in 1954. Such an absurdly small figure, he said, illustrates our problem better than long speeches. Soviet Government, he added, is in better position than other governments for acting on development of trade because it controls all trade and can orient trade as it wishes. Nevertheless, Soviets proposed no concrete measures. Soviets simply throw out Western suggestions without discussing them and make no suggestions themselves.

(g) He stressed that agreements confined to small number of businessmen and other professional people do not appear to be kind of agreement which meet the very great hope born at Summit.

(h) He emphasized that so far as France concerned, France not afraid of being known and France convinced that great part of present lack of confidence would disappear if Soviet people were in position to know French as they are and not through the distortions of propaganda.

Pinay then read draft four-power declaration on development East-West contacts which he tabled.[10] Text French draft follows immediately.

---

[8] For text of Dulles' statement, circulated as MFM/DOC/59, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 256–262, or *Cmd.* 9633, pp. 152–156.

[9] For text of Pinay's statement, circulated as MFM/DOC/66, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 262–265, or *Cmd.* 9633, pp. 156–159.

[10] For text of this proposal, circulated as MFM/DOC/61, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 266–267, or *Cmd.* 9633, pp. 166–167. On November 15, the U.S. Delegation reported that the French had tabled this proposal in response to Molotov's unexpected reference to Faure's proposal on East-West contacts. The delegation noted that both it and the British had reservations about submitting such a general document, but agreed that the French could table it. The delegation speculated that the possibility of Soviet acceptance was remote. (Secto 299 from Geneva, November 15; Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 585)

In second round Macmillan indicated that if we really want our people to get together and to understand each other there are not very great difficulties. "What worries me is that I do not quite see as yet in the approach of Soviet delegation any real desire to do the things I hoped we had all decided to do at meeting in July and I hope it is not too late to return to that spirit."

Molotov pointed out that Pinay, who spoke after Soviet delegate, did not refer to Faure proposals made at conference heads of government and requested Pinay to state his views on Faure proposals. Difference between proposals made now and proposals made at heads of government conference including Faure's proposals was that latter made no attempt interfere in internal affairs of any country.

After repeating familiar arguments re Soviet desire to reduce international tensions and strengthen peace and emphasizing duty Soviet Government to defend rights and interests of Soviet working people Molotov stated that Soviet delegation will give views on new proposals in the morning.

Mr. Dulles then delivered rebuttal on Soviet argument re internal jurisdiction. I am considerably bewildered, he said, by Molotov statement that we should not in this area consider anything which is a matter Soviet internal or domestic jurisdiction. If we stick strictly to that principle, we would, I think, all have to be completely silent because it seems to me that subject of increased contacts inherently involves matters which are of domestic jurisdiction. Dulles then pointed out that Soviet proposal for example calls for elimination immigration barriers. Immigration, he said, is matter of domestic jurisdiction as are proposals in paper of Soviet delegation, in paper submitted by Faure last July and in paper submitted today by French. Assertions by Soviet delegation re domestic jurisdiction in effect means that there is nothing further to be discussed. "Certainly, so far as I am concerned, I would be much more interested in what the Soviet Union does than what it agrees to do," Mr. Dulles concluded.

Pinay suggested that Mr. Molotov might have been trying to make him contradict his own Premier and added that Molotov would find that six of the points in French draft of four-power declaration contained in proposal of Mr. Faure. Pinay then recalled to Molotov that at September session of UN in New York he spoke against efforts of certain countries to meddle in internal affairs of other countries. "I should like to express regret that your conversion to my thesis has come so late," Pinay concluded.

Discussion of Item III will be continued at 10:30 a.m. November 15.

368. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Department of State[1]

Geneva, November 14, 1955—10 p.m.

Dulte 79. Eyes only Acting Secretary from Secretary. For President:

Dear Mr. President: We started today on the third item of agenda—that is contact between East and West. The experts—Bill Jackson from our side—had been working for past two weeks with very discouraging results.

There seems to be no willingness at all on Soviet side to make any concessions in way of freer flow of information through exchange of broadcasts, information centers and the like.

After session relatively calm at beginning matters became heated largely as a result of Pinay's presentation and Molotov made a harsh Bolshevik-type statement to effect that bourgeoise powers representing special class interests would never be allowed to see their wares in Soviet Union which was dedicated to preserving a society where workers owned the instruments of production. This was said with cold finality which obviously Molotov as old Bolshevik enjoyed.

We expect to continue discussion tomorrow morning and I doubt we shall reach anything like agreement as Soviets only pick out of our proposals the few that are to their advantage and take nothing that will give us better access to Russian people.

It is always possible that Russians are saving some surprise to last but each day brings what seems fresh confirmation that they would not give anything to get even a modicum of agreement.

With British and French we are thinking of how to wind up conference. My idea is that Foreign Ministers should not commit themselves to another meeting but merely report to heads of government who will then exchange views and decide how further to proceed. Probably French for political purposes would like to hold out greater prospect of another meeting and possibly Germans will also, although in this respect West German opinion is sharply divided. You will, I feel confident, want us to give some weight to German and French views insofar as is compatible with our own self-respect.

Faithfully yours, Foster.

Dulles

---

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Administrative Series. Secret; Priority. Received in Washington at 5:24 p.m., November 14, and relayed to Gettysburg as Toget 1.

369. Telegram From the Department of State to the Secretary of State, at Geneva[1]

Washington, November 14, 1955—6:33 p.m.

Tedul 88. Eyes only Secretary from Acting Secretary.

1. At meeting early this morning with Adams and Hagerty we discussed your Dulte 75[2] regarding plans for return from Geneva and activities in Washington and Gettysburg immediately thereafter.

2. I pointed out that your plans, and particularly any statements you would wish to make yourself or in conjunction with UK and France, would depend to great extent on public posture which we would adopt at end of the conference, and that this posture could have far reaching significance in our plans for the future. I said I knew you would appreciate thinking of the President in closing days of the conference, both in regard to reaction domestically as well as in relations with our allies. Adams suggested we see the President immediately, before he left for Gettysburg.

3. Meeting with the President took place shortly thereafter, including Adams, Hagerty and myself, with Miss Whitman taking notes. I opened with brief statement along the lines of para 2 above. Transcription of Whitman notes follows:

"Subject was theme to be used by Secretary Dulles as he leaves the Geneva Conference and returns to Washington.

The following are quotes from the President:

'Terrible as this thing is that the Russians are doing, we are not going to be easily discouraged.' This should be the keynote of statements.

'I think we have got to admit that the Conference was a great blow to progress toward peace, but we will have no change in our policy of peace through strength, and we are never going to give up on the idea that even the Russians will come to understand that this kind of road block is pure suicide.'

Hagerty suggested that some of the domestic newspapermen believed that it would be important if a tripartite statement were issued before the Four Powers left Geneva, stating the three agenda items that were under discussion, the position of the Western Powers, and how they were blocked on each one.

The President agreed that was a good idea.

'We came here seeking nothing for ourselves, only seeking decency and justice for Europe and the world. This was a discouragement but we are still going to work for peace.'

President agreed that the Secretary of State should come to Gettysburg to report to him as soon as convenient after he returns (details to be worked out). At that time they will figure out plans, as far as possible for the future. In his statement to the people after his return, he should include some direct quote from the President.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/11–1455. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Hoover.

[2] In Dulte 75 Dulles stated that he would report to the Cabinet and National Security Council on the conference, see President Eisenhower at Gettysburg, and perhaps address the nation. (*Ibid.*, 110.11–DU/11–1355)

The President stated in talking about future:

'The results of this Conference mean that you can't let down an inch. In certain ways we will probably have to step up our precautions because there seems to be no idea on the part of the Soviet leaders that such matters as justice and decency in Europe and the world are the fundamental things that are at stake. It is essentially a matter of our moral purposes as opposed to theirs.'

Governor Adams brought out that at the Summit Conference, the President had the initiative; that now the Russians have the initiative. Hoover agreed, pointing out that they had moved into the Near East and were trying to put themselves into the position of being the one hope of unification of Germany. The President pointed out that their idea of a unified Germany was a satellite Germany, while our idea of Germany was a Germany free to choose its own form of government. We shall push ahead with every peaceful means at our disposal.

President suggested that perhaps Secretary Dulles would like to stop to see Adenauer. Hoover said that the Secretary had considered this, but for the present had decided not to do so.

Going back to the plans for President to see Secretary, he mentioned the drama of having the Secretary change planes in Washington, hop into a little plane and come directly to Gettysburg. He said that in the main their talk would be a calculation of what the Secretary is going to do now, what the President is going to do now, and what our country should do now.

With regard to statements in Geneva, the President said he thought the tripartite statement was the important one, and that he did not care so much about the formal communiqué that might be issued."

Meeting lasted about twenty minutes.

4. With regard to specific plans for your return, Hagerty points out that Gettysburg is now the news capital of the United States. Radio, live TV, and news coverage are excellent. In making specific plans he suggests Friday night as being much preferable to Saturday from audience standpoint. Nothing of course will be done until hearing from you.

5. Since preparing above your Dulte 78[3] regarding final communiqué has come in. The President's comments seem apropos, though fuller answer prepared in Department is also being sent.[4]

Hoover

---

[3] Document 366.

[4] *Infra.*

370. Telegram From the Department of State to the Secretary of State, at Geneva[1]

Washington, November 14, 1955—6:54 p.m.

Tedul 89. Concur fully your reasoning and proposed text Dulte 78.[2]

In addition, submit following thoughts on impact of communiqué and other statements, public and classified, on NATO nations in light tendency of peoples to indulge in wishful thinking on results of conference as indicating propriety of reduced defense efforts.

Specific problem is how to create correct impression without having it result in atmosphere of either too much sweetness and light on one hand or overselling of resumption of cold war on other. Purpose would be to convince NATO people that best way to insure continuation of meaningful check on Soviet military pressures and most promising way to obtain maximum dividends from such present possibilities of détente as are available is to recall that NATO's cohesion and strength have made present situation possible and therefore we should persevere along same general lines as in past.

We tend to think that some major attention should be focused on this problem at North Atlantic Council level, not at International Staff or technical level. This is matter we can consider further after final tripartite statement to NAC and Secretary has made report to nation.

However, we feel that tone of final report to Council on Foreign Ministers Meeting and general attitude taken by US, will be of utmost importance in setting tone for necessity of continuation NATO effort upon which maintenance of collective deterrent and common policy depends.

Hoover

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-GE/11-455. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Wolf and cleared by Murphy and Elbrick.

[2] Document 366.

November 15, 1955

371. Editorial Note

At 10:15 a.m. on November 15, Secretary Dulles and Stassen met with Molotov and Sobolev to discuss disarmament. Following their meeting, the fourteenth session of the four Foreign Ministers met at the Palais des Nations. The fourteenth session recessed from 11:03 to 11:25 a.m. during which the Western Ministers met to consider the Soviet proposal on item I of the agenda. At 1:55 p.m. Dulles lunched with Conant, MacArthur, and Merchant, and then the Secretary of State met with Macmillan at 3:15 p.m. to discuss the Middle East. The fifteenth meeting of the four Foreign Ministers met from 4 to 7:17 p.m. with a recess from 5:32 to 6:43 p.m. during which Dulles and Molotov again discussed disarmament. Following the completion of the fifteenth session, the Ministers went into restricted meeting from 7:30 to 8 p.m. to consider the drafting of a final communiqué. Dulles then met briefly with Macmillan after the restricted session, with Ambassador Johnson at 8:10 p.m., and had dinner with Gordon Gray. (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 586, Chron–24)

Records of the two meetings between Dulles and Molotov and the three meetings of the four Foreign Ministers follow. Records of the two meetings with Macmillan are *ibid.* No records of the other meetings have been found in Department of State files.

---

372. Memorandum of a Conversation, Geneva, November 15, 1955, 10:15 a.m.[1]

USDel/MC/39

PARTICIPANTS

USSR	*United States*
Mr. Molotov	The Secretary of State
Mr. Sobolev	Governor Stassen
Mr. Troyanovsky	Mr. Merchant
	Ambassador Bohlen

The Secretary handed Mr. Molotov a draft of the Tripartite proposal for a statement on Disarmament, which was translated into Russian by Troyanovsky. The Secretary said this was a suggestion on behalf of the Foreign Ministers of the UK, US and France. No doubt Mr. Molotov would wish to study it but if he had any immediate questions he would be glad to try and answer them.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 586. Secret. Drafted by Bohlen.

Mr. Molotov inquired if it would not be a good idea to make reference to the proposals on the subject made by the Heads of Government last July—those of President Eisenhower, Bulganin, Faure and Eden. He thought it would be a good idea to take these into account. The Secretary replied that they had made references to these proposals of the Heads of Government in their Tripartite proposal[2] but since this had seemed unacceptable to the Soviet Delegation it had seemed best to leave it out in the present formulation. If, however, the Soviet Delegation was prepared to accept the original formulation on this point of the three Western Powers, that could be considered. The failure to mention this point in this draft did not in any sense mean that the proposals of the Heads of Government had been wiped out, since they were specified in the Directive[3] which was in the first instance directed to the Subcommittee, and our representatives there will continue to be guided by it. They were instructed by the Heads of Government to carry out the Directive and will still be bound. Mr. Molotov said he wanted to refer to the Subcommittee in a moment but first he had a further comment on the point under discussion. It might not be possible to decide now whether to take the Soviet[4] or Tripartite formulation on this point but they could decide in principle that it would be useful to mention the proposals of the Heads of Government. They might try to work out a formula which would be acceptable to all four. The Secretary said they would be glad to consider any thoughts that Mr. Molotov had in regard to such a formulation. He assumed, however, that the instructions to the Subcommittee still stood. It had appeared to them that the Tripartite formula on this point was unacceptable to the Soviet Delegation and the Soviet formulation was unacceptable to them. It involved questions of order and emphasis. Mr. Molotov remarked that without a reference to this point their communiqué on Disarmament would not have much content. He thought the provisions in the proposals on this subject by the Heads of Government were important and they might be mentioned in such a way as not to commit any party.

As to the Subcommittee he inquired if there was any need to refer to it in this draft. Its organization was composed of representatives of the Four Powers and Canada and he assumed that their representatives would be guided by the views of the four Ministers. For example, Mr. Stassen and Mr. Sobolev who were present would certainly carry out the instructions of their Ministers and the same was true for the representatives of France and the UK. The Secretary replied that he assumed that the Directive of the Heads of Government, which was primarily directed to the Subcommittee, still stood. The Ministers had not been charged with the Disarmament question but only to take note of the work of the Subcommittee and to try and move it forward and help its work by discussions here. He assumed that the Directive still stood and that the Subcommittee was the chief body dealing with Disarmament. If the Soviet Government had any different views on this point he would like to hear them. Mr. Molotov said there is no doubt but that the Subcommittee is charged with these questions but that there is another question now whether the whole question should be narrowed down to the Subcommittee alone or whether as the Heads of Government had done while stressing the work of the Subcommittee the Ministers also were instructed to work on the question.

---

[2] For text of the tripartite proposal on disarmament, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 199–201, or *Cmd.* 9633, pp. 132–133.

[3] Document 257.

[4] For text of the Soviet proposal on disarmament, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 184–186, or *Cmd.* 9633, pp. 131–132.

At this point the meeting broke up in order to attend the session of the conference. Mr. Molotov said he would give study to the Tripartite proposal.

[Attachment]

Paper Prepared by the United States Delegation

STATEMENT OF THE FOUR FOREIGN MINISTERS ON DISARMAMENT

Guided by the desire to contribute to lessening international tension, strengthening confidence between states and reducing the burden of armaments.

The Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union, the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the French Republic remain convinced of the need to continue to seek agreement on a comprehensive program for disarmament which will promote international peace and security with the least diversion for armament of the world's human and economic resources.

Their discussions showed that, while there was agreement on this objective, it was not yet possible to reach agreement on effective methods and safeguards for achieving it.

The Ministers will transmit the record of these discussions to their representatives on the United Nations Disarmament Sub-Committee. They believe that their exchange of views has been useful in clarifying their respective positions and should assist the Sub-Committee in its efforts to reach agreement.

In the meantime the Ministers agree that the studies of methods of control which are now proceeding in different countries should be designed to facilitate a settlement of the disarmament problem.

---

373. Telegram From the Delegation at the Foreign Ministers Meetings to the Department of State[1]

Geneva, November 15, 1955—10 p.m.

Secto 312. East-West Contacts. Meeting convened 10:30 today with Macmillan in chair. Molotov, first speaker, reviewed actions taken by Soviets to implement decisions heads of government and then stated that while French draft tabled November 14,[2] represents step forward, it also contains proposals acceptance of which inadvisable.[3] Molotov here tabled and read Soviet revision French draft.[4] This Soviet draft sent Department separate telegram.

At suggestion Dulles, meeting recessed for 20 minutes to study Soviet paper. On return, Secretary made following points:[5]

(a) US would have been willing to accept French draft of yesterday had Soviets accepted it. However, present Soviet proposal does not meet directive because it permits practically nothing designed to permit exchange ideas and information.

(b) Secretary read points 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 16, and 17 of Western memorandum[6] and pointed out that these items rejected either totally or in important part by Soviet delegation.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-GE/11-1555. Secret. Repeated to London, Paris, Bonn, Moscow, and the Mission at the United Nations. The U.S. Delegation verbatim record of the fourteenth Foreign Ministers meeting, USDel/Verb/14 (Corrected), and the record of decisions, MFM/DOC/RD/14, both dated November 14, are *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 586.

[2] For text of the French proposal, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 266–267, or *Cmd.* 9633, pp. 166–167.

[3] For text of Molotov's statement, circulated as MFM/DOC/72, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 267–269, or *Cmd.* 9633, pp. 159–160.

[4] For text of the Soviet proposal, circulated as MFM/DOC/63, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 269–270, or *Cmd.* 9633, pp. 167–168. The text of this proposal was transmitted in Secto 306 from Geneva, November 15. (Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-GE/11-1555)

[5] For text of Dulles' statement, circulated as MFM/DOC/64, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 270–272, or *Cmd.* 9633, pp. 160–161.

[6] For text of the Western proposal on East-West contacts, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 245–248, or *Cmd.* 9633, pp. 164–166.

(c) Secretary recalled remarks he made yesterday that we consider peace not solidly based unless peoples of different countries can have access to what other peoples believe and think. Because Soviet paper would perpetuate what we term a very grave danger to peace and good understanding between peoples, because it does not seem to us to comply with the directive guiding us, we do not find it acceptable.

Pinay also referred to directive calling for elimination of barriers and stated that so long such barriers stand it will be impossible to hope for real progress. Exchanges now in existence will, of course, continue and perhaps even increase somewhat but they will always be narrow and limited if confined only to small number of people. Pinay also explained that French draft a coherent whole representing effort at compromise on question East-West contacts.

Macmillan expressed admiration Dulles' remarks on differences between Soviet document and Western memorandum [as] well as French text of November 14.[7] He then said, "I would still hope that Russian delegation might be able to accept French draft but if they are unable to do so I think it would really be better for us abandon attempt to get agreed document and to let these papers, when they are published to world speak for themselves. At present there seems real difference of view between two sides which cannot be bridged. Perhaps the time will come when we shall move closer together. We believe in the free movement of ideas and of people. The Soviet Government wants to restrict and control both. We want no countries to be isolated. The Soviet Government, as we know from experts discussions, wants to protect their people from corruption of Western thought. We have confidence in our people. We believe that freedom of thought is only sound basis of democratic and free people. The Soviet Government believes either in total exclusion certain ideas or in rigid censorship. These are fundamental differences". Molotov, in disagreeable, wearisome speech, advanced following arguments:[8] (a) Any objective presentation would recognize that Soviet draft reflects all points we can have in common between us and all steps which under present conditions would contribute to improvement and development contacts. (b) Speeches of Western Foreign Ministers endeavored to shelve possibility of agreement. (c) Western proposals do not accord either with proposals advanced at heads of government conference, with directive or with spirit of Geneva. (d) Proposal for information centers directed against Soviet Government. Such centers set up in satellites served as centers intelligence activity and were closed. Soviet Government has no intention allowing them to operate. (e) Proposal on tourism raises matter ruble rate which represents crude intervention in domestic Soviet affairs. (f) Proposal on direct air transport included in Western memorandum to complicate possibility reaching agreement this matter. (g) In fact most paragraphs of tripartite memorandum spearheaded against USSR and so formulated as to make them unacceptable to Soviet Union. (h) Necessary only to read proposals of Faure at Geneva conference[9] to see that Western memorandum does not conform to directive or to spirit of Geneva. (i) Perhaps French delegation no longer supports Faure proposals because now four months later it committed to 17 point Western memorandum. (j) Soviets still of opinion that principal aspect development of contacts is development economic and trade relations. Soviets prepared to wait until others see for themselves that position of discrimination has negative effect so far as Western countries concerned. (k) Hope that British position will not again prevent holding congress supporters of peace in Britain; that French will permit Russian Ballet to dance in France and that it will now be easier for delegations agriculturalists and journalists from USSR to visit US.

---

[7] For text of Macmillan's statement, which was not assigned a conference number, see *ibid.*, pp. 161–162.

[8] For text of Molotov's statement, circulated as MFM/DOC/73, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 272–277.

Secretary stated he cannot overlook and must categorically reject serious charge made by Molotov that Western Powers deliberately formulated their proposals in bad faith with view to bringing about their rejection.[10] He then said "We had thought that socialism was fully established within the USSR so that it would not topple if perchance some contradictory ideas found their way into Soviet Union; but apparently socialism is not as strongly established as we had thought. Nervousness and fear on behalf of Soviet Government for its own future is something we will have to take into account and evaluate when we consider results this conference and possibility further contacts." Secretary concluded by saying that process of increased contacts may perhaps proceed more surely as a living process than by dependence upon negotiation. The US does not intend to slacken its efforts.

Pinay, after brief interchange with Molotov, pointed out that proposals in French draft are in full harmony with those submitted by Faure in July. In fact, three-fourths of Faure proposals are repeated in new French draft. Attitude taken by Soviet delegation shows Soviets departing from directives of four governments and Geneva spirit. On matter of Russian Ballet, Pinay emphasized that Paris performance cancelled to protect Russian artists from actions which might have become violent on part of people who fought in French Indochina; that hostility caused by Soviet intervention in that war, just as Molotov knows well large quantities equipment of Russian origin found in that area. I must say, he added, that happened a good bit before Molotov criticized item 2 Western memorandum on ground that information centers designed for espionage purpose and that these centers closed in satellite countries would not be permitted to open. However, when this subject discussed in Expert Committee, Macmillan remarked, the Soviet representatives proposed that this might be reserved for bilateral negotiations. This example, he said, shows what would have happened to bilateral negotiations had they started.

---

[9] See Document 256.

[10] For text of Dulles' statement, circulated as MFM/DOC/65, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 277–279.

Discussion terminated 1:25 p.m.

---

374. Telegram From the Delegation at the Foreign Ministers Meetings to the Department of State[1]

Geneva, November 16, 1955—noon.

Secto 318. 1. As first speaker afternoon session fifteenth meeting, November 15, Molotov brought up previously mentioned Soviet proposals re troop withdrawal, fifty percent reduction of foreign forces in Germany, limitation of German military units and non-aggression pact between NATO and Warsaw.[2] In effort elicit Western comments he stressed contribution each of these would make to relaxation of tension in Europe and as first step toward establishment European security system.

2. Three Western Ministers rejected discussion of proposals re foreign troops and German units as part of Item 1, since Soviet delegation had failed discuss reunification. Secretary said US not prepared to consider such fragmentary proposals calculated to put asunder what heads of government had joined together.[3] Macmillan said that since Molotov had in effect torn up directive by refusing to dis-

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/11–1655. Secret; Priority. Repeated to London, Paris, Bonn, Moscow, and Berlin. The U.S. Delegation verbatim record of the fifteenth Foreign Ministers meeting, which took place at 4 p.m. on November 15, USDel/Verb/15 (Corrected), and the record of decisions, MFM/DOC/RD/15, both dated November 15, are *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 586.

[2] For text of Molotov's statement, circulated as MFM/DOC/74, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 169–176.

[3] For text of Dulles' statement, circulated as MFM/DOC/67, see *ibid.*, pp. 170–171, or *Cmd.* 9633, pp. 97–98.

cuss German reunification under system of free elections, discussion of latest proposals irrelevant and contrary to directive.

3. Molotov argued that treaty between NATO and WEU on one hand and Warsaw pact on other would take into consideration interests of both sides and enable four powers make beginning on European security by avoiding points not yet agreed.[4] Efforts to subordinate such agreement to settlement of German problem as whole would not contribute to progress. This proposal takes into account existence of two German states. To be concluded it would have to be agreed with all member states each military grouping.

4. Western ministers pointed out that this draft treaty added nothing to UN Charter provisions relating to renunciation use of force and settlement of disputes by peaceful means. Western security proposals repeated these provisions but went beyond them to provide specific and concrete European security measures. Secretary said that US would not sign any security treaty with Soviet Union in relation to Europe except as part of arrangement for reunification of Germany in freedom.[5] Soviet proposal devoid of real meaning and would mislead public by creating impression new measures taken providing for European security.

5. Molotov then repeated familiar criticism Western security proposals as being designed to place remilitarized and reunified Germany in NATO. This he claimed would endanger rather than promote European security. Other provisions in three-power draft he characterized as "merely paper guarantees" not even satisfactory to France since Pinay wants united Germany in NATO as additional guarantee. Soviet proposal for treaty between military bloc fully consistent with UN Charter and necessary because no other measures exist adequately governing relations between groupings. European people would hardly understand failure to take such step for peace and relaxation tension simply because three-power draft proposal not agreed.

6. After extended recess Molotov submitted resolution (text transmitted separate telegram[6]) summing up European security points on which Soviet and Western positions had been similar and pointing out that agreement had not been reached on "assurance of European security on the basis of consolidation of cooperation between states and also the settlement of the German problem and the restoration of Germany's unity". Resolution ended with statement: "All

---

[4] For text of Molotov's second statement, circulated as MFM/DOC/75, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 171–172.

[5] For text of Dulles' statement, circulated as MFM/DOC/68, see *ibid.*, p. 173.

[6] Secto 319 from Geneva, November 19, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/11–1655) For text of the Soviet proposal, circulated as MFM/DOC/70, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 174–175, or *Cmd.* 9633, p. 109.

parties to the meeting have shown their desire to continue their efforts toward achieving such agreement."

7. Western ministers each indicated desire study Soviet resolution before making detailed comment and Secretary said resolution failed adequately reflect fact Western security proposals expressly related to German reunification through free elections in accordance directive.[7] He indicated that views contained in draft resolution might preferably be reflected in closing speeches rather than in precise formulation of an agreement. Macmillan said Soviet resolution confirmed his previous impression that real progress might be made if Soviet Government would accept major premise of German unification by free elections.

8. Ministers then agreed to consider problem of quadripartite communiqué in restricted session, leaving further discussion Item 1 and Soviet resolution until Wednesday morning. Final communiqué and closing speeches scheduled for afternoon session Wednesday.

9. Restricted meeting agreed communiqué should be short and objective.[8] UK will circulate tripartite agreed draft as its own and experts of four delegations will discuss it in morning. Also agreed morning plenary to conclude Item 1 and afternoon session for closing speeches and issuance communiqué.

---

[7] For text of Dulles' statement, circulated as MFM/DOC/79, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, p. 175.

[8] See Document 376.

---

375. Memorandum of a Conversation, Molotov's Suite, Palais des Nations, Geneva, November 15, 1955, 6:15 p.m.[1]

USDel/MC/42

PARTICIPANTS

United States	*USSR*
The Secretary	Mr. Molotov
Gov. Stassen	Mr. Sobolev
Amb. Bohlen	Mr. Troyanovsky

SUBJECT

Disarmament

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 586. Secret. Drafted by Bohlen on November 16.

The Secretary said that Mr. Macmillan, M. Pinay and he had examined the Soviet draft on disarmament and did not find it acceptable.[2] There were a number of reasons. Among others, it seemed to replace the directive to the Subcommittee from the Heads of Government and to turn over to the Four Powers, together with "other interested states" which were not named, a new formula. In the earlier part of the draft, he said, the positions regarding the prohibition of atomic weapons had become closer. He did not know that this was true. It was possible that the Soviet position had become closer to ours, but there was nothing to show that.

The reference to the proposals of the Heads of Government were identical with that in the original Soviet draft which he had already told Mr. Molotov was not acceptable.[3] The last paragraph is new, and he was authorized to say that, if the tripartite proposal he had given Mr. Molotov is acceptable, the three Powers were willing to add the paragraph to the effect that they were in accord to renounce the use of force, except when not in conformity with the Charter of the U.N.

Mr. Molotov said that in regard to Mr. Dulles' first point regarding the other states concerned that meant the other members of the U.N. since all were interested. It might, however, be better to leave out those words, i.e. "other interested states."

In regard to the reference to atomic weapons, they had assumed that, in accepting the three Powers' proposal, the prohibition of atomic weapons would enter into force when 75% of the agreed reduction of conventional armaments had gone into effect. He thought this indicated that their positions had come closer.

The Secretary said that this was not a correct assumption.

Mr. Molotov said that he assumed it since they had accepted the three Powers' proposal, but if the assumption was wrong, he would have to take that into consideration. He said they would consider the proposed amendment to the last paragraph.

Regarding the proposals of the Heads of Government—paragraphs a, b, c, and d, reference is made to the Directive which is not in the first Soviet draft and it, therefore, leaves the list of proposals in the context of the Directive. The Western draft did not make any mention of the proposals of the Heads of Government and he inquired whether it would not be possible to mention them.

The Secretary replied in the affirmative, provided they were stated in the form quoted in the original tripartite proposal.

---

[2] For text of the Soviet proposal on disarmament, circulated as MFM/DOC/69, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 225–226, or *Cmd.* 9633, pp. 133–134.

[3] See the attachment to Document 359.

Mr. Molotov remarked that the formulation was not quite exact. For example, the Soviet proposal was not limited to the question of control points, which were merely a part of a comprehensive plan. He inquired whether there was any objection to mentioning the Soviet proposals of May 10 and July 21.[4]

The Secretary said they would object to their being mentioned first.

Mr. Molotov answered that they were still proposals of the Heads of Government.

The Secretary explained that this formulation would mean the examination, in the first instance, of the prohibition of atomic weapons which they were not prepared to start with.

Mr. Molotov said the item had been listed by the title of the Soviet proposal, which contained not only the question of the prohibition of atomic weapons but many other points. He said the tripartite draft makes no mention of atomic weapons and this was not acceptable. He said also that any draft which ignored the proposals of the Heads of Government would not commend itself to them.

The Secretary pointed out that the Directive was to the Subcommittee and they could not change it.

Mr. Molotov said that the Directive was not only to the Subcommittee but also to the Foreign Ministers. (He sent out for the Directive and in the interval asked the Secretary if he had any suggestions on other items of the agenda of the conference: for example, point 1. The Secretary replied in the negative.)

Mr. Molotov then read from the Directive, the instructions to the Ministers to take note of the work of the Subcommittee and to take into account the views of the Heads of Government.

The Secretary said that he thought we had already fulfilled that but the second part of the Directive was directed to the Subcommittee.

Mr. Molotov said since they had not finished and reached no agreement that they must continue to take into account the view and proposals of the Heads of Government.

The Secretary agreed that they must be taken into consideration since they came from our superiors, and assumed that when the Heads of Government instructed the Ministers and members of the Subcommittee to take into consideration certain questions, this would be done by both.

Mr. Molotov remarked that this was all the more reason to make reference in the draft to the proposal from the Heads of Government.

---

[4] For text of the Soviet proposal of May 10, see *Documents* (R.I.I.A.) for 1955, pp. 110–121; for the proposal of July 21, see Document 252.

The Secretary said it would, of course, be possible to merely repeat the words of the Directive, instructing the Ministers and the Subcommittee, but this would hardly mark a step forward.

Mr. Molotov said that if they did not stress the proposal of the Heads of Government they would not be fulfilling their duty.

The Secretary replied that, so far as he and Mr. Stassen were concerned, that they would be guided by the instructions received from President Eisenhower and it was not necessary to repeat them.

Mr. Molotov said that there could be no doubt of that but public opinion should be taken into account.

The Secretary stated that all the French and British delegations had authorized him to say was that this draft is unacceptable, and he had given some reasons. In addition, he was authorized to state that, if the tripartite draft were accepted by the Soviet government, they could accept the last paragraph, with the addition to the reference to the Charter of the U.N.

Mr. Molotov said he felt that that would be a step backward from the Directive received from the Heads of Government.

The Secretary remarked that, perhaps, in that case, as in others, they could only agree to disagree. Mr. Molotov replied that possibly it would be something to think over if they could not reach agreement on such an elementary thing as the reference to the proposals of the Heads of Government contained in the Directive. He thought that they could not weaken the Directive.

The Secretary said that they had no authority to weaken or detract from the Directive.

Mr. Molotov agreed that they were not authorized to weaken the Directive from the Heads of Government in any way.

---

376. Memorandum of a Conversation, Palais des Nations, Geneva, November 15, 1955, 7:30–8 p.m.[1]

USDel/MC/43

SUBJECT

Final Communiqué of Foreign Ministers Meeting

PARTICIPANTS

United States	*France*
The Secretary	President Pinay
Mr. Merchant	M. Roland de Margerie

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 586. Confidential.

Mr. MacArthur
Mr. Bowie
Mr. Phleger
Mr. McCardle

United Kingdom
Mr. Macmillan
Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick
Sir Geoffrey Harrison
Lord Hood
Mr. Pink
Mr. Hancock
Mr. Boloshev

M. Sauvagnargues
Ambassador Joxe
M. Andronikov

U.S.S.R.
Mr. Molotov
Marshal Sokolovsky
Mr. Sobolev
Mr. Vinogradov
Mr. Pushkin
Mr. Troyanovsky

Mr. Macmillan, as Chairman of the Conference today, opened the restricted meeting called to discuss the final Communiqué by suggesting that the form of the Communiqué be first discussed. He suggested that it be short and objective, and that if there were agreement on any of the three Items of the Agenda, such a decision should be recorded in a separate announcement on that Item. Mr. Macmillan then suggested that the Communiqué should point out that in compliance with the Directive of the Heads of Government, the four Foreign Ministers had met and had had frank discussions on all Items covered by the Directive. The Communiqué would then go on to say that the four Ministers had agreed to report the results of their work to their Heads of Government who had appointed them to carry out this work. This would leave open the question of how to deal with any future meeting of the four Foreign Ministers. He concluded by saying that if his suggestion commended itself to the other three Ministers, each could designate an adviser to a working group which could get together to draft something along these lines.

Mr. Molotov said perhaps Mr. Macmillan had a draft which he could read to the Ministers.

Mr. Macmillan replied that he thought it was better for the advisers to get together to produce a draft.

Secretary Dulles said he agreed with Mr. Macmillan's suggestion as to the form and substance of the Communiqué, and his own thought was that the question of a future meeting of the Foreign Ministers be left for decision by the Heads of Government, since obviously the Foreign Ministers could not decide that until the Heads of Government had had a chance to study what had been done at Geneva.

Mr. Pinay said that if the Ministers were in general agreement on the form of a Communiqué, they should get a text to serve as a basis for discussion.

Mr. Molotov said he had no objection to this procedure, and agreed that the Communiqué should be short and objective, to which

Mr. Pinay commented that the shorter it was the more objective it would be.

Mr. Molotov replied that this was "quite possible".

Mr. Molotov then said that the idea that the Ministers should report to their Heads of Government should evoke no objections. He said that with reference to future meetings of the Foreign Ministers he would like to ask what precisely was in mind as to the subject of such a meeting, as well as the time and place.

Secretary Dulles commented that a possible future meeting was a matter for the Heads of Government to consider after they had had time to evaluate the reports of their respective Foreign Ministers.

Mr. Pinay said he agreed with what the Secretary said.

Mr. Molotov said he had simply asked about a future meeting to obtain clarification, and suggested that Mr. Macmillan as the author of the suggestion could perhaps indicate more clearly what he had in mind.

Mr. Macmillan said he had in mind that the Heads of Government would consider the reports of their respective Foreign Ministers and that the question of a future meeting of the Foreign Ministers, as well as the scope and character of any discussions they might have, would be handled through diplomatic channels.

Mr. Molotov said that Mr. Macmillan was correct in that the Heads of Government had the right to be informed by their respective Foreign Ministers. With respect to a future meeting of the Foreign Ministers, public opinion would be much interested in the kind of a meeting it was to be, as well as in its purposes and objectives.

Secretary Dulles suggested that Mr. Macmillan draw up a draft text of a Communiqué and circulate it tonight. Each Minister could this evening designate an expert and then the experts could form a drafting group to meet tomorrow morning.

Mr. Molotov said he would like to look at a text, but he was interested in the substance of the matter of the convening of another meeting of Foreign Ministers.

Secretary Dulles replied that his idea was that the question of a further meeting, as well as its scope and character, would be left for the Heads of Government to decide in the light of their evaluation of their Ministers' reports. It could then be discussed through diplomatic channels. It was possible the Heads of Government would decide not to have another Conference because not much agreement had been reached at this one. On the one hand, it would certainly be unwise to give the impression that this Conference had resulted in what was tantamount to a break in relations between the Soviet Union and the other Western powers. On the other hand, it would not be wise to give the impression that the four Foreign Ministers had reached agreement on matters of substance, since this was not the case.

Mr. Pinay said that when the Foreign Ministers reported back to their Heads of Government it was up to the latter to decide what to do next, because if there was another Conference it would be a prolongation of the Conference which the Heads of Government had called.

Mr. Macmillan summarized again the scope of the Communiqué he had suggested, stressing that it would be short and objective and that it would conclude by saying that the Ministers would report the results of their work to the Heads of Government. He agreed to the suggestion that he draw up a text which would be circulated tonight, and that the drafting group could meet in the morning at ten o'clock.[2]

Mr. Molotov said he did not see why the idea of a future meeting should meet with objection, but reserved his position because he was not clear about the character of any future meeting.

Mr. Macmillan concluded by saying that all the Ministers should reserve their positions with respect to his draft until they had had a chance to receive and study it.

The discussion then turned to tomorrow's meeting, and it was agreed that the communiqué drafting group would meet at 10:00; that the Ministers would meet at 11:30 to complete discussion of Item I; that they would adjourn by 1 p.m.; and that they would meet again for final plenary session at 3 p.m. to conclude the Communiqué and to make their final statements.

---

[2] The draft circulated later that evening by Macmillan reads:

"In compliance with the Directive issued by the four Heads of Government after their meeting in Geneva in July, the Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom, the United States of America and the U.S.S.R. met in Geneva from October 27 to November 16.

"The Foreign Ministers agreed to report the result of their discussions to their respective Heads of Government and to recommend that the future course of the discussions of the Foreign Ministers should be settled through diplomatic channels." (Attachment to a note from the Secretary of the British Delegation to MacArthur, November 15; *ibid.*, Central Files, 396.1–GE/11–1555)

377. Letter From Secretary of State Dulles to Chancellor Adenauer[1]

Geneva, November 15, 1955.

My Dear Chancellor: I had hoped that I might be able to stop by and see you on my way home. However, it looks as though we would not get through in time tomorrow for me to do so on Wednesday, and I do not feel I should delay a whole day in returning to Washington to report to the President.

President Pinay reported on his talk with you last Sunday[2] and gave a most reassuring account of your good health and spirits. I at once cabled that news to President Eisenhower who will be delighted, as am I.[3]

The Conference here has, I think, served an indispensable purpose. As President Eisenhower said, it would be this meeting that would provide the "acid test" of the intentions of the four powers and determine whether or not their verbal agreements could be translated into actual deeds.

I fear the Conference did not pass that test, but it was important that the nations should be subjected to that test. It is better to know the truth, however unpalatable, than to go on under an illusion.

We came here prepared to make very serious proposals on security designed to promote the reunification of Germany. However, the Soviets have, as you know, never once indicated any terms whatsoever upon which Germany could be reunified, except that they implied that this might be possible when the GDR could take over all Germany.

They have tried to give the impression that Germany might be reunified if it would be neutral or if the NATO and Brussels arrangements were liquidated. But they have never said this. They have, to be sure, asked for the liquidation of NATO and Brussels and for assurance that Germany would not join any "military bloc". But never have they said that even on these conditions they would permit Germany to be reunified. On the contrary, they have made clear their steadfast allegiance to the GDR and their opposition to anything which might lead to its liquidation.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 586. Personal and Confidential. Drafted by Dulles and cleared by Merchant and Conant, who had come to Geneva on November 15 for consultations with Dulles.

[2] Pinay and Adenauer met at Bonn on November 13 to discuss the Saar.

[3] Dulte 80 from Geneva, November 15, reads:

"Pinay came back from his talk with Adenauer reporting Chancellor was in splendid condition mentally and physically. Pinay said 'he seemed ten years younger.' I know you will be glad of this good news." (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 621)

I think that clears the air at least for the time being.

I believe that the present position of the Soviet Union stems not from strength but rather from weakness. At the present time there is uneasiness within the satellite countries. The present rulers are in the main of the old Stalin school, and the people are demanding a government which will be less harsh and more tolerant and more expressive of the "spirit of Geneva" as they understand it.

I think this accounts for the fact that the Soviet Delegation here has not felt that it could under present circumstances contemplate developments which could undermine the GDR, as that would have repercussions throughout the entire satellite world. Also that is why they have almost openly provoked an ending of the "spirit of Geneva". However, I think we can fairly anticipate that the satellite situation will gradually be resolved—I think in favor of governments which while initially still Communist will be much more nationalistic and responsive to national needs, i.e. along the Tito pattern. When this happens, the GDR can be reappraised by the Soviets. It will not be primarily significant in relation to all of Eastern Europe, but as an item that can be dealt with independently. When this time comes, then I think the Soviets may well reappraise the German situation and accept the farreaching security assurances we were prepared to give in exchange for the reunification of Germany.

In the meantime it seems to me that the most constructive line to pursue is the development of the European idea. There are possibilities there for creative, constructive developments which can capture the imagination of the peoples of Western Europe, particularly the youth. The United States, while not a direct party to this European movement, stands ready to give it whatever support is practical.

It is probably not necessary for me to recount here the developments with reference to the Conference items of Disarmament and Contacts. Developments there have been, in their way, as disappointing as in relation to German reunification. At no point have the Soviets been willing to make even a gesture to preserve the "spirit of Geneva".

As indicated above, I suspect that this spirit was a heavy liability to and within the Soviet Union itself, and even more within the satellite countries. Also I think they saw opportunities for spreading their influence in the Middle East and Africa which they could hardly have pursued consistently with the "spirit of Geneva". So perhaps external ambitions as well as domestic preoccupations may have contributed to their present posture.

While I am of course disappointed, I am by no means despondent. On the contrary, I feel that analysis of the causes of the present impasse gives us ground to hope. I know that the cause for which we stand is a just and righteous cause and that if we are faithful to it, it will prevail.

Faithfully yours,

John Foster Dulles[4]

---

[4] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

---

378. Memorandum From the Ambassador to the Soviet Union (Bohlen) to the Secretary of State[1]

Geneva, November 15, 1955.

With reference to our conversation this morning, I submit some thoughts on how to deal with the definition of the Summit Conference and the "Spirit of Geneva."

The Conference of the Heads of Government of the Four Powers last July gave rise to great and, in some quarters, exaggerated hopes among the peoples of the world. It also added the term "Spirit of Geneva" to the international vocabulary. It would seem appropriate here to outline how our Government views the results of that Conference and how we interpret the "Spirit of Geneva."

It is important to remember that the Geneva Conference of the Heads of Government reached no policy decisions and, indeed, no attempt was made to negotiate the problems that divided the three Western powers and the Soviet Union.

The invitation sent by the three Western powers in May made it plain that this was not the purpose of the Conference, and its proceedings accurately reflected this original intention. It was a conference, therefore, not of negotiation but of an exchange of views for the purpose of clarifying the positions of the participating governments and for the creation of a more healthy international atmosphere that would permit subsequent negotiations to proceed in a serious and realistic manner, unencumbered by the accumulation of the past years of heightened tension.

In its broadest and more basic aspect it did, however, produce one very substantial and intangible result. In effect, it might be said that the Summit Conference revealed the political acceptance by the Soviet government of a scientific truth, long known to the three

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/11–1555. Secret. A notation on the source text indicates that it was seen by Dulles.

Western powers, that the development of nuclear weapons, with their incredible power of destruction, had totally changed the character of warfare and rendered it no longer feasible or intelligent as a means of achievement of any national objectives.

This thought was succinctly summed up by President Eisenhower several months before the Geneva Conference when he said, "There is no alternative to peace." It did not follow, nor does it now, that recognition of this basic fact meant that the major problems, which have rent asunder the world since the end of the war, will thereby be automatically solved.

It did mean, however, in the view of our Government, that there was general recognition that the problems could only be dealt with by diplomacy and negotiation. The process, which was emphasized over and over again by President Eisenhower at the Conference, would involve a long period of time, even years. In addition, by sweeping away the large measure of mist which had accumulated during the years of the so-called cold war, it was possible for the governments of the Four Powers participating to obtain a more accurate estimate of the nature of the problems with the Soviet Union which confronted and still confront the nations of the free world. By clearing the air, it offered an opportunity for the Foreign Ministers of the four countries to deal with these problems as they were, unblurred by propaganda and polemics. There was no illusion on the part of the Western powers as to the difficulties and nature of the problems, but it was hoped, and I believe it was a legitimate hope, that these problems would be tackled by the Foreign Ministers in a realistic and serious manner in conformity with the directive handed down by the Heads of Government. In essence, that is what we understood, and still do, by the term the "Spirit of Geneva"—a clearing of the atmosphere and offering of an opportunity for serious and, we hoped, fruitful diplomacy. Its observance by all parties will be made possible at this Foreign Ministers' Conference in a sober and realistic examination of the various points on the agenda and, in particular, the first item, the linked problem of European security and German reunification.

If the "Spirit of Geneva" means anything, it means that these problems would be tackled in the manner I have mentioned and not by voiding or by-passing of the issue by any one of the parties. It is on this score that I feel the legitimate charge can be levied against the Soviet delegation.

The Western powers submitted proposals for the reunification of Germany through free elections, in accordance with the directive and submitted an outline of security arrangements to deal with the changed situation in Europe resulting from the reunification of Germany. The Soviet Foreign Minister, in effect, declined any serious discussion on the unity of Germany and advanced proposals which can only be regarded as a device to avoid serious discussion of this problem.

In the security field, every security proposal advanced was predicated upon the continued division of Germany and thus ignored the link established between this question and that of German unification.

I did not believe anyone expected, and I know the U.S. Government did not, that Soviet policy would automatically and instantaneously change as a result of the Summit meeting. On the contrary, we were fully aware in coming here of the policy statements made by Prime Minister Bulganin. We expected difficult negotiations, but we did expect, and I believe we had every right to, that these negotiations would deal directly and realistically with the problem.

It is in the failure of the Soviet delegation to undertake such negotiation that we feel the "Spirit of Geneva" has been neglected, if not violated, by the Soviet Foreign Minister.

C.E. Bohlen[2]

---

[2] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

November 16, 1955

379. Editorial Note

On November 16, the final day of the Conference, Secretary Dulles met at 8:45 a.m. with his senior staff to discuss the schedule of meetings. At 10, the quadripartite drafting group began its work in the Small Conference Room at the Palais des Nations. At 10:30, the three Western Foreign Ministers assembled in Secretary Dulles' office at the Palais de Nations to draft public statements on Germany and disarmament. Following this meeting, Dulles and his senior staff reconvened before attending the sixteenth meeting of the four Foreign Ministers from 11:30 to 11:55. At 3 p.m., they reassembled for the seventeenth and final meeting of the Conference. The final session ended at 6:35. Secretary Dulles then held a press conference at the Hotel du Rhone before departing from Geneva for Washington at 9:30. (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 587, Chron–25)

Records of the tripartite and quadripartite Foreign Ministers meeting follow. A verbatim transcript of the press conference is *ibid.*

No record of the two staff meetings has been found in Department of State files.

---

380. Telegram From the Delegation at the Foreign Ministers Meetings to the Department of State[1]

Geneva, November 16, 1955—2 p.m.

Secto 323. At tripartite Ministerial meeting November 16 it agreed to table in conference proposed statement to be made by four Foreign Ministers (text in immediately following cable[2]).

Secretary stated his assumption that in terms of guidance to US, UK and French representatives on UN Disarmament Subcommittee this paper would not supersede previous tripartite paper tabled at conference at 10th session November 10th[3] which would serve as guidance to our UN representatives. Macmillan and Pinay fully concurred saying present paper was tactical move and did not supersede or replace original paper.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–FE/11–1655. Confidential. The meeting took place at 10:30 a.m. on November 16.

[2] Secto 324 from Geneva, November 16, not printed. (*Ibid.*) For text of the statement on disarmament, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, p. 227, or *Cmd.* 9633, p. 134.

[3] For text of this proposal, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 199–201, or *Cmd.* 9633, pp. 132–133.

---

381. Telegram From the Delegation at the Foreign Ministers Meetings to the Department of State[1]

Geneva, November 16, 1955—9 p.m.

Secto 339. Morning session of 16th meeting November 16 devoted to brief discussion Soviet delegation resolution presented at previous meeting.[2] In commenting on what Soviet resolution referred to as "concurrence of positions with regard to a number of important questions pertaining to European security" Secretary said he neither ignored fact that certain parallelism had developed nor did he minimize importance that fact.[3] He referred to his own earlier statement calling attention to parallel aspects but pointed out that statement was made before Soviet delegation position re German reunification had been fully exposed. Differences which subsequently emerged relating to Germany, revealed considerable measure disagreement as far as European security concerned. Exchange of opinions indicated that if basic insecurity due to division of Germany could be eliminated other security aspects could perhaps be resolved. Soviet paper gives somewhat false impression because it does not adequately develop strong views of Western Powers that there can not be security with continued division of Germany. Soviet draft resolution also fails reflect value placed by Western Powers on NATO and WEU in relation security. Secretary mentioned difficulties of agreeing on precise wording of security points covering highly technical matters which require careful weighing by experts. For these reasons Secretary recommended that Ministers let record speak for itself.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/11–1655. Secret. Repeated to London, Paris, Bonn, Moscow, and Berlin. The U.S. Delegation verbatim record of the sixteenth meeting, USDel/Verb/16 (Corrected), and the record of decisions, MFM/DOC/RD/16, both dated November 16, are *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 587. The meeting took place at 11:30 a.m. on November 16.

[2] For text of the Soviet proposal, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 174–175, or *Cmd.* 9633, p. 109.

2. Pinay took similar position, stating that apparent concurrence of positions was one of formal concurrence rather than of substance. Soviet draft ignores basic divergence of views and Western refusal accept Soviet approach to security which would maintain division of Europe and bring about progressive elimination Western organizations for collective defense. Whenever four powers agree on common concept and goals for European security, then coincidence of views noted by Soviet delegation will have true meaning.

3. After Macmillan had indicated complete agreement his government with statements by Secretary and Pinay, Molotov made brief statement in rebuttal and then moved discussion item 1 be considered completed. Morning session was adjourned as soon as it was ascertained none of four Ministers had additional points to raise at conference.

---

[3] For text of Dulles' statement, circulated as MFM/DOC/80, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 175–176.

382. Telegram From the Delegation at the Foreign Ministers Meetings to the Department of State[1]

Geneva, November 16, 1955—9 p.m.

Secto 342. Seventeenth and final Ministerial meeting approved draft communiqué without discussion and heard single round of prepared statements with no substantive exchanges.[2] Understand text of Secretary's speech and substantial proportions other three speeches available in Washington.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/11–1655. Official Use Only; Priority. Repeated to London, Paris, Bonn, and Moscow. The U.S. Delegation verbatim record of the seventeenth meeting of the Foreign Ministers, USDel/Verb/17 (Corrected), and the record of decisions, MFM/DOC/RD/17, both dated November 16, are *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 587. The meeting took place at 3 p.m. on November 16.

[2] For texts of the closing statements of the four Ministers, circulated as MFM/DOC/76, 77, 81, and 82, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 284–304, or *Cmd.* 9633, pp. 169–183. For text of the final communiqué and the Tripartite Declaration on Germany issued by the three Western Foreign Ministers, see *ibid.*, pp. 184–185.

REPORTS ON THE FOREIGN MINISTERS CONFERENCE

383. Editorial Note

Secretary Dulles reported to the nation at 7:30 p.m. on November 18 concerning the Conference of Foreign Ministers at Geneva after a day spent in consultation with President Eisenhower at Gettysburg. After posing and answering several questions about the meaning of the conference, he concluded that the Soviet Union wanted certain results, but had not been willing to pay the price necessary to obtain them. For the full text of his address, see Department of State *Bulletin*, November 28, 1955, pages 867–872.

On November 21, Dulles briefed the National Security Council on aspects of the Geneva Conference that were not covered in his address to the nation and on the following day reported to the Cabinet. A memorandum of the discussion at the National Security Council is *infra.* At the Cabinet meeting, Secretary Dulles summarized the main parts of his report to the Council. (Minutes of the Cabinet meeting of November 22; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Cabinet Meetings)

384. Memorandum of the Discussion at the 267th Meeting of the National Security Council, Camp David, Maryland, November 21, 1955[1]

[Here follow a list of participants and discussion of item 1, world developments affecting United States security.]

2. Report by the Secretary of State

After an introduction by the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Secretary Dulles said that his forthcoming report to the Council would assume a knowledge of his report to the nation Friday night,[2] on the part of all those present. He would accordingly confine himself to aspects of his activities at the Geneva Conference which were of particular interest to the National Security Council.

Initially, said Secretary Dulles, he would like to present his estimate of why the Soviet Delegation had acted as they had during the course of the Conference. In the first place, it was clear that the Soviets were extremely fearful of the impact of the so-called "spirit of Geneva" on the internal stability of the Soviet Union and of the Communist bloc. Whenever, in the course of the negotiations, any subject was discussed suggesting a course of action which would have substantial impact on the stability of the Soviet bloc, the Soviet negotiators not only shied away from the subject—they refused point-blank to discuss it. In part, thought Secretary Dulles, this conduct derived from the instinctive sentiments of officials who had been brought up under the harsh tenets of Stalinist Communism. On the other hand, it also reflected the sense of insecurity of the Soviet Delegation. They could have served themselves well if they could even have brought themselves to give lip service to some of the proposals put forward by the Western Foreign Ministers. Even so, they felt unable to make a single significant concession, for example, with respect to the unification of Germany. This resulted from their evident fear of the effect of such a concession on their hold over East Germany and their other satellites. While this course of action obviously exposed them to the charge of openly violating the agreements reached by the Heads of Government at the first Geneva Conference, they felt this preferable to risking any impairment of their hold on their satellites.

Secretary Dulles believed that a proper inference from the foregoing was that it was not only the United States which had suffered certain unfortunate effects; for example, the loss of the cement of fear in our alliances. The spirit of Geneva had also had a dangerous impact on the Soviet Union, which was accordingly erecting safeguards against it. In this respect at least Secretary Dulles said he regarded the Soviet position at Geneva as evidence of weakness rather than of strength.

---

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Gleason on November 22.

[2] See *supra*.

Despite their intransigeance at the Foreign Ministers Conference, Secretary Dulles expressed confidence that the Soviet behavior at Geneva was no indication that they sought an open break with the West. In areas of negotiation where they were less worried over courses of action which might affect their internal stability, they did make certain very limited offers and concessions. This was true in the case of the disarmament item. Their objective here was to preserve the semblance of agreeable relations with the West, without making any substantial concessions. Secretary Dulles indicated that the Western Foreign Ministers were aware of the Soviet tactics.

Going on, Secretary Dulles said that talks with the Soviet Delegation had occurred in the course of which some very slight progress was recorded. For example, the Soviets had gone so far as to agree to a role for the President's aerial inspection plan,[3] though they placed it toward the end of the development of a disarmament program instead of placing it at the beginning, as President Eisenhower had indicated. However, the mere fact that they were willing to give any consideration to the President's inspection proposal could perhaps be described as some advance over their earlier position on the general issue of disarmament.

Secretary Dulles then stated that he had had one quite frank talk on Saturday morning with Molotov[4] which he believed perhaps advanced somewhat the possibilities which lay before the Disarmament Commission, although he deferred to Governor Stassen's opinion in this area. Molotov had made it clear that he was quite willing to go forward with a disarmament program provided this program contained no real provision for inspection and control. Obviously, thought Secretary Dulles, Molotov figured that we would live up to our obligations under an agreed disarmament proposal, whereas the Soviet Union need not. Molotov, in reply to our insistence on the importance of inspection and control, had cited the fact that neither side used poison gas during the Second World War, although there was of course no inspection or control. Molotov had urged that the weight of public opinion was sufficient to assure the compliance of each nation with its obligations under an agreed disarmament plan. Secretary Dulles had expressed to Molotov extreme skepticism as to the validity of this argument, pointing out that the fear that the other side would use gas had been the real deterrent on its use. Nevertheless, Secretary Dulles came away with the feeling that the Soviets really wished to get a disarmament program under way. For one thing, they do not wish to continue spending so large a proportion of their resources on their military establishment. This was too great a burden on the people of the Soviet Union, and they wished to lower their defense budget if they were able to do so. It was quite possible that they would cut their military expenditures even in the absence of any disarmament agreement. Meanwhile, they are pressing us hard for such an agreement minus any features involving international inspection and control.

---

[3] See Document 221.

[4] Document 359.

Secretary Dulles then said he would like to turn to the problems which faced the United States now that the Foreign Ministers Conference had concluded. The big problem, of course, was Germany. In the course of negotiations on that problem the Soviets had gone so far, or the Western Ministers had forced them to go so far, that they were driven to the point of being obliged to defend their negotiating position in the final terms of preserving the East German regime and the Communist system which they had created in East Germany. Of course, these tactics now deprived them of negotiating arguments which they could have used in any direct negotiations with the West Germans for reunification. For example, they could not agree with the Federal Republic to settle for a reunified neutral Germany outside NATO. Secretary Dulles went on to point out that Chancellor Adenauer's fears had been allayed to a considerable extent by the lengths to which the Soviets had gone in order to prevent any genuine discussion of German reunification. So while the USSR had created great problems for itself with respect to the future of Germany, the problems of the Federal Republic had been somewhat reduced.

These thoughts led Secretary Dulles to the question of the future of Germany, and indicated what the United States must be prepared to do—namely, everything that it could do effectively to develop the integration of Europe. If there was to be no unification of Germany in the foreseeable future, it was incumbent on the United States to provide the Federal Republic and its people with the strongest possible sense of their future close relationship with Western Europe. In this connection Secretary Dulles said that he wished to touch on NATO. He said he believed that the most important thing that we could do was to give the Federal Republic some sort of vested interest in NATO through the development of a West German military establishment which was integrated with the West. Perhaps this military agency, NATO, was not the ideal way to reach this objective, but in point of fact NATO was the great magnet of free Europe. For over-all political rather than mere military objectives, we must make use of this military magnet to attract and retain the Federal Republic in integration with the free world. Accordingly, it was perhaps of very great importance that the United States provide more information to the NATO powers on our new weapons. This was one means of keeping alive the morale and spirit of NATO.

While NATO was thus, in Secretary Dulles' opinion, the instrument which today is most effective in holding Western Europe together, we must also seek to develop alternatives to NATO in case the fear of overt aggression and general war continues to decline with the resulting effect of further lowering the sense of solidarity of NATO. Perhaps the Coal-Steel Community was an alternative which offered significant possibilities; but almost any instrumentality was desirable if its use could develop the European principle rather than the national principle. All these things would help keep West Germany a part of the Western community of nations and make more endurable for the Germans the continued division of their country. While they would not say so out loud, of course, the French would not be at all disturbed by the prospect of the continued division of Germany. At any rate, Secretary Dulles was confident that there was much that could be done to make the present impasse tolerable and to prevent the Federal Republic from falling under Soviet influence.

[Here follow reports of Dulles' trips to Spain and Yugoslavia and discussion of the Middle East at Geneva, NATO buildup, and military assistance for Fiscal Year 1957.]

S. Everett Gleason

---

385. Telegram From the Office of the Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council to the Department of State[1]

Paris, November 23, 1955—7 p.m.

Polto 850. Subject: Private session NAC November 21. At brief private session De Margerie noted NAC had been kept informed of factual developments at Geneva.[2] Said he would confine his remarks to presentation of "atmosphere" of conference. Emphasized point Soviet delegation evidenced little or no interest outside of conference room in seeking contacts with any of tripartite dels. Gave examples of several instances in which Soviet del could have been expected seek such contacts in order achieve at least minor accommodations yet did not do so. Pointed out Molotov appeared to be man acting under rigid instructions. Noted apparent stiffening after his return from Moscow but also noted had made effort in last speech[3] retain "spirit of Geneva". In explanation latter point suggested Russians might simply think it enough to talk about spirit of Geneva without feeling compelled do anything about it.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 560. Secret.

[2] Representatives from the three Western delegations at the Geneva Conference briefed the NAC each week on the progress of the Foreign Ministers.

Said tripartite dels had impression Soviets now view time in their favor. Noted marked change from Soviet attitude at Berlin Conference[4] which had come only six or seven months after East German riots. At Geneva Russians gave impression they were confident they had mended their fences in East Germany and seemed eager display their new confidence. This connection mentioned Molotov's conversation with Pinay in which former exhibited conviction Soviet social system would hold up in front of new Germany whereas UK and French would not.

De Margerie wound up by observing too soon reach precise conclusions but tentatively following seemed apparent:

(1) Soviet diplomacy now showing less interest in multilateral conference and can hereafter perhaps be satisfied in near future with bilateral efforts "to score single victories".

(2) NATO appears to have inspired some fear in Moscow and Soviets can be expected go after NATO "hammer and tong". This connection De Margerie suggested closest NAC liaison to keep finger on pulse expected new type Soviet diplomacy.

(3) While few had expected much reconciliation on items 1 and 2 at Geneva some had been surprised at Soviet willingness get nowhere with item 3 and at apparent Russian fear intrusion Western ideas other side of curtain.

After conclusion De Margerie's remarks Perkins asked him how he accounted for difference in attitudes displayed by Soviets between first and second Geneva conferences. De Margerie replied that at heads of government meeting a menu had been adopted. At second Geneva, problem was to cook. Whereas he had no convincing explanation differing Soviet attitudes at two meetings it appeared they believe they could keep spirit of Geneva alive without themselves offering anything. Danish and Belgian PermReps asked for fuller explanation response to Perkins question but De Margerie had little else to say on this subject. Greek PermRep wanted to know whether Russian attitude at second Geneva was "show of power for benefit of satellites". De Margerie said he thought this was case especially with respect East Germany. Canadian PermRep said he was puzzled by absence attempts on Molotov's part divide West. De Margerie responded he had impression Molotov was acting under strict instructions and had little flexibility permit him seek find weak points in Western tactics.

---

[3] For text of Molotov's closing statement, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 297–304, or *Cmd.* 9633, pp. 178–183.

[4] For documentation on the Foreign Ministers meeting at Berlin, January 25–February 17, 1954, see *Foreign Relations*, 1952–1954, vol. VII, Part 1, pp. 601 ff.

Perkins

Index

- Achilles, Theodore C., 126–130, 131*n*, 134–135, 198
- Adams, Sherman, 225, 621, 642–643, 677*n*, 725, 777–778
- Adenauer, Konrad:
  - Europe, U.S. policy toward, 225–226
  - European security, 155–158, 162, 238–239, 322–323, 556, 570–571, 675, 680–681, 760
  - Federal Republic of Germany:
    - Military volunteers legislation, 225, 227–228
    - Soviet Union, relations with, 224, 235–236, 264, 320, 544–546, 567–571, 575–588
    - United States, relations with, 228–230, 303, 589–594
    - Western orientation of, 162
  - Foreign Ministers Conference, 676, 681–682
  - German Democratic Republic, 134, 575
  - German unification, 148–151, 153–154, 235, 237–238, 397–398, 418, 465, 484, 574, 805
  - Germany, 132–133, 225–226
  - Moscow visit, 391*n*, 573*n*, 575–594
    - And German unification, 403, 538, 555
    - And Soviet foreign policy, 288, 326
    - U.S. position, 531, 550, 566*n*, 567–571, 574*n*, 610
  - Paris Agreements, 139, 169–170
  - Soviet Union, 147, 168–169, 226–227, 307, 551, 574–575
  - Summit Conference, 122, 125, 152, 170, 179, 537–539
    - FRG participation, 156, 169, 172, 232–235

- Adenauer, Konrad—Continued
  - Summit Conference—Continued
    - German unification, 176, 397–398, 514–515, 547
    - Western tactics, 175, 309–310, 315, 318, 345, 439
    - Working group proposal, 128–131, 138, 140
- Aldrich, Winthrop W., 131*n*, 153, 195–196
- Allen, Edgar P., 1*n*, 4*n*, 19*n*, 30, 44*n*
- Alphand, Hervé, 597
- Anderson, Dillon, 366, 398*n*, 419*n*, 442*n*, 803
  - Austrian State Treaty, 52–53
  - Disarmament, 425–427, 453*n*
  - Summit Conference, 182–183, 185–189, 268–275, 278–282, 530
- Anderson, Robert B., 315, 384–386, 425, 427–429, 440, 442, 499*n*
- Andronykov, Constantin, 232, 244, 493, 597, 792
- Appling, Hugh G., 253, 262, 555, 581*n*
- Arms control. *See* Disarmament.
- Arms race, 199–200, 410–411, 592–593, 635, 640
- Atomic energy, peaceful uses of, 210, 219, 338, 365, 369–370, 385, 533, 586, 668, 693
- Atomic weapons, 255, 134
  - Inspection systems, 286, 327, 492, 745, 751–752
  - Prohibition of, 486
    - Soviet position, 199–200, 289, 384–385, 413–414, 450, 464, 484, 500, 519–520, 744, 755–757
    - U.S. position, 385, 482, 532, 745, 751, 755–756
  - Public opinion, 220, 352

Atomic weapons—Continued
- Soviet development of, 43, 211, 221-222, 226, 748–749
- And Soviet foreign policy, 249, 251, 271
- Soviet position, 148, 789–790
- U.S. position, 219, 492, 745, 750–752, 798

Austria (*see also* Austrian State Treaty):
- Hungary, relations with, 12, 55, 110, 112
- Military, establishment of, 34, 55, 58, 68–69, 78, 80, 110–112
- NATO participation, 16, 26
- Neutrality (*see also under* Austrian State Treaty), 253, 256
- Political situation, 24–25, 46
- U.N. membership, 34, 37, 40, 49, 57, 63, 89–90, 106
- United States, relations with, 5, 18, 25, 56, 110–111

Austrian State Treaty, 19–20, 31, 40, 56, 88, 92–93, 95–97, 100–103, 115–117, 155, 542
- Anschluss security guarantee (*see also* Territorial integrity guarantee *below*), 2, 4–8, 11–12, 14, 15–17, 21, 24, 27, 45–46
- Austrian position, 12, 14*n.* 23–24, 28, 35*n.* 36, 84–85
- Austrian visit to Moscow (*see also* Economic agreements with the Soviet Union *below*), 16–20, 22–28, 30–32
- And Berlin Conference, 342, 344
- British position, 1*n.* 2*n.* 19*n.* 32–33, 44, 45*n.* 66, 68–69, 75–77, 94, 99–103, 108, 115
- Economic agreements with the Soviet Union (*see also* German assets *below*), 17, 38, 40, 42, 48–49, 58, 60, 96, 99
  - Economic consequences, 17, 77–78
  - Soviet position, 35, 37, 74–75, 81, 100
  - U.S. position, 23–24, 34, 69–70, 74, 87–89, 93–94, 97–99, 103–105, 116
- Economic consequences, 77–79, 109
- Four-Power Conference proposal, 1, 5–9, 11, 13, 15, 17–19, 23, 35, 41, 43–44
- Four-power guarantee. *See* territorial integrity guarantee *below.*
- French demarche, 120, 126

Austrian State Treaty—Continued
- French position, 5*n.* 20, 30, 32–33, 66, 68–69, 73–77, 84, 175
- German assets, 23–25, 36, 42, 48, 58, 73–74, 82, 94, 96, 98–99, 105
- And Germany issue, 1, 2, 6, 13, 25–26, 33, 36, 43, 44*n.* 49–50
- Jewish claims, 111–112
- Military limitations, 55, 58, 68–69
- National Security Council discussion, 52–54, 59
- Neutrality (*see also* Territorial integrity guarantee *below*):
  - Austrian position, 42, 55, 57–58, 68
  - British position, 84, 90
  - Military, establishment of, 34, 58, 68, 110–112
  - Proposed declaration, 113–115
  - Soviet position, 1, 13, 16, 26–27, 35, 37, 60, 74, 161
  - U.S. position, 10, 21, 24, 26–27, 19, 34, 49, 52, 83–84, 106–107, 110, 384
- Occupation forces withdrawal, 6, 15–16, 30*n.* 34–38, 40, 42, 43*n.* 69–70, 84–85, 100
- And Paris Agreements, 1–3, 6–9, 11, 15–16
- Quadripartite note proposal, 6–7, 9
- Refugees, 62, 66–68, 70–72
- And Soviet foreign policy, 154–155, 163, 173, 222, 227, 288, 307, 548, 551
- Soviet position, 1–2, 8, 15*n.* 21*n.* 35–37, 199, 369
- Territorial integrity guarantee (*see also* Anschluss security guarantee *above*), 43*n*, 54, 65
  - Austrian position, 23, 42, 48, 51, 55, 57
  - British position, 90–91, 113
  - French position, 90, 113
  - Soviet position, 1, 16, 35, 37–41, 48–49, 60–61, 85, 90, 113
  - U.S. position, 24, 19, 34, 44–46, 62–65, 83–84, 90–91, 107, 113
- U.S. position, 12–14, 17–20, 29, 32–33, 44–45, 47
- War guilt clause, 103, 106, 112, 116

Bailey, Col. William B., 636, 742

Baillou, Jean, 655, 668

Bandung Conference, 147, 168, 369

- Barbour, Walworth, 33*n*, 138*n*, 542, 544*n*
- Barnett, Robert W., 265–266
- Barringer, B.P., 145, 156*n*, 609
- Beam, Jacob D., 1*n* 20*n*, 33*n*, 44*n*, 156*n*, 195*n*, 323*n*, 405*n* 578*n*, 649*n*
  - Soviet Union, 461–462, 605–606
  - Summit Conference, 137, 190, 317, 363, 388, 460, 560, 749,
    - Western tactics, 262–263, 318, 319*n*, 343*n*
    - Working groups, 145, 151, 153–154, 158, 160, 223, 309, 312–313, 314*n*
- Begougne de Juniac, Gontran, 5*n*, 138
- Berard, Armand, 198, 319*n*, 343, 381
- Berlin, 147, 150, 294, 557
- Berlin Conference, 559, 807
  - Austrian State Treaty, 1, 17, 32, 40, 56, 61, 73*n*, 342
  - German unification, 120, 291, 368
- Bidault, Georges, 703, 709
- Bischoff, Norbert, 4, 5, 6, 8–12, 15*n*, 24, 38–39
- Blankenhorn, Herbert A.H., 133, 567, 589–591, 705
  - European security, 134, 155–158, 309–310, 515, 679–676, 710
  - Foreign Ministers Conference, 643, 667, 681, 702, 727, 739*n*
  - German unification, 132, 167, 309–310, 318, 322, 418, 515, 649, 711
  - Soviet Union, 224, 230, 569, 571, 574–575, 579–583
  - Summit Conference, 153–155, 460, 513–514, 537–538
    - FRG participation, 232, 315
- Boeker, Alexander, 597, 615, 649, 674
- Bohlen, Charles E., 226, 243, 355, 456, 488, 754, 767, 780, 788
  - Austrian State Treaty, 10, 11*n*, 14–16, 26–28, 35–41, 43*n*, 46–49
  - Eastern Europe, 372, 377
  - European security, 433, 440, 700–702
  - Federal Republic of Germany, 545, 570, 589–591
  - Foreign Ministers Conference, 544*n*, 651, 667
  - Soviet Union, 378–379, 573–577, 579–584
    - United States, relations with, 386–387, 408, 441*n*, 442*n*, 479
- Bohlen, Charles E.—Continued
  - Summit Conference, 121*n*, 128*n*, 221–223, 283–285, 362–363, 376, 388, 432–433, 440, 797–799
- Bonbright, James C.H., Jr., 643
- Bova-Scoppa, Renato, 681, 727, 760
- Bowie, Robert R., 167, 232, 338, 419, 560, 597, 605, 614*n*, 649*n*, 742, 792
  - Disarmament, 191, 636–638, 671, 715
  - European security, 192, 253, 255–257
  - Foreign Ministers Conference, 381, 732–633, 651, 653, 667, 706–708, 711
  - Summit Conference, 263–264, 343*n*, 363, 372, 388, 404, 419, 431–432, 468, 487
- Brentano, Heinrich von, 567, 584
  - Disarmament, 627–630
  - European security and German unification, 515, 538, 621–623, 625–627, 629, 675
  - Foreign Ministers Conference, 597, 599, 600–601, 613, 623–625, 727, 739*n*
  - FRG relations with the United States, 570, 591*n*, 681
  - GDR relations with the Soviet Union, 576, 586–587
  - German unification, 627–630
- Brook, Norman, 343, 494
- Brownell, Herbert, Jr., 621, 642, 677*n*
- Brussels Pact, 327, 341, 403, 406, 459, 561–562, 795
  - And European security, 441, 561
  - French position, 312, 342, 801
  - German membership, 346–347, 562, 564, 617
  - U.S. position, 315–316, 438, 441, 672, 801
- Bulganin, Nikolai Alexandrovich:
  - Austrian State Treaty, 36, 43, 93
  - China, People's Republic of, 463–464, 467
  - Communism, international, 370, 440
  - Disarmament, 369, 443–44, 449–450, 455, 482, 619*n*, 635, 716, 744, 781
  - East-West trade, 685, 712
  - Eastern Europe, 372–373, 377, 554
  - European security, 370, 389, 395–396, 406–407, 412, 421, 423–424, 444, 447–449, 479–480, 494–498, 639, 700
  - Foreign Ministers Conference, 424, 500, 503–512

Bulganin, Nikolai Alexandrovich—Continued
  German unification, 370, 390–394, 435–436, 440–441, 444, 699
  Soviet Union:
    Economic situation, 374–375
    Federal Republic of Germany, relation with, 576–577, 579, 582, 584–587, 593
    Foreign policy, 226, 227*n*, 595*n*, 611, 650
    Political situation, 379, 592
    United States, relations with, 371, 374, 376, 479, 490, 540–541
  Summit Conference, 346, 356, 364*n*, 365, 424, 437, 482, 736
    German unification, 440–441
    Soviet attitudes, 174, 375, 398*n*, 430, 459
    Soviet position, 258–260, 308, 340, 799
    Soviet tactics, 330, 382
Bulgaria, 105, 220
Butterworth, W. Walton, 571, 573

Caccia, Harold A., 232, 243, 343*n*, 381, 457, 502, 571–573
Canada, 155, 237
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 247–252, 271, 284, 606
Cheklin, N.I., 669, 684–685, 691, 711–714, 715*n*, 722–725, 733–734
China, People's Republic of (*see also* Summit Conference agenda *under* Far East), 147, 220, 358, 367–368, 370, 450, 466–467, 491
  Five- or Six-power conference proposal, 180–181, 187–188, 193, 196, 222–223, 232, 252, 285*n*, 297, 308, 329, 382, 467
  Soviet policy towards, 181, 290, 370, 416, 491–492
  Soviet Union, relations with, 10, 168, 219, 227, 248–249, 463, 530, 592
  Summit Conference participation, 180–181, 187–188, 297
  U.N. membership, 252, 273, 290, 370, 416
  United States, relations with, 281, 297, 415–416, 463–464, 467, 192
  U.S. policy toward, 187–188, 193, 466–467, 491
Chinese Nationalist Offshore Islands, 358, 466–467
Chou En-lai, 317, 330, 367, 549
Churchill, Winston, 119*n*, 121, 307, 336, 552
Clements, Earle C., 308, 435*n*
Cleveland, Stanley M., 138*n*, 143*n* 145
Cline, Ray S., 486 752–753
Coblenz, Gaston, 589, 706
Colombo Plan, 351
Communism, international, 210
  Summit conference, 370, 377–378, 414–415, 440, 534
  U.S. position, 240, 280, 296, 365, 377, 385, 415, 530, 553, 612
Conant, James B., 147–151, 169, 230–231, 266–268, 584–591, 780, 795*n*
Congress, U.S.:
  Acts of:
    Battle Act, 297
    McCarran Act, 607–608
    Refugee Relief Act of *1953*, 71
Council on Foreign Economic Policy, 281–282, 609–610
Couve de Murville, Maurice, 232, 244, 560, 562, 570, 597
  Foreign Ministers Conference, 542–544, 566, 588
  Summit Conference, 140, 197, 215, 223, 262*n*
Crouy-Chanel, Etienne de, 32, 223, 232, 309*n*, 502, 566*n*
Czechoslovakia:
  Austria, relations with, 12, 55, 110
  And European security, 253–254, 276, 324, 396, 658, 666, 706, 720
  Neutrality, 161, 324
  Soviet Union, relations with, 148, 168, 293, 550

Defense, Department of, 52–53, 186, 609
Denmark, 255–256, 407, 657, 723
Dillon, C. Douglas, 121*n*, 139, 141–143, 197, 319, 333
Disarmament (*see also* Atomic weapons; European security):
  British position, 213, 236, 335, 350–352, 454, 483, 497, 716–717, 745–746, 752
  Budgetary controls, 342, 349, 352–353, 366, 442–443, 454, 521–522, 745
  Foreign Ministers Conference agenda, 470–471, 473, 481–485, 491, 494–501, 503, 527–528, 534, 565
  Foreign Ministers statement, 780–783, 789–791

- Disarmament—Continued
  - French position, 334, 339, 349–354, 361, 385, 496–497, 521–525, 634, 717
  - FRG position, 148–149, 157, 234–237
  - And German unification, 213, 627–628
  - Inspection systems (*see also* Open Skies proposal *below*), 191, 286, 311, 320–321, 341, 350–351, 401, 412–413, 428–429, 443, 451–452, 486, 533, 751, 759
    - British pilot proposal, 426, 455, 524, 562–563, 627–628, 708, 745
    - French position, 338, 444
    - Ground control posts, 716–717
    - Soviet position, 251, 804
    - U.S. position, 277–278, 426, 442–444, 500
  - International fund, 335, 337–338, 342–343, 349–354, 443, 454, 522–525
  - Open Skies proposal, 218, 426–429, 434–435, 452–453, 479–480, 532–534, 540, 619, 716, 750
    - Soviet position, 456–457, 461, 464, 487, 529–530, 744–746, 804
  - Paris working group position, 327–328
  - Procedure, 715–716
  - Publicity, 444–445, 454–455, 525
  - Soviet position, 183–184, 199–200, 223–224, 251, 288, 384–385, 412–414, 635, 751, 756–759, 804–805
  - Soviet proposal, *May 10, 1955*, 183, 222, 236, 334, 369, 449–450, 455, 482, 548, 551–552
    - U.S. position, 492, 752
  - Soviet proposal, *July 21, 1955*, 519–520
  - Soviet tactics, 327, 331
  - Summit Conference agenda, 148–149, 160, 161*n*, 183, 189, 191–192, 196, 210, 213, 223, 239, 246*n*, 251, 427
  - U.N. role, 565
    - British position, 236, 261, 321, 369, 445
    - French position, 352, 361, 454, 751
    - Soviet position, 484–485, 491, 534
    - Summit Conference directive, 471
    - U.S. position, 321, 352, 442–443, 483
    - Western position, 328, 331
  - U.S. position, 218–220, 237–238, 292–295, 350–351, 353, 365, 412–414, 425*n*, 432–433, 450–453, 481–483
  - Western European Union, 125–126, 146, 154, 161, 275–276, 278
- Disarmament—Continued
  - Western tactics, 638–639, 670–671, 717–718, 742–743, 758, 800
    - Summit Conference, 234–238, 326–328, 331, 385, 400–402, 425, 434–435, 442–443, 445
- Donaudampfschiffahrtsgesellschaft (D.D.S.G., Danube Shipping Company), 24, 40, 42, 49, 69, 105
- Dulles, Allen W., 62, 748
  - Soviet Union, 185, 247–252, 271, 280, 284, 619
  - Summit Conference, 262–264, 530, 551*n*
- Dulles, John Foster:
  - Austrian State Treaty, 1–2, 16–19, 20–21, 47, 53, 88–89, 94, 97, 104–107
    - And Germany, 49–50, 54–55
    - Neutrality, 33–34, 42, 110–112
    - Refugees, 62, 70–72
    - Territorial integrity guarantee, 23, 44–45, 54, 64–65, 83–84, 90–91, 113
  - China, People's Republic of, 463–464, 466
  - Communism, international, 377–378
  - Disarmament, 158, 482–484, 629–630, 667, 671, 740, 742–743, 780–782, 788–791, 800
    - Atomic weapons, 754–756
    - French position, 342–343
    - Inspection systems, 286, 400, 428–429, 434–435, 563, 1745–746, 750–752
    - International fund proposal, 351, 353
    - Open Skies proposal, 453*n*, 464, 532–533
    - Soviet position, 443–444, 758, 804–805
    - U.S. position, 237–238, 337*n*, 636, 690, 727
  - East-West contacts, 533–534, 566, 602, 643, 655, 769, 774–775, 783–785
  - East-West trade, 280–282, 609–610, 630–631, 685
  - Eastern Europe, 372–373, 377
  - Egypt, 402–403, 650
  - Europe, U.S. policy towards, 225–226, 273–274
  - European security, 629, 641, 696
    - Demilitarized zones, 323–325, 332, 357–358, 401, 556, 626–627, 697
    - Foreign Ministers Conference Agenda, 433–434, 468–471

Dulles, John Foster—Continued
  European security—Continued
    And German unification, 276–278, 403–404, 634, 672, 674, 677, 686
    Molotov statement, 722, 725–726, 735–736, 739*n*, 740, 747–748
    Soviet position, 700–702, 752–753, 795–797, 801
    Summit Conference directive, 433–434, 468–471
    Treaty proposals, 275, 474–475, 560–562, 570–571, 598–599, 644–648, 786–787
    U.S. position, 315–316, 406–407, 788
    Western tactics, 313–314, 319–321, 444, 542–543, 564–565, 599, 622–623, 680–681
  Federal Republic of Germany, 167–170, 224–225, 227–230, 546, 591
  Foreign Ministers Conference, 616–620, 632, 661, 759–760, 766–768, 780, 799–800, 802
    Agenda, 419–420, 484–486, 493, 502–503, 565, 597–598
    Communiqué, 770–771, 791–793
    GDR participation, 600–601, 623–625, 694
    NATO role, 543–544
    Opening statements, 633–634
    Preparation for, 544, 547, 553–554, 620
    Press relations, 708–709
    Soviet tactics, 803–804
    Western tactics, 542–543, 618–621, 681, 699–700, 702, 776
  German unification, 345, 397–398, 403–405, 486, 514*n*, 688, 805
    All-German council proposal, 666, 698
    Foreign Ministers Conference agenda, 437–438, 440–441, 471, 473, 481
    FRG tactics, 555–559
    Soviet position, 399, 465, 657, 700–702, 752–753, 795–797, 801
    U.S. position, 549–550, 622–623, 649*n*, 677, 680–681, 689, 695, 699, 788
  Germany, 225–226, 279, 384, 562, 652–653
  Indochina, 446–447
  Middle East, 372, 769–770
  Neutralism, 534–535

Dulles, John Foster—Continued
  North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 116, 138–140, 341, 441, 513–514, 779, 805–806
  Soviet Union, 374, 379, 430–431, 551–554, 605–606, 609–610, 650, 748–749
    Foreign policy, 226–227, 547–548, 550, 611–613
  Summit Conference, 115, 119–125, 135–136, 164–167, 170–171, 339, 363, 388
    Agenda, 186–189, 191–193, 196, 243–246, 383
    Approaches to the Soviet Union, 195, 215, 241
    British position, 203–204, 209
    Location, 152, 176, 190–191, 194, 200
    Procedures, 177, 223, 232, 247, 333, 355–356
    Public opinion, 237–238
    Soviet attitudes, 382, 430–431
    Soviet tactics, 201, 283–285
    Timing, 197–198, 207–208, 214
    U.S. position, 158–160, 174–175, 182–184, 239–240, 301–309, 340–341, 420, 493, 530, 797
    Western tactics, 262–266, 269–273, 300, 306, 343–344, 381, 439
    Working group proposals, 140–141, 143–144, 206
  Warsaw Pact, 349

East-West contacts (*see also* East-West trade), 328, 383, 655–656, 729–730, 741, 775
  British position, 210, 654, 669, 728–731, 772–773, 784
  Exchange of persons, 607–609, 773
  Foreign Ministers conference agenda, 494, 502–503, 511, 528, 533–534, 565–566, 609–610
  French position, 477–478, 526, 634, 653–654, 668–669, 729, 731, 774–775, 784–786
  Government publications, 729–730, 772–773
  Procedure, 662–663, 668–669, 678, 682–683, 692–694, 760–762
  Radio broadcasts, 605–607, 729–731, 762, 772–773
  Ruble rate, 768–769, 785

- East-West contacts—Continued
  - Soviet position, 431, 635, 654–655, 728–731, 759, 768, 773–774, 776, 784–785
  - Tourism, 728–730, 785
  - U.S. information programs, 530, 606–607
  - U.S. position, 219, 475–476, 602–609, 728, 731, 775, 783–785
  - Visas, 441*n*, 442*n*, 462, 479, 703
- East-West trade:
  - British position, 210, 630–631, 654, 685, 690–692, 711–712, 723–724, 732–733, 772
  - Civil aviation, 714, 732–734, 765–766, 785
  - Eastern Europe, 184, 189, 313
  - Foreign Ministers Conference agenda, 534, 609–610
  - French position, 478, 669, 684, 686, 690, 724–725, 733–734, 774
  - Shipping, 732–733, 763–764
  - Soviet position, 222, 252, 289, 329–330, 655, 668–669, 684–686, 691, 712–714, 722–724, 732–733, 762–764, 773
  - Summit Conference agenda, 184, 189, 196, 240, 252, 265–266, 280–282
  - U.S. position, 219, 240, 296–297, 476–477, 609, 685–686, 691, 712, 714, 724, 733–734
  - Western position, 329–330, 630–631, 763
- Eastern Europe (*see also* Warsaw Pact):
  - British policy towards, 212, 313
  - East-West trade, 184, 189, 313
  - European security arrangements, participation in, 275–276, 278, 310, 320–324
  - French position, 312–313
  - Soviet control of, U.S. position, 227, 276, 322–324, 365, 372–373, 377, 385, 412, 534, 553, 796
  - Soviet policy toward, 263, 542, 549, 803
  - Summit Conference agenda, 188, 196, 222, 232, 312–313, 328
    - Soviet position, 370, 373, 377, 384–385
    - U.S. position, 240, 313, 392
  - Summit Conference effect on, 530, 803
  - U.S. policy toward, 192–193, 287–288, 290–291, 295, 309
- Economic Commission for Europe (ECE), 712, 724
- Eden, Anthony:
  - Austrian State Treaty, 19*n*
  - China, People's Republic of, 463–464, 466
  - Disarmament, 335, 350, 395, 432–433, 454–455, 628, 781
  - Egypt, 402–403
  - European security, 369, 389, 394–395, 400–401, 423–424, 448–449, 562–563, 593, 657
    - Demilitarized zones, 321, 324, 357–358
  - Foreign Ministers Conference:
    - Agenda, 424, 432, 493–494, 496–499, 503–506, 508–512
    - British role, 632, 643
  - German unification, 301, 341–342, 344–348, 368–369, 393–394, 399–400, 420, 657
  - Indochina, 308, 446–447, 457
  - Iraq, 402, 493
  - Summit Conference, 119*n*, 129, 164–167, 123–124, 304, 339, 362, 365, 398, 471, 484*n*
    - Agenda, 397, 421, 475, 478
    - Length, 203–206
    - Procedures, 340, 356
    - Timing, 121–123, 137
    - Western tactics, 262, 345–348, 487
- Egypt, 402–403, 644*n*, 650
- Eisenhower, Dwight D.:
  - Atomic energy, peaceful uses of, 338, 365, 385
  - Austrian State Treaty, 50*n*, 53, 89, 104–106, 115–116
  - China, People's Republic of, 415–416
  - Disarmament, 235, 276, 432–433, 492, 635, 715–716, 781, 791
    - Atomic weapons, 352, 532–533
    - Budgetary controls, 350–351, 442–443
    - French position, 334, 342–343
    - Inspection systems, 400–401, 412–414, 426–429, 434–435, 444–445, 456–457, 529–530
    - Open Skies proposal, 425*n*, 450–453, 487, 540, 553–554, 619*n*, 634
  - East-West trade, 280–282
  - Eastern Europe, 276, 365, 372–373
  - Europe, U.S. policy toward, 225–226, 273–274

- Eisenhower, Dwight D.—Continued
  - European security, 126, 325*n*, 400–401, 406–407, 423–424, 696, 795
    - Demilitarized zones, 278–279, 332, 357–358
    - And German unification, 278, 422, 448
    - Inspection systems, 479–480
    - Molotov statement, 725–727, 747–748
    - Treaty proposals, 275, 449, 474–475
  - Federal Republic of Germany, 230, 546
  - Foreign Ministers Conference, 493–496, 498, 500, 504–512, 547, 777–778, 802
  - German neutrality, 225–226, 279, 348
  - German unification, 341, 345, 365, 393, 488–489, 550, 680
    - Soviet position, 398–399, 689, 795
  - Heart attack, 597*n*, 621, 633, 642–643
  - Indochina, 445–447
  - Iraq, 402, 493
  - North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 392–393, 459, 538
  - Soviet Union, 374–376, 379–380, 382, 402, 417, 475–476, 479, 540–541, 593*n*, 650
  - Summit Conference, 121, 124, 165–167, 172–173, 223, 362, 388, 420, 431, 471
    - Agenda, 196, 383, 475
    - British position, 164–165, 203–205
    - Length, 206–207, 213
    - Opening statements, 335, 358–360, 364–365
    - Procedures, 353, 356
    - Soviet attitudes, 404, 486
    - Timing, 193–195, 207–208
    - U.S. position, 158, 177–179, 182–184, 186–189, 237, 301–304, 340–341, 528–529, 798
    - Western tactics, 269–270, 298, 306–308, 343–344, 347–348
  - Zhukov conversations, 304, 364, 371, 376*n*, 392, 402, 408–418, 436, 440, 488–490, 591
- Eisenhower, Maj. John, 339, 340, 362, 366, 372, 380, 388*n*, 442, 453*n*, 460, 462*n*, 471, 492*n*
- Elbrick, C. Burke, 119*n*, 128, 137–138, 158*n*, 779*n*
- Europe:
  - British forces in, 311
  - Canadian forces in, 236–237
- Europe—Continued
  - U.S. forces in (*see also* Occupation forces withdrawal *under* Germany), 132, 149, 155, 168, 222, 236–237, 251, 254, 261, 273, 279, 293, 311, 370, 387, 406–407
  - U.S. policy towards, 220, 225–226, 273–275, 290–291
- European Coal and Steel Community, 55, 806
- European Defense Community (EDC), 23, 122, 124, 126
- European security (*see also* Disarmament; Europe: U.S. forces in):
  - Balance of forces:
    - British position, 236, 261, 369
    - French position, 318–319
    - FRG position, 235, 310–311, 322
    - U.S. position, 310–311, 561–562
  - British position, 212–213, 307–308, 321, 323–324, 639, 646–647, 719–720, 786–787
  - Demilitarized zones, 184, 323–324, 401, 426
    - British position, 211–212, 253–258, 261, 310, 332, 342, 348, 357, 369, 625–627
    - French position, 254, 324–325, 332, 334
    - FRG position, 229, 310, 322, 600, 625–627
    - Soviet position, 196, 254, 441, 658–659
    - U.S. position, 161, 278–279, 293, 310–311, 324, 357, 556, 626–627, 697
  - Eastern European participation, 275–276, 278, 292–293, 310, 320–324, 334
  - European integration, 163, 593, 675, 696, 760, 796
  - Foreign Ministers Conference agenda, 485, 527
    - British position, 424, 438, 494, 497, 500, 504–505, 508–511
    - French position, 424, 437–438, 496–497, 501, 506–511
    - Soviet position, 419–420, 433–434, 436–438, 464, 468–469, 495–496, 498–499, 503, 505–511
    - U.S. position, 423, 434, 437–438, 440, 486, 495–496, 498, 501, 504, 507–511, 565

European security—Continued
  French position, 307–308, 342, 641–642, 646, 719, 786–787, 801
  FRG position, 134, 147–149
  German Democratic Republic, Soviet policy towards, 618, 720–721, 747–748, 759, 795–796
  And German unification, 394, 437–438, 440, 444, 485, 531, 677
    British position, 261–262, 423–424, 438, 497, 563, 664, 666–667, 687
    French position, 161–162, 267, 311–312, 333–334, 346–347, 393–394, 437–438, 633–634, 664, 666
    FRG position, 156–157, 161–162, 310
    Soviet position, 370, 391, 403, 406, 423–424, 436–437, 458, 484, 489–490, 496, 498, 634, 640–641, 647–648, 665, 674
    U.S. position, 238, 276–278, 310, 315–316, 422, 448, 489–491, 560, 648, 664, 666, 672, 686–687
    Western position, 239, 326–327, 405, 458, 787
  Germany's neighbors, 674, 706, 719–720
  Molotov statement, 720–722
    British position, 734–735
    French position, 736–737
    U.S. position, 725–727, 735–736, 747–748
  NATO role (*see also* Soviet two-stage treaty proposal *below*):
    British position, 212, 254, 639
    French position, 354
    FRG position, 155–157, 310, 322, 324
    Soviet position, 370, 400, 406
    U.S. position, 292, 324, 349, 357, 542–543, 561
  Soviet position, 640–641, 647–648, 674, 752–753, 787–788, 801
  Soviet tactics, 222, 320, 326, 700–702
  Soviet two-stage treaty proposal, 391, 412, 421, 447–479, 516–519, 634, 640, 657–658, 677, 786–787
    French position, 422, 646, 801
    U.S. position, 458–459, 644–646, 660
  Summit Conference agenda, 196
    British position, 320–321, 324, 400
    Soviet position, 222–223, 246*n.* 444
    U.S. position, 146, 185, 189, 192, 239, 257, 309–310, 313–314, 320–321, 324, 357, 359, 400

European security—Continued
  Treaty proposals (*see also* Soviet two-stage treaty proposal *above*), 474–475
    British five-power treaty proposal, 334, 389, 394–395, 406, 423
    British position, 258, 400, 407, 438
    French position, 334, 422, 646, 708
    FRG position, 155–157, 310, 570–572
    Soviet position, 223, 370, 386–387, 396, 400, 406, 411–412, 438
    U.S. position, 275, 400, 406, 438, 645, 660, 661*n.* 787
    U.S. treaty proposals, 542–543, 560–562, 565, 570–572, 598–599
  U.S. position, 291–294, 645–646, 786–787, 800–801
  Warsaw Pact role (*see also* Soviet two-stage treaty proposal *above*), 310, 334, 342, 370, 385, 400
  Western European Union role (*see also* Soviet two-stage treaty proposal *above*), 146, 154, 161, 276, 278, 310, 321, 322, 342, 639
  Western memorandum, 622–623, 629
  Western tactics, 677–678
    British position, 320, 323, 705–710
    French position, 342, 705–711
    FRG position, 322, 681*n.* 710–711
    German Social Democratic Party position, 695–697
    U.S. position, 323–324, 542–543, 564, 599–600, 680–681, 696–698, 704, 706–708
    Working group positions, 325–331

Far East (*see also* China, People's Republic of):
  Soviet policy toward, 10, 157, 250, 257, 329, 370, 612
  Summit Conference agenda, 148, 211, 383–384
    Soviet position, 180, 222–223, 232, 382–383, 487
    U.S. position, 186–187, 193, 297–298, 308, 384
    Working group positions, 146, 160, 329
  U.S. policy towards, 219
Faure, Edgar, 775
  Disarmament, 318–319, 337, 342–343, 349–352, 366, 442–445, 454–455, 521–525, 781
  European security, 325, 422, 424, 593

- Faure, Edgar—Continued
  - Foreign Ministers Conference, 493–494, 496–500, 503–512
  - French political situation, 229, 382, 739
  - German unification, 153, 333–335, 342, 346–348, 365, 393–394, 396, 422
  - Indochina, 172, 445–447, 457
  - Paris Agreements, 139–142
  - Soviet Union, 477–478
  - Summit Conference, 175, 208, 333–334, 339–340, 356, 381, 388, 459
    - Agenda, 174, 388–389, 397, 475
    - Opening statements, 358–360, 365
    - Western tactics, 345–348, 439, 487
    - Working Group proposal, 134–135, 203
- Federal Republic of Germany (*see also FRG subheadings under other subjects*; German unification; Germany; Paris Agreements), 148, 162, 228, 294, 558, 597
  - Demilitarized zone plans, 253–254
  - German Democratic Republic, relations with. *See* All-German council proposal *under* German unification.
  - Military volunteers legislation, 225, 227
  - Rearmament (*see also* Paris Agreements), 15, 26, 132, 150, 170, 219, 251, 634, 646–647
  - Saar issue, 137–140
  - Social Democratic Party, 148, 150, 228, 652, 676, 695–699, 737
  - Soviet Union, relations with, 224–225, 230–231, 235–236, 238, 288, 290, 307, 369, 399, 531, 538, 548, 552, 593–594, 634, 723
    - FRG public opinion, 322
    - German unification, 567–569
    - Prisoners of war, 235, 544
    - U.S. position, 546, 567–571
  - United States, relations with, 121–122, 132, 228–231, 294–295, 589–592
- Figl, Leopold:
  - Austrian State Treaty, 36, 38–39, 41, 45, 74–77, 86, 95, 103, 109, 115
    - Anschluss security guarantee, 2–3, 11–12
    - Military limitations, 68–69
    - Neutrality, 10, 57–58, 66, 83
    - Occupation forces withdrawal, 80–81, 84, 100
    - Raab visit to Moscow, 22, 30
    - Soviet position, 4–7
  - Yugoslavia, 102
- Finland, 184, 373, 377
- Five-Power Conference proposal. *See under* China, People's Republic of.
- Flemming, Arthur S., 184–185, 188
- **Foreign Ministers Conference** (*see also* Disarmament; East-West contacts; East-West trade; European security; German unification), 588, 631–633, 636, 643–644, 651, 661, 667, 681–682, 690, 694, 702–703, 727–728, 739–740, 749–750, 754, 766, 770
  - Agenda, 419–420, 515, 527–528, 598
    - British position, 494, 497, 499–500, 504–506, 508–511
    - French position, 494, 496–498, 500–501, 504–511
    - Order of discussion, 468–471, 474–475, 484–485, 489, 494–501, 503–511, 531
    - Soviet position, 489–491, 494–495, 499–500, 503–511
    - U.S. position, 489–491, 495–496, 498, 501, 504–511
  - Communiqué, 770–771, 792–794, 802
  - FRG participation. *See under* German unification.
  - GDR participation. *See under* German unification.
  - National Security Council discussion of, 616–620
  - NATO role, 543–544, 779
  - Opening statements, 633–635
  - Preparations for, 543, 613–614, 620
  - Press relations, 629–630, 705–706, 709
  - Soviet position, 768–769
  - Soviet tactics:
    - French position, 806–808
    - U.S. position, 798–799, 803–804
  - U.S. position, 699–700, 759–760, 767–768, 777–778, 795–797
  - Western tactics, 542, 553–554, 569, 612–613, 618, 621, 747–749, 776
- Four-Power Conference proposal. *See* Summit Conference; *see under* Austrian State Treaty.
- France (*see also France, French, and Western subheadings under other subjects*):
  - Austrian State Treaty, 2*n*, 90–95, 99–101, 103, 107, 113, 115
  - Disarmament, 334, 339, 349–354, 361, 385, 496–497, 521–525, 634, 717
    - Budgetary controls, 366, 442–443, 454, 521–522, 745
    - Inspection systems, 338, 444

France—Continued
  Foreign Ministers Conference communiqué, 792–794
  Germany, relations with, 274, 291, 293
  Indochina, 175, 445–447, 457–458
  North Africa, 274, 446, 660
  Political situation, 3, 131, 229
  Saar issue, 137–140
  Soviet Union, relations with, 290, 690
  Summit Conference information leak, 197–198
  U.S. military assistance, 125–126
Franco y Bahamonde, Generalissimo Francisco, 660–661
François-Poncet, André, 584–586, 588
Freund, Richard B., 1*n*, 4*n*, 16, 19*n*, 20*n*, 30, 33*n*, 44*n*

Galloway, William J., 253, 261*n*, 262, 313*n*, 560, 605
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 266
Genevey, Gen. Pierre, 637, 670, 715, 742
George, Walter F., 180, 225–226, 340, 435*n*
German Democratic Republic (*see also GDR subheadings under other subjects*; German unification; Germany):
  Berlin Autobahn tolls issue, 169, 218, 234, 698
  British position, 614
  Demilitarized zones, 253–254, 256–257, 278–279, 324, 334, 347
  FRG position, 148, 574, 576, 593
  Federal Republic of Germany, relations with (*see also* All-German council proposal *under* German unification), 228
  Soviet Union, relations with, 156, 168, 251–252, 295, 310, 418, 531, 542, 545, 549, 558, 575, 618, 623, 677, 680–681, 720–721, 747–748, 759, 795–796
  U.S. policy toward, 294–295
German unification (*see also* European security; Germany; *German subheadings under other subjects*), 122, 123*n*, 133, 145
  All-German council proposal, 665–667, 674, 687–688, 698–699, 721, 736–737
  British position, 267–268, 368–369, 614–615
  And disarmament, 627–628
  And Eastern Europe, 168, 251, 295

German unification—Continued
  Eden Plan:
    British position, 257, 261, 267–268, 323, 614, 639, 673
    FRG position, 133, 149, 154–155, 266
    Soviet position, 155, 405–406, 641, 665, 673–674, 677, 688, 703–704, 720–721
    U.S. position, 151, 291–292, 542, 672, 688
  And European security, 156, 261–262, 267, 276–277, 292–293, 310–312, 394, 437–438, 440, 444, 485, 531, 677
    British position, 161, 261–262, 321, 389, 423–424, 497, 563, 664, 666–667, 687
    French position, 161–162, 267, 311–312, 332–334, 346–347, 393–394, 633–634, 664, 666
    FRG position, 155–157, 161–162
    Soviet position, 391, 403, 406, 423–424, 458, 484, 489–490, 496, 498, 634, 647–648, 665, 674
    U.S. position, 276–278, 310, 315–316, 422, 448, 489–491, 560, 648, 664, 666, 672, 686–687
    Western position, 239, 326–327, 405, 787
  Foreign Ministers conference agenda, 474, 485–486, 527
    British position, 342, 344, 397, 438, 494, 497, 500, 504–505, 510–511
    French position, 346, 396–397, 437–438, 496–498, 501, 503–510
    Soviet position, 397–398, 419–420, 423, 433, 435–438, 464, 468–469, 472–473, 475, 495–498, 500, 503–511
    U.S. position, 419–420, 437–440, 495–496, 498, 501, 504–508, 510, 565
    Western position, 470, 494
  French position, 365–366, 641–642, 672–673
  FRG participation (*see also under* Summit Conference):
    French position, 656–657
    FRG position, 600–601, 623–625, 649, 675–676
    Soviet position, 473, 481, 484, 656–657, 688, 737–738
    U.S. position, 473, 623–625, 656
    Western position, 474, 708–709

- German unification—Continued
  - FRG position, 132, 147, 149–150, 153–154, 168, 235, 266–268, 418, 567–569, 665, 805
  - FRG public opinion, 147–148
  - And FRG NATO membership, 284, 406–407, 490, 575, 634, 721
  - GDR participation (*see also under* Summit Conference), 474, 485–486, 647, 649
    - British position, 614–615
    - French position, 394, 656–657
    - FRG position, 134, 600–601, 623–625
    - Soviet position, 390–391, 473, 481, 484, 647, 656–657, 737–738
    - U.S. position, 473, 481, 623–625, 656
    - Western position, 708–709
  - German Democratic Republic, Soviet policy towards, 168, 251–252, 558, 618, 665, 703, 720–721, 747–748, 759, 795–796, 803
  - And German NATO membership, 390–391, 399, 701–702, 707, 719, 721, 753
  - Molotov statement, 720–722
    - British position, 734–735
    - French position, 736–737
    - U.S. position, 725–727, 735–736, 747–748
  - Oder-Neisse line, 132, 148–149, 154, 212
  - Provisional security treaty proposal, 614–615
  - Soviet position, 132, 155–156, 284, 465, 530–531, 538, 549, 575, 593, 752–753, 787–788, 801
  - Summit Conference agenda, 191–192, 196, 239, 309–310, 323, 444
    - Soviet position, 222, 235, 251
  - U.S. position, 150, 219, 291, 365, 398, 549, 553, 666, 786–787, 800–801
  - U.S. tactics, 616–617
  - Western memorandum, 622–623, 629
  - Western tactics, 326–327, 439, 443, 531–532, 677–678, 680–681, 689, 704–711
    - British position, 320, 341–342, 344–345, 399–400
    - French position, 346–347
    - FRG position, 555–559, 649, 681*n*
    - German Social Democratic Party position, 695–697
    - U.S. position, 251, 345, 557, 564, 572–573, 599–600
- Germany (*see also* Anschluss security guarantee *under* Austrian State Treaty; *German subheadings under other subjects*; German unification; German Democratic Republic; Federal Republic of Germany):
  - Assets in Austria, 23–25, 36, 42, 48, 58, 73, 94, 105
  - And Austrian State Treaty, 13, 25–26, 33, 36, 43, 44*n*, 49–50
  - Demilitarization (*see also* Demilitarized zones *under* European security), 2, 133, 161, 211–212, 719–720
  - France, relations with, 274, 291, 293
  - Military potential of, 238
  - NATO forces in, 625–627, 629, 710–711
  - Neutrality, 1, 13, 334, 600
    - British position, 341, 652
    - French position, 151, 342, 346
    - FRG position, 133, 154–155, 157, 292
    - Soviet position, 13, 196, 320, 702
    - U.S. position, 225, 292, 348, 384, 652, 696–697
  - Occupation forces withdrawal, 133, 219, 222
    - British position, 267–268
    - Soviet position, 222, 596, 665, 738, 786
    - U.S. position, 158*n*, 219, 279, 293, 295
  - Peace treaty, 6, 145–146, 154
  - Rearmament of, 11, 13, 54, 276–277, 334, 395, 786
    - FRG position, 133, 149, 154
    - Soviet position, 238, 289
- Gleason, S. Everett, 54, 59, 182–189, 268–283, 616–620, 747–749, 803–806
- Goodkind, Louis W., 605, 609–610, 669, 685, 690–691, 712, 714, 715*n*, 722–724, 733–734
- Goodpaster, Col. Andrew J., 124*n*, 306*n*, 340–341, 366–368, 428–429, 432–433, 442, 460
- Gowen, Franklin C., 471, 514–515, 537–539
- Gray, Gordon, 609, 742, 746
- Greece, 256, 658
- Grewe, Wilhelm, 309*n*, 570–571, 597, 615, 649, 674, 676, 695, 698
- Gromyko, Andrei Andreevich, 35, 372, 375, 380, 433, 754
- Gruber, Karl, 4–6, 16–19, 21–22, 24–25, 28–32, 49–50, 51*n*, 55

- Gruenther, Gen. Alfred M., 425–426, 428–429, 431, 442, 453, 460, 617, 625–626

- Ha Vinh Phuong, 667
- Hagerty, James:
  - Foreign Ministers Conference, 777–778
  - Summit Conference, 340, 366*n*, 371*n*, 372, 379, 388, 419*n*, 431, 460, 462*n*
- Hallstein, Walter:
  - Federal Republic of Germany, 570–571, 584–585, 587–588, 591*n*
  - Foreign Ministers Conference, 567, 597, 625
  - German unification, 315*n*, 538
  - Summit Conference, 167, 318, 515
- Hammarskjöld, Dag, 364, 366–368
- Hancock, Patrick F., 343*n*, 597, 670, 742, 792
- Handler, 589, 591, 676
- D'Harcourt, 669, 684–686, 711–712, 722–725, 732–734
- Harrison, Geoffrey, 151, 309*n*, 314, 343*n*, 381, 597, 704–710, 792
- Hayter, William G., 92–93, 343*n*
- Hensel, Struve, 186
- Heusinger, Lt. Gen. Adolf, 229
- Heuss, Theodor, 139
- Hitler, Adolf, 576, 579
- Hohler, Henry A.F., 656, 669, 693, 728–731
- Hollister, John B., 282
- Hood, Samuel, 223, 232, 502, 573, 597, 706, 792
- Hooper, Peter, Jr., 130*n*, 145
- Hoover, Herbert, Jr., 560, 614*n*, 642–643, 777–779
  - Austrian State Treaty, 4–5, 7, 51–53, 105–106
  - Foreign Ministers Conference, 620, 747–749, 777–779
  - Soviet Union, 458, 578, 581, 678–680, 689
  - Summit Conference, 130–131, 173, 177–180, 207–209, 305*n*
- Hoover, J. Edgar, 606–607
- Humphrey, George M., 184, 272, 278, 281–282, 617, 621, 642, 677*n*
- Hungary, 12, 55, 105, 110, 112, 165, 220, 295, 396, 550, 606, 749

- Ilichev, Ivan Ivanovich, 2–3, 35, 66–70, 73–77, 80–87, 92–95, 97–104, 106, 108–109, 441*n*
- Indochina, 308, 329, 369, 445–447, 457–458, 786
- International Atomic Energy Agency, 533
- International Control Commission, 445, 457
- International Cooperation Administration, 282*n*
- Iraq, 402, 427, 432, 493
- Italy, 174–175, 229, 254, 269, 513, 759–760

- Jackson, C.D., 216–217, 301–305
- Jackson, William H., 602–610, 643, 668, 678, 694, 715*n*, 740–741, 760–764, 776
- Jacquin de Margerie, Roland, 566*n*, 568, 667, 703–711, 742, 758
  - Foreign Ministers Conference, 754, 792, 806–808
  - Summit Conference, 198, 343, 381
- Japan, 219–220, 247, 265, 270, 288, 290, 548, 552
- Jebb, Sir Gladwyn M.H., 121*n*, 129, 333
- Johnson, U. Alexis, 363, 703, 780
- Joint Chiefs of Staff, 53, 157–158, 186, 268–272, 276, 278–279, 617–618
- Jones, John Wesley, 1*n*, 4*n*, 30, 47*n*, 64*n*, 130*n*
- Joxe, Louis, 259–260, 493, 502, 792
- Jurgensen, Jean, 44*n*, 45*n*, 267

- Kemenev, V.S., 669, 682, 692–693, 694*n*, 728–731
- Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeyevich, 93, 372, 377–378, 440, 554
  - Disarmament, 456–457, 464, 529–530, 533
  - European security, 441, 444, 479–480
  - Foreign Ministers Meeting, 494, 499, 505, 509
  - German unification, 435–436, 444
  - Soviet Union:
    - Federal Republic of Germany, relations with, 576, 579, 584–587, 595–596
    - Foreign policy, 226, 227*n*, 611
    - Political situation, 248, 378–380, 592
    - United States, relations with, 371, 441*n*, 462, 479, 487, 541
  - Summit Conference, 258–260, 362, 364*n*, 375, 398, 459, 490
- Khvostov, 693, 729–731

Kidd, Coburn B., 1*n*, 138*n*, 156*n*, 539, 554*n*, 566*n*, 578*n*, 581*n*, 610*n*, 695, 703
  European security, 253, 571, 674
  Foreign Ministers Conference, 643, 667
  German unification, 573*n*, 597, 614–615, 649
  Soviet Union, 555, 567
  Summit Conference, 145, 153, 262, 514–515, 537
Kirkpatrick, Ivone, 161–162, 343, 494, 502, 515, 571–573, 615, 652, 742, 792
Knowland, William F., 226, 307, 435*n*, 532
Kreisky, Bruno, 2, 10–12, 19, 22–26, 28–30, 37–39, 41–43, 57–58, 85
Krekeler, Heinz L., 230, 232, 555, 557–558, 567–568, 570, 591*n*, 597

Lalouette, Roger, 12, 62, 66*n*, 67, 73–77, 80–84, 93–95, 99–103, 107
Lay, James S., 247, 268*n*, 287*n*
Leishman, Frederick J., 253, 542
Lemberger, Ernst, 16, 30
Linebarger, Paul, 216–217
Litvinov Agreement, 196, 240, 280
Luce, Clare Booth, 620, 724
Lyon, Cecil B., 128*n*, 130, 132*n*, 145, 190

MacArthur, Douglas, II, 193*n*, 195*n*, 196*n*, 313*n*, 315*n*, 323*n*, 341*n*, 372, 388*n*, 578*n*, 614*n*, 630*n*, 631*n*, 649*n*, 770*n*
  Disarmament, 563, 636, 667, 670, 742–743
  East-West contacts, 566, 609–610, 643
  European security, 253, 255–256, 258*n*, 322, 560
  Foreign Ministers Conference, 588, 597, 681, 704, 706–708, 710–711, 780, 792, 794*n*
  German unification, 554, 559
  Soviet Union, 380, 605, 607
  Summit Conference, 197*n*, 209–213, 214*n*, 232, 363, 431–432, 487
    Procedures, 183–186, 190–192, 243
    Western tactics, 257, 262, 264–265, 305*n*, 318, 343
    Working Groups, 223, 381, 404, 419, 468
McCardle, Carl W., 190, 201*n*, 340, 363, 381, 388, 404, 432, 636, 667, 792
Mackenzie, Archibald R.K., 636, 670, 715, 717, 742
Macmillan, Harold, 240, 466, 622
Macmillan, Harold—Continued
  Austrian State Treaty, 84, 88, 90–92, 104, 107, 113, 115
  Disarmament, 334–335, 351–352, 482–484, 628–630, 667, 789
    Inspection systems, 563, 745–746, 751–752
    Western tactics, 670–671, 742–743, 800
  East-West contacts, 654–655, 772–773, 775, 784, 786
  East-West trade, 630–631
  European security, 323–324, 401, 406, 646–648, 786–787
    Demilitarized zones, 357–358, 625–627
    And German unification, 634, 659
    Germany's neighbors, 719–720
    Molotov statement, 725–726, 734–735, 738–740
    Summit Conference agenda, 314, 319–321
    Western position, 239, 596, 599, 622–623, 639, 801
  Foreign Ministers Conference, 543, 600–601, 623–625, 632, 633*n*, 667, 709, 740, 750, 766, 780, 792–794
    Agenda, 486, 493, 499, 502–503, 597*n*
    British position, 632, 643
    Middle East, 636, 643, 651, 727, 754, 780
    Western tactics, 620–621
  German Democratic Republic, 233–234, 600–601, 623–625
  German unification, 332, 405, 407, 648, 657, 664, 666–667
    Elections, 673, 687–688
    Foreign Ministers Conference agenda, 438, 469, 471, 481
    Soviet position, 399, 786–788, 801
    Western position, 573, 639
  Summit Conference, 174, 178, 195*n*, 204–209, 233–234, 236, 362, 372, 381, 398
    Agenda, 191, 232, 383
    British position, 164*n*, 170*n*, 172, 176, 211, 304
    Procedures, 243, 245
    Timing, 193, 202–203, 214
Magistrati, Massimo, 460, 513
Makins, Roger M.:
  European security, 253–258, 313–314, 570

Makins, Roger M.—Continued
  Foreign Ministers Conference, 542–544, 596
  Summit Conference, 164–165, 191, 197, 203*n*, 204*n*, 209–213, 215, 223, 232, 262*n*, 273
Malenkov, Georgii Maksimilianovich, 248, 258, 587
Malik, Yakov Aleksandrovich, 398*n*, 502
Manac'h, Etienne, 669, 729–731
Marshall Plan, 122
Martino, Gaetano, 174, 225
Massigli, René, 129–130, 141–142, 333
Matsu, 358, 416
Mendès-France, Pierre, 30, 119–121, 124–131, 135
Menthon, Pierre Bernard de, 637–638, 670, 715–717, 742
Merchant, Livingston T., 1*n*, 20*n*, 33*n*, 44*n*, 64*n*, 97*n*, 124*n*, 128*n*, 130*n*, 132*n*, 143*n*, 158*n*, 195*n*, 196*n*, 197*n*, 315*n*, 323*n*, 341*n*, 364*n*, 368*n*, 379*n*, 453*n*, 457*n*, 493*n*, 499*n*, 573*n*, 578*n*, 581*n*, 610*n*, 614*n*, 630*n*, 631*n*, 636, 698, 749, 795*n*
  Austrian State Treaty, 5*n*, 16, 103
  Disarmament, 425*n*, 461, 742, 754
  East-West contacts, 502, 512
  European security, 253–256, 322, 566*n*, 571–572
  Federal Republic of Germany, 224, 228–232, 538, 550, 567–571, 676
  Foreign Ministers Conference, 494, 588, 596, 643, 651, 766, 767, 780, 792
  German unification, 256–257, 555–557, 649, 695–696
  Soviet Union, 147, 167, 258, 380, 462, 605
  Summit Conference, 190–191, 201*n*, 232, 243, 340, 362–363, 372, 376, 388, 431–432, 460, 487, 514
    Western tactics, 262–264, 318, 343
    Working group, 145, 381, 404, 468
Middle East, 769–770
Mikoyan, Anastas Ivanovich, 35, 42–43, 93, 258
Millikan, Max, 216–217
Molotov, Vyacheslav Mikhailovich:
  Austrian State Treaty, 74, 90–91, 104, 116
    Soviet position, 1–12, 15*n*, 23, 35–38, 47–49, 88, 92–93, 107, 115, 175
Molotov, Vyacheslav Mikhailovich—Continued
  China, People's Republic of, 463–464
  Disarmament, 251, 464, 482–484, 486, 635, 670–671, 715, 758, 780–782
    Atomic weapons, 754–756
    Inspection systems, 750–752, 804
    Open Skies proposal, 456, 744–746
  East-West contacts, 609*n*, 635, 654–655, 685, 740, 761, 768–769, 773–775, 783–786
  European security, 325–326, 644, 647–648, 658–569
    Foreign Ministers Conference agenda, 433–434, 436–439, 449, 468–471
    Foreign Ministers Conference statement, 720–722, 725–726, 734–737, 747–748
    And German unification, 634, 639–641, 686–687
    Soviet position, 700–702, 752–753, 786–788, 801
  Foreign Ministers Conference, 543–544, 588, 632–633, 651675, 678, 742–743, 754, 766, 780
    Agenda, 486, 494–495, 502–503, 597–598
    Communiqué, 792–794
    Press relations, 705, 709–710
    Soviet position, 706–707, 711, 748, 767–768, 807
  German unification, 256, 397–398, 403–405, 407, 435–436, 689, 697, 738–739
    All-German council proposal, 665–667, 674
    Elections, 673, 677, 688, 703–704
    Foreign Ministers Conference agenda, 419–420, 440–441, 472–473, 481, 489
    GDR partcipation, 656–657, 664–665
    Soviet position, 465, 700–702, 720–722, 786–788, 801
  Middle East, 769–770
  Soviet Union:
    Federal Republic of Germany, relations with, 576, 585, 587
    Foreign policy, 270, 329, 359, 548, 611, 650
    Political situation, 226, 379, 380
    United States, relations with, 374, 541, 679

- Molotov, Vyacheslav Mikhailovich—Continued
  - Summit Conference, 181, 215, 317*n*, 345–346, 367, 398*n*, 482–484
    - Agenda, 183, 243–246, 383–384, 387, 475
    - Procedures, 247*n*, 308, 355–356
    - Soviet attitudes, 258, 375, 382, 459
    - Timing, 152, 159, 194, 202, 204, 208
- Mosely, Philip, 216–217
- Murphy, Robert, 51*n*, 124, 192, 201*n*, 230, 262, 578*n*, 581*n*, 779*n*

- National Intelligence Estimate *11-3-155*, 271–272
- National Security Council:
  - Action No. *1383*, 59
  - Austrian State Treaty, 52–54, 59–60, 64
  - Documents:
    - NSC *164/1*, 52–54, 59, 61
    - NSC *5524*, 247–252, 268–283, 287–298
  - Foreign Ministers Conference, 616–620, 747–749, 803–805
  - Germany, 805
  - North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 805–806
  - Soviet atomic weapons development, 748–749
  - Summit conference, 182–189, 247–252, 268–283, 529–535
- Near East, 726, 778
- Nehru, Jawaharlal, 317, 330, 358, 457, 467
- Neutralism (*see also under individual countries*), 320, 370, 383–384, 534
- Ngo Dinh Diem, 445–447
- Nixon, Richard M., 177, 280, 306, 618–619, 621, 642, 677*n*, 748
- North Africa, 274, 446, 660
- North Atlantic Council, 88*n*, 116, 136, 167, 806–808
- North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (*see also* Paris Agreements; Soviet two-stage treaty proposal *under* European security):
  - Austria, 16, 26, 110
  - British position, 341, 395
  - European security, role in:
    - British position, 212, 254, 639
    - French position, 354
    - FRG position, 155–157, 310, 322, 324
    - Soviet position, 370, 400, 406
    - U.S. position, 292, 324, 349, 357, 542–544, 561
- North Atlantic Treaty Organization—Continued
  - Foreign Ministers Conference, 543–544, 779
  - French position, 312, 342, 393–394
  - FRG membership, 116, 153, 156–157, 265, 284, 291–292, 406–407, 490, 634, 721, 805–806
  - German membership, 133
    - British position, 161, 211–212, 253, 646
    - French position, 346–347, 394, 641, 719, 787
    - FRG position, 538, 753
    - Soviet position, 289, 386–387, 390–391, 399, 498, 641, 647, 701–702, 707, 737, 753, 787
    - U.S. position, 219, 291–293, 393, 562, 564, 616–617
  - Soviet position, 370, 385, 395, 399, 409, 458, 576, 735
  - And Summit Conference, 233
  - U.S. position, 146, 220, 291, 315–316, 392–393, 406, 411, 438, 441, 801
  - Western position, 327
- Norway, 110, 255–256, 563
- Nuclear weapons. *See* Atomic weapons.

- O'Connor, Roderic L., 432, 439*n*
- Ollenhauer, Erich, 225, 676, 694–699, 703, 708
- Open Skies proposal. *See under* Disarmament.
- Operations Coordinating Board, 52–53, 146
- Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), 31
- O'Shaughnessy, Elim, 132–134, 566*n*, 567, 591*n*

- Palmer, Joseph, II, 130*n*, 138*n*, 143*n*, 145, 315*n*
- Paris Agreements (*see also* North Atlantic Treaty Organization: FRG membership), 170, 211
  - And Austrian State Treaty, 2–3, 6–9, 11, 15–16, 18
  - British position, 3, 139
  - And European security, 155–157, 316, 327, 407
  - French ratification of, 23, 120, 124–131, 138–139, 141–142
  - FRG position, 9, 130–131, 147, 537
  - And Saar issue, 138–140

- Paris Agreements—Continued
  - And Soviet foreign policy, 548, 551
  - Soviet position, 1, 8–9, 11, 13, 127, 249, 458, 575–576, 673, 721
  - And Summit Conference, 119–122, 123*n*, 125, 130–131, 135, 137–142, 163, 169–170, 307
  - U.S. position, 138–141, 143, 805–806
- Penfield, James K., 2–3
- Perkins, George W., 806–808
- Pervuhkin, Mikhail Geogievich, 258, 260
- Pettee, George, 216–217
- Phleger, Herman, 405*n*, 493*n*, 502, 560, 614*n*, 649*n*
  - China, People's Republic of, 466, 636, 703
  - Foreign Ministers Conference, 432, 494, 565, 597, 651, 667, 792
  - Soviet Union, 605–606, 608–610
  - Summit Conference, 262, 263, 372, 381, 388, 404, 419, 431, 468, 487
- Pinay, Antoine:
  - Austrian State Treaty, 88, 90–92, 107, 113, 115, 175
  - Disarmament, 338–339, 349, 351, 353, 483–484, 745, 751–752
    - And German unification, 628–630
    - Western position, 789, 800
  - East-West contacts, 240, 653, 668–669, 684, 760, 774–775, 784–786
  - European security, 324–325, 566*n*, 646, 648, 664, 704–707, 710, 719, 760, 801
    - Balance of forces, 318–319
    - Demilitarized zones, 332, 625–627
    - And German unification, 633–634
    - Molotov statement, 725–726, 736–737, 739–740
    - Western memorandum, 622–623, 629
  - Federal Republic of Germany, 225, 238
  - Foreign Ministers Conference, 473, 621, 632, 643, 651, 675, 681, 708, 727
    - Agenda, 486, 493, 501–503, 597
    - Communiqué, 791–794
    - GDR participation, 601, 624
    - Opening speeches, 633–634
  - France, 229, 382, 652
  - German unification, 405–407, 437–438, 469, 471, 481, 622–623, 641–642, 648, 664, 666, 672–673
    - All-German council proposal, 687
    - FRG participation, 656–657
    - Western memorandum, 622–623, 629
  - Paris Agreements, 139–140, 143
- Pinay, Antoine—Continued
  - Summit Conference, 138, 153, 176–177, 194–195, 201–203, 205, 233, 244, 381
    - Agenda, 232, 383
    - Opening statements, 333–335, 358–360
    - Timing, 193*n*, 197–198, 207, 214
    - Western tactics, 236, 343, 439
    - Working groups, 134–135, 141
- Pink, I.T.M., 636–638, 667, 670, 715–717, 742, 792
- Poland, 148, 276
  - European security, 253–254, 324, 396, 407, 658, 666, 706, 720, 737
  - Soviet Union, relations with, 168, 293, 295
- Possony, Stefan, 216–217
- Pushkin, Georgii Maksimovich, 169, 792

- Quantico Vulnerabilities Panel, 216–220, 453*n*
- Quemoy, 356, 416

- Raab, Julius:
  - Austrian State Treaty, 2*n*, 14*n*, 23–24, 28–29, 44–46, 47*n*, 51, 56, 96, 111–112
    - Moscow visit, 15, 19–22, 26–27, 30, 34
    - Neutrality, 39, 55, 57–58
    - Occupation forces withdrawal, 42, 79, 109–110
  - Germany, 54, 153–154
  - Summit Conference, 201
- Radford, Adm. Arthur W., 239, 442*n*, 460, 466, 617
  - Atomic weapons, 384–386
  - Disarmament, 429, 434, 453*n*
  - East-West trade, 281, 609
  - European security, 278–279, 315, 479, 617
- Radio Free Europe, 280, 729, 762
- Reinstein, Jacques J., 145, 158*n*, 190, 614
- Rockefeller, Nelson A., 134, 298–301, 305–306, 400*n*, 404, 419*n*, 425, 442, 453*n*, 460, 471, 609
- Roux, Jacques, 457, 458*n*
- Rumania, 105, 220, 295, 607
- Russell, Francis, 630*n*, 631*n*, 636, 643, 661, 740

- Saar, 137–140, 558, 675

- Sauvagnargues, Jean-Victor, 232, 597, 670, 792
- Schaerf, Adolf, 2*n*, 19, 22–23, 25, 30, 44–45, 57–58, 96, 109, 111–112
- Schoener, Josef, 22, 58
- Schulz, Col. Robert, 372*n*, 472
- Scott, Robert, 560, 562–563, 565, 588
- Semenov, Vladimir S., 9, 11–12, 576
- Seydoux, François, 151, 155–156
- Six-Power Conference issue. *See* Five- or Six-Power conference proposal *under* China, People's Republic of.
- Smith Bromley, 308, 529*n*
- Sobolev, Arkady Aleksandrovich, 244, 767, 780, 788, 792
- Soldatov, Aleksandr Andreevich, 386–387, 460–462
- Soutou, Jean, 597, 709
- Soviet Union (*see also* Austrian State Treaty; East-West contacts; East-West trade; *Soviet subheadings under other subjects*), 147, 187, 723
  - Atomic energy, 533, 586, 668, 693
  - China, People's Republic of, 10, 168, 219, 249, 491–492
    - Economic assistance, 227, 248, 463, 530, 592
    - Summit Conference participation, 180–181, 288
    - U.N. membership, 290, 370, 416
  - Disarmament, 635, 751, 756–759
    - Foreign Ministers statement, 781, 789–791
    - Inspection systems, 251, 412–413, 804–805
    - Proposal of *July 21, 1955*, 519–520
    - Proposal of *May 10, 1955*, 183–184, 222, 236, 288, 334, 369, 449–450, 455, 482, 492, 548, 551–552, 752
    - Summit Conference agenda, 199–200, 223
  - Economic situation:
    - FRG position, 147, 168, 235
    - Soviet position, 259, 374–375, 378, 418
    - U.S. position, 221–222, 226–227, 248, 264–265, 284, 548, 569
  - Egypt, arms sales to, 402, 644*n*, 650
  - Federal Republic of Germany, relations with, 224–225, 555, 585–587, 593–594, 634, 723
    - British position, 236, 238
    - And foreign policy, 222, 288, 307, 369, 548, 552

Soviet Union—Continued
  - Federal Republic of Germany, relations with —Continued
    - FRG public opinion, 322, 391
    - German unification, 531, 538, 555–559, 567–569, 574
    - Prisoners of war, 235, 544, 575–576, 581–585, 587
    - U.S. position, 238, 544–546, 573–575, 578, 581, 583–584, 587–588, 595
  - Foreign Ministers Conference communiqué, 792–794
  - Foreign policy, 2, 154–155, 163, 236, 249, 402
    - Economic situation effects on, 147, 168, 221–222, 226–227, 235, 248, 264–265, 284, 548, 569
    - FRG position, 168–169, 258
    - U.S. position, 173, 185, 226–227, 247–252, 268–273, 275, 288–290, 307, 548–553, 611–613, 796, 804
  - German Democratic Republic, relations with, 545, 595–596
  - Indochina, 329, 369, 786
  - Japan, 247, 270, 288, 548, 552
  - Near East, 726, 778
  - Political situation, 379–380, 417–418, 592, 611
  - Prisoners of war, 40, 235, 328–329, 417, 544, 575–576, 579, 581–585, 587
  - Stalin's death, 221, 248, 271, 289
  - United States, relations with (*see also* East-West trade):
    - Arms race, 247, 410–411, 586, 592–593, 606
    - Cultural exchanges, 252, 374, 386
    - Exchange of persons, 678–680
    - Summit Conference, 371–376, 382, 408–411, 417, 487–488, 540–541
    - Trade relations, 723–724
  - U.S. policy towards, 193, 216–220, 287–288, 290, 553–554
  - West, relations with, 359–360
  - Yugoslavia, relations with, 222, 227, 248, 288, 307, 369, 399, 542, 548–549, 551
- Spain, 400, 660
- Speier, Hans, 216–217
- Stalin, Josef, 248, 289, 307, 380, 399, 552
- Stassen, Harold E., 281, 617

- Stassen, Harold E.—Continued
  - Disarmament, 183–184, 276–278, 285–286, 337–339, 400–401, 742
    - Open skies proposal, 428–429, 434, 453*n*, 532
    - U.S. position, 237, 425, 618–619, 718, 788, 791
  - Foreign Ministers Conference, 419*n*, 746, 754, 770, 780
  - Summit Conference, 404, 420, 442*n*, 460, 499*n*, 728
- Stoessel, Walter J., Jr., 605–607, 669, 692, 694, 728–731
- Streibert, Theodore C., 530, 551*n*
- Sullivan, Charles A., 253, 255, 262, 264–265, 311, 597
- Summit Conference (*see also* Foreign Ministers Conference agenda *subheadings;* Four-power conference proposals; *individual subjects discussed*):
  - Agenda, 159, 196, 325–326, 383–384, 475
    - British position, 135–136, 210–211, 213
    - FRG position, 148
    - Soviet position, 196, 246*n*, 251
    - U.S. position, 159, 166, 237–239, 300
  - Approaches to the Soviet Union, 179, 195, 215, 241
    - British position, 127*n*, 152–153
    - French position, 126–128, 197–198
    - U.S. position, 119–121, 124–125, 128, 130–131, 144, 159–160, 171–172, 174
  - British position, 160–161, 164–165, 170*n*, 176, 203–205, 210–214, 273
  - Chinese People's Republic participation, 180–181, 187–188, 297
  - Communiqué, 511–512
  - Declaration of principles, 263–264, 312*n*, 317–318, 330–331
  - Documentation, 361–363
  - Five- or Six-power conference proposal. *See under* China, People's Republic of.
  - Foreign Ministers directive, 527–528
  - French position, 141–142, 155–156, 161–162, 202, 333
  - French public opinion, 151, 273
  - FRG participation (*see also under* German unification), 151, 153, 169, 233–234
  - FRG position, 153–156, 169–170, 234–235, 514, 537–540

- Summit Conference—Continued
  - GDR participation (*see also under* German unification), 169, 233–234
  - Length of, 150, 203–208, 213, 243–244, 246
  - Location, 152, 156, 159, 173, 176, 181, 190–191, 194, 197–198, 205, 208
  - National Security Council discussions, 182–189, 268–283, 529–535
  - NATO involvement, 137, 140, 151, 177, 233, 265, 311, 339, 341
  - Opening statements, 325, 340, 342, 345–348, 355–356, 359–360
    - France, 333–335, 342, 346–347, 349, 365–366
    - Soviet Union, 369–371, 384–386
    - United Kingdom, 210, 368–369
    - United States, 341, 343–344, 360, 365
  - And Paris Agreements, 119–122, 123*n*, 125, 130–131, 135, 137–142, 163, 169–170, 307
  - Press relations, 177, 242, 245–246
  - Procedures and protocol, 241–246, 335, 356
  - Public opinion, 174, 234, 237, 308
  - Significance of, 530, 539–540, 546, 554, 602, 796–799, 803–804
  - Soviet attitudes, 375, 382, 398, 430, 459, 486, 537–540
  - Soviet position, 120, 181, 199–201, 259–260, 378, 487, 552
  - Soviet relations with the United States, 488–489
  - Soviet tactics, 156, 222, 232, 284, 326–327, 329–331
    - U.S. position, 122, 249–252, 271–272
    - Western position, 326, 329–331
  - Timing, 123*n*, 152, 156, 159, 161, 163, 173, 180–182, 197–198, 307
    - British position, 135, 139, 204–205
    - French position, 139, 201–202, 214
    - U.S. position, 119–122, 125, 130–131, 136–141, 159, 193–194, 207–208
  - U.S. position, 158, 170–173, 177–180, 301–308, 333, 547–550, 797–798
  - U.S tactics, 185, 191–193, 218–219
  - Western tactics, 196, 257, 269, 284–285, 318, 330–331
    - French position, 236, 311–312
    - FRG position, 234–235, 315
    - U.S. position, 239–240, 262–266, 273, 280–281, 287, 298–301, 305, 309–310, 315–316

Summit Conference—Continued
  Working groups, 144–145, 159–160, 162–164, 190, 194–195, 223, 233, 325–331
    Agenda, 145–146
    British position, 127, 203, 205
    French position, 129, 134–135, 138*n*, 141–142, 151–152, 202–203, 214
    FRG participation, 129–131, 135–136, 138, 140, 144, 151, 153
    FRG position, 123*n*, 134
    NATO participation, 140, 151
    And Saar issue, 137–140
    U.S. position, 128–131, 137, 140, 143–144, 151, 159–160, 178–179, 206, 208–209
Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe (SHAPE), 220, 392
Suydam, Henry, 589*n*, 633, 643, 651, 661, 667, 682, 703, 727, 740, 750, 754, 770
Sweden, 9, 13, 25, 68, 112
Switzerland, 35, 37, 38, 41, 42, 48, 55, 68, 112

Thompson, Llewellyn E., 180*n*, 363, 372*n*, 380, 404, 432, 471
  Austria, 25, 80–81, 89, 109, 111–112
  Austrian State Treaty, 1–2, 4, 6–7, 11–14, 19–20, 21*n*, 22, 28, 43, 86
    Economic agreements with the Soviet Union, 69–70, 73–75, 87, 93–94, 96–100, 103–105, 116
    Economic consequences, 77–79, 108–109
    Neutrality, 10, 34*n*, 42, 57–58, 60, 68, 82–84, 106–107, 113–115
    Territorial integrity guarantee, 23–24, 45–46, 55–56, 61–64, 65*n*, 85
    U.S. position, 26, 29, 66*n*, 72*n*, 88*n*, 101–102
  Soviet Union, 375–376, 419*n*
Thomson, Charles A.H., 216–217
Thring, Rear Adm. George A., 636, 670, 715–718
Thurston, Ray L., 119*n*, 128*n*, 130*n*
Tippetts, R.B., 669, 685, 690, 692, 711–713, 722–724, 732–733
Tito, Josip Broz, 551, 760
Trieste, 304, 375
Troianovskii, Oleg Aleksandrovich, 244, 355, 372, 380, 408, 433, 440, 488, 494, 754, 767, 780, 788, 792
Tuapse incident, 464, 732
Turkey, 256, 563
Tyler, William R., 16, 119*n*, 128*n*, 136*n*, 137, 138*n*, 145, 338, 432, 513*n*, 614, 667

United Kingdom (*see also United Kingdom, British and Western subheadings under other subjects*), 161, 177, 290, 336, 357–358, 402, 427, 432, 445–446, 493, 745, 792–794
United Nations:
  Austrian State Treaty, 46, 63–64, 120, 126
  Austrian membership, 34, 37, 40, 49, 57, 63, 89–90, 106
  Charter:
    Disarmament, 461, 751
    European security, 275, 294, 316, 438, 448, 517, 708, 787
    Summit Conference declaration of principles, 264, 312*n*, 317, 330
  Chinese People's Republic membership, 252, 273, 290, 370, 416
  Disarmament, 261, 471, 565
    British position, 236, 261, 321, 369, 445
    French position, 352, 361, 454, 751
    Soviet position, 484–485, 491, 534
    U.S. position, 321, 352, 442–443, 483
    Western position, 328, 331
  Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), 728
  European security, 149, 157, 369
  Germany, 149
U.S. Information Agency (USIA), 186, 273, 606
U.S. information programs, 146, 530, 729
Upravlenye Sovetskogo Imushchestva v Avstrii (USIA, Administration of Soviet Property in Austria), 42, 46, 77–79

Van Zeeland plan, 257, 320
Verosta, Stephen, 22, 31, 58
Vietnam, 175, 220
Vinogradov, Sergei Aleksandrovich, 225, 235, 502, 568, 704, 792
  East-West contacts, 655, 662–663, 668, 694, 714, 741
Voice of America, 729, 762

Wainhouse, David W., 667, 670, 715–718, 741*n*, 742

Wallinger, Geoffrey:
  Austrian State Treaty, 2–3, 12, 62, 66–68, 79–84, 86, 100–101
    British position, 73, 75–77, 95, 102–103, 108–109
    Economic agreements with the Soviet Union, 69, 73–74, 93–94, 96*n*, 98–99
Walmsley, Walter N., Jr., 92–93, 199–201, 258–260, 595–596
Walters, Lt. Col. Vernon, 343, 358, 366, 442, 462*n*, 471
Warsaw Pact (*see also* Soviet two-stage treaty proposal *under* European security):
  European security, role in, 310, 334, 342, 349, 370, 385, 400
  GDR membership, 490
  German membership, 647, 719
  U.S. position, 315–316, 320, 322, 324, 342, 349, 357, 385, 387, 543, 561, 563
Watson, J.H. Adam, 137–138, 253, 255–258, 261*n*, 560, 564
Weber, Heinz, 224, 232, 597
Western European Union (WEU) (*see also* Soviet two-stage treaty proposal *under* European security), 18, 121, 341, 720
  Arms Control Agency, 125–126
  European security, role in, 146, 154, 161, 276, 278, 310, 321, 322, 342, 639
  French position, 312, 342, 801
  FRG membership, 153, 155, 407
  FRG position, 556
  German participation, 292, 334, 346–347, 387, 390–391, 617, 641, 647
  Soviet position, 120, 270, 321, 370, 385, 406, 735
  U.S. position, 315–316, 801
Western security organizations. *See* Brussels Pact; North Atlantic Treaty Organizations; Western European Union
Whitman, Ann, 339, 362, 398*n*, 408*n*, 777
Wilkinson, Peter, 243, 493*n*, 494, 509
Willis, Francis, 60, 462*n*, 471, 715
Wilson, Charles E., 54, 186, 278, 280, 282, 533, 617, 636, 651, 748
Wolf, Henry D., 145, 156, 253, 262, 309*n*, 311, 318*n*, 388*n*, 401*n*, 597, 779*n*
World economic conference proposal, 329–330, 382
World Health Organization (WHO), 668

Young, Geoffrey, 32, 597
Young, George, 32, 742
Young, Kenneth, 457*n*, 458
Yugoslavia, 13, 86
  Austrian State Treaty, 75–76, 95, 102
  European security, 256, 562, 657–658
  Soviet Union, relations with, 222, 227, 248, 288, 307, 369, 399, 542, 548–549, 551
  United States, relations with, 534, 760

Zarubin, Georgyi N., 244, 355, 386–387, 460–462, 502
Zhūkov, Georgii Konstantinovich, 358, 375, 378, 408–411, 413–416, 444, 479, 486–487, 494
  Disarmament, 456–457, 464, 480, 491
  Eisenhower conversations, 304, 364, 371, 376*n*, 392, 402, 408–418, 436, 440, 488–490, 541
  European security, 411–412, 479–480, 489–490
  Soviet political situation, 379, 417–418
Zhukov, Yuri, 486–487